Rubio testimony before Senate Appropriations Committee — full video

[0:00] And, again, seven-minute rounds. [0:04] Again, Mr. Secretary, welcome. [0:07] And I'll just start. [0:08] Anything you'd like to say? [0:09] Okay, do an opening statement now? [0:11] Nope. [0:14] It's going to be real quick, though. [0:15] Okay. [0:17] This account is important to me. [0:19] I've been involved with this account since I've been pretty much in the Senate. [0:23] I'm a fairly hawkish guy, but the state foreign ops account, the 150 account, Mr. Secretary, is the lifeblood for the State Department. [0:32] The men and women in the State Department, under your charge and direction, are real heroes. [0:38] They're serving in some very dangerous places, very much like a military. [0:42] Diplomacy can be a dangerous calling. [0:46] To all the men and women of the Foreign Service, thank you. [0:48] Thank you very much for what you do, for showing up and representing our country and our values in some of the most difficult places. [0:56] So, to those who serve in the State Department, you have my gratitude and admiration. [1:02] As to the budget proposal, we'll see what number we come out with. [1:08] This soft power, to me, is still power. [1:11] There are limits to hard power. [1:13] And soft power, to me, has the potential to make us safer in very troubled parts of the world. [1:20] And I've learned one thing. [1:21] If you can help feed a starving child, you're probably going to have a good relationship with the mother and the father. [1:30] And there are programs in this account that have been wasteful and missed the mark. [1:37] And a lot of them have been cleaned up. [1:38] And I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for looking at this account anew and making it more businesslike. [1:44] But there are some core functions of this account, global health and humanitarian aid, that are, again, national security in another form. [1:53] And I look forward to working with Senator Schatz, Coons, the whole crowd here. [1:57] We work together well. [1:58] And we have a common view that soft power is important. [2:03] With that, Senator Schatz. [2:05] Thank you, Chairman. [2:05] Thanks, Secretary, for being here. [2:07] A year ago at our fiscal 26 hearing, I told you I was willing to make hard tradeoffs on funding in order to do a couple of things. [2:16] First, we had to enact a bill reaffirming bipartisan support for foreign assistance following the evisceration of the enterprise under this administration. [2:24] Second, it was essential that we strengthen this committee's ability to oversee the implementation of that funding. [2:30] And that's how we ensure that it's used to protect Americans from infectious diseases, to help American businesses better compete abroad and lower costs at home, [2:39] and to deter threats that make us less safe here at home. [2:43] But the narrow goal of enacting a bill earlier this year was to begin to turn the page and work together to restore some of the vital work that has been abandoned. [2:53] Unfortunately, there are concerning signs that the administration is still not properly executing foreign assistance. [3:01] Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement, you said foreign assistance is, quote, [3:04] being brought under the strategic direction of the State Department, where it belongs. [3:09] This was a policy choice that some of us were willing to undergo, and some of us were brought into kicking and screaming, to be blunt. [3:19] But my request to you, Mr. Secretary, now that we're a year into this, is we're going to have to walk the list. [3:27] There are a bunch of things that we fought hard for in the bipartisan negotiations to enact legislation in this account. [3:36] And it makes it a little difficult to do it again if we feel that the statutory language that we passed on a bipartisan basis, [3:46] reflecting bipartisan priorities, GAVI, PEPFAR, among them, are still not being implemented. [3:55] And so my purpose here is to continue the conversation we had yesterday and continue the conversation we had two or three weeks ago [4:02] to get serious about, neither of us are trying to generate a clip here. [4:07] We're trying to make sure that the law that we enacted is implemented. [4:12] And now that foreign assistance really has been brought under your purview, [4:16] I want you to assert that authority and actually execute on the law [4:21] and execute on what I know is your basic belief that foreign assistance, when done right, [4:28] really projects American power across the globe. [4:31] But I am not interested in what HHS thinks. [4:34] I'm not interested in what someone at OMB thinks. [4:36] You're the secretary. [4:38] You've been granted extraordinary authority, not just as the secretary of state, [4:41] but as the national security advisor and one of the closest members of the cabinet [4:46] to the president of the United States. [4:48] And so I want you to assert your authority and to start implementing the law that we've already passed [4:53] because that's really the only way we're going to be able to pass a new SVOPs bill. [4:58] It is very hard for me to have swallowed a 13% cut and then argue for another bill [5:06] if the bill we already passed is not being followed. [5:09] And so I look forward to a constructive conversation, not necessarily lacking any difficulty, [5:14] but a constructive conversation about those areas in which I think your leadership is needed [5:19] to actually implement the bill that we've already passed. [5:22] Thank you very much. [5:31] Mr. Secretary. [5:32] Thank you. [5:33] And if you guys don't mind, I know you have a long night ahead. [5:35] Instead of giving you a seven-minute opening, maybe I'll give you a four-minute opening? [5:39] I don't think anybody would object to that. [5:41] Okay. [5:41] Because I know you've got a long night ahead of you. [5:43] Look, first of all, thank you for the, first of all, this opportunity, [5:46] but also for the constructive way in which we've engaged both with the committee and with your staff. [5:51] And we know we have more work to do, and we look forward to making that work. [5:54] I think that you've touched upon it. [5:55] And look, like I said, this is always a work in progress. [5:58] But our goal was always to align foreign assistance generally with the strategic lever, [6:04] with the strategic interest of the United States and how we prioritize. [6:07] And we can go through some of that today. [6:09] But I think we're on our way to doing it, whether it's realigning so that more [6:13] of our assistance is going into the Asia and the Western Hemisphere [6:17] than it has historically in the past, whether it's entering into compacts [6:22] with individual countries, 32 of them now, [6:24] that we can strengthen their domestic capacities [6:26] and their national health systems, whether it's our ability to arrange new agreements [6:31] with like the Global Fund and others, OCHA, [6:33] to be able to more effectively deliver the donations, you know, [6:39] the taxpayer dollars of the United States to these entities. [6:43] I think all that's been very valuable. [6:45] Obviously, there's a process by which money is appropriated in this country [6:49] and that involves us like sharing with you a proposal. [6:52] Again, this is my experience having served here for 16 years. [6:56] I did not expect that you would take up our budget and our proposal and pass it as is. [7:01] I know that Congress is an important role to play in making determinations. [7:04] I take the point that the ranking member has made about the role that Congress plays once it passes that bill [7:11] and having compliance with those conditions. [7:13] We'll work through some of that with you today as well as after that, after our meeting today. [7:17] But what I wanted you to understand is, and I think this has been largely misunderstood, [7:20] the goal of moving these programs, with the exception of the Food for Peace program, [7:25] which has been moved over to the Agriculture Department, [7:27] because we think they're, given their links to America's agricultural sector, [7:31] they're in a better position to deliver on that. [7:32] I think the goals we had was to say, what is our foreign policy and our national interest, [7:36] and then ensure that foreign assistance is a part of that strategy, not a stand-alone strategy of its own [7:43] that was not in any way coordinated or related to our broader foreign policy and national interest. [7:48] In addition, I always have a, even in my time here, and I was a supporter of foreign assistance, [7:53] but I've always believed the best foreign assistance programs are the ones that end. [7:56] They end because the country that you're helping no longer needs it. [7:59] I think one of the examples I always cite is South Korea. South Korea used to be an aid recipient, [8:04] a massive aid recipient. In fact, at one time, South Korea's economy was smaller than North Korea's. [8:08] Today, South Korea is not only not a recipient, South Korea is the ninth largest economy in the world, [8:13] and they are a donor state. Now, obviously, not every nation state has the capability to achieve what they did in that regard, [8:19] but I think every nation state has the ability to become more self-sufficient, and frankly, many of them ask for that. [8:24] Many of them want that. Many of them welcome that. [8:27] I know that in my travels and in my interactions with leaders around the world, [8:30] they did express concern and frustration that in the past, our foreign aid came either with massive strings attached, [8:36] in the sense of you had, you know, focus on this or that, or it came with, and also because I know that every country [8:58] doesn't have the capability to do that, but a lot of countries expressed concern that oftentimes we were doing aid [9:03] in their countries through NGOs without coordinating with a government at all. They had their own priorities. [9:08] They had their own systems they wanted improved, and we were just doing what we thought they needed, [9:12] not what they were asking for. So, I think that's helped in that regard. So, we can go through all some of these details today. [9:17] I'll stop here to save you the time. I know. Do you guys have a Voterama tonight is the rumor? Oh, tomorrow? Oh, well, then I can go all night. [9:25] I'm kidding. That's the one part of being in the Senate I don't miss. Voteramas. Thank you. [9:36] You're welcome to attend, if you like, for old times' sake. I will watch on C-SPAN. [9:42] We would have fun in the cloakroom. Senator Collins. [9:46] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rubio, it's wonderful to see you, and I want to thank you for your service in this new post. [9:57] Mr. Secretary, before the military hostilities with Iran began, did the Department of State and other parts of the government, [10:10] Department of Defense obviously, make an assessment on the likelihood that Iran would close or interfere with commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz? [10:27] Especially since 20% of the world's oil goes through that narrow passageway. [10:34] Yes. Not only was that a known risk factor, but there were others, like the launches against neighboring countries that they wanted to punish. [10:42] All of those factors were understood and weighed when the President made his decision about whether or not to do it. [10:48] It was imperative that Iran not be able to establish, and I agree, that Iran would not be able to establish a conventional shield that they were building, [10:57] with massive number of drones and missiles, and they were on their way to getting double what they had. [11:01] And if they reached the point where they had so many missiles and so many shield and so many drones, plus their naval capabilities that existed at the time, [11:08] Iran would then say to the world, there's nothing you can do about our nuclear program because if you do, we will overwhelm your defenses with the sheer volume of launches that we have. [11:17] And then they could do whatever they wanted on their nuclear program. [11:19] That was an unacceptable risk. It was a risk that we were running out of time to address. [11:23] That was weighed against the risks that you just outlined, not just the Straits, but also the attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain and UAE and Saudi Arabia and Qatar. [11:33] It was weighed against that. And the President made a decision that them not having a nuclear weapon above all else had to be the priority. [11:40] Is our country working with our allies in the region or with American oil producers, Canadian oil producers, [11:54] to look to the future on what could be done to mitigate the consequences of such a dependence on this particular strait in the future? [12:09] It wasn't the first time that Iran has done this. During the Iran-Iraq war, we saw Iran try to take control of the strait. [12:19] So it's disturbing that nothing was done in the intervening years to try to figure out are there alternative routes that could be used, [12:32] more pipelines, other ways so that Iran does not have such an ability to control the strait. [12:41] Well, there is an existing western pipeline. It certainly doesn't have sufficient capacity out of Saudi Arabia to make up for what's happening through the straits potentially. [12:50] But a couple points. Yes, the answer is, and I think the indications are that in the aftermath of what's happened with the straits, supply lines, [12:58] where the world is going to be getting its energy is going to diversify away from at least the straits traffic through a variety of means. [13:05] The first is you are going to see, I believe, the construction of more infrastructure that goes to the west and even to the north to avoid the straits. [13:12] It's a bit less efficient because the straits are a quicker shot, but I do think you're starting to see the alignment, but those are long-term projects. [13:18] I can't exactly tell you how long it takes to build these pipelines. It's not my area of expertise, but I certainly know it takes more than a month or even a year. [13:25] The second, I think you're going to see that the existing global capacity is going to shift. For example, there are now markets that are increasingly seeking to buy U.S. energy, [13:33] which we can supply and which we can provide. Historically, it hasn't made any sense for them because they could get it faster from the straits. [13:39] But given what's happened, you're seeing increasing interest. In fact, I think you'll start to see some real-time deliveries from U.S. refiners and producers to the Pacific region. [13:53] That's beginning to happen, and the Canadians are stepping into that world as well. [13:58] Let me switch to a different issue. Last month, I led a bipartisan letter to you urging the department to release the $600,000 [14:10] appropriated in fiscal years 25 and 26 for Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and I would ask unanimous consent that that letter, which many members of this subcommittee signed, be entered into the record. [14:27] Without objection. Gavi, as you well know, plays a critical role in preventing the spread of infectious diseases around the globe, [14:38] and helps to protect public health in our country as well by stopping outbreaks before they reach our borders. [14:47] That's particularly important right now as the world is responding to the Ebola outbreak in the DRC. [14:55] Can you update us on the status of the funding for Gavi, and when we can expect to see it obligated, consistent with clear congressional intent? [15:07] Yeah, and I think a number of you are aware of the particulars, but let me share it publicly as well so that people understand better. [15:12] On this account, we took into account, at the President's directive, HHS's view, and it's particular about one thing, and that is a certain preservative that's used in vaccines. [15:21] We don't use them in the vaccines in the United States, but they are used in vaccines around the world. [15:25] And the ask of Gavi was that they would stop providing these vaccines with that preservative. [15:30] But the problem Gavi has, according to them, is that they have purchased stocks of these vaccines, you know, the millions of doses, and they can't just throw those away because they have this preservative in there. [15:42] And so what we're trying to do is find, and we have now re-engaged more heavily, and I know some of you have been personally involved in this, to try to get this thing resolved, to try to figure out an outcome in which perhaps there's a phased approach to it. [15:54] They did make us a counteroffer. I haven't personally seen it in the last couple of days from Gavi, but it is my hope we can bring this to a resolution on the issue of these preservatives. [16:02] You know, they make the point, Gavi, is that in some of these countries where these are distributed, they don't have the same refrigeration system, so they need to have this preservative in there. [16:09] Perhaps there's a way to phase our way through that, so we'll consult with HHS on it as well. [16:14] But ultimately, we would like to see this problem solved, and we think we can. [16:18] We're certainly going to try, because we want it to be solved. [16:22] But in the meantime, the United States needs to get that money out there. [16:28] This is the first time that the United States has given up its seat on the Gavi's board in the partnership's history. [16:37] I don't think that's a good outcome. [16:40] So I hope we can get that money, which is desperately needed. [16:44] And that was a consequence of us missing that dues payment. [16:47] So in my sense, I'm pretty sure that in any deal we strike with them, part of the deal will be we get our seat back, and the money comes. [16:53] But we want to deal with this central issue. I think you're well aware of it. [16:56] And I think we can get there, but we've got to work a little bit on it. [16:59] Thank you. [17:00] Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, so I'll submit the rest of my questions for the record. [17:07] I just want to point out that there are proven high-impact interventions for pregnant women in prenatal vitamins made in the United States, and a food supplement, RUTF, again, made in the United States, that dramatically improved maternal and child health outcomes. [17:33] And it's something that I'll be talking further about the public-private partnership to get this kind of supplement out to those who need it globally. [17:45] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [17:46] Senator Schatz. [17:49] Thank you, Chairman. Secretary, to follow up on Gavi, my staff are on the emails between your department, HHS, and Gavi, and all the questions have been answered. [18:00] I know you're a busy guy, and you've been, I don't know how many hearings you've had this week, so you're probably not totally up to speed. [18:05] But all those questions have been answered, and Gavi committed to find a way forward. [18:10] But either way, I just want to make this extremely clear. [18:15] You and I have a very good relationship, even though we don't agree on a lot of things. [18:21] The statute itself gives you this authority, not the Secretary of HHS, not anybody else. [18:29] And the statute itself requires, does not authorize you, does not permit you, requires you to move this money. [18:38] And so, I just, we've had a lot of sort of reassuring conversations, and then another six weeks, and another ten weeks, and another three months pass by. [18:49] And I understand that you're having to navigate some pretty difficult terrain internal to the administration. [18:55] But the statute is not unclear about whose authority it is, and what you are obliged to do. [19:01] And so, can we get a timeframe for moving this money? [19:04] Well, the best way I can answer is, I want to get this solved. [19:09] I believe we will get it solved. [19:11] I'll be engaged in getting it solved. [19:13] I don't know the time, but I mean, shortly. [19:17] How's that? [19:18] I mean, like I said, I know that some paper came in, maybe it was yesterday or the day before they made a, I wouldn't want to call it a counteroffer, [19:23] but a proposal on what they think they could do to solve this problem. [19:26] I have not personally had an opportunity to review it, but I'm aware of it. [19:29] I was informed of it again this morning. [19:31] The commitment I can make to you is that this is a problem I would like us to solve. [19:34] I do think that the HHS point about this preservative is not irrelevant and invalid, because we don't use it in our country. [19:44] So, I want to account for that as well, but we will get this solved. [19:47] We want to get this solved. [19:49] Thank you. [19:50] You have $2.5 billion in unspent funds we provided specifically for the Global Fund since fiscal 24. [19:57] It is in Title III of the SVOPs bill for each year. [20:00] Again, on the USAID stuff, we had a disagreement about the kind of programmatic implementation. [20:09] But it was very hard to argue that the government itself didn't have the authority to determine who was a recipient of a grant. [20:17] This is different. [20:19] The Global Fund is specified in the statute. [20:22] And you have an internal cap on U.S. contributions. [20:31] It's not statutory, but it says 33%. [20:34] For every $1, you're going to get two non-American dollars. [20:37] Again, not required by law, not even necessarily permitted by law. [20:41] But even under that, there's still $661 million that you could move tomorrow morning. [20:48] And this is not a complicated situation with a preservative and a vaccine and interagency. [20:54] Like, this is entirely your authority. [20:56] And the $661 million that is available to be moved, those are data that came from your department. [21:06] And so, I'm just wondering when we can move this money because it's so highly consequent. [21:11] Yeah. [21:12] We've pledged up to the 33% cap, which as you outlined, is an internal cap. [21:15] It's one that I believe the previous administration used some cap as well. [21:20] But I think, just to be clear on your question, what you're saying is that of the amount that's pledged, there's still $600 million that has not moved. [21:26] $660 million has not moved. [21:27] Okay. [21:28] So, I think that will move shortly, very quickly. [21:30] I think you also understand OMB will not allow us to move additional funds beyond the 33% cap. [21:36] And the purpose for the 33% cap is to encourage more donations. [21:40] Basically, make it clear to the world that the more you give the Global Fund or the more the fund can raise, [21:44] the more we will provide it. [21:46] By the way, it's my understanding as well, under the Biden administration, they too, despite additional appropriations, [21:52] did not go above the cap they had imposed. [21:54] But the goal of the cap is not punitive. [21:55] It's to encourage more donations to match our amount. [21:59] But on your point, I'll take it back on the $600 million. [22:01] That might just be an internal bookkeeping matter that needs to move the money to get us to our pledge. [22:07] And we'll give more if they raise more. [22:09] Got it. [22:10] Let's talk about the USAID closeout. [22:12] There's $16 billion in the USAID account tied to awards that were terminated from prior years. [22:20] But then there's another $3 billion in the bill that President Trump signed into law. [22:28] And so what's happening within your department is that $16 billion is just sitting there. [22:33] The $3 billion is being used to cover so-called closeout costs for USAID. [22:38] And what they are saying is they're going to assess, determine the cost of closeout. [22:45] And then after that, whatever's left over could be provided. [22:51] And let me give you the line items. [22:54] $250 million to combat malaria. [22:56] $330 million to combat HIV AIDS. [22:59] $320 million for maternal and child health. [23:01] $135 million for nutrition programs. [23:04] And $150 million to counter TB. [23:06] You have $16 million in a pile. [23:08] And then you have $3 million that was passed and enacted by President Trump and all of us. [23:15] And none of it is moving until we assess the closeout costs. [23:19] And then we're saying, well, whatever's left over for contract closeouts, [23:23] that's available from malaria and TB and all the rest of it. [23:26] I think that's inverted. [23:28] You should use the $16 billion from the canceled contracts to close out whatever you need to close out. [23:33] And the $3 billion that we enacted for specific purposes should be used for those specific purposes. [23:39] So can I get your attention on that matter? [23:41] Sure. [23:42] Couple points, as you now know, the USAID, I'm no longer the acting director. [23:45] It's no longer under our purview, not even through my personal engagement. [23:48] It's now basically out of OMB. [23:50] And they are sitting on this closeout fund. [23:52] The closeout fund isn't just for contracts. [23:54] Some of them are tied up in litigation. [23:56] In essence, some of that money may be needed because these people have sued. [23:59] They want to get paid for the contract. [24:00] They claim they were in breach. [24:01] And courts are basically saying we may rule in their favor, and in some cases might. [24:05] And we have to have funds available. [24:06] So they're still estimating what that closeout cost will be. [24:09] We have been able to go and get some money for OMB. [24:11] For example, I think after our conversation, we talked a little bit about Ebola response. [24:16] OMB released, I think the number is $200 or $250 million from that fund for the Ebola response. [24:22] And theoretically, the money that's not needed for the closeout, as I said, may be given to the state for programming. [24:27] As you can imagine, we want it to be given to the state for programming because we have programming we can put it towards, [24:32] including the items that you've outlined. [24:34] And that was the whole point. [24:35] I mean, the whole point here was to move aid under the State Department. [24:38] Whether we like that or not, that was your objective. [24:40] And so now that there's this pile of money that's still in USAID, it strikes me as a little odd that you can't control those dollars. [24:47] That was the purpose of enacting this kind of new model. [24:50] The other thing I'd say is, first of all, thank you for releasing those Ebola dollars. [24:53] It also demonstrates that you are perfectly capable of getting money released from those closeout funds if you wish. [25:00] And I would say Ebola is an urgent priority, but so is malaria, so is TB, and so is HIV AIDS. [25:06] Thank you. [25:07] Mr. McConnell. [25:09] Welcome back to your whole place of work, Mr. Secretary. [25:20] Hope you like your new job. [25:22] There are some days I like this one better, some days I like the new one better. [25:25] It depends on, like, tomorrow will not be one of those days. [25:28] You reported last month that the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, quote, did not feature prominently, end quote, in President Trump's meeting with President Xi. [25:43] But you also acknowledged China was, quote, upset, end quote, by the approval of $11 billion in sales to Taiwan. [25:55] So last month, the acting secretary of the Navy testified that pausing delivery of sales to Taiwan couldn't be a result of munitions expenditures in CENTCOM because, quote, we have plenty, end quote. [26:14] But if it's not about U.S. military needs, I struggle to see the rationale. [26:20] We pushed Taiwan to spend billions on U.S. weapons only to balk at actually delivering them. [26:31] As for yourself, you've been clear-eyed about the gravity of Chinese ambitions and the threat they pose to our interests. [26:41] You know why the optics of this pause aren't great. [26:45] What's the administration's calculus, and what are you doing to reassure Taiwan and U.S. treaty allies in the region that can actually count on our commitments? [26:58] Yeah. [26:59] A couple points. [27:00] First, we don't consult with the Chinese on these sales. [27:03] They raise it constantly. [27:05] And – but we have not – we don't consult with them, and that's in keeping with our longstanding policies, which have not changed. [27:10] The second point I would make is we just did an $11 billion sale in December. [27:14] And the reason why we know the Chinese were upset is not just because they told us. [27:17] It's because they fly all kinds of planes. [27:19] They crossed the center line multiple times. [27:20] Very aggressive response to it. [27:22] It was the single largest arms sale to Taiwan, I believe, in history. [27:25] Just concluded in December. [27:27] I think the actual cumulative amount was larger than the four years of Biden combined, [27:31] and certainly larger than the six years in which President Obama gave no sales, zero, to six of his eight years as president to Taiwan. [27:38] That said, this current one is not on a pause. [27:40] It's simply under a review. [27:41] It's a big amount of money. [27:42] It's $14 billion. [27:43] It has implications on our defense industrial base and whether – you know, what the production line will look like. [27:48] We have to balance that with these other things. [27:50] So it's going through the internal DOW review. [27:52] It's not – I don't think the right terminology is paused. [27:55] I think the right terminology is it continues to be under review as it's being processed. [27:59] But I just remind, five months ago, we did the single largest sale to Taiwan in history at $11 billion. [28:04] That's very substantial. [28:05] So – and that just happened under this administration not very long ago. [28:15] Another issue that's probably not real high on your radar screen but something I've had an interest in for a long time [28:21] and never have been able to figure out how to make a difference, and that's the democracy in Burma. [28:28] At last year's budget hearing, I asked you about the administration's plan to counter Chinese influence in Burma. [28:40] A year later, I still don't see a coherent strategy on that. [28:46] The Department repeatedly declined to obligate funds to implement the Burma Act, and it softened its policy toward Chinese-backed military junta. [28:58] So, Mr. Secretary, when Hong Kong's pro-democracy advocates were under attack, you stood by them, both on principle and because friends of democracy tend to be friends of America. [29:14] So, does the State Department have a preference on whether Burma is ruled by a Chinese-backed junta or by duly elected civilian leaders? [29:25] Or is the policy toward Burma agnostic toward values and stable outcomes? [29:32] Yeah, I don't think our policies will ever be agnostic anywhere in the world. [29:35] If we had our choice and our preference, we would much prefer to deal with a democratically-elected government that's friendly to the United States than one that isn't and is under the control of a foreign power. [29:45] The challenge in Burma has been, obviously, that the Chinese hold a tremendous amount of leverage over that system there, and we have tried to find and continue to search for creative ways in which we can at least have a relationship with elements within Burma. [29:57] But it's been a hard nut to crack, obviously, because both the regime that's in place has been brutal in the way that it's governed and because the amount of leverage and influence that China has over them. [30:08] So, we continue to seek opportunities to change that dynamic. [30:11] And maybe that's in baby steps, maybe that's in leaps. [30:13] You never know when history provides a unique opening and an opportunity. [30:16] But to your fundamental question, look, ideally – and by the way, dealing with democracies is not always easy because they change governments, and sometimes the person who got elected is a little less friendly to us than the others. [30:26] But over time, we have found that our ability to interact with democratically elected governments is much more stable and much more in our interest than otherwise. [30:36] In some cases, you don't get that option, unfortunately. [30:39] And I'm not saying that Burma is incapable of democracy. [30:41] I'm just saying that as the circumstances there exist right now, we are still searching for creative, innovative ways in which we can sort of find our way to at least have some relationship with individuals who have a chance to make a difference there and give them a chance to make that difference. [30:55] I've got time for one more. [30:56] I appreciate the administration's efforts to end Iran's decades-long war against America and Israel. [31:07] But I worry our public diplomacy on this has been self-defeating. [31:13] We had tools in place since the Cold War to reach freedom-loving people under censorship. [31:20] They are hosted primarily under the U.S. Agency for Global Media. [31:26] But even as the President has spoken directly to the Iranian people, the administration has repeatedly allowed USAGM to withhold funding from the international broadcast entities designed to help its message reach audiences who are under repression. [31:49] So I'd like to hear your view on the utility of USAGM guarantee organizations like Radio Florida and the Open Technology Fund. [32:00] What is the Department doing to leverage them to communicate with Iranian citizens? [32:07] And what role should that agency guarantee play in countering censorship and oppression from the PRC and China as well? [32:20] Well, and as you know, that agency is in the purview of this committee in terms of funding. [32:24] It runs ancillary to state, but we don't necessarily run it or control it. [32:28] It had somebody that was involved who had been appointed by the White House. [32:31] That appointment was removed by a court decision, and all of the decisions they made while they were there were also reversed. [32:39] I do know in my role as National Security Advisor that we're now involved in finding a restart of how we can get this program, because I do believe it has utility and value. [32:49] I think in the 21st century one of the questions we will ask ourselves is not just do we want to provide broadcasting to these places, but whether we should be getting more into the access business. [32:57] Meaning using part of that funding and part of that programming, not simply to have a radio station that broadcasts or something, but actually giving people in that country the tools to circumvent censorship and be able to access news and information from around the world. [33:10] And more importantly, to communicate with one another. [33:12] One of the things you will find pretty consistently in every totalitarian system is they want to control the ability of their citizens to communicate with one another. [33:20] It's why Russia has started its own Internet and its own internal systems. [33:25] It's why China does not allow American social media platforms to operate. [33:29] They have to control. [33:30] It's the reason why Iran shut down the Internet as one of the first things they did when hostilities began, because they don't want their people communicating with one another. [33:38] So I do agree it's a valuable tool in our toolbox. [33:40] And in my other role and capacity, it's one that I've given emphasis to and hopefully we'll have something to bring you that both complies with the court order and I think furthers our national interest. [33:50] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [33:53] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [33:55] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [33:56] Thank you, Mr. Secretary. [33:57] It's good to see you. [33:58] I think you might have been at the same briefing that I attended when Putin invaded Ukraine and we were in the skiff and we were asking our experts, how long is this war going to last? [34:09] And some of them suggested two weeks. [34:13] Valiant people, but they're up against one of the largest militaries in the world. [34:17] Here we are four, four and a half years later and the Ukrainians are still valiantly successfully in many respects fighting day in and day out. [34:25] I've never had any doubt in my mind whose side I was on in terms of the war in Ukraine. [34:31] My mother was born in Lithuania. [34:33] I know the Russians through the Tsar and Soviets and the history that I've read and I know what their ambitions are and they're not consistent with the values of this country. [34:42] I'm trying to figure out now exactly where we are as a nation when it comes to the war in Ukraine. [34:49] And I think of some specifics. [34:52] The $400 million that we appropriated to help the Ukrainian people fight this war has bounced back and forth. [34:59] Is it finally resolved? [35:00] Are we going to send this to the Ukrainians? [35:02] The $400 million? [35:03] Yes. [35:04] That's going through the interagency process right now. [35:06] In fact, I saw maybe last Friday something on it. [35:09] I think you'll see news on that pretty soon. [35:11] Well, that's exactly what Secretary Higspeth said two weeks ago, three weeks ago, and nothing's happened. [35:17] So here they are fighting for their lives. [35:19] They're facing ballistic missiles. [35:21] They don't have the defense that they need. [35:24] They're valiantly doing everything they can to save their people. [35:27] And we are going through some bureaucratic malaise, I'm not sure what. [35:33] Yeah. [35:34] It's just going through the interagency process and there are a couple stops along the way that unfortunately got tied up a little bit. [35:39] But I've seen it not as Secretary of State. [35:41] I've seen the interagency as National Security Advisor. [35:44] And it's something that I think we'll have news on fairly soon. [35:47] Will it be timely help? [35:49] Will it be help last year? [35:50] And there's indications it could be just as brutal this year, especially their inability to generate energy. [35:56] So there is urgency in trying to get this resolved and delivered. [35:58] Well, let me also ask you this question. [36:01] I realize with the Straits of Hormuz we found ourselves buying oil from the Russians. [36:06] Was that the understanding? [36:08] So Treasury has lifted on a short-term basis the sanctions on the sale of some Russian oil, primarily as a trade-off, unfortunately, [36:16] but designed to get more oil into the market to try to stabilize global prices. [36:21] But this is not a permanent change to our policy. [36:23] It's a time limit of one that was just recently extended by, I believe, by another 30 days. [36:28] Not that long ago we characterized Russia as one of the four hard targets in the world for the United States. [36:33] Are they still? [36:34] They clearly still remain the challenge. [36:37] And back to your point that you made a moment ago, I don't think there's any doubt at this point. [36:40] In the minds of most observers around the world, and I would say in the minds of some inside of Russia, [36:46] that the invasion of Ukraine has been a strategic disaster for them. [36:49] They are not going to achieve the objectives they set out on day one for certain, [36:53] and they may not even be able to militarily ever achieve the objectives they're demanding now in negotiations. [36:58] I would also say that how we have viewed it is this war has no military solution. [37:02] It has to have a negotiated settlement to it. [37:04] And that's the role we've tried to play, and it's been a difficult role to play because, frankly, we're not an impartial mediator. [37:09] We sanctioned Russia, and we are providing and have sold weapons through the Pearl Program, [37:13] which has remained unimpeded to the Ukrainians. [37:16] Unfortunately, those talks have stalled in recent months for a variety of reasons. [37:20] The Ukrainians have actually made some battlefield gains in the last month as well. [37:24] The Russians are losing 5,000, not injured, dying. [37:27] In fact, it is the first conflict, according to the Department of War, [37:31] it is one of the first conflicts ever in which the death rate is higher than the casualty rate on the Russian side. [37:38] It's the first time ever that you have more deaths than casualties. [37:40] So you're right, not only are the Ukrainians bravely fighting, they're effectively fighting. [37:44] So the role we want to play is if there's a way to negotiate this thing to a peaceful – [37:48] because ultimately this is going to be – the end of this is going to be negotiated. [37:51] But it's been difficult because the demands that both sides have in order to end it have been far apart to this point. [37:57] I'd like to take you to what happened last night, just 12 hours ago or so, when the Russians were attacking Ukraine and Kyiv again, killing civilians, [38:11] while the Ukrainians were attacking the Russians in St. Petersburg. [38:15] And they have destroyed some of their infrastructure and oil-producing facilities. [38:22] It's especially embarrassing to Putin because this is the week of the Russian Davos. Are you familiar with that? [38:27] I am. [38:28] Why did we – [38:29] Never attended, but I'm familiar with it. [38:30] Well, I'm asking why the United States would send an official delegation to Vladimir Putin's Russian Davos to talk about economic development in Russia. [38:39] I'm not aware of the delegation that went. I'm aware of the event. I know they were hosting one. [38:46] But I don't think it would have been a high-level official. [38:49] I'm not sure what level it is, but to think that we had anything official – [38:52] and it included Steven Seagal, the actor, as one of the people representing the United States. [38:58] Are you familiar with that? [38:59] I'm familiar with who he is. [39:01] I am too. [39:02] Yeah. I'm not – look, at the – not a government official. [39:05] Back to your point – because I think the broader point is – and you just raised it a moment ago about these attacks. [39:10] What's changed – Russia has always been capable of these long-range strikes. [39:13] And the key – you've seen an increase in intensity as a result of what you've pointed out [39:18] and the fact that the Ukrainians have been effective against them. [39:20] That's been the one dynamic that's changed in the last few months is Ukraine has become increasingly effective [39:25] at conducting long-range strikes deep into Russia and deep against critical nodes of the Russian economy. [39:31] And I think one of the things that reminds us of why it's important to try to bring this war to an end if we can, [39:36] because the risk of escalation is real – more real than it was two years ago. [39:40] We have a sanctions bill here that might do that as well. [39:43] I'd like to close with one personal note. [39:46] You joined me when you were a member of the Senate in the Paul Simon Water for the World effort [39:50] to bring clean drinking water and sanitation to some of the poorest people on Earth. [39:55] We've reached 76 million people with water, 58 million with sanitation. [40:00] That program is still on the books. [40:01] Are we going to fund it? [40:02] Yeah, we are. [40:03] And in fact, there's about 100 million in total that we'll be spending again this year. [40:06] Great. [40:07] Thank you. [40:08] Thank you. [40:09] And on the sanctions bill, there's 36 seconds left. [40:11] I know we've been working with you, Senator Graham, and perhaps others on the Office of Legal Counsel. [40:16] You've been going back and forth on some language. [40:18] So I think you'll get there on your bill in terms of what you need to have. [40:24] Thank you, Senator Durbin. [40:30] We'll just pick up on that point. [40:32] Number one, I think you're doing a great job for our country. [40:34] I'm glad you're there. [40:35] And you've been working really hard, and it's appreciated by many of us up here. [40:39] You represent us well, Secretary Rubio. [40:43] About – do you agree the blockade has really hurt the Iranian economy? [40:48] Yeah, it's denying them upwards of $300 to $400 million potentially a day of revenue. [40:54] And the reason it's hurt their economy is because their economy is basically based around oil and gas sales, right? [41:01] Yeah, largely. [41:03] I mean, obviously, that would be the core of their ability to generate revenue. [41:06] Do you agree the soft underability of the Russian economy is oil and gas sales? [41:10] Of their economy? [41:11] Yeah. [41:12] Well, again, that's one of the commodities. [41:14] They have some agricultural sales as well, but oil and gas are clearly the leading generator. [41:18] So the theory of the bill you just mentioned, which is enormous bipartisan support, and we're very close, is to give the president the ability, if he chooses to, to put tariffs and sanctions on countries that buy a cheap Russian oil and prop up their economy. [41:33] You support that concept, right? [41:35] I support having those tools available for the president to use, especially if what we're trying to do is reach a negotiated agreement. [41:40] The more leveraged tools we have at our disposal, I think the bigger role we can play in breaking this about. [41:45] Thank you. [41:46] This will come from Congress, so it'll have our blessing. [41:48] It'll be, I think, a better situation in court. [41:51] So like China and India are the two top. [41:54] China buys the most oil from Russia, the most oil from Iran. [41:58] So to our friends in China, if you would stop this, we'd end both these wars. [42:04] So we hope to give you that tool soon to the president, and thank you for all your help to get it done there. [42:11] Do you agree that under our law that there is an agreement with Iran that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act would apply and it'd have to come to the Congress? [42:20] Yeah. [42:21] The ANARA is a pretty tightly written bill, and so it does have very specific requirements about elements of the nuclear program that would have to be noticed to Congress. [42:30] Okay. [42:31] Good. [42:32] When it comes to any deal that may be entered into with Iran, and I hope you can, I want to get a diplomatic solution. [42:38] Hezbollah is a terrorist organization under U.S. law, is that correct? [42:41] Hezbollah, yes. [42:42] Correct. [42:43] So in the future, if Iran continues to help Hezbollah, will there be anything in the deal that would punish Iran for doing that? [42:49] Well, that's what we want. [42:50] We certainly think that in order to deal with, look, the primary threat here is the nuclear weapons, and that's what we want to be able to fix, and that is that they can never have a nuclear weapon. [42:57] Right. [42:58] Obviously, their ability to export terror and finance it in the region is also deeply problematic, and we would most certainly insist, I mean, there could be sanctions just on that. [43:06] Okay, thanks. [43:07] See, October 7th had nothing to do with their nuclear program. [43:10] It was generated by proxies, and it killed 1,200 Israelis, and it just shows you the power of these proxies, and I think any successful containment of Iran would have to contain their proxies like Hezbollah, so I'm glad to hear that that certainly will be part of the deal. [43:28] When it comes to the deal itself, the nuclear part, to make sure they didn't have a nuclear weapon, do you agree that without enrichment, you can't make bomb material? [43:42] If you don't have the ability to enrich, you can't make bomb material. [43:45] No, that's right. [43:46] Yeah. [43:47] Unless somebody's willing to sell you 90 percent of richer. [43:49] Right. [43:50] Well, that's not making it. [43:51] It's buying it. [43:52] Correct. [43:53] There are countries that have peaceful nuclear power programs that don't enrich. [43:57] It's my view that whatever deal you do with Iran, they should not be allowed to enrich at all. [44:02] If they want peaceful nuclear power, they can have a one-two-three agreement. [44:05] Do you agree with that concept? [44:07] Not only do I agree with that, we've offered it to them in one of the rounds of previous negotiations before Epic Fuel. [44:11] We actually offered to give them access to free fuel that they didn't have to enrich, which they declined, of course. [44:17] They want to enrich to make a bomb, don't you think? [44:19] They want what, I'm sorry? [44:20] They want to continue to enrich for one day to make a bomb. [44:24] Well, if what they want is a civilian nuclear program, which, as you said, they can have because other countries have it, you don't have to enrich, and you certainly don't have to enrich buried deep in a mountain. [44:32] If the past is any indication of the future, they took what was supposed to be a limited civilian program and were able to make 900 pounds of 60% highly enriched uranium, right? [44:43] Correct. [44:44] Approximately. [44:45] Yeah. [44:46] Okay. [44:48] They cheat. [44:49] Is there anything that would make you believe in the future they wouldn't cheat if they could? [44:52] Well, that's why any deal would have to have strong verifications. [44:56] And the JCPOA allowed enrichment. [45:00] Do you agree with me that if they had no enrichment capability, it'd be hard to cheat because you don't have anything to cheat with? [45:06] Well, that's right. [45:07] Okay. [45:08] Good. [45:09] When it comes to Cuba, you know what you're talking about. [45:15] And congratulations on Venezuela, the role you've played here to try to get Venezuela from communism to a friend of America. [45:24] Tell us about why we should care as a nation for the regime and the communist regime in Cuba to fall. [45:36] Well, first let me just say briefly on Venezuela, I think we're better off than we were just five months ago. [45:40] This was five months ago. [45:41] We're not where we need to be. [45:42] A lot more work needs to happen and needs to be done, and that includes needs to conclude with free and fair elections, and the conditions for that need to be created. [45:49] But we certainly feel like Venezuela no longer poses the threat to our national interest that they did just five months ago when it was run by someone who openly cooperated with narco-trafficking cartels and, in fact, ran one himself. [46:00] In the case of Cuba, the proximity alone makes it relevant. [46:03] But you have a failed state 90 miles from our shores that hosts both Russian and Chinese intelligence apparatus within their country that has a long history of supporting violent leftist Marxist groups in the region and anti-American groups in the region as well and have been a destabilizing force for 67 years. [46:21] But just the existence of a failed state that's friendly to our adversaries in our own hemisphere is in and of itself a national security situation. [46:28] Now, I would say this about Cuba. [46:30] We want Cuba to be a country that can enjoy the same things they do in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, most of the Caribbean, all of the Caribbean bases for the most part. [46:39] The problem they have is that the country is not even run by a government. [46:42] The country is run by a military conglomerate named Gaisa that controls 70% of the GDP of the country. [46:48] And all the money they generate, they're sitting on $18 billion of assets. [46:52] Not a single penny of the money that that conglomerate generates transfers over to the national treasury. [46:57] That means it doesn't build bridges. [46:58] It doesn't build roads. [46:59] It doesn't build schools. [47:00] It doesn't do any of it. [47:01] It all goes in. [47:02] And that's what we need to tackle. [47:03] And those are the people that have to agree to normalize Cuba to the world and to its neighbors in the United States. [47:10] Well, God bless your efforts to do that. [47:11] I think Venezuela and Cuba going from the communist column to what you described would be a great advantage. [47:17] What a great advancement for our hemisphere and the people of those countries as well as America. [47:22] Final question. [47:23] President Trump has said that after the Iran nuclear deal, he wants to expand the Abraham Accords. [47:28] And I work with President Biden and many people on this panel here to try to get Saudi Arabia to recognize Israel under Biden's watch. [47:38] And I just want to applaud President Trump for saying that would be the game changer of all game changers. [47:44] Do you agree with that? [47:45] Can you articulate to this committee why expanding the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia? [47:50] What would that do to the region and why is that so important? [47:53] Well, I think it's self-evident, but I would say look at the benefits it's already had with regards to the Emirates, [47:58] the United Arab Emirates and Israel and the relationship that they have. [48:01] If you can create these strong economic and people-to-people linkages between these countries and the recognition, [48:06] it creates tight bonds that I think extend beyond just defense. [48:09] It extends to economics in ways that they're now enjoying joint prosperity. [48:14] It makes a lot of sense from the economic standpoint because what Israel has, for example in the technology sector, [48:19] would be highly beneficial to these countries that would join. [48:22] And likewise, the resources these countries have would be beneficial to Israel. [48:26] So we do want to expand the Abraham Accords. [48:28] Obviously, it's difficult to do at this moment, but we're laying the groundwork for it. [48:31] It'll be a top priority of this administration. [48:33] Go ahead. [48:34] Finally, I just want to say, Saudi Arabia is different than any other country. [48:38] It's the keeper of the holy sites of Islam. [48:41] It's the center of Islam as we know it. [48:43] If they join, folks, a lot of other Muslim nations will join. [48:49] North Africa would be the biggest change in our lifetime. [48:52] Let's work together under Trump like we did Biden to make this happen. [48:55] Senator Murray. [48:57] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [49:00] Mr. Secretary, you are not only the Secretary of State, you are also the President's National Security Advisor. [49:08] Those are both full-time jobs when we're at peace, let alone as we have troops deployed in multiple conflicts [49:15] around the world and the President is threatening to invade Cuba. [49:19] So I want to just ask you specifically about Iran. [49:23] You were one of just a handful of top aides with a seat at the table when the President ultimately did decide to launch the Iran War. [49:33] Did you advise the President against the war? [49:35] Well, I'll never tell anybody what I advised the President privately, but I will tell you that the President had before him all the information that he needed. [49:42] I agree with the decision that he made, if that's what you're asking, because the President of the United States saw a threat of Iran developing a nuclear weapon behind a conventional shield that in about a year would have been impenetrable. [49:53] And we could not allow him to develop that immunity and then they could break out to a weapon. [49:57] So you won't tell us, you know, this is a question that millions of Americans are asking, how on earth did we get here? [50:04] So I wanted to know what you did advise the President. [50:07] Were you for or against this war? [50:09] Or did you, the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, have no opinion? [50:14] No, I just told you I support the President's decision. [50:17] I think he made the right decision. [50:18] What I cannot tell you and will never do, and you have to understand, nobody in my role has ever done, is to go to you and say, oh, I was in a meeting and I told the President this or I just can't do that. [50:26] I won't do that. [50:27] It's unwise to do that and it's unfair. [50:29] But I am telling you the President made the right decision. [50:31] That's my view. [50:32] I believe in it strongly. [50:33] You do now. [50:34] Okay. [50:35] Let me just. [50:36] I did. [50:37] I've always have. [50:38] I mean, in terms of my view of the challenge that it poses. [50:39] Okay. [50:40] Well, back in March, you said this war would end in, quote, weeks, not months. [50:43] And here we are, four months. [50:45] Hundreds of troops injured or killed and billions of dollars later. [50:49] Trump promised everybody he was going to lower prices and no new wars. [50:54] Now we have higher prices, new war. [50:57] Trump promised the American people this war would be fast and decisive. [51:01] It has been slow and secret and endless. [51:05] And the majority of Americans do oppose this conflict. [51:08] What my constituents are telling me is they want childcare, they want healthcare to be more affordable. [51:14] They don't want Trump to have one and a half trillion dollars more for a defense budget to start wars around the globe. [51:21] I hear that constantly from so many people. [51:24] You know, Secretary Rubio, let me just say this. [51:27] Diplomacy and development tools help keep us safe here at home by mitigating conflict, by mitigating disease, other global threats. [51:36] But the budget that you are here to defend, which would slash this work to the bone, while sending war spending through the roof, makes clear that diplomacy is Trump's last priority. [51:49] And it, by the way, it's not just the budget or the unhinged rants attacking allies like Greenland and Canada or threatening to end civilizations or Trump treating war like a game, the White House posting literal video game edits as if he weren't getting American soldiers injured. [52:06] It's also the actions that you've taken over the past year to gut the State Department, deeply concerning, dismantle foreign aid, abdicate American leadership. [52:17] Under your leadership, it is deeply concerning that things like the state leaving left 500 tons of food to rot in ports and it had to be incinerated, [52:27] or pushing out thousands upon thousands of dedicated public servants, including families who put country first here and left their home to serve around the world. [52:37] Only to be sacked with no rhyme, no reason. I've heard from them. [52:42] Meanwhile, you are planning to put Trump's face on US passports, as if that's going to help our image when all that's happening. [52:49] And the hack and slash job that you have done to foreign assistance, and you're asking for in this budget, has not only shattered America's global leadership, [53:00] it has led to millions of preventable deaths. Programs have been frozen, grants have been cancelled, [53:07] lifesaving work utterly turned upside down. I want to talk about global health. The stakes of life and death are here under global health. [53:15] PEPFAR supported testing reaching nearly 5 million fewer people than the year before. [53:22] In Zambia, babies born to HIV positive moms used to be tested within hours of birth and treatment started immediately for positive cases. [53:32] Now, babies are not being even tested until they're six weeks old. So, you're not just cutting resources that I just referenced. [53:40] You are actually cutting the United States out of the conversation on global health threats and leaving all of us less prepared. [53:49] We are in the middle of a deadly Ebola epidemic. We're seeing a worrisome hantavirus outbreak. [53:56] This administration has halted funding to the World Health Organization, and you are currently withholding nearly $2 billion in FY25 global health funding that was appropriated with bipartisan support here, signed into law by President Trump, and expires in less than four months. [54:16] Now, I know that Ebola funding somehow miraculously started moving when we were seeing bad headlines. [54:23] But what is moving right now, Mr. Secretary, is less than 2% of what is available. [54:29] So, my point is that the delay in mobilizing those resources has cost us valuable time and let this disease kill more people. [54:39] And the fact is we already had these support systems in place. They were in place until this administration destroyed them. [54:47] And even as we stare down a crisis caused by this administration's incompetence, in my opinion, you are here today to defend a budget that doubles down on that. [54:57] That is what is really disturbing to me with a 40% cut to global health programs in this budget. [55:03] So, to my point of view, this budget doesn't make America great again. It makes the world sicker and less safe. [55:11] And that, I'm just talking about the cuts that you're proposing with this budget. [55:15] Because we can't ignore the biggest line item in the President's overall budget that's in front of us, which is war. [55:22] One and a half trillion dollars for war. Not a cent for childcare. Not a cent to make healthcare more affordable. [55:30] That's the budget that you are here today to defend. And it spends one and a half trillion dollars on war. [55:36] And slashes your department to ribbons. [55:38] So, that is what is concerning to me as you come before our committee today to back this request up. [55:45] It just seems to me we are cutting diplomacy and paying defense contractors. [55:51] And I just believe from my point of view, and I know you disagree with me, but I just think this is the wrong way for our country to go. [55:58] Budget is a statement of values. I've said it many, many times. [56:01] And I think it is in big question where the values are in this budget. [56:05] So, that's where I am. [56:08] Who's the chair right now? [56:09] Senator Bozeman? [56:10] Senator Bozeman. [56:11] Can I respond? [56:12] Because she touched a lot of topics. [56:13] I don't know if I can get all of them, but I'm going to get most of them. [56:15] Yeah, sure. [56:16] Because I strongly disagree with almost everything that was said. [56:18] I figured you would. [56:19] I know. [56:21] A couple of points. [56:22] First, let's talk about the State Department. [56:23] The State Department was actually one of the least impacted of all the agencies in government. [56:26] I'm not talking about least impacted, you heard. [56:28] No, no, no. [56:29] But let's be frank. [56:30] We didn't, not a single, for example, overseas employee was ripped from the State Department. [56:35] The vast majority of the reduction in forces came from the career civil service, not the foreign service. [56:41] And that's because we got rid of the functional bureaus and put all the power under the regional bureaus. [56:45] It's one of the best things we've ever done and I think is going to prove to be very wise. [56:49] And we already see the impacts of it. [56:51] Let's walk through some of the programs you pointed to. [56:53] So, for example, our disaster response today around the world, because we combined those accounts, is faster than it's ever been and more effective than it's ever been. [57:01] These are not theories. [57:02] These are the reality. [57:03] We responded to hurricanes in the Caribbean, Jamaica and Cuba, by the way, $3 million in aid to Cuba, faster at a record pace than ever before. [57:11] We've responded to two typhoons in the Indo-Pacific faster than we've ever responded because we combined and consolidated those accounts and were able to move very, very quickly in that regard. [57:21] Beyond that, you mentioned the PEPFAR. [57:25] The reality of it is, first of all, you have to combine it with all these other programs that we're involved in. [57:30] If you look at the numbers for the last, I mean, the third quarter of 2026, 2025, the exact number of people that were receiving medications were receiving medications during that period of time. [57:42] The exact number, and it's going to even improve because we're adding innovation to it. [57:45] There have been recent innovations in AIDS treatment and HIV treatments that are even more effective than some of the legacy programs that are available. [57:51] Mr. Secretary, it's very clear why you are the Secretary, because you're very good at words. [57:56] No, but I'm giving you, I don't know, how else can I answer you other than words? [58:00] I will stand by my statement against yours. [58:02] I just will. [58:03] What was that? [58:06] I'm sorry? [58:07] I will stand by all of the facts that I gave you. [58:09] Okay, but I get a chance to respond, right? [58:11] Well, my time's out. [58:12] It's up to the Chair. [58:13] You can respond. [58:14] Okay. [58:15] So, on the other things you're not talking about, which I think are very valuable to this, are these global health compacts that we're entering with 32 countries, 27 of them in Africa, [58:24] in which we're basically going to the country to say, okay, we used to give money for clinics. [58:28] We used to give money for healthcare. [58:29] We used to give money for maternal care. [58:31] And we used to have it in a bucket, and it was maternal care globally, and then we went out and dished out contracts for people to go into individual countries. [58:38] Now we're entering into contracts, compacts, agreements with the country, and we're saying to them, okay, what are your needs? [58:44] And we're doing this through the embassies. [58:45] What are your specific needs in this country? [58:47] And entering into a compact, not just to provide them aid for these things that they need, but to help them strengthen their national healthcare systems so that long-term, they will be self-sustaining. [58:57] Now, in some countries, it may take 10 years to get to that point. [59:00] Some, it may take less. [59:01] But for the first time, we are not just having these buckets that then are distributed broadly around the world. [59:06] It is targeted at the highest needs of those countries based on their own domestic strategies and allowing us to become a value added to their strategy and to build their capacity. [59:16] That's something that hasn't been talked about. [59:18] You look at what we've done with OCHA, where we've signed the first humanitarian reset agreement in Geneva. [59:24] And along with our anchor pledge of $2 billion in support for the 18-country-based crisis-level pooled funds, this is going to allow us to respond in a more effective way with the global fund. [59:33] We've entered into agreement with the global fund. They've put out repeated statements thanking the United States for the role that we are playing with the global fund. [59:40] And we're prepared to do more if donors match what we are providing. We're prepared to do even more in that regard. [59:46] The list goes on and on. The point is, this is not about, first of all, this is not about denying or being punitive towards the world. [59:52] This is about delivering aid, but delivering it in a more effective and concise and consolidated way that actually gets more aid to more people faster. [1:00:01] That is the goal, and I think we're well on our way to achieving it. [1:00:03] Now, as far as the budget is concerned, you know we operate under an OMB guidance that tells us this is how much you have, tell us what you would do if this is what you get. [1:00:10] We present this to you. Having served here for a long period of time, I said this before you walked in, so perhaps you missed this point, is we always understand that there's going to be a congressional process in which you're going to look at our request and generally ignore it, but in many cases add to it or reframe it. [1:00:25] And we're prepared to work with you as we did last year in the passage of an appropriations bill, which we would like to see passed. [1:00:32] Because when you pass appropriations bills, it gives us the structure that we need in order to carry out these reforms. [1:00:38] Mr. Secretary, I just will tell you, I appreciate that you have words to explain everything from your point of view. [1:00:47] I'm talking from reality on the ground and from what I am seeing and hearing, and I fear deeply that we are losing our place and our value globally. [1:00:56] So you and I have a disagreement. Thank you. [1:00:58] Senator Moran. [1:00:59] Mr. Secretary, so good to see you. Thank you for your public service here in the Senate and in your current capacities. [1:01:08] You have been helpful, and I want to express my gratitude in regard to Food for Peace. [1:01:13] We have worked hard on trying to transition from the State Department to USDA. [1:01:19] Secretary Rollins has been an advocate, and I'm grateful for the cooperation between both departments to make sure that an important and highly successful Food for Peace program is continued and improved in its new home at USDA. [1:01:38] In Senator Bozeman's Farm Bill, Senator Bozeman and Senator Klobuchar's Farm Bill, we will hope to make that transfer permanent. [1:01:46] We appreciate the transfer that has been made administratively. [1:01:50] Let me ask you if there's just things that I should know, the committee should know in regard to that transition. [1:01:55] Anything that is being left behind? Are there problems in delivering the food aid? What role does State Department still play? [1:02:03] Well, I think the role the State Department will always play is because our embassies, and in some cases we do have Department of Agriculture people embedded in our embassies. [1:02:11] I think ultimately our embassies will always serve as a key liaison point with host countries that are recipients or may be in need of recipients. [1:02:18] So I always think there may be some issues in terms of bringing in the aid or bringing in the Food for Peace assistance into those countries that we would have to navigate with a host country. [1:02:27] But by and large, we felt that the transfer made sense. It had long been advocated for by many representing agricultural states. [1:02:33] Because truly, at the end of the day, the Food for Peace program is an American agricultural program to benefit the world, to use what we've been blessed with as part of a tool of our foreign policy. [1:02:42] We just felt it would be better executed. We agreed it would be better executed through the Department of Agriculture. [1:02:46] So we commit to doing everything we can on our end to facilitate the transition and then facilitate implementation. [1:02:52] So, Secretary, that I assume would include that if Food for Peace funds are appropriated in this appropriations process for fiscal year 27. [1:03:02] We won't keep it. [1:03:03] You won't keep it. You'll assure us that it will be utilized in Food for Peace at USDA. [1:03:07] Yes, because we're committed to this as part of our reform. [1:03:11] It was your yes to we won't keep it? [1:03:13] Yeah, no, I know that's what you're worried about. We don't have any intention of keeping it. [1:03:16] But I guess you're arguing that you may need to do it that way because of the way you're currently structured in your process here. [1:03:21] Correct. I would guess this appropriations subcommittee, not agricultural appropriations subcommittee, will appropriate for Food for Peace, [1:03:27] which then needs to be made certain again in the new year that that is utilized. [1:03:32] I imagine once the transition is complete, that would also shift the jurisdiction here? [1:03:36] That is true. [1:03:37] Okay. [1:03:38] Let me ask you a question about oil sanctions waiver. [1:03:43] I have I'm concerned about the decisions that have been made on three occasions to issue waivers for Russian oil sales. [1:03:54] President Trump was right to impose those sanctions last fall, but the waivers provide Moscow with badly needed revenue. [1:04:01] And I think make little difference to American consumers in the price of gas. [1:04:06] But if if Russia is struggling to make gains on the battlefield, I don't want them to have additional revenue assets to further their cause. [1:04:18] You indicated earlier that it's a difficult thing to negotiate to bring these two parties together. [1:04:23] It's really important for Ukraine to have the resources necessary to stay in the battle if the ultimate outcome is a negotiated settlement. [1:04:32] No, I acknowledge the tradeoff between what you're arguing, which is that these are short-term waivers. [1:04:36] These will not be permanent. [1:04:37] The permanent policy of the United States remains that those sanctions are in place. [1:04:40] And the reason for the short-term waivers, frankly, is the tradeoff, and that is that there are some countries around the world, [1:04:45] depending on where they're located, that are deeply dependent on the straits. [1:04:48] We are not. [1:04:49] But many countries around the world, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, are deeply dependent on the straits [1:04:54] and have no other way to get fuel if, in fact, those shipments are not getting through. [1:04:58] And so this was a short-term sort of decision to make more oil available in the global market [1:05:03] to be able to address the needs that some of those countries are facing [1:05:06] and to sort of stabilize global oil prices akin to the releases from the strategic reserves that you've seen from a couple of places. [1:05:13] But that is not a permanent change to our policy. [1:05:16] They've been renewed a couple of times at least, and I hope that non-permanent means that they will shortly come to a conclusion. [1:05:22] Yeah, if I'm not mistaken, I think the first one was 45 days. [1:05:25] I don't recall if the second one was 30 or 45 days. [1:05:28] But as I said, the policy of the United States, the baseline policy, remains what it was before. [1:05:32] At some point, those waivers will end unless something dramatic happens to end the war in Ukraine. [1:05:38] Mr. Secretary, in your team of State Department officials are ambassadors that represent the United States, [1:05:45] represent the State Department, but are a nation around the globe. [1:05:48] What's the status of the nominations to fill vacancies in your world? [1:05:54] Yeah, not good enough. I mean, I'd like to have more ambassadors, to be frank. [1:05:57] I'd like to get them. And there's a couple of reasons why that happens. [1:05:59] I mean, first of all, we have some, just to understand, even if there's not an ambassador, the person in charge is usually a highly capable career person. [1:06:06] But I understand the need for ambassadors. I really do. [1:06:09] So I think we've had three complexities here. [1:06:11] The first is the pace of confirmations. [1:06:15] I don't entirely lay it on the Senate, but I think we've gotten about 100 confirmations total for the department. [1:06:21] I think there are a few more on the way this week or next week. So that's good. That's number one. [1:06:25] The second is, frankly, the pace of nominations. [1:06:29] We've had some people that have expressed an interest. [1:06:32] They start going through the vetting process and then decide they don't want to do it. [1:06:35] And so they pull out for a variety of reasons. [1:06:37] It's a pretty intensive situation. [1:06:39] So attracting people on the non-career side has been problematic in some places. [1:06:44] Although we've gotten good candidates in the pipeline, but it sometimes takes months for them to clear through the paperwork. [1:06:50] And then the third is, and we're finally working through this process on the career front, is the D Committee and the recommendations that are starting to percolate up. [1:06:56] So I think we're going to have another class of about 30-some-odd career nominees that we're going to be bringing to the Senate shortly. [1:07:03] I think those should be able to pass fairly quickly. [1:07:05] But we agree. I'd like to see those numbers look dramatically different in the second half of this year. [1:07:09] Mr. Secretary, let me ask you one more question before my 52 seconds departs. [1:07:13] I returned recently from a trip with a couple of my colleagues at a visit to China. [1:07:20] We talked about many things in China, but I just want to raise one. [1:07:23] Is there any evidence that the precursor chemicals that are coming to Mexico or to the United States, [1:07:29] that China is serious about diminishing and ending that practice? [1:07:36] I would say that, remember, many of the critical mineral supply chain that have been denied to parts of the world, including the United States, were theoretical threats two, three years ago. [1:07:50] We used to talk about it and say, my gosh, if these guys ever denied us this, we'd have trouble. [1:07:53] And then it actually happened. They actually have done it, and they've done it. [1:07:56] So I think you have to assume that critical dependency on any single source around the world is dangerous because it can be disrupted by a pandemic or it can be disrupted as a strategic counter response to something you do that they don't like. [1:08:10] So I would just put to you this way. [1:08:12] It is an unacceptable risk that we run today, where 88% of the active ingredients in our pharmaceuticals are so sourced from one place. [1:08:18] And it is among, when we talk about supply chains, one of our most critical priorities is to diversify where we are getting that, including increasing domestic production. [1:08:27] Because the threat may be theoretical today. I think we have to assume it will not be theoretical one day, especially in a moment of crisis or conflict. [1:08:34] Thank you, Secretary. [1:08:36] Senator Shaheen. [1:08:39] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Secretary Rubio. We're glad that you're here. [1:08:46] I just want to go follow up a little bit on the questions about ambassadorial positions, because the fact is, it's not the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate that are holding up those nominees. [1:08:59] It's the fact that the nominees are not being submitted to us, and that those nominees who start to go through the process often aren't willing to comply with the ethics requirements that require that they divest of their outside holdings. [1:09:16] Right now, the United States has more than 100 vacant ambassador posts. I'm sure you're aware of that. China has 20. [1:09:25] In Africa alone, 37 of our 51 embassies have no ambassador, and China's filling that vacuum. [1:09:32] And you just sent over 20 nominees, of whom only four are career people. [1:09:40] So, the problem is not in the Congress. The problem is in the administration. [1:09:45] And I hope that you will begin to take up that slack by appointing more career ambassadors. [1:09:51] I want to go, though, back to the question about Ukraine, because you've rightly recognized that peace talks have stalled. [1:10:00] But I think it's important to point out that those negotiations have failed because Russia, not Ukraine, strung along the administration in its efforts to bring a peace deal. [1:10:12] And the only way to end this war on any kind of lasting terms is for President Trump and the administration to finally put some real pressure on Vladimir Putin and Russia. [1:10:24] Late last year, the Russian Central Bank warned that the Russian economy was slowing sharply. [1:10:29] Russia was in debt, and it was making contingency plans to fund its war effort in Ukraine. [1:10:35] This is the time, Mr. Secretary, for us to increase pressure on Russia. [1:10:44] And what have we done instead of that? [1:10:46] We've done exactly what Senator Moran said. [1:10:49] We've lifted the general license and are allowing the Russians to make $4 billion a month because of the lifting of those sanctions on its oil. [1:11:02] Now, I want to also go back to the discussion you had with Senator Schatz, where you talked about the $19 billion in closeout for USAID. [1:11:11] Because you rightly pointed out that one of the challenges in Ukraine is energy costs. [1:11:17] And $1.7 billion of that $19 billion is funding from the AEECA account, which is an account for all non-security, non-health-related issues for Europe. [1:11:33] You, as Secretary, could choose to spend those dollars to provide them to Ukraine to help address energy issues and other issues that Ukraine is having with this war, [1:11:48] in particular the fact that they're in desperate need of interceptors because of the attacks by Russia. [1:11:55] And you can see, I know you're aware of this, but for the audience, I think it's important to note the increased attacks coming into Ukraine from Russia, particularly drone attacks. [1:12:09] So, are you willing to spend some of those $1.7 billion to address some of the concerns that you point out and we agree that Ukraine has in fighting this war? [1:12:22] Yeah, we did last year, too, and I anticipate we'll do so again. [1:12:25] But on the point of the chart that you're using there, it's important to point the reason why those strikes began to increase is because of their inability to make sufficient gains on the front lines. [1:12:33] And so the only way Russia can impose costs on Ukraine is to punish them deeply. [1:12:37] Which is why now is the time to put pressure on Russia, because Russia's feeling it. [1:12:41] So let's put pressure on them, let's get them to the negotiating table, and let's get a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. [1:12:48] And that's not going to happen as long as we're pussyfooting around with Vladimir Putin and letting him get away with stringing the president along. [1:12:57] I would disagree with that assessment of how we treated it. [1:12:59] In fact, the president, this president, posed additional sanctions on Russia last year. [1:13:04] It remains one of the most sanctioned countries on the planet by the United States. [1:13:08] Even on the oil that you say in the short-term extension was given or the short-term waiver was given, that oil was still being sold. [1:13:15] They just weren't making the money they're making now because they couldn't sell it at market rate. [1:13:18] They had to sell it at a discount because it was sanctioned. [1:13:20] Because they were selling it under the shadow fleet. [1:13:22] They were. [1:13:23] And if we went after the shadow fleet, we would do a much better job of putting pressure on Russia's economy. [1:13:29] So my question, though, is to go back to the $1.7 billion. [1:13:34] Are you willing to spend some of those dollars to help address the urgent challenges that Ukraine is facing? [1:13:39] Well, on all the humanitarian side, including the energy side, we've done so in the past. [1:13:43] I anticipate we would do so in the future because we don't want to see calamity there. [1:13:46] On the broader issues that you've pointed to, I want to reiterate, Ukraine remains a purchaser under the Pearl Program, which is paid for through Europe. [1:13:54] We continue to participate in the Pearl Program that provides them the munitions they want to purchase and buy with European money. [1:14:00] That effort remains ongoing. [1:14:01] I'm aware of that, Mr. Secretary. [1:14:03] But the fact is, we, as Senator Durbin pointed out, we have not put the kind of pressure on Russia that would force them to come to the negotiating table. [1:14:15] And that's the question that I'm raising. [1:14:17] And unless, I mean, maybe, I hope I understood you to say you were going to support the Graham Blumenthal sanctions bill. [1:14:26] Did I understand that correctly? [1:14:27] Well, it's not for me to support it or not support it. [1:14:29] What I said was that the White- [1:14:30] You as a representative of the administration- [1:14:32] Well, I will follow the administrative's lead, the administration's decision and the president's on it. [1:14:35] What I have informed everybody is that the White House Office of Legal Counsel, along with the interagency, has been working with Senator Graham's office on the details of that bill and providing feedback on things that would be acceptable to us. [1:14:46] The president has indicated and has allowed them to do so, so obviously that sows an intent. [1:14:50] Well, I understand, we have been working on that bill as well with Senator Graham and Blumenthal. [1:14:56] And my understanding is that we are still waiting after months for the White House to make a decision on whether this is something they're going to support. [1:15:04] Well, as recently as yesterday, there was comments that came back from one of our agencies. [1:15:08] I believe it was Treasury on the bill that I think Senator Graham will be incorporating. [1:15:11] And I know we've been talking to him. [1:15:13] We just spoke about it a few moments ago before we came out here on the specific bill. [1:15:16] And on the broader topic of, look, at the end of the day, I think we haven't – all of our sanctions are on Russia, [1:15:22] and all of the aid that we've provided has been on the Ukrainian side. [1:15:25] So as I reiterate what I said earlier, we are not an impartial mediator here. [1:15:29] We clearly are supporting one side over another. [1:15:31] Now, you may not agree because you may think we need to be putting more pressure on Russia. [1:15:34] I clearly think we need to be putting more pressure on Russia. [1:15:37] Well, I think Russia is under an incredible amount of pressure. [1:15:39] And I think there is bipartisan agreement in this Senate that we should be putting more pressure on Russia. [1:15:44] And that the Graham Blumenthal sanctions bill would do that in a way that would force Russia to come to the table [1:15:50] and finally fulfill the promise that President Trump made to end this war on day one. [1:15:56] That's what he said when he was running for president. [1:15:59] And here we are, almost a year and a half into this administration, and he has let Russia and Putin off the hook. [1:16:07] I disagree with that statement. [1:16:08] Well, you and I are going to have to disagree on that. [1:16:10] We are, because I can tell you that at the highest levels of our administration, at the highest levels, [1:16:15] we've committed an extraordinary amount of time to the Ukrainian situation [1:16:19] and trying to resolve that conflict meeting after meeting all over the world, [1:16:22] many of which I attended myself to trying to bring and bridge the differences between the two sides. [1:16:27] We've not been successful to date, but not for lack of trying. [1:16:30] And we continue to be prepared to pay that role. [1:16:31] Well, but, Mr. Secretary, you rightly imposed sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft, and you've lifted those. [1:16:40] You've lifted those, and you've given Russia the ability to continue to fund their war in Ukraine. [1:16:45] Well, we have not lifted the sanctions. [1:16:47] The sanctions remain in place. [1:16:48] What's been granted is a license for a short-term period of time because of global oil demand. [1:16:52] Yeah, we're arguing semantics here. [1:16:55] Well, I acknowledge there's a trade-off in the broader foreign policy. [1:16:58] If the license is lifted and they're able to make the money, then they're not being hurt by the sanctions that were put in place. [1:17:05] Well, there are plenty of other sanctions that are hurting them, but I will tell you that in that case, [1:17:09] I have acknowledged that there was a trade-off here between the destabilization of the availability of oil [1:17:14] for countries in the Indo-Pacific in particular and the decision that was made in the short-term on this specific oil. [1:17:20] Except that the cost of a barrel of oil was $100 when you lifted those sanctions, and it's still over $100. [1:17:27] It would have been much higher if more oil had not been available. [1:17:29] So it hasn't provided the kind of relief that it was intended to. [1:17:31] But it's not just the cost, it's the availability. [1:17:32] It's not just the cost, it's the availability. [1:17:33] Thank you. [1:17:34] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:17:35] Thank you. [1:17:36] We appreciate you being here. [1:17:37] I appreciate the tremendous job that you're doing on the world stage as secretary, [1:17:42] and then all the other jobs that the administration has you doing in a number of different areas. [1:17:50] I've just got a couple of things. [1:17:51] I think most of my questions have been answered. [1:17:53] But I want to talk to you about the U.S. Foundation for Natural Security and Counterterrorism. [1:17:58] You're very aware that was done when you were here, and this committee had a tremendous amount [1:18:05] to do with getting that passed. [1:18:07] And I guess my question is, is that it's so important for a number of different reasons. [1:18:14] One reason is that this area is tremendously mineral rich in things, and certainly building [1:18:19] the relationships that we need there is so, so very important. [1:18:23] But what I'd like for you to do is we're kind of stuck, you know, in the sense of not getting organized. [1:18:29] If you could commit somebody to work with us to kind of figure out how we need to go forward organizationally [1:18:37] so we can go ahead and get that up and running. [1:18:40] Let me tell you something. [1:18:42] I've had four hearings in two days, and in all four hearings this one has come up. [1:18:45] So I assure you that we're watching it very closely. [1:18:48] Look, I think the issue there has been the appointment of the board members. [1:18:50] You're aware of that? [1:18:51] Yeah. [1:18:52] I think there was an initial list that was produced by the personnel office at the White House [1:18:55] that vets all these appointments. [1:18:57] There were – maybe the suggestions that came from Congress, there was some trade-off on that. [1:19:01] So I think – and I commit that we're going to engage the personnel office at the White House to produce new names [1:19:06] maybe suggested by Congress so we can get that board stood up once and for all. [1:19:10] So I don't have to keep answering questions about the board. [1:19:12] No, I understand. [1:19:13] But I think that illustrates that, you know, it has wide support in Congress and, you know – [1:19:17] Understood. [1:19:18] Yeah, I was here when it passed. [1:19:19] Great public-private partnership, you know, took a long time to get done. [1:19:22] Understood. [1:19:23] We appreciate that. [1:19:24] The other thing I'd like to talk to you about is the Fulbright scholarship program. [1:19:29] I'm always amazed and traveling. [1:19:31] You know, you sit down and you visit with me, everybody from the Prime Minister on down, [1:19:37] and it's amazing the number of people that have gone through that program, specifically that program, [1:19:42] but many other programs where they've come and studied in the United States, very, very familiar with our culture, [1:19:49] and are almost, again, so, so very helpful that you've got that frame of reference as you start visiting with them. [1:19:57] So what we'd like to do is continue to, you know, expand those or at least, you know, continue as we're doing now as we go forward and support those programs. [1:20:11] So can you talk a little bit about the importance of those and how we can be helpful? [1:20:17] I think you've pointed to the reason why, and that is I think you see that in multiple realms, not just in Fulbright, [1:20:22] but any time that some foreign leader or somebody that's prominent in a government system or in a country has had experiences in the United States, [1:20:29] whether it's studying at our universities or attending one of our military academies or a national defense college or training of some sort, [1:20:37] it proves to generally be positive. [1:20:40] Not always, but generally to be positive, and it creates an interlink there that's very powerful and very positive. [1:20:44] So I think identifying future leaders of other countries early on while they're young, [1:20:49] allowing them to have exposure to U.S. culture, society, and the way we do business here, [1:20:53] I think generally speaking is a positive and something that we want to be able to continue to do within, you know, [1:20:58] the constraints that we face budgetary and otherwise. [1:21:00] But generally speaking, you had no argument from me that interacting with people that have had these experiences [1:21:05] through Fulbright and other opportunities is a net positive. [1:21:08] Very good. Senator Coons. [1:21:11] Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman Graham, and thank you, Secretary. [1:21:15] I'm just going to continue this. [1:21:18] One of many things that Senator Graham, Senator Bozeman, Senator Moran and I have worked on over many years [1:21:23] is the U.S. Foundation for National Security and Counterterrorism. [1:21:26] Or to put it simply, good for animals, bad for terrorists. [1:21:29] That's Lindsay's description of it. [1:21:31] A year and a half ago in your confirmation hearing, I asked if we could count on you to be helpful in swiftly implementing it, [1:21:39] and you did sign the incorporation. [1:21:41] But we've been waiting for a year and a half for the board. [1:21:44] Can we move this quickly so you can stop being asked questions? [1:21:47] Yes, we want to, and we will. [1:21:49] I'll go back to personnel because they vet every nominee for every position, and I think there was an early list that somehow fell off. [1:21:56] There was an early list, and then there was a second list, and we have been waiting four months since then. [1:22:01] And there is significant private sector support for this initiative that is waiting and beginning to lose confidence because of just how long it's taken. [1:22:10] And this is a very small piece of everything I want to address with you, but it'd be great to have you committed to follow up. [1:22:14] I get the message. [1:22:15] I've heard it consistently now for four committee hearings. [1:22:18] From Republicans and Democrats, House and Senate. [1:22:19] And everybody that works for me that's here is hearing the same thing, so I got it. [1:22:23] We've got to get this thing moved forward, and I'm going to do everything, and obviously in my role at the White House, to make sure that we can expedite these appointments. [1:22:29] Thank you, and I just want to associate myself with Senator Collins' comments about RUTF and the bipartisan comments about Gavi and the urgency of releasing those funds. [1:22:39] If I can be helpful in any way in facilitating, resolving that. [1:22:43] I know that's an HHS issue, but at the end of the day, it's in your hands. [1:22:47] I'd love to talk to you briefly about NATO and true posture. [1:22:50] I asked you yesterday about the importance of Article 5 and NATO being one of our most central security commitments. [1:22:56] There have been some really striking changes that I met with a whole series of parliamentarians from a number of Eastern and Northern European countries yesterday. [1:23:06] On May 1, President Trump announced the abrupt withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany. [1:23:11] May 14, the cancellation of a rotational brigade of 4,000 to Poland. [1:23:15] May 19, the President then reportedly reversed that decision about the Poland deployment, but we don't have any further details. [1:23:22] And I just learned yesterday about there being no plan to replace the 1,000 troops in Lithuania who just finished one of those heel-to-toe deployments. [1:23:32] As you may know, four Americans were killed in Lithuania in a training accident. [1:23:36] I was at Dover Air Force Base along with senior leaders in the administration and a bipartisan group of members of Congress to receive their remains. [1:23:43] And I was really stunned. The people of Lithuania formed a human chain from where they left to the airport miles and miles to celebrate their service. [1:23:54] We have great and close allies in NATO, but because of some comments that have been made by the President and others about Greenland and Denmark, [1:24:02] because of some of these troop rotations, they really lack confidence in us. [1:24:07] As you know, there's a provision in last year's NDAA that prohibits the administration from lowering the number of troops below 76,000. [1:24:14] And with these latest troop realignments, we're getting dangerously close to that. [1:24:19] Will you commit to following the law and sustaining U.S. troop levels in Europe at a minimum of the statutory required? [1:24:26] And do you understand how comments about Spain not pulling its weight really don't meet the reality that the overwhelming majority of our NATO allies, [1:24:37] largely because of bipartisan and sustained pressure on them, have led them to significantly step up? [1:24:43] As you just said a few minutes ago, they're funding all of the weaponry going into Ukraine now. [1:24:48] Can we stop scaring our NATO allies and sustain a regular troop presence in compliance with law? [1:24:55] Oh, so a couple – you know that on the issue of troop deployments and numbers around the world, that is not a Department of State function. [1:25:01] That is a Department of Warfare. [1:25:02] Yes, but I'm the leading Democrat on defensive ropes, and I got nothing out of Secretary Exeter. [1:25:06] Okay, so – but I can speak to a few of these. [1:25:08] But you are the National Security Advisor. [1:25:09] Because of my other role, and I get to see some of this. [1:25:10] I'm not here to testify, National Security Advisor. [1:25:12] I was told by the lawyers to say that. [1:25:13] All right. [1:25:14] So – but I can speak to it, because I'm aware of it. [1:25:18] A couple points. [1:25:19] On some of these rotations that have occurred, like for example, the one in Germany, I know it got a lot of headlines, [1:25:23] but frankly, the Germans themselves were not that exercised about it. [1:25:27] They are aware that all it did is take us back to 2022 numbers. [1:25:30] So they knew this was not a surprise to them. [1:25:32] This was ongoing, and it was planned. [1:25:33] What was a surprise is that it hit the media before they had been informed of it formally, but they were aware of that front. [1:25:39] And in the case of Poland, as you rightly pointed out, there was this short-term rotational withdrawal, [1:25:44] but the President wanted to make it clear that our relations with Poland are very solid, [1:25:47] and therefore made the announcement the following day as I was arriving at the Foreign Minister's meeting of NATO in NATO. [1:25:53] What I will tell you, and I can say, but I can't speak with specificity because it's not our department, [1:25:58] is we are constantly reevaluating our force posture all over the world. [1:26:01] Because just as NATO wants us to have X number of troops in Europe, [1:26:05] the Indo-Pacific wants to make sure we're not going to leave South Korea and we're not going to leave Japan. [1:26:09] And our partners in Africa now, for example, in Nigeria and other places, [1:26:12] want to know that we're committed to the counterterrorism mission. [1:26:14] And our allies in the Middle East want to know that now we're not going to leave them because some base got hit by a drone. [1:26:19] And in the Western Hemisphere, we have growing cooperation and desire. [1:26:22] So the Pentagon and the Department of War have to constantly take extraordinary but still limited resources [1:26:28] and allocate them around the world. I can't speak in detail to those alignments. [1:26:32] What I can tell you is that everything we are doing is – none of it is being done as a shock or surprise to our allies in NATO. [1:26:40] They are informed every step of the way. [1:26:42] Let me – I have several other questions to get to. [1:26:44] I'll simply share with you that a defense minister and several senior parliamentarians from several NATO allies said to me yesterday [1:26:51] that they were stunned and unaware of the impending departure of a unit in Lithuania without a follow-on unit [1:26:58] and of the decisions and announcements about Poland. [1:27:01] Let's just agree that NATO is critical and we're going to work harder to make sure they understand. [1:27:05] I also want to associate myself with the comments about pressure on Russia. [1:27:09] Finally getting to yes on this sanctions bill. [1:27:12] And this is me and Secretary Hegseth delivering the interceptors that Zelensky is begging us for would put that pressure on. [1:27:20] Let me ask you two more things about Venezuela and about the global health compacts and the SIVs and I'll be quick. [1:27:27] I was encouraged to hear you say that we need to make progress towards elections in Venezuela. [1:27:32] I couldn't agree more. [1:27:33] I recently joined a group – a bipartisan group of senators in meeting with Maria Machado. [1:27:38] Can you give us any sense of a concrete timeline or plan for when some of the 400 political prisoners will be released, [1:27:45] for when there will be reforms to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the Electoral Council, and when we can expect elections? [1:27:52] Well, all of those are topics we discuss with Venezuela every single day. [1:27:55] As you know, and I outlined this when we – and I appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee back in February after that operation. [1:28:01] It's a three-phase process. Stabilization – we didn't want to see civil war. We didn't want to see mass migration. [1:28:06] I think that's largely been achieved. There's a little bit more work to be done there. Recovery. And part of that recovery is building the institutions that make it possible to have an election. [1:28:14] It's not just the Electoral Council, which is critical, but it's not just that. You have to have independent media that can operate. [1:28:20] And while we've seen signs that that's happening, that needs to be sustained. Political parties and individuals involved in them to be able to, at some point, [1:28:26] either to return or those who are already in the country have to be able to organize. They have to go to open offices, field candidates, [1:28:32] start to do all the work that it takes to create the conditions for an election. That's critically important as well. [1:28:37] And that one we're following. It's one of the reasons why these direct flights into Venezuela were so important, because now people can go and interact directly, [1:28:44] even if they're not yet living full-time in Venezuela. But we have more work to do. We raise this – I just remind everybody, this only – Maduro was – [1:28:52] 150 days. [1:28:53] Was grabbed five months ago. [1:28:54] Yep. [1:28:55] Not five years ago. We've come a long way in five months. [1:28:57] Mr. Secretary, I know you are passionate about democracy. I just hope that we will move past this current interim period [1:29:05] and towards democracy and free and fair elections, and achieve the possibilities of Venezuela, [1:29:10] and not leave the unfortunate image of putting extraction and oil and gold and emeralds first, and the people of Venezuela second. [1:29:19] And I'd love to work with you on that. Two other points quickly. The 32 global health compacts that you referenced, [1:29:25] we have no implementation plans. And seeing the details of how they're being implemented would be very helpful. [1:29:31] As you know, I've long been close to the Kenyan government and the Kenyan people. We're asking them to take on Ebola treatment, [1:29:37] which is getting a very rough reception. There's also real tension in some of the data details around these health impacts. [1:29:44] And there is evidence – there's data from state that there's less treatment, less testing, and less prevention overall. [1:29:53] And I need to better understand the role of the CDC and how these health compacts are going to actually achieve your laudable goal of more aid to more people faster. [1:30:03] Yeah, well – [1:30:04] Can we work on these details? [1:30:05] Yeah, of course. But on the implementation – remember, you reach a compact, and now the implementation is part of the compact. [1:30:10] You have to work on that, you know, in collaboration with the host government. [1:30:13] Right. [1:30:14] So as those plans become available, as those plans become finalized, you'll have insight into those. You'll be able to see that. [1:30:19] In the case – just to correct one point – we're not actually in Kenya to set up treatment for Americans. [1:30:24] I think the one that's been very controversial is a misunderstanding. There is a facility that the Kenyans are allowing us to open. [1:30:30] If there are any Americans that are exposed – [1:30:32] Yes. [1:30:33] Potentially exposed – they will be transferred to this facility for observation. [1:30:37] If they test positive at any time while in that facility, we will remove them from Kenya and send them to the nearest treatment facility, [1:30:43] either in Europe or in the United States, to be treated for Ebola. [1:30:47] But what's been controversial is no one wants to see that people are coming into their country. [1:30:51] There's never been a case of Ebola in Kenya. They don't have the domestic capacity to deal with it, [1:30:55] and there is alarm that I would love to work with you on to address. [1:30:58] I'll follow up with you about your offer yesterday to work on SIVs. [1:31:02] We have thousands still stuck in Pakistan who were cleared, who have chief of mission clearance, [1:31:07] and you have the ability under the EO, in partnership with the Homeland Security Secretary, [1:31:14] to allow those who were vetted to come to the United States – [1:31:17] On a case-by-case basis. [1:31:18] On a case-by-case basis. [1:31:19] Yes. [1:31:20] And I urge you to use that to get folks out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Qatar, [1:31:25] to save countries, including the United States. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. [1:31:29] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:31:30] Secretary Rubio, appreciate you being here. It's always good to have you back in this chamber, [1:31:35] and thank you for the job that you're doing for our country, and it's good to see you on the world stage. [1:31:41] I want to begin by thanking the brave service members of the U.S. military who participated in the recent operations in Iran. [1:31:50] I want to honor the memory of the 13 service members who lost their life, including three Alabamians – [1:31:57] Major Alex Kleiner, Major Ariana Savino, and Technical Sergeant Ashley Pruitt. [1:32:04] I know that all of Alabama and our country stands with me to honor their bravery and their ultimate sacrifice. [1:32:11] During the Operation Epic Fury, the United States carried out a coordinated campaign of unprecedented scale and success. [1:32:19] Prior to those operations, we know that Iran refused to meaningfully come to the table with regards to negotiations with their nuclear enrichment, [1:32:28] their terrorist proxies, and their missile capabilities. [1:32:33] I am immensely grateful to President Trump for finally doing something about that. [1:32:38] 47 years of terror needed to come to an end, and because of his decisive actions, we have an opportunity to actually see that achieved. [1:32:47] I believe that because of these actions, we are in a stronger negotiating posture in this moment in time. [1:32:55] But I believe that any agreement that we come to needs to have very clear red lines when it comes to nuclear enrichment, [1:33:03] when it comes to capabilities and weaponization, and also Iran's network of terrorist proxies. [1:33:09] Can you talk to me about how this administration's maximum pressure strategy and approach towards Iran [1:33:16] has actually weakened Iran and its terrorist proxies and ultimately made the United States more safe and secure? [1:33:23] I would start with what the purpose of Epic Fury was, and that is to deny them the conventional shield of missiles and drones [1:33:29] and naval vessels and air defenses that would have allowed them to act with impunity, including on a nuclear weapon, but beyond that. [1:33:35] And today, Iran has no Navy. It has no Air Force. Its air defenses are severely degraded, [1:33:40] which gives us freedom of operation in the future if that contingency arises. [1:33:45] They've lost a substantial percentage of their missile launchers, and not just of their missiles, but of their missile launchers. [1:33:51] And most importantly, they've lost a substantial percentage of their defense industrial base. [1:33:55] They also don't have the money to rebuild that industrial base rapidly because they don't have the funds, [1:34:01] because they're being denied those funds through a combination of three things. [1:34:04] Sanctions, enforcement of those sanctions. We are enforcing sanctions. [1:34:07] We had a bunch of sanctions on the books, some of which were not being enforced. [1:34:10] In fact, for the first time that I can recall, the U.S. has actually seized Iranian oil vessels in the Indo-Pacific, [1:34:16] five or six of them, and denied them the revenue from those vessels, although they have many more that are still out there. [1:34:21] Now, where we stand today, unfortunately, is they have decided to mine the Straits of Hormuz and shoot drones at ships that move without their permission or paying a toll. [1:34:29] The only ships they will allow to move through freely are their ships. [1:34:34] There is no way that they are going to illegally, unlawfully try to close the Straits of Hormuz the way they are doing and not pay a price for it. [1:34:41] There's no way that they can benefit from oil sales, but nobody else can. [1:34:44] So we imposed, as a countermeasure, a blockade against those ships, and that is the only thing we are blockading. [1:34:49] You have seen over the last few nights kinetic action occurring, and I will describe what those largely entail. [1:34:54] That is, some commercial ship that didn't pay a toll and starts to move. That ship comes under attack by a drone. [1:35:00] We shoot down the drone. In some cases, not only do we shoot down the drone, but we hit the launcher of the drone so they can't hit the ship a second time. [1:35:07] The Iranians then respond by launching two missiles or three at some base in the region as their response. [1:35:14] And that's what you've seen play out three of the last four nights with regards to this. [1:35:18] Now, where we'd like to get to is where they agree they're going to open the Straits like they were supposed to when the ceasefire was agreed to. [1:35:24] We would lift the blockade, and they would agree, and as part of all of this, that they are prepared to sit down and negotiate an agreement that disposes of the highly enriched uranium, [1:35:34] that limits and or prohibits their enrichment program. And in return, they would be able to have some, not all, but some of the sanctions that they are facing for their nuclear program potentially waived or reduced. [1:35:48] But that would be only depending on what they give. They have to give. And of course, these things all have to be verifiable. [1:35:53] The highly enriched uranium you can verify because when it's removed, it's removed. The enrichment monitoring is the one that's going to be critical for any deal to be successful. [1:36:00] But they are weakened in the sense of they're losing three to four hundred million dollars a day in revenue. They have hyperinflation. Their currency is worthless. [1:36:07] They're struggling to meet payroll in their own services in the country, and their regime is badly fractured internally to the point where it takes seven to ten days to get an answer to a proposal. [1:36:16] And I think that is excellent. When we're talking about an interim agreement, though, if we look at relieving any kind of financial pressure that they're under, how are we, number one, are we looking at that? [1:36:26] Are we going to keep it the way it is? And if so, can we ensure that it's not going to go to missiles or capability or terrorism? [1:36:31] What's been offered to them, there's no down payment or bonus for entering into negotiations. [1:36:36] What's been offered to them is everything that they ask for will be commensurate to what they're willing to give as part of the broader negotiation for a deal. [1:36:44] It is not part. The only thing they get for opening the straits is the lifting of our blockade. [1:36:48] And then when you talked about uranium and enriched uranium, are we talking about removal of all forms of uranium or just enrichment? [1:36:57] What we're focused on, I think most people are focused on, is the highly enriched uranium, which is, you know, anything that is, you know, like the 60%, for example, that we know they still possess, that can quickly be turned into 90%. [1:37:08] That's the term highly enriched uranium. There's some 20% enriched as well, but the bulk of what the world is concerned about is the 60%. [1:37:16] Speaking of the maximum pressure strategy, you recently announced new sanctions, as you discussed earlier, on Cuba's military industrial enterprise and its leaders and its state-owned natural resource companies. [1:37:29] Cuba's communist regime has been a longtime threat to our entire hemisphere, a destabilizing force, as you put it earlier in your remarks. [1:37:38] Public reporting states that Cuba has purchased attack drones from Russia and from China and also host intelligence officers from Iran, China and Russia. [1:37:49] I appreciate President Trump's decisive actions with regards to protecting U.S. national security and these sanctions and your continued efforts to address the threats that are posed by China. [1:38:00] Can you speak briefly as to why this maximum pressure campaign is so important and how it can ultimately provide for a new Cuba, one that provides freedom and prosperity both to the people of Cuba and a safer hemisphere? [1:38:15] What's unique about these sanctions is that they're against a conglomerate that generates revenue in Cuba and none of it, not a single penny of it, goes to benefit the Cuban people. [1:38:23] None of it, because it's not part of the treasury. [1:38:25] For example, the government of Cuba cannot go and audit where Gaisa is spending its money or how much money they've made. [1:38:30] It is almost a government within a government, a state within a state, and that's what we are targeting. [1:38:35] Because instead of that going to this conglomerate, that's what the Cuban people should be allowed to do. [1:38:39] They should be allowed to own their small independent businesses. [1:38:41] That's right. [1:38:42] They should be allowed to be in business in that regard and not allow this state within a state to continue to empower itself at their expense. [1:38:48] This is a country that literally, you know, doesn't invest in their own energy plants and never has. [1:38:55] Meanwhile, they're sitting on $18 billion in this conglomerate of assets that they should be using to benefit the Cuban people and they are not. [1:39:02] So those sanctions are targeted at this conglomerate. [1:39:05] Excellent. [1:39:06] Thank you so much. [1:39:07] And thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:39:08] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary. [1:39:14] Good to see you. [1:39:15] Two days in a row. [1:39:16] How about tomorrow? [1:39:17] We'll make it three. [1:39:18] No, you got – no. [1:39:21] I'm almost losing my voice after – I did four hours in the House. [1:39:25] Yesterday we were talking about Taiwan, and you stressed there was no change in policy. [1:39:30] And I think I can characterize, but I want to check that we're – the administration is 100 percent supportive of Taiwan's Democratic Republic and of their expanded participation in international organizations. [1:39:42] Yeah, and we've actually advocated for them to have a seat at different forums in which they've been denied in the past, sometimes to some success, sometimes to not success. [1:39:50] Thank you. [1:39:51] I really want to emphasize that message to those who are fighting for – to sustain their republic in Taiwan. [1:39:58] I was listening to the tale of the two blockades. [1:40:01] The deal now on the first stage is they lift their blockade, we lift our blockade. [1:40:06] And that takes us kind of back to the status quo, and then we engage in these other issues. [1:40:10] But I believe what I've heard you or others say is that Iran is saying, hey, that's not enough for us. [1:40:16] We want you to lift some of the sanctions that we're under. [1:40:19] We want to unfreeze some of the funds that have been frozen by the United States. [1:40:24] And I've also heard on the United States side that we want to make sure that they end their support for proxies, which, of course, we all want to see. [1:40:33] But is that part of – are there things other than freeing up the Strait of Hormuz that are our requirements for lifting our blockade of their ports? [1:40:43] No. [1:40:44] So the only reason there is a blockade is because of what they've done in the Straits, right? [1:40:48] The fact that they are telling the whole world, we will not let your ships through unless you pay us a toll, and we can never accept that. [1:40:54] We can never accept the tolling system in the Straits. [1:40:57] If we accept that in the Straits, it will be replicated in multiple places around the world. [1:41:01] They'll become a new status quo. [1:41:02] Everyone will want to do one. [1:41:04] But the only reason there's a blockade is because they've mined the Straits and are shooting drones at ships. [1:41:10] So they need to stop doing that. [1:41:12] They need to cooperate with the removal of the mines. [1:41:14] Point taken. [1:41:15] And if they do that, then the Straits – then the blockade comes off. [1:41:17] Going on to the second part about the nuclear materials. [1:41:21] In the end, I picture that they're going to agree not to enrich for a period of time. [1:41:25] They're going to agree to enrich to very low levels after that, sufficient for medical research and so forth. [1:41:30] They're going to put their more highly enriched uranium in some custody that we can verify. [1:41:38] And that starts to look a whole lot like the JCPOA. [1:41:42] What's different about what you're trying to achieve or the U.S. is trying to achieve in terms of the nuclear materials? [1:41:48] Well, two things. [1:41:49] First of all, that is not our position that they get to enrich for some period of time or get to enrich, you know, at a certain level. [1:41:54] That certainly may be what their position they'll argue for, but that's not our position. [1:41:57] Our position is if what they want is a civil nuclear program, they can have it without enrichment. [1:42:01] And they can certainly have it without enrichment buried deep in a mountain somewhere. [1:42:05] I mean, if this is civil nuclear, why do you need to bury it in a mountain? [1:42:08] So that's our position. [1:42:10] That's the position we stated at the outset. [1:42:12] And I think one of the main differences is JCPOA and actually the limitations on the enrichment to 3.67 would have been expiring this year. [1:42:19] JCPOA would have been expiring right now. [1:42:21] We're not interested in something that expires in five or six years. [1:42:24] We want it to be a long-term and permanent prohibition because they don't need to enrich. [1:42:28] And, of course, the other big difference is the removal of the highly enriched uranium, which is a factor that we think is critical in all this. [1:42:35] So I know you said permanent, but I've also heard the U.S. is looking for a couple decades. [1:42:43] Yeah, look, again, that's going to be part of the negotiation. [1:42:46] But let me just say I'm just putting a number out there, okay? [1:42:48] I'm not saying that this is where the deal is going to land or that they've agreed to this. [1:42:51] But if we could get 20 years of zero enrichment, that's substantially better than JCPOA was. [1:42:56] And the world continues to negotiate in the future, I take that. [1:43:00] Okay. [1:43:01] I want to switch to some concerns about the vision that Bibi Netanyahu has been expressing support for of a greater Israel. [1:43:13] In an August 25 interview, he said he is on a, quote, historic and spiritual mission, unquote, [1:43:22] and is, quote, very, unquote, attached to the vision of greater Israel. [1:43:29] And when gifted an amulet described as a map of the promised land and asked if he connected to the vision of greater Israel, he replied, very much. [1:43:36] Meanwhile, he has finance minister Smotrich, who says there will be expansion in Gaza that will extend our borders in Lebanon, to the Latani, in Syria, Mount Hermon, parts of the north, south, and east. [1:43:51] This vision of Bibi Netanyahu driving a vision of greater Israel, is that a position that our State Department supports? [1:43:58] Apart from just the state, though, I'll just say the administration. [1:44:04] What you've just described, and again, I'm just going off your words, is not the policy of the United States. [1:44:08] We have advocated repeatedly and made very clear that we want the status quo, meaning that there not be additional actions taken in the West Bank that can destabilize the broader situation. [1:44:18] Israel has actually acknowledged that they have no territorial claims in Lebanon. [1:44:22] They're prepared to do so, I hope, in writing as early as today, but they've repeatedly stated that. [1:44:26] We've also been very involved with them in Syria and in southern Syria, where they argue that they need to establish a security corridor because they're afraid that that will be used by Iranian elements to target them. [1:44:36] And that's why we've gotten involved with the Syrian authorities to find a solution there where the Israelis don't have to fear that from existing. [1:44:43] And in the case of Gaza, the 20-point plan that governs the ceasefire is pretty clear, and that is that Gaza is to be governed by an autocratic entity that's being formed as we speak, [1:44:52] that has police officers that we're trying to train now and an international stabilization force that creates the conditions for investment, [1:44:59] so that you can actually build an economy there and people don't have to live in rubble the way they do now in many cases. [1:45:04] That's our policy. That's what we're pursuing. I can't speak to the statements people are making internally in their politics. [1:45:09] Let me ask a little bit specifically about the West Bank. We have seen that settlers have been very aggressive in trying to separate Palestinian villagers from the source of water, [1:45:19] from their orchards, their vineyards. Often the Israeli Defense Force has been more protective of the settlers' aggression than restraining. [1:45:32] And when I talked with Bibi Netanyahu a couple years ago, he said our strategy is enclaves, Palestinians put into enclaves. [1:45:43] Are we exercising our influence to try to discourage the aggressive settler action against Palestinian villages? [1:45:51] Well, we've raised it repeatedly and, in fact, have told them that this is an impediment, as I said, to some of the other things we're trying to work on, [1:45:57] which we believe are in Israel's interest. And, in fact, and to somewhat to their, I mean, I would say a little bit to their credit, [1:46:01] they have stood up special units of some of their forces to take on some of these elements that include everything from settlers, [1:46:07] but it also includes, for example, some gangs that come over from Tel Aviv of youngsters that carry out some of these acts of violence. [1:46:13] And this needs to be addressed. These images are negative. They're not positive. And it's already a tinderbox over there. [1:46:19] The last thing we need is to throw one more match into that fire. And that's the point we've made to them repeatedly on the West Bank. [1:46:24] I appreciate you making that point. And I encourage us to press that very hard because it's a very unjust situation. [1:46:31] And then I wanted to ask for you to press for reporters to be allowed into Gaza. [1:46:37] I think the lack of any sort of transparency makes it difficult for the world to see what's going on, [1:46:44] either to support anyone's arguments about the conditions. [1:46:47] The international agencies report that it remains a challenge on nutrition. [1:46:53] It remains a challenge on medicine and hospital capability. [1:46:59] And I think that it would be very helpful to actually have some transparency in Gaza. [1:47:06] Is that something you might be able to add? [1:47:08] Yeah, I'll take that back, obviously. I'm not, to be frank, I'm not exactly aware of how many journalists are operating inside. [1:47:13] I have seen news reports from different outlets that are from inside of Gaza, but I don't know how many have not been allowed in. [1:47:19] I think virtually no international reporters have been allowed in, and many of the Palestinian reporters have been killed. [1:47:26] So there's been, you know, people getting on their cell phones and taking videos and sharing that as a source of information. [1:47:34] But I think it's important to have credible international journalists present. [1:47:40] Understood. I'll check back on the numbers of who's actually been allowed or who's actually operating inside now. [1:47:44] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rubio, thank you for your service both at the state and federal level. [1:47:51] And I want to, you know, as I'm out traveling Ohio, I talk to people. [1:47:58] They mention high fuel prices, but they also mention they don't want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. [1:48:04] Sounds pretty similar to what you've articulated, what the president's articulated as a goal for ending the conflict with Iran. [1:48:11] The question is, those actors on the other side, who are we negotiating with? [1:48:18] And do you believe that they are negotiating in good faith? [1:48:20] I wouldn't use the term good faith. [1:48:23] I mean, let's just leave that aside for a second when it comes to the Iranian regime because of our long history with them and everything they've done during that time. [1:48:30] Here's the best way I would describe it. [1:48:31] There are the people you see on television, like their foreign minister Arachi, the Goluboff, who's the speaker of the Majils there, and a couple other folks. [1:48:40] And these are the ones that are out there, not just doing TV interviews, but are going to the negotiations. [1:48:44] They are not decision makers. [1:48:45] They are implementers. [1:48:46] Any offers they make us or any offers they take back in any sort of talks have to be run through some system internally that ultimately relies on the sign-off of the Supreme Leader, but a counsel that surrounds him. [1:48:58] And one of the impediments, and why you see this has taken the time that it's taken, is every time we communicate to them, let's say a counteroffer or change in language on some of the documents that have been worked on, [1:49:08] it can take anywhere from four to seven to ten days to get a response because they have to work it through the intricacies of their system. [1:49:14] And I think that's one of the things that has not been talked about enough is that in the aftermath of Epic Fury, one of the things that has happened is that their system internally has been fractured. [1:49:24] You have a Supreme Leader that still hasn't been seen publicly, who communicates only still through written communications that are released through the Iranian system. [1:49:33] And by the way, you've also seen reflections of the official Iranian media outlets putting out contradictory statements to what ultimately either we know the regime is doing or the regime is agreed to or the regime is saying somewhere else. [1:49:46] So that's proven to be a challenge. But ultimately, in the system that they have, any decisions to agree to anything or even agree to enter negotiations would need to be approved by the Supreme Leader and the counsel that surrounds him. [1:49:59] And I think the impediment in time has been how long it takes for these individuals that are the negotiators to communicate with them and get sign-off. [1:50:07] Okay. Thank you. And we have security partners in the Middle East who have been attacked by Iran. And it's easier for people to be critics of approaches to policy and negotiations. [1:50:20] Are any of our security partners suggesting a different approach than what is currently being undertaken? [1:50:26] No. By and large, we have found support. I say by and large in unanimity. I think every one of the countries, if you were to poll them, would say there's a chance to get the straits open by lifting the blockade and enter into a serious constrained, [1:50:38] meaning well-defined ahead of time negotiation on the highly enriched uranium and enrichment. I think that's an outcome they would like to see and have encouraged us to pursue. [1:50:47] They understand our red lines, of course, and we're not going to get involved in negotiations that aren't going to be fruitful, and we're certainly not going to sign on to a bad deal. [1:50:54] But generally, they've been supportive of the efforts we've been undertaking. [1:50:57] Great. Thank you. I want to shift to something that I feel very passionate about, and that is doing more Made in America, a domestic supply chain for our critical minerals, [1:51:12] for the things that are essential for our economic and national security. And whether that's pharmaceuticals, bullets, bombs, batteries, I should say, military equipment, chips, other technology. [1:51:24] And having that secure domestic supply chain seems to me to be pretty important, not just for our national security and economic security, but also for our strength in negotiating with foreign nations. [1:51:39] If we had a secure domestic supply chain for the things that were essential for that economic and national security, how much different would the conversation have been with China regarding Taiwan? [1:51:51] Not just us. The whole world. I mean, we'd have a very different comment. It's an incredible point of leverage, and it's truly due to negligence. [1:51:57] In some cases, some of the things we rely on from China are things we invented, and we basically turned it over to them because businesses in America either sold the capacity to them [1:52:06] or made a decision that we could get it cheaper from China, so why keep making it here? And we've allowed these dependencies to build, and we've mapped out all of these dependencies internally through the interagency, and we know what they are. [1:52:18] We are capable of reversing many of these, but it will take a little bit of time, but we have a plan to do so. [1:52:23] But we've also globalized this. It's not just about America. If you talk to the Japanese, the South Koreans, all of Europe, and many advancing countries around the world, they share the same concern, [1:52:33] which is why we held the Critical Minerals Ministerial earlier this year where foreign ministers came from over 30 countries, many of whom signed on to this MOU to cooperate collectively, [1:52:42] not on just sources and access to rare earth minerals, but also the ability to process and refine them into usable product. [1:52:49] So we've tried to internationalize it and globalize it that way. [1:52:52] The second thing is the Paxilica, in which 14 countries are bound together to very specifically focus not just on critical minerals and supply chains, [1:53:00] but the critical minerals and supply chains necessary to win the AI race for the future. [1:53:05] And so that's been, ourselves and 13 other countries have signed on to that, been very successful, been spearheaded by Jacob Hellberg at the State Department, [1:53:14] and it's an effort I think is going to grow. In addition to that, virtually, and I say this to you, virtually every foreign engagement that I have with a foreign minister [1:53:24] or when I visit another country, they give you a little paper and you read it. These are the five topics we want to touch upon. [1:53:29] And every single one of those, Critical Minerals is a part of it, either because they have Critical Minerals or they want to partner with us on Critical Minerals [1:53:36] or they're having access issues to Critical Minerals. So it has featured prominently in our foreign policy. [1:53:43] Well, I would just say this. I believe that the Trump administration can do a great service to the nation, the world, to, if they fix one thing, [1:53:52] in combination with your work and Ambassador Greer and Secretary Lutnik, it's to, within our timeframe capabilities, [1:54:00] to get a domestic or secure supply of that supply chain because it is everything to our national economic security. [1:54:13] I finally just will make a point for you so you know I represent the North Coast. I know there's the East Coast and the West Coast and the Gulf Coast, but as a Great Lakes state, [1:54:22] I will take note of the fact that in the International Commission's account, there was a reduction, a significant reduction in commitment to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission. [1:54:35] And Great Lakes is very important to make sure we don't have invasive species and things like that. So I just ask that you take a look at that and we'll work with you on those particular issues. [1:54:46] That's very important to our Midwestern states. Thank you. Thank you. [1:54:51] You seem to really enjoy this. I'm amazed. Two hours. Just two hours and not a stutter or stumble. I don't know what you get for it. I'll be invited back next year. [1:55:06] We did a great job, Mr. Secretary. I'm proud of you. You really represented your department well. [1:55:13] Questions for the record can be submitted by Close of Business Friday, June the 12th. [1:55:18] Ask the Department of State's OIG written testimony on their FY27 budget request be made part of their record. [1:55:26] Thank you very much. Well done, Mr. Secretary. The hearing is adjourned.