Robert Gates says "it would be a mistake" for the U.S. to change its rhetoric on Taiwan

[0:00] On Friday, we traveled to William & Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia, to speak with former [0:03] Defense Secretary Robert Gates. And we began with that warning from President Xi that the issue of [0:09] Taiwan could lead to an extremely dangerous situation, if not managed carefully. [0:15] The U.S. still officially has this stance of strategic ambiguity. But do you think the tone [0:22] needs to shift a little bit from the United States, given how strong the Chinese rhetoric is now? [0:28] I think the Chinese rhetoric has often been strong in the past when it comes to Taiwan. Whenever we've [0:35] made an arms sales to Taiwan in the past, the Bush administration, the Obama administration, [0:40] and so on, the Chinese rhetoric gets very, very strong. And so I think Xi was reiterating the [0:48] Chinese position on that. I think it would be a mistake to change the carefully worded position [0:57] of the United States with respect to Taiwan. Any change at all, the nuances, this is one of those [1:03] things where the experts parse these things down to the tense of the verbs and so on. [1:08] So I think keeping things in the U.S. position as it has been was important. And I think everything [1:17] I've read so far indicates that the president did that. [1:20] So leave it open to question whether the U.S. would militarily come to the defense of Taiwan [1:25] if China were to move on it. That needs to be an open question. Well, on paper, the president has [1:30] made significant pledges to Taiwan in terms of promised arms sales, not delivered on yet. There's [1:38] another 14 billion in proposed weapons sales that the Trump administration has delayed approving. [1:44] Do you think the president should greenlight that? I think he should. I think we should go forward with [1:52] what we've agreed with Taiwan. One of the concerns that I have is even with respect to previous arms [1:59] sales, there is a huge backlog of weapons that we have sold to Taiwan that we have not been able to [2:08] deliver because we don't have the supplies. And so if you're offering another 14 billion, [2:14] is that just going to be added to the backlog or is there a way forward in terms of actually getting [2:20] these weapons to the Taiwanese? I think one of the an important thing that has happened in recent years [2:27] is is getting the Taiwanese to focus on purchasing the kinds of weapons that would be necessary to [2:36] defend themselves against the Chinese amphibious invasion. And the Taiwanese legislature has just [2:43] finally reached an agreement to fund the purchase of these weapons. So I think I think we should go [2:50] forward with it. It is in our own way our counter to President Xi's strong statement. Yes, you have [3:00] your position. We have ours. Secretary Rubio did tell another network though that his belief is that [3:06] China's preference is to have Taiwan willingly join the People's Republic. Do you expect that to be the more [3:15] likely scenario that there is sort of a slow strangulation of Taiwanese democracy by the Communist Party? [3:23] I think the chances of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are pretty low, particularly over the next several years, [3:32] and partly because Xi has other other options open to him that include that involve far less risk. [3:41] So they have surrounded Taiwan with ships and in the air. They have shown their ability to close off maritime [3:50] and air access to the island. They could create a blockade or a quarantine around Taiwan anytime they [3:55] wanted, what the Taiwanese call an anaconda strategy. And it would strangle Taiwan over time. I don't think they [4:04] want to go in and attack Taiwan. They don't want to destroy the very chip factories they want to take [4:10] over. So and and then there's there's cyber. There are all kinds of pressures. There isn't one single [4:17] Chinese general or admiral today that has one day of combat experience. The last time these guys fought [4:23] was 1979 in the North Vietnamese. The Vietnamese gave him a bloody nose. He's fired. Xi has fired all these [4:31] generals. He's there now no generals left on the Central Military Commission that kind of oversees the [4:37] whole thing. Let me ask you about what's happening in the Middle East. The last time we spoke last [4:44] spring, we were just weeks away from that U.S.-Israeli strike on the three nuclear sites in Iran. You said at [4:53] that time, it was May, when you were Defense Secretary, you were concerned that a strike on the nuclear [4:59] program would just buy time a year or two, but it would not solve the problem. Do you still believe [5:05] that? I think the only way that we are likely to get the enriched uranium out of out of Iran and bring [5:16] about an end to their nuclear aspirations is through a negotiation. Is it possible for the president [5:25] of the United States to walk away and leave this for the Israelis to settle? No, I don't think he can [5:31] walk away. And no, I don't think the Israelis can settle it. I don't think, as powerful as they are, [5:39] they don't have the kind of power the United States has. And I think the president seems to have been [5:46] very consistent and very clear that under no circumstances can Iran ever have a nuclear bomb. [5:52] Well, the only way you get to that objective is resolving this issue of the enriched uranium and [6:01] any future plans for enrichment. I mean, I think, I don't think that the nuclear program in Iran [6:10] poses an imminent threat. After all, we bombed it twice. But it is a big enough problem that it was [6:16] clearly not going to be settled in four to six weeks, which was the timestamp that the American [6:20] people were told to expect in terms of the duration of conflict. I think that there were [6:25] some unrealistic expectations. Have you heard a clearly articulated sort of center of gravity to [6:31] this operation, an end goal, a strategy? Well, I think some of the justifications have [6:37] have changed over time. But one thing, I think there have been a few things that have been consistent [6:42] from the very beginning. One is to eliminate Iran's ability to have a nuclear weapon. Another is to [6:52] eliminate their military capabilities to attack their neighbors. The third is to eliminate the [7:00] capability to support their surrogates, the Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, to sink their navy. [7:07] Mm-hmm. I think those are all, those were, have all been articulated as objectives of this operation. [7:14] And although the nuclear program has been dramatically damaged and set back a long time, [7:23] I think those other things, a lot has been accomplished. You were CIA director, you were [7:30] a defense secretary. How do you assess Secretary Hegseth's performance? I'm not into talking about my [7:37] successors, but I will say, I want to point to something positive that I think is going on. [7:44] It goes back to something we were talking about earlier. I think, I think the leadership in the [7:49] Pentagon, and especially the deputy secretary and the undersecretary involved in acquisition, [7:56] are doing some very important and overdue things in terms of shaking up the bureaucracy in the Pentagon. [8:02] But he's got this focus on the warrior ethos. I'm sure you've heard a lot of what he has announced. [8:09] He summoned the generals to DC, told them he's tired of seeing fat troops and fat generals. [8:14] He wants to weigh them twice a year. He ordered a ruthless review of the Judge Advocate Court, [8:19] the military lawyers. He fired most of the inspectors general, saying he planned to overhaul the [8:25] weaponized internal Pentagon watchdog. When you're talking about the things you like, [8:30] would you put any of these things on that list? [8:32] No, I will say this. I mean, I fired a fair number of generals and senior people myself. [8:43] The way I handled it was a little differently in the respect that I felt that I needed to go in front [8:48] of the press and explain why I hadn't taken these actions. [8:52] Well, there's not a full Pentagon press corps even present at the Pentagon these days for a [8:58] news conference like that without getting special permission to be on the premises right now. [9:03] He's fired 16 military officials at least, including the Navy secretary, the Army chief of staff, [9:10] General Randy George. During the Iran war, he pushed out the admiral at the helm of South Com, [9:15] the chief of naval operations, the Air Force vice chief of staff, the head of defense intelligence. [9:21] Do you see those things as necessary disruption that ultimately will have a positive impact or does [9:27] it concern you? Well, it concerns me, but I also have to acknowledge that I don't know the rationale [9:34] for those changes. I don't know why those changes were made. And there may be perfectly justifiable [9:41] reasons, but I just don't know what they are. And you think that that should be explained to the [9:46] public and to the Congress? I think, I think that people, when, when you have a lot of changes like [9:52] that, yeah, I think you, I think there, there is an obligation to explain at a minimum to the Congress, [9:58] the rationale. The systems don't seem to be operating that way right now. No. Our full interview [10:06] with Secretary Gates is available on our website, YouTube channel, and our podcast. We'll be right back.