Why won't the DNC release its 2024 autopsy?

[0:00] We all know that Kamala Harris lost the 2024 election, but in the aftermath, there has been [0:05] shockingly little effort by the Democrats to find out why she lost. Post-election reviews are [0:11] nothing new in American politics. In fact, the modern autopsy, if you will, in the form we know [0:16] it today, was actually born after the 2012 election, when Mitt Romney lost to Barack Obama by nearly [0:21] 5 million votes, and the Republican Party did a little soul-searching. They commissioned what [0:26] they called the Growth and Opportunity Project. What it found, Mitt Romney underperformed with [0:31] many groups, including Latino, female, and young voters. Now, fast forward to 2024, the vice [0:37] president at the time, Kamala Harris, loses to Trump, but not only did she lose, key groups [0:42] drifted away from the Democratic Party, again, Latino, female, and young voters. So Democrats, [0:48] rightfully so, wanted some answers. What did the party get wrong? What did the campaign miss? [0:53] Democratic National Committee Chair Ken Martin promised to make the report public until he [0:58] changed his mind, because apparently it wouldn't help Democrats win in 2028. [1:05] You criticized the DNC's refusal to release their 2016 autopsy as exactly what not to do. You said, [1:12] quote, was there any utility in doing that, and then promised your 2024 autopsy would be different. [1:17] Your exact quote was, of course it will be released. Why did you change your mind on that? [1:22] Well, look, I mean, what I said all along, even when I ran for this position, is that we were [1:27] going to focus on the things that will help us win the upcoming election. [1:32] But now, one of the few Harris campaign officials the DNC's autopsy team actually interviewed is [1:37] doing what the party has not. He is making his diagnosis of what went wrong public. Rob Flaherty, [1:43] the Harris campaign's deputy campaign manager, writes in the bulwark that Democrats had [1:48] tactics, ads, creators, social media, and viral moments. What they did not have, [1:53] he argues, was a brand. [1:55] And Rob Flaherty joins us now. Rob, it's good to have you on the show. [1:59] In your piece, you say that you haven't seen the autopsy report. There's some questions as to [2:03] whether it actually ever was put together in a report sense. But you spoke to the team putting [2:09] together this assessment in October of 2025. What can you tell us about the types of questions [2:15] they asked you and whether or not you got a sense that they were heading in a certain direction [2:19] based on the questions they were asking? [2:22] Yeah. Well, first of all, thank you for having me. I spoke with the autopsy in late October of 2025. [2:29] They had said the autopsy would come out shortly after the election. And it was a two-hour-long [2:35] conversation. The questions were solid. They were serious. But my concern was they were not really [2:42] diving into a lot of the deeper questions about tactics and strategy and the lessons that we could [2:47] learn from last time. So I started writing what I actually think we ought to do and what we ought [2:53] to think about. And that led to the piece that came out earlier this week. But it was a relatively [3:00] surface conversation, but it was focused on a lot of the questions people were asking at the time. [3:06] Did you get the sense that they were casting a wide net? I mean, in addition to just the questions [3:10] that they asked you, the issues they were interested in, did they make a real effort to [3:15] talk to people sort of up and down the chain in the operation? It's hard for me to know. I know that [3:22] they did not speak to that many people from the campaign or the super PAC side. You know, they spoke [3:28] to a lot of people in the ecosystem is my understanding. But, you know, as far as I can tell, there was not [3:33] a lot of conversation with actual folks who were on the campaign or on the independent expenditure. [3:38] Rob, so this is really a deep dive, your piece. I'm not sure exactly how many words, but you go [3:47] through many of the numerous high points of the 2024 presidential campaign. And in particular, [3:54] you do talk about the two ads that were perhaps the most debated ads of the cycle. You talk about [4:02] the Kamala Harris, she's with they, them, not you. And you also talk about the clip from The View where [4:10] she couldn't disagree with Joe Biden on anything. And you come to a different conclusion than the [4:16] Trump campaign officials who have talked about that ad in that you say that it was more about [4:21] not having a total brand than it was any ad being so damaging. But you also, you don't regret that [4:27] the Harris campaign didn't respond to the they, them ad and said that cultural issues are not as [4:34] president anymore. But with Abigail Spanberger and her success against fighting trans ads, [4:41] she did release an ad and try to combat the narrative. And she didn't get into the policy, [4:47] but she said, you know me. And she kept consistently arguing for locals. So isn't her success and her [4:54] win actually partially attributed to the fact that she was willing to respond and engage? [5:00] Well, I want to push back on that question a little bit. Insofar as we did respond to the [5:06] trans ad, I think the thing that we found that people were concerned about with that ad was not [5:10] actually transgender people. They were concerned about the sense that Kamala Harris was focused on [5:15] the wrong stuff. And so we produced a number of ads that, you know, pushed back directly on the claim. [5:21] They were less effective in real terms and in focus groups than actually just talking about the [5:27] economy and showing that Harris cared about the issues that mattered to them. And so, you know, [5:31] you've seen Republicans try to go back to this over and over and over and over again, and it hasn't [5:36] worked. And in the Spanberger race and in other places, and it's because it's not an issue that [5:41] people really care about all that much. The reason it was effective to the extent it was effective in [5:47] 2024 was it was part of an overall argument that Harris was focused on, you know, the wrong kind of [5:53] liberal priorities over, you know, the things that people were actually worried about in real time. [5:59] And I think that's why you've seen Republicans kind of move away from that and why you've seen even [6:02] the Trump team push back and say that that was the, you know, one of the reasons why, you know, [6:09] Spanberger one was actually focused on being focused on that rather than cost of living. And so, [6:13] you know, in many ways, I think that the strategy we used to push back sort of bore out. [6:18] So do you think, Rob, this central problem that you identified, that Democrats didn't have a brand [6:25] in 2024, has been remedied? Do you think that Democrats have a brand today? Or is there, if not, [6:34] in what direction would you push them? [6:37] Yeah, look, I think there are moves being made in the right direction. At the end of the day, [6:42] when you are the out party, you have a lot more chance to sort of define yourself by hypotheticals than, [6:46] you know, the things that are actually happening. But in many ways, I do think, you know, an economic [6:52] message that is broadly populist, focused on bringing costs down and, you know, sort of making [7:01] the country fairer and more just, I think those are all great places to go. You know, I think Trump [7:06] is sort of finding himself in the trap of leaning into a lot of the stuff that people are mad about. [7:10] If you, you know, as I sort of talk about in the piece, I think Democrats very often sort of [7:15] miss just how disillusioned people are. And when you're the folks who are sort of defending [7:19] the institution and defending the status quo, it's very easy to find yourself in the position of [7:24] saying, well, everything's great, you know, and or not going far enough. And, you know, [7:30] there are a lot of people out there who are just really feeling like the institutions of government, [7:35] the institutions of media, and the institutions of our body politic are not looking out and delivering [7:40] for them. And I think ultimately, that's the big thing is the last part of this is really delivery. [7:44] I think Democrats may get, you know, another opportunity to govern because of the Republicans [7:49] falling down on the job. But the question is really going to be, are you able to get things [7:53] done for people? Are you able to make people's lives materially better? And that's the open [7:56] question. Rob, do you believe that Gaza was a factor in why Vice President Kamala Harris lost [8:03] the election? When you look back and see where the country has shifted just over the last year and a [8:09] half and the attitudes that were beginning to come to the surface as a result of college protests and [8:15] campus protests, the sentiment that people had that she wasn't distancing herself from the Biden [8:21] administration, specifically Joe Biden's Gaza policy. Do you believe that was a factor that cost [8:27] her the election? [8:27] Look, I think Gaza was absolutely a factor. And, you know, maybe not in the ways that people would [8:35] consider it, you know, a polling issue, you know, you would see a lot of numbers that would say, oh, well, [8:40] you know, young people don't actually care about Gaza or anything like that. But it just sort of is, [8:45] it doesn't really pass the smell test, right? You know, when you feel the environment that was [8:50] out there, I think it sort of meaningfully reduced enthusiasm in ways that might be difficult to [8:55] measure. But, you know, at the end of the day, you know, you would see this. It was hard to say [9:00] supportive things about, you know, certainly President Biden or Kamala Harris on the internet [9:03] because it would become a conversation about their position on Gaza. You know, the protests [9:09] really drove coverage in a real way. And so, you know, my take is that in ways that may not be picked [9:16] up in a traditional poll, it became an issue that made it harder to be publicly supportive, which [9:22] obviously reduced enthusiasm. So can I say to you, it was the reason? I don't think it was the reason. [9:27] There were a lot of reasons, but certainly it was a factor.