About this transcript: This is a full AI-generated transcript of Why Trump 'would be LUCKY’ to secure Iran nuclear deal like Obama's: Fmr. Natl. Security Vet from MS NOW, published May 27, 2026. The transcript contains 2,219 words with timestamps and was generated using Whisper AI.
"And Ben, you know, he obviously has been very critical of the Obama team's handling of Iran. So let's let's get your thoughts on that and where you see this right now, where, you know, Tehran seems emboldened and it seems like President Trump's the goals, maybe not plainly stated for this war, but..."
[0:00] And Ben, you know, he obviously has been very critical of the Obama team's handling of Iran.
[0:06] So let's let's get your thoughts on that and where you see this right now, where, you know,
[0:12] Tehran seems emboldened and it seems like President Trump's the goals, maybe not plainly stated for
[0:19] this war, but he has said what they were eventually were accomplished next to none of them.
[0:25] No, we haven't. And look, I heard your conversation with David in the last segment. I mean,
[0:30] we said back in 2015 that there are two ways to solve the problem with Iranian nuclear program.
[0:35] One is a war and one is a diplomatic agreement and that a war is the worst way to do it because of
[0:41] all the costs and uncertainties of a war, but also because unless you have a ground invasion of Iran
[0:47] to literally dismantle its nuclear program on the ground, you're not actually even going to solve
[0:51] the problem with the war. And I think what happened here is, you know, he pulled out of that deal
[0:56] mainly because of his hostility to Obama. This is something Obama did. So I don't like it.
[1:01] And then he believed that this war would quickly collapse the Iranian regime and force them to
[1:07] completely capitulate on the nuclear program. And unsurprisingly, because every war game I was ever
[1:12] in confirmed what Mika's dad said, which is the first thing the Iranians would do is close the
[1:17] Strait of Hormuz, paralyze the global economy because 20 percent of the world's fossil fuel rolls through
[1:22] there and essentially have a deterrent that is not a nuclear weapon, but has almost the same scale in
[1:28] terms of its impact on the global economy. And so now the regime didn't collapse. In fact,
[1:33] the regime got more hardline. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, they're the ones
[1:36] that closed the Strait. They're the ones that run that regime right now. And they have the leverage
[1:40] because they know that Trump needs that straight open. He needs the appearance of some victory,
[1:45] but he's not going to get it because they are the ones that are sitting with more of the leverage.
[1:49] All predictable. That's what's so tragic about this. And the reality is he would be lucky to get
[1:55] something approximating the nuclear deal in which they ship out their stock and submit to inspections,
[2:00] but he's not going to get more than that. Gene. So Ben, what do you think he could get? I mean,
[2:06] how do you think he could end this war? Obviously he will claim, President Trump will claim victory no
[2:13] matter what, when he finally gets an off ramp. But is there a kind of best possible outcome at this
[2:21] point, given all the mistakes that have been made so far? Yeah, I think the best possible deal,
[2:29] Eugene, that he could get is essentially you've got to get that highly enriched uranium stockpile out
[2:34] of the country. You have to get strict limitations on Iran's nuclear program for a verifiable period of
[2:41] time. And importantly, you need an inspections regime, because if the Iranians just say, hey,
[2:46] we won't do certain things for a certain period of time, obviously you're not going to trust that
[2:50] under the nuclear deal that he pulled out of. You had the strictest inspections ever negotiated of
[2:54] their nuclear facilities, of their uranium mines and mills. So we could literally see where the
[2:59] material that went into their program was coming from and how it was being handled. So that's that's
[3:04] what he needs. But the reality is he's going to have to pay for that. And I think this is probably
[3:10] what is holding up the negotiations is the sequencing. The Iranians want revenue, I'm
[3:14] sure, on the front end. Revenue from tolling the strait, revenue from sanctions relief. I think Trump
[3:20] probably recognizes how that's going to look, given all the things he said about the revenue they got
[3:25] under the Iran nuclear deal that he's been blasting for a decade. And so I think where we are is nobody's
[3:31] blinking on who moves first. You know, Trump wants a straight open before that revenue comes in,
[3:37] and I'm sure the Iranians want the revenue coming in first. And I think that's probably
[3:40] what the holdup is in negotiation. Ben, let's talk about your book. It's just absolutely
[3:45] fascinating. And of course, you are not a historian. You say you're a speech writer. You've obviously
[3:53] helped President Obama. But I love when you talk about how a speech is history in present tense.
[4:00] And you take us back to some of the most remarkable speeches in American history,
[4:05] whether it's Lincoln's second inaugural, whether it's FDR's for freedom speech,
[4:12] whether it's composite nation, which, of course, remarkable Frederick Douglass speech,
[4:17] are Reagan's evil empire speech. Talk about it had to be very difficult for you to pick these
[4:25] speeches. It took you a year. Talk about the process and what you, as a speech writer who
[4:32] wrote history in present tense, learned through this process.
[4:37] Yeah, I wanted to understand, Joe, how we got here, the kind of toxic, dysfunctional moment that
[4:44] we're in, by going back and looking at how Americans have debated and argued with one another
[4:48] throughout history. And as a speech writer, I kind of had an instinct that we could learn
[4:54] something about ourselves by looking back at this whole sweep of American history through speeches.
[5:00] It took me a year. I start with Benjamin Franklin at the Constitutional Convention. He wrote the
[5:05] closing argument speech on behalf of the Constitution. And what's interesting about that speech, Joe,
[5:10] is he doesn't even mention the Constitution itself. It's a speech about the virtue of compromise.
[5:14] If we're going to live together as people with different interests and different views,
[5:18] we have to start with compromise. That's what made the country possible. But it also set in motion
[5:23] all the conflict and competition we've had since because we compromise about big things.
[5:28] And then what I learned in choosing these speeches is that because we're a country that no matter what
[5:34] J.D. Vance and Donald Trump says, we are an idea. I mean, we were 13 states at the beginning on the
[5:40] East Coast and look at us today. You know, we have transformed ourselves time and again.
[5:46] And speeches are where we have adjudicated American identity, like who we are. What kind of nation do
[5:53] we want to be? If you talk, if you, you know, I heard you talking about how Trump has talked about
[5:57] this war. You know, FDR's for freedom speech, for instance, which I put in here, that is FDR speaking
[6:04] into being an American identity. This is who we are. This is what we stand for. We're not just
[6:10] going to war because we don't like the fascists. We're not just going to war because of a set of
[6:14] interests. We're going to war because we believe in a set of things for freedoms, freedom of belief,
[6:20] right? Freedom from fear, freedom from want, right? FDR is literally telling Americans,
[6:25] here's who we are versus against who they are. And every speech, that's what Reagan was doing too,
[6:30] a moral basis for how we defined ourselves in opposition to communism. So every speech in the
[6:35] book dealt with this question from different perspectives, left, right and everything in
[6:38] between, about what is American identity. So Ben, you just mentioned that speech by Reagan. Joe
[6:46] mentioned it too, the evil empire speech from 1983. Let's take a quick listen to that and talk about
[6:50] it on the other side. That shrewdest of all observers of American democracy, Alexis de Pocqueville
[6:58] put it eloquently, after he had gone on a search for the secret of America's greatness and genius.
[7:04] And he said, not until I went into the churches of America and heard her pulpits aflame with
[7:10] righteousness, did I understand the greatness and the genius of America. America is good.
[7:20] And if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great. Ben, I mean, it's known as the evil
[7:28] empire speech and a rejection, of course, of everything that the USSR represented there. He's
[7:34] talking about American goodness. But what was remarkable about Reagan was that he went into
[7:39] all of his negotiations with the USSR and with Gorbachev saying, actually, there cannot be a loser
[7:46] here. We can't define this as one empire defeating another empire, even if it had been labeled the evil
[7:53] empire in that speech. His understanding of the process of getting there was so much more complex
[7:59] than the name given to that speech might have suggested.
[8:04] Well, first of all, what's so interesting about that speech in each chapter, I talk about the
[8:08] person and the movement that made the speech possible. And what Reagan represented was a movement
[8:12] over 20 years to join together religious evangelical Christians in this country with people who cared
[8:19] about national security. You can hear Reagan speaking into being what was really the Reagan
[8:24] coalition. And that buttressed what his argument was against the Soviet Union. You know, he's
[8:28] representing a certain view of American that believes in goodness and is rooted in Christian values.
[8:36] But also, Cady, what's also really interesting about Reagan compared to Trump is he was also pragmatic
[8:41] because while the evil empire created part of the leverage that he was building on the Soviet
[8:46] Union, creating a moral contrast. Later on, when he was able to find a partner in Gorbachev,
[8:51] he pivoted. And when he went to Moscow, he was asked, do you still believe this is an evil empire?
[8:56] And he said, no, that was something I said at a different time. And so one of the things I learned
[9:00] about Reagan is not just that he was willing to speak this coalition into being and kind of knit
[9:07] together different constituencies, free market conservatives, national security hawks and Christian
[9:11] conservatives. But then he was able to be pragmatic when he saw an opening because he was not
[9:16] as dogmatic as the current occupant of the White House. If he saw the ability to shift course,
[9:21] to accomplish something he believed in, he was willing to do that.
[9:24] Jen?
[9:25] I'm so excited. I mean, I'm just like so into it. The whole concept. And the fact, I mean,
[9:30] as Ben and I worked with him in the Obama White House and a lot of times speechwriters,
[9:33] you less so would be like, you can't solve all the problems with the speech. Don't keep coming to me.
[9:38] You were one of the people. Yes. And as it turns out, they really, like, all we say,
[9:43] what we say really does matter. I'm wondering, you know, I know you have Trump's speech,
[9:47] Trump's speech, at least one Trump speech in there. Is there a speech in sort of real time from
[9:53] Trump's second administration or first administration from a Democrat that you think
[9:58] about America that we are, that does matter? Might Bruce Springsteen be this person?
[10:04] Well, I mean, but no, but seriously, you know, seriously, you know.
[10:07] Honestly, like, Jen, one of the things I was struck by, and I did not originally intend to end with
[10:12] Trump. It's sad that you have to, but it's fair. Yeah. And I think we had to confront it,
[10:16] so I ended with his second inaugural address, which in many ways, look, I found a lot of origins of
[10:21] Trump in American populism and isolationism. I read about America First Movement in the 1930s.
[10:26] But Trump is a deviation because he stands up in the second inaugural and says,
[10:30] I won. The debate is over. And it's about me. It's not even about something I built like what
[10:35] Reagan did. And I think with the Democrats, one of the problems that we've dealt with
[10:39] as communications people is we're constantly trying to figure out, like, what's the social
[10:43] media strategy? How do we show up and tell a pithy story? How do we package our talking points
[10:47] better? What is the story that we're telling? Because as you know, the story, which is usually a speech,
[10:54] is the best way to get your story right, that becomes the trunk of the tree. And all the other
[10:59] communications are the branches, the interviews, the social media clips. And I think Democrats have
[11:04] lost sight of the fact that maybe the counter-programming of Trump, and this is hard in
[11:08] an era of social media, is to get back to storytelling. And now when I look at the Democrats today,
[11:13] though, I see some hopeful signs. I see John Ossoff making a very coherent case about corruption and
[11:18] how that's the reason that you're not getting the government you deserve. Or James Tallarico talking
[11:22] about how his faith connects to what he's doing. And so I think it's that ability to stand out
[11:26] authentically and say, here's my motivation. Here's the movement I come out of. Here's where
[11:31] this country is and where it needs to go. I think that's what's missing in politics today. And that's
[11:36] another thing I found in writing the book.