IAEA director says no war would destroy Iran's nuclear ambitions, "unless it was nuclear war"

[0:00] The U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, the IAEA, says it has not detected any raised levels [0:06] of radiation around nuclear sites that have been targeted by strikes in Israel and in Iran. [0:11] On Thursday, we spoke with the head of that agency and began by asking him whether Iran's [0:16] nuclear ambitions can be destroyed through military action. [0:21] Well, of course, there has already been a lot of damage done. Last year, [0:27] a 12-day war was, in that sense, quite effective. This time around, I think the focus of the [0:37] campaign does not seem to be specifically the nuclear facilities, although there have been some [0:45] hits in Natanz and Isfahan and also at another place near Parchin, which used to be a facility [0:54] more related to the weaponization efforts. [0:57] But back in the day, it was a facility that was more related to the weaponization efforts. [0:57] But back in the day, it was a facility that was more related to the weaponization efforts. [0:57] the early 2000s. [0:59] So there has been some, but I would say they have been relatively marginal when you consider [1:06] the overall nature of the military campaign so far. [1:11] So going back to your question, there has been a lot of impact on the program. [1:18] One cannot deny that this has really rolled back the program considerably. [1:25] But my impression is that once the military effort comes to an end, we will still inherit [1:36] a number of major issues that have been at the center of all of this, one most notably [1:45] the inventory of unreached uranium at 60 percent, which is very close to the degree you need [1:52] to make a bomb. [1:53] That is going to still be a problem. [1:56] It will still be where it is, largely. [1:59] Under the rubble. [2:00] Under the rubble, and in some cases no rubble, somewhere under. [2:06] And also, importantly, some facilities, infrastructure, equipment, which have most probably survived [2:19] some of the attacks. [2:20] Even they could be damaged, seriously damaged. [2:26] But that is something that we will only be able to ascertain once our inspectors go back. [2:33] So let's talk about that. [2:35] What I heard you say there is Iran had that nuclear weapons program that in 2003, according [2:40] to U.S. intelligence, was halted. [2:43] But as you know, there's this debate over whether Iran's nuclear program actually did [2:49] have a weapons ambition. [2:52] You were never quite able to say yes or no. [2:55] Well. [2:56] We are not analysts or people having opinions. [3:01] We are the IAEA. [3:03] So whenever we say something, it has to be based on actual inspection. [3:09] And the thing is, and continues to be, one, yes, like you say, yes. [3:14] We haven't seen a systematic program like the Amad plan with offices, people reporting [3:20] to people, and an array of places where you are doing stuff. [3:26] There were many, many concerning things, many unanswered questions, and especially [3:32] since 2019, 2020, when I became, more or less when I became director general, where, yes, [3:39] in 2015, in 2016, when the JCPOA, the previous agreement, you remember. [3:44] Right, the Obama-era nuclear program. [3:46] Exactly. [3:47] When that started to be applied, Iran was complying with a number of things. [3:54] But we started seeing new stuff. [3:57] We started seeing and getting new elements that gave rise to concerns. [4:03] And we were talking about them with Iran. [4:06] And then it came a point, very important point, when I said, you know, in view of this, I [4:12] have to say that I'm no longer able, I'm no longer able to say that everything is in order. [4:23] Because you were finding uranium in places it wasn't supposed to be, because they weren't [4:26] allowing you unfettered access. [4:28] You couldn't say clearly one way or the other. [4:31] Exactly that. [4:32] So let's come back to that. [4:34] According to what you did know and were able to declare in these IAEA reports, Iran had [4:40] uranium enriched up to 60 percent, weapons grade is 90, as I understand it. [4:45] And if that material remains now in Iran after combat ends, will it still have nuclear capabilities, [4:54] if it has the enriched material and the centrifuges? [4:57] Well. [4:58] You remember, and for this I would quote or partially refer to things that have been said [5:05] in Iran by Iranians. [5:08] You remember very important officials saying, we have all the elements of the puzzle. [5:12] So when this is said, we were telling them, this is unhelpful. [5:16] Or at least you should explain what is meant by that. [5:23] It's a vast program, all right? [5:28] And so. [5:29] All right. [5:29] Well, we have to understand that there is a lot of work going on in these facilities. [5:33] Albeit the physical destruction that has been operated, acted upon these facilities, there's [5:38] a lot going on. [5:40] And don't forget something, Margaret. [5:42] When we talk about centrifuges, when we talk about these kind of facilities, this is an [5:47] activity that can be relatively, I wouldn't say easily, but it is very possible to reconstruct [5:54] this effort. [5:55] It's mythology. [5:56] Yeah. [5:57] It's a sophisticated washing machine. [5:59] It's nothing. [6:00] I mean, and you cannot unlearn what you've learned. [6:03] Right. [6:04] You can't bomb away the knowledge. [6:05] So that capability will exist after combat. [6:07] Exactly. [6:08] And it was very sophisticated. [6:09] Let's not forget, again, referring back to JCPOA, JCPOA was based or predicated upon [6:18] a very primitive type of centrifuge. [6:21] Now Iran has the most sophisticated, fast, and efficient machine that exists. [6:30] And they know how to make it, and they know. [6:32] And on top of that, there may be places out there which are not nuclear places. [6:39] This is why what I say is that we still need to find a framework, an agreed framework that [6:49] is going to be providing us with the necessary previsibility and sense of a clear idea of [6:58] where they are, where they want to go. [7:00] Because… [7:01] Because this war will not destroy Iran's nuclear ambitions and capabilities. [7:04] Anywhere. [7:05] I would say anywhere. [7:06] Anywhere. [7:07] Unless it was nuclear war and you go for destruction in an unfathomable way, which we hope, of course, [7:14] will never be the case. [7:16] Well, talk to me about the options that we know are being discussed by the United States [7:20] right now, including President Trump and Israel have talked about the potential of sending [7:24] special forces in to secure some of this enriched material. [7:28] You have been to Isfahan. [7:30] You have seen some of the… [7:31] Yes. [7:32] …underground facilities. [7:33] Yes. [7:34] How difficult would it be to move these cylinders that are there full of chemicals? [7:37] We're talking about cylinders containing gas of highly contaminated uranium hexafluoride [7:46] at 60 percent. [7:49] So it's very difficult to handle, so much so that, for example, in terms of this negotiation, [7:55] we might perhaps discuss that a little bit, that did not bear fruit, one of the things [8:00] that we were discussing… [8:01] Yeah. [8:02] …was downblending it because of its difficulty in terms of handling in the scenario, [8:08] for example, of a ship out of the material, exfiltrating the material. [8:13] So it is very difficult. [8:14] Then of course, I guess there will be a number of decoys, a number of distracting cylinders, [8:27] materials over there, which would make it very difficult. [8:29] I'm not saying it's impossible. [8:30] I know that here there are incredible military capacities to do that. [8:34] But it would be a very challenging operation for sure. [8:40] For military operation to be carried out. [8:43] Yeah. [8:44] Let me just ask you about one other thing. [8:46] You said about half the nuclear material was around Isfahan. [8:48] What is that? [8:50] Well, it's a little bit more. [8:52] But the majority of the material is there, and this is not a secret because I've seen [8:58] a lot of hype about it. [8:59] This has been in our reports. [9:01] The vast majority is there. [9:03] There is some in Natanz as well and some other parts. [9:07] There is focus on these other undeclared facilities President Trump has brought up. [9:11] There's a facility called Pickaxe Mountain, for example, that comes up. [9:15] Are you concerned about those other sites? [9:17] Well, we should visit those. [9:19] They were not operational. [9:21] So this is why we hadn't. [9:22] You may remember that on the eve of the June 2025 campaign. [9:27] Yeah. [9:28] Iran announced that they had a new enrichment facility in Isfahan. [9:34] Yes. [9:35] On the same day, I issued a request for an urgent inspection, which was granted. [9:40] And the inspectors were there in the morning or the late night when the attacks happened. [9:50] So we never got to see the place. [9:52] We will have to go there eventually. [9:55] Final thought here. [9:56] Do you think President Trump supports? [9:58] Yeah. [9:59] He supports what I heard you say, which is that a military campaign cannot destroy Iran's [10:04] nuclear program and that the only way to understand what they're really doing is to be on the [10:11] ground inspecting it. [10:14] And that can't be done by the United States military fully either. [10:17] Well, I think I don't know what he whether he would endorse this or not. [10:22] But he has said also that, of course, diplomacy is the preferred option. [10:27] I think that is encouraging. [10:29] We have had a very constructive conversation in the past and now. [10:36] Have you spoken to him? [10:38] Not to the president. [10:39] No. [10:40] I haven't had the honor. [10:41] But I was talking to people that I had been talking in the past and we continue. [10:46] We continue this effort. [10:48] I think the essence of this is that in the bleakest hour, we should never lose hope. [10:56] You can see our extended conversations on our website and on our YouTube channel.