Vernon Walters (Full) Watergate Hearings Testimony

[0:00] In the Senate of the United States, a resolution to establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any persons, acting individually or in combination with others, in the presidential election of 1972, or any campaign, canvas, or other activity related to it. [0:26] From Washington, NPAC brings you gavel-to-gavel videotape coverage of today's hearings by the Senate Select Committee on presidential campaign activities. [0:35] Here is NPAC's senior correspondent, Robert McNeil. [0:38] Good evening. The Senate Watergate Committee this afternoon adjourned for the week after hearing the former acting director of the FBI explain how there was constant White House pressure last summer to derail part of the FBI's investigation into Watergate. [0:54] L. Patrick Gray says the White House, via John Dean, kept suggesting that Manuel Ogario, who ran the Mexico City Money Laundry, and Kenneth Dahlberg, a Nixon financeman in the Midwest, both had CIA connections that would be compromised by a continuing probe. [1:12] Gray says that even while the CIA was telling him the fears were groundless, John Dean was urging that FBI interviews be delayed. [1:19] Things finally got to a point in early July, Gray said, when he called campaign director Clark McGregor to complain. [1:26] Within the hour, Gray recalls, he got a call from the president about another issue and used the opportunity to state his complaint in general, not specific terms. [1:35] He was told to pursue the probe and later came to think of himself as an alarmist for harboring fears about White House pressure. [1:41] It wasn't until months later, Gray says, that he realized he'd been right from the start. [1:47] He also explained how he destroyed documents from Howard Hunt's safe and subsequently lied to his friend Lowell Weicker, a member of the committee, about how and when he destroyed the papers. [1:57] It should be interesting when the committee begins to question Gray on Monday. [2:01] Today's testimony at times may seem a maze of reconstructed telephone calls, conversations, and meetings. [2:08] Well, to give you a vantage point from which to watch today's retelling of events, we have summarized some of these in chronological order. [2:15] Remember, the Watergate break-in was on June 17, 1972. [2:20] Patrick Gray first heard from the White House on June 21st, a call from John Ehrlichman warning him about leaks to the press, [2:27] telling him Dean was investigating for the White House. [2:29] Dean called later and then visited Gray. [2:33] The next day, Gray called CIA Director Helms. [2:35] Helms told him there was no CIA involvement. [2:38] Then a meeting with Dean on the Mexican money. [2:41] The next day, that meeting with Walters. [2:43] It was earlier that day that General Walters and Director Helms met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman at the White House. [2:48] It was on June 26 and June 27 that Walters talked to John Dean, requesting, and Dean requested CIA assistance [2:56] and asking him about a Mexican operations of the CIA. [3:00] Back to Patrick Gray, who got a call from Dean on the 27th. [3:04] After that, Helms called to OK an interview with a Mexican lawyer. [3:07] Then Dean called back, asking the interview be delayed. [3:10] On the 28th, a series of calls from Dean, Ehrlichman, and Helms. [3:14] The result, another delayed interview and a canceled meeting with CIA chiefs. [3:19] It was on June 28 that Gray picked up the hunt files from Dean and Ehrlichman. [3:24] On the 29th, Dean called to ask for another interview delay. [3:28] Then another important series of conversations came on July 6th, [3:31] when Vernon Walters confirmed no CIA involvement in Watergate. [3:35] That led Gray to call Clark McGregor to express uneasiness, [3:38] and that was followed by the call from President Nixon. [3:43] Watching the hearings with us today has been Georgetown University Law Professor Jack Murphy. [3:48] Jack, what do you think are the most significant points for people to look for this evening? [3:52] Well, I think the focus continues to be the interest of the White House in the CIA [3:57] in this critical period a few days after the break-in. [4:01] As Jim has aptly summarized just now, the dates and times of meetings are a maze, [4:08] and it's very difficult, I think, to sort all that out as you watch. [4:11] But I would point out in particular a couple of items which interested me enormously. [4:16] One, forgive me, is the fact that while Director Helms was able to assure the White House [4:25] in the June 23rd meeting and then with Mr. Dean on June 26th, [4:30] Mr. Walters met with Mr. Dean that the CIA would not be compromised if the investigation went forward. [4:35] The fact is that no mention was made by either Walters or Helms at those meetings [4:40] of something they apparently knew at that time, [4:43] which was that Mr. Martinez, one of the persons arrested in the Watergate, [4:46] was at the time of his arrest on a retainer basis on the payroll of the CIA. [4:52] This highlights something else you'll see, I think, in General Walters' testimony, [4:56] which is a protective urge with respect to the agency, [4:59] a protective urge which I think we also observed yesterday in Director Helms' testimony. [5:05] They didn't want the CIA to be linked to this. [5:07] They did what they could to keep it away from publicity. [5:10] General Walters will speak about the lack of desirability of a fight [5:14] which would bring the CIA into the limelight. [5:18] He did not want to have to put his word against John Dean's [5:20] on the question of whether or not there was something peculiar going on here. [5:23] So I think that the focus there, and there are many other details which will develop, [5:28] is one that the viewer might most profitably follow [5:30] as he follows this maze of calendar phone calls and meetings in the next few hours. [5:37] Thank you. [5:38] We'll talk to Jack Murphy again when the hearings are over later tonight. [5:42] And NPAC's Peter Kay will explore the future course of the hearings [5:45] with Chief Counsel Sam Dash at the conclusion of our playback. [5:49] This is a relatively short day, [5:51] hence our program tonight won't keep you up until the wee hours. [5:55] So that you can plan your viewing, here is NPAC's hour-by-hour rundown. [6:00] In the first hour, General Walters, the CIA's Deputy Director, [6:03] says that White House Counsel John Dean kept pressing him to tell the FBI [6:07] to call off its investigation into the so-called Mexican connection [6:11] between Nixon campaign contributions and the Watergate break-in. [6:15] Walters says he told Dean that if the White House insisted on a course of action [6:18] that might compromise the CIA, I would resign. [6:22] Much of the second hour was devoted to General Walters' second-hand report [6:25] of a July 6th conversation between Patrick Gray and President Nixon. [6:30] Walters said Gray told Mr. Nixon to get rid of those involved [6:33] because the investigation of the Watergate break-in could lead quite high in the government. [6:38] In hour number three, General Walters has read a long series of letters [6:41] from James McCord to a friend at the CIA. [6:45] Walters says he wasn't aware of the letters. [6:47] The letters chronicle attempts to get McCord to admit [6:49] that there was CIA involvement in Watergate. [6:52] Also in that hour, Walters is asked why his account [6:55] of his White House marching orders conflicts with H.R. Haldeman's. [6:58] Walters says, [6:59] I will stand on my recollection. [7:01] In the fourth hour, Patrick Gray testifies that he cancelled interviews [7:05] with Kenneth Dahlberg and a Mexican lawyer after John Dean urged him to, [7:09] allegedly because of national security matters. [7:12] He said he became concerned when General Vernon Walters [7:15] could not give him a written statement to support reports of CIA involvement. [7:20] In hour number five, Gray confirms he told President Nixon, [7:23] people on your staff are trying to mortally wound you. [7:26] And in detailing how and why he destroyed the files from Howard Hunt's safe, [7:30] Gray says that was a grievous misjudgment. [7:33] Now to the proceedings themselves and Senator Irvin. [7:40] The committee will come to order. [7:44] General Walters, will you stand up, please, and hold up your right hand. [7:49] You swear that the evidence that you shall give to the Senate Select Committee [7:52] on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth, the whole truth, [7:57] and nothing but the truth, so help you God. [7:59] I do. [8:00] Thank you. [8:00] Thank you, sir. [8:03] General, suppose you're just to give us your full name and address [8:06] for all the purposes of the record. [8:09] My name is Vernon Walters, Vernon A. Walters. [8:13] I am the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. [8:17] I am, at the present time, acting director until Mr. Colby is sworn in [8:21] after having been confirmed by the Senate. [8:24] And I live in Arlington, Virginia. [8:26] Thank you, sir. [8:27] I am a lieutenant general in the United States Army. [8:30] General Walters, how long have you had the position as deputy director of the CIA? [8:35] Since the 2nd of May, 1972, is the day I was sworn in. [8:41] Prior to obtaining that position, what position did you have? [8:45] I was the defense attache to France. [8:48] And how long were you in that position? [8:51] Four and a half years. [8:52] Now, prior to your joining the CIA, could you just briefly tell us what contacts, if any, [9:06] you've had with the president of the United States, President Nixon? [9:10] My first contact with President Nixon was when he was vice president. [9:15] I was detailed to accompany him on a trip around South America. [9:20] I went to eight countries with him and served as his interpreter and translator and aide at that time. [9:28] In two of those countries, I was in the car with Mr. Nixon when extreme violence was encountered, mob violence. [9:37] And if I were to tell this committee that I did not feel admiration and respect for the courage and calmness Mr. Nixon showed at that time, [9:45] I would not be telling you the whole truth. [9:48] Subsequently, I saw I did not work for Mr. Nixon again during the period between the time he left the vice presidency [9:55] and at the time he became president, I saw him perhaps two or three years in those, two or three times in those eight years. [10:04] After he became president, I went on two or three of the trips abroad he took to countries where I spoke the language and could translate for him. [10:15] I have not had any private conversation with the president since I became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that is, since May 2nd. [10:25] Did you, shortly actually after you became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, [10:37] did you attend a meeting at the White House with Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ellertman, and Director Helms on June 23, 1972? [10:47] Yes, I did. [10:48] Could you tell us how that meeting was arranged? [10:51] During the morning of the 23rd of June, I received a phone call, I do not recall exactly how, [11:00] telling me that I was to be there at Mr. Ellertman's office on... [11:06] You say you received a telephone call from home. [11:08] Yes. I do not know whether I received it personally or my secretary received it, [11:11] just stating that I was to be at Mr. Ellertman's office with Mr. Helms, [11:15] it may have come from Mr. Helms' secretary, at 1.30 that afternoon. [11:21] Mr. Helms and I went downtown. [11:22] We did not know what the subject of the meeting was. [11:24] We had lunch together, and at 1.30 we went to Mr. Ellertman's office. [11:29] All right. Now will you, to the best of your recollection, relate the discussion that was had at that meeting? [11:39] By the way, who could you say actually was doing most of the talking at the meeting? [11:45] I believe Mr. Haldeman was doing nearly all of the talking. [11:49] I do not recall Mr. Ellertman actually participating actively in the conversation. [11:53] All right. Now would you relate to the committee what Mr. Haldeman said and what you or Mr. Helms said? [12:00] Mr. Haldeman said that the bugging of the Watergate was creating a lot of noise, [12:06] that the opposition was attempting to maximize this, that the FBI was investigating this, [12:14] and the leads might lead to some important people. [12:17] And he then asked Mr. Helms what the agency connection was. [12:22] And Mr. Helms replied quite emphatically that there was no agency connection. [12:26] And Mr. Haldeman said that, nevertheless, the pursuit of the FBI investigation in Mexico [12:37] might uncover some CIA activities or assets. [12:42] Mr. Helms said that he had told Mr. Gray on the previous day, the acting director of the FBI, [12:48] that there was no agency involvement, that none of the investigations being carried out by the FBI [12:54] were in any way jeopardizing any agency activity. [12:58] Mr. Haldeman then said, nevertheless, there is concern that this investigation in Mexico [13:08] may expose some covert activity of the CIA. [13:13] And it has been decided that General Walters will go to Director Gray, acting Director Gray, [13:18] and tell him that the further pursuit of this investigation in Mexico, [13:24] and I wish to emphasize that the only question of investigation involved was Mexico, [13:28] the investigation in Mexico, could jeopardize some assets of the Central Intelligence Agency. [13:36] Again, Mr. Helms said he was not aware of any activity of the agency that could be jeopardized by this. [13:44] Mr. Haldeman repeated, nevertheless, there is concern that the further pursuit of this investigation [13:49] will uncover some activity or asset of the CIA in Mexico, [13:55] and it has been decided that you will go and tell this, addressed to me, [14:01] you will tell this to Acting Director Gray. [14:04] Well, now, Mr. Walters, could it have been that Mr. Haldeman asked you or Mr. Helms [14:13] to go to Mr. Gray and to first inquire at the CIA whether or not there might be some problem at the CIA [14:23] if there was an investigation in Mexico, rather than saying it was decided that you should go? [14:28] I do not recall it being put in a question form. It was put in a directive form. [14:32] In other words, you understood that to be a direction. [14:35] I understood that to be a direction, [14:36] and since Mr. Haldeman was very close to the top of the governmental structure of the United States, [14:44] and as Mr. Helms testified yesterday, [14:46] the White House has a great deal of information that other people do not have. [14:50] I had been with the agency approximately six weeks at the time of this meeting. [14:55] I found it quite conceivable that Mr. Haldeman might have some information that was not available to me. [15:00] And you did not feel it appropriate at that time to inquire Mr. Haldeman [15:04] why it was that he was directing you to go to Mr. Gray and tell that to Mr. Gray? [15:08] No, I did not. [15:09] I, if I had felt there was any impropriety in this request, [15:14] I would have given him the same answer I later gave Mr. Dean, [15:17] that I would resign rather than do it. [15:19] By the way, it was, did you wonder why it was that Mr. Haldeman said it was decided [15:26] that you, General Waters, should go to see Mr. Gray, not the Director Helms? [15:31] Yes, I did. A number of hypotheses crossed my mind. [15:35] I thought perhaps he thinks I'm military, and a lot of people have the mistaken belief [15:40] that military obey blindly. [15:44] I thought he might have heard reports that there had been some friction in the past [15:48] between the FBI and the CIA, [15:51] and perhaps since Mr. Gray was new in the job and I was new in the job, [15:55] that that might be a good way to start out. [15:57] I did wonder about it, but I didn't, [15:59] this was his privilege to do it any way he wished. [16:02] Now, General Waters, did there come a time when you put in writing, [16:08] in the form of a memorandum, your recollection of that meeting on June 23, 1972? [16:13] There did, Mr. Dash, five days later. [16:16] When this thing started, I do not habitually keep memoranda of my conversations. [16:23] However, when on the Tuesday, the following Tuesday, [16:27] Mr. Dean put the question to me, or didn't put the question, [16:30] but explored the possibility of the CIA going bail [16:34] and paying the salaries of the suspects who were in jail, [16:39] I realized it was time for me to start keeping a record. [16:42] So following that second meeting on the 27th, [16:45] I sat down and I wrote memoranda for myself. [16:49] They were not intended to be a verbatim account of the conversation [16:52] or to cover all aspects of the conversation, [16:55] but notes to jog my own memory. [16:57] I wrote a memorandum on the meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. [17:01] I wrote a memorandum on the meeting with Mr. Gray. [17:04] I wrote a memorandum on my first meeting with Mr. Dean on Monday the 26th [17:08] and a memorandum of my second meeting with Mr. Dean on the 27th. [17:12] On the 28th, I met with Mr. Dean for the third and last time, [17:16] and I wrote a memorandum, I believe, the following day. [17:20] On the subsequent memorandum, namely my calls on Mr. Gray, [17:25] I wrote those memoranda either on the same day that I had the talk with Mr. Gray [17:29] or the following day. [17:30] If I may, I would like to make one point clear. [17:35] I have been alleged to have a splendid memory and so forth, [17:38] and here I must make a confession that I'm afraid will not fit in with it. [17:41] Mr. Helms was quite right in his testimony yesterday [17:44] in that the question regarding bail and paying the salaries of these people [17:48] came up on Tuesday. [17:50] When I reviewed my notes and before I wrote the affidavit, [17:53] I did correct this in my affidavit, [17:56] namely that the request regarding bail for the defendants was on Tuesday. [18:00] Well, General Walters, we'll get close to that, [18:02] and I think you can restate that when I ask you about the meetings with Mr. Dean. [18:06] I want to show you a copy we have of a memorandum purportedly from you [18:13] or written by you on June 28th covering the June 23rd meeting [18:18] and ask you if this is a correct copy of the memorandum. [18:22] Yes, Mr. Dash, it is. [18:36] Mr. Chairman, may that copy be marked as an exhibit and introduced? [18:41] Without objection on the part of any committee member, [18:45] it is ordered that this copy be marked appropriately as an exhibit [18:48] and received an evidence as such. [18:50] Now, General Walters, after you left the meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, [19:00] did you leave it with Director Helms, former Director Helms? [19:04] I did. [19:05] We walked downstairs and we stood and talked close to the car out in the West Executive Avenue, [19:11] and Mr. Helms said to me, [19:13] you must remind Mr. Gray of the agreement between the FBI and the CIA [19:18] that if they run into or appear to be about to expose one another's assets, [19:24] they will notify one another, and you should remind him of this. [19:28] And then what did you do? [19:32] I do not recall whether I went back to the agency or not. [19:37] I don't think time would have allowed it [19:39] because the appointment had been made to see Mr. Gray at 2.30. [19:45] My recollection is not clear on this, [19:46] whether I went back to the agency or whether I stayed downtown. [19:49] I have a feeling I stayed downtown, [19:51] and at 2.30 I went to see Mr. Gray. [19:54] Now, was Mr. Gray, by the way, expecting your visit? [19:57] Mr. Gray, I believe, was expecting my visit. [19:59] How do you know that? [20:01] I believe he has subsequently testified that Mr. Dean [20:04] had told him that I was on my way down. [20:07] All right, now, would you briefly relate to your best recollection [20:11] what conversation you had with Mr. Gray at that time? [20:15] This was on June 23, 1972. [20:18] I said to Mr. Gray that I had just come from the White House [20:21] where I had talked to some Stenia staff members, [20:24] and I was to tell him that the pursuit of the FBI investigation in Mexico, [20:31] the continuation of the FBI investigation in Mexico, [20:34] might uncover some covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. [20:40] I then repeated to him what Mr. Helms had told me about the agreement between the FBI and CIA, [20:47] and he said he was quite aware of this, and he intended to observe it scrupulously. [20:51] Now, did you tell him who gave you the direction to... [20:58] I did not. [20:59] I told him I talked to some senior people at the White House. [21:01] All right. [21:01] Now, did you... [21:03] Was that the sum and substance of that conversation, that's the Gray Sanchez? [21:07] I believe so. [21:08] We expressed pleasure at meeting one another. [21:09] I'd been intending to call on him and so forth. [21:12] And anything else that occurred will, I believe, be covered in the memorandum, [21:16] which is in your possession. [21:17] And I think you've testified that you also, on June 28th, [21:21] included a memorandum of the meeting with Mr. Gray on June 23rd. [21:27] And I'd like to show you a copy of the memorandum [21:31] and ask you if this is a correct copy and does cover the testimony you've just given. [21:48] Yes. [21:49] Yes, it is a correct copy. [21:50] Mr. Chairman, may that memorandum be marked as an exhibit and received in evidence? [21:55] It's an absence of objection by any committee memorandum that is so audible [21:59] and be appropriately marked as an exhibit and received in evidence as such. [22:10] After you met with Mr. Gray, did you return to your offices at the CIA? [22:17] Yes, I did. [22:19] And did you make a report of that meeting to former Director Helms? [22:23] I did. [22:24] And I also started to check on whether this was a fact. [22:29] I talked to the people in our geographic area that handles Mexico, [22:37] and I'm not sure whether this was complete on the Friday afternoon [22:39] or whether it was completed Monday morning. [22:43] But it was soon clear to me that nobody who was responsible for that area in the agency [22:48] felt that the ongoing FBI investigation could jeopardize any of the agency's sources [22:55] or activities in Mexico. [22:56] Well, now, did you subsequently receive any communication from anybody at the White House [23:03] after June 23rd? [23:05] On Monday morning, the 26th of June, I received a phone call from a man who identified himself [23:12] as John Dean, and he said he wished to speak to me about the matters that Mr. Haldeman [23:18] and Mr. Ehrlichman had discussed with me on the Friday. [23:22] I did not know Mr. Dean, and I expressed something to the effect of, [23:28] I don't know who you are, and he said, well, you can call Mr. Ehrlichman [23:32] to see whether it's all right to talk to me or not. [23:35] Did you call Mr. Ehrlichman? [23:36] I called Mr. Ehrlichman. [23:38] I had some difficulty in reaching him, but finally I reached him, and I said, [23:41] hey, Mr. John Dean wants to talk to me about the matters which I discussed with you, [23:45] with Mr. Haldeman, on the preceding Friday. [23:48] And he said, yes, it's all right to talk to him. [23:50] He's in charge of the whole matter. [23:53] Did you then meet with Mr. Dean on that day, on the 26th? [23:57] I then called Mr. Dean again, and he asked me to come down and see him, I believe, at 11.30 or 11.45. [24:03] I believe it's indicated on the memorandum I wrote. [24:05] All right, would you relate to the committee the conversation you had with Mr. Dean at that time, [24:10] on June 26, 1972? [24:12] Mr. Dean said that he was handling this whole matter of the Watergate, [24:18] that it was causing a lot of trouble, that it was very embarrassing. [24:22] The FBI was investigating it. [24:24] The leads had led to some important people, and might lead to some more important people. [24:29] The FBI was proceeding on three hypotheses, namely that this break-in had been organized [24:35] by the Republican National Committee, by the Central Intelligence Agency, or by someone else. [24:42] Whereupon I said, I don't know who else organized it, [24:45] but I know that the Central Intelligence Agency did not organize it. [24:48] I said, furthermore, I have related to my conversation with Mr. Dean and Mr. Haldeman [24:55] and Mr. Ehrlichman on the previous Friday, and told him I had checked within the agency [24:59] and found that there was nothing in any of the ongoing FBI investigations [25:04] that could jeopardize CIA activities or sources or compromise them in any way in Mexico. [25:12] He then said, well, couldn't this have happened without your knowledge? [25:16] Well, I said, originally, perhaps, but I've inquired, I've talked to Mr. Helms, [25:21] and I am sure that we had no part in this operation against the Democratic National Committee. [25:27] He kept pressing this. [25:28] There must have been. [25:29] These people all used to work for the CIA and all of this. [25:32] I said, maybe they used to, but they weren't when they did it. [25:36] And he pressed and pressed on on this and asked if there wasn't some way I could help. [25:41] And it seemed to me that he was exploring, perhaps, the option of seeing whether he could put some of the blame on us. [25:47] It wasn't any specific thing he said, but the general tenor was in this way. [25:52] And I said to him, I did not have an opportunity to consult with anybody. [25:57] I simply said, Mr. Dean, any attempt to involve the agency in the stifling of this affair would be a disaster. [26:06] It would destroy the credibility of the agency with a Congress, with a nation. [26:10] It would be a grave disservice to the president. [26:13] I will not be a part to it, and I am quite prepared to resign [26:17] before I do anything that will implicate the agency in this matter. [26:21] This seemed to shock him somewhat. [26:23] I said that anything that would involve any of these government agencies, like the CIA or the FBI, [26:29] in anything improper in this way would be a disaster for the nation. [26:35] Somewhat reluctantly, he seemed to accept this line of argument. [26:40] Now, General Walters, since you had made the check prior to seeing Mr. Dean concerning whether, in fact, [26:48] any FBI investigation in Mexico would seriously or not seriously involve any covert activities of the CIA, [26:57] and you reported that to Mr. Dean at this meeting, [27:01] did you believe that you were responding at that meeting then to the concern that you had received at the earlier meeting [27:09] from the statement from Mr. Haldeman? [27:12] Yes, Mr. Dash, I did. [27:14] And at the risk of perhaps seeming naive in retrospect, [27:17] it did not occur to me at that time that Mr. Dean would not tell Mr. Gray. [27:21] Since Mr. Gray had told me he was in touch with Mr. Dean, [27:24] Mr. Dean had told me he was in touch with Mr. Gray. [27:26] In retrospect, I should, of course, have called Mr. Gray directly. [27:30] I regret that I did not. [27:31] And you had been informed by Mr. Ehrlichman when you checked [27:34] as to whether you should talk to Mr. Dean that Mr. Dean was a person you could talk to, [27:39] that he was handling the matter. [27:39] That is correct. [27:41] Now, I think when you were testifying just a little while ago, [27:46] you said that you may have incorrectly put in your memorandum of the June 26 meeting [27:51] something that should have been in another meeting. [27:54] I want to show you your memorandum, or a memorandum that appears to be a memorandum, [28:00] prepared by you on June 28th, dealing with the conversation you had with Mr. Dean on June 26th, [28:07] and ask you if you want to make a correction as to that memorandum for the record. [28:23] You'll notice, General Walters, that there is an excised portion of that memorandum, [28:28] which has been cut out. [28:29] And on our receipt of that, that appeared to be matters in which dealt with the international security [28:35] and therefore was excised. [28:37] I am very appreciative of the committee for doing this. [28:40] Yes, it does. [28:42] If I were to make a correction, it's somewhat complicated. [28:44] It would really be that one, two, three, the fourth paragraph, the sixth and seventh paragraphs, [28:50] belong to the conversation of the 27th, rather than the conversation of the 26th. [28:56] And that dealt with the question of money, bail, money from the CIA. [29:00] That is correct. [29:01] This is a correct copy. [29:03] It is a correct copy, though, of your memorandum. [29:04] Yes, it is. [29:05] Mr. Chairman, could we have that memorandum marked as an exhibit and received an evidence? [29:10] The memorandum will be appropriately numbered as an exhibit and received an evidence as such. [29:17] Now, after that meeting with Mr. Dean on June 26th, did you report back to former Director Helms? [29:24] I did. [29:25] I told Mr. Helms generally what had transpired, and he approved of my firm stand with Dean [29:31] and I related in some detail the various matters that I had discussed with Mr. Dean [29:41] and the fact that I had told Mr. Dean that no agency assets would be compromised [29:46] by the pursuit of the FBI investigation in Mexico. [29:49] I think you mentioned earlier that you did again meet with Mr. Dean. [29:52] When did you next meet with Mr. Dean? [29:54] On the following morning, the 27th of June, I received another telephone call from Mr. Dean [29:59] summoning me down to his office. [30:02] I went down to Mr. Dean's office. [30:03] I believe the time is indicated in the memorandum, 11, 11.30. [30:08] I think 11.45. [30:09] 11.45. [30:10] And Mr. Dean said that the investigation was continuing, that some of the suspects were wobbling [30:18] and might talk, and I said, well, that's just too bad, but it has nothing to do with us [30:23] because nothing that they can say can implicate the agency. [30:27] So he again said, haven't you discovered something about agency involvement in this matter? [30:31] And I said, no, I have not discovered anything about agency involved in this matter. [30:36] And he said, well, isn't there something that the agency can do to help? [30:38] I said, I don't see how we can be helpful. [30:40] And then he said, well, would there be any way in which you could go bail or pay the salaries [30:49] of these defendants while they're in jail? [30:52] And I said, no way. [30:55] To do so would implicate the agency in something in which it is not implicated. [31:01] I will have no part in this. [31:03] Again, I went through the reasoning of the appalling effect it would have. [31:07] I made plain to him that if the agency were to intervene in this, it would become known [31:12] in the leaking atmosphere in Washington, that it would be a total disaster. [31:18] And I would like to say, if I may, at this point, that I have not spent the whole of my [31:22] adult life in the Central Intelligence Agency. [31:25] I joined it for the first time in May of 1972. [31:30] But I am convinced that an effective CIA is essential if the United States is to survive [31:36] as a free and democratic society in the rough world in which we live. [31:39] And I was determined that I would not see it destroyed or implicated as might be desired [31:46] in this business. [31:48] I further told Mr. Dean that when we expended funds, covert funds within the United States, [31:55] we were required to report this to our congressional oversight committees. [32:00] And this seemed to cool his enthusiasm considerably. [32:05] We had a few more discussions. [32:07] And again, he asked me whether there was any way we could be helpful. [32:10] And I said, no, we could not. [32:11] Did you, by the way, on the meeting on the 28th of June, do you have a copy of your memoranda [32:19] with you? [32:19] Yes, I do. [32:20] This is the meeting of the 28th or the memorandum written on the 28th? [32:33] No, the meeting of the following day, the meeting you just testified to on the 28th. [32:37] On the 28th, yes, I do. [32:39] Yes. [32:39] First, let me show you your copy of the memorandum you prepared on June 29th of your meeting on [33:03] June 27th and ask if this is a correct copy of that meeting. [33:27] Yes, it is. [33:29] Mr. Chairman, if we can have that marked for identification and received. [33:34] That would be marked, be appropriately numbered as an exhibit and received and evidence as such. [33:41] All right, now, General Wars, the very next day, it appears that you had another meeting [33:49] with Mr. Dean. [33:51] That is correct. [33:51] By the way, did you report to former Director Helms on your 27th meeting? [33:55] Mr. Helms was extremely interested in this whole business, and I reported to him immediately [34:00] on returning to the agency on each occasion. [34:02] Now, on the 28th is when you began to write these memorandums, is that right? [34:10] Could you then tell the committee what caused you to begin to put this down in writing? [34:17] Well, as soon as he broached the question of bail and paying the salaries of these defendants, [34:27] I realized that for the first time this was a clear indication that something improper [34:31] was being explored. [34:34] And I discussed this with Mr. Helms, and we agreed, again, I don't know whether he or [34:39] I suggested that we write the memoranda, that I write the memoranda on these meetings and [34:42] keep a record of them. [34:45] And that is how the memoranda came to be reckoned. [34:47] It will be noted that I wrote five of them practically on the same day to catch up with [34:51] the past. [34:51] Yes. [34:52] All right, now, the meeting on the 28th, it appears, was a fairly significant meeting because [35:00] it was a follow-up again and a third meeting that you had with Mr. Dean. [35:05] Do you have a copy of that memorandum? [35:09] Of my meeting on the 28th? [35:10] Yes. [35:10] Yes, I do. [35:11] Prepared on June 29th, 1972. [35:13] That's correct. [35:13] I do have it. [35:14] Would you read that memorandum in full, General Walters? [35:18] On the 28th of June, at 1130, John Dean asked me to see him at his office in the executive [35:24] office building. [35:25] I saw him alone. [35:27] He said that the director's meeting, that is, Director Helms' meeting, with Patrick [35:31] Gray, FBI director, was canceled and that John Ehrlichman had suggested that Gray deal [35:36] with me instead. [35:37] The problem was how to stop the FBI investigation beyond the five suspects. [35:43] Leads to two other people, Ken Dahlberg and a Mexican named Gaina. [35:48] Dean said that $89,000 was unrelated to the bugging case and Dahlberg was refusing to answer [35:54] questions. [35:56] Dean then asked hopefully whether I could do anything or had any suggestions. [35:59] I repeated that as deputy director, I had no independent authority. [36:03] I was not in the channel of command and had no authority other than that given to me by [36:08] the director. [36:10] The idea that I could act independently was a delusion and had no basis in fact. [36:16] Dean then asked what might be done, and I said I realized he had a tough problem. [36:20] But if there were agency involvement, it could be only a presidential directive and the political [36:26] risks that were concomitant appeared to me to be unacceptable. [36:30] At present, there was a high explosive bomb, but intervention such as he had suggested would [36:36] transform it into a megaton hydrogen bomb. [36:40] The present caper was awkward and unpleasant. [36:42] Directed intervention by the agency could be electorally mortal if it became known, and [36:47] the chances of keeping it secret until the election were almost nil. [36:51] I noted that Scandals had a short life in Washington, and other new spicier ones soon [36:56] replaced them. [36:58] I urged him not to become unduly agitated by this one. [37:02] He then asked if I had any ideas, and I said that this affair already had a strong Cuban flavor. [37:08] Everyone knew the Cubans were conspiratorial, anxious to know the policies of both bodies [37:13] would be towards Castro. [37:14] They therefore had a plausible motive for attempting this amateurish job which any skilled technician [37:20] would deplore. [37:20] This might be costly, but it would be plausible. [37:25] Dean said that he agreed this was the best tack to take. [37:27] It might cost a half a million dollars. [37:30] He also agreed for the second time that the risks of agency involvement were unacceptable. [37:36] After a moment's thought, he said that he felt that Gray's cancellation of his appointment [37:40] with Director Helms might well be reversed in the next few hours. [37:44] Dean thanked me, and I left. [37:45] First, General Walters, what was this meeting to be held on June 28th, which was canceled? [37:53] I did not know, Mr. Dash. [37:55] I did not know what he was talking about. [37:56] I presumed that some arrangement outside of me had been made for Director Helms to see [38:00] Mr. Gray. [38:01] But in any event, as your memorandum shows, that Mr. Ehrlichman had indicated that he had [38:05] preferred that Gray meet with you on an ongoing basis. [38:09] This is what Mr. Dean said to me. [38:11] Now, could you tell the committee at least what your impression was concerning that part [38:19] of your memorandum where you said this might be costly concerning a Cuban conspiratorial [38:26] plot and Dean's statement that he agreed that this was the best tack to take, but it might [38:31] cost half a million dollars? [38:33] Yes, Mr. Dash. [38:36] Dean went back at this point in the conversation, as I remember, to the three hypotheses, and [38:41] he was sort of saying, who could have done this? [38:43] Who could have done this? [38:44] He did not indicate at any time that he knew where the origin of this was. [38:49] Quite frankly, at this point, my principal purpose was to divert him from pursuing the [38:54] option of involving the agency in this. [39:00] I had read, I believe, about that time an article in the newspaper which put out a hypothesis [39:05] that the Cubans might have been at the origin of this in order to try and find out what [39:09] the policies of the Democratic Party would be if it were elected in 1972. [39:15] This is what I basically said to Dean, that the Cubans had a plausible motive for doing [39:19] this. [39:20] Mr. Dean obviously understood this as a suggestion of mine that he should try and blame the Cubans. [39:27] In retrospect, as so often been said here from this table, I should have corrected him. [39:32] Frankly, I was so relieved that seeing him apparently abandoning the idea of involving [39:38] the agency, or at least retreating on the idea of involving the agency, that I did not correct [39:43] his impression when he said he obviously thought I was suggesting he could buy the Cubans. [39:48] Would that be the inference that Mr. Dean's statement, it might cost a half a million dollars, [39:53] would require actually paying somebody off in order to take this position? [39:56] I believe so, but I would like simply to state that just as I believed agency involvement [40:00] could not be hidden, false implication of the Cubans could not be sustained. [40:05] I should have corrected Mr. Dean at this point and said this is not what I was meaning. [40:09] I was advancing a theory, but I did not. [40:11] General Wallers, I'd like to, you've read it, read your memorandum, and I have an exact [40:15] copy of the memorandum here. [40:17] I'd like to show it to you, dated June 29th, covering your meeting with Mr. Dean on June 28th, [40:24] and ask you to look at it and indicate if this is a copy. [40:41] Yes, it is. [40:44] Mr. Chairman, may I have this memorandum marked as an exhibit and received in evidence? [40:52] Will it be, you know, appropriately numbered as an exhibit, received in evidence as such. [41:02] Now, did you receive, General Wallers, a call from Mr. Gray on July 5th, 1972? [41:14] Yes, Mr. Dash, I did, at 10 minutes to 6 in the evening. [41:16] And could you tell us briefly what that call was about? [41:21] I believe that Mr. Gray said to me at this point that the pressures were mounting to continue [41:27] the investigation, and that unless he received a written letter from Mr. Helms or from me [41:33] to the effect that the further pursuit of this investigation in Mexico would uncover CIA assets [41:39] or activities, he would have to go ahead with the investigation. [41:43] I did not wish to discuss this with Mr. Gray over the telephone. [41:47] I told him I would come down and see him the first thing the next morning. [41:50] This was at the end of the business day. [41:52] It was at 10 minutes to 6 in the evening. [41:54] And did you go down the next morning and see him? [41:57] Yes, I did. [41:58] Would you briefly tell the committee what the nature of your conversation was with Mr. Gray at that time? [42:03] I told Mr. Gray right at the outset that I could not tell him, and even less could I give him a letter [42:10] saying that the pursuit of the FBI's investigation would in any way jeopardize CIA activities in Mexico. [42:19] I told him I had to be quite frank with him. [42:23] I recounted the meeting with Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman. [42:28] I told him that I had seen Mr. Dean on three occasions, that I had told Mr. Dean what Mr. Dean had told me. [42:34] Mr. Gray seemed quite disturbed by this, and we both agreed that we could not allow our agencies to be used [42:41] in a way that would be detrimental to their integrity. [42:45] Since I'm discussing what someone else said, I would like to refer here to my memorandum. [42:51] Now, this memorandum, unlike the others, was written, I believe, on the same day that I saw Mr. Gray. [42:59] Yes, would you refer to your memorandum and read what you want from it, General Walters? [43:04] Well, I think basically this was it. [43:05] I said, I could not give him a letter to this effect. [43:08] I couldn't tell him this, and I could not give him a letter to the effect that further investigation would compromise assets of the CIA. [43:16] He said he understood this. [43:18] He himself had told Ehrlichman and Haldeman that he could not possibly suppress the investigation of the matter. [43:24] Even within the FBI, there were leaks. [43:26] He had called in the components of his field office and chewed them out for these leaks. [43:30] I said the only basis on which he and I could deal was absolute frankness, and I wish to recount my involvement in the case. [43:36] I told him of the meeting at the White House with Mr. Helms. [43:40] I did not mention Haldeman or Ehrlichman's name. [43:43] I told him that I had been directed to tell him that the investigation of this case further in Mexico could compromise in CIA activities. [43:55] Subsequently, I had seen Mr. Dean, the White House counsel, and told him that whatever the current unpleasant implications of the Watergate were, [44:06] that to implicate the agency would not serve the president, would enormously increase the risk to the president. [44:11] I had a long association with the president and was desirous as anyone of protecting him. [44:18] I did not believe that a letter from the agency asking the FBI to lay off this investigation on the spurious grounds that it would uncover covert operations would serve the president. [44:28] Such a letter in the current atmosphere of Washington would become known and could be, frankly, electorally mortal. [44:33] I said, quite frankly, that I would write such a letter only on direction from the president, [44:37] and only after explaining to him how dangerous I thought this action would be to him. [44:41] And if I were really pushed on this matter, I would be prepared to resign. [44:45] Mr. Gray thanked me for my frankness. [44:47] He said he could not suppress this investigation within the FBI. [44:51] He had told Mr. Kleindienst this. [44:53] He had told Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman that he would prefer to resign, [44:55] but that his resignation would raise many questions that would be detrimental to the president's interests. [45:04] He did not see why he or I should jeopardize the integrity of our organization [45:08] to protect some middle-level White House figure who had acted imprudently. [45:13] He was prepared to let this go to Ehrlichman, to Haldeman, or to Mitchell. [45:16] He felt it was important that the president should be protected from his would-be protectors. [45:21] He had explained to Dean as well as to Haldeman and Ehrlichman. [45:24] He had explained this. [45:25] Finally, I said that if I were directed to write a letter to him saying that future investigation of this case [45:32] would jeopardize the security of the United States and covert operations of the agency, [45:37] I would ask to see the president and explain to him the disservice I thought this would do to his interests. [45:42] The potential danger to the president of such a course far outweighed any protective aspects [45:47] it might have for other figures in the White House, and I was quite prepared to resign on this issue. [45:52] Mr. Gray said that this is a very awkward matter for us to come up at the outset of our tenure. [45:56] He looked forward to good relations between our two agencies, thanked me for my frankness, and that was it. [46:03] All right, General Waters, I'd like to show you a copy we have of your memorandum of July 6th [46:08] covering your meeting with Mr. Gray on July 6th, and ask if this appears to be a correct copy. [46:31] Yes, it does. [46:32] Mr. Chairman, may we have this exhibit marked and received in evidence? [46:38] This will be marked appropriately as an exhibit and received in evidence as such. [46:44] Now, General Waters, did there come a time shortly after, several days after, that you met with Mr. Gray again, acting director? [46:54] Yes, I did. [46:55] Patrick Gray. [46:56] Yes. [46:56] Can you tell us the purpose of that meeting and what was discussed at that time? [47:01] We had been passing. [47:02] By the way, when was this? [47:03] It was on the 12th of July, Mr. Dash. [47:08] In the meantime, the CIA had been cooperating fully with the FBI investigation, [47:14] passing them all the material we had on these former employees of ours [47:18] and any other matters that were of interest to them. [47:20] We were continuously passing the memoranda, and I believe that on this day, I was still acting director. [47:27] Mr. Helms was in Australia on his way back from Australia. [47:31] And as I recall it, I gave him another memorandum on this date [47:37] covering various things that had been brought out that we had given Hunt [47:42] concerning the assistance given to Hunt, which had been terminated in August 1971. [47:47] Now, during this meeting with Mr. Gray, did Mr. Gray tell you that he had received a call from the president? [47:57] Yes, he did. [47:59] Could you read that party memorandum where he discussed that call? [48:05] He said, last Friday, I believe that may have been the day of my previous conversation with him. [48:09] I do not have a calendar in front of me. [48:11] This was written on the 12th. [48:13] It was the preceding Friday. [48:15] He had received a phone call from the president. [48:18] The president had called him to congratulate him on the FBI action, [48:22] which had frustrated the airplane hijacking in San Francisco. [48:26] Towards the end of the conversation, the president asked him if he had talked to me about the case. [48:31] Gray replied that he had. [48:33] The president then asked him what his recommendation was in this case. [48:37] Gray had replied that the case could not be covered up. [48:40] It would lead quite high, and he felt the president should get rid of the people that were involved. [48:45] Any attempt to involve the FBI or the CIA in this case would only prove a mortal wound. [48:51] And then I put in brackets he used my words because these were the words I had used in talking to Mr. Gray. [48:56] The president then said that I should get rid of whoever is involved no matter how high. [49:01] Gray replied that this was his recommendation. [49:04] The president asked what I thought, and Gray said that my views were the same as his. [49:10] The president took it well and thanked Gray. [49:11] Anyway, in all fairness, I must say that Mr. Gray did tell me, and I did not put it in here, [49:17] that the president had told him to go ahead with his investigation. [49:25] Do you wish me to go on reading, Mr. Gray? [49:27] Does that complete Mr. Gray's statement to you concerning his call from the president? [49:34] Yes, it did. [49:35] We again philosophized some more, as is shown in the memorandum, [49:38] concerning the need for the president to be protected from his would-be protectors. [49:42] All right. [49:43] General Walters, I'd like to show you your memorandum on July 13th, [49:47] which deals with this meeting with former acting FBI director, Alpatrick Gray, [49:57] and ask if this is a correct copy. [50:15] Yes, it is. [50:16] Mr. Chairman, may we have this memorandum marked as an exhibit and received an evidence? [50:21] This memorandum will be marked, appropriately marked, [50:24] a number as an exhibit and received an evidence as such. [50:27] Now, General Walters, did you have occasion on July 28th, 1972, to call on Mr. Gray again? [50:40] Yes, I did. [50:41] And could you tell us briefly what the purpose of that visit was? [50:44] Briefly, I came down to give him additional information for which he had asked [50:48] relating to one of our people who had been in contact with Mr. Hunt during August of 1971. [50:54] I gave him additional data concerning this and concerning contacts with Mr. Hunt. [51:03] I believe they are identified in the memorandum. [51:07] Towards the end of the conversation, Gray asked me, and I am here reading, [51:11] if the president had called me on this matter, and I said that he had not. [51:16] Gray then said that a lot of pressure had been brought on him in this matter, but he had not yielded. [51:20] I can't read mine. [51:23] I can't read mine. [51:24] Mine is very poor reading here. [51:27] But anyway, anything to destroy the integrity of our two agencies would be the worst disservice we could do to the president, [51:33] and I would not do it. [51:34] He said he would not either. [51:36] Then he made some reference to money, which was not totally clear to me. [51:40] I then told him that we would terminate a phone, which we had, [51:43] which had been a number that had been given to Hunt to contact us two or three years before. [51:49] And he then said, this is a hell of a thing to happen to us at the outset of our tenure in our respective offices, [51:54] and I very heartily agreed. [51:55] Now, did this refer to, did you know what this reference to Mr. Hunt [52:02] and any assistance that had been given to Mr. Hunt from the CIA was all about? [52:07] As you know, Mr. Dash, all this occurred a year and a half before I came to the agency. [52:11] I really wasn't familiar with it. [52:12] The agency was continuously passing to the FBI material that was uncovered concerning this contact or assistance to Mr. Hunt, I believe. [52:21] One of the memoranda I took to Mr. Gray really summed up a whole series of shorter memoranda we had sent him, [52:28] and this was just an ongoing process. [52:30] After this date of the 28th of July, I no longer participated in this process. [52:35] It was done directly through our liaison with the FBI, through Mr. Colby and various other things. [52:39] But I take it that the memorandum and the references to the contact with Mr. Hunt [52:43] related back to the prior year, July 71, meetings that General Cushman had with Mr. Hunt. [52:50] That is correct. [52:52] I'd like to show you a copy we have of your memorandum dated July 28th, [52:57] covering your meeting with Mr. Gray on that same date, and ask if it's a correct copy. [53:08] And you'll notice there are some excisions there of names that were excised [53:12] because of security reasons, national security reasons. [53:17] Yes, it's as bad a Xerox copy as mine. [53:19] Yes. Mr. Chairman, may that memorandum be appropriately marked and received in evidence. [53:30] The memorandum will be appropriately numbered as an exhibit and received in evidence as such. [53:37] Now, when was your next contact with anybody at the White House, General Walters? [53:47] Was this your last series of meetings? [53:49] I think you said that from there on in, the contacts with the CIA and the FBI were taken up by somebody else. [53:55] Yes, yes. On this matter, certainly, obviously, in my job, I attended meetings at the White House [54:00] relating to foreign policy and so forth that had nothing to do with this in the meantime. [54:04] But did there come a time sometime later, and could you tell us when, [54:07] that you had another meeting or call for Mr. John Dean? [54:11] I did not have a call from Mr. John Dean. [54:13] I think Mr. John Dean had gotten my message loud and clear. [54:16] The next time he had business with the agency, he didn't call me. [54:19] He called the new director, Dr. Schlesinger. [54:23] I believe that was on the 9th of February, 1973, if I am correct. [54:30] And Dr. Schlesinger has, I believe, submitted a memorandum for the record covering this call from Mr. Dean. [54:36] I was not in Dr. Schlesinger's office when Mr. Dean called, and my only knowledge of this is the memorandum [54:41] and what Dr. Schlesinger told me about Dean's call. [54:47] And will you have a copy of that memorandum from... [54:49] Of Dr. Schlesinger's memorandum? [54:51] Yes. [54:51] Yes, I do. [54:53] Let me... [54:54] Can I show you a copy? [54:57] It's February 9, 1973, memorandum, I think, which you're referring to, and ask you if this is a correct copy. [55:16] Yes, it is. [55:17] And it, too, was made on the same poor... [55:19] Now, all right. [55:20] Yes. [55:20] Could you briefly tell us what was the nature of that contact that Mr. Dean had with Mr. Schlesinger? [55:27] I believe he... [55:30] And here I go from the Mr. Schlesinger memorandum. [55:32] He referred to a package of material that had been sent by the CIA to the Department of Justice in connection with the Watergate investigation. [55:41] He suggested that Justice be requested to return this package to the agency. [55:46] The only item that would be left in Justice would be a card in the files indicating that the package had been returned to the agency at its request. [55:54] Since the material in the package was no longer needed for the purposes of the investigation, [56:00] he indicated that the agency had originally provided these materials to the Department of Justice at the request of the Attorney General and Mr. Howard Peterson. [56:09] Then he referred to some IT&T matter, which is unrelated. [56:11] Although this was not your memorandum, do you know what the package of materials is referred to here that the agency had given to Mr. Peterson? [56:22] I don't have personal knowledge of it, Mr. Dash, but my understanding was it was all of the written material, [56:27] and I believe also the photographs that had been taken with the camera, which is why it was called a package. [56:34] Under what circumstances taken with the camera? [56:36] I believe when it was furnished to, after it was furnished to hunt by whoever used the camera at that time. [56:42] Were you informed by Mr. Schlesinger or others that this dealt with the Ellsberg matter? [56:47] I don't believe Mr. Schlesinger was familiar with the package. [56:50] Mr. Schlesinger just, incidentally, I would like to say at this point that when Mr. Schlesinger came to the agency in late January or early February, [56:58] I did briefly go over these various approaches that had been made to the agency and to myself, [57:04] so that he was generally familiar with the background of this. [57:07] I do not believe Mr. Schlesinger knew the details. [57:10] I do believe that he and I agreed that for the agency to request the Department of Justice to return these materials [57:16] would simply leave an arrow in the files pointing at Langley. [57:19] Well, either at that time or afterwards, have you been informed as to whether the package of materials, [57:26] which you say either written materials and photographs, did deal with the attempt to get information from Mr. Ellsberg's psychoanalyst? [57:35] I really do not know, Mr. Dash. [57:37] As far as I understand it, I understood the package to mean all of the material that the agency had passed to the Department of Justice [57:45] from the beginning of the inquiry on all of the material, all of the assistance, all of the equipment that had been given to Hunt. [57:53] All right. [57:53] Now, were you asked by Mr. Schlesinger to take any action with regard to Mr. Dean's request? [57:59] Mr. Dr. Schlesinger and I discussed this and agreed the request was out of the question. [58:03] Dr. Schlesinger then asked me to go down and tell Mr. Dean this. [58:07] And did you? [58:07] I did. [58:08] And could you tell us when did you meet with Mr. Dean and have this discussion? [58:13] When I called Mr. Dean, he was in Florida, and it took me quite a while to get hold of him. [58:18] I left a word at his office saying that I wished to be in touch with him, and I finally got a call. [58:23] An appointment was laid on, I believe, for the 21st of February. [58:30] On the 21st of February, and this is a very short memorandum. [58:34] If the committee will bear with me, I'd like to read it. [58:35] Why don't you read the memorandum? [58:37] At the request of the director, Dr. Schlesinger, I called on Mr. John Dean at his office in the White House at 1430. [58:43] That's 2.30 in the afternoon. [58:44] I explained to him that in connection with his request that the agency ask the Department of Justice to return a package of material that had been sent to them in connection with the Watergate investigation, it was quite impossible for us to request the return of this. [59:01] As this would simply mean that a note would be left in the Department of Justice files that the material had been sent back to the agency, and we had been asked not to destroy any material in any way related to this case. [59:13] I again told him there was no agency involvement in this case and that any attempt to involve the agency in it could only be harmful to the United States. [59:22] He seemed disappointed, and I left. [59:25] General Walters, I'd like to show you a copy we have of your May 11th memorandum and ask if it's a correct copy. [59:29] May I say one word about the memorandum, Mr. Dash? [59:31] I did not write a memorandum on this conversation. [59:36] In early May, Dr. Schlesinger, who was having a thorough inquiry made into all the aspects of this case, asked me whether I had made a memorandum on it. [59:44] I said I had not. [59:45] He asked me to make one, and that is the memorandum I wrote, which was written some two months subsequently. [1:00:03] May I show you the memorandum that you did prepare on May 11th, 1973? [1:00:09] At least our copy of it, and ask you if it's a correct copy. [1:00:21] It is. [1:00:21] Mr. Chairman, may we have that memorandum appropriately marked and received in evidence? [1:00:27] The memorandum will be appropriately marked as an exhibit and received in evidence as such. [1:00:35] Now, General Walters, did there come a time, shortly after you actually prepared that memorandum, [1:00:42] when you put all of the recollections you've had concerning your meetings with the White House [1:00:49] and with former acting director Gray, in the form of an affidavit? [1:00:56] Yes. [1:00:57] Can you tell us the circumstances that led you to put your recollections of these meetings and discussions you had in the form of an affidavit? [1:01:04] I was in the Far East in early May, and when I came back, Dr. Schlesinger, in fact, Dr. Schlesinger called me back. [1:01:12] He had asked anyone in the agency who had had any connection with this case whatsoever to write an affidavit. [1:01:19] I did so, and those are the circumstances of the writing of the affidavit. [1:01:22] And that affidavit does include, in substance, all of the matters that you've testified here concerning your meetings with the White House and with Mr. Gray? [1:01:32] To the best of my knowledge, it does. [1:01:34] May I show you a copy that we have of the affidavit dated May 12, 1973, and ask you if it's a correct copy? [1:02:07] Yes, it is a correct copy. [1:02:08] Mr. Chairman, may we have that affidavit appropriately marked for identification and admitted in evidence? [1:02:16] It is so altered. [1:02:18] Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. [1:02:20] In a moment, Minority Counsel Fred Thompson, the last General Walters, if the President's name was invoked in the request that he go to the FBI. [1:02:36] From Washington, N-PACT continues its coverage of hearings by the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. [1:02:44] Here again, Correspondent Jim Lehrer. [1:02:47] As we pick up the testimony, Fred Thompson is about to question General Walters, the Deputy Director of the CIA. [1:02:56] Mr. Thompson. [1:02:59] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:02:59] General Walters, as I understand it, it was your feeling that, and it is your feeling, that on June 23rd, you were being asked to, in effect, deliver a message which would, in effect, limit the Watergate investigation with regard to the Mexican part of it because of the possibility of either compromising some covert CIA activities or CIA employees. [1:03:33] Is that correct? [1:03:34] Yes, it is. [1:03:35] It seems to me that the crucial question is whether or not you were being told to deliver a message to limit the investigation in any other respect. [1:03:47] Were you or were you not? [1:03:48] I was not, Mr. Thompson. [1:03:49] All right. [1:03:54] Now, as of June the 23rd, did you know the names of the people who had been apprehended inside the Democratic National Committee headquarters? [1:04:02] I had read the names in the newspaper, yes. [1:04:04] Did you realize that Mr. McCord, for example, was a former CIA employee? [1:04:08] I believe I did know this, yes. [1:04:12] Did you know Mr. McCord personally before you? [1:04:14] I did not. [1:04:15] Did you realize that Mr. Hunt was a former CIA employee? [1:04:18] Yes, I did. [1:04:20] Did you realize that Mr. Sturgis was? [1:04:24] Did you realize that Mr. Martinez was still on retainer by the CIA? [1:04:28] I don't believe I knew that he was still on retainer at that time. [1:04:31] Did you know that he had been on retainer or an employee at any previous time? [1:04:35] I believe that it came out within discussions in the agency that these men had previously been employed by the agency. [1:04:42] All right. [1:04:43] Did you realize that Mr. Barker had been a CIA employee in the past? [1:04:50] I believe I knew that all of these men that you mentioned. [1:04:52] With regard to the Mexican aspect, if I remember correctly, the certain checks were, in effect, funneled through, I think allegedly at this point, funneled through Mexican banks, and they wound up in the bank account of Mr. Barker in Miami. [1:05:13] Have you since understood that to be the case and the allegations of this state? [1:05:17] I have since understood it, but at the time I was not aware of what the Mexican investigation was possible. [1:05:22] I see. [1:05:22] But you now realize that there were, at least according to the best of your information, that there were checks funneled through a Mexican account, which I think involved Mr. Aguario, whose names have been mentioned, [1:05:35] which were funneled to the bank account of Mr. Barker in Miami, and that some of those funds from that account, I believe, were taken from some of the defendants apprehended in the DNC. [1:05:52] Is that correct? [1:05:52] I'm aware of this in a different way. [1:05:54] I do not know the detail of it. [1:05:55] But you were not aware of that at your meeting on June the 23rd? [1:05:58] No, I was not. [1:05:59] Go to your memorandum of June the 28th, which recounts your meeting on June the 23rd. [1:06:20] I believe you stated, since writing that memorandum, in a covering note at the time, I believe this was submitted to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, dated May 18th, [1:06:34] that although there is a reference in your memorandum of June the 28th that Mr. Haldeman said it was the President's wish that this be done, [1:06:44] that you now believe that he did not, in fact, say that. [1:06:47] When I showed the memorandum to Mr. Helms, he said it was not his recollection that the President's name had been used. [1:06:57] I did not correct the memorandum. [1:07:00] The memorandum was for my own personal use, and I did not use it. [1:07:02] I did not feel strongly one way or the other about this. [1:07:14] I'm not sure whether Mr. Haldeman has testified to whether he used it or not. [1:07:17] If you're pardoning me, I'm skimming your covering note dated May 18th. [1:07:20] It's my understanding that as of the time you wrote the note, that if you had to come down one side or another, as of that time, it was your belief, [1:07:29] that he did not, in fact, say that. [1:07:31] Would that be correct? [1:07:32] I think that would probably be correct. [1:07:34] All right. [1:07:35] Then the memorandum... [1:07:36] If I may, just for a second, Mr. Johnson. [1:07:39] As I say, I do not have a strong recollection one way or the other. [1:07:42] We were in Mr. Haldeman's office, and presumably his power derived from this. [1:07:48] Mr. Helms said he didn't recollect it. [1:07:51] I didn't recollect it. [1:07:51] I didn't recollect it strongly enough to challenge Mr. Helms. [1:07:54] I accepted Mr. Helms saying that, no, he did not recall. [1:07:56] Well, Mr. Haldeman has testified that this matter was discussed with the President, so that's not really an issue. [1:08:01] It's really a matter of memory, I think. [1:08:03] And I did not feel strongly enough to challenge Mr. Helms' statement that he did not recall the name. [1:08:11] You believe also that, according to your testimony this morning, that the discussion of Betel occurred on Tuesday. [1:08:20] Tuesday the 27th. [1:08:21] Tuesday the 27th. [1:08:22] Yes. [1:08:22] And I believe you have it here in your conversation, the 20-Civics. [1:08:26] That's correct. [1:08:26] Is that correct? [1:08:27] So that would be an error in that regard. [1:08:29] I had straightened it out in my affidavit. [1:08:30] Yes, sir. [1:08:31] I understand. [1:08:34] Let me ask you for this. [1:08:35] When you had this conversation on the 23rd, what time of date was it? [1:08:42] I believe it was 1.30 in the afternoon. [1:08:44] 1.30? [1:08:46] It was postponed. [1:08:47] I recall that it was postponed either an hour or a half an hour. [1:08:52] And then you had your meeting later that same afternoon with Mr. Gray? [1:08:56] About an hour later. [1:08:58] 2.30, I believe, according to your memorandum. [1:09:01] Do you recall about how long your meeting lasted with Holloman and Ehrlichman? [1:09:07] 10, 15 minutes. [1:09:10] Did you go directly from your meeting with Holloman and Ehrlichman to your meeting with Mr. Gray? [1:09:20] I think I've justified already, Mr. Thompson. [1:09:22] I don't really remember what I did. [1:09:24] I don't think I would have had time to go back to the office. [1:09:27] I know I separated from Mr. Helms at this point, and he went back to the office. [1:09:31] Where is the CIA office? [1:09:33] It's way out at Langley. [1:09:35] It's eight or nine miles out of Washington. [1:09:37] You were going back eight or nine miles, traveling back in eight or nine miles to the Justice Department. [1:09:41] Yes. [1:09:42] As I recall it, I just killed time downtown in Washington. [1:09:45] All right. [1:09:46] Your memorandum states here that, upon leaving the White House, I discussed the matter briefly with the director. [1:09:51] Upon returning to the office, I called Gray and indicated there was a matter of some urgency, and he agreed to see me at 2.30. [1:09:58] So that evidently is incorrect. [1:10:01] Would that be it? [1:10:01] I would say it was perhaps incorrect. [1:10:03] I can't guarantee that it's incorrect. [1:10:05] I may have driven straight out and called from the office and driven straight back. [1:10:07] What was your normal practice with regard to following up meetings or particular events which you participated in with memorandums? [1:10:32] When I was an interpreter, I wrote long memorandums, Mr. Thompson. [1:10:35] Since I have been at the CIA, generally there was someone else present who makes note on the meetings. [1:10:39] These are the only memorandum of the record, I think, almost, that I wrote since I've been with the CIA. [1:10:44] These that you've submitted to us are the only ones that you've written since you've been there? [1:10:47] That's right. [1:10:48] I noticed that the memoranda of the June 23rd meeting was not written until June 28th. [1:10:57] Is that correct? [1:10:58] That is correct. [1:11:00] But when you started writing memorandums, they became very prompt, I noticed. [1:11:04] On the July 5th meeting, well, first of all, the June 28th meeting, you wrote up June the 29th. [1:11:13] July 5th meeting, you wrote the same day. [1:11:16] July 6th meeting, you wrote the same day. [1:11:19] July 12th meeting, you wrote the next day, the 13th. [1:11:22] At July 28th meeting, you wrote the same day. [1:11:27] What caused you to start systematically writing memoranda of the events that were taking place? [1:11:34] Mr. Dean's exploration of whether the agency could produce bail and pay the salaries of the defendants while they were in jail. [1:11:42] I'd prefer, in your memoranda dated July 6th, 1972, you did not see why he, referring to Grady or I, should jeopardize the integrity of our organizations to protect some mid-level White House figures who had acted imprudently. [1:12:03] Who were you referring to? [1:12:04] I don't think we had anybody specific in mind. [1:12:06] I certainly didn't know who might be behind this. [1:12:08] Well, who were you dealing with who you might consider mid-level at the White House? [1:12:17] Middle-level figure, I would say, would be Mr. Dean. [1:12:19] But he, there may have been other middle-level figures. [1:12:21] I did not know who these middle-level figures might be. [1:12:25] I did not know who was behind this. [1:12:27] Did you consider Halliman middle-level? [1:12:30] No. [1:12:31] What, what was your feeling with regard to Mr. Dean when you were dealing with him, when you were talking about these matters with him? [1:12:46] At which point in the conversation, Mr. Johnson? [1:12:48] Well, start from the beginning. [1:12:50] Start with the first meeting you had with him on the 26th and tell us what your, what your thoughts were based upon those conversations. [1:12:59] Well, I thought... [1:12:59] As you, as you began to meet with him, what his interest might be. [1:13:03] Well, I, first of all, was struck by his insistence that the agency was in some way involved. [1:13:11] He pursued this with, well, it couldn't have been without your knowing it. [1:13:14] It isn't there some way, and it must have been. [1:13:16] And look, all these people used to work for the CIA and so forth and so on. [1:13:20] This is the first thing that struck me, his insistence on trying to drag us into it, [1:13:25] which made me think that he was exploring this option, [1:13:28] which is what made me tell him that I would resign rather than have the agency participate in any attempt to stifle this. [1:13:35] Did you conclude in your own mind that possibly some of the people directly involved might be working for some of Mr. Dean's friends who were intermediaries? [1:13:51] This thought did cross my mind. [1:13:54] We've had any further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. [1:14:00] Senator Montaglia. [1:14:01] General Walters, you indicated that you and other witnesses have similarly indicated that a certain memoranda [1:14:17] with respect to the investigation in-house at CIA was given to the FBI. [1:14:25] Am I correct in that statement? [1:14:27] Yes, Senator. [1:14:28] Would you tell us what was in that particular memoranda or in any other communications to the FBI? [1:14:36] I believe that most of these memoranda, Senator, referred to matters that had occurred before I came to work at the agency. [1:14:44] There are, I believe, several memoranda in the possession. [1:14:48] The memoranda, for instance, which I gave Mr. Gray on the 6th, [1:14:52] contains a recapitulation of the various pieces of information we have been steadily extending to the FBI, [1:15:00] I believe, since the 20th of June. [1:15:04] In capsule form, what did this memoranda indicate? [1:15:08] I believe it indicated Hunt's call at the agency, the equipment that had been furnished to him, and so forth. [1:15:14] What kind of an investigation did you conduct in-house after you were called to the White House [1:15:23] for this conference with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman? [1:15:28] I talked to the people in the agency who were responsible for operations in Mexico, [1:15:32] and it was through them that I received the assurance that the FBI inquiries in Mexico would not jeopardize [1:15:40] or compromise any of the CIA's operations in that area. [1:15:46] What kind of investigation did you conduct with respect to the possible background and possible connection [1:15:53] of the defendants who had been arrested at the Watergate? [1:15:56] I believe that Mr. Helms ordered our security and personnel people to provide all necessary information [1:16:02] to the Department of Justice and the FBI, I'm sorry, to the FBI on this. [1:16:06] And did you, as a result of this investigation, uncover the fact that Eugenio Martinez was on retainer at that time? [1:16:19] I believe we did, Senator. [1:16:20] And did you communicate this to the Department of Justice and to people in the White House? [1:16:28] I personally did not. [1:16:31] A great deal of communication was going on, Senator, between our personnel and security people [1:16:35] and the Department of Justice and the FBI. [1:16:38] Whether it was communicated to the White House or not, I am not in a position to answer. [1:16:41] Were there any communications with respect to this investigation delivered to the White House? [1:16:51] I'm not aware of any, Senator. [1:16:54] Why did you omit this? [1:16:56] In view of the fact that you had been in contact with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Dean? [1:17:03] Didn't you feel that the White House should know about the possible involvement of a man on retainer to CIA [1:17:13] by the name of Eugenio Martinez? [1:17:15] I believe that the FBI was being kept fully informed. [1:17:18] I believe that the FBI would keep the White House informed in the pursuit of this investigation. [1:17:23] Now, I'm not trying to cross you up or anything like that, General Walters. [1:17:30] And I'm merely asking you to see if you can recall whether or not anyone in CIA communicated with anyone in the White House [1:17:46] with respect to the in-house investigation and what you uncovered with respect to these individuals. [1:17:52] I personally have no knowledge of any such communications, Senator. [1:17:55] The FBI was the investigating body, and as I understand it, all the information that became available to us was furnished to them. [1:18:16] Now, with respect to your conversations with Mr. Gray, [1:18:21] was there any mention made in your conversations with him that possibly the information which you were imparting to him [1:18:30] might be communicated to the White House? [1:18:34] No, sir. I thought it would be inappropriate for me to try and tell Mr. Gray how to run his agency. [1:18:41] As you look back to the conversations starting on June the 23rd, [1:18:55] the subsequent conversations with White House people, including Mr. Dean, [1:19:01] is it your feeling, as you look at this thing in retrospect, [1:19:06] that the White House, those individuals with whom you talked, were trying to use you for some ulterior motive? [1:19:15] I would say I must draw a distinction between the two contacts I had with two different people in the White House. [1:19:25] As I've testified earlier, I had no reason to doubt that Mr. Haldeman might not have information [1:19:31] to which I was not privy that the further conduct of the investigation in Mexico [1:19:37] might jeopardize covert agency activities. [1:19:42] Are you being charitable there, General? [1:19:46] Senator, I don't believe so. [1:19:47] As I testified earlier, if I had thought that Mr. Haldeman was asking me to do something that was improper, [1:19:52] I would have made the same threat to resign to him that I did to Mr. Dean [1:19:55] the first time Mr. Dean made a suggestion I consider was improper. [1:20:01] How did you interpret the mandate which he gave you to go to Mr. Gray [1:20:07] and to tell Mr. Gray, when he had no information, for you to tell Mr. Gray that an FBI investigation in Mexico [1:20:20] might endanger CIA activities? [1:20:24] I interpreted this as meaning that Mr. Haldeman had some information which I did not have. [1:20:29] I would like to go back to this time and say that the idea of improperity or improper actions, [1:20:34] I had no reason to doubt the word of a very senior official of the United States government. [1:20:39] Did you think at that moment, about asking him what his background information might be [1:20:45] as a premise for the directive or mandate which he had given you? [1:20:51] No, sir, I did not. [1:20:53] Had you thought about it since? [1:20:54] Obviously, there's no sight like hindsight. [1:21:01] But given the relative nature of our positions, I still have somewhat of a feeling that it might have been inappropriate to ask him. [1:21:10] The White House bears a great responsibility. [1:21:12] They have to do things other people do not. [1:21:13] Why would it have been inappropriate, General? Why? [1:21:19] Sir, if in all our dealings with the White House we doubted what they told us, we would have a very difficult time. [1:21:26] I did not feel it was appropriate to ask him because I did not think there was anything improper in it. [1:21:31] Well, on June the 23rd, you had been reading the newspapers. [1:21:35] You knew that some of these people were involved with the committee to re-elect the president [1:21:41] and that they had been arrested. [1:21:43] They were in jail and that they had previous connections with CIA. [1:21:51] You knew the whole context and still you did not think of asking for some kind of clarification [1:22:01] with respect to the mandate which had been delivered to you by Mr. Haldeman? [1:22:06] Sir, Mr. Haldeman indicated to me that he might have information which I did not have. [1:22:11] What I would really have been asking him is White House sources, how he'd found something out [1:22:15] had I asked him where he got this information from. [1:22:18] Did you, in your conference with Mr. Gray, try to develop a dialogue with respect to possible reasons [1:22:27] that the White House might have in giving you this directive? [1:22:31] No, sir. [1:22:31] I transmitted the message to Mr. Gray. [1:22:33] He made some reference to some people whose names meant nothing to me like Ogario and Dahlberg. [1:22:38] Mr. or General Walters, in view of the experience of CIA in this particular matter [1:22:48] and the attempts made by some people at the White House to involve CIA in tasks which were [1:23:01] ultra-virus or outside the scope of the agency, what recommendations do you have to make to [1:23:08] this committee so that this might not occur in the future? [1:23:13] Senator, I think it would really be presumptuous of me to try and tell this committee what [1:23:19] legislation could be effective in this respect. [1:23:23] I must, however, associate myself with what Mr. Haldeman said in reply to your question yesterday, [1:23:27] Senator, that I don't know how you legislate honesty and decency. [1:23:32] You've got to pick the right people for these jobs above all else. [1:23:37] There is obviously some legislation that could be effective, but I think the most important [1:23:41] thing is the selection of the right people for positions of trust. [1:23:44] Well, do you feel that there should be some provision in the law governing CIA requiring [1:23:59] the director or deputy director or any other employee to report to an oversight committee [1:24:06] in the Congress when someone in the executive department or any other department tries to [1:24:12] use CIA for political purposes? [1:24:15] That could be one solution to prevent a recurrence, Senator, yes. [1:24:18] Thank you very much, Senator. That's all the questions I have. [1:24:22] He has a vote on in the Senate, so we'll have to suspend to the members of the committee to [1:24:29] get over and vote in return. [1:24:35] Today's floor action dealt with ratifying treaties. [1:24:38] The committee recessed briefly and then returned to allow Sam Dash and then Lowell Weicker to question [1:24:43] General Walters. [1:24:44] The committee will come to order. [1:24:59] I'm informed by counsel that Senator Montoya had finished, except he wanted to have read [1:25:05] into the record a memorandum. And without objection, I'll let counsel read that memorandum and then [1:25:12] recognize Senator Weicker. [1:25:13] General Walters, I understand Senator Montoya asked you about when the CIA informed the FBI [1:25:22] concerning the employment of Mr. Martinis. And I understand you've been shown a copy of the memorandum [1:25:32] for the acting director of the federal investigation. Attention, Mr. Arnold L. Pornham, a subject, Mr. Martinis, [1:25:41] from the director of security. [1:25:46] Mr. Osborne. [1:25:49] Yes. Now, Mr. Osborne. Now, let me, I'd like to read that into the record, which would indicate that there was on, [1:25:55] and it's stated, I think, June 20, 1972. [1:25:58] Mr. Martinis was born on 8th of July, 1922, and it's a bit of Xerox, but it looks like artemian. [1:26:11] A-R-T-E-M-I, and I think it's S-A, Pina del Ria, Cuba, and he is naturalized United States citizen. [1:26:21] He was educated at the University of Havana, and he has a BS degree. [1:26:26] He also has two years additional work in the School of Medicine, previously married to a Cuban from whom he is divorced. [1:26:34] Mr. Martinis is currently married to a United States citizen. [1:26:39] Mr. Martinis was recruited by the agency in January 1961 in connection with Cuban operations. [1:26:46] The project to which he was assigned was terminated in 1969. [1:26:49] Since that time, Mr. Martinis has been on a part-time retainer to report on the Cuban exile community. [1:26:58] In connection with this activity, he was last met on June 6, 1972, and has been unable to be contacted since June 14, 1972. [1:27:10] For these part-time activities, Mr. Martinis has received a retainer of $100 per month since 1969. [1:27:22] Prior to that time, he received $8,100 per year for his full-time operational activity. [1:27:29] It is to be noted that Mr. Martinis is a real estate partner of Mr. Bernard L. Barker. [1:27:35] The above information is for use only and should not be disseminated outside your bureau. [1:27:42] Please transmit any information on this matter to the attention of the Director of Security. [1:27:50] You have seen that memorandum just prior to your returning to testify. [1:27:55] Yes, and I think in part it answers one of the questions Senator Montoya asked me. [1:27:59] Senator Wyko. [1:28:01] Well, can I ask, Counselor, because I'm quite interested in that. [1:28:04] Now, either Counselor or General Walters, when was this information? [1:28:11] Acquired, and was it transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation? [1:28:18] I believe this is a letter transmitting it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the 20th of June, 1972. [1:28:24] That is three days after the break-in, Senator. [1:28:28] Well, that's fine. [1:28:29] I'm not disputing it. [1:28:30] As a matter of fact, it's just one of the questions that I have in the back of my mind. [1:28:33] It is what did the CIA do insofar as these persons were concerned, and I would gather that you went right to work in investigating the status of these various people. [1:28:53] This is, what, the 20th of June? [1:28:57] Is that the date on this? [1:28:58] You know, 20 June, 1972, that's within, what, three days of the break-in the CIA had completed. [1:29:09] Had all the other individuals also been investigated by that time? [1:29:14] I don't believe the investigation. [1:29:16] I think it was an ongoing project, Senator. [1:29:18] I believe I testified earlier that starting on June 20th, we began feeding to the FBI as fast as we acquired any information on any of the defendants or anybody in any way connected to this matter. [1:29:29] I think it's a very important point as far as the agency is concerned, that it did its job and did it pretty darn fast so that insofar as those persons that have been ex—with the exception of Mr. Martinez, everybody else was an ex-CIA agent. [1:29:50] Well, I'm not saying they all were, but they were not in the employ of the CIA. [1:29:55] Is that correct? [1:29:56] That is, Senator, if I may make a minor distinction, only two of them, Hunt and McCord, had ever been CIA full-time employees. [1:30:06] The others were contract employees for a short duration or a longer duration. [1:30:11] You and I could make that distinction. [1:30:12] I think in the minds of the American public, a contractor full-time really wouldn't make any difference. [1:30:18] But in any event, the rest of the personnel, with the exception of Mr. Martinez, had left the CIA. [1:30:23] They were no longer in the employ of the CIA at the time of the breaking, except for Mr. Martinez, who was on a retainer contractor, whichever term you want to go ahead and use. [1:30:39] And yet, I gather your investigation still did include, since they had been ex-employees out of full-time or contract, these other individuals. [1:30:51] Is that true? [1:30:52] As I understand it, Mr. Helms directed our personnel and security people to communicate all information available on these people to the FBI. [1:31:00] And by the time the 20th rolls around, the one person that was on a part-time basis, even a report on him, had been sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [1:31:11] I believe the agency made a very genuine effort to cooperate with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [1:31:17] So that it was with some basis of fact arrived at, after investigation, that when Mr. Helms talked to the director on the 22nd and said that there is no CIA involvement, he just wasn't pulling something out of the air. [1:31:37] I mean, he had some facts before him. [1:31:39] Isn't that correct? [1:31:40] My experience with Mr. Helms, he never pulls things out of the air, Senator. [1:31:43] Right. And when you walked in on the 23rd and with the director, you were cognizant of these investigations that had been going on? [1:31:55] I had not seen this particular memorandum. [1:31:57] I knew that these people had been former CIA employees, and I knew that we were furnishing all available information on them to the Department of Justice. [1:32:04] Again, I want to repeat the importance, I think, of what's being stated here, because the impressions that we give, I think, are equally important to the facts that this committee elicits. [1:32:19] I think there might have been an impression left that in the meeting of the 23rd, when you and the director sit down with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and state that there's no CIA involvement, [1:32:33] that this, as I've said, it just wasn't something that you were saying categorically without knowledge that the agency itself had gone into this matter in the previous days. [1:32:46] I believe Mr. Helms was talking on the basis of what he knew on that day, on the 23rd, and the result of all of these which were communicated to him. [1:32:55] Have you ever counted up, and I thought about this when you were testifying between you and the director, [1:33:00] how many times in this period did you say there is no CIA involvement to various individuals? Have you counted it up? [1:33:10] Couldn't possibly count it. As Mr. Helms stated yesterday with some warmth, it needs constant repeating. [1:33:20] Well, I think it does need constant repeating. We know that the director turned to acting director Gray and said, [1:33:28] there is no CIA involvement on the 22nd. And I gather in the meeting on the 23rd, it was made again clear, [1:33:35] both by yourself and the director, to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, there is no CIA involvement. [1:33:40] Now, I gather when you met with Mr. Dean, you were very forceful, as I would imagine here. [1:33:46] They're saying it in a variety of ways. There is no CIA involvement. [1:33:49] Now, let me, and I gather, the final chapter, and there is no CIA involvement, being transmitted, [1:34:04] this is only to the knowledge that you acquired from Mr. Gray, and we'll have Mr. Gray before us later on, [1:34:11] to the president, actually. Is that correct? [1:34:16] Sir, I did not have any personal contact with the president. [1:34:19] No. I'm saying, in your recollection of the conversation, of your conversation with Mr. Gray, [1:34:24] where he reported to you, where he reported to you. [1:34:28] I could only assume that he had told that to the president. [1:34:31] All right, now let's go to June the 23rd in your memorandum, [1:34:34] because I do have some questions as to statements made in that. [1:34:39] The first part there, where you described the beginning of the meeting, [1:34:46] on June 23rd at 1 o'clock, [1:34:50] called with the director of Helms on John Ehrlichman and Robert Haldeman, [1:34:52] Ehrlichman's office at the White House. [1:34:54] Haldeman said the bugging affair at the Democratic National Committee headquarters [1:34:59] at the Watergate Apartments had made a lot of noise, [1:35:03] and that the Democrats are trying to maximize it. [1:35:09] The FBI had been called in and was investigating the matter. [1:35:11] The investigation was leading to a lot of important people, [1:35:15] and this could get worse. [1:35:18] He asked what the connection with the agency was, [1:35:21] and the director repeated that there was none. [1:35:26] Haldeman said the whole affair was getting embarrassing, [1:35:29] and it was the president's wish that Walters call on acting director L. Patrick Gray, [1:35:33] and suggested to him that since the five suspects had been arrested, [1:35:37] this should be sufficient, [1:35:39] and it was not advantageous to have the inquiry pushed, [1:35:41] especially in Mexico, etc. [1:35:46] Now, my question to you is, [1:35:54] right at that point, [1:35:55] don't you consider this to be a rather strange conversation [1:35:58] for CIA officials to be involved in? [1:36:01] I mean, with the exception of that one sentence, [1:36:04] he asked what the connection with the agency was, [1:36:06] and the director repeated that there was none. [1:36:07] And all the rest of those three paragraphs deal with a political situation [1:36:12] here in the United States. [1:36:15] It has nothing to do with the CIA. [1:36:17] I mean, didn't it occur to you at that time [1:36:18] that this was a rather strange conversation for you to be involved in? [1:36:22] It sounds more to me like a meeting of the Republican National Committee [1:36:28] than a meeting of the CIA. [1:36:32] Did this occur to you that this was a rather strange subject [1:36:35] for us to be sitting around here talking to him? [1:36:38] In my mind, there was a distinction [1:36:39] between the agency being involved [1:36:43] in the sense of having had any participation [1:36:45] in the operation against the Democratic National Committee. [1:36:50] What I understood Mr. Haldeman to be referring to [1:36:53] was CIA activities outside the United States. [1:37:01] But I know, but that's not the context of these comments. [1:37:04] This is strictly, it is focusing on, [1:37:07] this is an embarrassing political situation. [1:37:11] The investigation is leading to important people. [1:37:14] Haldeman said the whole affair is getting embarrassing, [1:37:16] and it was the president's wish [1:37:17] that Walters called on acting director Patrick Ray [1:37:21] and suggested to him that since the five suspects [1:37:22] have been arrested, this should be sufficient. [1:37:25] I may not have been complete enough. [1:37:28] As I stated at the outset, [1:37:29] this is not the totality of what he said. [1:37:32] He gave these general considerations, [1:37:34] and then the concern he expressed [1:37:36] was that the FBI investigation in Mexico [1:37:38] might jeopardize some assets or some activity of the CIA. [1:37:44] He was talking in a philosophical sense [1:37:46] about what had happened in the United States. [1:37:48] And then the other part that I understood [1:37:50] referred to the possibility of compromise [1:37:52] of CIA assets or personnel outside the United States. [1:37:57] All right, so you leave the meeting, [1:38:07] and as Director Helms said yesterday, [1:38:10] and I'd like to ask you whether you had the same feeling, [1:38:13] that he frankly was uneasy with, uneasy, [1:38:17] with what, with the orders that had been given to you [1:38:22] from Mr. Haldeman, [1:38:25] and that he stated yesterday, [1:38:26] I'm trying to paraphrase his testimony, [1:38:28] that he suggested to you that you might call on Gray [1:38:32] and indicate to him the normal arrangements [1:38:36] as between the FBI and the CIA, [1:38:38] and that was quite sufficient. [1:38:40] Do you recall any such conversation? [1:38:43] I recall such a conversation, [1:38:44] but I do not recall it as being quite as limitative [1:38:46] as Mr. Helms mentioned yesterday. [1:38:50] At no time did he tell me [1:38:51] that I was not to deliver the message [1:38:53] I had been given to deliver. [1:38:54] He did emphasize that I should remind Mr. Gray [1:38:57] of this agreement between the CIA and the FBI [1:38:59] not to interfere with one another's operations. [1:39:04] So now you go to the director, [1:39:08] the acting director, [1:39:11] and you state to him, [1:39:17] I repeated that if the investigation [1:39:18] were put south of the border, [1:39:19] it would trespass on some of our covert projects, [1:39:22] and in view of the fact [1:39:22] that the five men involved were under arrest, [1:39:25] it would best to taper off the matter there. [1:39:28] Now General Walters, [1:39:32] and I'm trying to phrase this as best I can, [1:39:37] because I certainly believe you to be a man of integrity. [1:39:43] I think your career speaks for that. [1:39:49] This wasn't really exactly, [1:39:51] this concept that you left with the acting director [1:39:56] really wasn't the truth, was it? [1:40:00] I had no way of knowing so. [1:40:01] I presume Mr. Haldeman had information [1:40:03] that I did not have, [1:40:05] that something in this investigation [1:40:07] would uncover assets of the CIA. [1:40:09] I had been with the CIA six weeks at this time. [1:40:12] I did not know the details of its operations in Mexico. [1:40:14] Mr. Haldeman was a very well-informed man, [1:40:17] close to the top of the American structure of government. [1:40:19] I had no reason to doubt him. [1:40:21] I had no reason to doubt [1:40:22] any of the senior people in government [1:40:24] with whom I was talking at this stage of affairs. [1:40:27] Well, all right, then may I just ask you this question? [1:40:30] When you said this to Mr. Gray, [1:40:32] did you say to Mr. Gray, [1:40:35] Mr. Haldeman has told me to tell you these facts, [1:40:41] or did you deliver this to Mr. Gray [1:40:43] as if this were your own idea? [1:40:45] I believed, to the best of my recollection, Senator, [1:40:48] that I told him that I had come from the White House, [1:40:50] that I had talked to some senior people there, [1:40:53] and I then proceeded to deliver this message to him. [1:40:56] But as Mr. Gray sees you standing before him [1:40:59] as a representative of the assistant director of the CIA, [1:41:04] would he have every right to believe [1:41:09] that this was the opinion of the CIA [1:41:12] or that this was coming from the White House? [1:41:16] I believe that he had the right to think [1:41:18] that the message that I gave to him [1:41:20] that this could jeopardize assets of the CIA [1:41:23] was essentially correct. [1:41:24] And at what point in time [1:41:34] did you disabuse Mr. Gray [1:41:40] of this concept that you had left with him [1:41:43] on the 23rd of June? [1:41:45] Directly on the 6th of July. [1:41:48] However, on the next working day, [1:41:53] this was a Friday evening, [1:41:54] on the Monday, [1:41:55] I told Mr. Dean, [1:41:57] who I was informed was in charge of this whole matter, [1:42:00] that there was no agency involvement, [1:42:03] that this would not jeopardize [1:42:04] any activities of the agency. [1:42:06] As I stated earlier, [1:42:08] perhaps naively, [1:42:09] I believed Mr. Dean would tell him [1:42:10] since they were obviously in contact with one another. [1:42:13] In retrospect, [1:42:14] I should certainly have called Mr. Gray [1:42:16] and told him myself. [1:42:21] Now, do you... [1:42:24] I want to get back to the basis of the belief [1:42:29] that Mr. Haldeman would know something [1:42:32] about the operations of the CIA [1:42:34] in a way that you and the director didn't know? [1:42:38] I find that to be rather unusual. [1:42:41] I'm not saying that there are things in the White House [1:42:42] in a broad, general way, [1:42:44] in the way of policy, [1:42:45] that they wouldn't know [1:42:46] or that wouldn't be in your knowledge [1:42:51] and would be in theirs. [1:42:53] But as far as the actual operations of the CIA, [1:42:56] is there anything that you feel [1:42:58] the White House knows [1:42:59] that you don't know, [1:43:01] you and the director? [1:43:02] Well, we could know if we went into it. [1:43:06] But there are cases [1:43:07] where the White House [1:43:08] is sometimes supported [1:43:09] or something is done for them [1:43:11] in foreign countries [1:43:12] by members of the CIA. [1:43:15] And it would be awkward for me [1:43:16] to go into details... [1:43:17] And without the knowledge of the CIA? [1:43:21] Well, I think if it's clearly evident [1:43:22] that it's coming from the White House, [1:43:23] at least at this time, [1:43:26] without the knowledge is difficult [1:43:28] to say without the knowledge of the CIA. [1:43:30] This is why I felt someone in the CIA [1:43:32] might know [1:43:32] and why I checked with the geographic people. [1:43:34] Well, then my last question [1:43:36] is very simply this. [1:43:37] Is it possible for Mr. Haldeman [1:43:40] or Mr. Ehrlichman [1:43:41] to give direction [1:43:42] to a CIA agent [1:43:44] without the director, [1:43:47] the assistant director knowing that? [1:43:48] To give instructions? [1:43:49] I don't believe so, sir. [1:43:58] Senator Talmadge. [1:44:00] General Walters, [1:44:01] for how long [1:44:02] and in what capacity [1:44:04] have you known President Nixon? [1:44:07] I have known President Nixon, [1:44:08] I believe, Senator, [1:44:09] since 1957. [1:44:11] As I testified earlier, [1:44:12] I served as his interpreter [1:44:14] during a trip he made [1:44:16] through eight countries [1:44:16] in South America. [1:44:19] Subsequently, [1:44:19] I saw him only [1:44:20] on the anniversary [1:44:21] of the stoning in Caracas [1:44:25] where the car was attacked [1:44:26] by a mob. [1:44:27] He used to give a party [1:44:28] during the time [1:44:29] in the remaining years [1:44:30] he was vice president. [1:44:31] He used to give a party [1:44:31] once a year. [1:44:33] I went to that. [1:44:34] In the years [1:44:36] between Mr. Nixon's departure [1:44:38] from the White House [1:44:40] and his re-election [1:44:42] as president, [1:44:43] I saw him perhaps three times [1:44:45] in those eight or nine [1:44:46] or whatever it was years. [1:44:48] After Mr. Nixon [1:44:49] became president, [1:44:50] I accompanied him [1:44:51] on two trips around Europe. [1:44:55] I saw him [1:44:57] on an occasional basis. [1:44:59] As I have testified earlier, [1:45:00] I have not seen [1:45:01] Mr. Nixon privately [1:45:02] to talk to [1:45:03] since the 2nd of May, 1972, [1:45:07] when he swore me in [1:45:08] as deputy director [1:45:09] of the agency. [1:45:10] I've had one phone call [1:45:11] with him in that time frame. [1:45:14] He called me [1:45:15] for something concerning [1:45:16] his trip to Moscow. [1:45:17] Nothing else was discussed. [1:45:19] Would you say [1:45:19] that your relationship [1:45:20] was personal [1:45:21] as well as professional? [1:45:25] I would say yes, Senator. [1:45:26] When you shared [1:45:26] the kind of danger [1:45:27] that I mentioned this morning, [1:45:28] there is a certain element, [1:45:29] but I would like to bring out [1:45:31] that I have also served [1:45:32] as interpreter [1:45:32] to President Truman, [1:45:34] to President Johnson, [1:45:35] and to President Eisenhower. [1:45:36] We've had some testimony, [1:45:38] General, [1:45:38] before the committee here [1:45:40] that the White House [1:45:42] was making efforts [1:45:43] to make all the agencies [1:45:45] more responsive [1:45:46] to the White House. [1:45:48] Would you say [1:45:48] that your appointment [1:45:49] as deputy director [1:45:50] of the CIA [1:45:51] was an effort [1:45:52] to make that agency [1:45:54] more responsive [1:45:55] to the White House? [1:45:57] I would say, Senator, [1:45:58] that normally [1:45:58] a president appoints people, [1:46:00] presidential appointees, [1:46:01] because he has confidence [1:46:03] in them. [1:46:04] There has been [1:46:04] some testimony [1:46:05] that I have heard [1:46:06] to the effect [1:46:07] that someone had said [1:46:08] that I was put [1:46:09] in the agency [1:46:09] in order to influence [1:46:10] agency policy. [1:46:12] In all fairness, [1:46:13] I would like to say [1:46:14] that with a single exception [1:46:15] of the events [1:46:16] about which I am [1:46:16] testifying today, [1:46:18] no one in the White House, [1:46:20] the president, [1:46:21] or anyone else, [1:46:22] has ever sought [1:46:23] to influence [1:46:23] agency policy [1:46:24] through me. [1:46:26] I'm told that you [1:46:26] have a very outstanding [1:46:28] background [1:46:28] for the position [1:46:29] that you hold. [1:46:30] Is it true [1:46:31] you speak eight [1:46:32] different languages? [1:46:33] Yes, Senator, it is. [1:46:34] I'm also told [1:46:35] that on one occasion [1:46:36] when the president [1:46:37] was in France, [1:46:38] when you were there, [1:46:39] his military had a shake, [1:46:41] that he made [1:46:41] a 15-minute speech, [1:46:44] you listened to it, [1:46:45] and repeated it [1:46:46] verbatim in French. [1:46:47] Is that correct? [1:46:48] That's very flattering, [1:46:49] but I doubt [1:46:49] if it was verbatim, [1:46:50] Senator. [1:46:50] I wondered [1:46:51] if your memory [1:46:52] was that phenomenal. [1:46:58] General, [1:46:59] there's one very [1:47:00] important point [1:47:01] here in your testimony. [1:47:02] I don't know [1:47:03] whether it's escaped [1:47:04] the attention [1:47:05] of others, [1:47:07] but it's important [1:47:08] from my standpoint. [1:47:09] You have a memo [1:47:11] dated here, [1:47:13] July the 13th, [1:47:14] 1972, [1:47:17] and in that memo, [1:47:18] do you have it [1:47:18] before you? [1:47:21] You read it [1:47:21] into the record, [1:47:22] I believe. [1:47:24] It's on the occasion [1:47:25] that the president [1:47:26] called Mr. Gray [1:47:27] to congratulate him [1:47:29] on the FBI action [1:47:31] which had frustrated [1:47:32] the aircraft hijacking [1:47:34] in San Francisco, [1:47:37] and I'll pick up [1:47:38] your exact language [1:47:39] at that point. [1:47:41] The president asked him, [1:47:43] referring to Gray, [1:47:46] if he had talked to me [1:47:47] about the case, [1:47:49] period, [1:47:49] what case are you [1:47:50] referring to? [1:47:51] The Watergate case, [1:47:52] I presume, sir. [1:47:52] That was my understanding [1:47:53] of it. [1:47:53] I had assumed [1:47:54] that that was [1:47:55] what you had reference [1:47:56] to in this memo. [1:47:59] Gray replied [1:48:00] that he had. [1:48:01] That meant that [1:48:02] you and Gray [1:48:03] had conferred, [1:48:05] of course, [1:48:05] about the Watergate case, [1:48:06] and Gray at that point, [1:48:08] the director of the FBI, [1:48:09] was reporting that fact [1:48:10] to the president [1:48:10] of the United States. [1:48:11] That was my understanding [1:48:12] from what Mr. Gray [1:48:13] told me. [1:48:13] All right. [1:48:13] Go on down further now. [1:48:16] The president then asked him [1:48:18] what his recommendation [1:48:19] was on the matter. [1:48:22] Gray had replied [1:48:23] that the case [1:48:24] could not be covered up [1:48:26] and would lead quite high, [1:48:29] and that he felt [1:48:30] that the president [1:48:31] should get rid of the people [1:48:32] that were involved. [1:48:35] Any attempt to involve [1:48:37] the FBI [1:48:37] or the CIA [1:48:39] in this case [1:48:40] would only prove [1:48:42] a mortal wound, [1:48:43] and you say [1:48:44] that was your words, [1:48:45] and would achieve nothing. [1:48:47] The president then said, [1:48:50] then, [1:48:50] I'm quoting [1:48:51] the director of the president now, [1:48:53] I should get rid [1:48:54] of whoever is involved [1:48:56] no matter how high. [1:48:58] Gray replied, [1:49:00] that was his recommendation. [1:49:03] The president then asked [1:49:05] what I thought, [1:49:06] meaning you, [1:49:07] and Gray said, [1:49:08] my views [1:49:09] were the same as his. [1:49:11] The president took it well [1:49:13] and thanked Gray. [1:49:15] Later that day, [1:49:16] Gray had talked to Dean [1:49:18] and repeated the conversation [1:49:20] to him. [1:49:21] Dean said, [1:49:23] okay. [1:49:24] Is that a correct [1:49:24] verbatim quotation [1:49:26] from your statement? [1:49:27] Yes, sir? [1:49:27] That is a correct [1:49:28] verbatim quotation, [1:49:29] Senator, [1:49:30] but as I added earlier, [1:49:31] I do recollect, [1:49:32] I did not put it [1:49:33] in the memorandum, [1:49:34] Gray saying that [1:49:35] the president had told him [1:49:36] to go ahead [1:49:36] with his investigation. [1:49:37] Now, [1:49:39] am I to conclude [1:49:41] from that [1:49:41] that at that point, [1:49:44] and that was July, [1:49:45] early July, [1:49:46] 1972, [1:49:48] the president [1:49:49] of the United States [1:49:50] had the opinion [1:49:51] of the acting director [1:49:53] of the Federal Bureau [1:49:54] of Investigation [1:49:55] and the deputy director [1:49:57] of the Central Intelligence Agency [1:50:00] that there was something [1:50:01] going on wrong [1:50:02] in the White House staff [1:50:03] and he ought to correct it. [1:50:05] This is my assumption [1:50:06] from my recollection [1:50:07] of what Mr. Gray told me. [1:50:09] That would be my conclusion [1:50:10] from reading your remarks. [1:50:12] Yes. [1:50:13] Now, [1:50:15] am I to assume [1:50:16] from your testimony [1:50:17] that you felt [1:50:19] that these repeated efforts [1:50:21] from the White House staff [1:50:23] on the part of Haldeman [1:50:25] and Ehrlichman [1:50:27] and subsequently Mr. Dean [1:50:29] when they tried [1:50:31] to get you involved [1:50:32] in a cover-up [1:50:33] against your best judgment [1:50:35] and against your own will [1:50:37] that it was an effort [1:50:39] on the White House staff's part [1:50:41] to get you [1:50:43] and Mr. Gray, [1:50:46] the director [1:50:46] of the Federal Bureau [1:50:47] of Investigation, [1:50:48] to act in concert [1:50:50] to cover up this case? [1:50:52] Senator, [1:50:53] I would like to draw a distinction [1:50:54] between the three people [1:50:55] you have mentioned. [1:50:56] Yes, sir. [1:50:56] As I have testified earlier, [1:50:58] I believed [1:50:59] at the time [1:51:00] that Mr. Haldeman [1:51:01] asked me to go to see Mr. Gray [1:51:03] that he did have [1:51:03] or could have [1:51:04] some information. [1:51:06] Mr. Ehrlichman, [1:51:06] as I recall it, [1:51:07] in all fairness, [1:51:08] did not take part [1:51:08] in this conversation. [1:51:11] My first conversation [1:51:12] with Dean on the 26th [1:51:13] made me suspicious. [1:51:14] When he asked me [1:51:15] whether the agency [1:51:16] could pay bail [1:51:17] on the salary [1:51:18] of these people [1:51:19] when they were in jail, [1:51:20] I became convinced [1:51:21] that the option [1:51:22] of doing something improper [1:51:25] was being explored. [1:51:26] I would remind, however, [1:51:27] that I had no further [1:51:28] conversation [1:51:29] with Mr. Ehrlichman [1:51:30] or Mr. Haldeman [1:51:31] at any time [1:51:32] after the 23rd of June. [1:51:35] So there was really [1:51:37] a differentiation [1:51:38] in what the three people [1:51:39] were asking me to do. [1:51:40] As I have said before, [1:51:42] if I had thought [1:51:42] Mr. Haldeman [1:51:43] was asking me [1:51:43] to do something improper, [1:51:45] I wouldn't have done it. [1:51:46] Yes, I'm certain [1:51:47] you would not have, sir. [1:51:49] There's one final thing [1:51:51] I would like to ask you, sir. [1:51:53] You have been [1:51:54] on a professional basis [1:51:55] with the President [1:51:56] of the United States [1:51:57] as well as a personal basis. [1:52:00] You saw what was happening [1:52:01] in his staff [1:52:02] to get to the most important [1:52:04] agencies in the United States [1:52:07] involved in obstruction [1:52:09] of justice. [1:52:10] Why didn't you, sir, [1:52:12] ask for an appointment [1:52:13] with the President [1:52:14] and go over and tell him [1:52:15] frankly what was happening? [1:52:16] Sir, I felt I would have [1:52:17] been circumventing my channels. [1:52:19] I reported it [1:52:19] to my superior, Mr. Helms, [1:52:21] and I reported it [1:52:21] to the acting director [1:52:22] of the FBI. [1:52:23] You didn't think [1:52:24] you should go higher [1:52:25] than that? [1:52:26] If I had been pushed, [1:52:27] if I had been told [1:52:28] to do something improper, [1:52:29] I would have. [1:52:30] I made this quite plain [1:52:31] to Dean. [1:52:32] He was exploring with me. [1:52:34] I made quite plain to him [1:52:35] from the very first meeting [1:52:36] that if he attempted [1:52:38] to order or direct me [1:52:39] to implicate the agency [1:52:40] in any way, [1:52:41] I would resign [1:52:41] and I would go [1:52:42] and tell the President. [1:52:44] And I didn't hear much [1:52:45] from Mr. Dean after that. [1:52:47] You've had a long [1:52:48] and distinguished career [1:52:49] in the Army now. [1:52:51] You saw something going on [1:52:53] as a first lieutenant [1:52:54] that you knew [1:52:55] was absolutely, [1:52:56] inherently wrong [1:52:57] and ought to be corrected. [1:52:59] Would you ever have [1:53:00] occasion to bypass [1:53:01] the captain [1:53:03] and go see the major [1:53:04] in an effort [1:53:04] to get it corrected? [1:53:05] If I saw something [1:53:06] going on wrong, [1:53:08] I believe I would, [1:53:09] Senator. [1:53:09] But I must repeat [1:53:10] that what Mr. Dean [1:53:11] was asking me to do, [1:53:13] he wasn't asking, [1:53:13] it was all tentative [1:53:14] exploration. [1:53:15] Had Mr. Dean [1:53:16] at any time [1:53:17] ordered me to do [1:53:18] something improper, [1:53:19] I would have asked [1:53:19] to see the President. [1:53:20] I'm not talking about that. [1:53:21] There's no reflection [1:53:22] whatever on your conduct, [1:53:24] General. [1:53:24] I commend you for it. [1:53:26] You were asked [1:53:27] to get involved [1:53:28] in the obstruction [1:53:29] of justice [1:53:29] and you didn't do it. [1:53:31] But you did know [1:53:32] that some of the closest [1:53:33] confidants and advisors [1:53:35] to the President [1:53:35] of the United States [1:53:36] were involved [1:53:37] in that conspiracy [1:53:38] and you didn't inform [1:53:40] the President. [1:53:41] Why not? [1:53:43] I don't quite take [1:53:44] the same assumption [1:53:45] on the question [1:53:45] that you do, Senator, [1:53:46] but I will try [1:53:47] and answer it. [1:53:49] First of all, [1:53:50] to go back [1:53:51] to the climate [1:53:51] of this time, [1:53:52] the agency was under attack [1:53:54] with various [1:53:54] unjustified accusations. [1:53:57] My interviews [1:53:58] with Mr. Dean [1:53:58] were alone. [1:54:00] It was his word [1:54:01] against mine. [1:54:03] If I had gone out [1:54:04] and simply accused him [1:54:05] of trying to involve me [1:54:07] in something [1:54:07] and he'd said, [1:54:08] no, the environment [1:54:10] in the United States [1:54:11] at that time [1:54:12] would not necessarily [1:54:13] have been favorable [1:54:13] to my unsupported word. [1:54:15] I would have simply [1:54:16] involved the agency [1:54:17] in further publicity [1:54:18] in support of something [1:54:20] I could not prove [1:54:21] other than by my statement. [1:54:23] General. [1:54:23] Excuse me. [1:54:26] My overwhelming concern [1:54:27] for Senator [1:54:29] at this time [1:54:30] as it is today [1:54:31] is because I believe [1:54:32] that an effective CIA [1:54:33] is essential [1:54:34] to the United States. [1:54:35] Had I gotten us involved [1:54:37] in a Donnybrook [1:54:38] which I couldn't prove [1:54:40] other than by my [1:54:41] unsupported word. [1:54:43] I would not have served [1:54:44] the purpose [1:54:44] that I was attempting [1:54:46] to serve. [1:54:46] General, I have no [1:54:47] further questions. [1:54:48] I want to compliment you [1:54:50] on your long [1:54:51] and distinguished service [1:54:52] to your country [1:54:53] and your absolute candor [1:54:55] in testifying [1:54:56] before this committee. [1:54:57] Thank you very much, [1:54:57] Senator. [1:54:59] Senator Garnett. [1:55:01] In a moment, [1:55:02] Senator Garnett will ask [1:55:03] if General Walters [1:55:04] was requested [1:55:05] or ordered [1:55:05] to go see the FBI director. [1:55:08] Public television coverage [1:55:09] of the Senate Watergate hearings [1:55:10] will continue [1:55:11] after a pause [1:55:12] for station identification. [1:55:14] Unabridged coverage [1:55:15] of these hearings [1:55:15] is provided [1:55:16] as a public service [1:55:17] by the member stations [1:55:18] of PBS, [1:55:20] the public broadcasting service. [1:55:31] From Washington, [1:55:32] N-PACT continues [1:55:33] its coverage of hearings [1:55:34] by the Senate Select Committee [1:55:35] on Presidential Campaign Activities. [1:55:38] Here again, [1:55:39] correspondent Jim Lehrer. [1:55:41] As we go back [1:55:42] to the hearings, [1:55:42] it's Senator Gurney's turn [1:55:44] to question General Walters. [1:55:47] Senator Gurney. [1:55:50] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:55:51] General, [1:55:57] there are two different versions [1:55:59] about what Mr. Haldeman [1:56:02] said to you [1:56:05] at that first meeting [1:56:06] in your memo, [1:56:08] and I read from the memo, [1:56:10] it says, [1:56:10] Haldeman then stated [1:56:11] I could tell Gray [1:56:13] that I had talked [1:56:13] to the White House [1:56:14] and suggested [1:56:16] that the investigation [1:56:17] not be pushed further. [1:56:21] In your testimony [1:56:22] before the Appropriations Committee, [1:56:26] you had this to say, [1:56:27] and this is from the record [1:56:29] of the Appropriations Committee, [1:56:31] Mr. Haldeman said this, [1:56:33] it has been decided [1:56:35] that you, Walters, [1:56:37] will go to Mr. Gray [1:56:38] and tell him [1:56:39] that if the investigation [1:56:40] of the Mexican finance [1:56:42] part of this thing [1:56:43] is pursued, [1:56:44] it may uncover [1:56:45] some CIA assets. [1:56:48] Now that is [1:56:48] somewhat different. [1:56:49] Which order [1:56:51] did he actually give you, [1:56:52] or what did he say to you? [1:56:55] Senator, [1:56:56] being a lesser man [1:56:57] than Matthew, Mark, [1:56:58] Luke, and John, [1:56:59] I also occasionally [1:57:00] have things. [1:57:02] I do not, [1:57:03] in retrospect, [1:57:04] in thinking it back [1:57:04] and refreshing my memory, [1:57:05] I do not recall [1:57:07] him mentioning money. [1:57:10] I'm not trying [1:57:11] to trip you up, General. [1:57:12] Please believe. [1:57:13] But there is [1:57:14] a tremendous difference [1:57:15] between these two versions. [1:57:17] One version is [1:57:18] that Haldeman [1:57:19] is ordering you [1:57:20] to order the FBI [1:57:22] to stop. [1:57:23] The other one [1:57:25] is to inform [1:57:26] the FBI [1:57:27] that if they [1:57:28] pursue this [1:57:28] Mexican money business [1:57:31] that it may [1:57:32] uncover some CIA assets. [1:57:34] And those are [1:57:35] two diametrically [1:57:36] different things. [1:57:37] My best recollection, [1:57:40] Senator, [1:57:40] as I see it, [1:57:41] was that the pursuit [1:57:42] of this investigation [1:57:42] in Mexico, [1:57:44] in Mexico, [1:57:45] and limited only [1:57:45] to Mexico, [1:57:46] could endanger CIA assets. [1:57:48] Whether the money aspect [1:57:50] came into my mind, [1:57:51] because Gray mentioned it [1:57:52] when I talked to him, [1:57:53] which was prior [1:57:54] to my testimony [1:57:54] before the House [1:57:56] Appropriations Committee, [1:57:58] but long subsequent [1:57:59] to the memorandum I wrote, [1:58:00] I would rather, [1:58:01] in this case, [1:58:02] trust the memorandum [1:58:03] I wrote five days later [1:58:04] than a testimony [1:58:06] I might have given [1:58:06] a long time later [1:58:08] influenced by what [1:58:09] I knew subsequently [1:58:11] that the Mexican thing [1:58:12] involved money. [1:58:14] Quite presently, [1:58:15] my recollection is [1:58:16] that money [1:58:17] specifically [1:58:17] was not mentioned. [1:58:19] Well, [1:58:20] that really isn't [1:58:21] the thing [1:58:22] that I'm talking about. [1:58:24] The money [1:58:24] is kind of incidental here. [1:58:27] What I'm talking about [1:58:28] is whether [1:58:28] Mr. Haldeman [1:58:29] directed you [1:58:30] to go to the FBI [1:58:31] and tell them [1:58:33] not to, [1:58:34] let's use your own words here, [1:58:40] push the investigation [1:58:41] furthest. [1:58:42] That is correct, [1:58:43] Senator. [1:58:43] That really is [1:58:45] ordering the FBI [1:58:46] to stop. [1:58:48] The other one [1:58:49] is saying [1:58:52] to the FBI [1:58:53] that if you [1:58:54] pursue something [1:58:55] in Mexico, [1:58:56] whether it's money [1:58:57] or anything else, [1:58:58] that's unimportant, [1:59:00] that it may interfere [1:59:01] with the CIA. [1:59:02] And one of the reasons [1:59:03] why this is so important [1:59:04] and why I'm asking it [1:59:05] is that one version, [1:59:08] the version you gave [1:59:09] before the [1:59:09] Appropriations Committee, [1:59:11] coincides, [1:59:13] I think, [1:59:13] with what the president [1:59:14] told Haldeman [1:59:16] to do, [1:59:18] the other one [1:59:19] in your memorandum [1:59:20] coincides more [1:59:22] with what apparently [1:59:24] was going on [1:59:24] in the White House [1:59:25] that we've learned [1:59:27] before this committee [1:59:28] here in these last [1:59:29] several weeks. [1:59:30] And that was a cover-up. [1:59:31] That's why it's important [1:59:33] to get this thing [1:59:33] pinned down [1:59:34] if we can. [1:59:34] The only thing [1:59:35] I can tell you, [1:59:36] Senator, [1:59:36] is to the best [1:59:36] of my recollection [1:59:37] at the present time [1:59:39] in all the light [1:59:39] of what I know, [1:59:40] I was told [1:59:41] you will go [1:59:42] to Mr. Gray [1:59:43] and you will tell him [1:59:45] that if the investigation [1:59:47] in Mexico [1:59:48] is pushed further, [1:59:49] it may, [1:59:50] I didn't say stop, [1:59:51] it may uncover [1:59:52] some CIA assets. [1:59:58] That coincides more [2:00:00] with the testimony [2:00:02] that you gave [2:00:02] before the Appropriations Committee [2:00:04] and less with [2:00:05] your memorandum here. [2:00:07] Now then, [2:00:08] after you finished [2:00:09] this meeting [2:00:10] with Haldeman [2:00:12] and Ehrlichman, [2:00:13] you and Director Helms, [2:00:15] you mentioned [2:00:15] that you left [2:00:16] the meeting [2:00:17] and you chatted [2:00:18] together for a moment [2:00:19] and Mr. Helms [2:00:20] reminded you [2:00:22] to tell Pat Gray [2:00:24] that there was [2:00:25] a rapport [2:00:25] between the two agencies. [2:00:27] Yes, sir. [2:00:28] But didn't you [2:00:29] and Director Helms [2:00:30] discuss this very [2:00:31] unusual meeting [2:00:32] and this very [2:00:33] unusual order? [2:00:35] Here is Haldeman, [2:00:38] the presidential assistant, [2:00:40] ordering you [2:00:41] to go to the FBI [2:00:42] and instruct them [2:00:45] to do something [2:00:46] and not do something. [2:00:47] Didn't you [2:00:48] and the Director [2:00:48] discuss that, [2:00:49] unusual? [2:00:50] I think we both felt [2:00:52] that Mr. Haldeman [2:00:53] might have some information [2:00:54] to which we were not privy. [2:00:57] Well, [2:00:58] did you ask him? [2:01:00] Did I ask who, sir? [2:01:02] Mr. Haldeman. [2:01:03] I did not ask Mr. Haldeman [2:01:04] what information [2:01:05] he might have. [2:01:05] I felt that [2:01:06] if he wanted me to know, [2:01:07] he would have told me. [2:01:08] But isn't the mission [2:01:10] of the CIA [2:01:12] to find out [2:01:13] for the President [2:01:14] as well as [2:01:14] the Defense Department, [2:01:15] the State Department [2:01:16] and any other [2:01:17] interested agencies [2:01:18] all manner [2:01:19] of foreign intelligence [2:01:20] that may be dangerous [2:01:22] or detrimental [2:01:22] to the United States? [2:01:23] I believe that is [2:01:24] the general mission [2:01:25] of the agency, yes. [2:01:26] Who would in this government [2:01:27] be better able [2:01:29] to have that kind [2:01:31] of information [2:01:32] than Mr. Helms [2:01:33] and General Walters? [2:01:34] We would have, sir, [2:01:35] once we had access [2:01:36] to our sources [2:01:37] on this matter. [2:01:37] The CIA is quite [2:01:38] a large agency [2:01:39] and I do not believe [2:01:40] that Mr. Helms [2:01:40] after six years, [2:01:42] and I certainly [2:01:43] after six weeks, [2:01:44] did not know [2:01:45] the details [2:01:45] of all the agency [2:01:46] operations in Mexico. [2:01:48] I wouldn't expect [2:01:49] that either, [2:01:50] general, [2:01:51] and I'm not really [2:01:51] talking about that. [2:01:53] I'm saying that [2:01:55] it strikes me [2:01:56] as though you might [2:01:56] have been curious [2:01:57] and said, [2:01:58] Mr. Holloman, [2:01:59] what are we doing [2:01:59] down in Mexico [2:02:00] that you're afraid [2:02:01] is going to be [2:02:02] interrupted? [2:02:04] Perhaps in retrospect [2:02:05] I should have, sir, [2:02:06] but the nature [2:02:06] of the direction [2:02:07] that was given to me [2:02:08] was quite explicit. [2:02:10] Well, [2:02:10] but that impresses me too. [2:02:13] It was extremely explicit [2:02:14] and I wonder [2:02:18] why there wasn't [2:02:19] some question of it [2:02:20] or some further inquiry [2:02:21] by either you [2:02:23] or Director Helms [2:02:24] there of Mr. Holloman. [2:02:25] Sir, [2:02:26] as soon as I talked [2:02:27] to Mr. Gray, [2:02:27] I went back [2:02:28] to the agency [2:02:28] and attempted [2:02:29] to check up [2:02:30] to see whether [2:02:30] this was a fact or not. [2:02:38] You mentioned also [2:02:40] that I think [2:02:44] it was in this [2:02:44] first meeting [2:02:45] or maybe one [2:02:46] of the dean meetings. [2:02:48] No, it was [2:02:48] the first meeting. [2:02:50] The investigation [2:02:50] was leading [2:02:51] to a lot [2:02:52] of important people. [2:02:53] Who were [2:02:53] these important people? [2:02:55] I was not told, sir. [2:02:56] Did you ask? [2:02:57] No, sir. [2:02:58] Did Director Helms ask? [2:02:59] I do not believe he did. [2:03:08] In a later meeting [2:03:09] with Dean, [2:03:10] I think that was [2:03:10] the 27th, [2:03:11] Dean said that [2:03:13] some of these suspects [2:03:15] might talk. [2:03:16] Talk about what? [2:03:18] I thought he was telling me [2:03:19] they might talk [2:03:20] and involve the CIA [2:03:21] and it didn't worry [2:03:21] me one iota [2:03:22] because I knew [2:03:23] that there was nothing [2:03:23] they could say [2:03:24] which would involve [2:03:25] the CIA. [2:03:27] It didn't occur to you [2:03:28] that he might be saying [2:03:29] that they might talk [2:03:30] and involve [2:03:31] somebody in the government [2:03:33] other than the CIA? [2:03:35] No, sir, [2:03:35] that was not the [2:03:36] understanding I had of it. [2:03:37] The understanding I had [2:03:38] was they might talk [2:03:39] and involve the CIA. [2:03:40] Maybe in the committee [2:03:41] to re-elect the president? [2:03:44] My understanding [2:03:45] was that it referred [2:03:46] to us, sir, [2:03:46] that it was a veiled [2:03:47] form of a threat. [2:03:49] Didn't occur to you [2:03:50] it might be people [2:03:51] in the White House? [2:03:52] No, by the time [2:03:54] I had my meeting... [2:03:55] They might talk [2:03:56] about people [2:03:57] who were in the White House. [2:03:58] This thought [2:03:59] did cross my mind, [2:04:00] yes, sir. [2:04:00] Did you ask him? [2:04:01] No, I did not. [2:04:02] This business [2:04:13] about the letter [2:04:13] from the CIA [2:04:15] to the FBI, [2:04:20] that the FBI [2:04:20] should not go ahead [2:04:22] of this investigation [2:04:23] because it might [2:04:24] compromise security interests. [2:04:28] Who asked the agency [2:04:29] to write a letter [2:04:30] to the FBI? [2:04:31] On the 5th of July, [2:04:34] Senator Pat Gray [2:04:35] called me [2:04:35] and said, [2:04:37] I can't stop this [2:04:37] unless I get a letter [2:04:38] from you [2:04:39] or the director [2:04:40] or from Helms [2:04:41] or from you [2:04:41] saying that the further [2:04:43] pursuit of this investigation [2:04:44] in Mexico [2:04:44] will jeopardize CIA assets. [2:04:47] That was the first [2:04:47] mention of it. [2:04:48] Did he indicate [2:04:49] that somebody [2:04:50] had asked him [2:04:51] to talk to you [2:04:53] and ask for a letter? [2:04:56] I do not have [2:04:56] any recollection [2:04:57] of that, Senator. [2:04:58] Did you ask him? [2:04:59] No. [2:05:01] It was your impression [2:05:04] that he was going ahead [2:05:06] and only that [2:05:07] could stop him [2:05:08] from going ahead. [2:05:08] That was my impression, [2:05:09] Senator. [2:05:10] I won't repeat [2:05:16] the question [2:05:17] that Senator Talmadge [2:05:18] asked. [2:05:19] I had it here [2:05:20] to ask myself [2:05:21] about the long [2:05:23] association [2:05:24] with the President [2:05:25] and all of these [2:05:26] very unusual events [2:05:28] that occurred [2:05:28] between the White House [2:05:29] people and CIA [2:05:32] and the FBI [2:05:33] that would certainly [2:05:35] lead to indicate [2:05:37] that all was not well [2:05:39] in these requests [2:05:40] being made of you. [2:05:42] And, of course, [2:05:42] you realized that [2:05:43] and you didn't do [2:05:43] anything about it. [2:05:44] And I share [2:05:44] Senator Talmadge's [2:05:47] feeling that [2:05:49] you acted properly. [2:05:51] I do indeed. [2:05:52] And I don't want [2:05:53] to question that. [2:05:55] But I, [2:05:56] and I want to ask you [2:05:56] why you didn't go [2:05:57] to the President. [2:05:58] He already has done [2:05:59] that. [2:06:00] But did you ever [2:06:01] discuss this [2:06:02] with Director Helms [2:06:03] and say, [2:06:04] now, Mr. Helms, [2:06:05] all this is going on [2:06:07] here. [2:06:08] Something really [2:06:08] must be very strange. [2:06:10] Do you think [2:06:11] that we ought [2:06:11] to advise the President? [2:06:13] Did you ever [2:06:14] discuss that [2:06:15] with Mr. Helms? [2:06:16] I don't think [2:06:17] we did, Senator. [2:06:18] I think one [2:06:18] of the reasons [2:06:19] for that, [2:06:19] which is difficult [2:06:20] to see in retrospect, [2:06:21] is this was compressed [2:06:22] in a very short [2:06:23] period of time. [2:06:25] The whole span [2:06:26] of this was [2:06:27] from the 23rd [2:06:28] to the 28th [2:06:29] in a period [2:06:30] of five days. [2:06:32] After that, [2:06:33] after I told Dean [2:06:33] that if he pushed [2:06:34] me any further [2:06:35] I would go [2:06:35] to the President, [2:06:37] I never heard [2:06:37] from him again. [2:06:39] Yes, and I can [2:06:40] understand that [2:06:41] and that occurred [2:06:41] to me also. [2:06:42] But then in February [2:06:44] of the next year, [2:06:46] here comes a call [2:06:47] from Mr. Dean [2:06:48] saying, [2:06:49] now there's some [2:06:50] material over there [2:06:51] in the FBI [2:06:52] that you gave [2:06:54] the FBI, [2:06:55] CIA gave the FBI. [2:06:56] I want you, [2:06:59] that is the CIA, [2:07:00] to request [2:07:01] that material [2:07:02] to be returned [2:07:03] to you [2:07:03] and simply [2:07:04] a card put in there [2:07:06] with that advice [2:07:07] that it had been returned [2:07:08] without any reference [2:07:09] to what the material was. [2:07:12] Now, what did you think [2:07:13] Mr. Dean [2:07:14] was trying to do then? [2:07:15] Well, as I recall, [2:07:16] Senator, [2:07:17] he called Dr. Schlesinger, [2:07:18] not me. [2:07:19] I thought that he was trying [2:07:20] to, as I put it, [2:07:21] leave an arrow [2:07:22] in the Department [2:07:23] of Justice files [2:07:24] pointing at Langley. [2:07:26] But again, [2:07:27] didn't that occur [2:07:28] to you [2:07:29] and Director Schlesinger [2:07:31] and I do remember [2:07:33] now the call [2:07:33] was to him, [2:07:35] but you and he [2:07:36] discussed it [2:07:36] and you also discussed it, [2:07:39] did you not, [2:07:40] in reviewing [2:07:41] all these other facts [2:07:43] that had occurred [2:07:44] in 1972? [2:07:45] Weren't those [2:07:46] brought up again? [2:07:47] Didn't you say [2:07:47] you talked to [2:07:48] Director Schlesinger [2:07:49] about that? [2:07:50] I talked to [2:07:51] Director Schlesinger [2:07:52] before Dean's call. [2:07:54] But he knew [2:07:54] about those things. [2:07:55] He knew about [2:07:56] the events [2:07:56] that had gone before, [2:07:57] yes, sir. [2:07:57] Well, in your discussions [2:07:59] about this latest [2:08:00] request from Mr. Dean, [2:08:01] did you and he [2:08:02] raise the question [2:08:03] that this looks [2:08:05] like a cover-up [2:08:06] over there [2:08:06] at the White House [2:08:07] that Mr. Dean [2:08:08] may be involved in? [2:08:09] No, sir. [2:08:10] I think we regarded it [2:08:11] as making an improper [2:08:12] suggestion to us [2:08:13] that would incriminate [2:08:14] the agency, [2:08:14] which was not implicated. [2:08:16] We refused to do this [2:08:18] and Mr. Dean [2:08:19] asked nothing further [2:08:20] of us. [2:08:20] But why would he [2:08:21] want to incriminate [2:08:22] the agency? [2:08:23] That wouldn't do [2:08:24] him any good [2:08:25] or the cause [2:08:27] that he was [2:08:27] so eagerly working [2:08:28] at at that [2:08:29] particular time, [2:08:30] would it? [2:08:30] I don't know [2:08:31] what his motivation [2:08:32] was, Senator. [2:08:34] Motivation to me [2:08:35] looks like he wanted [2:08:36] that material out [2:08:37] of there so that [2:08:38] it wouldn't be seen [2:08:39] by the prosecutors [2:08:40] as somebody in charge [2:08:41] of prosecuting the case. [2:08:44] It was definitely [2:08:45] a part of the cover-up. [2:08:47] That could have been [2:08:47] the case, yes, sir. [2:08:49] But anyway, [2:08:50] there wasn't any [2:08:50] discussion about that. [2:08:52] No, sir. [2:08:52] Well, I think [2:08:55] my time has elapsed [2:08:56] and I certainly [2:08:57] agree, as I say [2:09:01] with Senator Talmadge, [2:09:02] that the CIA [2:09:03] is clean [2:09:04] and not involving [2:09:06] themselves in this [2:09:07] messy business [2:09:08] that we've been [2:09:09] discussing here [2:09:10] for several weeks. [2:09:11] But I do wish [2:09:13] that somebody [2:09:15] had won the President [2:09:16] of the United States. [2:09:17] It would have been [2:09:17] very helpful, I think. [2:09:18] That's all. [2:09:19] Thank you, Senator. [2:09:23] I'd just like to announce [2:09:24] that Senator Montoya [2:09:25] is floor manager [2:09:27] of the pending bill [2:09:28] before the Senate [2:09:28] for that reason [2:09:29] cannot be here. [2:09:30] General, the first [2:09:38] approach of John Dean [2:09:42] to you was to inquire [2:09:46] whether or not [2:09:47] the CIA was involved [2:09:50] in the Watergate [2:09:51] break-in, wasn't it? [2:09:52] Yes, Mr. Chairman. [2:09:53] And you assured him, [2:09:55] as well as everyone else [2:09:57] you conversed with, [2:09:58] that the CIA had no part [2:10:00] in the Watergate [2:10:01] burglary. [2:10:02] That is correct, [2:10:03] Mr. Chairman. [2:10:04] Then he told you [2:10:06] that he had a problem, [2:10:12] his problem was [2:10:13] to stop the investigation [2:10:18] with the five men [2:10:20] that were caught [2:10:21] in the Watergate. [2:10:22] And he wondered [2:10:23] whether the CIA [2:10:25] could afford him [2:10:26] any assistance. [2:10:27] And you informed him [2:10:29] that the CIA [2:10:30] could not afford him [2:10:32] any assistance [2:10:33] in solution to that problem [2:10:34] and would not. [2:10:36] That is correct, Chairman. [2:10:37] And as you state, [2:10:40] this whole, [2:10:41] your communications [2:10:42] about this matter [2:10:44] with either Mr. Dean [2:10:46] or anybody else [2:10:47] covered a period [2:10:50] of only the period [2:10:53] from June the 23rd [2:10:56] to June the 25th. [2:10:58] Eighth. [2:10:58] 28th, I mean. [2:11:00] And that no further [2:11:02] approaches of any kind [2:11:04] were made to the CIA [2:11:06] and that you assumed [2:11:09] that whatever problem [2:11:12] that the communications [2:11:16] you had made to Dean [2:11:17] had put an end [2:11:19] to any effort [2:11:20] to enlist any aid [2:11:22] of any kind [2:11:23] on the part of the CIA. [2:11:25] That was my impression, [2:11:26] Mr. Chairman. [2:11:27] Now, you were asked [2:11:29] whether you thought [2:11:32] that you should have made [2:11:33] any communication [2:11:34] to the president, [2:11:36] but you were aware [2:11:37] of the fact [2:11:38] that on July the 26th, [2:11:42] July the 6th, [2:11:43] you were later acquainted [2:11:44] by Mr. L. Patrick Gray, [2:11:46] the acting director [2:11:47] of the FBI, [2:11:50] that he had communicated [2:11:51] with the president [2:11:52] and that he had informed [2:11:54] the president [2:11:54] that some of his aides [2:11:57] were doing him [2:11:59] mortal injury. [2:12:02] That was what he told me, [2:12:02] yes, sir. [2:12:03] You have testified [2:12:10] so clearly [2:12:12] that I have no further questions. [2:12:16] I just wish to make [2:12:17] two comments. [2:12:20] I assume from your evidence [2:12:21] that you accompanied [2:12:23] President Nixon [2:12:24] when he was vice president [2:12:25] on the tour [2:12:26] to South America [2:12:28] when he suffered attacks [2:12:31] by individuals [2:12:34] or groups down there. [2:12:36] Yes, sir. [2:12:36] And you testified [2:12:37] that he displayed [2:12:38] great courage [2:12:40] and I would like [2:12:42] to say that [2:12:42] from at that time [2:12:43] from hearing [2:12:44] what I heard [2:12:45] over the media [2:12:45] and what I read [2:12:47] in the newspaper [2:12:48] that I certainly [2:12:48] concur in that opinion. [2:12:51] I would also like [2:12:52] to say that [2:12:52] I could concur [2:12:53] in your opinion [2:12:55] that in the precarious [2:12:57] world in which [2:12:58] our nation now exists [2:13:00] that one of the best ways [2:13:03] to make it certain [2:13:05] that our nation [2:13:06] can remain a free country [2:13:07] is to have [2:13:09] an official [2:13:09] and viable [2:13:11] organization [2:13:12] back to CIA. [2:13:14] Thank you very much, [2:13:15] Mr. Chairman. [2:13:17] Senator Bacon. [2:13:18] The number of witnesses, [2:13:32] almost every witness, [2:13:33] I guess, [2:13:34] that they should not [2:13:36] assume from my questions [2:13:37] that I believe [2:13:38] or disbelieve [2:13:39] their testimony [2:13:40] or that the nature [2:13:41] of the inquiry [2:13:42] signifies anxiety [2:13:45] or concern [2:13:46] on my part [2:13:46] or satisfaction, [2:13:47] but rather [2:13:48] my questions [2:13:49] are designed [2:13:50] to elicit [2:13:50] particular information [2:13:52] and in some cases [2:13:54] to test that information [2:13:55] against the testimony [2:13:56] of other witnesses, [2:13:58] documentation, [2:13:59] and circumstances. [2:13:59] I'm sure you understand that. [2:14:01] I do, Senator. [2:14:02] It may be that [2:14:03] some of the questions [2:14:03] I'm going to ask you, [2:14:05] you have no personal [2:14:06] knowledge of. [2:14:07] If that's the case, [2:14:07] I'd be happy [2:14:08] to be directed [2:14:09] to a better primary [2:14:11] source of information. [2:14:13] I have today received [2:14:14] three bound copies [2:14:16] of documentation [2:14:18] which I understand [2:14:19] was supplied [2:14:20] by the CIA [2:14:21] to the staff [2:14:22] of this committee. [2:14:23] I have not yet [2:14:25] had an opportunity [2:14:25] to examine it. [2:14:26] I understand [2:14:36] for Mr. Dash [2:14:38] that the material [2:14:38] was supplied [2:14:39] by the CIA [2:14:40] to the Appropriations Committee [2:14:42] and to the staff [2:14:44] of the Appropriations Committee [2:14:45] to the staff [2:14:46] of this committee. [2:14:47] But in any event, [2:14:48] the significant thing [2:14:49] is that I've only [2:14:50] just seen it [2:14:51] and there has not been [2:14:52] an opportunity [2:14:52] to read it [2:14:53] and digest it. [2:14:54] So if I skip around [2:14:55] a little, [2:14:55] it does not mean [2:14:57] that I am trying [2:14:59] to pinpoint [2:14:59] a particular item [2:15:00] of being of significant [2:15:01] importance, [2:15:02] but rather that that's [2:15:03] what I've been able [2:15:04] to run across so far. [2:15:06] Let me state [2:15:07] one other thing [2:15:07] in preamble. [2:15:08] I am in no way [2:15:09] trying to buttress [2:15:11] the idea [2:15:12] that the CIA [2:15:13] was involved [2:15:14] in Watergate. [2:15:15] I am making [2:15:16] no such allegations. [2:15:19] I have a great [2:15:19] respect for the CIA [2:15:21] and a great appreciation [2:15:23] for what it's done [2:15:24] for you, [2:15:25] for Director Helms, [2:15:26] for all of those [2:15:28] other great gentlemen [2:15:29] who've served [2:15:30] this nation, [2:15:31] I believe, [2:15:31] very well [2:15:32] and very diligently. [2:15:33] So with that preamble, [2:15:35] I'd like to ask you [2:15:36] a few questions. [2:15:38] I notice in this document [2:15:39] a whole series [2:15:40] of letters [2:15:41] from McCord [2:15:44] to the agency. [2:15:45] Are you familiar [2:15:46] with those letters? [2:15:47] I became familiar [2:15:47] with them, [2:15:48] I would say, [2:15:48] in the beginning [2:15:49] of June of this year, [2:15:50] Senator. [2:15:51] To begin with, [2:15:59] Mr. Chairman, [2:16:00] I might note, [2:16:00] as we have [2:16:01] on previous occasions, [2:16:03] that these documents [2:16:04] are nominally classified [2:16:05] top secret, [2:16:07] handled via comment, [2:16:09] control system only, [2:16:11] and marked inside [2:16:12] on several pages [2:16:14] for administrative use [2:16:15] only and sensitive. [2:16:19] We understand, [2:16:20] I understand, [2:16:21] Mr. Chairman, [2:16:21] that insofar [2:16:23] as the evidence [2:16:23] that may be, [2:16:24] the material [2:16:24] that may be contained [2:16:25] in these documents [2:16:26] is clearly relevant [2:16:28] to the inquiry [2:16:28] of this committee, [2:16:29] that we have [2:16:30] the authority [2:16:31] by communication [2:16:32] from the White House [2:16:33] and by the inherent [2:16:33] authority of this committee [2:16:34] and of the Congress [2:16:36] to put them [2:16:37] in the record [2:16:38] notwithstanding. [2:16:38] I so construe [2:16:39] our authority. [2:16:40] Would you bear with me [2:16:46] just for a moment, [2:16:47] General, [2:16:47] while I go back [2:16:48] and try to find [2:16:49] the McCord letters [2:16:51] looking in your index? [2:16:53] I'm sorry for the delay, [2:17:26] Mr. Chairman, [2:17:27] but as I say, [2:17:28] it's only while [2:17:29] questioning began [2:17:30] that I've had an opportunity [2:17:31] to look at these documents [2:17:32] and I noted their location [2:17:37] by paper clip [2:17:38] and that turns out [2:17:38] not to be [2:17:39] the very best form [2:17:40] of indexing. [2:17:41] Third copy here. [2:17:54] Third copy. [2:17:56] Maybe you can tell me, [2:18:04] General, [2:18:04] while we're still looking [2:18:05] for these letters, [2:18:06] how many letters [2:18:07] were there [2:18:07] from Mr. McCord [2:18:08] to the CIA [2:18:10] after he was arrested [2:18:11] on June 17th [2:18:13] that are reflected [2:18:14] in these documents? [2:18:15] Senator, [2:18:15] it's quite difficult [2:18:16] for me to answer [2:18:17] this question [2:18:17] since I had no [2:18:18] personal contact [2:18:19] or knowledge of them [2:18:19] until I heard about them [2:18:20] in a general way [2:18:21] about a month ago. [2:18:22] But you are aware [2:18:33] that there are a number of them? [2:18:35] Yes, I have heard [2:18:36] that discussed and mentioned. [2:18:39] Have you read the letters? [2:18:40] No, sir, [2:18:41] I have not. [2:18:41] I'm referring now [2:18:51] to what appears [2:18:52] to be copy number two, [2:18:55] tab N, [2:19:00] and the first entry [2:19:02] is a letter dated [2:19:03] January 5, 1972, [2:19:05] which simply says [2:19:06] notes [2:19:07] and is unsigned, [2:19:10] but which has [2:19:10] a company in it, [2:19:11] a Xerox copy [2:19:12] of an envelope [2:19:14] addressed to Paul F. Gaynor, [2:19:16] G-A-Y-N-O-R, [2:19:18] 4629 35th Street, [2:19:20] North Arlington, Virginia. [2:19:21] Do you recognize [2:19:22] that name? [2:19:23] I believe that is [2:19:24] a member [2:19:24] of our organization, [2:19:25] yes. [2:19:26] Is that a standard [2:19:27] method of reaching [2:19:28] or conveying information [2:19:30] to your agency? [2:19:32] I wouldn't know, [2:19:32] Senator. [2:19:34] Do you know [2:19:34] who Mr. Gaynor is? [2:19:35] I know that he is [2:19:36] an agency employee. [2:19:37] I do not know [2:19:38] in detail what he is. [2:19:38] Do you know [2:19:39] why Mr. McCord [2:19:39] would be writing to him? [2:19:41] I have heard it said [2:19:41] that he knew [2:19:42] Mr. McCord [2:19:43] when Mr. McCord [2:19:43] was still working [2:19:44] with the agency. [2:19:44] Can you tell us [2:19:45] what Mr. Gaynor's [2:19:46] function is? [2:19:47] I believe he works [2:19:47] in the Office [2:19:48] of Security, Senator. [2:19:49] I'm not sure of that, [2:19:50] but I believe he works [2:19:51] in the Office of Security. [2:19:51] Did he work with [2:19:51] Mr. McCord [2:19:52] when Mr. McCord [2:19:54] was in the Office [2:19:54] of Security? [2:19:55] I have been given [2:19:56] that to understand. [2:19:57] I have no personal [2:19:58] knowledge of it. [2:19:59] Much of this [2:20:00] is information [2:20:01] we already have [2:20:02] from the testimony [2:20:03] of Mr. McCord [2:20:03] and I guess [2:20:04] an additional preamble [2:20:05] might be in order. [2:20:06] I'm not trying [2:20:07] to contradict [2:20:09] the testimony [2:20:09] of Mr. McCord. [2:20:10] As a matter of fact, [2:20:11] much of this [2:20:11] corroborates it, [2:20:12] but I want to do this [2:20:13] to reach [2:20:14] a final area [2:20:16] of inquiry. [2:20:16] The January 5, 1972 [2:20:19] quote note says [2:20:20] the outfit [2:20:21] tried to lay [2:20:22] the operation [2:20:22] at the feet [2:20:23] of the CIA [2:20:23] this week [2:20:24] and failed. [2:20:26] Paragraph 2 [2:20:27] yesterday, [2:20:27] they tried to get [2:20:28] all the defendants [2:20:29] to plead guilty, [2:20:30] thus protecting [2:20:30] those higher up [2:20:31] from involvement [2:20:32] and that failed. [2:20:34] Barker and Hunt [2:20:35] allegedly were willing [2:20:36] to plead, [2:20:36] so it is said. [2:20:37] McCord and Liddy [2:20:38] refused. [2:20:40] 3. In revenge, [2:20:41] now the prosecution [2:20:42] is planning to state [2:20:43] that the motives [2:20:44] of at least some [2:20:45] of the defendants [2:20:45] was blackmail. [2:20:47] This came out [2:20:48] of the ACLU [2:20:48] hearings today [2:20:49] in which the ACLU [2:20:50] lawyer said [2:20:51] that he was told [2:20:52] this by the prosecution, [2:20:54] that blackmail [2:20:54] was the motive. [2:20:55] 4. The outfit [2:20:56] is even getting [2:20:58] predictable. [2:20:59] It was anticipated [2:21:00] that when I refused [2:21:01] to implicate CIA [2:21:02] they would undertake [2:21:03] a massive character [2:21:04] assassination attempt. [2:21:06] 5. The judge [2:21:07] is not buying [2:21:07] this ploy. [2:21:09] He indicated [2:21:09] as much this morning, [2:21:10] referring to it [2:21:11] as a cover story [2:21:12] and indicating [2:21:12] that the world [2:21:13] was watching this case, [2:21:15] the Democrats [2:21:16] were criticizing [2:21:17] its handling, [2:21:18] and that the jury [2:21:18] was going to get [2:21:19] to the bottom of it. [2:21:20] He said that he [2:21:21] would personally [2:21:22] examine the tapes [2:21:23] of testimony [2:21:24] and send any [2:21:25] of the grand jury [2:21:26] that involved [2:21:26] higher-ups [2:21:27] or lower figures [2:21:28] involved. [2:21:29] Some of the newsmen [2:21:30] say they are scapegoats. [2:21:32] We are scapegoats. [2:21:33] They are right. [2:21:34] Corrected telephone [2:21:35] call data. [2:21:37] Call to Israeli embassy [2:21:39] September 21, 1972, [2:21:41] 8.35 a.m., [2:21:42] telephone 762-8720. [2:21:46] Call to Chilean embassy, [2:21:48] October 10, 1972, [2:21:50] 4.50 p.m., [2:21:52] telephone number [2:21:53] the same. [2:21:54] There are ditto marks, [2:21:55] Andrew. [2:21:56] Do you have any idea [2:21:56] why Mr. McCord [2:21:57] would be passing on [2:21:58] that information [2:21:59] to the CIA? [2:22:01] I have no idea [2:22:02] why he might, sir, [2:22:03] except as what I've read [2:22:05] in the newspapers, [2:22:06] I gather he still felt [2:22:07] a certain sense [2:22:07] of loyalty to the CIA [2:22:08] and he was anxious [2:22:09] that it not be blamed [2:22:10] for something [2:22:10] for which it was [2:22:11] not responsible. [2:22:12] And once again, [2:22:12] I'm not trying [2:22:13] to put you on the spot, [2:22:14] but is the fair inference [2:22:16] to draw from [2:22:16] that information [2:22:17] that Mr. McCord [2:22:18] was at least hoping [2:22:19] that you would investigate [2:22:20] whether or not [2:22:22] those calls [2:22:22] to those two embassies [2:22:23] were recorded? [2:22:25] I do not know [2:22:26] what he was thinking, [2:22:27] Senator. [2:22:27] As I told you, [2:22:28] I had no knowledge [2:22:28] of this letter [2:22:29] until June of this year. [2:22:31] Thank you, gentlemen. [2:22:31] The existence of it. [2:22:33] The next page, [2:22:34] it would appear [2:22:35] that we've headed them [2:22:37] off at the past. [2:22:38] At the past. [2:22:41] It would appear [2:22:42] that we've headed them [2:22:43] off at the past. [2:22:44] The crisis appears [2:22:45] to be over. [2:22:46] Also addressed [2:22:47] to Mr. Gaynor. [2:22:49] Are you familiar [2:22:50] with that statement? [2:22:51] I believe these [2:22:52] were published [2:22:53] in the newspapers, [2:22:53] unless I'm mistaken. [2:22:54] These letters? [2:22:55] I don't know [2:22:56] whether they were, [2:22:56] but I have read them somewhere. [2:22:57] I have heard [2:22:58] that statement before, yes. [2:22:59] We took them up [2:23:00] to the brink on this, [2:23:02] but I don't believe [2:23:02] they'll try it again. [2:23:04] I'm reading parts of it [2:23:05] because it's very long. [2:23:06] Mr. Chairman, [2:23:07] I ask unanimous consent [2:23:09] that the collection [2:23:11] of McCord letters [2:23:13] together with [2:23:13] the cover envelopes [2:23:15] might be received [2:23:16] in evidence [2:23:16] as an exhibit. [2:23:18] Without objection, [2:23:19] the next item [2:23:21] is unaddressed, [2:23:23] but it's dated [2:23:24] December 29, 1972, [2:23:27] and it appears [2:23:28] to have been transmitted [2:23:29] in an envelope [2:23:30] also addressed [2:23:31] to Mr. Paul F. Gaynor, [2:23:33] postmarked from Rockville, [2:23:34] Maryland, [2:23:34] on the 29th of December [2:23:36] at the same address. [2:23:38] What is needed [2:23:39] is the salutation. [2:23:44] Evidence of illegal [2:23:46] government wiretapping [2:23:47] of our telephones, [2:23:48] either on national [2:23:49] security grounds [2:23:50] or domestic security grounds, [2:23:52] both of which are done [2:23:53] on authority [2:23:54] of the Attorney General [2:23:55] signature alone. [2:23:56] There were two [2:23:57] national security calls [2:23:58] by me from our home phone, [2:24:00] 7620187. [2:24:03] One was made [2:24:03] to the Israeli Embassy [2:24:05] on blank, [2:24:06] and the other was made [2:24:07] to the Chilean Embassy [2:24:08] on blank. [2:24:09] Both calls were witnessed [2:24:10] by my wife. [2:24:11] He testified to it. [2:24:16] I am convinced [2:24:19] that from at least [2:24:20] June 17, [2:24:22] early July, [2:24:24] there was a wiretap [2:24:25] on our home [2:24:26] and office phones [2:24:26] on authority [2:24:27] of the AG signature alone. [2:24:29] On June 26, 1972, [2:24:31] the Supreme Court [2:24:32] declared such wiretaps [2:24:33] illegal, [2:24:34] and several cases [2:24:34] have been dismissed [2:24:35] on these grounds. [2:24:36] Recently, [2:24:37] rather than disclose [2:24:38] the adversary proceeding [2:24:39] in the adversary proceedings, [2:24:41] the contents [2:24:41] of such calls [2:24:42] and conversations, [2:24:43] and the names [2:24:43] of the party involved, [2:24:45] there is no question [2:24:46] but that our home [2:24:46] and office phones [2:24:47] are still being tapped. [2:24:49] It is being done [2:24:49] without a court order. [2:24:51] We are in an excellent position [2:24:52] to have the cases dropped. [2:24:55] What I need is proof, [2:24:56] logs, transcripts, [2:24:59] or testimony [2:25:00] from an FBI agent [2:25:01] or two [2:25:02] who had monitored [2:25:03] such calls. [2:25:05] Evidence of perjury [2:25:06] or false swearing [2:25:07] by Gary Bettenbender, [2:25:09] the MPD, [2:25:10] I take it to mean [2:25:11] the Metropolitan Police [2:25:12] Department officer. [2:25:13] I know he is lying. [2:25:15] Some additional evidence, [2:25:17] even circumstantial, [2:25:18] would help. [2:25:20] Going on and reading [2:25:21] other portions [2:25:23] of the thing, [2:25:25] or I think in fairness [2:25:33] to some semblance [2:25:34] of completeness [2:25:35] of this thing, [2:25:36] since I am omitting [2:25:37] parts of the letter [2:25:38] but they will in their entirety [2:25:39] be included in the record, [2:25:40] I might say that [2:25:41] also on this tab [2:25:43] are statements as follows [2:25:44] by Mr. McCord. [2:25:46] I have released [2:25:47] Gerald Altsch [2:25:48] as my defense attorney [2:25:49] in the Watergate case. [2:25:50] In a meeting recently [2:25:51] in which plans [2:25:52] for our defense [2:25:52] in the Watergate trial [2:25:53] were discussed, [2:25:54] he persisted in a proposal [2:25:55] that I claim [2:25:56] that the Watergate operation [2:25:57] was a CIA operation. [2:25:59] That is flatly untrue. [2:26:01] And when I rejected it, [2:26:03] he then went on [2:26:03] to make a second proposal. [2:26:05] The second proposal then [2:26:06] was that I claim [2:26:07] that the four Cubans [2:26:08] and I cooked up [2:26:09] the bugging operation [2:26:11] on our own. [2:26:11] This was also untrue. [2:26:14] When the hundreds [2:26:14] of dedicated fine men [2:26:16] and women of the CIA [2:26:17] can no longer write [2:26:18] intelligent summaries [2:26:19] and reports [2:26:20] with integrity, [2:26:22] without fear [2:26:23] of political recrimination, [2:26:25] when their fine director [2:26:26] is being summarily discharged [2:26:28] in order to make way [2:26:30] for a politician [2:26:31] who will write [2:26:32] or rewrite intelligence [2:26:33] the way the politicians [2:26:34] want them written, [2:26:36] instead of the way [2:26:37] the truth and best judgment [2:26:38] dictates, [2:26:39] our nation is in the deepest [2:26:41] of trouble [2:26:42] and freedom itself [2:26:43] was never so in peril. [2:26:45] Nazi Germany rose and fell [2:26:47] under exactly the same philosophy [2:26:49] of governmental operations. [2:26:52] Now, I understand [2:26:53] that I'm imposing on you, General, [2:26:56] but can you give us [2:26:57] any insight into why [2:26:59] Mr. McCord [2:27:00] was passing on these reports [2:27:03] to the CIA [2:27:03] on a regular basis [2:27:04] addressed to this person? [2:27:06] Have you ever inquired into it [2:27:08] or can you give me any insight? [2:27:10] I haven't really inquired into it. [2:27:11] I've just heard it discussed. [2:27:12] I gather that Mr. McCord, [2:27:14] at least at this period, [2:27:15] still felt an intense feeling [2:27:17] of loyalty towards the agency. [2:27:18] He did believe [2:27:19] that somebody was trying [2:27:21] to frame it. [2:27:22] But it did seem like [2:27:23] he was asking for help [2:27:24] from the CIA. [2:27:25] He may have been, sir, [2:27:26] but as I say, [2:27:27] I did not see these letters. [2:27:28] I would like to make [2:27:28] one comment, however. [2:27:29] It is perfectly obvious [2:27:31] that anyone who thinks [2:27:32] Dr. Schlesinger [2:27:33] can be pushed around [2:27:34] or made to write anything [2:27:36] that will suit anybody [2:27:37] has never met Dr. Schlesinger. [2:27:38] I entirely agree with you. [2:27:40] I have met Dr. Schlesinger. [2:27:41] I've had some rather heated debates [2:27:43] with Dr. Schlesinger [2:27:44] when he was chairman [2:27:46] of the Atomic Energy Commission [2:27:48] and since I'm on the Joint Committee [2:27:49] on Atomic Energy. [2:27:51] And I must say, [2:27:52] we came away, [2:27:53] neither of us claiming victory, [2:27:55] I think, [2:27:56] but I came away [2:27:57] with a very, very heightened respect [2:27:59] for his integrity [2:27:59] and also for his toughness. [2:28:02] Six months of working for him [2:28:04] gave me the same feeling. [2:28:05] I don't... [2:28:06] Great respect for his integrity. [2:28:06] I wouldn't imply for a moment [2:28:08] nor would I condone [2:28:09] the implication [2:28:10] that that description [2:28:11] would fit Dr. Schlesinger. [2:28:13] I don't believe that [2:28:14] for a second. [2:28:14] Now, I've just violated [2:28:15] the rule that I put on myself [2:28:17] that I won't comment [2:28:18] on the testimony, [2:28:19] but in that one I will. [2:28:20] Sir, if I may, [2:28:20] I'd like to say [2:28:21] that my statements [2:28:22] apply to James Schlesinger. [2:28:23] Pardon? [2:28:24] My statements apply [2:28:25] to James Schlesinger, [2:28:26] who is the Secretary of Defense. [2:28:28] That's right, [2:28:28] and he was once [2:28:29] head of the CIA [2:28:30] and before that [2:28:31] chairman of the [2:28:32] Atomic Energy Commission. [2:28:33] And who knows [2:28:34] what he may be next. [2:28:41] I'm reading now [2:28:42] from the memo [2:28:43] of December 29, 1972, [2:28:46] also in an envelope [2:28:47] addressed to Paul Gaynor. [2:28:49] One paragraph reads, [2:28:51] their persistence [2:28:52] in wanting to let [2:28:52] Gary Alts call Helms [2:28:54] to testify [2:28:55] and to call Vic Marchetti [2:28:58] to lay the background [2:28:59] re-CIA employees [2:29:01] once caught in the act [2:29:03] refusing to admit it. [2:29:05] Also read custom [2:29:06] and tradition [2:29:06] of CIA along this line. [2:29:10] Reading now [2:29:10] from paragraph four, [2:29:11] the fixed police officers report. [2:29:14] That of Gary Bittenbender, [2:29:17] not Carl, [2:29:17] as previously reported. [2:29:19] The impact of his statement [2:29:20] is one which can be read [2:29:22] two ways, [2:29:23] giving them a fallback position. [2:29:24] One, [2:29:26] that I claimed to him [2:29:27] at the time [2:29:27] of the arraignment [2:29:28] that this was a CIA operation, [2:29:30] and B, [2:29:31] that this was an operation [2:29:32] which we, [2:29:33] the Cubans and I, [2:29:34] cooked up on our own. [2:29:35] No such statements were made. [2:29:37] They're absolutely false. [2:29:39] Now here is [2:29:42] a simple sheet of paper [2:29:45] that has the words [2:29:46] Mitchell, Dean, [2:29:47] Magruder, [2:29:47] Colson, [2:29:48] and Liddy on it [2:29:49] attached to that memo [2:29:50] with no explanation. [2:29:52] And beyond that, [2:29:54] the MPD officer's name [2:29:55] is Carl Bittenbender. [2:29:57] The pressure is still on. [2:29:59] They can go to hell. [2:30:01] Any time you need me [2:30:02] to testify [2:30:03] before a congressional committee [2:30:05] on your behalf, [2:30:06] just yell. [2:30:06] Now this was addressed [2:30:07] to Mr. Gaynor of the CIA. [2:30:10] Was there any thought [2:30:13] that you know of [2:30:14] in the CIA [2:30:14] of calling Mr. McCord [2:30:16] to testify [2:30:16] on behalf of the CIA? [2:30:18] No, sir. [2:30:19] Not that I've ever heard of. [2:30:20] Another one, [2:30:24] handwritten [2:30:25] to Mr. Paul Gaynor, [2:30:27] postmarked Washington, D.C. [2:30:29] and the post date [2:30:30] is illegible. [2:30:32] And there's none [2:30:33] on the typed memorandum, [2:30:35] Jack. [2:30:38] Sorry to have to write you [2:30:39] this letter, [2:30:40] but felt you had to know. [2:30:42] If helm goes [2:30:43] and if the WG operation [2:30:46] is laid at CIA's feet [2:30:48] where it does not belong, [2:30:51] every tree in the forest [2:30:53] will fall. [2:30:54] It will be a scorched desert. [2:30:56] The whole matter [2:30:57] is at the precipice [2:30:59] right now. [2:31:00] Just pass the message [2:31:01] that if they want it to blow, [2:31:03] they're on exactly [2:31:04] the right course. [2:31:06] I'm sorry that you [2:31:07] will get hurt [2:31:07] in the fallout. [2:31:08] Another one, [2:31:11] December 22, 1972, [2:31:13] addressed to Mr. Paul Gaynor [2:31:15] at a different address, [2:31:16] 1005 South Quebec, [2:31:17] Arlington, Virginia. [2:31:20] Dear Paul, [2:31:21] there is tremendous pressure [2:31:23] to put the operation [2:31:24] off on the company. [2:31:25] Is the CIA referred to [2:31:26] internally sometimes [2:31:27] as the company? [2:31:28] Sometimes. [2:31:29] Don't worry about me [2:31:31] no matter what you hear. [2:31:33] The way to head this off [2:31:35] is to flood the newspapers [2:31:37] with leaks [2:31:38] or anonymous letters [2:31:40] that the plan [2:31:40] is to place the blame [2:31:41] on the company [2:31:42] for the operation. [2:31:44] This is of immediate importance [2:31:46] because the plans [2:31:47] are in the formative stage now [2:31:48] and can be preempted now [2:31:50] if the story is leaked [2:31:52] so that the press is alerted. [2:31:54] It may not be headed off later [2:31:56] when it is too late. [2:32:00] The fix is on [2:32:01] one of the police officers [2:32:02] in the MPD [2:32:03] Intelligence Department [2:32:04] to testify [2:32:06] that one of the defendants [2:32:07] told him [2:32:08] the defendants [2:32:08] were company people [2:32:09] and it was a company operation. [2:32:13] He has probably been promised [2:32:14] a promotion [2:32:15] for changing his story [2:32:16] to this effect. [2:32:17] Be careful [2:32:18] in your dealings with them. [2:32:19] I will do all I can [2:32:21] to keep you informed. [2:32:22] Keep the faith. [2:32:27] And another one. [2:32:29] Address to Mr. Richard Helms, [2:32:32] Director, [2:32:33] Central Intelligence Agency, [2:32:35] Langley, Virginia, [2:32:37] on a postmark, [2:32:38] I believe, [2:32:38] of July 30, 1972, [2:32:42] marked personally. [2:32:43] From time to time, [2:32:46] I'll send along things [2:32:48] you may be interested in [2:32:49] from an info standpoint. [2:32:51] This is a copy of a letter [2:32:53] which I sent to my lawyer [2:32:54] with best regards, [2:32:57] unsigned. [2:32:59] And another one. [2:33:05] There is no accompanying envelope [2:33:07] as far as this compilation indicates. [2:33:10] Dear blank. [2:33:13] A few interesting bits of information [2:33:15] you will be interested in. [2:33:17] When Paul O'Brien was engaged [2:33:20] by the committee, [2:33:22] as their lawyer in this case, [2:33:23] the committee told him [2:33:25] that the operation [2:33:26] was a CIA operation. [2:33:29] He says he did not learn otherwise [2:33:30] until one of the defendants [2:33:32] told him the facts, [2:33:33] and he says he blew up over it. [2:33:37] The prosecution under Silbert [2:33:39] had, of course, [2:33:40] begun that line [2:33:41] with Judge Belson [2:33:42] from the very first hearing. [2:33:44] Although never coming right out [2:33:46] and saying so [2:33:46] is inferred by him [2:33:47] in every hearing [2:33:48] that I witnessed and learned [2:33:50] that he did so [2:33:51] with the other defendants [2:33:52] in the bond hearings. [2:33:54] Now that the CIA's story [2:33:56] has not held water [2:33:57] or, more correctly, [2:33:58] will not be allowed [2:33:59] to stand by the CIA, [2:34:03] the prosecution [2:34:03] is now planning [2:34:04] to change to charge [2:34:06] that Liddy stole the money [2:34:08] for the operation [2:34:08] from the committee [2:34:09] and, in turn, [2:34:10] bribed McCord and Hunt [2:34:11] to participate, [2:34:12] giving McCord [2:34:13] a $16,000 bribe [2:34:15] on one occasion [2:34:16] witnessed by a participant [2:34:17] who had turned [2:34:18] state's evidence. [2:34:20] Rest assured [2:34:21] that I will not be a patsy [2:34:22] to this latest ploy. [2:34:24] They'll have to dream up [2:34:26] a better one [2:34:27] than this latest story. [2:34:29] The state's witnesses [2:34:30] not only be impeached [2:34:33] on the stand [2:34:34] but be charged [2:34:35] with perjury [2:34:35] before the grand jury [2:34:36] of the federal official [2:34:37] if it has to be [2:34:38] such a statement to them. [2:34:39] If the committee officials [2:34:40] have alleged that Liddy [2:34:41] stole the funds [2:34:42] for such operation, [2:34:44] they also have perjured [2:34:45] themselves [2:34:45] or are subject [2:34:46] to such a prosecution. [2:34:48] Liddy may stand still [2:34:49] for this, [2:34:50] but I will not. [2:34:52] Final paragraph, [2:34:54] Mr. Chairman, [2:34:54] I'll stop reading. [2:34:56] As I have mentioned before, [2:34:57] I don't think [2:34:58] a fair trial [2:34:59] is ever going [2:35:00] to be obtained [2:35:00] in Washington [2:35:01] for the reasons [2:35:02] I have heretofore stated. [2:35:04] The prejudicial press coverage, [2:35:07] the high percentage [2:35:08] of registered [2:35:09] Democratic voters [2:35:10] from whom the jury [2:35:12] would be picked, [2:35:13] and the pro-government [2:35:15] leanings of such a jury, [2:35:17] most of whom [2:35:17] would be employed [2:35:18] by the government [2:35:19] and subject to a bias [2:35:20] or duress [2:35:21] from the prosecution [2:35:22] are only some [2:35:24] of the reasons. [2:35:26] The matter of timing [2:35:27] of a change of venue [2:35:28] motion is, [2:35:29] I realize, [2:35:30] is best left [2:35:31] in the hands [2:35:31] of the lawyers. [2:35:33] The fact remains [2:35:34] that I've lived [2:35:35] in Washington [2:35:35] since 1942 [2:35:37] and know certain things [2:35:39] about the District [2:35:40] of Columbia [2:35:40] from first-hand knowledge [2:35:42] having lived there [2:35:43] in the past [2:35:44] that I wanted you [2:35:45] that I wanted you [2:35:45] to be aware of. [2:35:48] Now, Mr. [2:35:49] I mean, General, [2:35:51] as I say, [2:35:53] I haven't had time [2:35:54] to read all this. [2:35:55] There's a veritable forest [2:35:57] of paperclips [2:35:58] that I've put [2:35:59] on this thing already, [2:36:00] and I'm going to read it [2:36:01] over the weekend [2:36:02] if I can. [2:36:03] And I want to talk [2:36:05] about it some more. [2:36:06] It would appear obvious [2:36:07] to me that [2:36:07] since you came on board [2:36:09] in your present capacity [2:36:10] or your service [2:36:12] in other capacities [2:36:13] to the agency [2:36:14] that you do not have [2:36:15] first-hand knowledge [2:36:16] of this. [2:36:17] I was on board [2:36:18] at the time, [2:36:19] but I do not have [2:36:20] first-hand knowledge of it. [2:36:21] Well, I'd appreciate [2:36:21] your advice [2:36:22] on who would have [2:36:23] first-hand knowledge [2:36:23] of it [2:36:24] so that I can talk [2:36:25] to them. [2:36:27] I would say probably [2:36:28] the best man [2:36:29] to talk to [2:36:29] would be Mr. Osborne, [2:36:31] who is our [2:36:31] Director of Security. [2:36:35] Can you venture [2:36:35] any estimate [2:36:37] based on your examination? [2:36:39] Or Mr. Helms. [2:36:40] All right, sure, thank you. [2:36:42] Can you venture [2:36:42] any estimate [2:36:43] based on your knowledge [2:36:45] of CIA operations [2:36:46] of Mr. Hunt [2:36:47] or the facts [2:36:48] as you've found them [2:36:49] since June 17 [2:36:50] on any reasonable basis [2:36:52] as to why [2:36:53] Mr. McCord [2:36:53] would be giving you [2:36:54] this information [2:36:55] periodically and regularly? [2:36:57] I tried to explain [2:36:59] it previously, Senator. [2:37:00] I believe Mr. Hunt [2:37:01] felt a very strong [2:37:02] sense of loyalty [2:37:03] to the agency. [2:37:04] I believe he felt [2:37:05] there was a conspiracy [2:37:06] against the agency [2:37:07] to involve it [2:37:09] and discredit it. [2:37:10] And this is what I believe, [2:37:11] and this is purely [2:37:12] my own personal opinion, [2:37:13] and I can't substantiate it [2:37:14] with anything other [2:37:15] than my judgment. [2:37:17] Would you conduct [2:37:18] an investigation [2:37:20] or cause one [2:37:21] to be done [2:37:21] at the CIA [2:37:22] on why [2:37:23] McCord was in touch [2:37:25] and certain other matters [2:37:27] that I'd like to discuss [2:37:28] with you more privately [2:37:29] about it? [2:37:29] Had it come to my knowledge [2:37:31] at the time, [2:37:31] I would have, Senator. [2:37:32] Yes, sir. [2:37:33] And the one to address [2:37:34] that to now [2:37:35] would be Mr. Colby? [2:37:37] Mr. Colby. [2:37:38] Well, technically, [2:37:38] it would be me today, [2:37:40] but if he's sworn in tomorrow [2:37:41] or the next day, [2:37:42] it would be him. [2:37:42] Why don't I ask you [2:37:43] and you pass it on to Mr. [2:37:44] I will, Senator. [2:37:45] Thank you, Mr. Chair. [2:37:46] These letters would indicate, [2:37:51] or rather these letters [2:37:51] in my judgment [2:37:52] would corroborate [2:37:54] certain testimony [2:37:56] given by McCord [2:37:58] to this committee [2:38:00] to the effect [2:38:01] that there was a plan [2:38:03] among some people [2:38:04] to try to blame this [2:38:06] on the CIA, [2:38:08] including his own lawyer, [2:38:12] and that he resented it [2:38:15] and knew that, [2:38:17] I believe with all the [2:38:19] intest of his nature [2:38:20] that the CIA [2:38:21] was not implicated [2:38:22] in any way in the matter. [2:38:24] Mr. Chairman. [2:38:24] Is that not a correct [2:38:26] That would be my assumption [2:38:27] also, Mr. Chairman. [2:38:29] Mr. Chairman, [2:38:30] I might say, [2:38:30] since that represents [2:38:32] a commentary [2:38:32] on my interrogation, [2:38:34] which I appreciate, [2:38:36] but that is certainly [2:38:37] one interpretation [2:38:38] and that's why [2:38:39] I went to some pains [2:38:40] to explain [2:38:41] that I am not making charges. [2:38:42] I am simply inquiring [2:38:44] for information. [2:38:45] But I'm afraid [2:38:46] it is not the only possibility. [2:38:47] And I think I owe it [2:38:49] to myself [2:38:50] and to the committee [2:38:50] to try to find out [2:38:51] as much as I can. [2:38:53] And in addition [2:38:54] to talking to Director Colby [2:38:59] or possibly to Ambassador Helms [2:39:02] or Mr. Osborne [2:39:04] or others, [2:39:05] I think I'd like to talk [2:39:06] to Mr. Gaynor. [2:39:08] I think I'd like to know [2:39:09] whether he ever answered [2:39:10] those letters [2:39:10] and what, if any, [2:39:12] action he took. [2:39:13] Thank you, sir. [2:39:13] Very well, sir. [2:39:14] Well, I certainly concur [2:39:15] on your opinion. [2:39:16] We ought to get as much light [2:39:17] on this subject [2:39:18] as we can. [2:39:19] Senator White, [2:39:19] do you have any [2:39:20] further questions? [2:39:21] I have a few more questions, [2:39:22] Mr. Chairman. [2:39:26] General Waller, [2:39:27] as you've indicated [2:39:28] that Mr. Haldeman [2:39:34] gave you a direction, [2:39:42] I mean, [2:39:42] that's the best way [2:39:43] to phrase it, [2:39:46] to carry it [2:39:47] to the acting director [2:39:48] of the FBI. [2:39:52] Let me quote exactly [2:39:53] from your memorandum here. [2:39:56] Haldeman said [2:39:57] the whole affair [2:39:57] was getting embarrassing. [2:39:58] It was the President's wish [2:39:59] that Waller's call [2:40:00] on acting director [2:40:01] Bell Patrick Gray [2:40:02] and suggest to him [2:40:03] that since the five suspects [2:40:04] had been arrested, [2:40:05] this should be sufficient. [2:40:06] It was not advantageous [2:40:07] to have the inquiry pushed, [2:40:09] especially in Mexico, [2:40:11] et cetera. [2:40:14] Director Helms said [2:40:15] he had talked to Gray [2:40:15] on the previous day [2:40:16] and made it plain to him [2:40:16] that the agency [2:40:17] was not behind this matter [2:40:18] and that it was not [2:40:19] connected with it. [2:40:22] And as I gather, [2:40:24] when you and I [2:40:24] were talking before, [2:40:27] you indicated [2:40:28] this well could have been [2:40:29] based on something [2:40:30] that was within his knowledge [2:40:32] that might not be [2:40:34] in your knowledge [2:40:34] or the knowledge [2:40:35] of the director. [2:40:36] Is that correct? [2:40:36] That's correct, Samson. [2:40:37] Well, if that was the case, [2:40:43] why wouldn't he tell you [2:40:46] what it was [2:40:47] if this was something [2:40:48] within his knowledge? [2:40:50] I don't know why [2:40:51] he wouldn't tell me, sir. [2:40:57] Just one quick question [2:40:58] in passing here, [2:40:59] that same paragraph, [2:41:01] and suggest to him [2:41:02] that since five suspects [2:41:03] had been arrested, [2:41:03] that this should be sufficient. [2:41:07] Sufficient for what? [2:41:08] Did that ever occur to you? [2:41:09] Not clearly. [2:41:14] No, sir. [2:41:14] I didn't draw [2:41:15] any particular assumption from it. [2:41:19] Now, both you [2:41:23] and Director Helms [2:41:24] have testified [2:41:24] that there was a discussion [2:41:25] of Mexico. [2:41:29] Well, I'd like to leave it [2:41:30] in a broad way. [2:41:33] I don't know [2:41:34] whether it was [2:41:34] Director Helms [2:41:34] referred to money. [2:41:36] You've indicated [2:41:37] that it didn't come up then, [2:41:39] but there was discussion [2:41:40] of Mexico, [2:41:42] Mexican relationship, [2:41:43] et cetera, [2:41:44] rather than anything specific [2:41:45] as money. [2:41:45] Is that correct? [2:41:46] That is correct, Samson. [2:41:47] Now, do you think [2:41:48] that that discussion [2:41:49] was substantial enough [2:41:51] so that a man [2:41:53] of normal recall [2:41:53] would remember it? [2:41:54] I mean, [2:41:55] did it form a part [2:41:57] of the discussions [2:41:58] that morning? [2:41:59] It did, Senator. [2:42:00] To the way I understood [2:42:00] it was, [2:42:01] he felt that if the FBI [2:42:03] continued its investigation [2:42:05] in Mexico [2:42:05] in some way [2:42:06] which was not clear to me, [2:42:07] it would uncover [2:42:08] either personnel [2:42:09] or activities [2:42:10] of the agency [2:42:11] in Mexico. [2:42:12] So that it did come up [2:42:13] in more than just [2:42:14] a casual way? [2:42:15] Oh, it was quite specific. [2:42:17] It was quite specific. [2:42:17] And the request [2:42:18] to the FBI [2:42:19] to, in a sense, [2:42:22] not push the investigation [2:42:24] to that point [2:42:24] was limited only [2:42:25] to Mexico, [2:42:26] nowhere else. [2:42:28] Now, may I read to you [2:42:29] for Mr. Haldeman's testimony [2:42:30] before this committee [2:42:31] on page 6202. [2:42:40] Mr. Dash, [2:42:43] do you recall [2:42:44] discussing at that meeting [2:42:45] that one of their concerns [2:42:47] was that the CIA [2:42:48] might want to have [2:42:49] an investigation [2:42:53] by the FBI [2:42:53] with regard [2:42:55] to the Mexican money? [2:42:58] Mr. Haldeman, [2:42:59] no, I did not. [2:43:01] Mr. Dash, [2:43:03] Mexican relationship. [2:43:06] Mr. Haldeman, [2:43:07] I don't recall [2:43:09] the Mexican question [2:43:10] being raised [2:43:11] either by the president [2:43:12] that morning [2:43:13] in his instructions [2:43:14] to me to hold the meeting [2:43:15] or by me [2:43:17] in the meeting. [2:43:20] Do you dispute [2:43:21] Mr. Haldeman's testimony [2:43:22] on that point? [2:43:23] I must stand [2:43:24] on my own recollection [2:43:25] of the matter, Senator. [2:43:26] I have no further questions. [2:43:27] On behalf of the committee, [2:43:39] I want to thank you [2:43:40] for your appearance here [2:43:41] and for the testimony [2:43:42] which you've given [2:43:43] the committee. [2:43:44] Thank you, Mr. Chair. [2:43:54] The committee will stand [2:43:56] in recess [2:43:56] until 2 o'clock. [2:44:05] In a moment, [2:44:06] we'll hear from another figure [2:44:07] in the alleged [2:44:08] Watergate cover-up, [2:44:09] former FBI Director [2:44:10] L. Patrick Gray. [2:44:12] Public television's [2:44:13] coverage of these [2:44:14] Senate Watergate hearings [2:44:15] will continue [2:44:16] after a pause [2:44:16] for station identification. [2:44:19] Unabridged coverage [2:44:19] of these hearings [2:44:20] is provided [2:44:21] as a public service [2:44:22] by the member stations [2:44:23] of PBS, [2:44:25] the Public Broadcasting Service.