Richard Helms (Full) Watergate Hearings Testimony

[0:13] Now, since you spent so much time as director of CIA, of the agency, [0:21] what recommendations can you make to this committee concerning new legislation [0:25] to help prevent the misuse of the Central Intelligence Agency for political or other purposes [0:32] other than the assigned purposes delineated in the act? [0:36] Well, Senator Montoya, I don't know how one legislates these matters. [0:40] I've never understood how morality and proper conduct and decency can be legislated about. [0:50] In Washington over the years, there have been many occasions [0:55] when various people have tried to manipulate some organization or another in an improper way. [1:02] This is not new to us. We read about it in the papers constantly. [1:06] But how you legislate about this, I swear to you, sir, I don't know. [1:09] In the Senate of the United States, a resolution to establish a select committee of the Senate [1:18] to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, [1:22] to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any persons, [1:28] acting individually or in combination with others, in the presidential election of 1972, [1:33] or any campaign, canvas, or other activity related to it. [1:37] From Washington, NPAC brings you gavel-to-gavel videotape coverage of today's hearings [1:42] by the Senate Select Committee and presidential campaign activities. [1:46] Here is NPAC's senior correspondent, Robert McNeil. [1:50] Good evening. [1:51] The Watergate committee heard today from two former senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency [1:57] about how it helped Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt at the request of the White House. [2:01] The request, a year before the Watergate break-in, came from John Ehrlichman, [2:06] when Hunt was working for the White House Plumbers Group. [2:09] Former CIA Director Richard Helms vehemently denied today that the agency had any part in the Watergate [2:16] and said he was puzzled why it was so difficult to get that message across [2:20] to acting FBI Director Gray just after the Watergate break-in. [2:24] But Helms did disclose today that one of the Watergate burglars, [2:28] Eugenio Martinez, was on the CIA payroll at the time of Watergate and was hastily dropped. [2:34] Helms' former deputy, Robert Cushman, now the general commanding the Marine Corps, [2:39] described supplying Hunt with equipment, including a disguise and false papers, [2:44] in the summer of 1971 for a secret White House project, [2:48] after being asked by John Ehrlichman for help. [2:50] Cushman also recounted his troubles earlier this winter [2:53] when Ehrlichman said he couldn't remember ever making such a request. [2:57] Cushman today confirmed that he did. [3:00] Outside the hearings, convicted Watergate conspirator James McCord today [3:04] charged that the FBI followed special procedures in the Watergate investigation [3:08] that slowed down the probe. [3:10] McCord says in a newspaper article that the FBI was required to clear all important leads [3:15] with the Justice Department before following them up. [3:18] If this hadn't been the case, says McCord, [3:20] and if agents had searched his home and car soon after his arrest, [3:23] they would have come up with $18,000 and $100 bills [3:27] and enough other clues to have broken the case wide open. [3:31] All right, some of the sidelights that come out of these hearings [3:34] are as interesting as revelations of major developments. [3:37] Today, such a topic was what spies talk about in casual conversation. [3:41] Impact's Peter Kay reports that it is nothing cryptic. [3:45] Have you ever wondered what real spies talk about? [3:47] Well, here's part of a conversation tape recorded July 22, 1971, [3:53] when Ace White House sleuth E. Howard Hunt went down to the CIA [3:56] to meet Deputy Director Robert H. Cushman for the first time. [4:00] Hunt, I've been charged with quite a highly sensitive mission by the White House [4:04] to visit and elicit information from an individual [4:07] whose ideology we aren't entirely sure of. [4:10] They asked me to come over here and see if you could get me two things, [4:13] flash documentation, and some degree of physical disguise. [4:18] General Cushman, I don't see why not. [4:20] And a little bit later in the conversation. [4:22] Hunt, if you pardon my saying so, you seem to have lost a little weight. [4:27] General Cushman, yes, I've taken some off. [4:29] I sort of go up and down. [4:31] When I go down, it's because I go on the wagon [4:33] and don't eat very much at all, [4:34] and that is hell to pay when you're being entertained [4:36] and going to embassies and dinners. [4:38] But it's the only way I can lose weight is to be miserable, [4:41] really miserable. [4:43] Then, a little later in the conversation between Hunt and General Cushman, [4:48] Hunt says, [4:49] If I'm going to put on a physical disguise that's going to stick, [4:52] I wouldn't want to be seen walking out of here. [4:54] I'm sure they've got safe facilities downtown. [4:57] Cushman, [4:58] The place I used to meet people was at an office building [5:00] right near the press club. [5:02] There used to be a nightclub on the second floor, [5:04] and we used to meet people up there. [5:06] I had a gal who thought it was just lots of fun to be in this business. [5:10] She used to have me meeting people out on the damn park benches [5:12] and all this stuff, [5:13] and I'd give her hell if necessary. [5:16] End of conversation. [5:17] Now, the transcript of this, [5:19] which was recorded by General Cushman, incidentally, [5:21] also had the embarrassing revelation [5:23] that the meeting with Hunt was set up by John Ehrlichman [5:26] of the White House staff, [5:28] a fact that Cushman really couldn't seem to recall [5:30] during a series of flip-flop memos and testimony earlier this year. [5:34] All right, tomorrow, Peter reports, [5:37] the major witness will be former acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray, [5:41] who will start things off with a 40-page statement [5:44] that's very critical of the White House. [5:46] Presumably, he will also be asked about the new McCord charges. [5:50] At the close of tonight's broadcast, [5:52] we'll have an interview with Dick Cavett, [5:54] who's just completed a program with four committee members. [5:57] To help you watch the intervening hours, [5:59] here is NPACT's nightly viewing guide. [6:01] In hour number one, former CIA director Helms says he felt obliged by law [6:07] to help with a psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg. [6:10] He suggests that law, dealing with government leaks, be changed. [6:14] Helms says that when John Dean put out feelers about using CIA funds, [6:18] he issued orders to General Walters that he do absolutely nothing [6:21] to hurt the CIA's reputation. [6:24] In hour number two, Helms admits that one Watergate burglar, Martinez, [6:28] was getting a CIA monthly retainer [6:30] to keep an eye on escapees from Cuba. [6:33] Helms also says he balked when Howard Hunt issued a request [6:36] for the use of a CIA secretary located in Paris. [6:40] In the third hour, Helms describes his resistance [6:42] to John Dean's inquiries about using the CIA [6:45] to pay bail money and salaries for Watergate defendants. [6:49] Asked why he didn't probe the involvement [6:50] of former CIA employees in Watergate, [6:53] Helms says his office turned everything it learned over to the FBI. [6:57] In the fourth hour, the former deputy director of the CIA, [7:00] General Robert Cushman, details Howard Hunt's request [7:03] for false identification papers for Gordon Liddy. [7:06] Also in that hour, he says he complained to John Ehrlichman [7:09] about Hunt's request, and Ehrlichman said he would restrain Hunt. [7:13] In the fifth hour, Cushman testifies that Howard Hunt [7:15] wanted a camera in a tobacco pouch for use on a new assignment. [7:19] And in that hour, Cushman admits that the profile of Daniel Ellsberg [7:23] was the only one done on an American that he can recall [7:26] in his three years at the CIA. [7:29] Now to Senator Irvin, his gavel, and today's proceedings. [7:32] The committee will come to order. [8:01] I am constrained to make some remarks [8:04] concerning a member of this committee, [8:09] Senator Danny Inouye of Hawaii. [8:12] Senator Inouye is an American, native-born American of Japanese ancestry. [8:26] I don't know a finer American. [8:31] He showed his devotion to our country by fighting under his flag, [8:39] not only for the liberty of our country, [8:41] but for the liberty of the free world in the Second World War. [8:45] He suffered severe wounds, [8:52] which necessitated the amputation of his right arm. [8:58] He was decorated with a distinguished service cross [9:01] for extraordinary heroism in action [9:05] with an armed enemy of the United States. [9:11] And he's proved himself in the latter days [9:15] as one of the most dedicated Americans this country has ever known. [9:22] And I feel that the events of yesterday [9:25] make it appropriate for me to make these remarks. [9:28] concerning a member of this committee [9:32] who has proved himself one of the most gallant [9:35] of all Americans in the history of this republic. [9:39] Mr. Chairman. [9:41] Senator Baceman. [9:42] Mr. Chairman, may I say that I've known Danny Inouye [9:46] since I've been in the Senate, [9:47] and there is no man I think is more loyal and dedicated to his country. [9:53] I don't know of anyone on this committee [9:54] who's made a greater contribution to its efforts than Senator Inouye. [9:59] I have a great affection for him [10:02] as well as a great admiration for him. [10:03] We are in a tension-filled atmosphere, [10:10] and it's unfortunate that things of this sort occur. [10:13] I think a mark of Senator Inouye's greatness is that [10:18] I'm sure it will not affect his further consideration of the matters [10:23] that are brought to our attention. [10:27] I'm sorry that the events of the last several days have occurred. [10:31] Hope and think that it would not affect the objectivity [10:36] and the efficiency and the effectiveness of this committee. [10:40] And I commend you, Mr. Chairman, [10:43] for bringing that matter to the attention of the official record. [10:48] And I believe now it's behind us, [10:51] and we can get on with the business at hand. [10:53] Thank you, sir. [10:53] If there are no further comments, [10:57] the council will call the first witness. [11:01] Former Director Helms. [11:02] Would you stand up and raise your right hand? [11:08] Do you swear that the evidence that you should give [11:10] to the Senate's electability on presidential campaign activities [11:13] should be the truth, the whole truth, [11:15] and nothing but the truth, so if you're God? [11:17] I do. [11:17] You might state your full name and the present address [11:24] for the purpose of the record. [11:28] My name is Richard Helms, [11:30] and I'm presently ambassador to Iran, resident in Tehran. [11:36] Mr. Chairman, could we suspend just for a moment? [11:38] Yes. [11:40] ...dressed to his ambassador Helms. [13:07] Chairman, the ambassador Helms will be questioned initially [13:13] by Mr. Data Dorson, assistant chief counsel. [13:16] Where's he sworn? [13:22] Ambassador Helms, how long have you held your present position? [13:29] I've been in Tehran since the middle of March of this year. [13:34] And prior to that, were you the director [13:36] of the Central Intelligence Agency? [13:39] Yes, I was the director of Central Intelligence, was my title. [13:46] How long were you a director? [13:48] Approximately six and a half years. [13:50] I believe I was sworn in on June the 30th, 1966, [13:54] and I left office when Mr. Schlesinger became director [13:59] on the 2nd of February, 1973. [14:02] How long did you, how long have you been, or were you, [14:08] with the Central Intelligence Agency? [14:10] From the day its doors opened in 1947. [14:15] Did you learn, Ambassador Helms, in July of 1971 [14:20] that E. Howard Hunt had been made a consultant to the White House? [14:25] I was informed of this. [14:28] And do you recall how you were informed? [14:31] Not specifically any longer. [14:33] I just, I remember being told that he had gone to work for the White House. [14:37] But precisely under what circumstances I was told [14:40] and on what specific date, I do not recall. [14:42] Did you have a conversation with General Cushman [14:46] concerning Howard Hunt in the summer of 1971? [14:50] Yes, I recall that General Cushman informed me [14:54] that he had authorized giving to Howard Hunt [14:59] a tape recorder and a camera. [15:04] And I asked for what purpose, [15:06] and he said he wanted to conduct a one-time interview [15:08] and that he had been properly authenticated by the White House [15:11] and that he was working at their behest. [15:15] What? [15:16] How long have you known Howard Hunt? [15:20] Oh, I've known him over the years when he worked for the agency. [15:23] And do you recall approximately how long he worked for the agency? [15:26] Oh, he must have worked for almost, [15:28] oh, somewhere over 15 years anyway. [15:31] And what was General Cushman's position at that time? [15:36] In July of 71? [15:38] That's correct. [15:38] He was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. [15:43] To your knowledge, was the tape recorder [15:45] and the camera given to Mr. Hunt? [15:50] I was informed that it was, [15:51] and my preoccupation at the time was to find out [15:54] whether these were normal pieces of equipment, [15:58] and by normal I mean simply available [15:59] in any store in downtown Washington [16:01] who carried this kind of equipment, [16:03] or whether there was something tricky about them, [16:05] when I was assured they were perfectly routine [16:07] and straightforward pieces of equipment. [16:10] I might say, parenthetically, [16:12] that in the last couple of days [16:13] and talking with some of the gentlemen [16:16] at the Special Prosecutor Cox's office, [16:19] there's some memorandum there about a clandestine camera [16:21] having been given to Howard Hunt. [16:24] I frankly, sir, don't know what a clandestine camera is. [16:27] The camera takes pictures or it doesn't. [16:28] That's all it does. [16:30] Well, can you describe the camera a little bit more, Ambassador? [16:33] I've never seen it. [16:35] Do you know whether it was a camera [16:36] that was concealed in some way? [16:38] I've been told it was put in a tobacco pouch, [16:42] carried in a tobacco pouch. [16:45] Were you advised of any further requests [16:48] by Mr. Hunt for assistance? [16:49] Subsequent to this conversation [16:53] of which I've just been speaking, [16:56] I learned, I believe in a memorandum, [16:59] that Mr. Hunt had asked to have a secretary [17:02] who was stationed with the CIA in Paris [17:06] brought back from Paris [17:08] and assigned to him in the White House. [17:11] He also wanted this to be done secretly, [17:13] and he didn't want anybody to know about it. [17:16] That, to me, was unacceptable. [17:18] I saw no reason for this. [17:20] It seemed to me that the agency was being used [17:24] if it was being asked [17:25] to have somebody brought back from Paris [17:26] and assigned to a man [17:27] doing unidentified chores at the White House. [17:32] So I got a hold of General Cushman [17:34] and told him that I thought this was totally unacceptable [17:37] and I wouldn't stand for it. [17:40] I don't recall whether it was then or a few days later, [17:44] but at some point, [17:46] the various additional requests [17:48] which Hunt was making of the agency [17:49] seemed to me totally unacceptable, [17:51] and I asked General Cushman to call Mr. Ehrlichman [17:54] and tell him that we just weren't going to do this anymore. [18:01] Mr. Ambassador Helms, [18:02] I'm advised there's some trouble hearing you [18:04] to the rear of the room. [18:05] Perhaps if you could bring the microphone [18:06] a little bit closer to you, [18:08] he would be heard. [18:09] This seems to be the story of my life [18:10] in Senate committees. [18:11] I don't know whether I don't raise my voice [18:13] high enough or what, [18:14] but maybe I'm not speaking into the microphone. [18:16] Now, you've indicated that in your conversation [18:22] with General Cushman [18:23] that you indicated to General Cushman [18:27] that John Ehrlichman should be called. [18:31] Why was it that John Ehrlichman was to be called? [18:34] Because it was my distinct impression [18:35] that he was the one who had arranged [18:37] with General Cushman [18:38] to have Hunt get these pieces of equipment. [18:48] Ambassador Helms, [18:49] when for the first time did you learn [18:51] of the burglary of Dr. Lewis Fielding's office, [18:55] that is, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. [18:59] I forget which weekend in May it was. [19:02] I think the second weekend of May this year, 1973, [19:05] I was in Shiraz, [19:08] and I picked up on Sunday [19:10] an English-language newspaper [19:12] and saw on the front page of it [19:16] that there'd been a burglary [19:17] of an office of a psychiatrist in California, [19:21] and the burglary had been done, [19:23] as it said in the newspaper story, [19:25] with the assistance of CIA equipment. [19:27] That was the first time I'd ever heard [19:29] of Dr. Fielding a burglary [19:31] or the fact that Dr. Ellsberg had a psychiatrist. [19:35] Do you know of your own knowledge [19:38] whether any equipment was used in the burglary [19:41] that was the property of the CIA? [19:43] I've been assured by members of the agency, [19:47] and this assurance was given me [19:49] when I was back here in May [19:51] testifying before four other congressional committees, [19:54] that the equipment that was given to Hunt [19:57] was not used in the burglary of Dr. Ellsberg's office, [20:02] that actually Mr. Hunt was physically not at the office. [20:05] He was staked out at Dr. Fielding's residence, [20:11] and that since he wasn't given [20:12] any burglary equipment by the agency, [20:15] I've always wondered how it was [20:16] that he used that equipment in the break-in. [20:21] So this is one of the things [20:23] that seems to have been perpetuated [20:25] as one of the myths around here [20:26] that he somehow got burglary equipment [20:28] from the agency, [20:29] which helped him break into places, [20:30] and I'm not aware of any burglary equipment [20:32] he ever got from the agency. [20:35] Ambassador Helms, [20:36] during the summer of 1971, [20:40] did you learn of a request [20:42] by a member of the White House staff [20:44] for the Central Intelligence Agency [20:46] to do a psychological or psychiatric profile [20:50] of Dr. Ellsberg? [20:51] Yes, I was familiar with this request. [20:55] Sometime before this, [20:57] Mr. David Young, [20:59] who was one of the assistants at the White House, [21:04] had originally been on Dr. Kissinger's staff, [21:07] informed me that he was being transferred [21:09] to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff. [21:10] In other words, [21:11] he was going to work for Mr. Ehrlichman, [21:13] and that he'd been given some duties [21:15] in connection with general security procedures [21:17] in the government, [21:18] classification of documents, [21:21] investigation of leaks, [21:23] and the clutch of other such matters. [21:27] Subsequent to that, [21:28] he called me and said [21:29] that he wanted to get into these things. [21:31] He wanted to find out [21:32] how the agency [21:33] and the intelligence community [21:34] handled the classification of documents [21:37] and other security procedures. [21:40] I said that I thought, [21:41] under the circumstances, [21:42] the best thing for me to do [21:43] would be to put him in touch [21:44] with the agency's director of security, [21:47] a gentleman named Howard Osborne, [21:49] who would then be able to talk with him [21:51] and be as responsive to his requests [21:54] as the agency could be. [21:57] It was apparently to Mr. Osborne [21:59] that Mr. Young originally made the request [22:02] for a profile on Dr. Ellsberg. [22:05] Mr. Osborne then brought this request to me. [22:10] Excuse me, Ambassador, [22:10] could you briefly summarize [22:12] at the present time [22:13] what this profile is? [22:14] There had been, [22:21] well, I guess I'm sort of searching [22:24] for a word here, [22:25] but in any event, [22:26] over a period of some years, [22:29] the agency had developed a technique [22:31] for putting together [22:34] a lot of information about a foreigner, [22:37] maybe a foreign statesman [22:38] or a foreign dignitary, [22:40] and then attempting to analyze [22:41] what sort of a human being he was. [22:46] These things were called variously. [22:48] I think psychological profile [22:50] is as good a title [22:51] as any psychological study. [22:53] The idea was to give insights [22:55] into what motivated [22:57] some of these individuals, [22:58] why they did things [22:59] the way they did, [23:00] and so forth. [23:01] David Young knew [23:04] that the agency [23:05] wrote papers such as this [23:08] because he'd seen them [23:09] when he was on Dr. Kissinger's staff. [23:12] So he then said [23:15] that he wanted the agency [23:18] to do this, [23:19] and I remonstrated with him. [23:20] I said, [23:20] we know nothing about Dr. Ellsberg. [23:23] I've never laid eyes on him [23:24] in my life. [23:25] We have no records on him. [23:26] We know nothing about him, [23:28] and I think this is an imposition [23:29] to ask us to do this. [23:31] He pled with me. [23:33] He said that this was very important, [23:34] that the White House [23:36] was very much interested [23:38] in getting this material [23:39] sorted out, [23:41] that Mr. Ehrlichman regarded [23:42] as of highest priority, [23:44] so did Dr. Kissinger, [23:45] that we should help, [23:48] that we were the only ones [23:49] they knew in town [23:50] who did things of this kind [23:51] and had practice of doing them, [23:53] and that please would we do so. [23:58] I want to say here [23:59] that the agency has a charge [24:03] under the statute [24:05] of the National Security Act [24:07] of 1947, [24:08] which makes the director [24:10] responsible for the protection [24:13] of intelligent sources [24:14] and methods [24:15] from unauthorized disclosure. [24:16] That's written into the law, [24:19] and this is a charge [24:20] that's been on the director [24:21] since 1947, [24:22] and it's been a very difficult charge [24:25] because finding out [24:26] how leaks occur [24:26] and how the enemy [24:27] gets privileged information, [24:29] things of that kind, [24:30] is very difficult to do [24:31] without having [24:32] an investigative staff, [24:33] and the agency never has [24:35] had an investigative staff [24:36] for these purposes, [24:38] and therefore this business [24:39] about leaks [24:40] and investigations thereof [24:42] has been a very difficult, [24:44] if not impossible, [24:44] charge to carry out. [24:47] And when I was testifying [24:48] before the Senate [24:49] Foreign Relations Committee [24:50] back in May [24:52] in response to a question [24:54] from Senator Hubert Humphrey, [24:55] I suggested that this language [24:57] in the law [24:57] either be taken out [24:58] or amended in such a way [25:00] that it was a fair charge [25:01] on the director [25:02] rather than what I thought [25:03] was an unfair charge, [25:04] but it was that charge [25:05] which gave him the leverage [25:08] to rather oblige me [25:10] to go along with an effort [25:11] to make this profile. [25:14] Did the staff [25:15] of the Central Intelligence Agency [25:17] thereafter prepare [25:18] such a profile? [25:20] Yes, they did. [25:21] And was it forwarded [25:22] to Mr. Young? [25:24] I understand [25:24] that it was forwarded [25:26] to Mr. Young, [25:26] that it was found [25:27] to be unsatisfactory, [25:28] that Mr. Young remonstrated [25:30] with the people [25:31] who had written it [25:32] about the fact [25:32] that it was unsatisfactory. [25:34] I believe it was, [25:35] I've learned since [25:36] that it was pointed out [25:37] to them [25:37] that more material [25:39] was going to have [25:40] to be provided, [25:41] otherwise they couldn't [25:42] do any better [25:43] than they'd done already. [25:45] And Mr. Young said, [25:45] all right, [25:46] I will try and get you [25:47] some more material, [25:47] which I believe he did. [25:50] So that the second profile [25:51] was written. [25:53] And was the second profile [25:55] delivered to Mr. Young also? [25:56] I believe so. [25:57] In other words, [25:57] this is the second version, [25:59] I think probably [25:59] that's better English. [26:01] And did you have [26:02] a conversation [26:03] with Mr. Young [26:04] in connection [26:05] with the delivery [26:05] of the second profile [26:07] to him? [26:08] Yes, as a matter of fact, [26:09] I did call him [26:10] and I told him [26:10] that the psychologists [26:13] and psychiatrists [26:14] who are working on this [26:15] were very disturbed [26:16] about the whole exercise. [26:18] They didn't feel [26:18] that the material [26:19] they'd been given [26:20] was adequate, [26:21] that they were being put [26:22] in an unfair position, [26:23] that they didn't want [26:24] their professional reputations [26:26] put on the line [26:27] as a result of this [26:28] kind of an exercise. [26:29] And that if he was insisting [26:31] on having this, [26:32] then I want his understanding [26:33] and his undertaking [26:35] that he would not identify [26:36] it with the agency [26:37] and put these fellows [26:38] in jeopardy, [26:39] put these fellows' [26:43] professional reputation [26:45] in jeopardy, [26:46] which is a... [26:47] During the period [26:48] that the two profiles [26:51] were prepared, [26:51] which I believe was, [26:52] took us into [26:53] early November of 1971, [26:58] what was your understanding [27:01] as to the identity [27:02] of the persons [27:03] over at the White House [27:04] who were involved [27:05] in requesting [27:06] the profile [27:08] and providing information [27:09] to the agency [27:11] for the profile. [27:14] I never heard [27:15] of anybody being connected [27:17] with this exercise [27:18] except Mr. David Young. [27:20] And when I returned here [27:21] in May of this year, [27:22] 1973, [27:23] I was informed [27:24] at the agency [27:26] that during this period [27:28] that this psychologist [27:30] had been consulting [27:31] with David Young [27:31] at the White House, [27:32] that Howard Hunt [27:33] had been present [27:34] on one occasion anyway, [27:36] and that he had [27:37] specifically asked them [27:38] not to inform me [27:39] that he had been present. [27:40] They certainly did not [27:41] inform me, [27:41] so I was totally unaware [27:42] of his identification [27:43] with this exercise [27:44] in any form whatever. [27:46] And the first time [27:47] you heard about [27:48] his participation [27:49] was in May of 1973? [27:51] That is correct. [27:53] To the best [27:54] of your knowledge, [27:55] Ambassador Helms, [27:55] was any of the material [27:57] that was used [27:59] in the preparation [28:00] of the psychological profile [28:03] derived from the office [28:04] of the psychiatrist [28:05] of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg [28:07] or from any other [28:08] illegal or improper [28:10] source? [28:10] I have never heard [28:11] that alleged. [28:16] Ambassador Helms, [28:16] I would like now [28:17] to direct your attention [28:18] to June of 1972 [28:21] and ask you, [28:21] when for the first time [28:22] did you hear [28:23] of the break-in [28:25] of the Democratic [28:26] National Committee [28:27] headquarters [28:28] at the Watergate? [28:29] It's my impression [28:31] that I heard about it, [28:32] read about it [28:33] in the newspapers [28:33] or heard it [28:34] on the radio, [28:36] but this is not [28:43] any lapse of memory. [28:44] This is just one [28:45] of those things [28:45] that this far back [28:48] it's hard to know [28:49] just exactly [28:50] who might have told me [28:51] or how I might have heard it. [28:53] Certainly it was big news [28:55] from the moment it happened. [28:57] And during the days [28:58] immediately following [28:59] the break-in, [28:59] were there conversations [29:00] at the CIA [29:01] concerning the break-in? [29:04] Yes, in the first place, [29:06] sometime on that weekend [29:08] I received a telephone call [29:09] from Mr. Howard Osmond, [29:11] the director of security, [29:12] to inform me [29:14] of the names [29:16] of the individuals [29:17] who had participated [29:18] in the break-in [29:19] and also to say [29:21] that Mr. Hunt [29:22] in some fashion [29:23] was connected with it. [29:25] Mr. Osmond's call to me [29:27] was a perfectly routine matter. [29:29] There was a charge on him [29:34] as director of security [29:35] to inform me [29:36] whenever anybody [29:36] in the agency [29:37] got in any kind of trouble [29:38] whether they're [29:39] present employees [29:40] or past employees, [29:41] in other words, [29:42] right now, [29:43] so that I didn't have [29:44] to catch up [29:45] with these events [29:46] like suicides [29:47] and house break-ins [29:48] and rapes [29:49] and the various things [29:50] that happened [29:50] to the employees [29:51] of any organization [29:52] in a city like Washington. [29:54] So this was [29:54] a perfectly routine thing [29:56] and when he heard [29:56] about these ex-CIA people [29:58] who had been involved [29:59] in this burglary, [30:00] he called me up [30:01] and notified me about it. [30:03] On Monday, [30:05] when I came to the office, [30:07] there'd been no mention [30:08] in the papers [30:08] of Mr. Hunt. [30:09] So I got a hold [30:10] of Mr. Osmond [30:11] and said, [30:11] how come you told me [30:12] that Mr. Hunt [30:13] was involved with this? [30:14] And he said, [30:15] well, there were [30:15] some papers found [30:16] in the hotel room [30:17] or one of the hotel room [30:18] was Hunt's name on it [30:19] and it looks as though [30:20] he was somewhere [30:21] in the area [30:21] when the break-in took place. [30:23] So I said, [30:24] all right. [30:25] And then from then on, [30:27] obviously, [30:28] there were various conversations [30:30] in the agency [30:31] as we went to work [30:32] on various requests [30:33] from the FBI [30:33] for information [30:34] about the people [30:35] and their background [30:36] and so forth [30:36] that had formerly [30:37] been employed [30:38] by the agency. [30:39] Am I correct [30:40] that James McCord [30:41] also was a former employee [30:42] of the agency? [30:43] He was. [30:43] And when did Mr. McCord [30:45] and Mr. Hunt [30:46] leave the employee [30:47] of the agency? [30:48] They left it [30:50] at different times [30:51] in 1970. [30:54] They both retired, [30:55] as I recall it. [30:59] Now, directing your attention [31:00] to June 22nd, 1972, [31:06] which was the day [31:07] before your meeting [31:10] with Mr. Ehrlichman, [31:11] Mr. Haldeman, [31:12] and General Walters [31:13] at the White House, [31:14] did you have a conversation [31:15] with Patrick Gray [31:16] on that afternoon, [31:18] namely the afternoon [31:18] of June 22nd? [31:20] I believe that the committee [31:21] is in possession [31:22] of a memorandum [31:23] which says that, [31:24] or a memorandum [31:25] or a note from Mr. Gray [31:26] that says I had this conversation. [31:28] I have no reason [31:29] to question that at all. [31:30] I was talking back and forth [31:31] with Mr. Gray [31:32] at various times [31:33] in connection [31:33] with this Watergate break-in, [31:37] so I have no reason [31:38] to doubt that there was one [31:39] on the 22nd of June. [31:41] In these conversations, [31:42] did you discuss [31:43] the possibility [31:44] of CIA involvement [31:45] in the break-in? [31:46] I assured, Mr. Gray, [31:48] that the CIA [31:48] had no involvement [31:50] in the break-in, [31:51] no involvement whatever, [31:53] and it was my preoccupation [31:55] consistently from then [31:56] to this time [31:57] to make this point [31:58] and to be sure [32:00] that everybody understands it. [32:01] It doesn't seem [32:02] to get across very well [32:03] for some reason, [32:03] but the agency [32:04] had nothing to do [32:05] with the Watergate break-in. [32:08] I hope all the newspaper men [32:09] in the room [32:10] hear me clearly now. [32:15] Ambassador Helms, [32:15] I'd like to move then [32:17] to June 23rd, 1972 [32:19] and ask you [32:20] if you recall [32:22] attending the meeting [32:23] with Mr. Ehrlichman, [32:25] Mr. Haldeman, [32:26] and General Walters. [32:27] I do recall [32:28] attending that meeting. [32:29] Where was that meeting held? [32:30] That meeting was held [32:31] in Mr. Ehrlichman's office [32:33] on the second floor [32:34] of the east wing, [32:36] west wing [32:38] of the White House. [32:39] Do you recall [32:40] the time of that meeting? [32:41] The meeting had been [32:42] originally scheduled [32:43] for 12 o'clock. [32:44] It was changed [32:45] to 1 o'clock [32:45] and it took place [32:46] shortly after 1 o'clock. [32:49] Could you please [32:50] describe to us [32:51] in substance [32:52] what happened [32:52] at that meeting? [32:55] General Walters [32:56] and I arrived first [32:57] and waited [33:00] for a few minutes. [33:02] Then Mr. Haldeman [33:03] and Mr. Ehrlichman [33:04] came into the room [33:05] as best I can recall [33:09] what was said. [33:12] And Mr. Haldeman [33:13] did most of the talking, [33:14] so, [33:16] and whatever Mr. Ehrlichman [33:17] contributed [33:18] in the course of this [33:19] was either to nod his head [33:20] or to smile [33:21] or to agree [33:21] with what Mr. Haldeman said. [33:23] I just simply want [33:24] to introduce it this way [33:25] because then it's [33:26] a little bit easier [33:27] for me to describe. [33:29] Mr. Haldeman said [33:30] that there was a lot [33:32] of flack [33:34] about the Watergate [33:36] burglary, [33:36] that the opposition [33:38] was capitalizing on it, [33:42] that it was going to, [33:44] it was apparently causing [33:45] some sort of [33:46] unidentified trouble [33:47] and he wanted to know [33:50] whether the agency [33:51] had anything to do [33:52] with it. [33:53] I assured him [33:54] that the agency [33:54] had nothing to do [33:55] with it. [33:58] He then said [33:59] that the five men [34:00] who had been found [34:01] in the Democratic [34:02] National Committee [34:03] headquarters [34:03] had been arrested. [34:05] That seemed [34:06] to be adequate [34:07] under the circumstances [34:09] that the FBI [34:10] was investigating [34:11] what this was all about [34:13] and that they, [34:19] unidentified, [34:20] were concerned [34:21] about some FBI [34:22] investigations in Mexico. [34:26] He also, [34:27] at that time, [34:28] made some, [34:29] what to me [34:29] was an incoherent reference [34:31] to an investigation [34:33] of Mexico [34:34] or an FBI investigation [34:35] running into [34:36] the Bay of Pigs. [34:37] I don't know [34:38] what the reference [34:39] was alleged to be, [34:41] but in any event, [34:42] I assured him [34:42] that I had no interest [34:43] in the Bay of Pigs [34:44] that many years later, [34:46] that everything [34:46] in connection [34:47] with that [34:47] had been dealt with [34:48] or liquidated [34:48] as far as I was aware, [34:49] and I didn't care [34:50] what they ran into [34:52] in connection with that. [34:57] At some juncture [34:58] in this conversation, [35:00] Mr. Haldeman then said [35:01] that something to the effect [35:03] that it has been decided [35:04] that General Walters [35:05] will go and talk [35:06] to Acting Director Gray [35:08] of the FBI [35:08] and indicate to him [35:12] that these operations [35:13] or these investigations [35:15] of the FBI [35:16] might run into CIA [35:17] operations in Mexico [35:18] and that it was desirable [35:21] that this did not happen [35:23] and that the investigation [35:25] therefore should be [35:26] either tapered off [35:27] or reduced [35:28] or something, [35:29] but there was no language [35:32] saying stopped [35:33] as far as I recall. [35:37] At this point, [35:39] the references to Mexico [35:42] were quite unclear to me. [35:45] I had to recognize [35:46] that if the White House, [35:48] the President, [35:49] Mr. Haldeman, [35:50] somebody in high authority, [35:52] had information [35:53] about something in Mexico [35:54] which I did not have [35:55] information about, [35:56] which is quite possible. [35:57] The White House [35:58] constantly has information [35:59] which others don't have, [36:01] that it would be [36:01] a prudent thing [36:02] for me to find out [36:03] if there was any possibility [36:04] that some CIA operation [36:06] was going to be affected [36:09] and therefore, [36:10] I wanted the necessary time [36:12] to do this. [36:13] I say this [36:14] in explanation of the fact [36:15] that there seems [36:16] that since I had consistently [36:20] pointed out [36:22] that no CIA operations [36:24] had been violated [36:25] by any investigation [36:26] up to then, [36:27] that we'd had nothing [36:27] to do with a Watergate [36:28] burglary, [36:29] the fact of the matter [36:30] was that if an investigation [36:33] continued to go on, [36:34] it might run into something [36:35] we were doing in Mexico. [36:36] I mean, [36:37] this possibility [36:37] always had to exist. [36:39] Nobody knows everything [36:40] about everything. [36:42] So at this point, [36:45] I think it was repeated [36:50] a second time [36:51] that General Walters [36:52] was to go and see [36:52] Acting Director Gray [36:54] with this charge. [36:55] It was then indicated [36:57] that Acting Director Gray [36:58] would probably be expecting [36:59] the call, [37:00] that he was looking [37:01] for some kind of guidance [37:02] in this matter [37:03] and that this should take place [37:06] as soon as possible. [37:08] I believe Mr. Ehrlichman [37:09] at that point [37:09] made his sole contribution [37:11] to the conversation [37:12] which was that [37:13] he should get down [37:14] and see Gray [37:15] just as fast as he could. [37:18] We left this meeting, [37:21] Mr. General Walters and I, [37:22] and went downstairs [37:23] to the automobile [37:24] and I spoke to General Walters [37:28] along the following lines. [37:29] I said, [37:30] when you go to see [37:30] Acting Director Gray, [37:31] I think you should confine yourself [37:33] to reminding him [37:34] that the agency [37:35] and the FBI [37:36] have a delimitation agreement. [37:38] It's been an understanding [37:39] for many years [37:40] that if the agency runs [37:42] into any FBI agents [37:44] or operations, [37:45] that the FBI [37:45] should be immediately notified [37:47] and if the FBI runs [37:48] into any agency, [37:50] agents or operations, [37:51] it shall be immediately notified. [37:55] I wasn't sure [37:56] whether Acting Director Gray [37:58] was familiar with this [37:59] because he had not been [38:00] Acting Director of the FBI [38:01] for very long. [38:03] I wanted General Walters [38:04] to understand about this [38:05] because he'd been [38:06] with the agency, [38:06] I think, [38:07] only about six weeks [38:08] at that time [38:08] and had been having briefings [38:09] and I wasn't sure [38:10] whether this had ever [38:11] come to his attention. [38:13] In other words, [38:13] I was asking him [38:14] to make a legitimate request [38:16] of the Acting Director [38:17] of the FBI [38:17] that if they ran [38:19] in any CIA operations [38:20] in Mexico [38:21] or any place else, [38:22] they were to notify us immediately. [38:23] And I thought General Walters [38:25] should restrict his conversation [38:26] with Acting Director Gray [38:28] to that point. [38:30] Precisely whether he did or not, [38:33] well, you will have [38:33] an opportunity to ask him. [38:36] And to your knowledge, [38:37] did General Walters [38:38] have a meeting [38:39] with Patrick Gray? [38:41] Yes, he had one [38:41] very shortly [38:42] after this meeting [38:44] in the White House [38:44] because he reported to me [38:46] later in the day [38:47] about his meeting [38:48] with Gray [38:49] that he'd been to see him, [38:50] that the general purport [38:53] of what they had discussed [38:54] and then for the first time [38:57] I learned [38:58] that Acting Director Gray [39:00] had told General Walters [39:01] at this meeting [39:02] about some money [39:02] having been sent to Mexico. [39:06] I was unaware [39:07] of any money [39:07] having been sent there [39:08] at the time [39:09] and even that explanation [39:10] didn't say [39:11] what the money was for. [39:13] But also floating around [39:14] in this, [39:16] at the time, [39:17] was the name [39:17] of a Mexican lawyer [39:18] that we'd been asked [39:19] to check out [39:20] by the FBI [39:20] to find out [39:21] if this man [39:23] was in any way [39:23] connected with the CIA. [39:24] His name was Ogaria, [39:26] I believe. [39:28] And we had been [39:29] running traces, [39:30] which is a word of art [39:31] of going through [39:32] the records [39:32] to find out [39:33] and checking [39:34] with our people [39:34] in Mexico [39:35] to see if they knew him [39:36] and so forth. [39:37] And I was someday [39:38] subsequent [39:39] that we got [39:39] the information back [39:41] that he was indeed [39:41] a lawyer in Mexico [39:42] but we'd never [39:43] had any connection [39:44] with him [39:44] and I so notified [39:45] the FBI. [39:47] Now on Monday, [39:50] June 26th, [39:52] did General Walters [39:54] receive a telephone call [39:55] from John Dean? [39:58] General Walters [39:59] told me [39:59] that he'd been called [40:00] by a man [40:02] he did not know [40:03] in the White House [40:04] named John Dean [40:05] and that Dean [40:08] had asked to see him [40:09] and when Walters [40:12] said, [40:13] well, [40:13] what do you want [40:13] to see me about [40:14] and so forth, [40:15] I believe Dean [40:16] referred to the matters [40:18] on which we had talked [40:19] with Haldeman [40:19] and Ehrlichman [40:20] on the previous Friday. [40:23] In any event, [40:24] Dean said [40:25] to General Walters, [40:26] if you want [40:26] to verify [40:28] my bona fides [40:29] and who I am [40:30] and my authority [40:31] to talk with you, [40:32] please call [40:33] John Ehrlichman. [40:35] So by the time [40:36] Walters talked to me, [40:37] he said he had [40:38] talked to Dean, [40:39] had verified [40:40] by telephone conversation [40:42] with Ehrlichman [40:42] that it was alright [40:43] to talk to Dean [40:44] and that he was [40:45] going down to see him. [40:48] Now, [40:48] when General Walters [40:49] came back [40:50] from seeing [40:52] Mr. Dean, [40:53] did he talk to you [40:54] about the meeting? [40:54] He reported the meeting [40:56] to me [40:56] and told me [40:57] that Dean [40:58] had raised with him [40:59] this question [41:00] of the Watergate [41:01] burglary, [41:02] that there was [41:04] a lot, [41:05] there were a lot [41:05] of problems [41:06] in connection with it, [41:07] problems unidentified, [41:09] was there any way [41:10] in which the agency [41:11] could help [41:11] and so on. [41:16] It was quite clear [41:18] that some kind [41:18] of feelers [41:19] were being put out [41:20] to see, [41:20] A, [41:21] if there was [41:21] any agency involvement [41:22] or B, [41:24] whether the agency [41:25] was prepared [41:25] to assist in some way [41:27] which was not at all [41:28] identified. [41:30] It was at this meeting [41:31] with General Walters [41:32] when he was reporting [41:32] this to me [41:33] that I told him [41:36] that I wanted him [41:37] to be absolutely certain [41:39] that he permitted [41:42] nothing to happen [41:44] using the agency's name, [41:46] facilities, [41:46] or anything else [41:47] in connection [41:48] with this business. [41:49] I said, [41:50] I didn't care [41:50] whether he wanted [41:51] to be a scapegoat, [41:52] I didn't care [41:53] whether he was prepared [41:53] to quit on the issue, [41:54] I didn't care [41:55] anything about that, [41:56] I simply wanted him [41:57] to do absolutely nothing [41:59] because I told him [42:01] point blank [42:02] that even though [42:02] he was a military officer [42:04] and even though [42:04] he was a presidential appointee, [42:06] that if he did [42:07] something wrong [42:08] it would besmirch [42:08] the name of the agency [42:09] no matter whether [42:10] he took the blame or not [42:11] and I was simply [42:12] not going to have it. [42:13] And I wanted him [42:14] to be abundantly clear [42:15] on this [42:15] in any conversation [42:16] he had with Mr. Dean [42:17] or with anybody else. [42:19] And as he reported [42:20] to me on the subsequent [42:21] two conversations [42:22] with Mr. Dean, [42:24] I not only reaffirmed this, [42:26] but I said, [42:26] now you hang in there, [42:27] you're doing fine, [42:29] but don't you yield an inch. [42:30] You've alluded to [42:33] the two meetings [42:34] that General Walters [42:37] had with John Dean [42:38] on the 27th and 28th. [42:40] Did General Walters [42:41] notify you [42:42] before each meeting [42:43] and brief you [42:45] as to what occurred [42:46] after each meeting? [42:47] General Walters [42:47] was very good about this. [42:49] As best I recall it, [42:50] he told me each time [42:51] that he was going down there [42:52] and when the meeting [42:53] was over he came back [42:54] and reported [42:54] what had taken place at it. [42:56] And could you briefly [42:57] summarize for us, [42:59] Ambassador, [42:59] what General Walters [43:01] told you [43:01] with respect to the meeting [43:03] of the 27th [43:04] and the meeting [43:04] of the 28th? [43:06] It is my recollection [43:08] that it was at the meeting [43:09] of the 27th, [43:10] which was Tuesday, [43:10] I believe, [43:13] that the issue first came up [43:15] of whether or not [43:16] the CIA, [43:17] out of its covert funds, [43:19] was prepared [43:19] to provide bail money [43:21] for the defendants [43:22] in the Watergate burglary. [43:26] Not only did this issue [43:28] come up, [43:29] but I also believe [43:30] that the additional point [43:32] was made, [43:33] would it be possible [43:34] for the CIA [43:35] to pay the salaries [43:36] of these individuals [43:37] while they served [43:40] their jail sentences? [43:44] General Walters, [43:46] and I have told you [43:48] about the conversation [43:49] I had with General Walters [43:50] the day before [43:50] about how he was [43:51] to guide himself [43:52] in this matter, [43:54] pointed out to Mr. Dean [43:56] that the agency [43:57] couldn't possibly [43:58] do anything like that, [44:00] that he had no authority [44:01] to do it on his own, [44:02] that his authority [44:03] is derived from me [44:04] and that he knew [44:05] what my position was. [44:08] And in addition, [44:09] he said he couldn't [44:10] conceivably imagine [44:12] that a thing like that [44:13] would remain secret forever. [44:16] And last but not least, [44:18] under the ground rules [44:20] which we operate [44:21] with the Congress, [44:22] or the agency operates [44:23] with the Congress [44:24] of the United States, [44:25] any exceptional expenditure [44:26] of this kind [44:27] would have to be identified [44:28] to the chairman [44:29] of the Senate Appropriations Committee [44:31] and the chairman [44:31] of the House Appropriations Committee. [44:36] During the week... [44:37] This obviously cooled [44:38] Mr. Dean's ardor. [44:41] And it was so reported to you? [44:42] Yes. [44:43] During the week of the 26th, [44:47] did you receive a telephone call [44:48] from Patrick Gray [44:50] with respect to setting up [44:51] a meeting [44:52] between representatives [44:53] of the two agencies? [44:55] Yes, I do recall [44:56] a conversation [44:57] to set up a meeting [44:58] because I was anxious [44:59] to have one with him. [45:00] There were a lot of traces [45:01] we were running. [45:02] There were the involvements [45:03] of these former CIA people [45:05] that we've been passing [45:06] to the FBI. [45:07] There was starting to be [45:08] a lot of leaks [45:09] out of the FBI [45:10] for the first time [45:11] that I could remember [45:12] on matters of this kind. [45:13] leaks of ongoing [45:15] operational material. [45:17] And I wanted to get together [45:18] with him [45:18] and some of his people [45:19] to see if we couldn't [45:20] get some of these things [45:23] not straightened out [45:24] so much [45:24] as get to walking along [45:26] in harmony. [45:29] So we agreed [45:30] to have the meeting [45:31] the next day. [45:33] The next morning, [45:34] which I believe [45:34] was the 28th, [45:35] if I may be mistaken, [45:38] it's all on the record, [45:38] I'm sure, [45:40] he called back [45:41] and said that he was [45:41] so busy [45:42] that he couldn't [45:42] make the meeting. [45:43] It wasn't possible [45:44] for him to hold it [45:45] and he would probably [45:45] have to put it off [45:46] until the following week. [45:48] I told him I was sorry [45:50] about that [45:50] because I was planning [45:51] to leave the end [45:52] of the week [45:52] in which we're speaking [45:53] to go to Australia [45:54] and that I wasn't going [45:56] to be there [45:56] the following week [45:57] and if he had a meeting [45:57] it was going to have [45:58] to be with General Walters. [46:01] Now, [46:01] when I asked you [46:02] about the second two meetings [46:05] on the 27th and 28th [46:10] between General Walters [46:11] and Mr. Dean, [46:12] did the summary [46:13] that you gave us [46:14] apply to the two meetings [46:15] together [46:16] or was that solely [46:18] with respect [46:19] to the meeting [46:19] of the 27th? [46:20] I am not able [46:22] any longer, [46:23] Mr. Counsel, [46:24] to sort out precisely [46:26] what, [46:26] out of my own memory, [46:28] what occurred [46:28] at each of these meetings. [46:29] I have two very clear [46:32] recollections. [46:32] One was that it was [46:33] at the second meeting [46:34] that the question [46:35] of the bail money [46:36] came up [46:36] because I don't recall [46:37] that at all [46:38] in connection [46:39] with my longer conversation [46:41] with General Walters [46:42] after the first meeting. [46:43] As far as the third meeting [46:44] was concerned, [46:46] my distinct impression [46:47] of that was [46:47] that this was just [46:49] more feelers [46:50] and that it was [46:50] relatively short [46:51] because Mr. Dean [46:52] was getting nowhere [46:53] with General Walters. [46:56] Just one or two questions [46:57] more, [46:57] Mr. Ambassador. [46:59] You were familiar, [47:01] were you not, [47:01] with the fact [47:02] that General Walters [47:03] was preparing memoranda [47:04] of these meetings? [47:06] Yes, [47:06] because after the issue [47:10] came up [47:11] of possible bail [47:12] or paying the salaries [47:14] of the fellows [47:16] who had broken in, [47:17] this struck me [47:18] that we were getting [47:19] into an area here [47:20] which was very questionable [47:22] indeed [47:23] and that therefore [47:24] these various meetings [47:26] ought to be a matter [47:26] of record [47:27] in case this ever came up [47:28] at any future time. [47:29] So it was at that point [47:30] that in the conversation, [47:32] as I recall, [47:33] that General Walters, [47:34] either General Walters [47:35] or I or both of us [47:36] agreed that these things [47:38] ought to be reduced [47:39] to writing [47:39] and that a record [47:40] ought to be kept. [47:42] Am I correct then [47:43] that you did go [47:45] to Australia [47:46] around the 1st of July [47:47] of 1972? [47:49] Yes, I did. [47:49] And that Patrick Gray [47:50] did not reschedule [47:52] the meeting [47:54] between the two of you [47:55] before you left? [47:56] I never met with him. [47:59] Mr. Chairman, [48:00] I have no further questions [48:01] at this time. [48:03] In a moment, [48:04] Fred Thompson [48:05] wants to compare [48:05] today's testimony [48:06] with some earlier statements [48:08] made by Mr. Helms. [48:09] Public television's coverage [48:10] of the Senate hearings [48:11] will continue [48:12] after a pause [48:13] for station identification. [48:15] Unabridged coverage [48:16] of these hearings [48:17] is provided [48:18] as a public service [48:19] by the member stations [48:20] of PBS, [48:22] the Public Broadcasting Service. [48:27] From Washington, [48:28] NPACT continues [48:29] its coverage of hearings [48:31] by the Senate Select Committee [48:32] on Presidential Campaign Activities. [48:34] Here again, [48:35] correspondent Robert McNeil. [48:37] As we go back [48:38] to the hearings, [48:39] Minority Counsel Fred Thompson [48:40] is about to question [48:41] Richard Helms. [48:48] Mr. Helms is... [49:05] My friend's down here. [49:10] Maybe we can do this [49:11] and that at the same time, [49:12] Mr. Helms. [49:13] Let me turn this microphone over. [49:15] Maybe then I can be... [49:16] I can face you [49:17] and be heard better. [49:19] Very good. [49:20] As I understand [49:20] that you had a conversation [49:21] with Patrick Gray [49:23] on June the 22nd [49:25] when you advised him [49:27] that the CIA [49:28] was not involved [49:28] in the break-in. [49:31] Was your conversation [49:32] limited to CIA involvement [49:34] in the break-in, [49:34] or did you go into [49:36] whether or not [49:38] the investigation [49:39] might undercover [49:41] other CIA operations possibly? [49:44] I don't recall [49:44] ever discussing [49:45] with Mr. Gray [49:46] this question [49:46] of its uncovering [49:47] other CIA operations. [49:49] Strictly the break-in discussion. [49:51] That we had no involvement [49:52] and I believe [49:53] that as part of this conversation [49:54] there was this business [49:55] about the Mexican lawyer [49:56] that I don't recall [49:58] whether he was specifically mentioned. [50:00] The Mexican lawyer [50:00] was mentioned at that time, [50:02] but Mr. Gray [50:02] had on his mind [50:03] in some way [50:04] the idea [50:05] that there was [50:06] some CIA involvement [50:07] that they were running into [50:08] and I was attempting [50:09] to reassure him [50:10] that this was not the case [50:11] as best I knew it. [50:12] CIA involvement [50:13] in the watergate break-in itself? [50:15] Or in some way [50:16] connected with it. [50:17] I see. [50:18] Did he state [50:18] the source of his concern? [50:21] He never did. [50:22] Did he indicate [50:23] whether or not [50:23] it was due to [50:24] the Bureau's own investigation [50:26] or whether or not [50:27] someone else [50:28] had told him that [50:29] from outside the Bureau? [50:30] I was unable to tell. [50:31] I simply was surprised [50:32] that this kept coming up. [50:34] All right. [50:35] And so the next day [50:36] you had the conversation [50:37] with Mr. Walters [50:40] and Mr. Haldeman [50:41] and Mr. Ehrlichman [50:41] as I understand it. [50:43] I'd like to go over briefly [50:44] what you stated [50:45] was discussed [50:47] in that conversation. [50:48] I believe you stated [50:49] that Mr. Haldeman [50:52] indicated [50:53] that the Watergate [50:54] was being capitalized on, [50:57] that five men [51:00] had been arrested [51:00] and that seemed adequate [51:01] and that sort of thing. [51:04] Well, obviously, [51:04] the Watergate investigation [51:06] was the reason [51:08] for the meeting, [51:09] was it not? [51:10] And as to what [51:10] the investigation [51:11] might disclose, [51:13] that was the basis [51:14] for the meeting? [51:15] Well, I can only assume [51:16] in hindsight [51:17] that it was, [51:17] Mr. Thompson, [51:18] because at the time [51:19] nobody had identified [51:20] to us why we were [51:21] being called [51:21] to the White House. [51:22] In other words, [51:23] we arrived and waited [51:24] to hear what the subject [51:25] of the meeting was. [51:26] when they stated [51:29] their concern [51:30] about possible [51:33] Mexican involvement [51:34] or Mexican involvement [51:35] with the CIA, [51:36] of course, [51:36] they were talking [51:37] about the Watergate [51:37] investigation [51:38] turning up [51:39] other involvement. [51:41] Were they not? [51:41] I assumed this was [51:42] what they were [51:43] talking about, yes. [51:44] But as I mentioned [51:44] a moment ago, [51:45] and I do want [51:46] to underline this, [51:47] I was totally unfamiliar [51:48] at that time [51:49] with what Mexico [51:51] had to do with anything. [51:55] But you had talked [51:56] to Pat Gray [51:56] the day before, [51:59] and I believe [51:59] you stated [52:00] that you thought [52:00] that he might have [52:01] mentioned a Mexican [52:03] lawyer at that time? [52:04] Yes, sir, [52:05] but when the Mexican [52:07] lawyer's name [52:08] was mentioned, [52:09] there was never [52:09] any implication [52:10] as to why [52:11] they were even [52:11] asking about him, [52:13] so that this was [52:13] not very revealing. [52:17] What I'm concerned [52:18] about is just [52:18] the extent [52:19] to which the [52:20] Watergate situation [52:21] was actually discussed, [52:24] because, of course, [52:25] I think it would [52:26] be fair to say [52:27] that some appearances [52:28] from what has been [52:28] reported and some [52:30] of the testimony [52:30] in this form [52:32] and others [52:32] is that the Watergate [52:34] investigation [52:34] was the reason [52:35] for the concern [52:36] and it could have [52:37] been a legitimate [52:37] concern. [52:38] It could have [52:38] been a possible [52:41] cover-up of the [52:41] Watergate investigation [52:42] itself into the [52:43] Watergate matter. [52:44] And this is the area [52:46] I'd like to address [52:46] myself to a minute. [52:48] And I'd like to refer [52:49] to your testimony [52:51] before the Committee [52:52] on Armed Services [52:54] Thursday, May 17, 1973. [52:58] Now, I had a little [53:00] bit of difficulty [53:00] getting this myself [53:01] last night and this [53:03] morning. [53:03] I've just received it. [53:04] And if you would like, [53:05] in the course of my [53:06] discussion of it, [53:07] for us to recess [53:09] with the permission [53:10] of the Chairman [53:10] of the Committee [53:11] where you can have [53:13] a copy of it [53:14] or a copy of certain [53:15] pages, I feel like [53:16] we can do that. [53:16] But if it's all right [53:17] with you, I'll go ahead [53:17] and proceed right now [53:18] and read certain [53:20] portions of that [53:20] and ask you a few [53:21] questions based on that. [53:23] Mr. Chairman, [53:25] the transcript from [53:29] which Mr. Thompson [53:30] is about to read [53:31] is nominally classified [53:33] as secret. [53:34] I take it that there [53:36] is no objection [53:37] on the part of the [53:38] Committee or any [53:40] claim on the part [53:41] of the Committee [53:42] that it does not [53:43] have the authority [53:43] to permit Council [53:44] to go ahead [53:45] and read from [53:45] that document [53:46] as it relates [53:47] to the mandate [53:47] for inquiry [53:48] of this Committee. [53:50] Mr. President, [53:50] I understand [53:51] that from [53:52] the resolution [53:53] and also [53:54] from the statement [53:57] made, as I understand [53:58] it, to the staff [53:59] attorneys by the [54:01] White House [54:01] attorneys that [54:03] they left [54:03] the question [54:04] of matters [54:07] of this kind [54:08] to the [54:09] determination [54:09] of the Committee. [54:10] Mr. Chairman, [54:11] I entirely agree [54:12] with you. [54:12] I simply wanted [54:13] to make sure [54:14] that the record [54:14] reflected at that [54:15] point. [54:16] That it is [54:16] the Committee [54:16] position, [54:17] that notwithstanding [54:18] the nominal secret [54:19] classification, [54:20] that by reason [54:21] of our inherent [54:22] authority, [54:22] by reason [54:24] of communications [54:25] to us [54:26] from the White [54:26] House, [54:27] that we have [54:27] the authority [54:27] to read [54:28] that document [54:29] into the [54:29] public record. [54:30] And I might [54:30] add that [54:31] the chairman [54:32] of the committees [54:33] which took [54:34] this, [54:35] of the Senate [54:35] committees [54:36] which took [54:36] this evidence [54:37] have also [54:37] said that [54:38] as far as [54:38] they had [54:39] in their power [54:40] they'd consent [54:40] to the use [54:41] of it. [54:41] Thank you, [54:42] Mr. Chairman. [54:48] Mr. Thames, [54:49] were Mr. Walters [54:50] and yourself [54:51] being questioned [54:53] at the same [54:53] time on this [54:54] occasion, [54:55] were you in [54:55] the same [54:55] room together? [54:56] On that [54:56] occasion, [54:57] General Walters [54:58] was sitting [54:58] on my right [54:59] and General [55:00] Cushman [55:00] was sitting [55:01] on my left. [55:02] We were in [55:02] the room [55:03] together [55:03] the whole [55:03] time. [55:07] Let me read [55:09] if I might [55:09] and if you [55:09] prefer me [55:10] to read [55:10] other portions [55:11] that you [55:12] might remember [55:12] or go back [55:13] a little further [55:13] than I will [55:14] but there's [55:14] a general [55:15] preliminary [55:17] section here [55:20] where you [55:21] stated it was [55:21] not a very [55:21] long conversation [55:22] and he'd [55:25] mentioned [55:25] the Bay of [55:25] Pigs. [55:27] As Ambassador [55:28] Helms, [55:28] well you [55:29] could, [55:31] first of all [55:31] Mr. Woosley, [55:32] let's go back [55:32] to the meeting [55:33] itself for a [55:33] moment. [55:34] Mr. Harleman [55:35] said that it [55:36] had been decided [55:36] that the general [55:37] should call on [55:38] Mr. Gray [55:38] did he say [55:40] or intimate [55:40] in any way [55:41] who had decided [55:42] upon that [55:43] course of action. [55:44] Ambassador Helms, [55:45] well you can [55:46] make an [55:46] intimation [55:47] but I'd rather [55:48] not draw an [55:48] intimation [55:48] if the chairman [55:49] will leave me [55:50] of that. [55:50] Here was Mr. [55:50] Harleman, [55:51] Mr. Ehrlichman, [55:52] two most senior [55:53] officials in the [55:53] White House [55:54] next to the [55:54] President himself [55:55] giving this [55:55] instruction. [55:56] I really feel [55:57] like now as I did [55:58] then that it [55:59] would have been [55:59] presumptuous to [56:00] impress them [56:00] any harder [56:01] as to how [56:02] they had come [56:03] up with this [56:04] or where they'd [56:05] got an idea [56:05] who was behind [56:06] it. [56:06] Mr. Woosley, [56:09] you said Mr. [56:09] Harleman mentioned [56:10] the Bay of Pigs. [56:11] Did he mention [56:12] Watergate case [56:13] itself in the [56:14] course of the [56:14] conversation? [56:16] Ambassador Helms, [56:17] no. [56:18] Mr. Woosley, [56:19] he did not? [56:21] Ambassador Helms, [56:22] no. [56:24] Senator Simington, [56:25] General Walters, [56:25] you confirm that, [56:26] do you? [56:28] General Walters, [56:28] yes sir. [56:29] He didn't mention [56:30] the Watergate. [56:33] Senator Simington, [56:34] I heard you [56:35] volunteering and [56:37] as long as you [56:38] did, I thought it [56:40] should be on the [56:41] record. [56:41] Mr. Woosley, [56:43] maybe this is [56:43] something that we [56:44] should get cleared [56:44] up, but the [56:46] committee was given [56:46] a copy of General [56:47] Walters' affidavit. [56:50] General Walters. [56:51] He did in the [56:52] introduction when he [56:53] said this case had [56:54] stirred up a lot [56:55] of things and the [56:57] opposition is [56:57] attempting to [56:58] exploit it. [57:00] That was the [57:01] reference I [57:02] testified to [57:03] previously. [57:04] I believe as we [57:04] came in he said [57:05] the Watergate has [57:06] stirred up a lot [57:06] of things, the [57:07] opposition is [57:08] attempting to [57:08] exploit it, [57:09] General Walters [57:10] talking, and it [57:12] has been decided [57:12] that you will [57:13] go. [57:15] That was the [57:15] inevitable lead [57:16] into the whole [57:17] reference. [57:19] Senator Jackson [57:19] decided that you [57:21] would go, [57:22] General Walters. [57:23] Mr. Gray [57:23] tells him if he [57:25] pursues the [57:25] Mexican part of [57:26] financing of this [57:27] business, we'll [57:28] uncover CIA assets [57:30] or scheme for [57:32] moving money. [57:34] Mr. Woosley, [57:34] I should perhaps [57:35] read into the [57:35] record here a few [57:36] sentences from [57:37] General Walters' [57:37] affidavit. [57:38] As I recall it, [57:40] Mr. Haldeman [57:41] said the [57:41] Watergate incident [57:42] was causing [57:43] trouble and being [57:43] exploited by the [57:44] opposition. [57:47] It had been [57:47] decided at the [57:48] White House that [57:49] I would go to [57:50] acting FBI [57:52] Director Gray and [57:52] tell him that now [57:54] that the five [57:54] suspects were [57:55] arrested, further [57:56] inquiries into the [57:57] Mexican aspect of [57:58] the matter might [57:58] jeopardize some of [57:59] the CIA's [57:59] activities in this [58:00] area. [58:02] Was there any [58:03] discussion in the [58:04] meeting at all of [58:05] Watergate? [58:07] Ambassador Hams, [58:08] not to the best of [58:09] my recollection. [58:11] And I frankly was [58:11] hard put at the [58:12] time to understand [58:13] what Mexico was [58:15] involved with. [58:17] This was only a [58:17] week after the [58:18] break-in. [58:19] I didn't know why [58:19] Mexico was being [58:20] mentioned. [58:20] It never occurred to [58:21] me that it had [58:23] anything to do with [58:24] the Watergate [58:25] burglary. [58:26] Senator Simon, [58:27] General Walters, [58:28] do you agree with [58:28] that? [58:29] General Walters, [58:29] to me the whole [58:30] question was [58:30] connected by virtue [58:31] of the beginning [58:32] of the thing when [58:34] he said Watergate [58:34] could be opened as [58:36] a preliminary, as a [58:37] lead-in as to why [58:38] he wanted me to go. [58:40] It was obviously a [58:41] lead-in to this, [58:41] but he didn't go [58:42] into any discussion [58:43] of the Watergate [58:44] other than what I [58:47] said in the [58:48] beginning. [58:50] And then you go to [58:51] other matters, [58:54] Mr. Hams. [58:54] Now that, let me [58:55] see if I summarize [58:57] this correctly. [58:57] The question was [58:58] put directly to you [59:00] first as to whether [59:01] or not there was [59:01] any Watergate [59:02] discussion, and you [59:04] said there was [59:04] not. [59:06] That was the way [59:06] I recalled it, [59:07] Mr. Thompson, [59:08] at the time since [59:09] then. [59:09] I've seen General [59:10] Walters' memorandum [59:11] for the record. [59:12] I've talked with [59:12] him about this, and [59:14] we went over again [59:15] what had occurred, and [59:16] I frankly at that [59:17] point had forgotten [59:18] this lead-in to the [59:19] conversation. [59:21] After all, I'd been [59:21] away for some time. [59:23] I'd been involved [59:23] with other things, and [59:24] if my memory was less [59:26] than perfect at that [59:27] time, it was less than [59:27] perfect. [59:28] I had no intention of [59:30] jiggery, pokery, or [59:32] anything else. [59:33] Well, I'm certainly not [59:34] accusing you or any [59:36] other witness of [59:36] anything, but I do [59:38] want to clear it up. [59:39] Let me make sure I have [59:39] my chronology right. [59:42] I'm reading from page 21A [59:47] of the transcript. [59:56] Opposed to you, he said [59:59] no, he said he did not, [1:00:00] he said no. [1:00:01] General Walters, do you [1:00:02] confirm that? [1:00:03] And General Walters says, [1:00:04] yes, sir, he didn't [1:00:05] mention the water gate. [1:00:08] And then Mr. Walters [1:00:09] said, this is something we [1:00:10] should clear up, and he [1:00:11] refers to General Walters' [1:00:12] affidavit at that time, [1:00:13] which he had previously [1:00:14] submitted, in which he [1:00:15] mentioned these things. [1:00:17] Mr. Thompson, what I'm [1:00:18] referring to and what I saw [1:00:20] subsequently was a [1:00:21] memorandum for the [1:00:22] record, which I believe [1:00:23] is in the custody of the [1:00:25] committee, which was [1:00:26] written several days [1:00:27] after this 23 June [1:00:29] conversation. [1:00:29] That's correct. [1:00:30] That's the memorandum [1:00:31] day of June 28, 1972. [1:00:33] I think that's correct. [1:00:34] And it was that [1:00:34] memorandum, which I [1:00:35] subsequently saw, which I [1:00:37] had not seen at the time [1:00:38] that I was testifying. [1:00:40] I talked to General [1:00:40] Walters about it. [1:00:42] I had no reason to, at [1:00:43] that point, to question [1:00:45] General Walters' [1:00:46] memorandum. [1:00:47] He has an excellent [1:00:48] ability to recall [1:00:50] as you will probably [1:00:52] are aware. [1:00:52] He's an excellent [1:00:53] linguist. [1:00:54] And anybody that can [1:00:55] speak five or six [1:00:56] languages with the [1:00:57] ability that he can [1:00:59] certainly has the [1:01:00] mental equipment to [1:01:01] recall something for [1:01:02] five days after the [1:01:05] event took place. [1:01:06] And I obviously talked [1:01:09] to him about this, and [1:01:10] I had clearly forgotten [1:01:11] that introductory aspect [1:01:13] of this. [1:01:14] Mr. Helms, are you [1:01:15] basing your testimony [1:01:16] now on your own [1:01:17] memory or upon Mr. [1:01:20] Walters' memory? [1:01:21] I mean, you recounted [1:01:25] your faith in his [1:01:25] memory, which I'm sure [1:01:27] is probably well [1:01:30] placed. [1:01:32] But I would think that [1:01:33] this would be a rather [1:01:34] significant matter if [1:01:36] Haldeman and Ehrlichman [1:01:37] has been widely [1:01:38] reported from the [1:01:39] basis of this [1:01:40] memorandum, which you [1:01:41] just referred to, I [1:01:42] suppose, came in and [1:01:44] says five people have [1:01:45] been arrested and that [1:01:46] ought to be enough. [1:01:47] And that's the lead in [1:01:48] as to how the CIA or the [1:01:51] FBI should conduct its [1:01:52] investigation. [1:01:52] investigation and the [1:01:53] basis of CIA contact [1:01:55] with the FBI, I would [1:01:56] think that this was [1:01:56] something that you would [1:02:00] remember. [1:02:00] So I'm really trying to [1:02:02] determine whether your [1:02:04] testimony is based upon [1:02:05] your own independent [1:02:06] recollection or just [1:02:08] after having read this [1:02:09] memorandum and your [1:02:10] faith in General [1:02:12] Walters' recollection. [1:02:13] Well, that's a [1:02:13] combination of the two, [1:02:15] Mr. Thompson, because [1:02:16] when he jogged my [1:02:17] memory and we went back [1:02:18] over the meeting [1:02:18] together, then I did [1:02:20] recall these other [1:02:21] remarks having been [1:02:22] made. [1:02:22] Well, now, he jogged [1:02:23] your memory here. [1:02:25] And the testimony [1:02:27] before the committee [1:02:27] also goes on page 21A [1:02:30] again, after a member [1:02:32] of the committee [1:02:32] evidently raised the [1:02:33] matter of the [1:02:34] affidavit of the [1:02:35] memorandum, General [1:02:36] Walters said this. [1:02:39] He said, he did in [1:02:39] the introduction when he [1:02:40] said, referring to the [1:02:41] Watergate, mentioning [1:02:42] the Watergate, he did [1:02:44] in the introduction when [1:02:45] he said, this case has [1:02:46] stirred up a lot of [1:02:47] things and the [1:02:49] opposition is attempting [1:02:50] to exploit it. [1:02:51] That was the [1:02:57] reference I testified [1:02:58] to previously, I [1:03:00] believe, and I assume [1:03:01] he's referring to his [1:03:01] affidavit or a [1:03:02] memorandum, I believe [1:03:05] as we came in, he [1:03:06] said the Watergate [1:03:06] has stirred up a lot [1:03:07] of things, the [1:03:08] opposition is attempting [1:03:09] to exploit it, it [1:03:11] had been decided that [1:03:12] you will go, that was [1:03:13] an inevitable lead-in. [1:03:16] Mr. Woosley, I [1:03:20] should perhaps read in [1:03:20] the record a few [1:03:21] sentences of General [1:03:22] Walters' affidavit. [1:03:23] And then at that time, [1:03:25] they read into the [1:03:25] record a few sentences [1:03:26] of General Walters' [1:03:27] affidavit, which you [1:03:28] just referred to, which [1:03:29] is the memorandum that [1:03:31] I referred to. [1:03:32] Quote, as I recall it, [1:03:33] Mr. Hallerman said that [1:03:34] the Watergate incident [1:03:35] was causing a lot of [1:03:36] trouble and being [1:03:37] exploited by the [1:03:37] opposition. [1:03:39] It had been decided [1:03:40] by the White House I [1:03:41] should go to acting [1:03:41] director, FBI, and [1:03:42] agree. [1:03:43] Now that five suspects [1:03:44] were arrested, further [1:03:45] inquiries in the Mexican [1:03:46] aspect of the matter, [1:03:48] might jeopardize some of [1:03:49] the CIA activities. [1:03:50] Another question is put [1:03:52] by one of the [1:03:52] committee. [1:03:52] Was there any discussion [1:03:54] in the meeting at all of [1:03:56] Watergate, Ambassador [1:03:57] Helms? [1:03:58] Not to the best of my [1:03:59] recollection. [1:04:00] Well, I didn't recall it [1:04:00] at that time, but when I [1:04:02] went over this with General [1:04:04] Walters and we tried to [1:04:05] piece this meeting together, [1:04:07] then I did recall that [1:04:09] these matters had been [1:04:10] alluded to. [1:04:13] Did it occur to you, or has [1:04:15] it affected you either [1:04:16] consciously or subconsciously, [1:04:17] the fact that it could be [1:04:18] very, or at least to some [1:04:21] extent, embarrassing for [1:04:22] General Walters, if you [1:04:25] testified contrary to him? [1:04:27] Did you discuss that [1:04:28] possibility with him when [1:04:29] you went over these [1:04:30] matters? [1:04:31] No, because I saw him [1:04:32] just a moment before we [1:04:33] actually went into the [1:04:34] room. [1:04:35] Of course, it was after you [1:04:37] got into the room before [1:04:38] you realized that you had [1:04:39] any conflict in your [1:04:42] testimony, was it not? [1:04:43] That's right. [1:04:44] And you were in the room [1:04:45] before you first realized [1:04:47] what this memorandum said, [1:04:49] were you not? [1:04:52] And the memorandum, if I... [1:04:52] As a matter of fact, that [1:04:56] memorandum was not on the [1:04:57] table at that time, as I [1:04:58] recall it. [1:04:59] There was an affidavit, but [1:05:00] I believe that those [1:05:01] memoranda were submitted [1:05:02] subsequently to the [1:05:04] committee. [1:05:05] I may be wrong. [1:05:07] And comparing your [1:05:09] testimony today with what [1:05:10] his memorandum says, a [1:05:12] couple of things do [1:05:13] strike me. [1:05:14] His memorandum dated June [1:05:17] 28th says that June 23rd at [1:05:23] 1300 on request I called [1:05:25] to Director Helms on John [1:05:28] Ehrlichman and Robert [1:05:28] Haldeman in Ehrlichman's [1:05:29] office in the White House. [1:05:30] Haldeman said that the [1:05:31] bugging affair at the [1:05:32] Democratic National [1:05:33] Committee headquarters of [1:05:34] Watergate Apartments had [1:05:35] made a lot of noise and [1:05:36] that the Democrats were [1:05:37] trying to maximize on it. [1:05:41] Then down here he says, [1:05:43] since five suspects had [1:05:47] been arrested, this should [1:05:48] be sufficient. [1:05:50] Let me ask you a few other [1:05:51] things about this memorandum [1:05:52] while we're on it, Mr. [1:05:56] Helms. [1:05:57] He states in here also that [1:06:01] Haldeman said the whole [1:06:04] affair was getting [1:06:05] embarrassing and it was [1:06:06] the president's wish that [1:06:09] Walters called on Gray and [1:06:10] suggested to him that [1:06:11] since five suspects had [1:06:12] been arrested, this should [1:06:13] be sufficient. [1:06:15] It was not advantageous to [1:06:16] have the inquiry pushed, [1:06:18] comma, especially in [1:06:19] Mexico. [1:06:21] Do you recall the [1:06:21] president's name being [1:06:22] mentioned? [1:06:23] No, I still don't agree [1:06:24] with General Walters about [1:06:26] that. [1:06:26] I don't recall us having [1:06:27] been put that way. [1:06:34] Helms said, again reading [1:06:36] from the Walters memorandum, [1:06:39] he had talked to Gray on [1:06:40] the previous day, made [1:06:41] plain to him the agency was [1:06:42] not behind the matter and [1:06:44] it was not connected with [1:06:45] it. [1:06:45] None of the suspects, none [1:06:48] of the suspects was working [1:06:50] for it, nor had worked for [1:06:53] the agency in the last two [1:06:54] years. [1:06:56] He had told Gray that none of [1:06:57] the investigators was touching [1:07:01] any covert projects of the [1:07:03] agency, current or ongoing. [1:07:07] Did you tell Mr. Gray that it [1:07:09] was touching none of the [1:07:10] covert projects of the agency [1:07:12] or did you have any basis for [1:07:13] saying that at that time? [1:07:14] I was unaware of any covert [1:07:17] projects of the agency that [1:07:18] had been touched on up to [1:07:19] that time. [1:07:20] Did you tell Gray that if you [1:07:22] recall or did you just simply [1:07:24] tell him the CIA was not [1:07:25] involved in the Watergate [1:07:26] break-in? [1:07:27] I told him the CIA was not [1:07:28] involved in the Watergate [1:07:29] break-in. [1:07:30] I do not recall whether I told [1:07:32] him that it had not thus far [1:07:33] run into any CIA covert [1:07:35] projects. [1:07:38] Did you tell him that none of [1:07:39] the suspects was working for [1:07:41] the CIA nor had worked for [1:07:43] the agency in the last two [1:07:44] years? [1:07:44] Yes. [1:07:44] Then at least one of the [1:07:49] suspects had worked for the [1:07:51] FBI previous to, for the CIA [1:07:55] previous to the last two [1:07:56] years then. [1:07:57] Is that correct? [1:07:58] Who was that, sir? [1:07:59] Well, I'm asking you. [1:08:00] You said none of them had [1:08:02] worked for the CIA within the [1:08:03] last two years. [1:08:04] I assume that before that one, [1:08:05] at least one of them had. [1:08:06] Well, Mr. McCord had been an [1:08:08] employee of the CIA for some [1:08:10] 20 years before he retired. [1:08:12] Mr. Hunt had worked there at [1:08:13] least 15, maybe more. [1:08:15] And a couple of the Cubans [1:08:17] had at one time had a [1:08:18] contractual relationship with [1:08:21] the agency. [1:08:22] Do you know which two [1:08:23] Cubans? [1:08:25] Do you mind giving me the [1:08:27] names? [1:08:28] I'm not a computer. [1:08:30] Would it be Barker, perhaps? [1:08:33] Mr. Barker? [1:08:34] Barker, I think, had a [1:08:35] relationship back in the early [1:08:36] 60s. [1:08:38] I think, is Sturgis another [1:08:40] individual? [1:08:41] Yes. [1:08:41] I think he at one time had [1:08:42] had some connection. [1:08:43] Martin had been on a sort of [1:08:47] a retainer to report on [1:08:50] individuals who came in from [1:08:53] Cuba as to whether they'd be [1:08:55] worth interrogating or [1:08:56] interviewing or not in [1:08:57] Florida. [1:08:58] And he'd been on that [1:08:59] retainer of about $100 a [1:09:01] month on the understanding [1:09:05] that he would report in from [1:09:06] time to time when he had [1:09:07] something to report. [1:09:08] When I found out that he was [1:09:10] still on the, and I had this [1:09:13] connection with the agency at [1:09:14] the time of this break-in, he [1:09:16] was cut off. [1:09:19] When was he cut off? [1:09:22] Right after we had discovered [1:09:23] that he was involved in the [1:09:24] break-in. [1:09:27] You mean Martinez was on [1:09:29] retainer by the CIA at the [1:09:32] time of the break-in? [1:09:33] That's right. [1:09:35] But in Florida, for the [1:09:37] purposes I've identified. [1:09:42] Beg your pardon, in Florida, [1:09:44] I didn't understand that last [1:09:45] statement. [1:09:47] Mr. Martinez was a resident in [1:09:52] Florida as far as the agency [1:09:54] knew. [1:09:56] Because he lived in Florida and [1:09:57] because he was a Cuban exile, [1:09:59] he was kept on a loose [1:10:02] arrangement whereby he would [1:10:04] report to the agency from time [1:10:05] to time, Cubans who got out of [1:10:08] Cuba, either legally or [1:10:10] illegally, whom he thought [1:10:11] might have some information [1:10:13] that would be useful to the [1:10:14] United States government, and [1:10:15] then he would report in and [1:10:16] give the name of this [1:10:17] individual. [1:10:20] When was he taken off [1:10:22] retainer by the CIA? [1:10:24] When it was ascertained that [1:10:26] he was involved in the break-in, [1:10:29] he was taken off right then. [1:10:30] When was it ascertained that he [1:10:32] was involved in the break-in? [1:10:33] Well, I assume when his name [1:10:35] was given to us by the FBI, [1:10:40] which was the, I imagine, [1:10:42] within 24 hours or 48 hours or [1:10:44] 72 hours after the break-in. [1:10:46] How was this done? [1:10:48] Did the CIA communicate with [1:10:50] Mr. Martinez? [1:10:51] Was there any paperwork [1:10:52] involved? [1:10:54] I don't recall the precise [1:10:55] details of the way it was done. [1:10:57] There are many people in the [1:10:58] agency who can tell you it may [1:10:59] even be in your records already. [1:11:01] The agency has been most [1:11:02] cooperative in turning over [1:11:03] lots of written material about [1:11:05] these various matters, and I [1:11:07] imagine it's in there someplace [1:11:08] I just don't remember. [1:11:11] Well, it seems to me, Mr. [1:11:13] Helms, that there might well [1:11:15] have been concern as to the role [1:11:16] of the FBI or the CIA by all [1:11:21] parties involved at this [1:11:23] particular time, right after the [1:11:25] break-in in June of 72. [1:11:26] If, in fact, one of the persons [1:11:28] who had broken in was, at that [1:11:30] time, on retainer by the CIA, did [1:11:34] you know at the time of your [1:11:36] conversation with Mr. Hallman and [1:11:37] Mr. Ehrlichman on the 23rd that [1:11:39] Mr. Martinez was, in fact, on [1:11:40] retainer? [1:11:41] I don't recall. [1:11:43] I imagine I may have. [1:11:44] But that doesn't mean that the [1:11:46] CIA was involved in the burglary. [1:11:48] No, sir. [1:11:48] No, sir. [1:11:49] I don't think you ought to put [1:11:50] words in my mouth. [1:11:52] I didn't think I was. [1:11:53] The issue seems to be whether or [1:11:56] not there was legitimate concern [1:11:58] with regard to either at that [1:12:01] time, whether the CIA was [1:12:03] involved in the burglary or [1:12:05] whether or not other covert CIA [1:12:07] activities might be exposed, or [1:12:09] whether or not Hallman and [1:12:11] Ehrlichman, quite frankly, were [1:12:13] using this as an excuse to cover [1:12:14] up the Watergate investigation, [1:12:16] which also, quite frankly, has [1:12:19] been widely implied, to say the [1:12:22] least. [1:12:23] Now, that's what I'm trying to [1:12:24] get at. [1:12:24] Now, you've already mentioned [1:12:26] the fact that you had talked to [1:12:28] Patrick Gray, and there was some [1:12:30] talk besides the people involved [1:12:33] in the Watergate break-in. [1:12:35] McCord was a former CIA agent. [1:12:36] Hunt was a former CIA agent. [1:12:40] Martinez was on retainer at the [1:12:42] time of the break-in. [1:12:43] Sturgis, former contact, former [1:12:47] employee of the CIA. [1:12:48] Also, in Mexico, as I understand, [1:12:50] there was some talk about an [1:12:52] attorney down there as being a [1:12:54] CIA contact, I suppose, would be [1:12:57] the correct way to put that, [1:12:58] would it not? [1:12:58] That was what we were asked, if we [1:13:01] had any connection with him. [1:13:04] You talked to Mr. Gray, I believe, [1:13:05] on June 27 about a Mr. [1:13:08] Aguario down there, did you not? [1:13:11] The FBI had asked us if this [1:13:13] Mexican lawyer had any connection [1:13:15] with the agency. [1:13:17] We conducted an investigation to [1:13:19] ascertain whether or not he had, [1:13:21] and I reported to Mr. Gray that he [1:13:23] had no connection with the agency. [1:13:25] We knew nothing about him. [1:13:28] But what I'm trying to get at is [1:13:30] the 27th, four days after this [1:13:33] meeting, there was still some [1:13:35] discussion as to whether or not [1:13:36] there was a problem with Mr. [1:13:39] Aguario. [1:13:41] If my notes are correct, Mr. Gray [1:13:43] called you about this matter at 11.30 a.m. [1:13:47] And you could not or did not respond [1:13:51] immediately, and you had turned Mr. [1:13:53] Gray's call at 3.40 that afternoon [1:13:55] and said that the CIA did not, in [1:13:58] fact, have any interest in Mr. [1:14:00] Aguario. [1:14:01] Does that meet your recollection? [1:14:02] But I want to point out, Mr. [1:14:04] Thompson, in case there's any [1:14:05] question in your mind, that from [1:14:07] the whenever we were initially asked [1:14:10] about this Mexican lawyer, it would [1:14:11] have taken a few days to ascertain [1:14:13] this, to be sure about it. [1:14:16] We have to check files and records, [1:14:18] and we'd have to check with people [1:14:19] in Mexico, and this is not something [1:14:22] that would happen from one minute [1:14:23] to the next. [1:14:25] But I don't recall when the first [1:14:26] inquiry was made to us about a man [1:14:28] named Aguario. [1:14:29] I just simply know from the record, [1:14:31] since I've consulted the record on [1:14:33] this point, that I did report this [1:14:35] back to Mr. Gray, that we had no [1:14:37] connection with him, the agency had [1:14:39] no connection with him on the 27th of [1:14:41] June. [1:14:42] I believe you have documents there in [1:14:44] my own handwriting attesting to this. [1:14:48] Mr. Hams, just show in order that [1:14:52] we're as clear as we can be on this. [1:14:55] I would like to ask you one more time [1:14:58] whether, to the best of your [1:15:01] independent recollection, that [1:15:04] Haldeman did say that opposition was [1:15:08] capitalizing on the Watergate, and [1:15:09] five men had been arrested, and that [1:15:11] was adequate. [1:15:12] I can't vouch for those exact words, [1:15:16] but as I reconstructed this meeting [1:15:18] with General Walters and went over it, [1:15:19] there was some sort of a lead-in or [1:15:22] reference at the beginning of the [1:15:23] conversation to this burglary. [1:15:24] And it was after you're sitting there [1:15:28] in the same room with General Walters [1:15:30] and hearing his testimony that it did [1:15:33] in fact occur, and it was after you're [1:15:36] reading his memorandum where he stated [1:15:38] that it did in fact occur, before you [1:15:41] first mentioned yourself, that you [1:15:44] recall that it did in fact occur. [1:15:45] Is that correct? [1:15:46] That's relatively, I'm sure, that's [1:15:49] good enough anyway. [1:15:50] I have no further questions. [1:15:51] Thank you. [1:15:55] No, I'm going to... [1:15:58] Send them to Montalya. [1:15:59] I just have two questions, Mr. Chairman. [1:16:03] Thank you. [1:16:07] Mr. Ambassador, did you know James [1:16:12] McCord personally? [1:16:14] Yes, Send them to Montalya. [1:16:15] How long had you known him? [1:16:18] Well, it's hard to tell you when I [1:16:21] might have first met him, but I saw [1:16:23] him from time to time during, let's [1:16:25] say, the time that I was director of [1:16:27] the agency during those six and a half [1:16:29] years. [1:16:29] I recall his having been in my office [1:16:32] on two or three occasions on various [1:16:34] matters. [1:16:34] What kind of a man was he? [1:16:37] He had a good reputation. [1:16:39] And what was his reputation for [1:16:41] veracity? [1:16:45] I have never had any cause to question [1:16:48] Mr. McCord's reputation for veracity. [1:16:52] Did you say that his reputation as a [1:16:54] human being, as a man, as an employee [1:16:56] was very good? [1:16:57] Yes, it was. [1:16:58] He left a good record behind him. [1:17:01] And what can you say about Mr. [1:17:03] Hunt? [1:17:04] Did you know him? [1:17:05] Yes, I did know him. [1:17:06] What was his reputation? [1:17:07] Well, Mr. Hunt was, had a, well, he had a good reputation. [1:17:19] There were some questions at various times during his [1:17:22] employment about how well he had carried out certain [1:17:24] assignments, but there was nothing malign about this. [1:17:27] It was just a question of his effectiveness. [1:17:31] Mr. Hunt was a bit of a romantic. [1:17:32] He used to write books in his spare time. [1:17:35] And I think there was a tendency sometimes for him to get a little bit carried away with some [1:17:42] of the things he was involved in. [1:17:44] But he'd never done anything illegal or nefarious that anybody was aware of. [1:17:48] And when he left the agency, he left a decent record behind him. [1:17:52] What would you say about his reputation for veracity? [1:17:57] Well, I've said, sir, that he was romantic. [1:18:04] I think that I just don't have any way of being able to answer that. [1:18:11] I would have assumed that in matters of importance, he would tell the truth. [1:18:16] Now, since you spent so much time as director of CIA, of the agency, [1:18:24] what recommendations can you make to this committee concerning new legislation [1:18:28] to help prevent the misuse of the central intelligence agency for political or other purposes [1:18:35] other than the assigned purposes delineated in the act? [1:18:39] Well, Senator Montoya, I don't know how one legislates these matters. [1:18:44] I've never understood how morality and proper conduct and decency can be legislated about. [1:18:53] In Washington over the years, there have been many occasions when various people [1:19:00] have tried to manipulate some organization or another in an improper way. [1:19:06] This is not new to us. [1:19:07] We read about it in the papers constantly. [1:19:09] But how you legislate about this, I swear to you, sir, I don't know. [1:19:13] Well, would you say that in view of your experience with respect to this episode, [1:19:19] there was an attempt by some people to manipulate the agency and its facilities? [1:19:25] Well, there was no question that there seemed to be an effort to use it, in quotes, quote, use it, unquote. [1:19:31] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:19:33] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:19:35] That's a question. [1:19:36] Oh, I'm a sense of why. [1:19:38] Excuse me. [1:19:39] Ambassador, during the period of time from January the 20th, 1969 until the spring of 72. [1:19:57] January the 20th, 1969? [1:19:59] Yes. [1:20:00] I just went trying to fix this. [1:20:01] Right. [1:20:02] Well, basically from 69, from the beginning of 69. [1:20:04] You mean from inauguration day on? [1:20:06] Right. [1:20:06] I see. [1:20:07] To the spring of 1972, were there occasions when you were contacted by either the Attorney [1:20:13] General John Mitchell or the Deputy Attorney General Robert Mardian? [1:20:18] Well, I used to see Mr. Mitchell quite frequently because Mr. Mitchell had duties given him by the [1:20:26] President that had nothing whatever to do with the conduct of the affairs of the Department [1:20:31] of Justice, and so I saw him with some regularity in meetings, in his office, on a variety of [1:20:40] matters having to do with the affairs of the agency and with our various operations. [1:20:47] Were there any times when in these contacts with either Mr. Mitchell, I don't recall your [1:20:55] having said whether or not you'd ever met Mr. Mardian or not? [1:20:58] I did meet him. [1:20:58] I met him one day in Mr. Mitchell's office, as a matter of fact. [1:21:01] Were there any contacts that you had with either Messrs. Mardian or Mitchell where you [1:21:11] were asked to bring the CIA into investigations of a domestic nature? [1:21:15] I don't recall any such meetings. [1:21:22] I know that the time that I mentioned that I met Mr. Mardian in Mr. Mitchell's office, it's [1:21:29] my recollection that the reason he was there was that he'd been put in charge of an internal [1:21:33] security operation or division of the Justice Department and that he was going to get together [1:21:39] a group of individuals from the various intelligence organizations to sit with him in an effort [1:21:45] to make up some reports and analyses and so forth about domestic unrest and things of that kind. [1:21:54] But it was always made very clear by me and I never was challenged by Mr. Mitchell that anything [1:22:00] that we contributed to these meetings had to be as a result of our work overseas of material we [1:22:07] developed there which might have some bearing on things in the United States. As for example [1:22:14] the FEDD and the terrorists, we've been working on them. We've been working on certain people [1:22:20] involved in drug smuggling and a variety of things. [1:22:28] But at no time, in other words, or there wasn't any sort of a pattern of requests of trying to [1:22:39] bring the CIA into matters that you would consider properly outside the scope of the CIA. I'm not [1:22:45] questioning your reaction at all. [1:22:47] I don't recall them Senator Weicker. Do you recall discussing with the committee staff that you [1:23:06] were being pushed to enter the domestic investigation area? This committee staff? Yes. Well at various [1:23:15] times questions have come up and well I remember one time there was a discussion in with some of these [1:23:25] the president's foreign intelligence advisory board about domestic operations and so forth and they [1:23:31] didn't think they were going satisfactorily and could the agency make a contribution to this and [1:23:35] I pointed out to them very quickly it could not. There was no way. But this was a matter that kept [1:23:41] coming up in the context of feelers. How can we do a better job? Isn't there somebody else that can [1:23:46] take on some of these things if the FBI isn't doing them as well as they should? Are there no other [1:23:51] facilities? But it was in that context it was not a direct pressure on me go do it. Did you ever [1:24:00] consider resigning your position as director of the CIA because of these types of feelers or indications? [1:24:09] No Senator Weicker I don't mean to be immodest but I felt that I understood about these matters and [1:24:17] these delimitations and I thought I could take care of the agency better if I stayed where I was. I've [1:24:24] gathered from your statement that you have a great pride in the agency. I do sir. And the only point [1:24:32] that I'm trying to bring out and let me just relate to your to your last answer did you have any concern [1:24:38] that that if you left the agency as its director that it might get into these other types of areas? [1:24:48] Well I don't know that my thinking ever went quite that far but because I had no reason to suppose that [1:24:55] my successor would be a man of inadequate caliber. But you felt that? But I had been around a long time and I [1:25:04] thought I understood pretty well what we were supposed to do and what we're not supposed to do and if [1:25:08] there are any sins that the agency has committed they're on my shoulders I'm not pointing them off [1:25:12] on anybody else. I knew the ground rules I know the laws and all the rest of it and I did the best I [1:25:19] could to keep the agency free and clear and sailing straight. And I gather you felt you felt that you [1:25:27] yourself felt that uh that it would it would do just that as long as you were at excuse the expression [1:25:34] at the helm. Yes Senator Wike. Uh in your uh in your meeting with uh Mr. Holloman and Mr. Ehrlichman and uh [1:25:49] General Walters and was General Cushman there at that meeting also the 23rd the meeting of the 23rd? Yes sir as I recall it we were asked to come together by some of the [1:25:57] call it we were asked to come together by Senator Symington and uh General Cushman was sitting on my [1:26:04] left and General Walters was sitting on my right and we were sitting right together at the table. Why [1:26:11] wouldn't such a request as Mr. Holloman was making be made to you? You were the director of the CIA [1:26:21] and the request that was being made was having to do with the acting director of the FBI so why not [1:26:29] talk to you did you were you being talked around here uh I I'd like to get your impression. Yes I was being [1:26:35] talked around and uh this uh I don't know exactly in what form this came up but uh I was assured that [1:26:44] it had been decided that General Walters was to do the talking and obviously I wondered at the time as [1:26:49] to why. Did you express any did you make any comment at the time uh saying that he shouldn't do it that I [1:26:59] should do it? No that um uh you know attorney Mr. Hallman if you've got anything to say to my agency [1:27:06] would you please say it to me rather than uh those that are my subordinates? Well I did not remonstrate [1:27:11] no we were sitting right there together the four of us and uh it was being made so clear that this [1:27:17] was the way it was going to be done and had to be done or they wanted it done that way. I have no further [1:27:30] questions at this time Mr. Chairman. Senator in no way. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, [1:27:40] Mr. Vice Chairman, before proceeding I'd like to thank both of you for your very generous remarks [1:27:45] this morning. If I may I'd like to take the liberty of thanking you in Hawaiian we would say mahalo and [1:27:52] aloha which means thank you very much and I love you both. Now Mr. Ambassador, you've indicated that [1:28:03] as director of the CIA you have the statutory responsibility for quote the protection of [1:28:10] intelligence sources and methods. From on from unauthorized disclosure Senator Inouye is the rest of [1:28:16] the sentence. Yes sir. Now during the period from June of 71 until your new assignment in Iran [1:28:24] did you have occasion to report on matters falling under that category to the president of the United [1:28:31] States? No sir I did not report on any matters of that kind directly to the president of the United [1:28:36] States. We had a subcommittee of the United States Intelligence Board charged with security. This [1:28:48] involved the system of clearances and how the community would work together in classifying documents [1:28:56] and matters of this kind. When there were leaks which seemed to be unauthorized particularly of [1:29:02] material that was in intelligence channels the matter was referred to this use of security subcommittee [1:29:09] to see if any information could be ascertained as to what agency of government had leaked the [1:29:14] information or what individual in what agency of government had given this information out. [1:29:20] These investigations usually aborted efforts were made through the security officers of the other [1:29:26] agencies to find out who might have done these things but I don't remember any of them coming to [1:29:30] any successful conclusion. We had no investigative staff for this. We had no rights to investigate in [1:29:37] the State Department for example or in the Department of Defense. We simply counted on their people to [1:29:42] contribute to this effort but we had very poor results and one of the reasons that I've [1:29:50] felt burdened by this charge and the statute over the years is that it gave me a responsibility which I [1:29:56] had no devices for carrying out. Were these discussions ever held in the Oval Office or the Cabinet [1:30:03] Room or the President's Executive Office Building? Well not the discussions on the matters having to do with the [1:30:11] use of subcommittee. I'm sure that at various times in those in the four years since January 20 1969 there [1:30:22] were discussions about leaks. I remember one early in the administration which took place in the Oval Office. [1:30:28] There were several Cabinet members there and I remember I was there myself. Were you aware that these [1:30:34] conversations may have been taped? I was not. Mr. Butterfield has testified that [1:30:43] these conversations were being taped. Do you think as Director of the CIA [1:30:48] it is your statutory responsibility to get hold of these tapes? That it would be my statutory [1:30:55] responsibility for whoever the Director is today in order not to compromise the CIA? Frankly sir it wouldn't have occurred to me and I [1:31:05] I didn't know that there were any tapes in existence while I was Director and since then I really hadn't thought about it. [1:31:11] If you knew that these were being taped do you think it would be the statutory responsibility under [1:31:20] the National Security Act for the Director of the CIA to call upon the White House to receive those tapes? [1:31:28] Well sir I don't. Otherwise it might compromise the [1:31:32] sources and methods of the CIA. I wouldn't have thought so Senator Annui because it's we were supposed [1:31:41] to protect them against unauthorized disclosure and discussions with the President and his duly [1:31:48] cleared cabinet ministers would not constitute unauthorized disclosure. A few days ago we had testimony [1:31:54] indicating that three of these tapes were placed into the hands of a private citizen kept away from the [1:32:02] official custodian for 48 hours. Would you consider that proper? I would not consider that proper. [1:32:12] I thank you very much sir. Senator Gurney. Mr. Ambassador what were Hunt's areas of of work at the CIA? [1:32:28] Senator Gurney he was with the agency for many years and had a variety of assignments. You might pull [1:32:38] that mic off. I'm sorry I didn't move it over for you. I beg your pardon. I had a variety of assignments and I [1:32:44] honestly think it would be putting my memory to too much of a test to remember what they all were. I [1:32:48] remember there was one that he had some assignment in connection with the operations leading up to the [1:32:54] so-called Bay of Pigs. But this is readily available in the agency. You could get his personnel record and [1:33:00] then it would be accurate. Oh I'm not interested in the detailed account. I wanted if his areas were in [1:33:06] the sort of work that he was doing on June 17th. It would be hard for me to recall. I don't. But I just don't remember. [1:33:21] How often does the CIA help out former employees in the loan of equipment as in the case of Mr. Hunt? [1:33:34] Well I can only say Senator Gurney that this was an extraordinary exception and it was done because we had been asked to do it by the White House. [1:33:44] Has it ever been done before to your knowledge? Not to my knowledge. Has it? Do you think it has [1:33:54] been done before without your knowledge? This is always possible, Senator Gurney. It's a large [1:34:00] organization. I would hope not, but I can't say that it had never been done. No, of course not. But at least no other [1:34:07] CIA person has said to you that yes, we did this on some other occasion with so-and-so. I don't recall that having been said to me. [1:34:14] Well, since this was such an unusual request, why did the CIA go ahead and cooperate with Hunt? [1:34:24] Well, General Cushman had already authorized this, as I understood at the time, on the basis of Mr. Ehrlichman [1:34:31] having asked that the agency help. At that time, as I recall it, Mr. General Cushman was simply told [1:34:41] that this was for him to conduct an interview. We had no way of knowing whether it was an interview [1:34:45] in the United States or an interview overseas. It had already been done by the time I learned about it. [1:34:55] What was your reaction when Cushman told you? Well, I was not pleased about it because I didn't [1:35:02] quite understand why it was that he couldn't have acquired these things someplace else. [1:35:06] Well, I must say that same thought occurs to me. If these were routine items of apparatus, [1:35:16] the White House certainly would have resources enough to get those themselves. [1:35:20] I would have thought so, Senator Gurney. I have learned, I learned when I came back here in May, [1:35:29] that there were some other things given to him, such as a voice changer or something. And I believe a wig [1:35:34] has become almost legendary in this whole matter. But I don't recall anything about the wig at the [1:35:39] time. But I don't question that it was done. Did General Cushman ever ask him, now, [1:35:45] Mr. Hunt, what do you want these things for? What are you going to use them for? [1:35:49] What General Cushman told me, as I recall it, was that he wanted this for a one-time interview. [1:35:54] But General Cushman can certainly attest to these things for himself. But he didn't tell [1:35:58] anything to you. And at that time, I think it's only fair to remember that nobody had ever [1:36:04] suggested that anybody was going to do anything illegal or improper. [1:36:08] I understand. But it's such an unusual request, I'm really surprised that no one [1:36:14] had a little more curiosity about what was going to be done. [1:36:17] Well, it was a very high-level White House official who was asking for this help. And we [1:36:22] tried to help, and it didn't seem it was going to do anybody any great harm. [1:36:30] I guess probably your answer would be the same to Mr. Young's request about the profile. [1:36:38] Yes, I have genuine regrets about being pressured into that. On Monday morning, [1:36:43] there are a lot of football games who, if played again, might have been done, played differently. [1:36:47] And I'm, you know, I'm not proud of that one. [1:36:56] There were, of course, these conversations with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, which you have described, [1:37:03] and Mr. Walters, I guess, had others that he reported to you about. And then the conversations with Mr. Gray. [1:37:11] And then, of course, the conversations with Mr. Dean, when he was pressing for things like bail money [1:37:20] and salaries while people might be in prison. Did it ever occur to anybody to go to the President [1:37:27] of the United States about this time and advise him of these very unusual things that were going on in [1:37:33] the White House? [1:37:35] Well, sir, my preoccupation at that time and all through these months was to keep the agency at [1:37:42] a distance from this whole problem. And when I realized that these feelers were being made, [1:37:49] there was never a proposal made. It was never said, will you do this? It was a suppository. [1:37:55] Could, you know, would it be possible? Is this something that could happen? And so forth. [1:38:00] And since we had stood firm, it seemed to me that that was adequate under the circumstances. [1:38:06] Well, I certainly commend you for that. And you did do the right thing in keeping the agency out of it. [1:38:20] In the phone call with Mr. Gray, which you had, did you think in this phone conversation that he was [1:38:33] trying to involve the CIA in any way? [1:38:36] I didn't have that sensation, Senator Gertie. The sensation I had was I couldn't quite understand [1:38:43] why it was that he kept thinking that the CIA was somehow involved. Now, what generated this on his [1:38:50] part? I don't know to this day, quite honestly. But it seems strange that he should get, well, [1:38:55] we seem to be running into some CIA involvement. And I couldn't understand what he was talking about [1:39:00] or how he knew this, because I couldn't see any involvement. I couldn't find any involvement. [1:39:05] And what motivated this? I don't know. And I honestly don't know even now. [1:39:14] One final question. Mr. Thompson went over this with you. But I'm asking another question. And that, [1:39:24] of course, is this business of whether Haldeman and Ehrlichman were making their requests, [1:39:29] or Mr. Dean, for that matter, at the request of the President of the United States. And I don't want to [1:39:37] go over that testimony again. I've heard it. But let me ask you this. In all of these transactions [1:39:44] between you and these people and Walters and these people that were lately reported to you, [1:39:50] did you get any idea at all that President Nixon was involved in any cover-up here and wanting to use [1:39:57] the CIA in the cover-up? President Nixon was not put forward by any of these people [1:40:03] in their discussions. They were conducting them on their own, as far as I was aware. Now, [1:40:08] implicit in this was the fact that I was talking to the President's Chief of Staff. [1:40:13] What conversations he'd had with the President, he never said. But he was such a senior official [1:40:21] that I had to assume that this was something that they wanted done. [1:40:26] Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. That's all. [1:40:32] Senator Talmadge. [1:40:35] Mr. Ambassador, you've had a long and distinguished career, both as a member of the CIA for many years, [1:40:45] and ultimately its director for more than six years, and now as a distinguished ambassador representing [1:40:52] the government of the United States. Will you tell us why you left as director of the Central [1:40:58] Intelligence Agency? I had a conversation with the President after the election. I believe it was [1:41:07] on November the 20th at Camp David, and we talked about my future, and he indicated that he wanted to [1:41:23] make a change. And this was in the context of making a lot of changes in the administration. [1:41:29] I was at that time pushing 60 and about to come to what we had in the agency as the regular retirement [1:41:38] age. This is not a statutory thing, but I had a policy in the agency that when officials got to be 60, [1:41:44] that they retired. And this therefore seemed a good time to do this. That is why I left. [1:41:57] You did not leave on your own initiative then? [1:41:59] I did not submit my resignation in the form of, obviously, the President always has your resignation. [1:42:06] You do serve at the pleasure of the President for the time being. That's what the Commission says. [1:42:12] So that this was a mutually arrived at arrangement. [1:42:17] You didn't have any impression that you were being pushed out? [1:42:20] Well, it wasn't put to me that way anyway. [1:42:23] In other words, when the President makes a suggestion, you don't have to determine whether you've [1:42:29] been pushed, shoved the lead, do you? Would that be an affirmative answer? [1:42:37] Thank you, sir. [1:42:40] Did the White House contact you for reference when they employed Mr. Hunt? [1:42:45] No, sir. [1:42:46] Didn't you think that was strange to employ an ex-representative of the CIA without checking on [1:42:53] his credentials with the director of that agency? [1:42:55] I did, Senator Talmadge. In fact, I went to some trouble at the time to see if anybody else in the [1:43:01] agency had been checked with other than me. In other words, had they gone to the personnel office [1:43:05] or had they gone to the security office? And I established that there had been no contact [1:43:09] made with the agency anywhere about Mr. Hunt. [1:43:12] No contact, whatever. [1:43:13] No. [1:43:14] Now, what was your reaction when Mr. Young came to you in the summer of 1971 and informed you that the [1:43:25] President's assistant, Mr. Ehrlichman, had assigned him to lead a White House investigation of security leaks. [1:43:34] Were you surprised that that was being handled outside the FBI? [1:43:39] I suppose that I was, Senator Talmadge, but there had been so much talk about leaks and so much concern [1:43:53] about them in this particular era that I suppose that what would have been normal surprise was somewhat [1:43:59] dulled by this fact that maybe they weren't getting very far in establishing how these leaks had occurred [1:44:05] and this was a somewhat of an extra effort to get into this. But I must say, I want to say to you now [1:44:12] that I never dreamed that this was going to lead to a kind of an activist role. I thought this was [1:44:18] pulling the material together and doing those things which for years had been done in the government. [1:44:25] This is not the first president who's been concerned about leaks. That's been a kind of an endemic [1:44:30] and chronic concern in the White House ever since I can remember. [1:44:35] Didn't J. Edgar Hoover have a reputation for running a pretty tight ship? [1:44:39] He did. [1:44:40] And an efficient organization? [1:44:42] Yes, sir. [1:44:42] And anything related to domestic activity the FBI normally handled? [1:44:47] They did and he insisted on it. [1:44:49] And you insisted on handling the foreign activity? [1:44:53] Yes, sir. [1:44:53] And you had a perfectly valid agreement between the two of you as to who would encroach on what [1:45:00] activities or not encroach on them, did you not? [1:45:03] We did, Senator Tal. [1:45:04] And it worked very well? [1:45:05] Yes, sir. [1:45:06] And you think in the national interest? [1:45:08] Yes, sir. [1:45:09] Now, when they requested a view that you do this psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg, [1:45:19] how could such a profile be made if psychiatric records were not obtained? [1:45:26] Well, sir, there's a question of terminology, Senator Talmadge, about this. [1:45:35] The psychological profiles which the agency had been doing on foreign individuals were not based [1:45:44] on psychiatric records. They were based on general intelligence information and from this information [1:45:49] and from interviews and things of that kind. All this material was put together and an effort was made [1:45:55] to draw a profile of this man as to what kind of a human being he was. But there was never [1:46:01] implicit in this ever that you had to have psychiatric material in order to do it. [1:46:07] In other words, you didn't have to put him on the couch? [1:46:09] No, sir. And none of them ever were put on the couch. [1:46:13] Now, I believe you testified that the only involvement the CIA had in this entire operation [1:46:21] was to provide a tape recorder and a camera to Mr. Young. [1:46:27] No, sir, that was to Mr. Hunt. [1:46:29] Mr. Hunt. [1:46:30] Yes. [1:46:31] And that was done at a request from Mr. Ehrlichman? [1:46:34] As my recollection of how that happened was, and General Cushman, I believe, will be here shortly [1:46:40] and will, you know, can clarify this specifically, it was my impression that Mr. Hunt came to see [1:46:47] General Cushman and asked him for these things, having been sponsored by Mr. Ehrlichman. [1:46:54] Is it your understanding over the years that when an assistant to the President of the United States [1:47:01] or the Chief of Staff of the President of the United States or the counsel for the President [1:47:09] or security advisor for the President request information or materials or equipment from the CIA [1:47:18] that this request is from the President? [1:47:20] Well, this is implicit in it, sir, and presidents have tended in recent years to operate through these [1:47:26] principal assistants because they can't be on the telephone all the time themselves, [1:47:31] and one gets used to this course of dealing. [1:47:34] And if you'd have thought otherwise, it wouldn't have been complied with. [1:47:38] That's right. [1:47:39] Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. [1:47:41] I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. [1:47:43] Thank you, Senator Townish. [1:47:44] No problem. [1:47:45] In a moment, Senator Baker will question Ambassador Helms about James McCord's duties at CIA. [1:47:50] Public television coverage of the Senate Watergate hearings will continue after this pause for station identification. [1:47:57] Unabridged coverage of these hearings is provided as a public service [1:48:00] by the member stations of PBS, the public broadcasting service. [1:48:12] N-PACT continues its coverage of hearings by the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. [1:48:18] Here again, correspondent Jim Lehrer. [1:48:21] As we go back to the questioning, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, [1:48:25] Richard Helms, is still on the stand. [1:48:27] Senator Baker. [1:48:32] Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. [1:48:34] Mr. Helms, when did you first come to know Mr. McCord? [1:48:41] Mr. McCord? [1:48:43] Yes, sir. [1:48:45] Senator Baker, I don't recall exactly when I first met Mr. McCord. [1:48:49] I believe you indicated that you knew him some 20 years. [1:48:52] If I indicated that, and I didn't think that I did, I simply was making a statement to the effect [1:49:04] that we had worked in this agency, the same agency, over this period of 20 years. [1:49:09] But exactly when he came into my sights, when I first shook hands with him, I honestly don't remember. [1:49:14] Very well. I misunderstood you, but I guess your testimony then was that you knew of his [1:49:20] employment by the CIA for about 20 years. [1:49:23] Yes, sir. And I had seen him on various occasions during the period that I was director. [1:49:30] There was a project which came to my attention from time to time in which he was involved, [1:49:35] and I think he may have been in my office three or four times during that period. [1:49:39] Did you know the nature of his assignment responsibilities within the agency? [1:49:43] Yes, I did. [1:49:44] Could you tell us what they were? [1:49:45] They were in the security office, and they had largely to do with the physical security [1:49:52] of our properties and plants and things of that kind. There was one time when he had an assignment [1:49:59] dealing with a defector, and I believe that he was the man who was taking care of this defector [1:50:05] and doing some interrogation of him. [1:50:08] Was Mr. McCord generally regarded as a good employee and effective employee of the agency? [1:50:13] He was. [1:50:14] Were part of his responsibilities to search for and monitor the possibility of the installation [1:50:20] of wiretap equipment in U.S. installations by others? [1:50:25] I can't recall whether he was in the counter-surveillance part of the security office or not. [1:50:31] I'm sorry, but this could be easily ascertained. [1:50:34] Do you know whether or not a part of his functions were to monitor the current state of the art of [1:50:41] electronic surveillance equipment and to make recommendations on its usefulness to the agency? [1:50:47] I don't remember if it's a document to that effect. I have no reason to question it. [1:50:52] Do you know in general whether or not Mr. McCord was proficient and knowledgeable of the general field of electronic surveillance? [1:51:00] I think he must have known about it. I can only make a comment here, and I'm not desirous of [1:51:07] making anybody laugh, but it's quite clear that those fellows who entered the Democratic National [1:51:12] Committee didn't know anything about the active way of going into buildings and getting out without getting caught. [1:51:18] You sort of adopt the Ulasiewicz theorem that I wouldn't have gone in there with no army. Is that what you're saying? [1:51:24] I'm not familiar with that statement. [1:51:27] All right. Is it fair to say, and I don't mean to put words in your mouth, that you're implying, [1:51:34] at least, or maybe saying that the McCord operation was not in keeping with modern and efficient standards [1:51:42] of electronic surveillance as you know them? [1:51:43] Amateurish in the extreme. [1:51:45] Well, how do you square that with the idea that McCord had been with the agency for 20 years [1:51:54] and that he was regarded as an effective employee? [1:51:57] Well, Senator Baker, I don't know whether these are proper matters for me to discuss in this forum, [1:52:04] but I'd like to point something out to you, that breaking and entering and not getting caught [1:52:14] is a very difficult activity. And for it to be done properly, one has to have trained individuals [1:52:22] who do nothing else and who are used to doing this frequently and are trained right up to the [1:52:28] minute in how to do it. [1:52:29] Was McCord in that category? [1:52:31] Obviously not. [1:52:33] Well, obviously the result would not bear that out, but you see what I'm searching for, [1:52:41] whether or not he was in fact proficient, notwithstanding that his performance was not proficient. [1:52:46] That was not his function in the agency as I ever recall it. It was to do this kind of thing. [1:52:51] When did Mr. McCord leave the employee of the CIA? [1:52:55] In 1970. I've forgotten in what month he retired perfectly legitimately. [1:52:59] It was a normal, ordinary retirement from the CIA? [1:53:02] Yes, sir. [1:53:03] At his request? [1:53:05] As far as I know. [1:53:06] What about Mr. Hunt? I believe your testimony is that he worked for the agency for 15 years, [1:53:13] approximately. Did you know him? [1:53:14] Or more. I just don't remember exactly how many years. [1:53:16] Well, anyway, for a significant length of time. [1:53:19] I did know him, yes, sir. [1:53:21] How well did you know him? [1:53:22] I knew him relatively well because he and I, over many years, worked in the same general [1:53:27] section of the agency. [1:53:29] What was his responsibility at the agency? [1:53:31] Well, as I replied to Senator Gurney, he had a variety of assignments, [1:53:37] and I would plead with you to simply ask the agency to give you the employment record because I don't [1:53:42] recall it. I do recall that he had an assignment in connection with the operations leading up to [1:53:47] the Bay of Pigs. I do recall that. [1:53:50] Can you describe for us what sort of activity he had in the Bay of Pigs operation? [1:53:54] I think he had to do with certain aspects of the propaganda in connection with it, [1:53:59] the propaganda against the Cuban government, the Castro government. [1:54:02] This was a CIA operation? [1:54:04] Yes. [1:54:05] And this would have been in the early 60s, I believe. [1:54:07] Yes, sir. [1:54:08] Was Mr. Hunt familiar with electronic surveillance and surreptitious entry? [1:54:15] I honestly don't know. [1:54:16] Mr. Hunt, I believe, was on the payroll in some capacity with the CIA. [1:54:23] Was he an employee or a contractor? [1:54:25] He was an employee. [1:54:27] I believe you indicated the delay. [1:54:29] A staff employee is what we called him. [1:54:32] And that continued through shortly after June 17, 1972. [1:54:37] No, he retired and went to work in Washington for somebody else. And he retired sometime in 1970. [1:54:45] Now, Mr. Hunt was not 62 or 65. Did he retire on disability? [1:54:53] No, sir. He retired because he was anxious to make more money than he can make in the government. [1:54:59] He had had some financial problems due to the fact that a daughter had been in a bad accident [1:55:03] and had developed some illnesses, I believe, physical as well as psychiatric. [1:55:10] But he'd run up a lot of doctor's bills. [1:55:12] He had a suit in connection with this accident. [1:55:14] And I believe he was looking for an opportunity to make more money than he could with the government. [1:55:18] Was Mr. Liddy ever employed with the CIA? [1:55:23] No, sir. [1:55:24] Or have any connection with it? [1:55:26] Well, that having any connection with, I found, is very dangerous. [1:55:30] I have to watch myself about this. [1:55:31] I was never aware of any connection that he had with the agents. [1:55:34] Did anyone ever inquire of you whether Liddy had any relationship to the CIA? [1:55:40] Well, I've been asked this at various times and I've given the same answer that I have to you. [1:55:45] Yes. [1:55:46] I'm not really trying to establish so much that he did or did not have a relationship [1:55:50] as I am trying to establish whether or not an inquiry is made, particularly by the White House staff [1:56:00] or someone connected with the investigation of the Watergate subsequent to June 17th. [1:56:05] I was never aware of any inquiry. [1:56:07] All right. What about Mrs. Hunt? [1:56:17] Somewhere in the dimness of my recollection, could we consult the actual employment records? [1:56:25] It seems to me that Mrs. Hunt was at one time employed by the agency before she married him [1:56:31] or something. I'm not sure about that. [1:56:32] And published speculation to the effect that Mrs. Hunt was very closely involved with the CIA [1:56:41] and possibly the superior of her husband, Mr. Hunt. Could you give me any insight into that? [1:56:45] Well, that's not true. Okay. Wasn't she employed in some embassy here in Washington in recent years? [1:56:53] I don't really think that may be mutually exclusive, Mr. Helms. [1:56:57] Well, it is. I want to make that clear. It is perfectly clear. [1:57:03] Perfectly clear. [1:57:03] But you have some dim recollection that Mrs. Hunt may at one time have been employed for the CIA, [1:57:12] but you commend to us the check of the CIA record. [1:57:14] I would appreciate if you would do that. [1:57:16] Mr. Chairman, I ask that that be done by state. [1:57:18] What about Mr. Barker? I believe you testified that he had some relationship to the CIA? [1:57:24] But that was a contractual relationship and I believe was in the early 60s during the time when [1:57:29] there was a great deal of activity in Florida over Cuban operations. I believe he was terminated in [1:57:36] the middle 60s and I don't believe there was any relationship with him after that time. [1:57:42] Did you know Mr. Barker? No. [1:57:44] Mr. Sturgis? No, I don't know him either. [1:57:47] Was he employed at one time with the CIA? [1:57:50] Mr. In your files, Senator Baker, there's the testimony which is classified that I gave [1:57:59] on February the 7th before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which I discussed all [1:58:03] these gentlemen and I was much better up to speed about their relationships at that time than I am [1:58:09] now and if you would mind consulting that record, I would accept it. [1:58:13] Mr. Chairman, in that respect, I would propose something that the testimony of this witness and [1:58:22] others before the Committee on Foreign Relations, taken on May 17, 1973, March 6, 1973, and the Committee [1:58:33] on Appropriations on May 16, 1973, and there's one other one. Which one is this? [1:58:45] On February 7, 1973, be incorporated in the files and records of the Committee with leave of the [1:58:53] Committee to decide what portions of that transcript may be excerpted for inclusion in the record as [1:58:59] appropriate. If there's no objection, that will be done. [1:59:03] Mr. Martinez worked for the CIA and I believe he's the one who was taken off the payroll shortly after [1:59:10] June 17, 1972. Did you know Mr. Martinez? No, sir. [1:59:14] Is he the only one who was taken off the payroll after June 17? [1:59:18] There were none others on it. [1:59:19] Well, I guess the answer is yes. Thank you. And Mr. Martinez was receiving $100 a month. [1:59:28] That's my recollection, but that's in the February 7 testimony. [1:59:30] Well, I won't pardon the record further with inquiry in that respect. [1:59:34] According to my understanding of the summary of the staff interviews with you, Mr. Helms, [1:59:40] these things appear and I'll go through them if you don't mind and stop as you may request or you may [1:59:47] comment on them after I finish. On July 7, 1971, General Cushman received a call from Ehrlichman [1:59:56] advising that Hunt, a former CIA employee, had been added to the security office at the White House. [2:00:04] This information was passed on by Cushman to you on July 8. [2:00:10] Mr. Baker, I interrupt only to say that I had never heard that he'd been added to the security [2:00:16] office at the White House. I just heard that he'd been employed by the White House. I don't know [2:00:20] whether they have a security office. Yes, but in any event, someone thought to notify [2:00:25] the agency that a former employee of the CIA had been added to the White House staff. [2:00:30] Yes. So it was clear that someone at the [2:00:33] White House knew that this man was a former CIA agent. Yes, I can only assume that. [2:00:41] And on July 22, according to our information, and this I understand to be based on a summary [2:00:48] of your interview with the staff, on July 22, Hunt visited General Cushman and requested the agency, [2:00:56] the CIA, to furnish him with identification documents and alias and physical disguises. [2:01:04] Are you aware of that? Yes, I am, because I've seen a document recording that meeting. [2:01:09] And they were supplied? Yes, yes. [2:01:12] Was there any protest to the supplying of this materiel to Mr. Hunt? [2:01:18] Well, as I testified earlier, when I was informed of this somewhat later, some of the items you [2:01:27] mentioned, I don't recall having been told that he'd been given. And it was the tape recorder and [2:01:34] the camera that I recall having been told about. And that's what sticks in my memory. [2:01:38] Have you later learned on good authority, particularly from agency authority, that Hunt requested and [2:01:46] received bogus identification documents, an alias and a physical disguise? [2:01:52] Yes. That was a voice changer, wasn't it? And the wig? [2:01:57] I was coming to that. Then on several occasions, Hunt met with CIA people and received further alias [2:02:04] documentation, specifically the name of Edward Joseph Warren, disguised material, which I believe may have [2:02:11] included a wig, a speech alteration device, which some of us would devoutly wish for, [2:02:19] a recorder in a typewriter case, and a camera in a tobacco pouch. [2:02:23] I have learned that that was what he was given. [2:02:25] And all of those things were requested of Hunt of the CIA and CIA supplied them. And this post date [2:02:33] of the time when you were notified this former CIA agent was going to work for the White House? [2:02:38] Yes. [2:02:39] Was Mr. Liddy present? Did you know or have you since learned on more than one of these meetings [2:02:49] and received similar disguises and alias documentation, especially in the name of George F. Leonard [2:02:55] at Mr. Hunt's request? [2:02:56] Senator Baker, I've never met Mr. Liddy. I don't know Mr. Liddy. [2:03:00] Did you receive this information? [2:03:01] I was given this information in May of this year. [2:03:05] By CIA people? [2:03:06] Yes. Is it not true that at the time that this material was given to Mr. Liddy, it was given [2:03:15] to him under an alias? [2:03:17] I believe under the name of George F. Leonard. [2:03:19] Well, that may be. [2:03:20] But I understand the name of George F. Leonard together with the alias documentation was supplied [2:03:26] by CIA. [2:03:26] Yes. [2:03:27] And by August... [2:03:30] I'm sorry, sir. [2:03:30] My only point was that at the time, he was not identified, I believe, to the CIA people as Mr. Liddy, [2:03:37] was he? [2:03:38] I'm not sure, Mr. Hunt. [2:03:39] I didn't think he was. [2:03:40] He may or may not have been, but my notes indicate here that Mr. Liddy, at the request [2:03:45] of Mr. Hunt, was supplied with an alias to George F. Leonard, an alias documentation to verify [2:03:52] that identity by the CIA. [2:03:57] And this post-dated the time when the White House had served notice on CIA and a former [2:04:02] agent, Mr. Hunt, was coming into their employ. [2:04:06] On August 24th, Mr. Hunt delivered to the CIA film, which he had taken for developing. [2:04:12] And it was, in fact, developed by the CIA. [2:04:16] That's what I... [2:04:16] Did you know or have you since learned that? [2:04:18] I've been told that that occurred. [2:04:20] And the CIA delivered prints from those negatives to Mr. Hunt and kept file copies of the prints and [2:04:30] negatives in the CIA records. [2:04:32] I was... [2:04:33] I don't know about these events from firsthand. [2:04:39] Well, have you learned that? [2:04:39] So what I may have been informed may not be accurate. [2:04:42] I had thought that when the film was developed, the film, the developed film was returned, [2:04:47] plus the films themselves, that the only thing the agency retained was some sort of a Xerox of the [2:04:53] of the photographs. [2:04:54] But in any event... [2:04:55] In other words, the negative is not still in the possession of the agency, I believe. [2:04:59] But prints were? [2:05:01] Of Xeroxes. [2:05:02] Well, all right. [2:05:03] Xeroxed prints, some sort of... [2:05:04] I say this, Senator Baker, only in the interest of precision, because photographs that have been [2:05:11] Xeroxed are not as clear as the original prints. [2:05:14] Well, I agree with you. [2:05:16] They certainly are not. [2:05:17] But one of those photographs we learned from another part of the record was a picture, [2:05:23] I believe, of Mr. Liddy standing in front of the decimated files of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, [2:05:31] which was a rather graphic form of identification. [2:05:34] I'm unaware of that. [2:05:37] But you are aware that some form of photographic record, probably a Xerox copy, [2:05:44] of the photographs of the Ellsberg break-in were retained in the CIA file. [2:05:48] Yes. [2:05:49] And the CIA received the film from Hunt and developed it. [2:05:53] That's correct. [2:05:53] But may I say that at that time, nobody knew what these films represented. [2:05:58] I've been told that since, too. [2:05:59] Surely it would arouse some modest amount of curiosity to see that. [2:06:05] And I won't pursue that any further, because that's not the point I'm reaching for. [2:06:09] But on August 26, you were advised of increasing demands made by Mr. Hunt. [2:06:15] He'd already made several, which had been exceeded to, the ones I've just described. [2:06:20] Increasing demands from CIA for technical and other assistance, including that to be supplied [2:06:27] with a personal secretary, then located in Paris. [2:06:31] Did you have personal knowledge of that? [2:06:33] I did. [2:06:35] And it was at that time that I spoke to General Cushman. [2:06:37] That was, in effect, the straw that broke the camel's back. [2:06:41] Yes, sir. [2:06:42] You put it very well. [2:06:44] And you declined to go any further. [2:06:46] And my information, based on the staff interview with you, Mr. Ambassador, indicates that you [2:06:52] were apprised of these facts by Cushman, and that you told Cushman that Hunt had now gone too far, [2:06:59] and that Cushman should tell Ehrlichman that no further assistance would be afforded to Hunt. [2:07:05] Yes, sir. [2:07:07] Cushman did apprise Ehrlichman on August 27, and on August 30, Cushman sent you a memorandum [2:07:14] on which you wrote the words good, or the word good. [2:07:17] Yes, sir. [2:07:19] Would you please read what General Cushman wrote to me on which I wrote the word good? [2:07:24] I think that makes... [2:07:25] Yes, sir. [2:07:26] I don't have that in the summary staff gave me, but I've now been handed what appears [2:07:30] to be a Xerox copy of a memorandum entitled at the top, Official Routing Slip. [2:07:39] Item six says, Howard Hunt, and under remarks with the date 27 August 1971 in the left-hand margin, [2:07:47] quote, I called John Ehrlichman Friday and explained why we could not meet these requests. [2:07:53] Yes, I indicated Hunt was becoming a pain in the neck. [2:07:57] John said he would restrain Hunt with the initial, and below that is the initial C, I take it. [2:08:07] Which was Cushman's initial. [2:08:08] And below that is the word good with the initial... [2:08:11] R-H. [2:08:13] R-H. [2:08:14] That's the document. [2:08:15] A little hard to read, but that's what it is. [2:08:17] Yeah, that too is a Xerox copy. [2:08:19] Mr. Chairman, this does not appear to be in the record. If it is not, might I ask that it be [2:08:25] included now as an exhibit to the witnesses. [2:08:27] As it be marked appropriate as an exhibit and admitted to the record as such. [2:08:31] Mr. Helms, isn't it clear from all of this that the CIA at whatever level, and you to some extent, [2:08:42] were aware of the fact that Mr. Hunt, at least, was deeply involved in White House activity with CIA [2:08:52] support, and that she blew the whistle after a great number of things had already occurred? [2:08:57] Senator Baker, if we go to July and August of 1971, I certainly was totally unaware of any illegal [2:09:10] activity, any improper activity, or anything that would have raised a question about the type of [2:09:18] thing that Mr. Hunt was involved in. I assure you there hadn't been any intimation whatever, [2:09:25] that there was any question of a burglary, there was any question of stealing anything, [2:09:29] there was any question of his having committed any illegal or improper acts. [2:09:34] I don't doubt that, Mr. Helms. I take your testimony the same way I do the testimony of every [2:09:39] other witness. I start with the good faith assumption that you swear the truth. I have no [2:09:46] reason to doubt that unless other and contradictory evidence is made to appear. But I don't suggest [2:09:54] that I'm trying to lead you into a contradiction. I'm rather trying to establish a relationship [2:10:00] on which the White House or the CIA would base its perception of the fear that CIA might have been [2:10:08] involved in these things. Now let's see how that goes. We've got Hunt. We've got McCord. We've got [2:10:15] Barker. We've got Sturgis. We've got Martinez. We've got two sets of forged identity documents. [2:10:22] We've got a voice alterating device. We've got a wig. We've got a camera and a tobacco pouch. We've got [2:10:28] the processing service for that. We've got the certain knowledge that all these things were discussed [2:10:34] between White House staff and CIA staff. And I wonder if that doesn't lead us to the idea that [2:10:39] when these people are caught, that somebody would certainly say, well, what was the CIA involvement [2:10:44] in? Well, Senator Baker, I have the greatest respect for you. And if you would, those were the thought [2:10:51] processes that have gone through your mind. I have no reason to argue with them. I simply, [2:10:56] a moment ago, was not trying to make a self-serving statement. I was simply trying to indicate [2:11:00] that there's been a tendency, it seems to me, in recent times to have everything run in real time, [2:11:08] as though all of these things were known and had happened, and that therefore one should have had [2:11:13] the good sense to know this thing or that thing at a certain period of time. And I simply was trying [2:11:19] to point out that this was not the case. Well, I'm accepting that at face value. And by the same token, [2:11:24] I hope, Mr. Ambassador, you don't think that these questions are accusatory, certainly not of you, [2:11:31] maybe not even of CIA, probably not even of CIA. But I'm trying to establish [2:11:37] a set of facts on which perceptions might or might not be based, particularly whether or not an inquiry [2:11:44] should be made after the arrest and the attendant publicity about whether or not the people involved [2:11:50] were, in fact, CIA involved. I'm not saying they were. I'm trying to establish the validity of an [2:11:55] inquiry in that respect. And I have not made up my mind on that point. I'm going to weigh that very [2:12:00] carefully, as I'm going to weigh all the other evidence, and it's going to be February 28th before [2:12:05] I state a conclusion. But your identification of these components is very helpful to me, and I [2:12:11] am grateful for it. Mr. Chairman, I'll conclude. I'm sure my time is over, but I can't [2:12:15] conclude without saying that I think Mr. Helms, at great personal sacrifice, has agreed to appear [2:12:23] before this committee and other committees that his information has been most helpful, [2:12:29] that his testimony has been forthright, I believe, and forthcoming. It may be that at a future time, [2:12:36] we'll require further information from Mr. Helms, but I hope not. He has a very important post to [2:12:41] return to. But at this point, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. [2:12:46] Thank you, Senator Baker. [2:12:50] Is not the director of the CIA appointed by the president, subject to confirmation of the Senate? [2:12:59] Yes, Mr. Chairman. [2:13:00] Does the same thing apply to the deputy director? [2:13:03] Yes, Mr. Chairman. [2:13:05] Now, inasmuch as these materials were furnished to Mr. Hunt in July and August of 1971, [2:13:15] at request of Mr. John Ehrlichman, is it not reasonable to assume that the White House knew [2:13:24] that Mr. Hunt was engaged in undercover work? And is Mr. Ehrlichman knew that Mr. Hunt was engaged in [2:13:31] undercover work? [2:13:32] Well, Mr. Chairman, I can only assume that if Mr. Ehrlichman asked that Mr. Hunt be helped, [2:13:44] I realized that in this life assumptions are very dangerous. One would have assumed that he'd asked [2:13:51] for this help for some reason, and he must have known what the reason was, or at least I would have [2:13:55] assumed that he would have known what the reason is. But I can't prove it, and I don't know, and I [2:13:59] didn't know myself at the time. [2:14:01] Well, you do know that Mr. Ehrlichman requested it, that Mr. Ehrlichman was a very important aid [2:14:09] in the White House, and he requested this aid from Mr. Hunt. And also, you know, that the CIA put [2:14:18] an end to the—when the CIA put an end to giving help to Mr. Hunt, that Mr. Ehrlichman was notified [2:14:25] that Mr. Hunt had become a pain in the neck. So didn't it strike you as—when you learned [2:14:34] of these things, didn't it strike you as strange that the White House would engage in undercover [2:14:39] work on its own initiative rather than resort to the use of the FBI? [2:14:44] Well, you know, Senator Irvin, at that time, there was no intimation that this was even [2:14:51] undercover work. What I understood Mr. Hunt had told General Cushman was that he wanted to [2:14:58] conduct an interview, and there was no intimation that this was undercover work. [2:15:03] Well, now here is a Whig. Oh, that was—you didn't think that the Whig was to improve [2:15:10] the appearance of the palkitude of Mr. Hunt, did you? [2:15:17] I assume, in retrospect, because I didn't remember about the Whig at the time, Mr. Chairman, [2:15:23] as I've testified, but I have assumed, in retrospect, that Mr. Hunt wanted to conduct this [2:15:29] interview disguising himself as someone else. But we didn't know that at the time. [2:15:36] Well, when a man undertakes to disguise himself as some other one else, he's engaged in under [2:15:41] the cover work, isn't he? [2:15:42] Well, we run into a definitional problem, sir. [2:15:45] Yeah. [2:15:46] Well, you didn't think that he got applied for this voice alteration device in order to sing [2:15:52] a different part in the choir, did you? [2:15:57] Mr. Chairman, my problem here is that at the time that this was going on, I do not recall [2:16:09] having been told that he'd been given a Whig and a voice alteration device. I found that [2:16:13] out in May of this year, so that this business of however one interprets undercover work or [2:16:19] however one defines it, no intimation was given to me at that time that Hunt was involved in [2:16:24] undercover work. [2:16:25] Well, we've had some discussion here, rather, some observation, some discussion that most [2:16:32] of us human beings are sort of like lightning bugs. We carry our illumination behind and see [2:16:37] better in retrospect than we do in prospect. But in retrospect, don't you think it would [2:16:43] be reasonable to infer that Mr. Hunt was engaged in something that might be called detective [2:16:49] work if not undercover work? [2:16:50] Yes, in retrospect, certainly. [2:16:52] A covert activity. [2:16:54] Certainly. [2:16:55] Now, [2:16:57] the same thing, I believe that Mr. Liddy was furnishing some material under an alias, [2:17:09] not under his own name, during the same period of time. [2:17:13] I believe that's true. [2:17:14] Yes. [2:17:16] Now, you stated that when you learned of the break-in at the Watergate, I believe you were [2:17:27] out of the country. [2:17:28] No, sir. I was here at that time. [2:17:29] You were here? [2:17:30] Yes, sir. [2:17:31] I thought you said something about reading it in a foreign, an American... [2:17:34] No, sir. [2:17:35] A foreign language newspaper. [2:17:36] No, sir. [2:17:37] No, Mr. Chairman, the question that I was asked, which I read about, was the break-in [2:17:41] of Dr. Fielding's office? [2:17:42] Oh, yes. [2:17:43] That's right. [2:17:44] I beg your pardon. [2:17:45] I remember now. [2:17:48] And it just shows that even the chairman of this committee is not... [2:17:52] It doesn't have an infallible memory of something that's heard just a few minutes before. [2:17:57] Now, after the break-in, when was the first time after the break-in you had any contact [2:18:05] with anybody from the White House? [2:18:10] Yes, sir. [2:18:11] It was at that June 23rd meeting. [2:18:12] 23rd. [2:18:13] You and General Walters were requested by the White House to come to the White House, were [2:18:20] you not? [2:18:21] Yes, sir. [2:18:22] We were asked to come to Mr. Ehrlichman's office. [2:18:23] And you had a conversation with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman? [2:18:28] Yes, sir. [2:18:29] Is that correct? [2:18:30] And they expressed concern about the possibility that if the FBI continued certain investigations [2:18:39] in Mexico, that it might interfere with some of the activities of the CIA. [2:18:44] Yes, sir. [2:18:45] Yeah. [2:18:47] Did they mention exactly what activities the FBI had in Mexico? [2:18:51] No, sir, they did not. [2:18:53] Was there anything said about Mexican checks? [2:18:58] Mr. Chairman, it is my recollection, and I can only say my honest recollection, that the [2:19:10] first time I heard about any money or a check going to Mexico was later on the day of the [2:19:21] 23rd when General Walters reported to me about his conversation with Acting Director Gray [2:19:28] earlier in the afternoon. [2:19:30] I believe that that happened about an hour and a half after we'd been with Mr. Haldeman [2:19:34] and Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Gray had mentioned to General Walters, as I recall it, that there [2:19:39] was something about a check for something over $80,000 that had showed up in Mexico. [2:19:45] But this was the first I'd heard about money. [2:19:47] That was after your visit to the White House, but on the same day of your visit to the White House. [2:19:53] That's right. [2:19:54] I don't recall Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman mentioning anything about money. [2:19:57] Well, did they say anything? [2:20:00] Did either one of them say anything? [2:20:02] What specific matters gave them the White House concern about the possibility that FBI investigations [2:20:11] might some way collide with the setup of the CIA? [2:20:15] No explanation was given, Mr. Chairman, and as I testified earlier this morning, it was not possible [2:20:23] for me to know everything that we were doing in Mexico or what the FBI might be running into, [2:20:28] and I simply thought it was prudent to do some checking before I got assertive about this. [2:20:33] Now, the director of the CIA or the acting director of the CIA is also a presidential appointee, isn't he? [2:20:45] The director and the deputy director of Central Intelligence are by statute presidential appointees [2:20:52] and subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. [2:20:54] And the same thing has recently happened with respect to the director of the FBI, hasn't it? Or has it? [2:21:02] I believe it has. I think that he now is subject to confirmation. [2:21:06] Well, anyway, after you and General Walters had visited the White House and had a conversation with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, [2:21:21] in which they expressed concern about the possibility of FBI investigations in Mexico colliding with the policy, the work of the, or the agents of the CIA, [2:21:40] General Walters did receive a communication from Mr. Gray, the acting director of the FBI, concerning these Mexican checks. [2:21:51] I believe that acting director Gray spoke to him in their meeting about this. [2:21:55] I don't remember a communication. I mean, a written communication. [2:21:58] Did the director of the, I mean, did Mr. Gray say anything about expressing any concern as to whether the FBI operations might impede on the CIA in some manner? [2:22:12] In pursuing an investigation about these $89,000 in checks, Mexican checks? [2:22:18] Mr. Chairman, I honestly don't remember. [2:22:20] But I believe that General Walters, who had the conversation, who I believe will testify here, might be able to clarify this for you. [2:22:27] Because he was the one, after all, that was with him. [2:22:30] Now, in addition to, then you, General Walters has had several meetings or phone calls with Mr. Gray about this matter. [2:22:44] My recollection is that during this period, I did, I personally did not see acting director Gray, I talked to him on the telephone. [2:22:54] It was only General Walters who visited with him and talked with him. [2:22:57] Did you talk to Mr. Gray about the Mexican checks? [2:23:01] I never talked to him about Mexican checks. I talked to Mr. Gray on the phone about this Mexican lawyer. [2:23:06] Oh, Gary or something like that. [2:23:09] Yes, that's right. [2:23:10] But General Walters did report to you that in his meetings with Mr. Gray that Mr. Gray talked about the Mexican checks. [2:23:19] Yes, sir, he did. But as I recall this now, it was a sum of an excess of $80,000 on the check. [2:23:28] But nobody ever explained to me at that time what this money was for or how it got there or anything about its purpose. [2:23:35] Then after that time, the CIA, acting either through you or General Walters, undertook to make it perfectly clear to Mr. Gray that they could, that the FBI's investigation into the matters relating to these Mexican checks would not interfere with the CIA. [2:24:01] Well, sir, what we made clear to Mr. Gray was that if by any chance they ran into any of our operations, they were to abide by our long-time understanding to notify us. [2:24:13] Yes, sir. [2:24:15] And that ended the matter as far as the CIA and the Mexican checks was concerned, did it? [2:24:19] Yes, sir. [2:24:20] Then a short time after that, Mr. Dean contacted the CIA on two successive days. [2:24:33] Three successive days. [2:24:34] Three successive days. [2:24:35] And the CIA assumed that he was representing the White House, didn't it? [2:24:42] Well, you see, Mr. Chairman, when he, Mr. Dean called General Walters, General Walters was not acquainted with Mr. Dean. [2:24:52] And since I think that somehow in the conversation General Walters intimated that why should he come down and talk to Mr. Dean, [2:25:01] Mr. Dean said, you get a hold of Mr. Ehrlichman and he will attest to the fact that I'm authorized to talk to you. [2:25:06] And General Walters told me he had reached Mr. Ehrlichman and that Mr. Ehrlichman had so stated. [2:25:11] Yes. [2:25:12] And then in these conversations, just in the interest of time, I lumped them together. [2:25:17] The first approach that Mr. Dean made was that he requested that the CIA pay the defense cost and the support of these five men that had been caught in the Watergate. [2:25:32] Mr. Chairman, may I with great deference correct your statement? [2:25:37] Yes, sir. [2:25:38] These were feelers to find out if there was some way that the CIA might do. [2:25:42] According to General Walters' reports to me, he was never requested to do anything. [2:25:46] Yes. [2:25:47] Well, Mr. Dean made an inquiry of General Walters as to whether or not there was any way in which the CIA could bear these costs. [2:26:02] I think that's probably a good discussion. [2:26:03] And then on a succeeding day, after he was advised by General Walters that the CIA would be beyond the authority of the CIA and that he knew that you wouldn't count on us, then Mr. Dean returned and asked if the CIA could arrange bail for the persons arrested in the Watergate. [2:26:27] I had distinct recollection and why this stuck so firmly in my mind, I'm not entirely sure. [2:26:33] It was on the second day that this question of bail and salaries was raised. [2:26:37] In other words, there were three sessions, Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, and it was at the Tuesday session that these matters came up. [2:26:43] Now, you stated that you did the best you could and you did succeed in stopping any further advances to the CIA in this respect. [2:26:57] And I presume that in so doing, you were acting under the statute and pursuant to the statute, which says that the CIA has no law enforcement powers of a domestic nature and has no function in regard to internal security. [2:27:13] But not only that, Mr. Chairman, but a trust is put in the director of central intelligence about the money that's given to him by Congress. [2:27:24] And there are certain understandings with the appropriate appropriations committees of Congress about what this money should be spent for and how it should be handled. [2:27:31] And I was very clear in my mind about those. [2:27:34] And there was nothing about this request that we could have accommodated within those guidelines. [2:27:38] And that was made very clear to Mr. Dean. [2:27:41] I believe it was. [2:27:42] Now, there's been some examination indicating that perhaps you and General Walters had some discrepancy. [2:27:52] There was some discrepancy of a slight nature in the testimony you gave before, I believe, Senator Symington's committee. [2:28:00] That's right, sir. [2:28:01] And this understanding was all hanging out there in the committee. [2:28:04] I mean, this is just the problem of human recollections. [2:28:08] And I realized that through these hearings, I was told by some gentleman this morning that people seem to have a good forgettery when they get this chair. [2:28:15] Yes. [2:28:16] I don't pretend to be any better or any worse than anyone else, and my memory is fallible from time to time, but I'm doing my very best at all of these hearings to tell you what I remembered at the time. [2:28:31] And as far as the small disagreement between General Walters and I were concerned that when we talked it over and analyzed the conversation and reconstructed it, I had to admit I'd forgotten. [2:28:40] This is, this is not, let's not ask any, any, any criticism at all, because I just illustrated myself for this morning that my memory is quite fallible. [2:28:52] And also, there's some other good men's memories, and I'll strike myself out of the good men, but there's memories of other people that have been fallible. [2:29:02] And the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John tell us that when Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor, ordered the crucifixion of Christ, that he wrote out a title and had it placed on, put on the cross. [2:29:26] And people who have an opportunity to read something, or whether things were used right, and I think it's more apt to be accurate than just what we hear. [2:29:38] And it's rather significant that these, the writers of these four Gospels disagreed. [2:29:44] This is exactly what this title that was put on the cross said. [2:29:51] The 37th verse of the 27th chapter of Matthew says that the writing which was put on the cross read as follows. [2:30:02] This is Jesus, the King of the Jews. [2:30:06] The 26th verse of the 15th chapter of St. Mark has a different version. [2:30:12] It says, the King of the Jews. [2:30:16] The 38th verse of the 23rd chapter of St. Luke has still a different version of what was on this title. [2:30:25] And it says, the title was, this is the King of the Jews. [2:30:31] And then the 19th verse of the 19th chapter of St. John has a fourth version of the same words, the same title rather. [2:30:43] Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews. [2:30:47] And so I say that if those four good men could have different versions of the same words, it's quite understandable why you and I and other human beings have sort of fallible memories about things sometimes. [2:31:06] And another thing I've noticed about the human mind, and that is this, that sometimes when something occurs, at first we have a recollection that certain things were said. [2:31:23] And our memory does not tell us that certain other things were said. [2:31:28] But when we hear the testimony of other people, or sometimes look at a document, that our memories become refreshed. [2:31:35] And the things that were hidden somewhere in an unconscious part of our mind become fresh to our memories again. [2:31:43] And so I just want to say these things because I don't attribute too much importance to the fact that human beings don't recall all conversations and all, even all written words exactly alike. [2:31:56] And I'd just like to say this, Mr. Helms, from the observation of the work you did as a director of the CIA and from the contacts I had with you, I think you did a magnificent job in that capacity. [2:32:14] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:32:20] Does any other Senator have a question? [2:32:24] Senator? [2:32:25] Senator? [2:32:26] Yes, Senator. [2:32:27] I'd rather recognize Senator in our way first, then I'll recognize Senator White. [2:32:30] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [2:32:31] Mr. Ambassador, in response to the Chairman's question, you used a word which intrigues me, feelers. [2:32:39] I presume feelers coming from the White House. [2:32:44] When did you realize that the White House was feeling you out about the possibility of using your agency as a cover-up for the Watergate [2:32:55] burglars? [2:33:03] When I used to Senator Inouye the word feelers, I was describing what I understood was the way Mr. Dean put, conducted a conversation with General Walters, which had to do with whether there was a possibility [2:33:20] that the agency could provide covert funds to provide bail for the men who had broken into the Watergate, and also whether or not when they were convicted and sent to jail, the agency would pay their salaries while they were in jail. [2:33:40] Now, according to General Walters' report to me, this was not a request of him by Mr. Dean. [2:33:47] It was sort of postulating what could be done under the circumstances. [2:33:52] And this is why I thought maybe a descriptive word as any would be feelers. [2:33:56] Now, don't you consider that the suggestions being made of the possibilities constitute a very serious departure from the statutorily prescribed functions of your agency? [2:34:10] It would have been if we had in any way become involved in this. [2:34:15] That being the case, did you feel that you should have advised the two senior members of the House and the Senate, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House and the Senate? [2:34:29] Well, Senator Nui, I didn't. And I don't recall having thought that that was an obligation I had at the time. [2:34:37] I thought that my job was to keep the agency clear of all this. [2:34:41] And as long as I succeeded in keeping it clear of it, that was my job and my business. [2:34:46] And further, that these conversations were held in such a fashion that there was, if I understood General Walters' report to me accurately, that to make the assertion that we'd been asked to do this would have been denied that this was a possibility that was being discussed. [2:35:07] But I don't want to lean heavily on that, please. I want to lean heavily on the fact that I was trying to keep the agency clean and that I didn't, as long as I kept it clean, I felt I was doing my job. [2:35:19] But whatever was being suggested in your mind was improper? [2:35:23] The improper thing would have been if we'd done it. [2:35:27] Did you advise your successor, Mr. Schlesinger, of these feelers? [2:35:33] I don't recall our disgustingness, no. As a matter of fact, I had the conversations I had with Mr. Schlesinger when he came into the agency had to do almost entirely with operational matters and liaison relationships and things of that kind. I didn't get into these matters, as I recall them. [2:35:54] Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. [2:35:59] Thank you. [2:36:00] Senator Wyckham. [2:36:01] Mr. Helms, I'd like to, Ambassador Helms, I'd like to, if I can, go back to the meeting of the 23rd. [2:36:23] And I'm now using the transcript of the hearing, specifically that portion of the transcript, which relates to Mr. Haldeman's recollections of that meeting. [2:36:35] You're now quoting from Mr. Haldeman. [2:36:37] That's right. That's right. [2:36:38] I think this is a good opportunity to try and not so much sell the question as to whether or not Watergate was discussed, because to be candid, there was no question that it was insofar as Mr. Haldeman is concerned. [2:36:51] But rather, of what was said, I think that's what's important here. [2:36:56] I think everybody concedes the fact that Watergate was discussed at this meeting. [2:37:01] Regardless, as I say, just look at your recollection at those hearings, nobody disputes that, either in your later recollection or in Mr. Haldeman's testimony before the committee. [2:37:11] As Haldeman said, so without commenting on either the accuracy of Mr. Walters' recollection or your recitation of it, and he's talking to Mr. Dash, because he's given a number of different statements and depositions in this thing that make it rather complex. [2:37:28] But the meeting, one of the purposes of the meeting, is assigned to me by the President on the morning of the 23rd, one he told me to have, to have me and Ehrlichman meet with Director Helms and Deputy Director Walters. [2:37:40] In addition to ascertaining whether there was any CIA involvement, and I put that as point number one, whether there was any CIA concern about earlier activities of people who had been arrested at the Watergate, I put that as point number two. [2:37:58] And three, was to tell the CIA directors that the FBI had expressed concern as to whether there was CIA involvement or any impingement. [2:38:09] Now, he elaborates that, he elaborates on this in the following statements. [2:38:16] Mr. Helms told me at the meeting that there was, had no CIA involvement in the Watergate operation, and he had so informed Director Gray. [2:38:28] So I learned that at that meeting, I didn't know it prior to the meeting. [2:38:32] Now, and here's what I'd like to question you on as to what your recollection is, we get into what he considered to be the main point. [2:38:41] Mr. Haldeman, because, and there seems to be a very difficult point to get across, but because there were other items of concern, the matter, the question raised, was not solely the question of whether the CIA had been involved in the Watergate break-in, [2:38:59] but also whether the investigation of the Watergate break-in, which was to be thorough and total, could possibly impinge upon the activities totally unrelated to Watergate and related to national security or to covert CIA operations, [2:39:16] the activities of some of the individuals who had also been involved in the Watergate and had been arrested at the Watergate. [2:39:22] Let me just read that last portion, but also whether the investigation of the Watergate break-in, which was to be thorough and total, could possibly impinge upon the activities totally unrelated to Watergate and related to national security or to covert CIA operations. [2:39:38] Now, is that the instruction that you recall, or is that the subject matter that you recall being related from Mr. Haldeman to General Walters, or is it of a different nature? And if so... [2:39:57] Well, I recall being asked if there was any CIA involvement, and I answered negatively. [2:40:03] Correct. [2:40:05] I recall, as I said earlier this morning, that Mr. Haldeman made some reference to the Bay of Pigs. [2:40:11] I referred to it as an incoherent reference because it was, frankly, in my recollection, I don't know exactly what point he had in mind. [2:40:20] But I reacted to that question very firmly. [2:40:27] Now, the Bay of Pigs is the rubric for a very unhappy event in the life of the CIA. [2:40:34] It's been a dead cat that's been thrown at us over the years ever since. [2:40:39] And therefore, it's one to which I'm likely to react and react rather quickly for the simple reason that the Bay of Pigs was long since over. [2:40:51] The problems arising from it had been liquidated. [2:40:54] I was well aware of this, and I didn't care what any investigation had to do with the Bay of Pigs. [2:40:59] It could have gotten anybody involved with it or without it or above it or below it. [2:41:03] I didn't care, and I was trying to make this clear to Mr. Haldeman on that occasion. [2:41:07] The fact that some of these people that broke into the Watergate had at one time had relationships with the agency, including Martinez, who had had them up until just a few days before, didn't make any difference to me. [2:41:21] I mean, there was nothing that anybody was going to find out about investigating them that was going to bother us, as far as I was aware. [2:41:28] We then get down to the question of what an FBI investigation in Mexico might turn up. [2:41:36] And as I explained earlier, I did not have in my head all of our operations in Mexico. [2:41:41] But what was more important, I didn't know where the FBI was investigating in Mexico. [2:41:46] I didn't know who they were following. [2:41:49] I didn't know what they were up to. [2:41:51] So I regarded as prudent to inform myself a bit about these things before I came down flatly and said, let the FBI go ahead and investigate in Mexico. [2:42:02] They'll never run across our operations because this might not have been the case. [2:42:06] Do I answer your question, sir? [2:42:09] All right. So that's what what then did Mr. Haldeman, to the best of your recollection, tell General Walters? [2:42:20] The thrust of what I understood Mr. Haldeman to say to General Walters was that he wanted him to speak to Acting Director Gray to restrain whatever investigation the FBI was conducting in Mexico because it might run into certain CIA operations down there. [2:42:42] And I've just explained to you why it was that I could not say on the spur of the moment it couldn't possibly happen. [2:42:48] So, Mr. Senator Weicker, I'd also like to mention here, if you don't mind, something I said a moment earlier, that often the White House gets information about things that other people in the government are not privy to. [2:43:08] The President and other people in the White House have a great many sources of information, and I didn't know what they had on their mind about CIA operations in Mexico at that point, or might have had on their mind. [2:43:21] Now, immediately upon leaving this meeting with General Walters, did you have any discussion with General Walters relative to the discussion which had taken place with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlich? [2:43:33] As I testified earlier, I told General Walters that I thought when he saw Mr. Gray that he should point out to Mr. Gray that there's a delimitation agreement between the FBI and the CIA, [2:43:46] wherein, if FBI investigations run into CIA matters, they're to be reported to the CIA, and if CIA operations run into FBI matters, they're to be reported to the FBI. [2:43:57] And I thought that this was all, the whole distance he had to go in his conversation with Mr. Gray, it was a legitimate request. [2:44:04] It was made because I didn't know whether Mr. Gray was familiar with this, he hadn't been acting director for very long. [2:44:10] I wasn't even sure General Walters was familiar with it because he'd only been in the agency about six weeks or so. [2:44:16] So I wanted to be sure that these two relatively new people were not talking about what I thought were, were talking about what I thought were important and legitimate things. [2:44:25] Would it be proper to say that you were comfortable with General Walters going to Pat Gray with what you indicated to him outside of the meeting, [2:44:39] and that you were uneasy if he had gone to General Gray with what had been transmitted by Mr. Haldeman? [2:44:44] I accept that. [2:44:45] Then one last question. I asked you in the first round of questioning as to whether or not you felt you were being talked around during that meeting of the 23rd. [2:45:06] And as you've testified, I've gathered this pride that you have in the independence of the CIA, the belief that you have in the trust that is imposed upon the director by the Congress. [2:45:25] And I gather you certainly don't hesitate to express those feelings to this committee, and I gather you don't hesitate to express them or you didn't hesitate to express them to anybody else while you were director of the CIA. [2:45:41] Do you feel that this might have been one of the reasons why you were talked around at this meeting of the 23rd? [2:45:47] Well, certainly that occurred to me. I had mixed emotions about this. Any sensible person, I think, would have wondered why I was not asked to do this. Various interpretations, I suppose, could have been thought up. [2:46:06] But the fact of the way it was handled is in itself an unusual event. And General Walters, I think, and he can speak for himself about this, thought that maybe they were asking him to do it because he was an army officer and used to taking orders. [2:46:27] Well, I've been in the government a long time and used to taking orders, too. So that I think one was forced a bit to the conclusion that for some reason they thought he might carry out the instructions more precisely and more fully than I might have. I just don't know. I've never been told. [2:46:44] Thank you very much. [2:46:46] Mr. Chairman, I won't take long. I have three questions and they won't consume very much time. As I understood your testimony, Mr. Ambassador, Hunt was supplied with certain equipment. [2:47:00] I don't recall what you said he was supplied with, but that it was not used in the Ellsberg burglary. [2:47:08] Well, Senator Baker, this is the point I was trying to make, that you read out to me a moment ago the equipment that he was given. And I submit to you, as a highly intelligent human being, could you break into a building with that equipment? [2:47:25] I don't know. But what I'm reaching for is if it wasn't used for that, what was it used for? [2:47:31] I don't know to this day. [2:47:32] Do you give us any idea? Were there other operations that required this rather elaborate and exotic spy set? [2:47:45] You know, the spy set was, if you put it together, I think is consistent with what the chairman was saying, that this would be the kind of thing you would want if you were going to conduct an interview with an individual whom you didn't want to recognize you for who you were. [2:48:06] In other words, under an assumed name for whatever purposes. [2:48:09] Do you have any idea what that might be? [2:48:11] No. [2:48:12] We've heard testimony, I believe, from other witnesses that it's the practice of the CIA in the event that one of their agents gets into trouble, that the agency takes care of their family and that sort of thing. Is that, in fact, a policy of the CIA? [2:48:30] Well, for example, it is now public knowledge that Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecto were working for the CIA when they were captured, arrested, convicted, and put in jail in China. [2:48:43] And during the period that they were in jail, their salaries were paid just as though they'd been on our rolls. [2:48:48] When they came out, they had a quite tidy piece of money to take care of them for whatever period of time they wanted to use it for. [2:48:55] And we supported the families of one of them during that period. [2:48:58] Is the answer yes? [2:48:59] Yes. [2:49:01] Do I understand the thrust of your testimony to be that the things I listed earlier about the wigs, about the camera, and about the voice-altering device, about the psychological profile, possibly, and a number of other things, were all done by the CIA, but that you learned of all or most of them much, much later? [2:49:25] No, I was involved in the psychological profile. [2:49:28] I don't want to duck that one. [2:49:29] All right. [2:49:30] I authorized it as being made. [2:49:31] Okay. [2:49:32] What about the others? [2:49:33] I understand that you learned of these things much later. [2:49:35] Somewhat later. [2:49:36] Because, you see, if you find my answer equivocal, let me explain it. [2:49:46] My recollection was that I heard about the tape recorder and the camera within the timeframe of July-August 1971. [2:49:54] It's the wig and the other things that I did not remember having been told about at that time, which I learned about considerably later. [2:50:01] And to this day, you don't know what those things were used for. [2:50:04] No, sir. [2:50:05] You know, Senator Baker, I want to explain something to the committee. [2:50:08] I've been away in these recent months, so I've not had access to the newspapers here of the full testimony before this committee. [2:50:15] I mean, this may have been explained many times in Congress, and I may have missed it, so I just don't know. [2:50:20] Why didn't you, when you found out about these things, launch an inquiry into it? [2:50:24] Well, quite frankly, as of the time that this was all going on, do you realize that at the time of the Watergate burglary, there was no evidence that had ever come to my attention that this equipment had been used for any illegal or improper act? [2:50:46] Yeah, but you knew it was outstanding. [2:50:48] At the moment you found out this stuff had been issued or the support supplied by CIA, did you do anything to investigate what it was used for? [2:50:56] No, sir. [2:50:57] Why didn't you? [2:50:58] Frankly, it didn't occur to me. [2:51:02] You knew a day after this happened that two or three, four of your former FBI-CIA agents, and one of them still on the payroll, was involved. [2:51:13] Did you launch yourself an investigation to see what was going on? [2:51:17] About the Watergate burglary? [2:51:18] Certainly. [2:51:19] Yes, sir. [2:51:20] What did you do? [2:51:21] Well, we checked on all these people, their relationships with our people, their relationships with the agency. [2:51:28] We went through all of that and turned all that material over to the FBI. [2:51:30] Did you go talk to these people? [2:51:31] Did you pick up the phone and say, what in the world is going on? [2:51:34] No, sir. [2:51:35] We never talked to any of them, as far as I'm aware. [2:51:37] After all, they were in jail at that time. [2:51:40] Well, that's right. [2:51:41] They were. [2:51:42] I'll pursue this, Mr. Chairman. [2:51:50] It strikes me, though, that there were great indications. [2:51:55] Maybe hindsight's the only way we can look at this. [2:51:58] They're great indications of a deep cross-identification with at least CIA personnel, CIA materiel, a past history of relationships with CIA that you didn't know about it except for the psychological profile. [2:52:17] And I can't help saying, but the similarity between that contention, and I do not doubt it, by you as director of CIA is remarkably similar to the contention with the president that he didn't know all about all these other things. [2:52:37] Let's halt a minute. [2:52:38] When we looked into these various relationships of these individuals with the agency, we turned over to the FBI everything that we were able to establish about this. [2:52:55] Now, therefore, I assume that what you're saying is that somehow I should have gotten to these fellows who were in jail and asked them, each one of them, what he'd been up to. [2:53:15] Well, it didn't seem to me that that was my function, sir. [2:53:18] They were in the hands of the law enforcement authorities. [2:53:20] The FBI was conducting an investigation. [2:53:23] They were the proper authorities to do this. [2:53:25] And quite frankly, if I think I had intruded into this matter at that time, it would have been an improper act on my part. [2:53:30] That's almost precisely Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman. [2:53:33] That may be, sir. [2:53:35] But you had people in the CIA that you later learned had supplied these wigs and voice altering devices and cameras and processing equipment and aliases and forged documents. [2:53:48] Did you go to the people inside the CIA and find out how come they did it and for what purpose? [2:53:54] You say it was not for the Ellsberg thing. [2:53:56] I am consumed by curiosity. [2:53:57] What else was going on? [2:53:58] What was it used for? [2:53:59] Senator Baker, all of this is in your record. [2:54:03] All of these memoranda, all of the inquiry of these various individuals in the CIA, you have it there. [2:54:09] I'm sure we do, but no part of that record tells me what those things were used for if we exclude the Ellsberg situation. [2:54:16] I don't know what they were used for. [2:54:19] What I'm saying is why don't you know? [2:54:20] Why didn't you find out? [2:54:22] Because I thought, frankly, that when these individuals had been arrested that that was the FBI's job. [2:54:29] And so did the White House. [2:54:30] Thank you. [2:54:32] Wasn't it the FBI's job? [2:54:33] Well, maybe it was, but I've used the analogy once or twice and I feel a little ill at ease using it. [2:54:42] If I had someone on my staff who was caught red-handed robbing a jewelry store, let alone the Democratic National Committee headquarters, [2:54:50] and I read about it in the newspaper then or later, I have a hunch that I would have jumped up and down and screamed until I found out what happened. [2:54:58] I have no reason to question that you might have, sir. [2:55:06] But I have no reason to question that you might have, too. [2:55:09] And that's why I'm asking why you didn't, because I have a great admiration for you, Mr. Helms. [2:55:14] I think you are an extraordinary citizen. [2:55:16] I think you've done extraordinary service for your country. [2:55:19] You know, I'd like to be worthy of your comments, Senator Baker, and I trust that I am. [2:55:27] But at the time that these men were arrested, it did not seem to me that it was a proper thing for me to get into that affair as to why they had been arrested or their past. [2:55:39] It just didn't seem like a big event at the time. [2:55:41] No, it was a big event, but it did not seem to me that it was a proper job for me to undertake to investigate how they'd gotten there or why they'd been arrested. [2:55:50] All right, lest I be misunderstood, Mr. Helms, I, Mr. Ambassador, I now continue to have, and nothing I've asked you by way of testing the situation by your evidence should imply anything to the contrary. [2:56:05] I continue to have an enormous respect and admiration for you for what you've done and what you will do, and I appreciate your testimony. [2:56:12] Thank you, sir. [2:56:13] One question. [2:56:14] Could you, couldn't you reasonably, or did you draw the conclusion that if you'd undertaken to investigate the burglarizing of the Watergate, that that would have been inconsistent with the prohibition of the act on which you operate, that you haven't, that CIA has no function in respect to internal security? [2:56:35] Yes, sir. [2:56:36] Well, Mr. Chairman, I'm not talking about that. [2:56:39] I'm talking about investigating his own staff within his own organization, and that certainly doesn't violate any domestic security prohibition. [2:56:47] Oh. [2:56:48] But didn't you testify that you did investigate it inside of the CIA and turned over the information to the FBI? [2:56:55] Yes, sir. [2:56:56] And, yes, sir, and also you have it in the records of this committee. [2:56:58] Any further questions? [2:57:01] Yes, sir. [2:57:02] As an analogy has been drawn, I think it's proper to pursue it. [2:57:08] On June 17, 1972, was Mr. Hunt a member of the CIA, a part of the CIA? [2:57:19] No, he was not, Senator White. [2:57:20] Was Mr. Liddy a part of the CIA? [2:57:22] No, Mr. Senator White. [2:57:23] Was Mr. Barker a part of the CIA? [2:57:24] No, Senator. [2:57:25] Was Mr. McCord a part of the CIA? [2:57:27] No, sir. [2:57:28] Was Mr. Martinez a part of the CIA? [2:57:32] Mr. Martinez was getting a retainer of $100 a month on a fiduciary relationship. [2:57:39] He was not a staff employee of the CIA. [2:57:41] Which operation was down in Florida insofar as screening those persons coming over from Cuba [2:57:46] and ascertaining as to whether or not they should be, would be, have an intelligence value? [2:57:52] Yes, sir. [2:57:53] Mr. Sturges, was he a member of the CIA? [2:57:55] No, sir, not at that time. [2:57:56] Mr. Gonzalez, was he a member of the CIA? [2:57:58] No, sir. [2:57:59] Mr. Baldwin, was he a member of the CIA? [2:58:04] No, sir. [2:58:06] Mr. Barker, was he a member of the CIA? [2:58:08] No, sir. [2:58:12] So, apparently, the only member of the CIA in all of these matters on June 17th, 1972, was Mr. Martinez, who was on a $100 retainer down in Florida relative to the screening of Cuban Exiles. [2:58:26] That's correct, Senator Barker. [2:58:28] Did you turn over the records of these men to the FBI? [2:58:39] Yes, sir. [2:58:41] When? [2:58:42] As soon as, well, I don't know the precise dates, but the FBI started inquiring of the agency about the backgrounds of these men as soon as the men had been arrested, [2:58:53] and we started providing the information from that day. [2:58:56] I have no further questions. [2:59:02] If I understand the analogy, and I'm not sure that I do, but perhaps your idea is then that because these were former CIA employees and not present CIA employees, [2:59:28] that that some way would relieve you of the responsibility you might otherwise have. [2:59:35] Is that fair? [2:59:36] Yes, I think so. [2:59:38] I think, Mr. Thompson, that I should make it clear because I was asked at another hearing one time, when an individual resigns or retires from the CIA, [2:59:49] that's the end of his identification with the agency as far as we're concerned. [2:59:53] Certainly under American laws, one has no way of keeping a string on people like this. [2:59:59] So when they walk out the door, they turn in their badge and their employment with the agency is finished unless some sort of a contractual or fiduciary relationship is established with them. [3:00:09] This was not the case with these others except for Martinez. [3:00:12] Well, I can see that, and as long as we're talking about analogy and not reaching any conclusion but just really thinking aloud, [3:00:20] for the same token, there were no present White House employees involved in the break-in either. [3:00:27] They were also former employees. [3:00:29] So if we have an analogy, I imagine that analogy still holds up. [3:00:33] Thank you. [3:00:34] You'll be back at 2 o'clock. We'll recess at 2 o'clock, but count. [3:00:49] I couldn't hear you. [3:00:51] We'll need you back at 2 o'clock. [3:00:53] The committee broke for lunch just as the questioning started to reveal differences between some committee members. [3:01:00] Public television's coverage of the Senate hearings will continue after we pause for station identification. [3:01:05] Unabridged coverage of these hearings is provided as a public service by the member stations of PBS, the Public Broadcasting Service. [3:01:14] NPACT continues its coverage of hearings by the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. [3:01:25] Here again, correspondent Robert McNeil. [3:01:28] As we pick up the testimony again, Assistant Chief Counsel David Dorsen is questioning Richard Helms. [3:01:35] The committee will come to order, and counsel will proceed to resume the interrogation of witness. [3:01:44] Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Helms, who was the normal contact from the White House to the CIA? [3:01:58] Dr. Kissinger. [3:02:00] Was there much contact between Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman and the CIA? [3:02:07] There was some. Of course, not nearly as much. There was more with Mr. Ehrlichman than there was with Mr. Haldeman. [3:02:12] Can you give us some idea of the number of contacts between Mr. Ehrlichman and the CIA during the time you were director? [3:02:21] Well, that would be difficult, Mr. Counsel, because I don't know any way to come up with a statistic. [3:02:29] I suppose that I've had a dozen or so contacts with him myself over a period of three or four years. [3:02:36] And were many of these requests for information or requests that the CIA do something? [3:02:41] Well, there were a variety of things. There were meetings that I attended that Mr. Ehrlichman called. [3:02:46] I recall one particular activity when the White House was redoing the method of classification of documents [3:02:57] and devising some new procedures for declassifying documents. [3:03:01] There were some meetings in order to rewrite these regulations, and I remember attending at least one. There may have been two. [3:03:07] Now, in connection with the request in July of 1971 for the CIA to furnish support for Mr. Hunt, [3:03:17] it is your understanding, is it not, that Mr. Ehrlichman contacted General Cushman, is that correct? [3:03:22] That was my distinct impression. [3:03:24] And in June of 1972, when you were at the meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office, am I correct that it was General Walters who was asked to go to Patrick Gray by Mr. Ehrlichman? [3:03:38] He was asked by Mr. Haldeman. [3:03:40] Excuse me, by Mr. Haldeman. [3:03:41] Yes. [3:03:42] Did you make any connection then or subsequently concerning the fact that the two deputies who were asked to participate in the fashion described were both military men? [3:03:54] Well, I didn't know whether it had to do with the fact that they were military men or they were particular appointees of this administration [3:04:02] or just exactly whether they were old friends and therefore it seemed to be easier to deal with them. [3:04:07] I really don't know which of these considerations loomed the largest. [3:04:12] Now, were you aware prior to the May 22, 1972 announcement by the President of the organization known as the Plumbers [3:04:24] or the fact that there was such an organization in the White House? [3:04:28] You mean the May 22, 1973? [3:04:30] Excuse me, 73. [3:04:32] I'd never heard of a plumber's unit. [3:04:34] Were you familiar with an investigative unit in the White House? [3:04:37] I didn't know there was any unit in the White House that was actively carrying out, if you like, burglaries or activist activities of this kind. [3:04:48] Now, with respect to the material supplied to Howard Hunt, you referred to the wig as a fairly famous item. [3:05:00] Was the wig that was supplied to Mr. Hunt by the CIA the same wig allegedly worn by Hunt, the red wig when he saw Dieter Beard? [3:05:13] I've been told in recent times that the wig provided by the agency was a brunette wig. [3:05:20] It was dark hair anyway. [3:05:22] And that some of the agency technicians rather resented the fact that the red wig had been tied in with the CIA because it was such a lousy fit. [3:05:32] Mr. Helms, Ambassador Helms, are you familiar with the memorandum to which there was a covering rooting slip from General Cushman to you with the date August 23, 1971 on it? [3:05:54] Yes. [3:05:56] This is indeed the memorandum that you showed me. [3:06:00] That's correct. [3:06:01] Can we show this? [3:06:02] And I'd just like to have you identify it, please. [3:06:08] Yes, I am familiar with the memorandum. [3:06:21] Excuse me, I'd like the Ambassador to hold it for another minute. [3:06:26] And does that memorandum, the memorandum-in-chief, if I may use that expression, deal with the request of Mr. Hunt for the secretary to which you referred earlier? [3:06:38] Yes. [3:06:43] And there's a portion of the rooting slip, is that a portion of that in your handwriting? [3:06:48] Yes, there is. [3:06:50] And could you read the rooting slip to us, please, including the portion which I understand is in General Cushman's handwriting and the portion that is in your handwriting? [3:06:58] The part that is in General Cushman's handwriting appears first. [3:07:01] It says, FYI and guidance on how to handle. [3:07:08] And then General Cushman's initial appears. [3:07:10] My note back to him says, if Hunt renews the request, please let me know and I'll speak to Ehrlichman about it. [3:07:19] Or I'll speak to Ehrlichman at once. [3:07:21] These Xeroxes are not famously good. [3:07:23] Mr. Chairman, with the committee's permission, I would like to have that received in evidence. [3:07:30] Without objection, it will be marked appropriate as an exhibit received in evidence as such. [3:07:44] Ambassador Helms, this morning you were shown, or it was read to you, the memorandum dated August 31, 1971. [3:07:56] And I'd like to show you a copy of that at this point. [3:07:58] And to refresh your recollection, this is the one that deals, well, which states, I called John Ehrlichman Friday and explained why we could not meet these requests. [3:08:12] I indicated Hunt was becoming a pain in the neck. [3:08:14] John said he would restrain Hunt, signed by General Cushman, and you wrote good. [3:08:19] Is that correct? [3:08:20] Yes, sir. [3:08:21] I direct your attention to the last typewritten page of that memorandum, and I read to you number three. [3:08:28] I told Mr., and the name is blanked out at the request of the CIA, that Mr. Hunt's latest requests drew us even further into the sensitive area of domestic operations against Americans, [3:08:40] and that all such requests should be referred to General Cushman's office. [3:08:43] Meanwhile, these requests should not be met, and there's a signature, initials DDCI, which represents a position in the CIA. [3:08:54] What does that paragraph mean? [3:08:56] I don't know what this gentleman had reference to. [3:08:59] It was signed by the executive assistant to the deputy director, and what he was referring to there, I have no idea. [3:09:06] I heard of no specific Americans being involved at that time. [3:09:10] Do you have any knowledge of domestic operations against Americans? [3:09:14] No, sir. [3:09:15] I don't know what he had in mind. [3:09:24] In your conversations with—excuse me, Mr. Chairman, this, I believe, has been received in evidence, and copies were supplied this morning of both— [3:09:32] That's correct. [3:09:33] Part of the record is lost. [3:09:35] And each senator had received a copy this morning. [3:09:39] Do you know what General Cushman was told concerning Mr. Hunt's operations? [3:09:46] I don't specifically, Mr. Counsel. [3:09:50] All I recall was what I said this morning, that when Hunt came to him and asked for this assistance, he said it was for a one-time interview. [3:10:03] And do you know whether the camera that was given to Mr. Hunt was returned to the CIA prior to September 3, 1971, which has been given as the date of the burglary? [3:10:19] I don't know. [3:10:20] I have heard it said that the camera was not returned, but that's really hearsay. [3:10:27] I'm not sure that that was accurate information. [3:10:29] But it was somehow my impression that he did not return this equipment. [3:10:33] Well, according to the records of the CIA, I believe the camera was returned, but the recorder was not. [3:10:38] Was it? [3:10:39] But you have this in the records, don't you? [3:10:42] That is correct. [3:10:43] And I think it should be in the records of the committee, because I don't think this should depend on my memory. [3:10:47] It's a relevant fact, and I would like to identify myself with what the record shows. [3:10:52] Very good, Mr. Ambassador. [3:10:54] Now, earlier you were asked by Senator Talmadge whether you were asked by the White House concerning Mr. Hunt in terms of supplying a reference, and you indicated that you were not so consulted. [3:11:08] What reference would you have given if asked? [3:11:10] Well, that's a terribly difficult question to ask me in July or August of 1973, after all the evidence that's been brought forward. [3:11:23] I think that what would have been in my mind at the time was to wonder why they wanted him and what his talents were that they wanted to avail themselves of. [3:11:37] And I think my answer would have been largely dependent on what they told me. [3:11:41] Am I correct that in the last years of Mr. Hunt's service with the CIA, he was given a somewhat different assignment than he had before? [3:11:49] Yes, I believe that in his recent years there, he was stationed in Washington for one thing. [3:11:56] And precisely what his duties were at the time, I don't know, but they were not particularly operational. [3:12:02] But as I explained this morning, he was having some family difficulties and so forth. [3:12:05] And he was trying to work these out as well as do his job and so on, so that I can only assume that we were taking these human factors into consideration [3:12:20] and had assigned him at a place where he could accommodate himself. [3:12:25] Did a question arise at a later time as to whether, in fact, Mr. Ehrlichman had communicated to the CIA with respect to Mr. Hunt? [3:12:36] Yes, and not terribly long ago. [3:12:39] It seems to me that it was at the end of last year that, and I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, [3:12:51] that I believe that there is in your record paper which will give the precise dates and details about these things. [3:13:00] But my recollection is that sometime in November, I guess it was, November or December of 1972, [3:13:10] Mr. William Colby and Mr. John Warner of the agency visited Mr. Henry Peterson at the Justice Department. [3:13:20] And I believe Mr. Peterson had Mr. Earl Silbert with him and perhaps two or three other people. [3:13:24] I'm not sure who all the individuals were. [3:13:27] And during this meeting, they were going over some material having to do with Howard Hunt. [3:13:32] And the question came up about who had arranged for Howard Hunt to get assistance from the agency. [3:13:39] And Mr. Colby identified the individual in the White House as Mr. Ehrlichman. [3:13:44] As best I recall it, some days go by, and one day I got a call from Mr. Dean who said that he had understood that it had been stated to Mr. Peterson [3:13:57] that Mr. Ehrlichman was the man who had sponsored Mr. Hunt, and that Mr. Ehrlichman didn't remember this, and could there be some confusion? [3:14:08] My recollection of the conversation was that I said that General Cushman was the one who had dealt with this matter, and that I thought they could get the information from him. [3:14:19] Mr. Dean then said he thought there ought to be a meeting to discuss this, and I said, fine, but be sure that you have General Cushman at the meeting. [3:14:27] Then subsequent to that telephone call, a meeting was called in Mr. Ehrlichman's office about this matter. [3:14:36] I went to this meeting with Mr. Colby, since Mr. Colby had had the conversation with Mr. Peterson, and we found at Mr. Ehrlichman's office, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean, and then there were the two of us. [3:14:48] But General Cushman was not there. [3:14:52] Mr. Colby was asked to explain what he had had to say, and he did so. [3:14:57] Mr. Ehrlichman, as I recall it, said that he didn't remember these conversations or this conversation with General Cushman. [3:15:06] The meeting then ended up in a rather unsatisfactory manner because the only person that could have been helpful in this was General Cushman. [3:15:13] And at the very end, Mr. Ehrlichman said, well, why don't you have General Cushman call me? [3:15:19] He asked Mr. Colby to do this, and I verified to Mr. Colby that it was to call General Cushman and let him know. [3:15:26] Now, also, if memory serves, when I got that first telephone call from Mr. Dean, I believe I instructed Mr. Colby to tell General Cushman this meeting might be coming up so that he would be prepared for it. [3:15:39] Was there any reason given why General Cushman was not at the meeting? [3:15:45] There was no reason given that I recall. [3:15:47] And General Cushman would be the person most familiar with the question on hand, namely who called? [3:15:53] He was really the only one that could verify it. [3:15:56] Now, during the recess, we did look at one or more records and discovered that the first transmission from the CIA to the FBI occurred on June 20th, 1973. [3:16:10] Would that be consistent with your recollection? [3:16:12] 1972, sir. [3:16:13] If the break-in was in 1972, this would have been— [3:16:16] Sure, thank you. [3:16:17] It does, and it corresponds to my recollection, as mentioned in this morning's testimony, when I said that as soon as the FBI started asking us questions about these people, we began replying. [3:16:26] So that would track very well. [3:16:28] With respect to General Walter's memoranda, on the subject of how they represent your recollection as well as General Walter's recollection, [3:16:42] could you please state to us again what contact you had in terms of reading them or speaking to General Walter's before he wrote them? [3:16:50] Well, when General Walter's and I decided that there should be a memoranda for the record of these various meetings and conversations, [3:17:05] if I recall it, he wrote several on the same day. [3:17:09] In other words, he was catching up. [3:17:12] He wrote the meeting of the 23rd, and I think he wrote his meeting of Dean on the 26th and on the 27th, [3:17:20] and there may be another memorandum. [3:17:24] It certainly is all in your record there. [3:17:26] But in any event, he was writing them all to catch up, and then I believe after that he began to write memorandum for the record as soon as he'd had a meeting, [3:17:34] so this wasn't necessary any longer. [3:17:37] I don't recall how carefully I read these various memoranda because he'd reported to me the contents of these meeting orally each time, [3:17:44] and I didn't feel at that juncture, as I recall, it constrained to read through every line to be sure that this was exactly what he told me. [3:17:51] In other words, I was not distrustful of his record. [3:17:54] But you did peruse them to the extent of making sure that they were generally accurate, is that correct? [3:17:58] I think so, yes. [3:17:59] And before General Walters wrote each memorandum, he had already articulated to you almost immediately after the meeting the circumstances of what occurred at each meeting. [3:18:11] Is that correct? [3:18:12] Yes, sir. [3:18:13] Now, there was some question this morning as to whether or not the president's name was invoked during the June 23rd, 1972 meeting, [3:18:25] and I believe it's your best recollection that it was not, is that correct? [3:18:29] Yes, that's correct. [3:18:31] General Walters, as I recall the language of the memorandum, said something about it is the president's wish. [3:18:36] I did not recall that language having been used. [3:18:38] When, for the first time, did you take note of your difference with the General Walters memorandum? [3:18:47] I believe we discussed that even at the time as to just exactly how this had been put. [3:18:53] So that was one instance in where you saw fit to— [3:18:56] I'm afraid there is a disagreement even now between us as to just how this was worded. [3:19:01] But in other words, you did discuss possible disagreements in the subject matter of the memorandum even— [3:19:06] And I think he felt at the time that since this was just a memorandum to jog his memory and so forth, [3:19:11] that there was no reason to put down that we had a difference or to re-edit the language or to re-dictate the memorandum. [3:19:17] It's very interesting, Mr. Counsel, that a lot of memorandum— [3:19:20] if one had known then what one knows now would have been compiled more carefully, [3:19:24] the language would have been more judicious, there would have been a lot of things happened that didn't happen. [3:19:29] Well, thank you for the memorandum that we do have, Mr. Ambassador. [3:19:32] Now, one question that I think is quite important. [3:19:38] I believe you testified that you were asked whether there was—during the same June 23rd meeting— [3:19:45] as to whether there was any involvement by the CIA in the Watergate. Is that correct? [3:19:53] Were you so asked that— [3:19:55] Yes, I believe I was, Mr. Counsel. [3:19:57] And you replied no? [3:19:59] Yes. [3:20:00] Now, before Mr. Haldeman turned to General Walters and told him to go and speak to Patrick Ray, [3:20:08] was any question directed at you or General Walters as to whether further investigation by the CIA might uncover assets or operations of the CIA— [3:20:21] You mean further investigation of the FBI? [3:20:23] Excuse me, FBI. [3:20:24] —might uncover assets or operations of the CIA in Mexico? [3:20:29] I don't recall that this point was ever put to either of us in the form of a question. [3:20:37] It was my recollection, or it is my recollection, that General Walters was asked to go and speak to Mr. Gray about this because there was the possibility that it might run into CIA operations. [3:20:49] I was not asked whether it would or it wouldn't. [3:20:51] Did you comment one way or the other at that meeting as to whether you thought it might uncover such operations? Was there any discussion of that subject? [3:21:02] I'm sorry, Mr. Counsel, I don't recall any. [3:21:04] At any time, did the CIA announce that it was conducting an investigation into the Watergate? [3:21:15] Announce that it was conducting? [3:21:17] Yes. [3:21:18] No. [3:21:20] You mean a public announcement? [3:21:21] Yes. [3:21:22] No. [3:21:23] Is there any debate within the CIA that there would be an investigation of the Watergate, or is the opposite true? [3:21:29] I'm talking about any CIA discussions as to whether there would be an independent investigation by the CIA? [3:21:34] I'm not trying to be picky. [3:21:35] When we talk about Watergate, now we're talking about the burglary, right? [3:21:38] I'm talking about the burglary, yes. [3:21:39] There was no public announcement. [3:21:42] We simply did, as I indicated this morning, and that is check with the various people that it had to do with the burglary, check on their records, check with others that had dealings with them to be sure what their status was, and all the rest of it. [3:21:55] And am I correct that there were a number of quite numerous amount of communications between the CIA and the FBI and the Justice Department? [3:22:05] Many. [3:22:06] Many. [3:22:08] And to your knowledge, was any relevant information withheld by the CIA to the FBI or the Justice Department, information that you were aware of while the events were taking place in June, July, or August of 1972? [3:22:26] Sir, I don't believe so. Does the record show that there was anything of this kind? [3:22:33] No, I'm not suggesting that at all, Mr. Ambassador. I'm just asking for your knowledge. I have no knowledge of the contrary. [3:22:38] Well, I don't either, but I just wanted to be sure that my recollection tracked with the facts. [3:22:51] Senator Baker, Mr. Vice Chairman, I have no further questions. [3:22:53] Thank you, Mr. Callister and Mr. Thompson. [3:22:56] Mr. Ambassador, did General Walters indicate to you between the time of June the 23rd and June the 28th that he was in any way concerned about the propriety of the request or order that Mr. Harleman had given him? [3:23:18] I don't know whether he ever mentioned the propriety of it. I think that, in fact, I'm sure that we discussed why the request was being made. We'd been asked to do it, what was behind it. We didn't have the information to put together at that time. And I'm sure, as associates would, we were expressing wonderment to each other as to what this was all about. [3:23:49] Do you know why, for example, he waited until June the 28th to prepare this memorandum, which we've been referring to, where he sets all these things out? Why he waited five days in order to do that? [3:24:09] Well, Mr. Thompson, I don't know, but he will certainly be able to testify to that. [3:24:14] Didn't stress this. [3:24:15] But as I indicated this morning, I don't remember anymore which one of us was the one that decided or whether we just agreed in a conversation together. After the request from Dean for the agency to provide bail or salaries for the breakers in or in breakers or whatever they are, that at that time it seemed desirable to put some of this on the record because this was getting a bit far afield and into a rather strange area, we thought. [3:24:43] And that these various meetings then ought to be caught up. And I think that's the reason that on the same day he did several at the same time. [3:24:53] And between the time of your conversation on the 23rd and the time he prepared this memorandum, Dean had contacted him three times, had he not? The 26th, 27th, 28th. [3:25:04] Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, anyway. [3:25:06] I believe that's right. [3:25:07] Yeah. [3:25:08] So would you say by that time then that he had become concerned about the matter and was covering his track, so to speak? [3:25:17] Well, you see, Mr. Thompson, I wish you'd help me with a point here. It is my recollection, contrary to what those memoranda show, that it was on Tuesday, the second meeting with Mr. Dean that Mr. Dean made mention bail and salaries, whereas General Walters' memorandum indicates that that comes on the Monday. [3:25:42] And because my recollection is that it came on the Tuesday, that it was after that that we agreed that he should write these memoranda, and therefore he wrote the first of them on the very next day. [3:25:54] I don't know whether his memory now that he started over is— [3:26:01] I believe there is. [3:26:02] I believe there may be some difference between the memorandum and the interview. [3:26:05] My understanding was, frankly, that on the 26th, the dean had asked him if there was any way that the CIA could possibly be involved and whether or not the CIA could have been involved without Walters' knowledge. [3:26:19] And then the following bail, on the 27th, mentioning the witnesses involved and whether or not the salary could be paid them and bail money could be raised. [3:26:31] And on the 28th, just a more general discussion as to whether or not Mr. General Walters had any ideas as to how the matter could be reviewed. [3:26:40] His memory may straighten that out now. I don't know. But the reason that I cling to my recollection in this particular case is that the question of bail and salaries hit me rather hard. [3:26:56] That made an impression on me. And it was that which I believe motivated us to say, you better start getting this in the record. [3:27:02] And I think that happened on the Tuesday, which I believe is the 27th, and therefore he would have been writing these memorandum thereafter. [3:27:10] I know it's difficult to conclude what another man was thinking, but I assume you were talking to him from time to time. [3:27:16] Might we conclude then that it was not so much the 23rd meeting in and of itself, but the subsequent contact with dean that inspired him to put the matter in writing? [3:27:28] Yes, I think that's right. It's a combination of this. [3:27:30] Thank you, sir. I have no further question. [3:27:32] Are there other questions of the witness? If there are no other questions, Mr. Helms, on behalf of the committee, may I thank you for your appearance. [3:27:41] And to reiterate, we have some appreciation of the inconvenience that it may have caused you. [3:27:47] We are grateful for your testimony and wish you good luck. [3:27:52] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the committee for its consideration. [3:27:55] Thank you, sir. Would counsel call the next witness, please? [3:27:58] General Cushman. [3:28:01] I'm not going to wait until... [3:28:04] The next witness is Marine Corps Commandant Robert Cushman, who was Deputy Director of the CIA in 1971 when the agency provided assistance to E. Howard Hunt. [3:28:15] Cushman is 58 years old and a graduate of the Naval Academy. [3:28:19] He was an aide to then-Vice President Nixon from 1957 to 1961. [3:28:24] He earned the Navy Cross, the Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star during World War II. [3:28:29] President Nixon named him to head the Marine Corps last year. [3:28:32] They were Question. [3:28:33] So, can you read? [3:28:34] Let us read more them, companies. [3:28:35] Let us know. [3:28:36] Okay. [3:28:37] Great. [3:28:38] That's great. [3:28:39] I'm leaving. [3:28:40] Thank you. [3:28:41] Let me get to start all my favourites. [3:28:42] And now I can find an increase in fact. [3:28:44] I'm recuerden. [3:28:45] This is the end adapted hop and that many times can be integrated into horror mode. [3:28:47] What is it? [3:28:48] How it does not make us feel? [3:28:49] It's a place to stay given. [3:28:50] Right, right here. [3:28:51] I'mè. [3:28:52] To make us know every time 10,000 bit more. [3:28:53] So, even later we're testing. [3:28:55] You can see the beginning today, cuz it looks like that we're inunditudes. [3:28:56] caught everything ready. [3:28:57] It's an incredible神ic star.