John Ehrlichman (Part 3) Watergate Hearings Testimony

[0:09] Since there is no objection to proceeding, I move at this time that counsel for the committee be authorized [0:14] under the appropriate laws and statutes of the United States, including the Declaratory Judgments Act, [0:19] to present a justiciable issue to the appropriate court based on the subpoena issued lawfully by this committee [0:28] and the letter declining to honor the subpoena dated July 25, 1973, signed with the President of the United States. [0:37] It takes that step that might be necessary to present that issue for adjudication. [0:41] If there is any second to the motion, then all in favor of the motion may be known by raising their right hand. [0:47] I think this litigation is essential. We are to determine whether the President is above the law [1:04] and whether the President is immune from all of the duties and responsibilities in matters of this kind [1:14] which devolve upon all the other mortals who dwell in this land. [1:17] In the Senate of the United States, a resolution to establish a select committee of the Senate [1:26] to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities [1:33] were engaged in by any persons acting individually or in combination with others in the presidential election of 1972 [1:40] or any campaign, canvas, or other activity related to it. [1:44] From Washington, N-PAC brings you gavel-to-gavel videotape coverage of today's hearings [1:50] by the Senate Select Committee and presidential campaign activities. [1:54] Here is N-PAC's senior correspondent, Robert McNeil. [1:58] Good evening. [1:59] John Ehrlichman weathered his third day of Senate interrogation [2:03] without making any admission of complicity in the Watergate cover-up. [2:07] One of the few new facts he permitted to escape his well-organized mind [2:11] was his wife's observation that he looked on television as though he were scowling too much. [2:16] The committee again spent a good deal of time exploring Ehrlichman's relations [2:20] with the White House plumbers group a year before Watergate. [2:24] This finally brought from Senator Baker what amounted to a demand for more information from the White House [2:30] if President Nixon's use of national security concerns to explain much of Watergate in the cover-up was to be credible. [2:37] Mr. Nixon wrote to Senator Irvin today refusing to comply with the committee's subpoenas to produce White House tapes. [2:44] The committee then voted unanimously to take the president to court over the issue. [2:48] Mr. Nixon also declined to honor the subpoena of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. [2:53] Federal Judge John Sirica set August the 7th for a hearing. [2:56] The White House said the president would accept an ultimate decision by the Supreme Court. [3:02] Throughout these difficult negotiations between the Senate Committee and the White House, [3:06] the leading optimist has been Howard Baker. [3:09] But after the committee voted to go to court on his motion, [3:12] it was a subdued Senator Baker who expressed his personal feelings to MPAC's Peter Kay. [3:17] The regret that has arrived at that point, [3:21] and I guess partly because I've tried to be the one who suggested middle courses and wise men [3:28] and alternative possibilities that I guess that played some part in my decision to go ahead and make the motion [3:36] and suggest we do it there as a signal that we intend to persevere and we intend to be fair [3:43] and we intend to litigate the matter in an orderly way in the courts, [3:48] put to rest any idea that there's division within the committee. [3:50] There is not division within the committee on the necessity for doing this. [3:54] So I guess all of those played some part in it. [3:56] Account in part for my fatigue and disappointment that we've reached this place, [4:00] but my continuing small flicker of hope that we'll get through it some way. [4:05] Have you been in contact with the White House throughout these rather troublesome weeks? [4:09] No, I had no contact at all with them. [4:11] I've done my communicating as I'm doing now by television and newspaper interviews and the like, [4:18] but I've had no contact. [4:19] Senator Baker had several other comments on the progress of the hearings thus far [4:24] and at the end of our videotape playback tonight, [4:27] we'll present the rest of his interview with Peter Kay. [4:31] Right before your very eyes, as the saying goes, [4:34] you're soon going to see a committee of the United States Senate vote in effect [4:38] to sue the President of the United States. [4:41] Jack Murphy of the Georgetown University Law Center here in Washington is with us. [4:45] Jack, how does this Senate action relate to the actions involving Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox? [4:51] In short, what I'm asking you to do is sort it all out for us. [4:54] Well, briefly, Jim, the White House this morning threw the legal initiative back in the direction of the parties [5:01] who had served it with the subpoenas. [5:04] In the case of the Congress, of course, refusing to cooperate for reasons stated in the President's letter of July 6th and July 23rd. [5:13] In the case of Mr. Cox's subpoena issued under the direction of the district court [5:17] by a letter to Judge Sirica indicating that the President apparently feels that he cannot submit to the jurisdiction of the United States courts. [5:24] This is a very interesting question which we'll have to develop later. [5:27] But the point is that Mr. Cox quickly resumed the initiative by filing a petition with the court [5:32] asking for a show cause hearing as to why these documents should not be brought forth. [5:36] The show cause order was signed by Judge Sirica. [5:39] There will be a hearing on that August 7th. [5:42] In the meantime, the Congress will have to file an independent lawsuit which will take much longer to get going. [5:47] Hence, Mr. Cox will have a first crack at the merits of the constitutional position taken by the President. [5:52] Although at some later time, the two cases might be consolidated for appeal purposes. [5:56] Okay, thank you. [5:57] Mr. Murphy will be back at the close of tonight's broadcast to share some more of his legal wisdom with us. [6:03] He'll be joined at that time by Alan Barth, long-time editorial writer here in Washington [6:07] and author of the book, Government by Investigation. [6:11] Once again today, Ehrlichman was the sole witness, [6:14] and he began his testimony as soon as the questions about the White House tapes were dealt with. [6:18] Here is our nightly specific schedule of coming attractions. [6:22] Chairman Irvin begins the session by reading a letter from President Nixon, [6:26] who says he most respectfully refuses the committee's request for the tapes. [6:30] Irvin himself terms it very unfortunate that the President has named himself custodian of the tapes, [6:36] making it necessary that he be directly involved in the forthcoming legal action. [6:40] Then Ehrlichman resumes his testimony, [6:43] saying that there was pressure to get information on Daniel Ellsberg [6:46] because the President was keeping the pressure on in response to the Pentagon Papers case. [6:51] In the second hour, Ehrlichman says there was a need for the plumbers in the Ellsberg case [6:55] because the FBI probe was inadequate. [6:58] And later, he says, President Nixon kept John Dean on the job [7:01] after learning of his cover-up involvement [7:03] because Henry Peterson of the Justice Department wanted Dean to stay [7:07] while the Department's probe continued. [7:09] Ehrlichman speaks in the next hour of why Maurice Stanz was allowed to give a deposition [7:14] rather than appear personally before the grand jury. [7:18] Asked whether this was done to avoid difficult questions from jurors, [7:21] Ehrlichman says the sole reason was to protect the campaign finance chairman [7:25] from the gauntlet of newsmen outside the grand jury room. [7:29] And here, Ehrlichman begins his debate about national security with Baker, [7:33] insisting that we are not playing games. [7:35] During the fourth and final hour, Ehrlichman says he didn't know [7:39] about the Dean and Kalmbach roles in the cover-up because he was not omniscient. [7:44] And he says Watergate was a manageable political liability [7:47] because it involved only the committee to re-elect, but not the White House. [7:53] Now Senator Ervin is about to begin today's session. [7:56] I'm going to make another request to the audience [8:10] that the audience refrain from expressing in any manner approval or disapproval of any person [8:19] or any question or any answer. [8:26] We are trying to conduct a dignified hearing, [8:31] which will be as fair as possible to everybody concerned. [8:36] And the committee is going to have to give serious consideration [8:41] to the question of excluding from the hearing room [8:47] persons who audibly express their approval or disapproval of any person [8:55] or any question or any answer in an audible manner. [9:01] And I hope that I will not have to repeat this request again. [9:04] The committee has received, at least I have received as chairman of the committee, [9:16] a letter from the White House dated July 25, 1973. [9:23] Dear Mr. Chairman, White House counsel have received on my behalf [9:30] the two subpoenas issued by you on behalf of the Select Committee on July the 23rd. [9:37] One of these calls on me to punish to the Select Committee [9:40] recordings of five meetings between Mr. John Dean and myself. [9:44] For the reasons stated to you in my letters of July the 6th and July the 23rd, [9:51] I must respectfully refuse to produce these recordings. [9:54] The other subpoena calls on me to punish all records of any kind [10:00] relating directly or indirectly to the activities, participation, responsibilities, [10:05] or involvement of 25 named individuals in any alleged criminal acts [10:12] related to the presidential election of 1972. [10:16] Some of the records that might arguably fit within that subpoena are presidential papers [10:21] that must be kept confidential for reasons stated in my letter of July the 6th. [10:26] It is quite possible that there are other records in my custody [10:31] that would be within the ambit of that subpoena [10:34] and that I could, consistent with the public interests [10:38] and my constitutional responsibilities, provide to the Select Committee. [10:42] All specific requests from the Select Committee will be carefully considered [10:47] and my staff and I, as we have done in the past, [10:52] will cooperate with the Select Committee by making available any information [10:56] and documents that can appropriately be produced. [11:00] You will understand, however, I am sure that it would simply not be feasible [11:04] for my staff and me to review thousands of documents to decide which do [11:08] and which do not fit within the sweeping but vague terms of the subpoena. [11:14] It continues to be true, as it was when I wrote to you on July the 6th, [11:20] that my staff is under instructions to cooperate fully with yours [11:25] in furnishing information pertinent to your inquiry. [11:27] I have directed that executive privilege not be invoked with regard to testimony [11:33] by present and former members of my staff concerning possible criminal conduct [11:37] or discussions of possible criminal conducts. [11:39] I have waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to my former counsel. [11:46] In my July 6th letter, I described these acts of cooperation with the Select Committee [11:51] as genuine, extensive, and in the history of such matters, extraordinary. [11:58] That cooperation has continued and will continue. [12:02] Executive privilege is being invoked not only with regard to documents and recordings [12:07] that cannot be made public consistent with confidentiality essential to the function [12:13] of the Office of the President. [12:14] I cannot and will not consent to giving any investigator body private presidential papers. [12:22] To the extent that I have custody of other documents or information relevant to the work of the Select Committee [12:27] and that can properly be made public, I will be glad to make these available [12:33] in response to specific requests. [12:35] Sincerely, Richard Nixon. [12:37] How the President expects this committee to specify each document that he says falls within the ambit [12:48] of one of these subpoenas is a very surprising thing. [12:59] We are not clairvoyant. [13:01] Since we have never seen the documents, and since even those White House aides who are willing [13:09] to identify the documents are not allowed to copy them or any parts of them, the President puts [13:16] on the committee a manifest impossibility to receive in the documents. [13:20] The way the chair construes this letter, the President flatly refuses to give us the tapes [13:28] that were identified in the subpoena as recording conversations between the President and John Dean. [13:36] And he lays down the second conditions about the documents which are impossible of fulfillment [13:47] by the committee because you can't identify a document which you've never seen. [13:53] And you have the restriction upon the White House former aides or aides or former aides [14:00] that would be, could go through these papers and identify this document that they can't copy them, [14:04] much less carry them out. [14:07] So, the chair finds it a little difficult to see where very much cooperation comes from [14:17] the President in these matters. [14:21] This is a serious affair that the committee is engaged in. [14:27] And here's the President of the United States that has informed us that some of these recordings [14:32] do have reference to the matters that we're investigating. [14:37] But he can't furnish us to us because we might misconstrue them. [14:41] And then he tells us he'll furnish us documents that he doesn't consider to be presidential papers [14:50] if we can identify the specific document, which is an impossibility. [15:05] Oh, I'd just like to say I think the President could apply with a request of the committee [15:09] in both of these respects, and that the Constitution wouldn't collapse [15:14] and the heavens wouldn't fall. [15:17] But the committee might be aided by the President in determining the truth of the involved. [15:22] Senator Bacon. [15:23] Mr. Chairman, as those of us who are lawyers, [15:31] and that's meant to be a term of approval rather than disapproval. [15:35] For those of us who are lawyers, I think the best way to summarize the President's situation [15:41] is to say, thus, the issue was joined. [15:43] It is important to note that this committee caused two subpoenas to issue rather than one. [15:55] The first subpoena specified with, I believe, great particularity of the conversations, [16:07] the dates, and the participants that we wanted access to on the allegation of the subpoena [16:13] that such conversations might be concerned with alleged illegal or criminal activity. [16:25] The second subpoena dealt with a rather more general demand for documents. [16:32] I'm pleased, Mr. Chairman, that we chose to issue our subpoena in two parts rather than one [16:39] because, as you've pointed out, it's far more difficult to specify with particularity [16:45] the documents we seek if we don't know what the documents are. [16:52] But it's fairly easy to specify the tapes or the portions of the tapes that we seek. [17:00] In any event, we've arrived at the place now where it would appear that the issues are, in fact, [17:05] joined, and the third branch of the government now, the judiciary, may, in fact, be called [17:13] on to resolve an historic conflict between the remaining two branches. [17:18] I think, as in all litigation in this country, it is our desire, all of us, to proceed, if we [17:29] choose to proceed, to permit the court to make a calm, intellectually and judicially sound judgment [17:39] on the appropriateness of the request of this committee, together with all of the several [17:45] fundamental and significant constitutional questions that are presented. [17:50] I have only one remaining comment, Mr. Chairman. [17:57] Notwithstanding that the issues are joined, I would still hope that there is some way to [18:03] ameliorate the situation. [18:07] There have been a number of suggestions in the past. [18:09] I've made many suggestions, both publicly and in the privacy of our executive proceedings. [18:19] Certain suggestions have been passed on, both formally and informally. [18:26] But notwithstanding that we have reached the point where the issues are joined and litigation [18:32] may, in fact, ensue, I would still hope we can find a way to permit this committee to [18:38] have access to the relevant portions of the testimony or of the evidence that we require, [18:44] quickly and speedily, and without a prejudicial effect on our mandate to investigate nor on [18:51] the appropriate functioning of the presidency as an institution. [18:54] I've suggested, for instance, that an informal panel of distinguished Americans not now holding [19:04] a position in government might review these tapes at the request of both the executive and [19:11] the legislative departments and recommend to both the president and the Congress what portions [19:18] are relevant and what portions are not relevant. [19:22] I am prepared to go even further, Mr. Chairman, and I have not discussed this with you or my [19:28] colleagues on the committee, and say that it's an extension and elaboration of that suggestion. [19:35] I would be willing to have one or two or three or a small group of distinguished non-governmental [19:43] officials review the tapes and the documents and recommend to the president and to the Congress [19:52] that certain documents or tapes are or are not relevant to this inquiry. [19:59] And if they're so intermixed with other conversation, or if they lend themselves to more than one interpretation, [20:06] that such a panel give to us a finding of the net effect of that information. [20:16] That may not end the controversy. [20:20] It may be necessary for the committee then to pursue the matter further. [20:23] It may be necessary for the president to disagree, but at least it would move us one space forward. [20:28] It is not idle optimism that compels me to once again urge that we find a way around this joinder of issue for the benefit of the Congress, of the presidency, of the president, for the benefit of the courts, that they may be spared the business of defining 200 years after the drafting of the charter document, implied, explicit, and overlapping apparent powers, and for the people of the country. [21:13] So no matter how small the flicker of the flame of optimism may be, I continue to urge that we have an accommodating spirit and that we continue to try to find a way in this way or any other way that seems promising of a result to produce that desire to end. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [21:36] Any other members of the committee have any observations that would like to make at this time? [21:44] Then if not, it would be my purpose to call a meeting of the committee at an early time and let the committee decide what action it shall take. [21:57] There is an order of the Senate, which is set forth in paragraph 77 of the Senate Manual, which confers upon this committee the power to bring any suit that the committee feels is necessary to enable it to perform duties that's required to perform by the Senate. [22:34] It's a very unfortunate thing that the president didn't claim that he has custody and control of everything in the White House because that prevents the committee from taking a very summary proceeding against the actual custodian of these tapes and the actual custodian of these papers. [23:02] I don't believe even the president would claim that he had custodian of all the things in E. Howard Hunt's locker, including the alleged telegrams that he is alleged to have had in his custody. [23:25] But if his claim be valid, that would have to be true, I would think. [23:32] Senator White could resume unless there's some comment by other members of the committee. [23:37] I'd just like to say that I'd just make a motion. I don't know. Go ahead and make it now, sir. [23:52] You don't mean that? Yeah. [23:54] Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wilson, before you proceed, I don't see any, if my colleagues have any objection, they may say so. [24:02] And I don't mean to embarrass any of them, but I don't see any point in having an executive session. [24:07] I think we've discussed the matter, and I think that we're in a position to act. [24:11] And if you want to do that, I'm perfectly willing to make a motion if a motion would be considered in order. [24:17] Well, it'd be considered in order unless, if any member of the committee would rather go in an executive session, leave that up, [24:23] and they could communicate that to me openly or privately. [24:27] Speaking for myself, Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to doing that immediately. [24:32] Tell me if he gets here. [24:37] Mr. Chairman. [24:38] Senator Talmadge is absent, but I guess we can let him record his vote when he gets here. [24:44] Then move down. [24:45] Mr. Chairman, let me state a motion. [24:47] I have a question. [24:48] Since there is no objection to proceeding, I move at this time that counsel for the committee be authorized. [24:52] Under the appropriate laws and statutes of the United States, including the Declaratory Judgment Act. [24:57] To present a justiciable issue to the appropriate court based on the subpoena issued lawfully by this committee, [25:06] and the letter declining to honor the subpoena dated July 25, 1973, signed by the President of the United States. [25:14] If it takes that step, this may be necessary to present that issue for adjudication. [25:19] If there is any second to the motion, then all in favor of the motion may be known by raising their right hand. [25:25] And the six senators present vote unanimously for the motion, and Senator Talmadge will be given an opportunity to record his vote when he comes in. [25:39] The chair recognizes that there is no precedent for litigation of this nature. [25:48] But there originally was no precedent for any litigation. [25:53] And I think this litigation is essential if we are to determine whether the President is above the law [26:11] and whether the President is immune from all of the duties and responsibilities in matters of this kind [26:21] which devolve upon all the other mortals who dwell in this land. [26:24] Mr. Wilson, do you want us to say something? [26:29] Mr. Chairman, I have received information overnight that the committee or its staff possesses at least one document in relation to the sequence of the document of August 3, 1971, [26:45] which was identified by Senator Weicker yesterday. Am I correctly informed, sir? [26:53] I guess I indicated that there was no correspondence, Mr. Wilson, in sequence. [26:59] If you're talking about a document in sequence, you have seen the document that might be considered in sequence and was submitted to you, [27:07] which was the August 11th memorandum from Mr. Young and Mr. Croakes and Mr. Ehrlichman. [27:12] That's the only document that might be considered in sequence. [27:15] The question put yesterday to the committee, which I responded to you, was were there any further correspondence? [27:23] Was there reply to this letter or other correspondence in sequence? [27:27] There is a document which may be considered to be in sequence and that had followed that letter. [27:33] And it actually even refers to that letter, but you have seen that document. [27:38] It was submitted to you. [27:39] It was the August 11th memorandum from Mr. Croakes and Mr. Young to Mr. Ehrlichman. [27:46] I know of no other document that we have in sequence. [27:49] Is that the one in which it is stated that Mr. Hoover said that he would proceed with a full-scale investigation of the Pentagon Papers? [27:57] I think it's the one that says that they would give it a FBI special, something of that nature. [28:02] We have the document. [28:03] You've seen it. [28:04] It was submitted and it was a matter of record. [28:06] Yes, it was put on a record. [28:07] But I just asked you yesterday to produce it. [28:11] It was produced and when I was questioning Mr. Ehrlichman, you were given that document. [28:16] Is that the document that's referred to in the New York Times this morning? [28:19] I didn't see any document in the New York Times. [28:21] Let me read you the sentence. [28:23] Reportedly, when the hearing resumes tomorrow, he, that Senator Weicker, plans to show Mr. Ehrlichman another letter, [28:33] this one from Mr. Croakes to Mr. Ehrlichman, in which Mr. Croakes remarks that Mr. Hoover had promised a full investigation [28:41] and noting that the Bureau had interviewed Mr. Marks's wife. [28:45] Is that an accurate report of the document that you have just described to me? [28:51] We'll get the document and we'll save you. [28:54] Mr. Wilson, I might state that it appears by implication or information, at least from the President's letter, [29:01] that this committee doesn't have all the documents it ought to have. [29:07] It hasn't been able to get them. [29:10] And we don't have any plumbers to go out and seek for them. [29:15] You've got a pretty good staff that seeks a lot of things. [29:19] Yes, sir. [29:20] But they don't believe in surreptitious activities. [29:24] May I have this clarified before Mr. Senator Weicker begins? [29:29] What document shows the reference to Mr. Marks's wife? [29:35] Just a minute. [29:36] Yes. [29:43] The August. [29:44] It's the August 11th. [29:45] The August 11th memorandum which you had received. [29:47] Mr. Wilson, which you saw and examined thoroughly when I presented it to Mr. Ehrlichman for examination. [29:53] It's the August 11th memorandum from Mr. Bud Krogh and Mr. David Young to Mr. Ehrlichman, [30:00] in which Mr. Ehrlichman was asked to approve a covert operation to be undertaken to examine all medical files. [30:10] It includes a list of names of persons that said the Boston grand jury will meet next week. [30:17] Justice has made a final decision, but it's considering subpoenaing the following individuals, and Mrs. Lewis Marks is one. [30:23] Then the memorandum says that we have received a letter from Director Hoover confirming that the Ellsberg case [30:33] and related matters will be handled on a bureau special basis. [30:38] And that's the only memorandum we have or document we have. [30:43] I believe that Mr. Wilson's asking for another letter that was offered in Evidence Health to the effect from J. Edgar Hoover, [30:49] stating that they had transmitted to someone all of the files they had on 17 people, [30:58] and stating that they would go ahead and investigate everybody except, and it said also including a statement of Ellsberg, [31:10] and in which he stated in the closing paragraph that they were prepared to interview all other people except Ellsberg. [31:21] Mr. Wilson, do you have a copy of the transcript? [31:23] No. [31:25] Well, I remember you giving me a three or four page August 11th document, which is exhibit, what, two? [31:36] It's exhibit, well, exhibit numbers 90 and 90. [31:40] No, I mean in this proceeding, Mr. Ehrlichman, did it not get a new number? [31:44] We don't have new numbers, no. [31:45] Oh. [31:46] It was listed as exhibit number three of an executive session. [31:49] Thank you. [31:52] Yes, I have that one, I think, before me. [31:55] Is that the one in which you said that they were continuing to press the FBI to determine some subjects in paragraph six? [32:08] We are continuing to press the FBI, that's right, to determine whether the report of a footlocker. [32:16] Thank you. [32:17] I just wanted to identify it. [32:18] Thank you very much. [32:19] And that was submitted to you. [32:20] Thank you very much. [32:21] I would like to state that the reason Senator Talmadge is not here at this moment is the fact that he is chairman of a very important conference committee on a very crucial piece of legislation. [32:54] And the conference committee is highly desirable since this piece of legislation relates to agriculture. [33:03] It's absolutely essential that the legislation be passed before the beginning of the next fiscal year so the American people who are interested in agricultural pursuits can know what they can do. [33:14] And that's the reason he had to do. [33:15] And that's the reason he had to give that task priority over his task as a member of this committee on this particular occasion. [33:31] Mr. Wilson, I'd ask you the question. [33:33] I want you to get any document we got. [33:36] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [33:37] I'm sure you do. [33:38] And those documents your attention has been called to, do they comport with the document mentioned as being printed in New York Times? [33:47] Say that again, sir. [33:49] The two documents that your attention has been called to, are they apparent that the document is referred to in the New York Times? [33:59] I'm assuming so, but I guess Senator Weicker will explain it if he cares to. [34:04] I don't care to pursue it. [34:10] Mr. Chairman, I don't think I have any explaining to do. [34:12] You've raised a point, Mr. Wilson, saying that there's a document outstanding that you've not received when in fact you'd received it two days ago. [34:22] As I understand it, that's the only point that's been made here, that you have had that very document in your hands for two days. [34:30] Then as far as you know, the New York Times is not talking about any other document. [34:34] As far as I know, you have had the information that you requested today in your hands for two days. [34:43] I have no other documents to go ahead and present to you. [34:46] Thank you, sir. [34:47] I have some, I have some questions for your client. [34:49] Thank you, sir. [34:50] And you, and you might proceed at this time with your interrogation of the witness. [34:56] Mr. Ehrlichman, you stated. [35:02] The challenge is called, and I ask that he be recorded in voting in favor of the motion which has been adopted by the vote of six other senators and so on. [35:16] You stated yesterday, Mr. Ehrlichman, that the FBI, through its leadership of Mr. Hoover, was not pushing, was not pushing the Ellsberg investigation, allegedly because of a relationship Mr. Hoover had with Mr. Ellsberg's father-in-law, Mr. Lewis Marx. [35:38] And that it wasn't until after September 20th, 1971, that the FBI, quote, was clicking on all eight cylinders, end of quote. Would that be correct? [35:49] I don't think I said after. If I said after, I should have said by, Senator. [35:54] And the reason that I picked that date is that on or about that date, there was a meeting which the Attorney General had with the President where he gave the President a progress report on this matter. [36:10] And that was the gist of his report at that time. [36:13] Now, when that commenced, I don't mean to testify to, because that's not something that I know of my own knowledge. [36:21] But in any event, one of the difficulties, apparently, on the FBI investigation was the relationship between Mr. Hoover and Mr. Marx. Is that correct? [36:29] That's what the Attorney General reported to me. [36:31] Are you aware of the fact that Mr. Lewis Marx was interviewed by the FBI in June 1971, before Mr. Krogh's memorandum to you of August 11th, which memorandum has been referred to here this morning, and before the September 3rd, 1971 break-in by Hunt and Liddy, part of the covert operation you approved? [36:55] Did you know that Mr. Marx had been interviewed in June? [36:59] I don't. By the FBI, Senator? [37:02] That's correct. [37:03] I don't recall that fact. [37:08] Well, then, how could you ascribe the reason of Lewis Marx or the failure of the FBI to get information from Lewis Marx as the reason for setting up this unit and for having this, or more specifically, have the unit investigate Ellsberg as they did? [37:29] Well, what I attempted to testify to was the report that I had had from two people who were intimately familiar with the progress of this case. [37:39] One was Mr. Krogh and the other was the Attorney General, Mr. Mitchell. They both reported to me what I have testified to here. [37:49] Now, it may be, and I don't know this, and I'd be speculating in this answer, but it may be that the explanation is that that interview was either unsatisfactory or perfunctory or did not adduce the information that was desired, or that that interview is what resulted in this disciplinary action that Mr. Hoover imposed. I just don't know. [38:12] I just don't know. [38:13] Mr. Chairman, may we see that report, the FBI report? [38:16] What FBI report? [38:17] You mean the interview of Mr. Marx? [38:19] Yeah. [38:22] I've asked. [38:23] Go ahead, Mr. Chairman. [38:24] We got the FBI reports from the, by permission of Attorney General Kleinbeest on condition that we would not release them to the public. Now, if you get the... [38:43] Mr. Chairman, I think maybe I can be helpful here. My knowledge of the interview by the FBI, Mr. Marx comes from Mr. Marx, and he was interviewed in June of 1971. [38:59] Well, I've now established that the committee is in possession of an FBI report. [39:05] No, no, I'm mistaken. [39:06] Is that so? [39:07] We have, do not have the FBI reports. They were committed to inspect them and to make notes from them, that's all. [39:13] No summary? [39:14] They have the staff, some staff summaries, but we got those under great difficulties and under an agreement that we would not release them to the public. [39:27] If you can get them, if you can get all of those things from Attorney General's consent, or he has a custody album, or Director Kelly, well, I'd be delighted for everything to come out and be shown. [39:40] Mr. Chairman, let me... [39:42] Mr. Chairman, could I say a word at this point if Senator Weicker will yield for a second? [39:46] We've been deeply involved in the business of trying to get documents and make documents public, and I can understand Mr. Wilson's concern in this respect, but you and I, Mr. Chairman, were parties to the conversation with former Attorney General findings, and very strict requirements are imposed on our access to those. [40:03] Now, rather than ask the witness to be relieved of the obligation, which we assumed at that time, for my part, I'm willing to have the committee ask to be relieved of that obligation so we can show that information to witness and counsel. [40:18] Since I was there and present, I know the rather extraordinary lengths we went to to gain access to them in any form. [40:24] I'm also keenly aware of the promise and the commitment that we made with respect to the confidentiality of raw FBI data. [40:31] But I would hope, if there is no objection on behalf of the committee, that the committee formally requests the Attorney General of the United States to relieve us of that obligation. [40:41] I'd be grateful to you if you do it. [40:42] So that the information can be supplied. [40:43] I want to tell Senator Weicker, I don't question for one moment, sir, that your remark that you got some information from Mr. Marks. [40:51] But it can't be as accurate, may I say, with all due respect, as the raw report would be itself. [40:58] And I appreciate the suggestion of the offer of the Vice Chairman on our behalf, perhaps for yours too, to seek to have that document released to us. [41:10] I would keep the records absolutely straight. [41:13] As Senator Baker said, this agreement was made between him and myself and Attorney General Klein, and we had to accept the terms under which we were offered access to summaries. [41:30] And the condition was, as we informed the Attorney General, we did not want the summaries or any FBI records for useless evidence. [41:44] We merely wanted them to identify persons who could be summoned and subpoenaed as witnesses because it was revealed by those summaries that they had some knowledge of the matters we were investigating. [42:02] And we gave the Attorney General our solemn promise that the committee would not release these publicly. [42:08] Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that counsel for the committee be authorized to request to the Attorney General a release from that commitment to secrecy so that a copy of the staff summary can be given to counsel for this witness. [42:20] Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. [42:23] And I assume from what's been said, and forgive me for pursuing this further, because I'm grateful for what has just been volunteered, [42:31] members of the committee or the staff did read either the summary or the raw report of the FBI on this so-called interview with Mr. Marks. [42:43] And your committee does have knowledge of the contents of this report, and we don't have it. [42:50] Mr. Chairman, may I speak to this point for a minute, please? [42:54] Mr. Chairman? [42:57] Yes. [42:58] May I address myself to this point? [42:59] I think I should point out a piece of history, legislative history, that at the time the Chairman and the Vice Chairman made the determination with the Attorney General that only they would be allowed access to the FBI files. [43:18] The junior senator from Connecticut, excitable as he gets, jumped up and down and objected. [43:25] I was certain to corroborate that. [43:28] Senator, maybe we're going to get it. [43:31] Maybe we're going to get it now, you and myself. [43:33] And so, having an investigation to pursue, I went down other avenues. [43:41] I've already told you, I have talked to Mr. Marks. [43:43] And I tell you now that I have also talked to Mr. Brennan, the assistant director of the FBI, head of Division 5, who ordered that the investigations take place. [43:54] So I can confirm to you from both the FBI that did the investigating and from Mr. Marks, who was investigated, that an investigation took place in June of 1971. [44:05] And Mr. Chairman, you have lived up to your agreements with the Attorney General of the United States. [44:10] And I have never seen any FBI file that has come into your possession or the possession of the Vice Chairman or any member of the Staff Majority Minority Council that were authorized. [44:18] Yes, to make the record even clearer. [44:20] And as a result of the record, the position stated by the Senate of Connecticut, I called Attorney General Klein Deese and asked him to modify the agreement and allow five other members of the committee to see these FBI files. [44:42] And he declined my request. And then after he was succeeded by Attorney General Richardson, I wrote him a letter repeating the request. [44:53] And he declined the request to extend that privilege to the other five senators. [44:59] So we have had, he did modify and allow one member of the staff designated by both Vice Chairman Shep to go and look at some of the original FBI files. [45:14] But let me tell you, it hasn't been any bed of roses trying to get information out of the executive branch of the government that's germane to this investigation. [45:22] But I'm going to suggest in the interest of time that you will communicate to the staff for the documents you want instead of us. [45:32] Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. [45:34] And we will do the best we can to you in our power. We will certainly try to give them to you. [45:40] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [45:41] And so I would suggest that Senator Weicker proceed with interrogation. [45:45] Before you, before Senator Weicker does, I'd impose on his time just one more moment. [45:49] I hope that it clearly appears from this record. [45:53] I don't believe anyone on this committee, certainly I do not, want to withhold any document or information from this witness or his counsel. [46:01] And we would not impose any restraint on that were it not for the condition imposed by former Attorney General Klein did. [46:09] So that was the basis for my unanimous consent request. [46:12] And I gather from the Chairman's statement just now that upon the request of counsel, we will proceed in the manner I outlined in my request. [46:21] Thank you both. [46:22] You're a good lawyer, Mr. Wilson. I've got to get my engines warmed up again here. [46:30] Thank you, sir. [46:32] All right. Now, Mr. Ehrlichman, isn't it fair to say then that Mr. Krogz, do you have the August 11th memorandum before you there? [46:43] Do you have the August 11th memorandum before you? [46:45] Do we have that August 11th? [46:46] Isn't it fair to say that Mr. Krogz's August 11th memorandum asks for Mrs. Marks's interview because both you and he knew that Mr. Marks had already been interviewed? [46:55] There's no mention of Mr. Marks. This is August 11th now. [47:01] Yes, I'm looking at it. [47:02] It asks for Mrs. Marks's interview. [47:03] Would you point out where it does that? I don't recall that. [47:07] Well, right there on the page where it says memorandum, it says the Boston grand jury will meet next week. [47:13] And the first name on there is Mrs. Lewis Marks. [47:16] Well, that doesn't say anything about the FBI interviewing her. [47:19] That says they have not made a final decision but is considering subpoenaing her to a grand jury. [47:25] I don't see anything there about the FBI interviewing her. [47:29] The August 11th memorandum from Messrs. Krogh and Young View states that the FBI had placed the Ellsberg case on bureau special status. [47:36] Well, that's not what you asked me, Senator. [47:37] So wouldn't it be—I am saying—I am very definitely going to pin down one fact here today. [47:43] And that is that you base the push on the FBI on the fact that there was some relationship between the director and Lewis Marks which made it necessary for you to go outside of normal law enforcement channels. [48:04] And we've already established the fact that Mr. Marks was interviewed in June of 1971. [48:11] Did you ever ask any member of the FBI if Mr. Marks had been interviewed in June of 1971? [48:17] Well, if I can disassociate your question from your direct statement, which I don't agree with. [48:24] What don't you agree with? [48:25] Well, if I could—if I could explain. [48:27] What I attempted to testify here to the committee was the total setting in which Mr. Krogh came to me and in turn the recommendation was made to the President that the special unit inaugurate investigation of Mr. Ellsberg and his associates. [48:49] The total setting included the Attorney General's information to us with regard to the investigation of specifically Mr. Lewis Marks. [49:03] But that was not the only problem. [49:05] It was a general problem with regard to the FBI's approach to this whole case. [49:11] That was the way Mr. Krogh reported it to us. [49:14] It was corroborated by the Attorney General. [49:17] And it did not rest solely on the interview of any one witness, Mr. Marks, Mrs. Marks, or any one individual witness. [49:24] So I had no occasion to inquire of anyone at the FBI or, for that matter, anywhere else about the specific interview of any one witness or any particular witnesses. [49:38] Mr. Krogh described for us a set of circumstances which was general. [49:43] I did not then recommend to the President that Mr. Krogh's eventual suggestion be adopted. [49:52] I talked to the Attorney General about it. [49:54] The Attorney General corroborated Mr. Krogh's description of the FBI's general approach to the case. [50:02] He was having his problems. [50:04] And so that validated Mr. Krogh's report in general. [50:12] The Attorney General cited this one instance as exemplary of the problem and a particular problem for him at the time vis-a-vis the director. [50:24] And so then the recommendation was made that these two men that Krogh was working with be designated as investigators to go and do this follow-up. [50:34] Now this was very reluctantly entered into. [50:36] This was not something, Senator, that the White House wanted to do or at least that I personally wanted to see the White House do unless we had to in order to move this thing along. [50:47] The President, frankly, was really keeping the pressure on to get results. [50:52] And that was the setting. [50:55] Did the Attorney General know you were going to get into the covert plumber business? [51:00] The Attorney General knew. [51:02] To solve this problem. [51:03] To solve this problem. [51:04] The Attorney General knew and the director of the FBI knew that the White House was going to send investigators out. [51:11] Yes, sir. [51:12] Let me read to you from the transcript of yesterday. [51:20] Senator Weicker, in other words, what I gather you are saying, he was fixed in his views to the extent, this is Hoover, that he would not agree to a break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. [51:32] Mr. Ehrlichman. [51:34] That, of course, overstates it dramatically, Senator. [51:37] What he would not agree to was an investigation of Mr. Marks and others close to Daniel Ellsberg. [51:43] Now let me drop back in time, or up either way. [51:50] In July, were you aware that in July of 1971, specifically on July 20th, 1971, that the FBI had attempted to interview Dr. Fielding? [52:13] I don't, I surely wasn't, I was aware of it at some time, and I don't remember when, Senator, but I do recall the fact that they unsuccessfully attempted to interview the doctor. [52:27] And this was before you decided to get into his records by covert action, is that correct? [52:36] I'm not sure I knew that before. [52:38] In a moment, Senator Weicker will continue his line of questioning, but for now, we're going to pause briefly. [52:53] Public television's coverage of the Senate hearings will continue after a break for station identification. [52:58] Unabridged coverage of these hearings is provided as a public service by the member stations of PBS, the Public Broadcasting Service. [53:07] From Washington, NPACT continues its coverage of hearings by the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. [53:22] Here again, correspondent Robert McNeil. [53:25] As we go back to the hearings, Senator Weicker is going over the issue of FBI interviews with John Ehrlichman. [53:32] Let's run through the dates again. [53:47] In June of 1971, Mr. Lewis Marks is interviewed by the FBI. [53:54] You say that you had no knowledge of that? [53:57] I certainly don't recall having any knowledge of it. [54:02] My consistent impression had been that the director had disciplined or threatened to discipline people in the FBI for proposing that interview. [54:15] I wasn't aware that the interview had gone through, but the sanctions, as I understood it, were proposed because of the fact that it had been proposed. [54:26] In fact, the interview did take place. [54:28] In July of 1971, the FBI attempts to interview Dr. Fielding, as you said, as you termed it, unsuccessfully, which is correct. [54:40] On August the third, on August the third, Mr. Crow gets a letter, which has been given to you and your attorney, from the director of the FBI, indicating full cooperation in the matter of the Ellsberg case. [54:57] On August the 11th, you get a memorandum from Mr. Crow and Mr. Young, which indicates the status of the matters and also indicating that we have received the letter from director Hoover confirming that the Ellsberg case and related matters will be handled on a bureau special basis. [55:17] In light of all these events, all of which transpired prior to the break-in into Dr. Fielding's office, do you maintain that this was for any other purpose other than to smear Dr. Ellsberg? [55:49] Oh, I certainly do, Senator. It's a highly selective assemblage of evidence, if I may respectfully say so. [55:58] Incidentally, my wife chided me a little bit last night because I appear to scowl at you when I'm answering your questions. [56:06] The fact is you have right over your head two of the brightest lights I have ever encountered, and I'm afraid that that has to account for the way I look in your direction. I'm sorry. [56:18] The fact here is that in addition to these facts which you've stated, some of which are still not in my knowledge, but I'm certainly willing to accept. [56:33] Which facts are not within your knowledge? [56:36] Well, for instance, I did not know that Mr. Marks had been interviewed in June by the FBI. [56:40] You said you didn't recollect that he was interviewed. [56:43] That's what I'm saying. [56:44] That's what I'm saying. [56:45] Yeah, I have no knowledge of that, but if you tell me so, then you're relying on Mr. Marks, and I'm perfectly willing to do that, too. [56:54] The point is that all through this period of time, on the one hand, the President of the United States is pressing for results. [57:05] On the other hand, Mr. Krogh is reporting to us from within the White House that he can't get the FBI moving, [57:12] and the Attorney General is corroborating to us directly what Mr. Krogh is reporting. [57:20] Now, I can only testify of my own knowledge here what people reported to me, because I made no independent check of this. [57:32] And it was my clear recollection that up until this meeting of the President with the Attorney General around the 20th of September, [57:43] I had the continuing impression because of continuing reports that came to us that the FBI was not yet moving satisfactorily. [57:55] And you received this information from the August 11th memorandum? Is that the basis of it? [57:59] Well, the August 11th memorandum is not a description of what was really going on. [58:05] It was in the sense of function. [58:07] It was a description of what had been designated by the FBI as a categorical designation. [58:15] Now, interestingly enough, it took three months for the FBI to get around to putting that special case [58:22] or priority or Class A designation on this case, whatever it was. [58:27] And I think the fact that some 60, 90 days passed before the Bureau would put that designation on the biggest raid [58:35] and top-secret documents in the history of the country has to indicate a certain amount of lassitude on the part of the FBI up to that point. [58:44] There was a continuing skepticism on Mr. Krogh's part about the bureaucratic paper that was coming over from the FBI [58:52] and justification of its efforts, like the memo you showed me yesterday. [58:56] And he continued to express that skepticism. [58:59] And the Attorney General continued to corroborate that right up until this meeting. [59:04] And I can't fix it precisely by date, but my best recollection is that it was in the third week in September [59:11] when the Attorney General vouched for the fact that things were moving satisfactorily at that point. [59:18] Now, I'm sorry that I can't give you direct personal information on this. [59:22] I can only give you a feel for what it was that the President had before him and that I had before me from others on this subject. [59:31] You have seen the memorandum of August 26 from David Young to you. [59:42] Have you had that memorandum with you? [59:55] Yes, sir. [59:57] And let's go to page five. [1:00:03] In connection with issue nine, it is important to point out that with a recent article on Ellsberg's lawyer Boudin, [1:00:09] we have already started on a negative press image for Ellsberg. [1:00:13] I'm sorry. [1:00:14] Oh, I see. [1:00:15] All right, go ahead. [1:00:16] If the present Hunt-Liddy project number one is successful, [1:00:20] it will be absolutely essential to have an overall game plan developed for its use in conjunction with a congressional investigation. [1:00:26] In this connection, I believe that the point of Buchanan's memorandum on attacking Ellsberg through the press should be borne in mind, [1:00:33] namely that the situation being attacked is too big to be undermined by planted leaks among the friendly press. [1:00:38] So you knew that there was a press purpose to this break-in? [1:00:43] Well, as I said yesterday, Senator, I don't have a recollection of the memo itself. [1:00:51] If you're asking me what I knew about the purposes of the investigation of Daniel Ellsberg, [1:00:59] I've testified already my understanding of the purposes. [1:01:03] The object here was not to prosecute Mr. Ellsberg, and as far as I'm concerned, it was not to persecute Mr. Ellsberg. [1:01:09] The object here was the same object that this unit conducted with regard to the strategic arms limitations talks, [1:01:17] compromise, and the other security matters. [1:01:21] And that was to try and find out how it happened and to make sure within the government that it did not happen again. [1:01:27] Now, with regard to the Congressional hearing aspect and the public relations aspect of this Ellsberg case, [1:01:39] I think you can develop additional information on that from others. [1:01:46] I'm not your best witness on that. [1:01:48] I do know that there was in the White House a desire to air this whole thing once the facts were known. [1:01:56] And it was hoped that a committee of the Congress would pick it up and would call witnesses [1:02:02] and would expose how such a thing could happen in our governmental system today, [1:02:09] where the treachery was within the government if there was, [1:02:12] where the treachery was in the think tank apparatus if there was, [1:02:18] and I'm not suggesting there was, but whether there was, [1:02:21] and who the individuals involved were, what their motivations were, and why this thing happened. [1:02:27] So I don't question for a minute that there was, under active consideration, [1:02:32] the possibility of fostering a Congressional inquiry. [1:02:37] And I have to say I think it would have been a healthy thing if we could have had such a thing. [1:02:42] But as far as the management of that particular effort is concerned, I'm not your man. [1:02:49] You're my man. [1:02:52] Sir? [1:02:54] You're my man. You're a good witness. [1:02:56] No, no. [1:02:59] Do you acknowledge, do you acknowledge this memorandum which I refer to, the August 26th memorandum, having received it? [1:03:11] Well, I don't know what you mean by acknowledge. [1:03:13] I see an E on it that is certainly very, very much my E. [1:03:17] And it would indicate that I had read it and that I had approved the concept of having a meeting on September 9th [1:03:24] with Marty and Buzzard Krogh-Young and McComber. [1:03:27] And I think that meeting was eventually held. [1:03:32] And one of the questions raised in the memorandum, if you just slip back the page before, at the bottom of page four says, [1:03:40] how quickly do we want to bring about a change in Ellsberg's image? [1:03:43] And that's footnoted to the material that you just read. [1:03:48] And that's footnoted to the material that I just read. [1:03:50] Yes, sir. [1:03:51] So I'm just going to run through the dates again. [1:03:53] And I think there's nothing much else I can do with this subject. [1:03:56] But let's just carefully review what occurred. [1:04:00] That on June of 1971, let me ask you this, Mr. Ehrlichman. [1:04:04] Would you at this time prefer, in the light of evidence that's been presented to you, [1:04:09] to leave Mr. Marks aside as one of the reasons for entering in this covert operation? [1:04:16] Or would you like to stick with Mr. Marks as a reason? [1:04:19] I can't leave it aside, Senator Weicker, because, of course, the fact is that the Attorney General did call and did convey his problems with regard to the Marks investigation. [1:04:30] And that's a matter of history and record. [1:04:32] There's no way to there's no way to blink that aside. [1:04:35] Now, you say that there was an interview. [1:04:38] Stop there, Mr. Ehrlichman. [1:04:39] We're not going into the motives of the director. [1:04:41] We're going into the reasons for the break in in Dr. Fielding's office. [1:04:46] I think you've asked. [1:04:47] The investigation took place. [1:04:48] You've asked if I would like to withdraw that factor as a justification for the investigation. [1:04:54] And it is not something that can be withdrawn. [1:04:58] It's a fact. [1:04:59] Now, I cannot explain for you something that is not in my knowledge, which is the fact that there was an interview of Mr. Marks. [1:05:08] It may have been a totally satisfactory and productive interview. [1:05:11] On the other hand, it may have been the kind of a first interview by the FBI that required a follow-up. [1:05:16] And that that is what precipitated the director's displeasure. [1:05:20] I don't know. [1:05:22] And I guess you don't know. [1:05:23] Well, I know that Mr. Marks met with the director. [1:05:30] With Mr. Hurt. [1:05:31] Mr. Lewis Marks 30 years ago in Dinty Moore's restaurant. [1:05:35] And that's the last time they ever met. [1:05:38] And they corresponded. [1:05:41] They corresponded. [1:05:42] Excuse me, Mr. Senator. [1:05:44] Yes, Mr. Wilson. [1:05:45] I don't believe it is proper I submit to the chairman for a member of this committee to produce evidence of this sort. [1:05:51] The issue is Mr. Marks. [1:05:54] No, but the fact that he was in the only Simon Dinty Moore's restaurant 30 years ago is the rankest kind of hearsay from you. [1:06:01] Mr. Wilson, your client is alleging a friendship with Mr. Marks. [1:06:05] I'm not going on to tell any senator of the United States how he should conduct himself. [1:06:11] Am I presumptuous and interfering in the bay of my client? [1:06:15] Well, I think you maybe have a right to object to admissibility of testimony. [1:06:21] But every senator in the United States has a right to do what he thinks his duty requires him to do. [1:06:32] And I'm not going on to take it to describe standards for other senators. [1:06:36] Well, the record shows my objection, doesn't it? [1:06:38] Yes. [1:06:39] Senator, could I add my hearsay to this so that you can evaluate it? [1:06:42] I don't know what this is worth. [1:06:43] But what I was told at the time was that the director, who is well known for his Del Mar racetrack vacations in Southern California every year, [1:06:55] had an acquaintanceship with Mr. Marks, which arose from his time in California on those vacations. [1:07:07] Now, I don't know whether that's true or not, but that's what I was told. [1:07:10] Well, my information is not hearsay. It is a conversation with Mr. Marks in which he told me what I have transmitted to you today. [1:07:17] Let me again then review the dates, and then we will leave this subject. [1:07:23] In June of 1971, Mr. Marks is interviewed by the FBI. [1:07:27] I don't know. [1:07:28] In July of 1971, Dr. Fielding, an attempted interview is had with Dr. Fielding, who refuses, who refuses the interview on the advice of his attorney. [1:07:41] On August the 3rd… [1:07:42] Do we know why he did that? [1:07:45] This is something that would have to be discussed with Dr. Fielding's attorney. [1:07:50] I see. [1:07:51] But the interview is refused. That's a fact. [1:07:54] On August the 3rd, we have evidence before the committee that the director writes to Mr. Eagle Krogh indicating full cooperation by the FBI. [1:08:05] In your testimony yesterday, you termed this puffing. [1:08:10] I think we finally agreed on that as the term. [1:08:13] It's not my characterization. It was your characterization. [1:08:17] Right. [1:08:19] On August the 11th, you get a memorandum from Mr. Crow and Mr. Young. [1:08:26] And in that memorandum, it is stated in this connection, we would recommend that a covert operation be undertaken to examine all the medical files still held by Ellsberg's psychoanalyst covering the two-year period in which he was undergoing analysis. [1:08:41] Approve, disapprove, we have your initial E with your comments underneath, if done, under your assurance that it is not traceable. [1:08:51] And then on August the 26th, we have the memorandum which I just referred to, which in… [1:08:58] And again, a memorandum you obviously received because it is initialed by you, in which the issue of Ellsberg's press image is discussed. [1:09:10] And then, lo and behold, on September 3rd, 1971, the break-in actually occurs. [1:09:18] Isn't it fair to say, and here's my question, that the August 11th memorandum approving the covert activities, your approval, to obtain Dr. Fielding's records, which resulted in the September 3rd break-in, was a result of Dr. Fielding's refusal to provide this information voluntarily to the FBI and not as a result of any shortcoming of the FBI? [1:09:42] Well, Senator, by way of answering your question, I think we ought also to include the other reference in your exhibits, the letter of October 3, where it appears that the President… [1:09:52] August 3. [1:09:54] Pardon me, August 3, where the President on July 29 found it necessary to write to the Director to jiggle up the Bureau. [1:10:04] I know of my own knowledge that, in addition to that, the President had a telephone conversation with the Director on this subject. [1:10:10] And, of course, the other part of the memo of August 11, just two paragraphs below where I put my E, where they reported we are continuing to press the FBI for action on certain items, which I think have to also be weighed in, along with these other conversations that I've indicated this morning in my previous answer. [1:10:35] And I think the long and short of this is that while you can find typical selective evidence in a matter of this kind, you have to take it on all four corners. [1:10:50] And I assure you that the decision that was made in this matter to put investigators in the field was taken most reluctantly and for genuine purposes, and the purposes are simply to supplement what was considered to be an inadequate effort at the time by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [1:11:10] Now, in order for you to satisfy yourself on this, you ought to hear from Mr. Mitchell, you ought to hear from Mr. Crode, you ought to hear from those who were on the firing line of this, and not simply someone like myself who was receiving these reports secondhand. [1:11:31] I'm going to repeat my question, which you've not answered, but since you've raised this other issue, just what did you expect to do with the information so obtained? [1:11:42] You were trying to supplement the efforts of the FBI. Did you intend to introduce this in court? [1:11:48] The purpose of this was to correct what was obviously a very serious shortcoming. [1:11:54] Either in the government itself or in the think tanks who had custody of these secret documents because the confidential document system had been compromised. [1:12:08] What did you intend to do with the evidence so obtained from Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist? [1:12:13] Did you intend to introduce it in court? [1:12:16] No, sir. That was not the purpose. The Justice Department had a prosecutorial... [1:12:21] Excuse me, sir. The Justice Department had an investigation for prosecution purposes, which was ongoing under Mr. Martian. [1:12:30] This was not intended to satisfy that need. This was intended to satisfy the President of the United States, who was saying, how could a thing like this happen? [1:12:40] What have we done to prevent it happening again? Is this is this Rand Corporation and all these other defense think tanks that are at fault in this? [1:12:50] Or is it our own Defense Department? Or is it the State Department? Or just where is the weakness in this? [1:12:56] Mr. Ehrlichman, are you telling me that the break-in to Dr. Fielding's office was to satisfy the President of the United States? [1:13:01] Well, now you've misunderstood me, Senator. The President wanted very much to make sure that a thing like this could not happen again. [1:13:15] How one learned whether Ellsberg acted alone as a disgruntled employee of a think tank, whether he acted as a member of an international spiring delivering secrets to a foreign embassy, or just what his role was, where he fit, had to be determined in the opinion of the investigators by every available means. [1:13:41] Now, obviously, as we discussed yesterday, this business of the psychiatric profile. Incidentally, Senator, I'd like to refer to something that came in last night. [1:13:51] As you all probably are very familiar on the committee, when you're a witness here, you get all sorts of suggestions by telegram and telephone and so on. [1:14:01] And someone overnight very kindly called in to suggest that the committee staff check the Warren Commission Report and the Kerner Commission Report for their references to the use of psychiatric profiles in domestic criminal acts. [1:14:20] Now, that was something I didn't know about. But apparently they felt that the use of the psychiatric profile is a very valid investigatory device. [1:14:28] And, of course, the CIA feels that, too. They have this they have this section. [1:14:32] Yes, we have the citations that were given us by a citizen who just wired in or called in. [1:14:38] It's a Warren Commission Report, pages 26, 461 and 781 and the Kerner Commission Report, page 73. [1:14:47] So this is apparently a technique of investigation which has considerable authenticity and dignity. [1:14:55] And that this this this business of trying to get additional information to permit the CIA psychiatric profile section to complete its work was the purpose of this additional task imposed upon these investigators. [1:15:12] Such CIA work would not be legal in the United States, would it? [1:15:21] That's that's a law question I can't answer, Senator. That's been debated back and forth in the McClellan Committee here in the Senate. [1:15:29] They've not yet issued their report. Evidently, there's considerable authority for the proposition that it either is or that it ought to be in the in the Kerner Commission Report and the Warren Commission Report. [1:15:42] It's one of those gray areas, apparently. [1:15:46] The chairman, I have one additional question I don't want to impose on the time of the other senators, but I would like to continue for a few additional minutes, if that's possible. [1:16:00] Now, Mr. Erlichman, you testified two days ago that on June 28, you called Pat Gray and had him cancel a meeting with General Walters because of a problem with leaks at the FBI. [1:16:24] Let me be specific. I'm now referring to page 5304 in response to questioning by the minority counsel, Mr. Thompson. [1:16:40] My strong concern and this is relative to calling off that meeting of the 28th with Pat Gray. [1:16:51] My concern, strong concern about the meeting was that it was going to include some staff members from the FBI. [1:16:56] And as I say, we're experiencing these leak problems. And right at that particular time, one of the people who would have been included in that meeting was under very strong suspicion as being the source of that leak. [1:17:11] And then again, on page 5305, you state because at that time we were talking with Mr. Klein East about how to go about smoking out this problem around Mr. Gray, frankly. [1:17:24] Now, those are your words. And yet, yesterday, when you testified on the turning over of documents, and this was the same day on the 28th to Pat Gray, in your testimony, you make the statement as the reason for giving the pack of documents to Pat Gray. [1:17:57] I quote you, it seemed to me like a good way of making sure that the documents did not leak as long as Mr. Gray held on to them. [1:18:09] Now, my question is very simple. On the same day you canceled a meeting with Mr. Gray because of leaks and then turned around and gave them documents so they wouldn't be leaked. Which is it? [1:18:21] Well, my problem was not with Mr. Gray personally with regard to leaks. Obviously, we wouldn't turn the documents over to him if we thought that he was going to leak them. [1:18:31] The problem was, as you read in the first transcript, was with a staff person high up in the FBI, or at least we suspected it was, never established it. [1:18:43] At the time, we had had a number of conversations with Mr. Gray about the problem. And I had some conversations with Mr. Kleindienst about the problem. And we had conversations about how to solve the problem. [1:19:00] Now, when I said we went around Mr. Gray, it was that Mr. Kleindienst, unknown to Mr. Gray, so that he would not even know it was being done, was going to plant a story or a fact. [1:19:12] And we were going to see in such a way that the individual under suspicion might be disclosed. It was a long shot, but it might have worked. [1:19:21] Now, I had implicit confidence in Mr. Gray as not being the source of the leak because we'd had experience with Mr. Gray in the Justice Department and at HEW before that. [1:19:34] And he was extraordinarily reliable. And so that was not the, that was not the problem. And I hope that I didn't, I hope I made that. [1:19:45] Well, I don't think you did because I repeat your sentence to you because at that time we, and I assume that's you, were talking with Mr. Kleindienst about how to go about smoking out this problem around Mr. Gray. [1:19:57] That's right. And the problem was on his staff. It was a holdover from the FBI who had been there when Mr. Gray came. [1:20:03] Do you go around people when you trust them? [1:20:07] Sometimes, sometimes. And it was Mr. it was Mr. Kleindienst's view that that was a way to proceed and his views, his view or mine, but that we would not bring Mr. Gray into our confidence with regard to Mr. Kleindienst's idea for planting a story. [1:20:30] Now, that's the only time we went around Mr. Gray that I can think of. [1:20:33] All right. One last series of questions. [1:20:37] Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to, I can see you warming up on that microphone. [1:20:44] I just want to make sure I'm not. [1:20:46] You just said one last question. I wasn't saying you should only ask one last question. [1:20:51] I was just getting this here so that I wouldn't forget to turn to recognize Senator Montoya. [1:20:58] As far as I'm concerned, why you can go ahead and ask more than one last question. [1:21:03] This is, this will be my last series on this go around. [1:21:07] You testified yesterday that on April 15th, you called Pat Gray and that he told you that he'd taken the Hunt papers to Connecticut and destroyed them. Is that correct? [1:21:29] I don't recall his telling me that he took them to Connecticut. [1:21:33] All right. Did he tell you that he destroyed them? [1:21:35] Yes, sir. [1:21:40] Let me read your testimony at that point. That was, and this was in response to Senator Gurney. [1:21:47] That was in April of this year. We had a conversation. The president asked me to telephone Mr. Gray. [1:21:52] It was Sunday night and it was the 15th of April at about 10, 15 p.m. [1:21:58] I was in the president's EOB office and he'd had a meeting that day with Mr. Klinienst. [1:22:04] The subject of these documents came up at that meeting and the president asked me to call Mr. Gray and find out what the documents were and where they were. [1:22:14] So I did that. Mr. Gray was not home. When he got home, he called back and we completed the conversation in the president's office. [1:22:21] Now, let me ask you this. After you received the word from Mr. Gray, which I believe was on April the 15th, did you transmit that information to the president? [1:22:40] Yes, sir. [1:22:42] And on what day was that? [1:22:49] Oh, he was sitting right there. I transmitted that instantly. [1:22:53] He was sitting with you when you made this call to Pat Gray. [1:22:58] Yes, sir. [1:22:59] And this was on April the 15th. Is that correct? [1:23:08] Yes, sir. [1:23:17] Any action taken by the president, any action recommended by you when you received word that the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had gone ahead and, in fact, burned or destroyed, rather, department files? [1:23:38] Yes, sir. [1:23:39] The president took the action that was taken and his first action was to contact either Mr. Klinienst or Mr. Peterson, and I'm not sure which of the two it was. [1:23:50] And he was asked to do nothing further until they had an opportunity to check into it and report back. [1:23:55] In other words, he asked for a report? [1:24:00] Well, he asked for an investigation and a corroboration of this and the circumstances surrounding it so that he would know how to take the next step. [1:24:09] Pat Gray admitted to you that he destroyed the file. [1:24:12] That's correct. [1:24:13] What is there to investigate in this matter? [1:24:16] You have a situation that obviously is considerably more than just an employment problem here. [1:24:24] And the president felt that, you see, he had spent the major part of that day or a good portion of that day with the attorney general and the assistant attorney general on the whole case. [1:24:36] And he was desirous of making sure that any step that he took was in coordination with those gentlemen. [1:24:44] And he, as a matter of fact, forbore to take a number of steps on his own motion in order to work in concert with the attorney general and the assistant attorney general, Mr. Peterson. [1:24:57] On April 15th, you and the president learned that files have been destroyed. [1:25:03] And the reaction of the president is we're going to get a report or we're going to do some. [1:25:10] Oh, no, no. [1:25:11] He was, he was obviously very concerned and upset by this. [1:25:15] And, and. [1:25:16] Well, let me recount to you a personal experience because I had the identical experience that you and the president had. [1:25:32] On April 25th, I was called by the director, who is still the acting director, even though he is notified the president of the United States and the head of the domestic council that he's burned FBI records. [1:25:48] I was called by the director, acting director of the FBI to his office. [1:25:52] And I sat in a chair and the acting director turned to me and in essence said the same thing that he told you and the president on April 15th. [1:26:05] I went ahead and I destroyed these files. [1:26:11] Now I had many of the cross currents of emotion that I'm sure must have also attended you and the president. [1:26:22] He's the acting director of the FBI. [1:26:26] I'm sure that crossed your mind. [1:26:27] I'm a United States Senator. [1:26:30] I'm a member of this committee. [1:26:32] I'm sure it must have crossed your mind that the president, he was the president of the United States, you were one of his closest advisors. [1:26:39] And quite frankly, I also had the additional emotion of seeing a man before me who was my friend. [1:26:45] These were the cross currents of emotion when the identical piece of information came to me as it had come to you 10 days earlier. [1:26:58] And I must confess, and I won't use more colorful language, when this was dropped in my lap, some thoughts went through my head as to what do I do with it? [1:27:09] What do I do to meet my obligations, to not let down a friend, but certainly to make sure that the information, information of this import, is made public and made available to the committee. [1:27:25] It was within the next 36 hours that the acting director told me substantial portions of what had occurred. [1:27:39] And it was within that period of time that I made sure that the story was laid out in front of the public as soon as I got it. [1:27:55] Not under my name, because I'm not getting to the top over the backs of any of my friends, but it wasn't something that could be withheld from the American public. [1:28:07] These were facts. They were known. All that was left is how were they going to be told. [1:28:14] But certainly in no wise did it ever occur to me that this was something that could be left unattended to, [1:28:23] that he could remain as acting director of the FBI, that the matters which I had heard of couldn't come to the attention of this committee. [1:28:32] And as you know, or as the record will indicate, having first had the news on April the 26th, or pardon, April 25th, the story was told to the American people on the 27th. [1:28:51] And Mr. Gray stepped down as director on the 28th. How would you indicate to me the difference? [1:29:04] Sure, it's just two different approaches, Senator. [1:29:06] And the information, no, the information we received was identical. [1:29:10] The President notified the chief law enforcement officer and you notified the newspapers. [1:29:15] It's, I say, two different approaches to the same problem. [1:29:18] No, Mr. Ehrlichman, I wanted to make sure that I lived up to all the obligations that I had. [1:29:28] The obligation as senator, the obligation that I thought he owed the American people as FBI director to tell them the whole story. [1:29:37] The obligation I had as a member of this committee and the feelings that I had for a friend. [1:29:46] There were various ways it could be handled, but I wanted him at least to get out and have the chance of telling his story. [1:29:54] Before he was left in place by, apparently, you and the President who had discovered the identical facts on April the 15th, but had made no move to either get Pat Gray, relieve him of his duties as director of the FBI, or to give information to the American people as to what he had done. [1:30:17] Well, Senator, I can't agree with your assertion that the President made no move. [1:30:21] He immediately informed those responsible for this entire investigation. [1:30:26] Now, this is, as you all on the committee well know, a very complex investigation with a lot of aspects to it, and with real problems of the rights of individuals and various kinds of legal overtakes. [1:30:42] Certainly, the President felt, I know he felt, that this had to be done in an orderly fashion by the law enforcement people who were responsible for this investigation. [1:30:53] As it turned out, it was well that he did, because Mr. Peterson, in pursuing the investigation with Mr. Gray, was able to develop other facts as a result of being able to do so without the cameras on, so to speak, which are, as I'm sure you recognize, both a positive and a negative aspect of a matter of this kind, in terms of adducing the facts. [1:31:21] Now, I think that, in hindsight, while it may sound very self-serving for me to say so, the President took precisely the right steps in immediately informing Mr. Peterson as he did, so that the prosecutors and the law enforcement people could do their work in making the case before it was all over the newspapers. [1:31:43] Now, the identical same consideration applied in John Dean's situation, where the President forbore to discharge Mr. Dean at Henry Peterson's request to give Mr. Peterson and his people an opportunity to complete their work before that relationship was severed. [1:32:08] Now, I think that we don't always have the luxury of gratifying our first instincts about a matter of this kind when we have the responsibility for the orderly execution of the laws in a prosecution of this kind. [1:32:28] What was the purpose of your phone call on April 15th to Mr. Gray? [1:33:06] Well, I explained that it was the result of the President's conversation that day with the Attorney General and Mr. Peterson, in which the question of these documents came up. [1:33:19] And the question that he put to me was whether I had any information with regard to the whereabouts of the documents. [1:33:28] And I said, yes, I did. I was present at a time when an envelope was delivered by Mr. Dean and Mr. Gray. [1:33:34] And he said, yes, that they were aware of this. [1:33:38] And he said, has Gray ever given them back? And I said, I don't know. [1:33:41] And he said, well, get on the phone and get a hold of Gray and tell him what we know about this and find out where those documents are and what's in them. [1:33:50] In other words, the enforcement agencies, the enforcement agencies had been working prior to April 15th. [1:33:55] Information had come through the grand jury, specifically on the testimony of Dean to the grand jury. [1:33:59] Well, no, I don't think Dean had been to the grand jury. [1:34:02] I think that Dean had talked with the prosecutors and had given them some of this information, if not all of it. [1:34:10] But we were operating with what the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General had told the President, [1:34:18] which the President recalled of the conversation and was imparting to me. [1:34:21] Well, I just would conclude by again asking you why Mr. Gray was left in place when this information was known to you and to the President and other members of the executive branch. [1:34:40] Well, I believe I've answered that question, Senator Weicker. [1:34:42] However, it was in aid of the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Peterson, and the Attorney General, Mr. Kleindienst. [1:34:50] I recall hearing later that Mr. Peterson had, in fact, interviewed Mr. Gray following this and had received conflicting stories. [1:35:01] This would have been prior, I guess, to your interview with Mr. Gray. [1:35:04] And finally, that the matter had been resolved. [1:35:07] They wanted to get a written statement. [1:35:09] They wanted to get the kind of evidence that they could use in court, apparently. [1:35:13] And so the President was giving them an opportunity to do that kind of thing. [1:35:17] This wasn't the first time that you left Mr. Gray in place, was it? [1:35:26] The first time that I left Mr. Gray in place. [1:35:30] This wasn't the first time, in other words, that in an adverse situation to Mr. Gray, he had been left in place. [1:35:38] Is that correct? [1:35:38] Mr. Gray, I'm sorry. I don't understand your question. [1:35:43] Well, for instance, during his confirmation hearings when he ran into some heavy weather, did you have any comments to make at that time? [1:35:55] Did I? [1:35:56] Yeah, about Mr. Gray? [1:35:58] Yes, indeed. [1:35:59] Can you remember what you said about him in the confirmation hearings at that time? [1:36:03] I think you're probably referring to my saying that he was hanging in the wind and should be left to spin slowly. [1:36:11] Yep. Let him hang there. [1:36:13] Well, I think we ought to let him hang there, let him twist slowly, slowly in the wind. [1:36:21] That's my metaphor, yes. [1:36:26] And he was twisting slowly, slowly in the wind on April 15th, wasn't he? [1:36:32] No, he was being investigated, investigated, investigated on April 15th. [1:36:37] I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. [1:36:39] Senator Monthorio. [1:36:41] Mr. Chairman, I know we've been on this burglary for quite some time, but I want to clear one point, Mr. Ehrlichman. [1:36:53] At what point did you feel that the FBI really got into the investigation of the Ellsberg case in a manner that was satisfactory to White House expectations? [1:37:07] I cannot fix that date, Senator, except to say that it was sometime prior to September 20th, because I do recall a meeting, either that date or very close to it. [1:37:19] Is that September 20th, 1971? [1:37:22] Yes, sir. [1:37:23] And the burglary occurred on or about September 3rd or 4th of 1971? [1:37:33] Around that time. [1:37:34] Yes. [1:37:35] And I believe your testimony indicated that you were notified by Mr. Krogue and Mr. Liddy, or either of them, while you were at Cape Cod about two or three days later? [1:37:49] No, sir. [1:37:50] When were you notified? [1:37:51] The best of my recollection, I was notified after I returned to the city. [1:37:56] And having been at Cape Cod in a kind of a remote area where I was not easily reachable. [1:38:03] And I was never notified by Mr. Liddy. [1:38:08] My best recollection is that I was notified by Mr. Krogue. [1:38:12] Then how many days after the burglary would that be? [1:38:15] Sir? [1:38:16] How many days after the burglary? [1:38:19] Well, I'm sorry I can't fix the date of the break-in for you. [1:38:22] Was it within a few days? [1:38:23] It was Labor Day weekend, as I understand it, that they broke in. [1:38:27] Monday was a holiday. [1:38:29] My first day back in the office was Tuesday, and I think it was probably that Tuesday. [1:38:33] It was the Tuesday after that weekend, then. [1:38:35] Yes, sir. [1:38:36] So that would make it— [1:38:37] I believe that. [1:38:37] That would make it on or about September the 4th or 5th or 6th. [1:38:43] I have a calendar here. [1:38:44] Could I look at it? [1:38:45] Well, the date is not relevant. [1:38:47] I see. [1:38:48] But it would be in that neighborhood, would it not? [1:38:50] Yes, sir. [1:38:51] All right. [1:38:53] Now, after about September 20th, as you indicated, the FBI really started working on this investigation. [1:39:02] No, I can't say that. [1:39:04] I'm sorry. [1:39:05] The only thing I can say is that I recall a meeting where there was a meeting of the minds [1:39:10] between the attorney general and the president as to the performance level of the Justice [1:39:17] Department, including the FBI, on the Pentagon Papers case. [1:39:22] And the president's feeling, based on the attorney general's report at that meeting, was [1:39:27] that the performance level was now satisfactory. [1:39:30] Now, when—you've asked me for a specific date, which I can't give you in terms of— [1:39:35] Well, it was on or about that time then. [1:39:37] I assume so. [1:39:39] All right. [1:39:40] Then, did you in the White House, with your investigative unit, develop a sort of investigative [1:39:48] partnership with the Department of Justice and the FBI? [1:39:52] I would say not. [1:39:53] But you were working in concert towards the same objective, were you not? [1:39:58] I don't believe that the White House people performed any specific investigations of that [1:40:05] character after the 20th of September. [1:40:09] All right. [1:40:09] Did you impart all the information that you had to the Department of Justice? [1:40:14] I did not. [1:40:15] But I'm sure that either Mr. Kroger or Mr. Young did. [1:40:18] Well, then, is it your testimony that they did— [1:40:23] That they did what, Senator? [1:40:24] Give all the information which they had to the Department of Justice. [1:40:28] I can't vouch for that. [1:40:29] I just assume that. [1:40:30] Well, this is one thing that strikes my fancy, Mr. Erlequin, that the burgery was committed [1:40:38] on September 3rd or 4th of 1971. [1:40:41] That you knew about it a few days later, upon your return from Cape Cod, that Mr. Liddy knew, [1:40:51] that Mr. Kroger knew, and that presumably other people in the White House knew. [1:40:56] Then why did it take until April the 15th, 1973, for the U.S. District Attorney here in [1:41:05] the District of Columbia, Mr. Silbert, to first find out of that burglary and then have [1:41:11] to transmit those news to the Department of Justice? [1:41:15] I don't think it did, Senator. [1:41:16] Well, that's what happened, according to the memo submitted here to this committee by [1:41:20] Mr. Silbert. [1:41:21] Well, the only thing I can tell you is what Mr. Dean told me about that, and that is that [1:41:28] the Justice Department had that information a good deal sooner than that. [1:41:31] Why did Mr. Silbert have to transmit this information about the break-in to Assistant Attorney General [1:41:40] Peterson on April 15th, 1973, then? [1:41:44] Well, if Mr. Dean told me the truth, he didn't have to, because Mr. Peterson already knew it. [1:41:49] Well, you knew the truth. [1:41:50] Sir? [1:41:50] You knew the truth. [1:41:52] I knew the truth? [1:41:53] You knew that the burglary had been committed. [1:41:55] No, you misunderstood me. [1:41:57] If Mr. Dean told me a year or so ago the truth, that Mr. Peterson then knew about the break-in, [1:42:06] then Mr. Silbert's transmittal of the paperwork in April of this year was not necessary. [1:42:15] But he did transmit it to Assistant Attorney General Peterson. [1:42:19] Oh, there's no question about it, but the question is whether that was news to Mr. Peterson or not. [1:42:23] Well, then, Mr. Peterson, the Assistant Attorney General, then informed on April the 26th, [1:42:32] informed Judge Byrne of the burglary attempt, or the actual burglary, I should say. [1:42:41] Now, that is also in the record in this hearing already. [1:42:43] Well, so is the fact that Mr. Dean told me a year before that or so that Peterson already knew it. [1:42:53] Why didn't Mr. Peterson take action then before? [1:42:56] I don't know, Senator. [1:42:57] As a matter of fact, I don't even know that that's true, but that's what Mr. Dean told me. [1:43:01] There were motions pending in the trial in California and petitions in discovery presented to the court [1:43:12] to try to get all the necessary evidence that might be helpful to the defendant. [1:43:17] And this did not appear at that time until April 15th when Attorney General Peterson presented this evidence to Judge Byrne. [1:43:26] Now, isn't that odd? [1:43:29] It's something I can't explain. [1:43:31] I think the record is very plain, and I think it's in the committee record, as a matter of fact, [1:43:36] that the photographs of the break-in were transmitted by the CIA to the Justice Department a long, long time before that. [1:43:44] Yes, the photographs were, but there was no evidence connecting the photographs to the break-in in the Ellsberg psychiatrist's office until later. [1:43:55] There was a great big picture, as they tell it to me, and I haven't seen these pictures, [1:43:59] but I understand there's a great big picture of Gordon Liddy with his mustache and a picture that has Dr. Fielding's name and address in the background. [1:44:08] And Gordon Liddy's picture's been on the front page of the Post every day, [1:44:11] and it doesn't take too much imagination to figure out who he was. [1:44:14] Well, it strikes my fancy that there is no evidence in the record here, and this burglary has been discussed. [1:44:23] There is no evidence here that the Department of Justice knew about it until Mr. Silbert's memo was presented to Assistant Attorney General Peterson. [1:44:32] Senator, the only thing I can say... [1:44:33] That's the state of the record at the present time. [1:44:35] The only thing I can say is that my hearsay is as good as Mr. Dean's credibility on the subject, [1:44:41] and I'm obviously not the one to vouch for that. [1:44:45] All right, now, let us go into another subject. [1:44:50] In the matter of presidential appointments, I'll start out by asking you whether this came within your domain. [1:45:00] The setting of the appointments for the president's time, Senator? [1:45:03] No, the matter of making presidential appointments to the different agencies of the government. [1:45:08] Oh, at some periods of time, I did get into that. [1:45:14] For instance, after the election in 1972, I was very much involved in that. [1:45:19] Did you get involved at all prior to 1972? [1:45:24] Yes, but on a case-by-case basis where it would be a domestic department where I might have something to contribute. [1:45:34] Well, that's what I mean. [1:45:35] Yes, sir. [1:45:35] Presidential appointments in the different departments. [1:45:37] But it was not something that was routinely cleared through me so that I signed off on every departmental appointment or anything of that kind. [1:45:43] Now, who would run a check on the possible appointees? [1:45:48] Well... [1:45:48] Would it be the FBI? [1:45:51] Ordinarily, there would be, among other things, an FBI check on major appointees to determine conflicts of interest in this kind of thing. [1:46:01] And so, the FBI, would you say that they conducted very complete and concise checks on these possible appointees? [1:46:10] They were not very good, Senator, in my opinion. [1:46:13] In what respect? [1:46:14] They were very superficial. [1:46:16] They'd go around and they'd talk to a lot of people and they'd get a lot of hearsay about them. [1:46:20] And there'd be very little follow-up. [1:46:22] I was consistently critical of the quality of that work. [1:46:25] Well, did you provide some input into these checks yourself or through your employees? [1:46:31] Very seldom. [1:46:32] Occasionally, where there was an appointee that I had known an FBI man would come around as they would to you or to any citizen. [1:46:40] But that was only two or three times probably. [1:46:42] But the White House did not have a setup for checkups? [1:46:44] Oh, yes. [1:46:45] There was a special office, and it was in the office of the council, where these things were routinely done. [1:46:52] And they had also a personnel office. [1:46:56] And the two worked together, generally in Mr. Haldeman's area of responsibility, to perfect these files of presidential appointees. [1:47:07] What kind of checkups would the FBI conduct? [1:47:11] What was their sphere in doing this investigation? [1:47:14] Well, you know, you fill out one of these long forms that you have to put down where you've lived for the last 30 years and where you've worked for the last 30 years. [1:47:22] And as I gather, and I'm no expert on this, but I gather, they go around and they talk to people in these different places. [1:47:29] And they ask about the candidate. [1:47:32] Now, you were assistant to the president for domestic affairs. [1:47:36] Yes, sir. [1:47:37] And have been for quite some time and was for quite some time until your resignation. [1:47:42] 1970. [1:47:43] Yes. [1:47:44] Now, in this capacity, you had to evaluate the possible appointments made by the president and provide input by way of recommendation after reading reports, would you not? [1:47:56] Only occasionally, where they were referred to me for my special consideration. [1:48:03] Now, what departments did you deal with as assistant to the president for domestic affairs? [1:48:09] Any department that had a domestic aspect to it. [1:48:12] All right. [1:48:13] All right. [1:48:13] Then, those who worked under you necessarily informed you as to what they undertook with respect to communication or relations with the different departments under your jurisdiction. [1:48:26] Would that be a correct statement? [1:48:27] Not on any regular basis, Senator. [1:48:31] But on important policy matters, would they? [1:48:34] Well, I relied on them to conduct their responsibilities, bringing to me only problems that they felt they couldn't handle themselves. [1:48:43] Well, would you be able to throw some light before this committee as to the genesis of the enemy's list about which testimony has been adduced? [1:48:56] No, sir. [1:48:57] Did you receive any memorandum with respect to the enemy's list from John Dean or any other person in the White House? [1:49:06] Not that I can recall. [1:49:07] Did you discuss the enemy's list with Mr. Haldeman? [1:49:10] No. [1:49:11] I did, after the testimony, hear about it because I don't recall ever hearing of it before. [1:49:18] Did you discuss the enemy's list with Mr. Coulson? [1:49:22] No. [1:49:22] All right. [1:49:24] Now, in your capacity as assistant to the president for domestic affairs dealing with the different departments, were you aware of the effort that was being made to place Mr. Coulson and Mr. Liddy in the Internal Revenue Service? [1:49:47] No, sir. [1:49:48] You have heard about it since then? [1:49:51] I'm not sure that I have. [1:49:53] Well, the dean memorandum reflects something to this effect. [1:49:58] I missed that. [1:49:59] I'm sorry. [1:49:59] All right. [1:50:01] Now, you do know that the White House made quite a few requests for the income tax returns of individuals, do you not? [1:50:11] I would doubt that seriously, Senator. [1:50:13] You would doubt that there were no requests? [1:50:15] I would doubt that the White House had made requests for the income tax returns of individual citizens. [1:50:21] All right. [1:50:24] Now, I will introduce for the record the statistical data furnished by the Internal Revenue Service in a book entitled Statistics, Requests for Inspection of Income Tax Returns or Data from Returns by Federal Agencies for the Six-Month Period, January 1st, 1972, [1:50:53] to June 30th, 1972, and then another volume with the same title for the period, July 1st, 1972, and December 31st, 1972. [1:51:07] And I will turn to the first page of the document in each instance and read, for your benefit, tax checks requested by federal agencies, January 1st, 1972 to June 30th, 1972, agency, White House, number 477. [1:51:37] Now, just a minute. [1:51:40] Let me lay my premise. [1:51:41] Okay. [1:51:41] And then on the second document, tax checks requested by federal agencies, July 1st, 1972, December 31st, 1972, agency, White House, number 438. [1:52:03] Now, what comment do you have on that? [1:52:05] Well, your question was whether or not the White House had requested anybody's tax returns, and I said I would doubt that. [1:52:12] Now, I don't know what a tax check is in those statistics. [1:52:15] Perhaps there's a definition in there, but a tax check, as I understand it, is to find out if an individual has tax problems before he's appointed to federal office, [1:52:26] because obviously you don't want to appoint an assistant secretary who's going to be indicted for tax fraud the next day. [1:52:32] So it is a routine procedure for this personnel office that I mentioned or for the council's office to find out from the IRS if these individuals have problems. [1:52:43] Now, that doesn't mean calling for their returns and going through and seeing who they've taken as deductions or what their sources of income may be. [1:52:50] Matter of fact, my personal experience with this senator has been in the instances where the president was considering individuals for the United States Supreme Court. [1:53:00] And he asked me to determine whether people that he had in mind had any tax problems. [1:53:06] And being kind of new to the business, I thought that what one did was to, you know, get the returns and flip through. [1:53:14] And I discovered that the White House could not get an individual's income tax return, the thing that the citizen files with the government, [1:53:22] that it's simply not available, even for such a situation as the appointment of a Supreme Court justice. [1:53:28] So what you do is you ask the tax people to tell you if an individual that you have in mind has any significant tax problem. [1:53:38] And then if they do, they would send back a memo saying this fellow is free of any tax problems for the last six years. [1:53:49] Or they would send a memo back saying, well, as a tax problem for the tax year 1970, it is in negotiation. [1:53:57] It'll probably be settled by such and such a date. [1:53:59] Well, Mr. Ehrlichman, I asked you those questions before I asked you this one. [1:54:04] And you said that you were not aware of any requests. [1:54:07] I'm sorry your question didn't say tax check. [1:54:10] Your question said tax return, Senator, and that's a very different thing. [1:54:13] Oh, do you mean to tell me now that there were no requests for tax returns of taxpayers? [1:54:20] I'm not aware of a one. [1:54:23] Well, would you say that the record of the internal revenue is correct? [1:54:29] Well, see, we're talking about apples and oranges. [1:54:31] That's our problem. [1:54:33] The apples here. [1:54:33] No, we're not talking about apples and oranges. [1:54:35] Well, the apples here. [1:54:36] We're talking about one thing. [1:54:38] Tax checks or tax returns? [1:54:41] Well, how can you get a tax check if you don't see a tax return? [1:54:44] Well, you asked somebody else in the Internal Revenue Service who has the legal authority [1:54:48] to see it to examine it and report to you if there is a problem or not. [1:54:53] Now you're talking about apples and oranges. [1:54:57] Well, I think I can assure you, Senator, that at least in my personal experience, no one on [1:55:03] the White House staff has any access to your tax return or the tax return of any citizen. [1:55:09] At the same time, if you were being considered by the president for the Supreme Court, it [1:55:17] would be a matter of routine for someone on his staff to ask the Internal Revenue Service [1:55:22] to examine your file as they have the legal right to do and report to the president whether [1:55:27] or not you have a tax problem. [1:55:30] Now, let me read you some other instances where there were requests for tax returns from [1:55:36] other departments. [1:55:37] Department of the Treasury for the period January 1st, 1972 to June 30th, 1972, the Department [1:55:48] of Justice requested 407 returns against 477 by the White House. [1:55:53] Are those returns or checks? [1:55:55] Well, these are tax checks requested by federal agencies under that title. [1:56:03] Well, I see, some, I might say this by way of a footnote to all this, and I'm by no means [1:56:10] an expert in this, but I understand that certain departments and agencies, not the White House, [1:56:14] but certain departments and agencies by statute, by laws passed by the Congress, have the right [1:56:20] to see returns. [1:56:22] The Department of Justice, I guess, is one. [1:56:26] But that's a very different thing than the question that you put to me in the first instance. [1:56:30] Yes, but those are categorized by department here in this list, and the White House is [1:56:36] categorized separately. [1:56:38] That's the point I'm trying to make. [1:56:39] Well, if that said that the White House received returns rather than got check, you know, just [1:56:44] memos of checks, that'd be a different thing. [1:56:47] Now, who else would have the supervision or authority to make these requests on behalf of [1:56:52] the White House? [1:56:53] Well, I assume. [1:56:54] Besides yourself. [1:56:55] I assume that the council did. [1:56:57] I had, I guess I had the authority, but I exercised it in very few cases as assistant to the president, [1:57:03] and they would be either cabinet officers or Supreme Court appointees ordinarily, where [1:57:08] the president didn't want to tell a lot of people who he was considering. [1:57:13] The council, I believe, ordinarily and routinely had the responsibility for determining whether [1:57:20] a person had a tax problem or not. [1:57:22] Don't you think that these tax checks and requests for tax returns represent quite a great number [1:57:32] for the White House because they only have 400 employees there? [1:57:35] Oh, but you see, they're checking the employees to be appointed in all of the departments under [1:57:41] what are called a presidential appointment. [1:57:42] That would be cabinet, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, agency heads, deputy agency heads [1:57:50] of various agencies like the Veterans Administration and places of that kind. [1:57:56] You mean during this period that you were considering approximately 1,000 persons for appointment [1:58:01] and announcing to the entire country that you were reducing the federal force? [1:58:06] Well, there's quite a bit of turnover, Senator. [1:58:08] I don't know what the number would be, but it doesn't surprise me that the volumes would [1:58:14] be, say, 400 in a six-month period. [1:58:16] All right. [1:58:16] See, we have, what, 2 million federal employees or something, down from 2,500,000? [1:58:22] Well, you gave us a lecture on political science the other day. [1:58:25] You tell us. [1:58:25] Well, that's my best recollection. [1:58:27] All right. [1:58:28] Thank you. [1:58:29] Now, let us go into another phase. [1:58:32] Mr. Chairman, if the sentiment Montoya is going to another phase, I wonder if he'd be kind [1:58:39] enough to let me see that document from which he's reading. [1:58:42] Yes, I'd be glad to. [1:58:43] Two documents. [1:58:44] Thank you. [1:58:45] May I return them after the recess? [1:58:47] You certainly may, sir. [1:58:48] Thank you. [1:58:49] Now, on July of the 21st, you were quoted in an article in the New York Times as being [1:58:58] in favor of releasing the tapes, which are in controversy. [1:59:02] Did you make that kind of a statement? [1:59:07] Well, I've had a lot of troubles with quotations in the New York Times, Senator, and that's [1:59:11] one of them. [1:59:12] What happened there was that I gave a television interview to a fellow. [1:59:18] You know, they come out and sit on my lawn, and as I come out in the morning, why, it's [1:59:22] pretty well unavoidable. [1:59:24] And this fellow said something in effect, do you have anything to worry about if these [1:59:30] tapes get out? [1:59:32] And I said, no, I don't think I have anything to worry about. [1:59:34] I didn't know I was being taped, but I don't think I said anything there that I'd be ashamed [1:59:39] of. [1:59:40] And he said, well, then you think that the president ought to release these. [1:59:47] And I said, well, you know, you've got to look at this from two standpoints. [1:59:51] Certainly from my standpoint, I have no problem. [1:59:54] But he has a much larger picture to look at. [1:59:57] Well, the word certainly is what carried on the wire. [2:00:00] And the rest of the sentence didn't get carried. [2:00:03] And so I saw the wire story. [2:00:05] And it said, Ehrlichman today, in response to a question, should the president release [2:00:10] these tapes, said certainly. [2:00:11] Well, what I said was, in effect, I think, certainly I don't have anything to worry about. [2:00:15] But the president's got a lot more worries than I have about the country and the separation [2:00:19] of powers and his relationship with the Congress and so on. [2:00:22] Now, having just said that sentence, I'll bet you the New York Times tomorrow says, Ehrlichman [2:00:28] says, the president has a lot more to worry about than he does. [2:00:32] Well, now, for two days, we've been talking about a burglary here, a burglary that you [2:00:42] justify as legal under implied presidential constitutional power. [2:00:48] You say that it was committed as a part of an effort to protect the security of our country. [2:00:55] Many of us say this was clearly illegal. [2:00:58] Now, I pose this question to you. [2:01:04] And I want to develop, in my own mind, a profile of the president and probe into his inner thinking. [2:01:12] If the president or someone at the White House was willing to order this questionable court [2:01:18] action, well, covert action, why does not the president now take cognizance of a real threat [2:01:29] to the presidency of our country, the erosion of confidence of our people, the internal institutional [2:01:39] chaos that has set in, and now perform a really patriotic act to bring stability to our country, [2:01:52] perform a legal act by shedding the mantle of executive privilege, and release these tapes [2:02:00] and records to this committee so that the American people can have some light on the truth [2:02:08] and put an end to the Watergate tale of suspense and tragedy? [2:02:14] Can you answer that question? [2:02:15] Well, obviously, that's a question, Senator, that ought to be directed to the president rather [2:02:20] than to me. [2:02:21] Let me just tell you my own view of this as a citizen. [2:02:26] Obviously, I don't speak for the president and haven't for a long time. [2:02:29] The chairman and learned counsel yesterday demonstrated to my satisfaction that these constitutional issues [2:02:45] are not susceptible of easy decisions. [2:02:51] I would certainly be the last to try and make a quick response to your question. [2:02:59] It's a profound question that involves the meaning of our Constitution and the relationship [2:03:06] of our governmental institutions. [2:03:07] I don't think it's really appropriate for me to respond to it in terms of substance. [2:03:19] Here, it's obviously a much more important question than someone in my situation ought to [2:03:25] try and answer right off the top of his head. [2:03:28] Well, if you were chief counsel at the White House, or if you were acting in the role of assistant [2:03:35] to the president for domestic affairs, and you were aware of the chaos that is setting in [2:03:43] in this country with respect to the presidency, and you were aware of other things, what would [2:03:49] you advise him? [2:03:51] Mr. Chairman, may I? [2:03:53] A proper question, because... [2:03:57] May I suggest that I never like to answer iffy questions? [2:04:04] Well, I never did like to answer iffy questions myself, but I think Senators have a right to [2:04:14] ask them. [2:04:14] I think the Senators... [2:04:15] I think so, since the witness has gone afield and expressed opinions about the power of the [2:04:21] president under the Constitution, I think, and since he was a lawyer for the White House [2:04:26] at one time, and since he was chief for domestic advice of the president, I think it's all right [2:04:33] to ask him what he would advise the president. [2:04:34] I think he wants to answer it anyway. [2:04:37] Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure I fully understood the point that was going to be made by Mr. [2:04:43] Wilson. [2:04:43] I might add this one word of caution. [2:04:48] We've taken proof from witnesses about what they would do if a set of circumstances, and [2:04:55] we've heard questions put and answers made to hypothetical situations, but the chairman [2:05:01] has admonished from time to time, as I have, that that is not proof of material fact in these [2:05:07] proceedings. [2:05:07] It rather may or may not be relevant to the state of mind or the attitude of a witness as [2:05:13] it bore on his conduct. [2:05:15] If that is the case here, that is, if it has to do with the impact that point of view might [2:05:22] have on the witness's conduct, I can't see anything wrong with it. [2:05:28] If it has to do with trying to prove the substance of the hypothesis... [2:05:32] Mr. Chairman, if the senator will yield to me on my own time... [2:05:39] I'll give you part of my time, Jerry. [2:05:42] This witness is an expert on the president's demeanor. [2:05:52] He is a specialist on White House procedures and thinking, and I think he would be the best [2:06:00] witness, other than Mr. Haldeman, to answer such a question which is bothering the entire [2:06:06] country, and I'm not facetious about it. [2:06:09] I was really sincere about it. [2:06:11] Well, I'm not facetious either. [2:06:13] I was agreeing with you. [2:06:14] Yes, I know you are. [2:06:15] I was telling you you ought to go ahead and answer the question. [2:06:17] I know you are, but I thought I'd lay that premise as to why I asked this particular question. [2:06:23] Senator, let me preface my answer by saying I'm not an expert, and that's the very reason [2:06:30] that I'm going to answer this question the way I will. [2:06:34] And you've asked me in terms of how the president approaches a problem like this, I guess, and [2:06:38] you were talking about his temperament or his makeup and so on. [2:06:46] If I were asked by the president sitting there to approach this problem and give him a recommendation, [2:06:53] I would have to know a great deal more about the elements of the constitutional law question [2:06:59] that are involved than I know sitting here today. [2:07:01] So one of the first things that I would do, as had been my practice there, is to draw on the very best minds [2:07:09] that we could assemble from around the country, in and out of government, to advise on this subject. [2:07:16] Now, we did this, for instance, in a somewhat critical phase of the busing problem. [2:07:24] And we had people like Alexander Bickle and Charles Wright from Texas and good legal minds from outside. [2:07:31] And we had the best people we could find inside the government as well to counsel with us both by way of memorandum [2:07:39] and in person as to the various options that would be available to the president. [2:07:46] And certainly as assistant to the president, it was my job not to decide for myself the right thing to do [2:07:52] and then tell him, but to try and assemble for him as much information, as much valid opinion, [2:08:00] as there was on the subject, and spread it before him so that he had the entire picture. [2:08:05] And that's the way he preferred to work. [2:08:07] Now, I have no doubt that in this dispute, that is precisely what he has done, [2:08:15] although I don't know that of my own knowledge. [2:08:16] I know how this man works. [2:08:18] So that I would expect that he has drawn upon legal scholars, [2:08:23] the best people in the Solicitor General's office and the Department of Justice, [2:08:27] and everywhere that he can find respectable views as to the relationship of the presidency [2:08:33] to the Congress and to the Constitution. [2:08:34] I think you are now testifying about the president's mind rather than your own. [2:08:39] Sir? [2:08:39] And I'm sorry I didn't sustain an objection. [2:08:42] I understood that that was one of the things that the senator was interested in. [2:08:46] Saying what you would say and not what the president would say. [2:08:50] Well, it would only be after a process of review like that, Senator, [2:08:53] that I would feel equipped to say. [2:08:55] I feel right now very inadequate to involve myself in a profound question of constitutional law [2:09:01] without the background. [2:09:02] I could shoot from the hip and say that were I sitting in the White House, [2:09:08] my instinctive reaction would be to feel my obligation to preserve the institution of the presidency intact. [2:09:17] You see, we pass this torch of the presidency from one man to one man to one man. [2:09:23] And it's his job for an entire period of four years to maintain the integrity of and the viability [2:09:32] and the constitutionality and the function of that office. [2:09:37] And there's nobody else that's going to help him. [2:09:39] The Congress is in the business of strengthening the Congress's prerogatives. [2:09:44] And we have this constant adversary relationship that goes on between our branches of government. [2:09:51] Just in interest, Tommy, aren't you testifying that you don't know what you would do [2:09:55] if you had a responsibility different from the one you now have? [2:09:59] Sir? [2:10:00] Aren't you telling us, in short, that you don't know what you would do if you had a responsibility [2:10:05] and a power which you do not now possess? [2:10:08] Well, it was admittedly a hypothetical question to which I was asked to respond, Mr. Chairman. [2:10:14] In other words, I sort of sustained an objection, at least not sustained an objection, [2:10:19] but to indicate that what you would do sheds no light on, except as a citizen. [2:10:26] It might illuminate the thing, but I interpret your answer to say that since you do not now [2:10:34] have the position of an advisor to the president, you don't know what you would do if you should [2:10:39] be restored to that position under the present circumstances. [2:10:42] I have a feeling you're objecting to the answer and not the question, Mr. Chairman. [2:10:45] No, I'm, well, frankly, I think, I gave my opinion about the answer. [2:10:49] I said I didn't come in question. [2:10:51] I don't care iffy questions myself. [2:10:53] Well, obviously, without a great deal of study and a great deal more expertise than I have, [2:10:59] I wouldn't feel competent to advise either the president or this committee. [2:11:03] The only thing that I recognize is that art is long and time is fleeting in my heart so [2:11:07] stout and brave, still like muffled drums are beating funeral marches to the grave. [2:11:10] We've taken about 10 or 15 minutes on this proposition. [2:11:15] Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions other than to make an observation that, in my opinion, [2:11:22] the witness has answered that he does not wish to answer. [2:11:27] That's, in effect, your answer. [2:11:28] Well, without a great deal more study, Senator, it would be very presumptuous of me to involve [2:11:34] myself in a question as profound as that. [2:11:37] Thank you, sir. [2:11:39] The committee will stand in recess at this time for 2 o'clock. [2:11:50] After two and a half days, the committee has finished its first round of questions for [2:11:54] John Ehrlichman. [2:11:54] In a moment, Senator Irvin will start round two. [2:11:57] Public television coverage of the Senate Watergate hearings will continue after a pause for station [2:12:02] identification. [2:12:04] Unabridged coverage of these hearings is provided as a public service by the member stations of PBS, [2:12:10] the public broadcasting service. [2:12:18] From Washington, NPACT continues its coverage of hearings by the Senate Select Committee on [2:12:23] Presidential Campaign Activities. [2:12:25] Here again, correspondent Jim Lehrer. [2:12:29] As the hearings resume after lunch, Senator Irvin has some questions about the secrecy surrounding [2:12:34] the so-called plumbers unit. [2:12:35] You spoke of the Kerner Commission and the Warren Commission. [2:12:59] Both of these commissions were appointed publicly by the president in office at the time of their [2:13:04] appointment, and both of them worked in public, didn't they? [2:13:08] Yes, sir. [2:13:09] And in that respect, they won like the plumbers who were appointed in secret and whose identity [2:13:17] was kept secret from the American people. [2:13:20] Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, their identity was not kept secret. [2:13:23] It was a subject of newspaper stories. [2:13:26] Secondly, the reason that I cited you to the reports of those commissions was because they [2:13:32] both discussed, or so my information is, they both discussed the use of psychiatric profiles [2:13:37] with relation to United States citizens. [2:13:40] And, of course, one of them brought me to the realization that the Secret Service does conduct [2:13:46] such an activity with relation to United States citizens in aid of its protection of the president [2:13:53] and the vice president and others in trying to determine in advance who might be threats [2:13:58] to assassination attempts. [2:14:00] So it goes to the point that you raised yesterday that such a technique would be illegal with [2:14:06] regard to United States citizens. [2:14:07] Well, wasn't the existence of the plumbers kept secret from the FBI and the CIA and other [2:14:12] investigative agencies of the government? [2:14:14] No, sir. [2:14:15] Did you tell Mr. Hoover about them? [2:14:18] Yes, sir. [2:14:18] And we also told the Attorney General. [2:14:20] Yes. [2:14:21] But they worked under cover of darkness, and their weapon was burglary. [2:14:26] They did not work under cover of darkness, Mr. Chairman. [2:14:28] Well, they didn't. [2:14:29] Did they burglarize Dr. Field's office in the daytime or the night? [2:14:34] I don't know, Mr. Chairman. [2:14:36] Wasn't that reported to you? [2:14:37] No, sir. [2:14:40] In point of fact, however, as I testified yesterday, I had interviews with the Secretary of Defense, [2:14:45] the Attorney General, Director of the CIA, in which I introduced Mr. Young and Mr. Krogh, [2:14:50] and they described the function of the special unit. [2:14:53] This was in advance of their actually coming into full operation. [2:14:58] Mr. Ehrlichman, you're telling me that you don't know that the burglary of the psychiatrist's [2:15:05] office occurred in the nighttime? [2:15:07] I do not, Mr. Chairman. [2:15:09] You think it occurred at high noon? [2:15:10] I have heard, and I don't know this, but I have heard that it occurred on a holiday [2:15:15] during the daytime, but as I say, I don't know it. [2:15:18] Well, anyway, you've spoken about, in derogatory terms, of Mr. Hoover. [2:15:26] No, I don't intend any derogation of Mr. Hoover. [2:15:28] Well, you said he should have quit the office, that he didn't know enough about surveillance, [2:15:32] although he spent his lifetime in it. [2:15:34] Oh, I didn't say that, and I wouldn't intend to say that, Mr. Chairman. [2:15:38] Well, you said he had different ideas about surveillance from what the White House had. [2:15:41] No, sir. [2:15:44] Well, you said that he wouldn't cooperate with the White House. [2:15:52] What I said was that in a specific instance, he had very fixed ideas about the degree to [2:16:00] which the Bureau should cooperate in this investigation. [2:16:03] Yes, he had very fixed ideas when the President appointed Tom Charles Houston to devise him [2:16:09] a method of having American citizens spied on. [2:16:12] Mr. Hoover had the fixed idea that they ought not resort to burglary, [2:16:17] that they ought not resort to the use of undercover military agents, [2:16:22] that they ought not resort to virtual unlimited surveillance, [2:16:26] and they ought not to resort to mail cover. [2:16:31] And that was stated by Tom Charles Houston in documents put in evidence here [2:16:36] about 15 times before the President approved those documents. [2:16:40] So he didn't cooperate. [2:16:44] And I'm going to say, speak for his defense beyond the grave since he's not here, [2:16:51] I call attention to the fact that Tom Charles Houston told the White House 12 or 15 times in the documents [2:17:02] recommending burglary, recommending the use of undercover military agents, [2:17:09] recommending the mail coverage, recommending virtual unlimited surveillance. [2:17:15] 12 or 15 times he protested against the use of those things, and yet the President approved them. [2:17:21] And here in the very letter that he wrote to the man that had charge of the surveillance, [2:17:31] or the effort to get the records of the psychiatrist, [2:17:36] here on August the 3rd, a month before the break-in, [2:17:40] he said that if he, Eagle of Kroger, [2:17:47] if you concur, [2:17:49] we will proceed with interviews of all of the remaining individuals except Daniel Ellsberg. [2:17:55] And knowing Mr. Hoover's idea, I think he made the exception [2:17:59] because he didn't make it a practice to interview people who won the indictment. [2:18:05] So there he was willing to cooperate. [2:18:08] And another thing, along about this time, [2:18:15] as a member of the United States Senate, [2:18:16] I was fighting the efforts of the administration to get no-knock laws enacted, [2:18:23] to get preventive detention laws enacted, [2:18:25] to expand by executive fight the powers of the Subversive Activities Control Board. [2:18:33] And I was fighting against the proposition being defended by the Department of Justice [2:18:37] that it was all right to use undercover military agents [2:18:40] to spy on civilians exercising their First Amendment rights. [2:18:44] And about that time, I got a letter from J. Edgar Hoover, [2:18:48] which also offers evidence. [2:18:49] And he said, you, referring to me, [2:18:55] you have indeed been one of the guardians of our liberties and protectors of our freedoms. [2:19:02] All Americans owe you a debt of gratitude. [2:19:04] I don't offer that as any praise of myself, [2:19:08] but I offer that as evidence of Mr. Hoover's devotion to the basic rights of American citizens, [2:19:15] the right not to be burglarized. [2:19:16] And I think that since he can't speak for himself, [2:19:21] that his documents ought to be able to convey his attitude. [2:19:25] I can understand, having heard this testimony about the Ellsberg matter, [2:19:32] I can understand why you say that Mr. Hoover wouldn't cooperate with the White House, [2:19:40] and he was on the side of liberty. [2:19:44] Now, as I understand your testimony that you gave to Senator Wycombe, [2:19:49] you testified that the plumbers attempted to get the records of the psychiatrists [2:20:04] in order that there might someone, the CIA or somebody else, [2:20:09] might develop a psychiatric profile to enable President Nixon to determine for himself [2:20:18] whether Ellsberg was some kind of a kook or was sometimes a foreign intelligence agent. [2:20:25] Isn't that what you told us? [2:20:26] Well, I don't think it's a question of the President determining for himself, Mr. Chairman. [2:20:31] I think this was an effort on the part of the special unit to do as they had done in other cases, [2:20:39] subsequently, to determine where there were holes in the, [2:20:44] either in the federal government itself or in the Rand Corporation or these outside units [2:20:49] that would permit a person like Ellsberg and his co-conspirators, if there were any, [2:20:56] to steal massive quantities of top-secret documents and turn them over to the Russians. [2:21:02] Well, I can hardly, maybe you can, but I can't harmonize with your statement to Senator Wycombe, [2:21:09] that they were not attempting to get the psychiatrists' records for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of Mr. Ellsberg, [2:21:17] and that they will get them in order that the President might satisfy himself on certain points. [2:21:23] Well, the President, of course, is charged with the proper administration of the departments of the executive branch, [2:21:30] the Defense Department, the State Department, the CIA, and the outfits like the Rand Corporation and others [2:21:38] that contract with those departments, and they have possession of secret documents. [2:21:42] Now, when you have a situation like this one, and you have information coming in from the Justice Department [2:21:48] that this individual is involved with a conspiracy, [2:21:52] and you have the surrounding circumstances of the delivery of these documents to the foreign embassy, [2:21:57] it is incumbent upon the President as the executive of this executive branch [2:22:01] to satisfy himself that he has done everything possible to be sure that such a thing does not occur in the future. [2:22:08] And in order to do that, he has to be in a position to know what happened here. [2:22:15] Now, that was the process that was underway, and I think you'll agree with me that that is a proper executive role. [2:22:20] Well, look, I believe Congress set up the FBI to determine what was going on in this country, didn't it? [2:22:28] Among other things, Mr. Chairman. [2:22:29] It set up the CIA to determine what was going on in respect to foreign intelligence, didn't it? [2:22:35] Yes, sir. [2:22:36] Among other agencies. [2:22:37] It set up the National Security Agency, didn't it? [2:22:40] And the Defense Intelligence Agency. [2:22:42] And the Defense Intelligence Agency. [2:22:43] And a number of others. [2:22:44] But it didn't set up the plumbers, did it? [2:22:47] Of course, the Congress doesn't do everything, Mr. Chairman. [2:22:50] No, the Congress is the only one that's got legislative power, [2:22:53] and I don't know anything, any law that gave the President the power to set himself up what some people have called a secret police, namely the plumbers. [2:23:01] Well, I think if anybody called it that, that they would be badly overstating the situation. [2:23:06] And we're getting now into this constitutional argument that you and Mr. Wilson engaged in yesterday, Mr. Chairman. [2:23:12] The fact is that the President has granted constitutional powers to make sure that these departments of the executive branch work properly. [2:23:21] And when you have a mistake, or when you have a shortfall, or when you have a grievous raid on secret papers like this one, [2:23:28] the President would be very remiss in his obligations if he didn't move forward on it. [2:23:32] In other words, the way to cope with those things is to set a burglar to catch a burglar. [2:23:37] Now, let me ask you one other question. [2:23:42] I hope this will be my last. [2:23:46] Didn't you know, didn't it come out very early after the June 17th break-in, [2:23:52] that $114,000 of the President's money had been deposited at least temporarily in the bank account of one of the burglars, Bernard L. Barca? [2:24:02] No, sir. [2:24:03] It did not? [2:24:04] No, sir. [2:24:04] Well, when did you learn that? [2:24:06] I don't know that the President's money ever showed up in this. [2:24:09] It was the proceeds of campaign funds that had been given to help elect the President, to re-elect the President. [2:24:23] Don't you know that? [2:24:24] Campaign contributions? [2:24:26] Yes. [2:24:26] Oh, I see. [2:24:27] Well, your term was not clear. [2:24:30] Well, I'll call it Nixon's campaign funds, and maybe we can agree on that. [2:24:35] Didn't you find out very soon after the break-in that $114,000 of the President's campaign funds [2:24:42] had found their way into the deposit account of Bernard L. Barca, one of the burglars, caught in the Watergate? [2:24:49] Yes, sir, without agreeing with the amount, because I don't know the amount. [2:24:52] Well, as a matter of fact, didn't you testify in the deposition in the civil case [2:24:56] that on the 23rd day of June, pursuant to the President's direction, [2:25:01] you discussed this matter of these funds being routed coming out of Mexico with General Walters? [2:25:06] Yes, sir. [2:25:06] Yes, and the President had talked to you about it. [2:25:09] He asked you to do that, didn't he? [2:25:10] No, he sent word to me through Mr. Haldeman. [2:25:13] Well, did Mr. Haldeman bring you word and tell you he came from the President, [2:25:16] and the President wanted you to find out something about this Mexican, these Mexican checks? [2:25:22] No, sir. [2:25:23] The thing that Mr. Haldeman said to me was that the President had asked that he and I meet with [2:25:29] Mr. Helms and General Walters to discuss the question of whether a full, all-out, vigorous [2:25:36] FBI investigation might somehow turn up and compromise some ongoing or CIA activity. [2:25:45] Well, wasn't it the activity directed to Mexican checks? [2:25:49] Not specifically. [2:25:50] Didn't you, weren't you asked about it, referring to these Mexican checks in that deposition? [2:25:56] I'm sure I was. [2:25:57] Yes. [2:25:57] But I'm sure I also answered in that deposition that that subject arose at the meeting and [2:26:04] was not a part of the instructions that came to me through Mr. Haldeman. [2:26:08] Well, anyway, you had a meeting with General Walters on the 23rd day of June, just six days [2:26:14] after the break-in. [2:26:16] Yes, sir. [2:26:16] In which it became known that $114,000 of the Nixon campaign funds had been routed, rather [2:26:24] had come in to Mr. Stange's office in the form of three Mexican checks or four Mexican checks [2:26:30] and that the proceeds of those checks had been deposited in the bank account of a burglar in Miami, Florida. [2:26:37] I'm sure that those kind of elaborate details were not discussed. [2:26:41] Do you know of any other campaign funds of the president or campaign contributions were routed in New Mexico? [2:26:52] I, I, not of my own knowledge, no sense. [2:26:54] And so the president was, interesting. [2:26:55] The president was afraid that if the FBI vigorously investigated these checks, they might interfere with the CIA. [2:27:08] The president was concerned, he told me later, that the all-out FBI investigation might compromise some CIA activity in Mexico. [2:27:21] And the way the FBI was leaking, that would be the surest way for that CIA activity then to appear in the nation's press. [2:27:28] And it might also explain how come $114,000 of the proceeds of a campaign contribution to him was found in the bank account of a burglar, [2:27:37] might it, if it pursued that investigation? [2:27:39] Well, Mr. Chairman, your inference is very unfair. [2:27:42] As in point of fact, the president's instructions to the FBI were to conduct a totally unlimited, [2:27:48] all-out, full-scale investigation of that and every other aspect of this Watergate matter, [2:27:55] and that Mr. Gray and Mr. Gray alone was to determine the scope, that the president wouldn't limit that scope at all. [2:28:01] Well, if that was so, why did he have asked whether the CIA ought to limit it? [2:28:05] He gave those instructions upon being reassured later that the CIA had no concern. [2:28:11] Well, the president can read, can't he? [2:28:15] Yes, sir. [2:28:16] And he listens to the television occasionally, doesn't it? [2:28:19] Not very often. [2:28:20] Well, didn't the people in the White House read and listen to television and discuss among themselves [2:28:26] about how all these strange things were happening? [2:28:30] What strange things, Mr. Chairman? [2:28:31] Such as burglars, burglars being found in the headquarters of the opposition party with Nixon campaign funds in their pockets. [2:28:39] He was well aware of what was in the news, yes, sir. [2:28:42] Yes. [2:28:43] Well, did you ever talk to the president about that? [2:28:46] Yes, sir. [2:28:46] Did you ever suggest to him that there's something rather strange about his campaign funds being found in the pockets of burglars in the headquarters of the opposition party? [2:28:57] It was certainly not necessary for me to suggest that to him. [2:29:01] That's the reason he ordered the FBI to do an all-out investigation. [2:29:04] Well, they didn't find out much, did they? [2:29:09] Yes, sir. [2:29:09] They found out a great deal. [2:29:11] Well, let's see. [2:29:12] They conducted, in point of fact, Mr. Chairman, on that score, they conducted the most intensive FBI investigation that had been conducted in this country in terms of the numbers of witnesses contacted, [2:29:23] the numbers of leads followed out, the numbers of agents involved in the investigation, the devotion of vigor of the Bureau of Investigation, the most intensive investigation since the Kennedy assassination. [2:29:36] And they didn't find out enough to indict anybody except the original seven men, notwithstanding the fact that the tracks of the burglar read right straight from the water gate into the committee to re-elect the president. [2:29:50] Well, that certainly isn't the president's fault. [2:29:53] He turned the FBI loose. [2:29:56] Well, it might be the fault of some of his aides not insisting it be a little more vigorously done. [2:30:02] I assure you, Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, excuse me, I assure you that there was no restraint on the FBI in this investigation whatsoever to my nose, none whatsoever. [2:30:15] Not even when you suggested to General Walters that they might interfere, they might interfere with CIA operations? [2:30:22] Well, let's be clear about what happened there. [2:30:24] That meeting, as you say, was on about the 23rd, I believe. [2:30:27] General Walters was not asked to do anything more than have a meeting with the director of the FBI and discuss with him any possible concerns. [2:30:37] Now, in point of fact, the CIA could not reassure us right then with regard to the president's concerns. [2:30:45] And it was not until the 27th of June that the CIA telephoned the FBI to say that they were satisfied that there was no CIA involvement in the Mexican aspect of this. [2:31:18] And it was very shortly after that that the president and Mr. Gray talked and the president instructed Mr. Gray that in view of that, the FBI should go all out in its investigation. [2:31:29] So that's the sequence of events. [2:31:32] Well, the president stated in his May statement, I considered it my responsibility to see that the Watergate investigation did not impinge adversely upon the national security area. [2:31:45] For example, on April the 18th, 1973, when I learned that Mr. Hunt, a former member of the Special Investigations Unit at the White House, was to be questioned by the then Attorney General, [2:31:57] I directed Assistant Attorney General Peterson to pursue every issue involved in Watergate, but to confine his investigation to Watergate and related matters and to stay out of national security matters. [2:32:10] Now, you testified that the plumbers were dealing with national security matters. [2:32:16] Well, that's an entirely different subject than what I was just talking about. [2:32:19] Now, are you asking me about the plumbers or the CIA? [2:32:22] Well, I've asked you about both, I think. [2:32:25] I asked you if you didn't testify that the plumbers were dealing with national security matters. [2:32:29] Yes, sir. [2:32:30] And therefore, here's the president's own statement that he said he directed them to stay out of that. [2:32:37] Directed who to stay out of what? [2:32:39] Out of national security matters. [2:32:42] The thing that you say the plumbers were dealing in. [2:32:44] He didn't direct the FBI. [2:32:45] He directed Henry Peterson. [2:32:47] Well, Henry Peterson was a man in charge of the whole affair, wasn't he? [2:32:52] What whole affair, Mr. Chairman? [2:32:53] The prosecution. [2:32:55] Yes, but not the investigation. [2:32:56] He also, he said in that same statement, I instructed Mr. Hallam and Mr. Ehrlich to ensure that the investigation of the break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the activities of the White House Investigations Unit, [2:33:15] and to see that this was partially coordinated with General Walters, the deputy director of the CIA, and Mr. Gray of the FBI. [2:33:23] That was the purpose of the meeting on the 23rd of June. [2:33:26] So he says to see that the FBI didn't then pinch on any national security matters. [2:33:35] No. [2:33:35] No, no, that's not what that says. [2:33:37] That says any CIA investigations unrelated to the Watergate. [2:33:44] Therefore, I instructed Mr. Hallam and Mr. Ehrlichman to ensure that the investigation of the break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the activities of the White House Investigations Unit. [2:34:01] What was a White House Investigations Unit? [2:34:04] Isn't that a euphemism for the plumbers? [2:34:06] I believe so. [2:34:06] Yes. [2:34:09] Therefore, then he says, and he told Mr. Hallam and Mr. Ehrlichman to see that this was personally coordinated between General Walters, the deputy director of the CIA, and Mr. Gray of the FBI. [2:34:27] And that was the purpose of it? [2:34:28] And yet you say that Mr. Gray wasn't limited in any manner. [2:34:34] That was the purpose of it? [2:34:35] And here's the direct statement the president had made that he instructed you and Mr. Hallam to see that he stayed out of national security matters. [2:34:43] Would you like to hear what we did? [2:34:45] It'd be right interesting if we could. [2:34:48] We held a meeting with Mr. Walters, General Walters, and Mr. Helms on the 23rd of June. [2:34:54] And thereafter, we asked General Walters to be in touch with Mr. Gray. [2:34:58] I'm not keeping the word. [2:34:59] And then, about four days later, the CIA informed the FBI that if the FBI did an unlimited investigation, it would not turn up any CIA operations and would not compromise. [2:35:12] Mr. Gray then informed the president, and the president said, all right, Pat, I want the FBI to go all out with no strings attached. [2:35:20] That was on the 6th of July, Mr. Chairman. [2:35:22] You know, I'm reminded of the parable of the Good Samaritan. [2:35:30] In that parable, there was a man way down on the travel down on the road to Jericho, and he fell among thieves. [2:35:37] And they beat him and robbed him and left him wounded lying there on the road. [2:35:43] And then the priest and the Levite, they came down there and pretended they didn't see him, and they walked by on the other side. [2:35:52] Then the Good Samaritan came down and rendered him aid and suffered. [2:35:57] And the evidence in this case thus far tends to show that all of the intelligence, not all of them, but the people in charge of the committee to re-elect the president, [2:36:11] the people in charge of the finance committee to re-elect the president, and the White House aides, like the priest and the Levi, [2:36:20] walked by on the other side and pretended that this thing didn't occur. [2:36:26] Senator Baker. [2:36:26] May I answer that question? [2:36:28] Yes. [2:36:29] Thank you. [2:36:29] In point of fact, Mr. Chairman, on four different occasions, the President of the United States had full-scale reports from the Attorney General [2:36:48] about the efforts of the entire Department of Justice, the efforts of the entire Department of Justice in this. [2:36:59] That included not only the FBI, it included the grand jury, it included the prosecutors, it included everybody who was involved in this investigation. [2:37:09] It was followed very closely by those of us in the White House who had an interest in this matter in one way or the other, [2:37:16] Mr. Dean primarily, but others of us as well. [2:37:18] I had a meeting, for instance, with the Attorney General on the 31st of July of the year of the break-in and got a full-scale report from him in which he said that the investigation was not yet completed but that it was very clear to the entire Department of Justice that the seven people who were indicted were, in fact, the only ones implicated. [2:37:45] Now, the White House had said to its employees, the President had instructed that everyone was to cooperate fully in giving evidence to the FBI, and they did that. [2:37:57] Mr. Dean conducted his own inquiry inside the White House with regard to White House involvement. [2:38:03] And Attorney General Kleindienst, about three or four days after the Department of Justice completed this investigation in September, made a complete report to the President, the Vice President, the Cabinet, and the Republican legislative leaders at a meeting which I can well recall. [2:38:20] And the Attorney General made the point at that time in the President's presence that this had been the most vigorous and extensive Department of Justice investigation since the assassination and that their conclusion was that the people arrested and then known to be implicated were, in fact, the only ones involved. [2:38:39] Now, that had the scrutiny and the interest of the people in the White House, the people in the Cabinet and the other executive branch officials, and it certainly had the full attention of the Attorney General. [2:38:55] There was no attempt to shield our gaze and pass over on the other side. [2:39:00] And notwithstanding the fact, did you ever discover that Sloan, the treasurer of the committee, at the direction of Magruder, after consultation with Stan's, paid $199,000 in cash to Liddy, who masterminded the burglary? [2:39:27] Well, that's an interesting point, Mr. Chairman, because at my meeting with the Attorney General on the 31st of July, he said that Mr. Sloan had a version of the facts, which the prosecutors had heard and which were going to be presented to the grand jury. [2:39:39] And they were, so that that was not concealed from the prosecutors. [2:39:43] The investigators had turned it up, and it was before the grand jury. [2:39:48] This was a known quantity. [2:39:50] Unfortunately, when the matter went to trial, the judge and the jury didn't believe Mr. Sloan. [2:39:56] Well, they didn't give them a chance. [2:39:59] They didn't indict Magruder. [2:40:01] And the prosecuting attorneys reported in the press to have said the evidence showed that nobody was involved except the seven men on the prosecution. [2:40:11] Don't you know that? [2:40:12] I know, too, that they had Mr. Sloan's testimony before them. [2:40:16] Yes. [2:40:17] It was not believed, and in point of fact, you'll remember in the press that at the trial, the judge made comments which indicated that he did not believe Mr. Sloan. [2:40:26] So it's turned out since he was telling the truth, I think, rather strongly. [2:40:29] So they certainly had his testimony that Magruder, the deputy director, had ordered him to pay this $199,000 in cash out of Secretary Stans' secret fund, [2:40:46] and that Secretary Stans had told him to comply, told Sloan to comply with the order of Magruder in this respect after a consultation with Mitchell. [2:40:58] Now, I can understand why they don't find out some things if they don't believe a party that was so outraged. [2:41:07] Didn't Mr. Sloan come up and want to tell you about this, and you said to him, [2:41:11] I don't want to hear anything about it because if he heard anything about it, I'll have to take executive privilege in half of the election. [2:41:17] I don't know what it was that Mr. Sloan wanted to tell me because after we had talked for a few minutes, [2:41:23] and I had determined that he felt he had some exposure but that he had not talked to an attorney, [2:41:29] I told him that it would be grossly unfair of me to hear him out until he had had an opportunity to talk with an attorney and take counsel on his own situation. [2:41:40] Well, you were one of the men in the White House that stood in power next to the president, weren't you? [2:41:47] I worked for the president there. [2:41:49] Yes, and when this treasurer of the finance committee really liked the president came and told you he wanted to tell you [2:41:56] about some things that troubled him, you refused to listen. [2:42:01] Well, I thought I was doing that from his standpoint, Mr. Chairman. [2:42:05] Duke Sloan has been a young man that I've known well during the time he worked at the White House. [2:42:10] I didn't want to see him tell me something before he had talked to counsel that later on was going to prove his undoing. [2:42:19] See, his wife, Debbie, also worked at the White House and was well-known to my wife and me. [2:42:25] I just didn't want to see him overreach. [2:42:28] The investigation has been interrupted by a floor vote on amendments to a bill that would reform political campaigns. [2:42:40] When the vote is completed, Senator Irvin wants to know about special treatment for Nixon finance chief, Maurice Stanz. [2:42:56] Before I put another question, I would say that my idea is it's up to the jury to determine whether a witness is telling the truth [2:43:23] instead of the prosecuting attorney. [2:43:25] Didn't you call Henry Peterson, the assistant attorney general of the criminal division, who had general supervision of this prosecution, [2:43:44] and ask him not to require former Secretary Maurice Stanz to go before the grand jury? [2:43:51] Yes, Mr. Chairman. [2:43:52] The circumstances were that it had come to the president's notice that Secretary Stanz was going to be asked to appear before the grand jury. [2:44:01] He asked me to determine if it would be possible for Secretary Stanz to give his testimony as others had [2:44:09] through the device of a proceeding at the Justice Department, a deposition, so to speak, under oath, [2:44:17] rather than to run the gauntlet at the federal courthouse. [2:44:21] The president said that a man who was a former cabinet officer and so on shouldn't be subjected to that kind of a situation. [2:44:31] And so I talked to Mr. Dean about it. [2:44:34] He suggested that I talk with Mr. Peterson, and I did that. [2:44:37] Well, as a Democrat with a small dean, I'm totally incapable of comprehending why a former cabinet officer [2:44:49] shouldn't have to do like all other mortals and go before grand juries. [2:44:57] And so he didn't go.