LIVE: Rubio testifies at Senate hearing on U.S. policy toward Venezuela

[0:56] committee will come to order good morning everyone and welcome everyone today we have important [1:02] business to do before i start i will tell everyone those of you in the audience we're so glad to have [1:11] you here thanks so much for coming this is a public hearing it is also the official business [1:16] of the united states of america and as a result of that the committee has a zero tolerance policy for [1:23] interruptions or for attempts by anyone in the room to communicate with somebody up here or [1:29] the witness so as a result of that if you do disrupt uh you will be arrested you'll be banned [1:36] for a year however i'm told that we have some guests today who have completed their ban [1:42] and are back with us again today we hope you've had the time to think about your indiscretions [1:52] as a persistent violator you do okay [1:53] you'll be banned for three years this time. [1:55] So in any event, welcome to everyone [1:59] and certainly Secretary Rubio, [2:02] we're glad to have you here and welcome back. [2:05] The new co-pilot I got, Pete, is doing just fine [2:08] in the seat you used to sit in and I'm glad to have him. [2:12] Thank you so much for being here. [2:13] We were a little afraid we were gonna lose you [2:15] to the Miami Dolphins there for a while, [2:16] but I guess that went a different direction, [2:18] so it's certainly our gain. [2:20] I'd like to start this hearing on the Venezuela situation [2:27] by recognizing the brave men and women [2:30] who participated in this operation. [2:32] The intelligence gathering, planning and execution [2:35] were incredible. [2:36] Only the US could have pulled off this mission [2:39] and that's only because the dedication and professionalism [2:42] of each and every one of our service members. [2:44] As we know, much of their work is done in secret, [2:48] but I do hope these people will receive the accolades [2:50] that they so rightly deserve. [2:52] I also want to acknowledge the leadership of President Trump [2:58] that he has shown and also you, Secretary Rubio. [3:01] It's no easy job keeping drugs and narco-terrorists [3:04] off our streets and keeping Americans safe. [3:06] Thank you for extraditing Nicolas Maduro [3:09] and bringing him to account for his many crimes [3:12] against the American people. [3:14] Let me reiterate a point that I've made many times [3:17] on the Senate floor. [3:19] President Trump's actions against narco-terrorists, [3:21] and his capture of Maduro, have made America safer. [3:24] Every American should be thanking Donald Trump [3:27] and Marco Rubio for what they have done. [3:30] There are a lot of Americans today who wouldn't be alive [3:35] if not for your commitment and dedication [3:39] to stemming the flow of drugs into our country. [3:43] The actions in Venezuela were limited in scope, [3:47] short in duration, and done to protect US interests [3:50] and citizens. [3:51] What President Trump has done [3:52] in Venezuela is the definition [3:54] of the President's Article II constitutional authorities [3:57] as Commander-in-Chief, and wholly consistent [4:00] with what other Presidents' efforts and what they have done [4:03] and actions they have taken to protect the American people [4:06] from threats in our own hemisphere. [4:09] In fact, President George H.W. Bush authorized similar, [4:12] but much broader and more extensive military operations [4:15] to arrest and bring Panama's Manuel Noriega [4:18] to the United States to stand trial for drug-related, [4:22] criminal charges. [4:23] In that case, President Bush deployed more than 9,000 troops [4:27] into Panama for more than a month. [4:30] At the time, all leaders of the Senate, including Democrats, [4:34] praised that move. [4:36] Unlike in Panama, President Trump authorized [4:39] a much more limited military action in Venezuela, [4:42] with only about 200 troops inside the country [4:44] for a couple of hours and a firefight [4:47] that lasted less than 27 minutes. [4:49] With no loss of life on the United States side, [4:51] but significant casualties on the other side. [4:54] This military action was incredibly brief, [4:57] targeted, and successful. [4:59] When bad guys are in the business of flying drugs [5:01] into the United States, drugs that kill our children, [5:04] hurt our country, violate U.S. laws, [5:06] and destabilize our hemisphere, [5:08] then they'll have to be held to answer for those actions, [5:13] and that's what's being done now. [5:15] Maduro was not recognized as the legitimate leader [5:17] of Venezuela by President Trump, or even by President Biden, [5:21] or by most of the international community. [5:23] It is a service to the world that this illegitimate leader [5:26] is no longer in power. [5:28] Now the United States has a tremendous opportunity [5:31] before us in Venezuela. [5:33] Because of the complexity of this operation, [5:35] there has been some confusion as to how it will be done. [5:38] I've been impressed by the way you, Secretary Rubio, [5:41] explained the plan to me going forward right from the start. [5:45] It is clear and it's doable. [5:47] I know you will lay that out for us here today. [5:50] Venezuela's natural resources are [5:51] frequently been used to bolster the economy [5:53] of our adversaries, especially China. [5:56] Through President Trump's actions, [5:57] we have effectively cut off that supply, [5:59] giving the United States tremendous leverage. [6:02] After our lengthy engagements in the Middle East [6:04] in years past, many Americans are rightfully concerned [6:07] about so-called forever wars. [6:09] I know this administration is laser-focused [6:13] on avoiding those experiences. [6:15] With Nicolas Maduro out of power, [6:17] the United States has the opportunity [6:18] to better protect America by bringing stability [6:21] to Venezuela. [6:21] The country has a history of democracy, [6:25] capitalism, and a respect for human rights. [6:27] It is only during the last two dictatorships [6:30] that it has lost these attributes. [6:31] The Venezuelan people are not strangers to these concepts [6:35] and long to have them reinstated. [6:38] They have you and the President Trump to thank [6:41] for giving them another chance. [6:43] It is all our hope that the Venezuelan people [6:45] will soon be able to hold free and fair elections [6:48] for their leaders. [6:49] To get there, Venezuela may require U.S. [6:51] and international [6:51] oversight to ensure these elections are indeed free [6:57] and fair, unlike their most recent elections. [7:03] Secretary Rubio, thank you for being here today. [7:05] I look forward to a productive discussion. [7:08] And with that, I'd like to hear the distinguished [7:11] ranking members' views on these matters. [7:14] Senator Shaheen. [7:15] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [7:16] Welcome back, Secretary Rubio. [7:18] Thank you for being here. [7:20] I certainly agree with the Chairman in terms of his comments, [7:23] including the relative to Nicolas Maduro. [7:26] He was bad for Venezuela. [7:28] He was bad for the region, and he was bad for the United States. [7:30] I think the question we have to ask now is, [7:34] was the raid to arrest him worth the cost? [7:38] And I also share the Chairman's admiration [7:42] for the military operation that took him out. [7:46] But the U.S. naval blockade around Venezuela [7:49] and the raid have already cost American taxpayers, hundreds of millions, of dollars. [7:53] Outside estimates are as high as a billion dollars, and yet the Maduro regime is essentially [7:58] still in power. [8:00] All the same people are running the country. [8:02] Maduro's vice president, now the interim president, has taken no steps to diminish Iran, China, [8:09] or Russia's considerable influence in Venezuela, one of the reasons that has been given for [8:15] the mission. [8:16] Her cooperation appears tactical and temporary and not a real shift in Venezuela's alignment. [8:23] In the process, we've traded one dictator for another. [8:27] So it's no wonder that so many of my constituents are asking, why is the president spending [8:31] so much time focused on Venezuela instead of the cost of living and their kitchen table [8:36] economic concerns? [8:38] Unfortunately, I think this has been a pattern across the administration, losing sight of [8:43] what actually advances America's interests and delivers results for the American people. [8:49] Take the elimination of personnel and departments that were critical to our national security [8:54] security, for example. [8:57] These are cost-effective tools, like Voice of America, that help us advance America's [9:01] interests globally. [9:02] And Mr. Secretary, as you remember, you strongly supported most of these programs when you [9:07] were on this side of the dais. [9:10] The administration says those cuts were about saving money, but the total federal spending [9:15] last year went up by 4 percent, not down. [9:18] We spent more, not less. [9:20] As a result, our adversaries, like China, are expanding their influence. [9:25] And there is broad bipartisan agreement in Congress that China is the central strategic [9:29] challenge of our time. [9:31] The president himself has said that as well. [9:34] But we're cutting foreign aid and diplomacy tools. [9:38] We're leaving embassies without leadership. [9:40] We're shutting down counter-disinformation programs. [9:43] We are driving talent away from the United States while Beijing is actively recruiting [9:48] it. [9:49] And I would just like to point out, this is a picture of the globe. [9:54] These are countries where... [9:55] This is where China has ambassadors in those countries. [9:59] All of the red, those are China. [10:02] And places where their diplomats are on the ground, except, of course, for China, which [10:08] is in blue, and they don't need to put diplomats there. [10:11] This map, this is where we have diplomats. [10:17] You can see the red is where we're filled. [10:20] And look at all of the white, where we do not have ambassadors on the ground. [10:28] We're even giving China some of our most advanced. [10:30] Semiconductors. [10:33] And after a year of tariffs that were supposed to make us stronger, China has posted the [10:37] largest trade surplus in history. [10:40] And American families are paying more at a time when the prices were already too high. [10:46] Since the start of the tariff campaign in 2025, U.S. manufacturing employment has fallen [10:52] by anywhere from 50,000 to 70,000 jobs, depending on whose estimates you look at. [10:58] That's a trend that undercuts promises that tariffs would bring factories down. [10:59] And that's a trend that undercuts promises that tariffs would bring factories down. [11:00] That's a trend that undercuts promises that tariffs would bring factories down. [11:01] And so we're pushing our closest allies into their arms. [11:02] Just look at Canada, whose business with the state of New Hampshire has been really critical. [11:17] They recently cut a trade deal with China because they no longer view the United States [11:21] as a reliable partner. [11:24] Pushing allies away like that is not strategic competition. [11:28] It is unilateral disarmament. [11:31] We see the same gap between world stellony Cons соперPaul defence roice tr dari al tiny [11:32] uelijk athiope uq deskno'Resqq LII [11:32] Hex National Stereojib Di ane [11:33] B Idjprv Angoul погithav Naam [11:33] F ekerh [11:33] o River [11:33] and how this administration deals with other authoritarian regimes. [11:38] At a time when Iran is violently cracking down on protests, [11:41] the U.S. is coming to agreements to deport Iranians in this country back to Iran, [11:48] people who will face persecution and interrogation by Iranian security forces. [11:54] And yet President Trump told the Iranian people that help was on the way. [11:57] But the United States has largely stood on the sidelines as the situation has deteriorated. [12:04] Americans are right in thinking that the Trump administration is tougher on our allies [12:09] than on most of our adversaries. [12:12] I just returned from Denmark, where I met with Danish and Greenlandic leaders. [12:17] Senator Coons was also on that trip. He led it. [12:20] What I heard directly is that President Trump's threats to take Greenland [12:24] have shaken public confidence in the United States to the core. [12:28] And this from an ally who first recognized the new United States of America [12:34] in 1792, has fought on our side in both World Wars and in Afghanistan. [12:40] And I heard from one Danish-American woman whose son holds both citizenships [12:44] and is approaching conscription age, that she's worried that her son might one day [12:49] be forced to choose between the two countries that he loves. [12:52] That kind of fear would have been unthinkable two years ago. [12:56] Or ten years ago. Or fifty years ago. [13:01] There is no strategic objective in Greenland that cannot be adjusted [13:05] or achieved through cooperation. [13:08] The only thing these threats have accomplished is weakening trust in the United States. [13:14] That trust is the foundation of our alliances. [13:16] And at a moment when Russia is waging the largest land war in Europe since World War II, [13:21] we should be strengthening allied unities. [13:24] Instead, we're undermining it. [13:28] European allies are worried about open conflict with the United States. [13:32] Canadian trading partners are turning toward China instead of the U.S. and the constant [13:36] threat of new terrorist attacks. [13:37] Europe's raising prices and making it impossible for businesses to invest is ever-present. [13:44] So from Venezuela to Europe, the United States is spending more, risking more, and achieving [13:50] less. [13:53] That does not project strength. [13:55] It hands our adversaries exactly what they want. [13:59] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [14:01] Thank you, Senator Shaheen. [14:02] We're now going to hear from Secretary Rubio. [14:04] After that, we'll do a round of five-minute questions. [14:08] And so with that, [14:10] Senator Rubio, welcome back to the committee. [14:12] I'd love to hear what you have to say. [14:13] Thank you. [14:14] I appreciate it. [14:15] And I'll be brief in my opening statement so we can leave more time for questions. [14:17] I've submitted a written statement, but I'm not going to use it. [14:20] I'm just going to talk to you guys for a few minutes and... [14:24] All right. [14:25] Here we go. [14:27] Suspend. [14:28] You know the drill. [14:29] Off to jail. [14:30] That's a war crime. [14:31] That's a one-year ban from the committee. [14:34] Anyone who is a persistent violator will be banned for three years. [14:38] So I don't know whether the guy falls in that category. [14:41] Looks like it. [14:42] I hope after three years, he'll fall out. [14:43] He'll find a more productive means of employment. [14:46] Secretary Rubio, we have two hearings a week. [14:49] You seem to have a more robust following than most of our witnesses that come before us. [14:54] But anyway... [14:55] There'll be a couple more. [14:57] So I just... [14:58] It will leave... [14:59] Thank you for stopping the clock. [15:00] But I appreciate it. [15:02] So and I know there's a lot of other topics you're going to ask me about, so we can talk [15:06] about those, including the ones that Senator Shaheen just outlined. [15:10] But let me just talk about Venezuela in particular. [15:12] Please. [15:13] I think we can talk if you want. [15:15] I'm sure your questions will be about what happened before and led up to in the operation. [15:19] I want to focus my comments this morning on what happens now moving forward, because you're [15:23] going to ask about going back. [15:26] And let me just say this. [15:27] What is our goal going in? [15:28] We had in our hemisphere a regime operated by an indicted narco-trafficker that became [15:35] a base of operation for virtually every competitor, adversary, and enemy in the world. [15:39] It was, for Iran, their primary spot of operation in the Western hemisphere was Venezuela. [15:45] For Russia, their primary base of operation in the Western hemisphere, along Cuba and [15:49] Nicaragua, was Venezuela. [15:52] In the case of China, China was receiving oil at a huge, about $20 a barrel discount. [15:58] And it was... [15:59] They weren't even paying money for it. [16:00] It was being used to pay down debt that they were owed. [16:02] This is the oil of the people of Venezuela, and it was being given to the Chinese as barter [16:06] at a $20 discount per barrel in some cases. [16:10] And so you had, basically, three of our primary opponents in the world operating from Venezuela, [16:16] from our hemisphere, from that spot. [16:18] It was also a place where you had a narco-trafficking regime that openly cooperated with the FARC [16:23] and the ELN and other drug trafficking organizations using their national territory. [16:28] It was an enormous strategic risk for the United States, not halfway around the world, [16:32] not in another continent, but in the hemisphere in which we all live. [16:36] And it was having dramatic impacts on us, but also on Colombia and on the Caribbean [16:40] Basin and all sorts of other places. [16:42] It was an untenable situation, and it had to be addressed. [16:46] And it was addressed. [16:47] And now the question becomes what happens moving forward. [16:49] As I've described to you in previous settings and in individual conversations, we had three [16:53] objectives here. [16:54] The final... [16:55] I'll work it backwards because the end state here is we want to reach a phase of transition [17:01] where we are left with a friendly, stable, prosperous Venezuela, and democratic, in which [17:07] all elements of society are represented in free and fair elections. [17:11] By the way, you can have elections. [17:12] You can have elections all day. [17:14] But if the opposition has no access to the media... [17:16] If opposition candidates are routinely dismissed and unable to be on the ballot because the [17:24] government... [17:25] Those aren't free and fair elections. [17:26] That's the end state that we want. [17:27] Free, fair, prosperous, and friendly Venezuela. [17:31] We're not going to get there in three weeks. [17:32] It's going to take some time. [17:34] And so objective number one was stability. [17:36] In the aftermath of the removal of Maduro, the concern was what happens in Venezuela? [17:40] Is there civil war? [17:41] Do the different factions start going at each other? [17:43] Are a million people crossing the border into Colombia? [17:46] All of that has been avoided. [17:48] And one of the primary ways that it has been avoided is the ability to establish direct, [17:52] honest, respectful, but very direct and honest conversations with the people who today control [17:58] the elements of that nation, meaning the law enforcement, the government apparatus, et [18:03] cetera. [18:04] And one of the tools that's available to us is the fact that we have sanctions on oil. [18:08] There is oil that is sanctioned that cannot move from Venezuela because of our quarantine. [18:13] And so what we did is we entered into an arrangement with them. [18:15] And the arrangement is this. [18:16] On the oil that is sanctioned and quarantined, [18:18] we will allow you to move it to market. [18:20] We will allow you to move it to market at market prices, [18:23] not at the discount China was getting. [18:25] In return, the funds from that will be deposited [18:28] into an account that we will have oversight over. [18:31] And you will spend that money [18:33] for the benefit of the Venezuelan people. [18:35] Why was that important? [18:36] Venezuela was running out of storage capacity, okay? [18:39] They were producing oil, they were drilling oil, [18:41] they had nowhere to put it. [18:42] They had nowhere to move it. [18:43] And they were facing a fiscal crunch. [18:45] They needed money in the immediacy [18:46] to fund the police officer, the sanitation workers, [18:48] the daily operations of government. [18:50] And so we've been able to create a short-term mechanism. [18:52] This is not gonna be the permanent mechanism, [18:54] but this is a short-term mechanism [18:56] in which the needs of the Venezuelan people can be met [18:58] through a process that we've created [19:00] where they will submit every month a budget [19:02] of this is what we need funded. [19:04] We will provide for them at the front end [19:05] what that money cannot be used for. [19:07] And they've been very cooperative in this regard. [19:09] In fact, they have pledged to use a substantial amount [19:12] of those funds to purchase medicine [19:14] and equipment directly from the United States. [19:17] As in fact, one of the things they need is dilutant [19:20] or dilutant, depending how you wanna pronounce it. [19:22] And that basically is the light crude [19:24] that you need to mix with their heavy crude [19:26] in order for the oil to be able to be mixed and moved. [19:29] They're getting, they used to get 100% of that from Russia. [19:32] They are now getting 100% of that from the United States. [19:35] So we're using that short-term mechanism [19:38] both to stabilize the country, [19:40] but also to make sure that the oil proceeds [19:42] that are currently being generated through the [19:44] licenses will now begin to issue on the sanctioned oil [19:47] goes to the benefit of the Venezuelan people, [19:49] not to fund the system that existed in the past. [19:52] The second is a period of recovery. [19:55] And that is the phase in which you wanna see [19:56] a normalized oil industry. [19:58] Again, this is, look, we've got plenty of oil. [20:00] There's plenty of oil all over the world. [20:02] Canada produces heavy crude. [20:03] So it's not like Venezuela's oil is unique in that regard, [20:06] despite the fact they have the largest known reserves [20:08] in the world. [20:09] It's not irreplaceable. [20:10] But we understand that that is the lifeline. [20:12] Their natural resources are gonna allow Venezuela [20:14] to be stable and prosperous moving forward. [20:17] And so we have created the, [20:18] what we hope to do is transition to a mechanism [20:20] that allows that to be sold in a normal way, [20:22] a normal oil industry. [20:24] Not one dominated by cronies, [20:25] not one dominated by graft and corruption. [20:28] To that end, the authorities there deserve some credit. [20:31] They have passed a new hydrocarbon law [20:33] that basically eradicates many of the Chavez era [20:36] restrictions on private investment in the oil industry. [20:39] It probably doesn't go far enough [20:41] to attract sufficient investment, [20:42] but it's a big step from where they were three weeks ago. [20:44] So that's a major change. [20:47] We can address some of the other components, [20:48] but I'll run out of time. [20:49] But one of parts of the transition phase, [20:52] or the recovery phase, [20:53] is beginning to create space for different voices [20:56] inside of Venezuelan politics [20:58] to have an ability to speak out. [21:00] Part of that is the release of political prisoners. [21:02] By some estimates, up to 2,000. [21:04] They are releasing them. [21:05] They are releasing them probably slower [21:06] than I would like them to, [21:08] but they are releasing them. [21:09] And in fact, you're starting to see [21:10] some of the people being released [21:11] beginning to speak out and participate [21:13] in political life in the country. [21:14] We have a long ways to go. [21:16] Look, we can talk in more detail about all of these things. [21:18] Suffice it to say, I'm not here to claim to you [21:20] this is gonna be easy or simple. [21:22] I am saying that in three and a half, almost four weeks, [21:24] we are much further along on this project [21:27] than we thought we would be, [21:27] given the complexities of it going into it. [21:30] And I recognize that it won't be easy. [21:31] I mean, look, at the end of the day, [21:32] we are dealing with people over there [21:33] that have spent most of their lives [21:35] living in a gangster paradise. [21:37] So it's not gonna be like from one day to the next, [21:39] we're gonna have this thing turn around overnight. [21:42] But I think we're making good and decent progress. [21:44] It is the best plan and we are certainly better off today [21:47] in Venezuela than we were four weeks ago. [21:49] And I think and hope and expect [21:51] that we'll be better off in three months, [21:53] in six months, in nine months [21:54] than we would have been had Maduro still been there. [21:56] So thank you. [21:59] Thank you, Secretary Rubio. [22:01] We'll now do a round of questions, five minutes each. [22:06] I'd like to start and I'd ask you to go, [22:09] I understand we're not in a classified setting, [22:11] but I think a lot of people had no understanding [22:16] of the groundwork that was done [22:18] before the actual action took place. [22:23] I was incredibly impressed with what you told me [22:26] about how you, the president, [22:29] negotiated with parties there on the ground, [22:32] particularly the parties who were going to be in charge [22:37] after Maduro was removed. [22:40] And I wonder if you could talk about that for a minute, [22:43] understanding that we aren't in, [22:46] in a very classified setting. [22:48] And I'd like to, if you could, say a few things about that. [22:52] Well, one of the things I've come to maybe more fully appreciate [22:55] than I didn't when I was here in the Senate [22:57] was the number of contingencies [22:58] that the Department of War plans for all over the world. [23:00] The overwhelming vast majority of them [23:02] will never come to fruition. [23:03] But there's all kinds of contingencies [23:05] that are planned for. [23:06] And one contingency that had to be planned for [23:08] is the fact that sitting in Venezuela [23:10] with a $50 million reward on his head [23:12] was an indicted narco trafficker. [23:15] In fact, I believe it's the largest reward we've been given. [23:16] I don't think we've ever issued for anybody. [23:17] I'd remind everybody, the Biden administration [23:19] had a $25 million reward on an indicted narco trafficker, [23:23] the same person. [23:24] And so, you know, multiple administrations [23:26] from both parties have wanted this man arrested. [23:28] And one of the options the president had before him [23:31] was the opportunity, if things didn't work out, [23:33] to go in and remove this individual [23:35] because he was wanted in a law enforcement operation. [23:37] Now, obviously, a law enforcement operation [23:39] against the de facto head of a, you know, of a regime [23:43] is not as simple as going after some fugitive hiding [23:46] in a closet somewhere. [23:47] It required planning, and it required eliminating anything [23:50] that was a threat to the forces [23:52] that were going in to extract him. [23:54] I want to be clear, and I'll share with you [23:55] what I've shared publicly. [23:56] We made multiple attempts to get Maduro to leave voluntarily [24:01] and to avoid all of this because we understood [24:04] that he was an impediment to progress. [24:05] You couldn't make a deal with this guy, okay? [24:07] This guy has made multiple deals. [24:08] He's broken every one of them. [24:09] As a point of example, [24:10] he made a deal with the Biden administration, [24:12] and here was the deal that he made. [24:13] It was a bad deal. We knew he wouldn't keep it. [24:16] He made the following deal. [24:17] Pardon my nephews, his nephews, [24:19] who were convicted narco-traffickers, [24:22] convicted already and serving time in jail. [24:23] Pardon them. [24:25] Pardon and release Alex Saab, who was his money man, [24:28] his bag man, primarily in charge of the portfolio with Iran. [24:32] Release these people. [24:34] He, in turn, agreed to release some political prisoners, [24:37] which he did. [24:38] Many of them were subsequently exiled or rearrested, [24:41] and that he would hold free and fair elections, [24:43] which he did not. [24:44] In fact, he basically disqualified Maria Karina Machado [24:47] from any other candidate, [24:48] and Edmundo Gonzalez ends up being the nominee [24:50] for the opposition party [24:51] simply because they forgot to ban him, [24:53] and they forgot to put him on the ban list. [24:55] And despite that, he loses an election [24:57] that everyone around the world recognizes [24:59] when it's a legitimate election. [25:00] So he's made previous deals. [25:02] In fact, he's broken so many deals, [25:04] not even the Vatican has been willing to interact [25:06] with Maduro in the past [25:08] because he's broken so many of these deals. [25:10] He's just simply not a guy you can make a deal with. [25:11] He had no intent of keeping it. [25:13] What he wanted to do was tap us along [25:15] and buy three years of time until he could deal [25:17] with a new administration [25:18] that he thought may be more favorable, et cetera. [25:20] He was an impediment to progress. [25:21] None of the things we're talking about now, [25:23] not the release of political prisoners, [25:26] not the transition of the oil industry [25:27] to a legitimate oil industry, [25:29] not the erosion of Iranian, Russian, or Chinese influence, [25:34] none of these things would have been possible [25:35] as long as Maduro was there. [25:37] And so this was one option [25:38] that was available to the president [25:39] after exhausting every other option [25:42] to remove this individual from the scene. [25:44] Again, I'm not here to tell you [25:46] these are all gonna be roses [25:47] along the way and it's all gonna go perfectly. [25:49] But for the first time in 20 years, [25:51] we are having serious counter-narcotic talks [25:54] with Venezuelan authorities [25:55] about going after counter-narcotics, [25:58] about going after narcotics organizations. [26:00] For the first time in 20 years, [26:02] we are having serious conversations [26:04] about eroding and eliminating the Iranian presence, [26:06] the Chinese influence, the Russian presence as well. [26:09] In fact, I would tell you that there are many elements [26:12] there in Venezuela that welcome a return [26:15] to establishing relations to the United States [26:17] on multiple fronts. [26:18] We are at the end talking about a Western country [26:20] that has a long history of cooperation [26:22] and work with the United States. [26:23] At one time, Venezuela, pre-Chavez, [26:24] was a very strong U.S. ally. [26:26] And we hope to get back to that point. [26:28] We're not there. [26:29] This thing still is in its infancy. [26:30] But I certainly think a lot of progress [26:32] has been made in that regard. [26:33] I was impressed with your description of the fact [26:37] how careful you were in the operation [26:40] not to dismantle either institutions or infrastructure [26:43] because you wanted to see the Venezuelan people [26:45] take that over. [26:47] And get back on their feet again. [26:49] I think that was really a wise decision to make [26:55] and have it as surgical as it was. [26:58] The last thing I'd ask about, if you could touch on [27:01] for just a minute, is I know you spent [27:03] a considerable period of time negotiating [27:04] with the people that were going to do day-to-day operations, [27:09] the Venezuelans who were going to fill the vacuum. [27:13] How's that going? [27:14] And how do you feel about where we are there? [27:16] Well, first of all, let me understand something. [27:18] I spent 14 years in the US Senate [27:19] going after these people pretty hard, along with many of you. [27:23] So I mean, I understand who they are. [27:24] And I understand this portfolio from a personal level [27:27] quite well. [27:28] So we're very realistic about what we're dealing with here. [27:30] We also understand that in geopolitics, [27:32] sometimes that's required. [27:33] And in this particular case, there [27:35] are an alignment of interests. [27:37] And we certainly think that the approach we're taking [27:39] is preferable to some of the other alternatives [27:41] that people speculate about or fear. [27:43] And I would say at this point, I do have to characterize. [27:46] Again, being realistic, clear-eyed, and understanding [27:48] that there will be impediments and unexpected events [27:51] along the way. [27:52] What we have found so far is cooperation, respect, dialogue. [27:57] And it's not just me. [27:58] As has been reported in the media, [28:00] Director Radcliffe traveled to Caracas [28:02] and met with leaders there and discussed [28:03] important items of potential cooperation. [28:06] I've also discussed, and I think I've alerted some of you, [28:09] that we have Laura Dogue, who was our ambassador to Nicaragua [28:14] in the past and to Honduras. [28:16] And I think she will be taking over the event affairs unit, [28:20] first in Bogota, but ultimately in Caracas. [28:22] We've had a team on the ground already there. [28:24] We already had 70 locally employed [28:26] that sort of maintain that facility. [28:28] But we have a team on the ground there assessing it. [28:30] And we think very quickly we'll be [28:31] able to open a US diplomatic presence on the ground, which [28:35] will allow us to have real-time information and interact, [28:38] by the way, not just with officials in the regime [28:40] and with the interim authorities, [28:42] but also interact with members of civil society, the opposition. [28:45] We think we're going to be much further down the road. [28:46] Further along, when we get them along the way, [28:47] they've been very cooperative on that front. [28:49] Obviously, there's some hard asks along the way. [28:51] We'll see what the response is to those. [28:53] But whether it's General Cain with his counterpart, [28:56] or Director Ratcliffe, or myself with Delcy Rodriguez, [29:01] we've established what I think so far has [29:02] been a very respectful and productive line of communication [29:06] as we go through this stabilization phase [29:08] and towards the recovery phase. [29:10] But there's a lot of work to be done here. [29:12] And we ultimately are going to judge actions, not words. [29:16] And that's what we're hoping to work towards. [29:19] Well done. [29:20] Senator Shaheen. [29:21] Thank you. [29:23] I'm pleased that we are looking at a diplomatic presence [29:27] in Venezuela in the near future. [29:28] I think that's very important. [29:30] But the DEA has reportedly identified Delcy Rodriguez [29:34] as a significant actor in the drug trade. [29:37] Do you agree with that? [29:39] And if you do, how are we to assure the American people [29:44] that the money that's going to Venezuela, as I [29:47] said, is not going to any of the cartels or drug running? [29:50] Yeah. [29:51] Well, first of all, on the first point, [29:52] I would say she's not indicted the way [29:54] Maduro and his wife were. [29:56] So I'm not going to speculate about newspaper articles [29:58] and what law enforcement is working on. [29:59] If, in fact, there were such an investigation, [30:01] that's something that we would speculate on. [30:03] Suffice it to say that this was not a normal system. [30:06] We all should stipulate to that. [30:09] That regime, as everyone understood, [30:11] was held together by corruption. [30:12] The glue that kept people together [30:13] was not loyalty to Maduro. [30:15] It was the fact that these five guys had five separate oil [30:18] fields. [30:18] That were assigned to them. [30:19] These people had drug runs. [30:19] No, I understand that. [30:20] So that's going to be clear. [30:21] And I'm not defending the regime. [30:23] In fact, I'm concerned that we haven't really [30:26] changed the regime enough. [30:27] And that America's dollars are still [30:31] going to drug runners and to significant organizations who [30:35] we don't want to have benefit from the funding [30:40] that we're selling now of oil and providing [30:43] to the Venezuelan government. [30:44] I acknowledge that we are dealing with, I told you, [30:46] with individuals that have been involved [30:48] in things that in our system would not be acceptable, [30:50] would not be acceptable to us in the long term. [30:51] By no means is our policy to leave in place [30:53] something permanent that's as corrupt as you've described. [30:57] We are in the transition and stabilization phase. [31:00] We are just acknowledging reality. [31:01] And that is you have to work with the people that [31:03] are in charge of the elements of government. [31:05] OK, but can you reassure people that money is not [31:09] going, continuing to go to the drug cartel? [31:11] Right. [31:12] So that's the process that I outlined to you. [31:14] So on the sanctioned oil, the oil that requires US permission [31:17] to move, that oil, the proceeds of that oil, which by the way [31:21] is being sold at market price, not at the discount [31:23] Venezuela was being forced to sell, [31:25] is being deposited into an account that ultimately [31:27] will become a US Treasury blocked account here [31:30] in the United States. [31:31] We will, they will submit, we will at the front end [31:34] say this is what this money can be spent on, on these things. [31:37] We will submit to them, they will submit to us [31:40] a budget request. [31:41] We want to use this money for these things. [31:43] And as part, and part of the proceeds [31:45] will go to fund a audit process. [31:47] To make sure that that's how the money is being spent. [31:50] So that's how we intend to handle those funds [31:51] in the short term. [31:52] There's an actual audit process that's been set up? [31:55] Who is responsible? [31:55] It will be set up. [31:56] And we have a couple options. [31:59] One option is the XM Bank. [32:00] They have expertise as bankers in being [32:02] able to do some of that option. [32:04] There may be some others in place. [32:05] We haven't finalized what that audit process would be. [32:08] We've only made one payment. [32:09] And that payment we did, and retrospectively [32:11] will be audited. [32:12] But it was important we made that payment [32:14] because they had to meet payroll. [32:15] They had to keep sanitation workers, police officers, [32:17] government workers on staff. [32:19] It was a $300 million payment. [32:21] Right. [32:22] So it's been reported that the oil sold for $500 million. [32:25] That $300 million went to Venezuelan government. [32:28] What happened to the other $200 million? [32:29] It's still sitting in the account, [32:31] is my understanding at this time. [32:32] The account in Qatar? [32:34] Well, the account, yes. [32:35] But that will ultimately be trans. [32:36] That's a short term account. [32:37] Ultimately, it will be a US Treasury blocked account [32:40] in the United States. [32:41] And will it also be audited? [32:43] Correct. [32:43] Well, the audit will be on the expenditures. [32:45] At the front end, we'll tell them [32:47] this is what the money can be spent on. [32:48] Again, I'm not talking about all the other revenues [32:50] that Venezuelan government may have. [32:52] We're talking about the revenues from the sanctioned oil. [32:54] At the front end, we will say this [32:56] is what the allowable expenses are. [32:58] And then they will agree to fund as part of the overall cost. [33:01] They will pay for and fund an audit system acceptable to us [33:04] to ensure that that's how the money was spent. [33:06] And can you report to this committee [33:08] once that audit system is set up? [33:09] Oh, absolutely. [33:10] Yeah. [33:11] I'd like to change the topic in my short time [33:14] that I have left. [33:15] Because when you were a member of this committee, [33:17] you authored legislation to prevent President Trump [33:20] from unilaterally leaving NATO, you and Senator Kaine. [33:24] Do you still believe that the US benefits from NATO? [33:27] We do. [33:28] But NATO needs to be reimagined as well [33:31] in terms of the obligations. [33:32] And this is not new to this president. [33:33] Multiple presidents have complained about it. [33:35] I agree. [33:35] I think this president just complains about it [33:37] louder than other presidents. [33:38] Well, I'm just trying to get a clear answer on where [33:42] this administration stands relative to NATO, [33:44] because it's been a very fuzzy message. [33:47] It's been a very fuzzy message over the last year. [33:51] And do you agree that we're stronger in confronting China [33:54] when we do so with like-minded partners, [33:57] and that China is still the number one threat that we [34:00] face in the United States? [34:01] Yeah. [34:01] But our like-minded partners have to have capability. [34:03] And that's been part of the problem, [34:04] is the erosion in European defense capabilities. [34:07] Because they've taken vast amount of the monies. [34:09] These are rich countries. [34:10] And because of the NATO umbrella, [34:12] it gave them the flexibility to spend [34:13] a tremendous amount of their revenues on social programs [34:16] and not on defense. [34:16] But the trend line will begin to change. [34:18] Well, it's already begun to change, frankly. [34:20] And thanks. [34:21] And I think the president deserves credit for that, [34:23] for the fact that there is now a commitment for 5% of GDP [34:27] to be spent on defense. [34:29] But part of that strength also comes not just [34:33] from having the mechanism the military might, [34:37] but it also comes from the unity with our allies. [34:40] And to the extent to which that unity is undermined, [34:43] like the talk about Greenland and antagonizing Denmark, [34:47] then it undermines NATO's ability. [34:49] And the only people who are excited about that [34:51] are Vladimir Putin and President Xi. [34:53] Yeah. [34:53] Well, I would say that I think our alliances in NATO, [34:56] ultimately, are something that's going to work out. [34:58] Our partners understand the importance [34:59] of the US presence in NATO. [35:01] Without the US, there is no NATO. [35:02] And we understand that in order for NATO to be stronger, [35:05] our partners need to be stronger. [35:07] And one of the things we've explained to our allies in NATO [35:09] is the United States is not simply focused on Europe. [35:12] We also have defense needs in the Western hemisphere. [35:14] We have defense needs in the Indo-Pacific. [35:16] And it will require us. [35:17] We may be the richest country in the world, [35:19] but we don't have unlimited resources. [35:21] And as we reassign these forces- [35:23] Which is exactly why we want to have allies and partners [35:26] to help us as we're looking at conflicts around the world. [35:29] And when we antagonize our allies and partners, [35:31] and when we send Canada to do a trade deal with China instead [35:34] of coming to New Hampshire or the United States, [35:37] it weakens our ability to confront our adversaries. [35:40] Yeah. [35:41] But our allies have to be two things. [35:43] They have to be willing to step up, [35:44] but they also have to be capable of stepping up. [35:46] And frankly, many of them have not. [35:47] I mean, Spain is still not doing the 5%. [35:49] I mean, there are countries that are still not doing. [35:51] And in fact, Mark Rutte yesterday pointed out [35:53] that without the United States, the countries of Europe [35:56] would have to spend 10% of their GDP for the next 20 years [36:00] to be able to make up the whole. [36:01] So I do think there needs to be a rebalancing. [36:03] And hopefully, we'll have cooperation. [36:04] I think we will. [36:05] Rutte has done a great job of managing all of it. [36:07] And I'm not arguing that point with you. [36:09] As I said, I agree with what the president has [36:12] asked of our European allies. [36:14] What I'm arguing with you about is [36:16] his rhetoric is undermining NATO and our partnerships [36:21] with our allies. [36:22] And that's a problem. [36:23] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [36:24] Thank you, Senator Shaheen. [36:26] Senator Ricketts. [36:28] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [36:28] Thank you, Secretary Rubio, for being here. [36:31] So some of the comments from my colleagues [36:34] on the other side of the aisle are difficult to square [36:38] with the record. [36:39] The goalposts didn't move, nor did Maduro change. [36:43] The only thing that changed was President Trump [36:46] acted on what members of both parties [36:48] said needed to be happen, and it needed to happen. [36:52] And did so, by the way, with an operation that [36:55] will go down in history as one of the most [36:57] impressive and tactfully proficient to be ever [37:00] carried out. [37:01] So Secretary Rubio, I'd like to get your response [37:03] to a few yes or no questions. [37:04] I know that's typically not your nature, [37:06] but please bear with me here a moment, OK? [37:08] All right, let's hear them first. [37:12] I hate game shows. [37:13] Go ahead. [37:14] For years, the United States had a standing battle [37:17] on Nicolas Maduro, correct? [37:19] Have what, I'm sorry? [37:19] A standing bounty on Nicolas. [37:21] Oh, yes. [37:22] And this bounty was increased by both the Biden and Trump [37:25] administrations, correct? [37:26] Correct. [37:28] And despite that bounty, did Maduro remain in power? [37:31] Yes. [37:33] Did he continue to support drug traffickers? [37:35] Oh, yes. [37:36] Was Operation Absolute Resolve a law enforcement operation [37:42] supported by the military? [37:43] It was. [37:45] Did that operation successfully remove Maduro and his wife, [37:48] and they were taken into custody? [37:50] Yes. [37:50] Great questions. [37:52] Thanks. [37:53] Were any service members, law enforcement officers [37:55] killed in that operation? [37:56] No, not any of ours. [37:59] None of ours, right. [38:00] Has there largely been a broad support across Latin America [38:03] for Maduro's removal? [38:05] Yes. [38:07] And is the United States better off [38:09] with Nicolas Maduro in custody? [38:12] Yes, and Venezuela, too. [38:14] Right. [38:16] I realize that you'll hear differing views [38:19] during this hearing, but I want to at least offer [38:22] my personal congratulations to you and everybody [38:24] who helped carry this out, because the world is better off [38:27] without Nicolas Maduro. [38:29] A few weeks ago, you briefed the Senate on your three-phase plan. [38:32] You've been talking about it here today on stabilization, [38:34] recovery, and the transition in Venezuela. [38:38] Is there anything this Congress can [38:40] do to be helpful in executing on that plan? [38:43] There will be in time. [38:44] There's no doubt about it. [38:45] On the stabilization front, in order to stabilize it, [38:48] for example, we're going to have to begin to provide some [38:50] licenses through OFAC. [38:51] So as an example, if a company wants [38:53] to go down and explore the opportunity to do some economic, [38:57] economic activity in Venezuela, they [38:59] will require a license from Treasury to be able to do that. [39:03] And so that doesn't require congressional action. [39:04] But I wanted you to be aware of it when you start [39:06] to see some of these things. [39:07] Some of these are just exploratory. [39:08] The second is, I think in time, look, [39:10] Venezuela is a very wealthy country. [39:12] This is not a country that's going [39:13] to require money from the United States [39:16] to rebuild, to stabilize, to transition. [39:18] It really isn't. [39:18] It has the ability to be, and it has been historically, [39:21] the wealthiest country in South America in many cases. [39:27] The problem is that the wealth of the country was being stolen. [39:29] And so part of both the recovery and the transition phase is ensuring that you leave in place [39:34] a prosperous, free, democratic, allied with the United States, and friendly, but also [39:39] prosperous Venezuela, where the resources of the country are being utilized responsibly [39:45] and to the benefit of the people and their economy. [39:48] So in time, I imagine we will be coming back to you with specific legislation that may [39:52] be required to assist in that function, but we don't expect that this is going to require [39:57] any spending on our part. [39:59] On the contrary, unlike many of the other parts of the world we've gotten involved, [40:03] we're not spending any money in Venezuela right now, other than whatever it costs to [40:07] stand up our embassy. [40:08] Let me switch gears on you a little bit. [40:11] One of the common criticisms after Maduro's capture was that this would incentivize communist [40:16] China to take similar actions in Taiwan. [40:19] My opinion, this couldn't be further from the truth, for starters, communist China doesn't [40:23] care about international law or norms, they've demonstrated that repeatedly, just ask the [40:27] Philippines. [40:28] Nor does it believe in international law even applies to Taiwan. [40:32] But most importantly, Xi Jinping's calculus on whether to take kinetic action against [40:36] Taiwan rests solely on whether or not he believes he will be successful or not. [40:40] In this sense, the tactical proficiency displayed during Operation Absolute Resolve may have [40:44] actually given Xi more pause in taking action in Taiwan. [40:50] Because despite its massive military buildup, the PLA continues to lend itself to the Chinese [40:53] military. [40:54] The PLA has lacked the experience so clearly on display that the United States demonstrated [40:58] in Maduro's capture. [41:00] And the PLA leaders that do have combat experience, like General Zhang, just got purged, or at [41:06] least one of them did. [41:07] So Secretary Rubio, do you believe that the operation to take Maduro into custody will [41:11] have any impact on communist China's actions or intentions toward Taiwan? [41:15] No. [41:16] Look, the situation on Taiwan is a Xi legacy project that he's made very clear that that's [41:21] what he intends to do. [41:22] And that's going to be irrespective of anything that happens in the world. [41:26] Your point, though, is well taken, and that is the U.S., in conducting this operation, [41:29] I think was certainly startling to China, to Russia, to Iran, to any adversary around [41:34] the world, because the U.S. is the only country in the world, the only country in the world [41:37] that could have done this operation. [41:38] Mr. Chairman, if I could just real briefly, I just mentioned General Zhang getting [41:45] purged here. [41:46] He was obviously a very important official in China. [41:48] Can you share with us just your assessment on what that means, that Xi just purged one [41:53] of the leaders? [41:54] Well, this is, I think, part of a pattern we've seen over the last few years, which [41:56] is a purge of leaders in their military. [41:58] They're spending a lot of money on their military, and obviously some of these guys are stealing [42:02] that money, and they're trying to address that. [42:04] So it's an issue internally in their system. [42:06] They're obviously not sharing with us or talking to us in depth about any of that, but it's [42:10] certainly something we watch with interest. [42:11] Thank you. [42:12] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [42:13] Thank you, Senator Ricketts. [42:14] Senator Coons. [42:15] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [42:16] Thank you, Secretary Rubio. [42:17] Good to be with you again. [42:19] My basic question is what are we doing here? [42:23] Thank you. [42:24] At this point, what is the goal of this hearing? [42:26] How do I know? [42:27] As you know well, having served on this dais alongside me for 14 years, this is an oversight [42:31] hearing. [42:32] And the point, the purpose of oversight is to encourage, if necessary, to compel consultation [42:39] between the administration and Congress. [42:42] And I just wanted to raise with you at the outset, of course the Commander-in-Chief has, [42:47] under Article II, the power to defend the American people against an imminent threat [42:53] or an incoming attack. [42:54] How else could we be kept safe? [42:56] But our Article I power requires consultation. [43:01] I'll agree with all of my colleagues, Nicolas Maduro is a bad guy. [43:05] He was indicted. [43:06] There was a bounty on his head over several administrations. [43:09] His removal, flawlessly executed by American troops, thankfully none of them hurt, did [43:15] cost the lives of 75 to 100 Venezuelans and Cubans, was a dangerous and high-risk maneuver. [43:22] I am glad that it ended as well as it possibly could. [43:24] But the point here, that I want to make first, is that it was rehearsed for months. [43:34] But over the course of months, when the administration was taking strike after strike after strike [43:39] against drug trafficking boats, in several instances where senior leaders of the administration [43:45] briefed this committee and others, we were told that military action to remove Maduro [43:51] was not on the table. [43:52] It was a self-reliant act. [43:53] And that the campaign to try and deter drug trafficking was, at least at the moment, dramatic. [43:54] It was a social act. [43:55] It was a self-reliant act. [43:56] trafficking was not going to include the exact military action that followed. Yet it was being [44:03] rehearsed. If there was time to practice, there was time to consult. And consulting with Congress [44:10] is not just some high-minded principle, not some abstract thing, not a nice-to-have. It's a [44:15] got-to-have. And look, the chairman opened by saying that this was limited in scope and duration, [44:22] that it was executed flawlessly, and we should all be happy about the result. [44:26] That much I agree with. But our president continues to threaten Delcy Rodriguez and [44:32] the remnant of the Maduro regime with military force if they don't comply. We should know [44:38] what are the policies, what is the path, what is the plan forward. You and I both know the long [44:44] and painful history of wars that began and seemed to be resolved and then opened up into excruciating, [44:52] expensive, years-long conflicts in Iraq in particular, in Libya and elsewhere, [44:58] and things do not always go as planned. And so consultation with Congress that is truthful [45:03] and forthcoming and transparent is critical. In your service in this body, you knew that, [45:09] you experienced it. I was in the room as you held to account members of previous administrations for [45:14] not coming forward as they should have. So look, in order to avoid our men and women in our armed [45:22] forces going into harm's way, doubting whether they have the support of the Congress, consultation [45:29] hearings and deliberations are required. I understand the risk of leaks. That's a risk [45:34] every administration takes. But at the end of the day, our framers entrusted the power [45:39] of the declaration of war to this body, not to the executive. [45:43] And where there is the time to consult, there has to be consultation. [45:47] Second, I just wanted to talk about allies and alliances. I was just in Europe. [45:52] I led a bipartisan delegation as Senator Shaheen referenced to Denmark. And our president's [46:00] about NATO, about Denmark, and his attempts to coerce Denmark into giving up Greenland [46:07] are appalling. They profoundly harmed our security. And I am asking you to do everything you can [46:15] to reinforce our commitment to NATO. I was concerned that you just said NATO needs to [46:21] be reimagined. Let's just be clear about the record. You know as well as I, Article 5 has [46:27] only been invoked once, and it was in defense of us after we were attacked. Danes and soldiers from [46:34] almost every other NATO ally deployed and served, fought, and died. 52 days. And for me, the most [46:41] emotional moment of my visit to Denmark was laying a wreath at the memorial to the Danes who served, [46:47] fought, and died alongside Americans. So when our president says we never asked for anything from [46:52] NATO, and they never gave us anything, and you suggest that they aren't carrying their weight, [46:57] whether it's [46:58] in bases, or in access, or in troops, or in service, it is allies that will keep us safe in the [47:06] Indo-Pacific, our treaty allies, Korea and Japan and Australia, and the Philippines are going to [47:11] be critical to Indo-Pacific security against our principal threat, China, and in Europe. [47:18] I am worried that the very foundations of trust are being shaken. Our democracy depends on [47:24] consultation with Congress that is truthful and timely, and the confidence of our allies, [47:30] depends on them knowing where we're going next. Today an armada is steaming [47:34] towards Iran, our president is on social media threatening Iran, and I hope I can [47:39] count on you, Mr. Secretary, to consult with us and inform us before our next [47:44] actions, whether against Nigeria, Colombia, Cuba, Iran, or anywhere else, and I hope [47:51] and believe that I can count on you to reinforce the sanctity of NATO, not to [47:56] reimagine it, but to reinforce it. Thank you. Well, let me unpack the three points [48:02] you touched upon. Consultation, NATO, Greenland, alliances in Greenland. Let me [48:07] tell them to consult. Look, this has been a point of tension not just in this [48:10] administration in Congress, but in multiple administrations, as you rightly [48:12] pointed out. I was a big fan of consultation when I was sitting over [48:17] there. Now, you know, it's a different job, different time, but it's not, that's not [48:20] necessarily the point. This is a very unique situation that we faced here. The [48:25] fact of the matter is that our mission and the one you were briefed on and [48:27] talked about, that mission [48:28] remains ongoing, and that is the counter-narcotic mission that we [48:31] continue to carry out in the, as controversial as it may be, you may not [48:34] all be fans of it, obviously, but it is happening in the Eastern Pacific, and it [48:38] is also happening in the Caribbean Basin. The problem is, or the good news, is [48:42] there aren't a lot of drug boats moving in the Caribbean Basin anymore, and [48:44] that's what we had briefed Congress upon. This specific mission that you've talked [48:48] about, one of the reasons why you rehearsed it is to see if it's even [48:51] feasible to basically go to the President and say, is this something that's even an [48:54] option on the table? The truth of the matter is that this mission [48:58] could not have been briefed to Congress because it even wasn't even in the realm [49:02] of possible until very late in December when the, when all of our efforts to [49:07] negotiate with Maduro had failed and the President was finally presented these [49:10] options and made these decisions. It was also a trigger-based operation. It may [49:13] never have happened. It required a number of factors to all align at the right [49:18] place at the right time in a very limited window and it wasn't even clear [49:21] if it was ever going to be possible. There's also the aspect which I do not [49:25] control, and that is deference to the Department of War on operational security, [49:28] despite the fact that we had kept this quite constrained. The truth of the [49:32] matter is that this was leaked. We now know it was leaked by a contractor, the [49:36] Department of War, that had it been published would have endangered the [49:40] lives of people and or would have probably canceled the ability to carry [49:44] out the mission. So this is a real tension and one that I'm doing the best [49:47] I can to try to manage within the constraints of two things, operational [49:51] security and also decisions being made. We have, there are multiple contingencies [49:56] for events all over the world including some that [49:58] none of us think were ever going to come to fruition. And in this particular case [50:02] one of the reasons why you rehearse these things in advance is to know [50:04] whether it's even possible, is this even doable, and what are the risks associated [50:07] with doing so you can present options to the president who ultimately makes these [50:11] decisions. In the case of reimagining NATO, it most certainly has to be [50:14] reimagined and the reason why it has to be reimagined is not because its purpose [50:17] is reimagined, its capabilities have to be reimagined. Let me give you as a point [50:21] of example, there's a lot of talk about security guarantees and it's something [50:25] that there's general agreement about now with the case of Ukraine. But those [50:28] security guarantees basically involve the deployment of a handful of European [50:32] troops, primarily French and the UK, and then a US backstop. But in fact the [50:38] security guarantee is the US backstop. It is not the, and I'm not diminishing [50:42] the fact that some countries in Europe are willing to place troops in a [50:46] post-war Ukraine. What I'm pointing out is that is irrelevant without the US [50:50] backstop. And so, and the reason why you need such a strong US backstop is [50:55] because our allies and our partners have not invested enough in their own defense [50:59] capabilities over the last 20 or 30 years. Now, hopefully that's going to change. Hopefully [51:03] that is changing. And in some cases and in some particular countries it's already changed. [51:07] But this is a fact that we cannot ignore. NATO is going to be stronger if our allies [51:12] are more capable. Especially, and here's the reality, whether we want to accept it or not, [51:16] we have interests all over the world. We have interests in the Middle East, we have interests [51:19] in the Western Hemisphere, and we most certainly have interests in the Indo-Pacific. A number [51:23] of you have already pointed out that China is the chief challenge. We can't have the [51:27] same soldiers or the same ships in both Europe and in the Indo-Pacific. We have to pick. [51:33] No matter how many ships we build, no matter how many capabilities we grow, we're going [51:37] to have to make these adjustments. And the stronger our partners are in NATO, the more [51:40] flexibility the United States will have to secure our interests in different parts of [51:44] the world. That's not an abandonment in NATO. That is a reality of the 21st century and [51:49] the world that's changing now. In the case of Greenland, I'll say we're in a good place [51:52] right now. We had excellent meetings with the General Secretary of, Secretary General [51:56] of NATO. [51:57] In fact, even as I speak to you now, there'll be some technical level meetings between us [52:02] and our partners in Greenland and Denmark on this issue. And I think we have in place [52:07] a process that's going to bring us to a good outcome for everybody. [52:11] The President's interest on Greenland has been clear. It's a national security interest. [52:14] It's a longstanding interest that predates this administration. It's one that our allies [52:18] acknowledge is real. I think we're going to get something positive done. We're going to [52:22] begin that process in a very professional, straightforward way. It begins today and it'll [52:26] be a regular process. [52:27] We're going to try to do it in a way that isn't like a media circus every time these [52:31] conversations happen because we think that creates more flexibility on both sides to [52:36] arrive at a positive outcome. And I think we're going to get there. And I thought it [52:39] was noteworthy and important that despite your concerns, the President at his speech [52:43] in Davos made very clear that the United States was not going to use force or military force [52:48] in Greenland. So I think we're going to wind up in a good place. We've got a little bit [52:52] of work to do, but I think we're going to wind up in a good place. And I think you'll [52:55] hear the same from our colleagues in Europe very shortly. [52:57] Mr. Secretary, the Gang of Eight has never leaked. It is critical that you consult [53:02] with Congress. For us to be safe, our allies have to trust us. And for this committee to [53:07] do our work, we have to trust you. Let's work together to restore that trust. [53:11] Senator McCormick. [53:12] Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. Defending American interests in the face [53:18] of Russian, Iranian, and Chinese encroachment in the Western Hemisphere is a key to the [53:22] Trump corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. But Venezuela's new interim leader in her public [53:28] military, at least, defends their ties to Russia, Iran, and the PRC, and had said this [53:33] week had enough of U.S. interference. So beyond the oil leverage, which you talked about in [53:38] your testimony, what steps is the administration taking to demand from the interim government [53:45] to put incentives in place to ensure that they prevent malign actors, foreign terror [53:50] organizations, and so forth, from continuing to have influence and safe haven in Venezuela? [53:56] Secretary Azar. [53:57] I mean, yes, there's leverage. And I wouldn't just say oil. I think anything that's sanctioned [54:02] in Venezuela, in order for them to normalize it, will require cooperation with the United [54:06] States. But it's not just leverage. It's also their national interest. It's an alignment [54:11] of their interests. The truth of the matter is that the United States will be a far better [54:14] partner for a future Venezuelan government that's free and democratic, and even for the [54:19] current authorities, than some of the partners they've signed up with now. Frankly, we think [54:25] it's not in Venezuela's interest to have an arrangement. [54:27] Secretary Azar. [54:28] You're right. [54:29] Secretary Azar. [54:30] You're right. [54:30] Secretary Azar. [54:31] I think the fact that they've allowed the Iranian presence or the sale of Iranian weaponry [54:33] or anything like that into their country. So I think there's alignment there. We think [54:37] and can argue that some of these criminal elements which they've allowed to act with [54:40] impunity in parts of their country is a deal with the devil. In the short term, it provided [54:44] revenues to some corrupt regime officials, but in the long term has created real destabilization, [54:49] not for just them, by the way, but also for Colombia. [54:52] Just understand something. The FARC dissidents and the ELN operate with impunity from Venezuelan [54:57] territory. [54:57] That was through deals with individuals aligned with the regime, because they made money off [55:01] of that. [55:02] But we don't think that's in the long-term interest, and what's been expressed to us [55:06] by leaders of the interim authorities is that they agree, and now we're going to test it. [55:09] Despite the public commentary, there's a recognition, you think, in progress? [55:12] Look, we all have politics, even in places like that. [55:16] Suffice it to say what I've said from the very beginning, and that is, we are going [55:19] to judge based on actions, not words. [55:22] And that's going both ways. [55:23] You can tell us you're going to do all these great things, if you don't do them, you didn't [55:26] do them. [55:27] You can say, I'm not going to do these great things, but if you do them, you did them. [55:31] And I think we can point to some things now that show you, just as an example. [55:36] Think about it. [55:37] Within two and a half weeks of Maduro's removal, they passed reforms to the hydrocarbon laws, [55:43] which basically rolled back many of the Chavez-era restrictions on private ownership and investment [55:49] in their country. [55:51] It doesn't go far enough. [55:52] It probably needs to do more, but that's extraordinary. [55:54] That never would have happened two or three weeks ago. [55:56] It certainly wouldn't have happened. [55:57] If Maduro was still there. [55:59] So I think these are signs of progress. [56:01] Do they still have political prisoners? [56:03] They do. [56:04] But many are increasingly being released every single day, and some are actually being released [56:08] and beginning to speak out again, and we're going to watch very closely how they're treated [56:11] and how that happens, because that'll be part of how we judge them and their actions, not [56:14] words. [56:15] You touched on my second question, which is this long history of a very sordid history [56:20] for outside investors coming into Venezuela. [56:22] And the President and you had a meeting with our energy leaders in the Oval Office to talk [56:27] about the opportunity to invest, and there was worries about the safety of investing. [56:34] What steps beyond what you just described in terms of the hydrocarbon law, security [56:40] guarantees for workers, any sorts of certainty that investors are gaining which is going [56:45] to allow them to have the confidence to move on the opportunities of Venezuela? [56:49] Yeah. [56:50] I mean, the first step is some of these investors or potential investors need to get a license [56:52] from OFAC to be able to even explore this. [56:54] Then they need to be able to go down there and meet with people and see what's happening, [56:57] and make that determination. [56:59] Here's what I would say. [57:00] Venezuela has a lot of oil. [57:01] They do. [57:02] But there's a lot of oil in other places, too. [57:04] Companies are only going to invest somewhere if they know we're going to invest, we're [57:07] going to make our money back with a profit, and our land isn't going to be taken from [57:10] us. [57:11] And if you try to, there's a court we can go to and contracts we can enforce. [57:14] That's the level of certainty that we're talking in terms of security. [57:17] And that's part of this transition process. [57:20] That's part of this recovery process, is to normalize their industry. [57:24] Because if not, they'll just invest the money in Guyana. [57:26] Right. [57:27] If they invest the money in some other part of the world that has oil, they're not going [57:29] to risk it. [57:30] So it's to their benefit to have set up a normal, transparent process that encourages [57:37] foreign investment, not just in oil, by the way, in other natural resources, but in other [57:41] sectors of their economy. [57:42] I mean, it's unlimited. [57:44] Whether it's retail, whether it's banking, I mean, a country that's prosperous in generating [57:47] economic activity holds the promise of all sorts of economic activity, including- [57:51] I'm going to try to squeeze in one more question, if I could, just in my remaining [57:54] seconds. [57:55] Just very briefly. [57:56] We've heard such differing accounts. [57:57] And the president has spoken strongly, you have as well, on the deaths in Iran and the [58:02] horrible atrocities that are being committed. [58:05] Can you give us some sense of, we see reports of thousands, tens of thousands. [58:09] What's the State Department's best estimate of what's happened on the ground? [58:12] Well, I don't know. [58:13] In the thousands, for certain. [58:16] And look, I think regimes, including that one in Iran, have learned that when you start [58:21] shooting people in the head with snipers, it's effective. [58:24] I mean, it works. [58:25] And they've done it. [58:26] And it's horrifying. [58:27] And that's what we've seen. [58:29] The regime is probably weaker than it has ever been. [58:31] And the core problem they face, unlike the protests you saw in the past on some other [58:35] topics, is that they don't have a way to address the core complaints of the protesters, which [58:40] is that their economy's in collapse. [58:42] And the reason why their economy's in collapse is because they spend all their money and [58:46] all their resources building weapons and sponsoring terrorist groups around the world, instead [58:51] of reinvesting it back into their society. [58:53] And as a result, have taken on massive global sanctions, which has isolated their economy [58:56] and their country. [58:58] And so that's what the Iranian people are demanding, is that they stop doing that and [59:01] start caring about them and get these sanctions off them. [59:04] And this regime is unwilling to do it. [59:06] So the core challenges, the protests may have ebbed, but they will spark up again in the [59:11] future because this regime, unless they are willing to change and or leave, have no way [59:15] of addressing the legitimate and consistent complaints of the people of Iran who deserve [59:20] better. [59:21] Very good. [59:22] Thank you. [59:23] Thank you. [59:24] Senator Murphy. [59:25] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [59:26] Listen. [59:28] I think what you're saying about the oil is without precedent. [59:29] You are taking their oil at gunpoint. [59:31] You are holding and selling that oil, putting for now the receipts in an offshore Middle [59:35] Eastern account. [59:36] You're deciding how and for what purposes that money is going to be used in a country [59:40] of 30 million people. [59:41] I think a lot of us believe that that is destined for failure. [59:44] And I know that you're telling us today just to be patient. [59:46] But a month later, we have no information on a timetable for a democratic transition. [59:51] Maduro's people are still in charge. [59:54] Most of the political prisoners are in jail. [59:56] And by the way, those that have been let out. [59:58] Have a gag order on them from the from the government. [1:00:00] The opposition leader is still in exile. [1:00:03] This looks already like it is a failure. [1:00:06] You say you're in serious talks, but as you know, the Venezuelans are great at being in [1:00:11] serious talks. [1:00:12] They almost never deliver. [1:00:14] So I'm just going to give you my three questions and hope that you'll answer them, because [1:00:19] I do think we want to try to understand how to judge the efficacy of this as time goes [1:00:25] on. [1:00:26] Because I worry. [1:00:27] I don't want to wait for this committee anytime soon and to understand whether this is just [1:00:32] facilitating corruption, both in Venezuela and here at home. [1:00:36] So here are my three questions. [1:00:38] First, reports are that you've given no bid licenses to two companies to sell Venezuela's [1:00:46] oil. [1:00:47] One of them is a massive donor to the president to many Americans that weeks. [1:00:52] And so my question is, can you commit that partners for future sales are going to be [1:00:56] chosen? [1:00:57] And can you do that through a fair, open selection process? [1:01:01] Second, if Delce Rodriguez, who is an unelected leader, the head of Maduro's torture operation, [1:01:10] is still in power six months from now, does that mean that your policy is a success or [1:01:17] failure? [1:01:18] How do we judge when we've had enough of Rodriguez? [1:01:22] And third, in your testimony, you reserve the right to use force again in the future. [1:01:29] the Venezuelan government isn't complying with your requests so if for [1:01:35] instance they refuse to give you access to the oil in the future if they said [1:01:39] we're just gonna keep it for ourselves would this cause you to consider [1:01:44] military action and do you concede that if you're using military action simply [1:01:48] to try to compel cooperation from the government you absolutely need [1:01:53] congressional authorization for that so if you can answer those yeah so the the [1:01:57] first question was about the trading companies the second is about Delsey [1:02:00] still in power six months six months from now and the third is on the use of [1:02:04] force yes okay on the first one the two traders so here's the problem we faced [1:02:08] the problem we face in the short term is they had no place to put oil they were [1:02:13] running out of storage capacity for their oil we had to move that oil to [1:02:16] market very quickly the only way to move it to market very quickly is to plug in [1:02:20] to these two primary trade companies that could sell it in the open market [1:02:24] that is not the permanent outcome here that is a short-term fix to a [1:02:27] short-term [1:02:27] problem which is they were literally storing oil they brought in tankers and [1:02:31] we had tankers sitting offshore just to hold their oil at some point their [1:02:35] capacity to produce was going to be shut down and their ability to generate [1:02:38] revenue so we had to move that oil very quickly the long-term plan is not those [1:02:41] two trading companies the long-term plan is for them to have a normal energy [1:02:45] program that sells directly into the market directly to refineries and the [1:02:49] companies that are exploiting and exploring it for example Chevron has [1:02:53] operations there that never stopped they seek to expand those operations they [1:02:56] don't use they don't need to expand those operations they don't use they [1:02:57] don't need those trading companies so those trading companies were a [1:02:59] short-term fix for a very acute problem because we wanted to prevent societal [1:03:04] collapse because they had no money for revenue on the second point about her [1:03:07] being is still in power look let me say this a couple things this is not [1:03:10] unprecedented I can point to a number of places Spain Paraguay two examples of [1:03:15] places in which there was a transition you know from an autocratic regime to a [1:03:19] democratic regime and it took time I can't give you a timeline of how long it [1:03:23] takes it can't take forever it can't it's only it's not even been four weeks [1:03:27] it's been six months it's been six months it's been six months it's been six months it's been six months it's been six months it's been six months it's been six months it's been six months it's been six months it's been six months [1:03:27] about too well I think we need to be put [1:03:29] a year two four I think we need to be put [1:03:30] you this way we need to be much further [1:03:31] along six months from now even three [1:03:33] months from now that may not be [1:03:34] satisfactory to you but I'm saying we [1:03:36] have to be much further along three four [1:03:37] or five months three or four five months [1:03:39] from now cannot look like what today [1:03:40] looks like and i think there's [1:03:42] acknowledgement on both sides of that I [1:03:43] can probably give you a better answer and [1:03:45] this is not deflecting when we finally [1:03:47] have people on the ground like the [1:03:49] ambassador and the team around her on a [1:03:50] daily basis that are interacting because [1:03:52] one thing is for me to pick up the phone [1:03:53] and talk to Dengxi Rodriguez three [1:03:55] times a week another thing is to have [1:03:56] someone on the ground on a daily basis [1:03:57] a daily basis that's following these events, is talking to civil society, but also engaging [1:04:02] with interim authorities. [1:04:04] But the fact of the matter is that, yes, we want to see quick progress. [1:04:07] As you said, it's unprecedented, okay? [1:04:09] All I'm saying to you is, before this, this was stagnant. [1:04:13] Before this, we had spent 14 years, you were involved in some of those efforts, 14 years [1:04:17] trying to change the dynamic in Venezuela, 13, 12, 11, 10, that was a big part of my [1:04:21] career and the Senate was spent on this. [1:04:23] This is the first time in over a decade that we see even the glimmer of an opportunity [1:04:28] to change conditions. [1:04:29] A lot of that will depend on us, but a lot of that will depend on them. [1:04:32] And it also will depend on the rest of Venezuelan society. [1:04:34] How quickly can we get all these Venezuelans that want to go back to Venezuela and participate [1:04:39] in civic and economic life back to Venezuela? [1:04:42] That's going to be critical here. [1:04:43] We recognize that. [1:04:44] So yes, we have to be much further along in six months. [1:04:47] We expect to be further along. [1:04:48] And if we're not, I'll tell you, we'll tell you. [1:04:51] On the third point of use of force, look. [1:04:52] The president never said anything. [1:04:53] He never rules out his options as commander in chief to protect the national interest [1:04:56] of the United States. [1:04:57] I can tell you right now with full certainty, we are not postured to, nor do we intend or [1:05:02] expect to have to take any military action in Venezuela at any time. [1:05:06] The only military presence you'll see in Venezuela is our Marine Guards at an embassy. [1:05:11] That is our goal. [1:05:12] That is our expectation. [1:05:14] And that is what everything that outlines towards. [1:05:16] That said, if an Iranian drone factory pops up and threatens our forces in the region, [1:05:20] the president retains the option to eliminate that threat. [1:05:22] I'm asking a more specific question because in your testimony, you suggest that you would [1:05:26] use force to compel cooperation, for instance, with oil sales. [1:05:31] Do you agree that you have to come to Congress to get authorization if you were simply using [1:05:36] force to try to compel cooperation? [1:05:37] Well, there's two things. [1:05:38] There's the constant. [1:05:39] Look, there's a there's. [1:05:40] It seems like under the War Powers Act. [1:05:42] No, under the War Powers Act, if we're going to be involved in something that's going to [1:05:47] put us in there involved in a sustained way, we have to notify you within 48 hours after [1:05:51] the fact. [1:05:52] If it's going to be longer than 60 days, we have to come to Congress with it. [1:05:55] We don't anticipate either of these things having to happen. [1:05:58] Everything is moving in a very different trajectory right now. [1:06:00] On the other hand, if we tell them we don't want to see drones from Iran, as an example [1:06:04] pointed at the United States or threatening our forces or our presence in the region or [1:06:08] our allies presence in the region, and they refuse to comply with that, the president [1:06:12] does reserve the option in self-defense to eliminate that threat. [1:06:15] We don't see that. [1:06:16] We don't anticipate it. [1:06:17] But it could happen. [1:06:18] But we hope not. [1:06:19] We don't want it to happen. [1:06:20] On the contrary. [1:06:21] If we take military action, it would set us back on all these other things that we're [1:06:24] talking about. [1:06:25] I can tell you, military action is not good for recovery and transition. [1:06:29] That's not what we hope to see. [1:06:30] It's certainly not our goal here. [1:06:32] A lot of that will depend on them. [1:06:34] But I think it would require the emergence of an imminent threat of the kind that we [1:06:38] do not anticipate at this time. [1:06:40] But they get a vote on that, too. [1:06:43] Senator Brasso. [1:06:44] Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. [1:06:45] Mr. Secretary, great to see you. [1:06:46] Congratulations. [1:06:47] What you and President Trump have demonstrated in the past year is clearly peace through [1:06:51] strength. [1:06:52] And I appreciate the leadership from both of you. [1:06:54] We've talked a lot about Venezuelan oil. [1:06:56] You know, I focus a lot on energy going to China. [1:06:59] And three-quarters of all the oil that went from Venezuela out of the country there last [1:07:04] year, 75 percent of it, went to China. [1:07:06] They got it at deep discounts, lots of money back to Venezuela through oil for loan deals. [1:07:12] Since the start of this blockade, basically, Venezuela crude shipments to China have fallen [1:07:17] dramatically. [1:07:18] Can you assess or talk a little bit about the impact this has on China? [1:07:21] What's the impact this has on China's broader energy strategy? [1:07:23] Just to be clear, it's a quarantine, not a blockade. [1:07:25] A blockade is an act of war. [1:07:28] It's a quarantine. [1:07:29] And it's been very effective in the sense that it's given us this leverage. [1:07:32] In fact, can I just add something? [1:07:33] And this might be to Senator Murphy's question as well. [1:07:37] The Venezuelan authorities are now identifying ships that they want us to grab. [1:07:42] In fact, about a week and a half ago, we grabbed one of these ships that was – because here's [1:07:47] what happened in the aftermath of Maduro. [1:07:50] About five ships took off. [1:07:51] Five ships took off without authorization from the Venezuelans because they were controlled [1:07:54] by some network in the country. [1:07:56] With the cooperation of the interim authorities, we seized one of those ships. [1:08:01] We brought it back into Venezuelan waters, handed the ship off to the Venezuelans who [1:08:04] in turn fed it into this mechanism, this short-term mechanism that I described to you, was created. [1:08:09] So we're seeing cooperation on that front. [1:08:11] Now, I think your question more specifically was about China. [1:08:14] Yeah. [1:08:15] So look, China can buy Venezuelan oil, but they're going to have to buy it like everybody [1:08:18] else in the world is going to have to buy it. [1:08:20] Not at deep discounts. [1:08:21] Not at a normal price. [1:08:23] And that money is going to flow back to the benefit of the Venezuelan people in a structured [1:08:26] way. [1:08:27] And I know that in the short term, that will involve this mechanism we've described. [1:08:31] In the long term, our intention is that it would be governed by a democratically elected [1:08:35] government, you know what I mean? [1:08:39] Like a normal country would handle it. [1:08:41] But it's not just about oil. [1:08:42] There's other economic – I mean, the full spectrum. [1:08:45] I mean, Venezuela was – and still – we're not talking about some third world country [1:08:50] here. [1:08:51] It's a country that doesn't just have wealth. [1:08:52] It has memory. [1:08:53] It has history of economic activity, of people who own chains of pharmacies. [1:08:57] I know some of these people, of people who own chains of retail stores, including American [1:09:01] retailers who had a presence there. [1:09:03] We just want it to be a normal, prosperous country again, not a playground for Iran, [1:09:07] Russia, and China in our own hemisphere. [1:09:09] And we're going to try to help them get that because we think it serves our national interest. [1:09:13] That will require actions on our part, not money. [1:09:16] But ultimately, that will require them. [1:09:18] This is ultimately going to be on the Venezuelan people and Venezuelan society. [1:09:20] And Venezuelan leaders to make this happen. [1:09:23] We're going to be there to help and assist and create the parameters for it. [1:09:26] And we feel like we're making really good progress. [1:09:28] If we make as much progress over the next four weeks as we've made in the last three [1:09:32] and a half weeks, I'll feel very good about that. [1:09:34] If it slows down or it gets complicated, I'll certainly let you know. [1:09:37] But our anticipation is that we're going to be able to continue to work cooperatively [1:09:40] with them because it's in their interest and ours. [1:09:43] But I will point out to this. [1:09:44] After this operation happened, look at the people who criticized it. [1:09:47] I mean, there were others. [1:09:50] Russia, Iran, Hamas. [1:09:53] These were the people that were upset about this strike and this raid and what we did. [1:09:58] And I can tell you that in many countries in the Western Hemisphere, there was great [1:10:01] pleasure in the fact that Maduro was removed and that it didn't involve an all-out war [1:10:05] and an invasion. [1:10:06] Since you mentioned Iran and Senator McCormick mentioned Iran as well, a lot of [1:10:09] oil is still going from Iran to China, a million barrels a day last year. [1:10:15] Lots of that money goes back to Iran, to the dictators, the people that are actually killing [1:10:19] others on the street. [1:10:20] Can you talk a little bit about that? [1:10:21] What we can do to prevent that from continuing to go and what we're doing to support the [1:10:24] Iranian… [1:10:25] Well, some of that is sanctioned oil. [1:10:26] This requires the willingness to enforce those sanctions. [1:10:29] And obviously, that comes with a cost-benefit analysis. [1:10:31] The Iranians are also capable of seizing ships and doing that in retribution. [1:10:35] But that's certainly something that will be under consideration, and others have done [1:10:38] that in the past. [1:10:39] And we have seized, for example, weapons shipments in the past that involve Iranian obscures. [1:10:43] And in fact, some of the ships – remember, all of these ships that we're seizing with [1:10:47] the oil are with court orders. [1:10:49] They're either one of two things. [1:10:50] That we either have a court order from a federal judge that allows us to seize it because [1:10:54] it's in violation of a sanction, or it's a flagless vessel in the shadow fleet. [1:10:59] And we were – many of these ships here involve Iran. [1:11:02] And some of that oil was going to be ultimately transferred to the excess refining capacity [1:11:06] that China currently has. [1:11:07] As you mentioned the word shadow fleet earlier, Senator Shaheen and I have legislation [1:11:12] on subsea cables. [1:11:13] I've asked you about that the last time we were here. [1:11:15] The sabotage being done, directly being targeted – I know that Sweden and Finland have both [1:11:20] detained Russian ships along those lines. [1:11:22] We're going to have a markup on that bill tomorrow. [1:11:25] Is that something you continue to support our efforts to go after the – [1:11:27] It is, and it'll – it's featured prominently in the agenda both at the G7 this [1:11:31] year, as it did somewhat last year, but again this year in the G7 will be one of the top [1:11:35] items we'll be discussing. [1:11:36] And we've also been pushing it as a priority for NATO to consider. [1:11:40] The two new things we want NATO to make a priority this year in our conversations are the undersea [1:11:44] cable infrastructure and Arctic security, and the third is critical minerals and supply [1:11:49] chains. [1:11:50] Ultimately, you can spend all the money in the world on weapons. [1:11:52] If you can't make them because you're missing some chip that requires some mineral that [1:11:56] China controls, you're in a lot of trouble. [1:11:58] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:11:59] Thank you. [1:12:00] Senator Kaine. [1:12:02] Thank you. [1:12:03] We started this operation on September 2nd with the attack on Venezuelans in boats in [1:12:08] open waters, and now we are nearly five months in. [1:12:13] Next week is five months. [1:12:15] Finally a public hearing. [1:12:18] Wow. [1:12:19] How novel. [1:12:20] Finally a public hearing. [1:12:21] In the Senate or House, this is the first public hearing we've had. [1:12:25] Two hundred folks who are on secret designated combatant lists have been killed, U.S. troops [1:12:30] have been injured, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent, an armada amassed, [1:12:35] the announcement of a new Monroe Doctrine, which does not land well in the Americas. [1:12:40] Democrats have been asking over and over again, can we have a public hearing? [1:12:44] Can we share what we know with the American public? [1:12:47] Finally, a public hearing. [1:12:48] But even that hearing is constrained. [1:12:51] I'd like to talk about the complete weakness of the legal rationale about the strikes on [1:12:58] boats in international waters, but I can't because the administration has only shared [1:13:03] it with members in a classified setting. [1:13:06] I can't tell you why the domestic rationale is hollow and the international rationale [1:13:11] is hollow. [1:13:12] I can't tell you why the rationale for attacking Venezuela is hollow because, again, the rationale [1:13:19] has been shared with us in eight weeks. [1:13:20] Thank you. [1:13:21] Thank you, Senator. [1:13:24] It's a very closed setting. [1:13:26] I can't share with you the grim details of the murder of shipwrecked survivors in open [1:13:32] waters that we all know because we've seen the videos. [1:13:36] And we've questioned the U.S. military officials involved about legality because the administration [1:13:42] will not release that publicly. [1:13:45] They released the boat strike videos publicly, but they hid the second strike that killed [1:13:51] Congress for nearly three months but I can't really talk to you about it I [1:13:56] can't talk to you about the weakness of the targeting criteria being used to [1:14:01] attack boats in the Caribbean and Pacific I would encourage any colleague [1:14:05] if you have not go to the classified setting and ask for a briefing on each [1:14:10] strike and ask this question what was the evidence that there were narcotics [1:14:13] on that craft you will be very surprised if you ask that question about every [1:14:20] strike and so even in this first public hearing five months in there's a lot we [1:14:25] can't talk about if it was such a righteous operation why is the [1:14:30] administration and the majority in this Senate so jealously protecting the [1:14:36] details about it from being revealed to the American public I have Virginians [1:14:41] deployed in this operation I can't answer their families questions thank [1:14:47] God we're having a public hearing five months in this is supposed to be the [1:14:51] greatest [1:14:52] in this deliberative body in the world Mr Secretary who won the July 2024 [1:14:57] Venezuelan presidential election all right I think the whole world would [1:15:01] acknowledge it was a mundo Gonzalez who lost that election Maduro and his vice [1:15:07] president Delcy Rodriguez now you have made the decision the administration has [1:15:12] made the decision in the aftermath of the attack that Delcy Rodriguez should be [1:15:16] leading the country let me read something that President Trump said about her on [1:15:23] January [1:15:23] 14 about Delcy Rodriguez who lost the election with Maduro we just had a great [1:15:27] conversation today and she's a terrific person I mean she's somebody that we have [1:15:31] worked with very well let me tell you what Delcy Rodriguez said the day after [1:15:36] Venezuela was attacked governments around the world are simply shocked that [1:15:41] the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the victim and target of an attack of [1:15:45] this nature which undoubtedly has Zionist undertones what the hell did Delcy [1:15:52] Rodriguez mean when [1:15:53] she said this attack had Zionist undertones I'm assuming you have no idea [1:15:59] oh I have an idea what you meant I mean what's the question what did you what [1:16:04] does she mean when she says this attacks on on this is done look up I'd have to [1:16:08] answer but let me I understand in a broader context no one here is telling [1:16:11] you this is what we want to see you in the long term okay we're not this is not [1:16:14] a campaign to leave in place the system that's currently in place we either have [1:16:18] me no no but I mean the criticism of us all right go ahead [1:16:21] ahead go ahead I'm ready to switch now to talk about [1:16:25] I thought you raised an important point. If I can get back to it, I will. [1:16:28] You know well and you respect well Maria Corina Machado. [1:16:33] Here's what President Trump said about her. [1:16:35] Won the Nobel Prize in the aftermath of the attack on Venezuela. [1:16:39] I think it would be very tough for her to be the leader. [1:16:42] She doesn't have the support within or the respect within the country. [1:16:45] She's a very nice woman, but she doesn't have the respect. [1:16:49] What did President Trump mean by that? [1:16:51] First of all, I've known Maria Corina for probably 12 years, 13 years. [1:16:54] I've dealt with her probably more than anybody on anybody as much as anybody on this committee has for certain. [1:16:59] And I'll be meeting with her today, in fact. [1:17:01] And we met with her a couple weeks ago. [1:17:03] So here's the reality, though, and I think what the president was pointing to. [1:17:06] And I think Maria Corina would acknowledge this. [1:17:07] She's the only way I talked to her last week. [1:17:09] Well, she's very disappointed in those comments. [1:17:12] And so are Venezuelans in my state. [1:17:14] OK, well, she didn't share that with me or with us. [1:17:15] But I would sell to this to you for the president is acknowledging is that today, as it stands, whether we like it or not, [1:17:22] the elements of control in that country, [1:17:24] the people with the guns, the people that control the guns and the institutions of government there are in the hands of this regime. [1:17:30] So we either, you know, on the one hand, we're getting criticized. [1:17:33] Some people are saying we don't want regime change. [1:17:35] On the other hand, we're being criticized for not undertaking regime change. [1:17:38] What we're trying to trigger here is a process of stabilization, recovery and transition to something where Maria Corina and others can be a part of. [1:17:44] You have respect for her, don't you? [1:17:47] Sure. [1:17:47] OK, great. [1:17:48] Let my last question is this. [1:17:50] And so does the president, by the way. [1:17:51] He met with her. [1:17:52] They had a great meeting. [1:17:53] And he actually. [1:17:54] Actually. [1:17:54] He spoke to her last week in my presence. [1:17:56] Here's what he said after that meeting. [1:17:57] We're talking to her and maybe we can get her involved in some way. [1:18:01] I'd love to be able to do that. [1:18:03] Maybe we can do that. [1:18:04] We'll set the terms for this Nobel Prize winner having a leadership role. [1:18:09] Last question is this. [1:18:10] You talked about the speech in Davos. [1:18:12] Here's what something the president said in Davos. [1:18:16] I'm helping NATO until the last few days when I told them about Iceland. [1:18:19] They loved me. [1:18:21] They're not here for us on Iceland. [1:18:23] That I can tell you. [1:18:24] Our stock market took the first dip. [1:18:26] Yesterday because of Iceland. [1:18:27] So Iceland is already cost us a lot of money. [1:18:32] President repeatedly mistook Iceland for Greenland. [1:18:35] Right. [1:18:35] We're not mad at Iceland. [1:18:36] They haven't cost us any money. [1:18:38] The president just mistook the two countries for each other. [1:18:40] Correct. [1:18:41] Yeah. [1:18:41] He meant to say Greenland. [1:18:42] But I think we're all familiar with presidents that have verbal stumbles. [1:18:46] We've had presidents like that before. [1:18:48] Some made a lot more than this one. [1:18:49] Nice try. [1:18:50] Thanks. [1:18:50] All right. [1:18:51] Thank you. [1:18:51] I thought he did well. [1:18:53] Let's see. [1:18:53] We got Senator Senator Paul. [1:18:59] Our founders debated. [1:19:00] Extensively over which branch of government should have the power to declare or initiate war virtually unanimously. [1:19:07] They decided in what was entered into the Constitution was that the declaration or initiation of war would be the power of Congress. [1:19:14] Now we have many advocates, many of whom are here today, who have been advocates for an expansive notion of presidential power. [1:19:23] They often argued that wars are not really wars, that they're kinetic actions or drug bus. [1:19:29] I think, though. [1:19:30] If you reverse the circumstances, it becomes very difficult for these arguments to hold up. [1:19:36] So I would ask you if a foreign country bombed our air defense missiles, captured and removed our president and blockaded our country, would that be considered an act of war? [1:19:47] Well, I think your question is about the and I will acknowledge you've been very consistent on all these points the entire career. [1:19:53] So let me let me no matter who the who's in charge. [1:19:57] So I will point to two things. [1:19:58] The first is it's hard for us to conceive. [1:20:01] That an operation that lasted about four and a half hours and was a law enforcement operation to capture someone we don't recognize as the head of state, indicted in the United States, wanted with a $50 million bounty. [1:20:11] My question would be if it only took four hours to take our president, very short, nobody dies on the other side, nobody dies on our side. [1:20:18] It's perfect. [1:20:19] Would it be an act of war? [1:20:20] We just don't believe that this operation comes anywhere close to the constitutional definition of war. [1:20:25] Would it be an act of war if someone did it to us? [1:20:27] Nobody dies, few casualties. [1:20:29] They're in and out. [1:20:30] Boom. [1:20:31] It's a perfect military operation. [1:20:32] Would that be an act of war? [1:20:34] Of course it would be an act of war. [1:20:36] I'm probably the most anti-war person in the Senate, and I would vote to declare war if someone invaded our country and took our president. [1:20:44] So I think we need to at least acknowledge this is a one way argument, one way arguments that don't rebound, that you can't apply to yourselves, that cannot be universally applicable are bad arguments. [1:20:57] So my next question would be, let's say it's not a war. [1:21:00] We're just going to define it a way and say it's not a war. [1:21:02] That's one of the arguments. [1:21:03] So it's a drug bust. [1:21:05] What if a foreign country indicts our president for violating a foreign law, should we extradite our president, or should we be okay if they come in and get him by force? [1:21:16] Look, I think ultimately we're always going to act in our national interest. [1:21:19] And so if somebody comes after our national interest, like the case you've described, which obviously does not exist at this time, but the case you've described, the U.S. always has the right to act in its national interest and to protect itself. [1:21:31] So really it's a war. [1:21:32] I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. [1:21:32] But I don't know about this equivalency. Does this justify them doing it? [1:21:35] We're always going to do what's best for the United States and America. [1:21:37] We're always going to protect our system. [1:21:38] But the point isn't, and you're exactly right, we will act in our national interest and we should. [1:21:43] So I'm not disagreeing with you at all. [1:21:45] What I'm saying is that our arguments are empty then. [1:21:48] The drug bust isn't really an argument. [1:21:50] It's a ruse. [1:21:51] The war argument, not a war is a war, is a ruse. [1:21:54] It's not a real argument. [1:21:56] And we do what we do because we have the force. [1:22:00] We have the might. [1:22:01] We do it because it's a war. [1:22:02] It's in our interest. [1:22:03] So we wouldn't let anybody come in, bomb us, blockade us, and take our president. [1:22:08] You know, we've had arguments about legitimate, illegitimate presidents, bad elections, rigged elections. [1:22:14] So there's all kinds of same arguments that we've had in our country that they've had in Venezuela. [1:22:19] But we wouldn't argue for an indictment. [1:22:22] And these things aren't idle speculation. [1:22:24] I mean, Netanyahu has been indicted by the ICC. [1:22:27] And one of the reasons I object to being part of the ICC, and I would say you and the administration probably agree, [1:22:32] is we're not going to let any international counsel indict our president and arrest him somewhere on foreign soil. [1:22:37] We're not going to do that. [1:22:39] We actually, most of us probably object to indicting Netanyahu in that way as well. [1:22:43] So I think the arguments are invalid. [1:22:45] So we did get the legal opinion that Senator Kaine referred to, the OLC opinion, Office of Legal Counsel. [1:22:52] And I think a lot of it's been released. [1:22:53] Plus, they came to our caucus and talked most of the open about everything they had classified. [1:22:58] So I will talk about at least one of the arguments. [1:23:01] They say this war wasn't... [1:23:02] A constitutional war, therefore it doesn't rise to the constitutional notion of us declaring or having to initiate the war. [1:23:09] It just doesn't rise. [1:23:11] And one of their main arguments was not enough people died. [1:23:14] And so there is some number that they... [1:23:18] They aren't specific, but there is some number. [1:23:20] I would assume, although I'm not positive, but the 50,000, 60,000 soldiers who died in Vietnam might be enough for them to call that a war. [1:23:28] But here's the problem. [1:23:29] It isn't the number. [1:23:31] It's that it happens in retrospect. [1:23:32] See, our founders gave us the power to initiate or declare war. [1:23:36] They didn't give us other powers to execute the war. [1:23:39] Those are left to the president. [1:23:40] But if we have to wait to see how many people are killed, we have to wait, as they describe it, as the scope, nature, and extent. [1:23:48] If we have to wait to see the scope, nature, and extent, the war has been going on for some time. [1:23:52] It's hard to vote to initiate a war that's been going on. [1:23:56] And we can say this war is over, but we're still blockading it. [1:23:59] And we may go back in. [1:24:00] And... [1:24:01] But there are no clear... [1:24:02] There are no clear answers. [1:24:03] You know, we put 2,000, we leave 2,000 troops in. [1:24:06] Are we going to call that war and initiate it? [1:24:08] So the definition of war is very important. [1:24:11] And I think we have to acknowledge the problems with our argument. [1:24:15] Calling things kinetic action is a disservice to our soldiers. [1:24:19] You weren't really wounded in war. [1:24:20] You don't have a medal of honor for war. [1:24:23] You have a medal of honor for a kinetic action. [1:24:25] So I think let's call it what it is. [1:24:27] And let's vote on these things. [1:24:29] But I think we're in violation of both the spirit and the law of the Constitution. [1:24:33] By bombing a capital, blockading a country, and removing elected officials. [1:24:39] And we certainly wouldn't tolerate it. [1:24:41] Nor would I if someone did it to us. [1:24:42] But we didn't remove an elected official. [1:24:45] We removed someone who was not elected. [1:24:47] And it was actually an indicted drug trafficker in the United States. [1:24:51] And their system... [1:24:52] Our laws. [1:24:53] Indicted under our laws. [1:24:54] Look, Bolsonaro says that da Silva is not really the president of Brazil. [1:24:59] Our president said Biden wasn't really the president. [1:25:02] Hillary Clinton said... [1:25:03] In 2016, Trump wasn't the president. [1:25:05] So you have these arguments. [1:25:06] And I agree with you. [1:25:08] It probably was. [1:25:09] And most likely was. [1:25:10] Most assuredly was a bad election. [1:25:12] He wasn't really elected. [1:25:14] But at the same time, if that's our predicate. [1:25:16] And you don't have to come to us because it's a drug bust. [1:25:18] We're just removing somebody. [1:25:19] You can see where it leads to. [1:25:21] And it leads to chaos. [1:25:24] And that's why we have rules like the Constitution. [1:25:26] So we don't get so far out there that presidents can do whatever they want. [1:25:30] It is this check and balance. [1:25:32] And I would argue. [1:25:32] For 70 years we've been going the wrong way. [1:25:34] It isn't just this president. [1:25:36] But it's a debate that I think is worth having. [1:25:41] Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:25:42] And I want to associate myself with the comments of Tim Kaine. [1:25:46] The fact that we're five months into this. [1:25:48] And this is the first oversight hearing. [1:25:50] Is really a complete failure of the responsibility of Congress. [1:25:54] Failure of this committee to demand oversight. [1:25:55] But also a reflection of the reluctance of the administration. [1:25:59] To engage in the proper consultation with Congress. [1:26:02] So I hope we can do a lot better going forward. [1:26:05] And that we'll see you. [1:26:06] At least every six weeks or so. [1:26:08] Not every five months. [1:26:11] I also feel like the strategy of keeping basically these very weak arguments secret. [1:26:19] So that they can't be discussed openly for the legal justifications. [1:26:22] I've gone down and read them. [1:26:24] And there's a reason, you know, obviously you'd be incredibly embarrassed if those were public. [1:26:28] So make them public. [1:26:29] Let's have an actual transparency here in the United States of America. [1:26:34] And let's be clear about what has gone on. [1:26:36] We had a dictator we didn't like. [1:26:38] We've replaced it with a dictator we think we can manipulate. [1:26:41] And if that doesn't work, we'll do something else. [1:26:43] In order to pry open that economy for oil. [1:26:47] And I must say that you did say something I liked. [1:26:52] So let me emphasize that. [1:26:54] I'm making progress. [1:26:55] Yeah. [1:26:55] You said no U.S. taxpayer dollars will be used. [1:26:59] No spending on our part on part of to kind of prop up Venezuela. [1:27:04] Can you restate that? [1:27:05] Can you restate that? [1:27:06] Can you restate your commitment to that? [1:27:08] Yeah. [1:27:09] They're not going to need it. [1:27:09] For example, we're not spending money in Venezuela right now. [1:27:12] I mean, obviously, look, I think you're putting aside embassy operations and all of that. [1:27:16] And by the way, there may be some program through foreign aid that some of you might be interested in in the future. [1:27:21] We don't think that Venezuela is the kind of country that needs that. [1:27:24] This is a very wealthy country. [1:27:25] Thank you. [1:27:26] I'm glad you restated that because I think that we will not – we will see some moment when the administration says, [1:27:31] let's subsidize our American oil companies to rebuild the infrastructure in Venezuela. [1:27:35] And I must say that's a very unpopular idea among my constituents. [1:27:40] I think America needs a lot of investments in infrastructure here. [1:27:43] And I think you have a way too rosy sense of the oil economy there. [1:27:47] Many experts have said, look, without 10-year prospect horizon of stability, [1:27:51] without Canada deciding to ship a lot more of its heavy oil from – instead of to the Gulf, [1:27:57] doing it to Asia so that we prop up the kind of demand in the Gulf, without keeping Iran off the international stage so that the – [1:28:05] of cost of oil, the value is higher. [1:28:08] All of those factors would have to be there for our oil companies to want to invest their own money. [1:28:14] So I think they'll be coming to the administration. [1:28:16] I think you'll all be trying to find some way to subsidize them. [1:28:19] But I'm glad what you said today, that you're not going to do it. [1:28:21] And I want to hold the administration accountable to that. [1:28:24] Second, on terms of the $500 million fund, $300 million, my understanding, has gone back to the central bank of Venezuela. [1:28:33] And they have essentially exchanged it for – [1:28:35] for boulevards to key industry players. [1:28:40] I don't think we have any transparency on what corporations or entities got that hard currency. [1:28:47] And yet you did say there's going to be a lot of transparency. [1:28:51] You also said, if I understood right, that those funds are eventually going to be brought back into the structure of U.S. control [1:28:59] as part of our – well, formal structure of funds. [1:29:05] And in that sense, the Constitution says no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made in law. [1:29:13] So are you going to make sure that if that money comes back into kind of full U.S. control, [1:29:18] not an offshore account the way it is now, that we're going to abide by the Constitution? [1:29:23] Third point here is that one of the things that transpired is cutting off the oil to Cuba. [1:29:32] And I know you have a strong interest in making life difficult for the – [1:29:37] the leadership in Cuba. [1:29:39] Can you lay out for us what other things you might be planning in that regard and how those fit into an overall plan? [1:29:44] Yeah. Well, I'll try to do that in a minute. [1:29:46] The – let me just say on the rosy projections of oil, it's not rosy projection. [1:29:52] I mean, it's either going to happen or it's not. [1:29:53] In essence, oil – there's no world in which the United States is subsidizing investment in Venezuela in oil. [1:30:00] It's very simple. [1:30:00] All companies will go in and say, okay, this is the oil you have. [1:30:03] This is how much we're going to – it's going to cost us investing on the front end. [1:30:07] To one end, make money, pay back our investment plus a profit at the back end. [1:30:11] And then depending on the terms of that investment, they'll make a decision about whether it makes sense for that or not. [1:30:17] Right now, what you have in Venezuela is a corrupt and broken oil company run by the government that basically takes this money, [1:30:23] doesn't reinvest in it at all, and basically sprinkles it to its people to keep the glue that keeps the regime together. [1:30:29] We want it to become a normal oil economy. [1:30:31] That's what the ultimate goal is here. [1:30:33] And in a normal oil economy, companies are going to go in. [1:30:36] They're going to look at Venezuelan law. [1:30:37] They're going to look at Venezuelan authorities, and they're going to make a determination about whether or not it's worth their investment. [1:30:42] And that will be – that's the normalization process that we're talking about. [1:30:46] That's going to be up to them if they want to have a normal oil economy as opposed to one that is basically used as a way to feed graft in a very inefficient way but didn't care about that. [1:30:54] If they do it the right way, we think it has great promise and potential over the long term especially because these investments take a long time. [1:31:00] But the U.S. doesn't have to put any money to encourage companies to go in and invest, nor is there any interest in doing so. [1:31:05] But a lot of it will depend – [1:31:06] The second point I really do appreciate because I don't want to see American tax credit dollars going in. [1:31:10] Well, I don't even think that's even been – I don't think that's even been discussed or considered by anybody. [1:31:14] Your second point was – well, I wrote it here, but now – [1:31:18] It's the $300 million being redistributed to corporations in Venezuela and lack of accountability over that. [1:31:23] The second one was what? I'm sorry? [1:31:25] The $300 million has already been distributed. [1:31:27] Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, on the account. [1:31:28] So that's not the permanent structure we want to see. [1:31:31] In the long term, we just want them to have a normal industry where the companies are involved in it. [1:31:34] They're selling it directly to the market. [1:31:35] And we're out of that game. [1:31:36] What we're talking about now is the sanctioned oil, the oil that's under our sanction. [1:31:40] So we have to monitor how that money moves. [1:31:42] So, yes, the first $300 million moved for the following reason. [1:31:44] We would all agree we didn't want to see systemic collapse. [1:31:47] Like one of the things a lot of you told me you were worried about on the short term is this is going to trigger internal chaos in Venezuela. [1:31:53] A million people are going to storm the border with Colombia. [1:31:56] Colombia even stood up troops to their border to prevent it. [1:31:58] Brazil was worried about it as well. [1:32:00] It's going to lead to fighting in the streets between rival factions and shooting. [1:32:03] None of that has happened. [1:32:04] And key to that stabilization is ensuring that the government had enough money to meet payroll and, you know, meet their basic needs as part of the stabilization. [1:32:12] We should not confuse stabilization with transition. [1:32:15] This is not what the permanent structure is going to look like. [1:32:18] I can't – look, the Treasury is handling the structuring of that account. [1:32:21] So I would refer you to them, and I can get you an answer for them as to what the legal framework of that Treasury blocked account is going to look like. [1:32:27] That would be very helpful because what you just mentioned, money to meet payroll, is very different than what we've heard about the money being used to give hard currency. [1:32:34] The key corporations inside of Venezuela, which would not be meeting payroll. [1:32:39] Well, which corporations? [1:32:40] This is where complete oversight is required. [1:32:42] We'd like to see transparency over how that's – [1:32:44] Yeah, remember, the first $300 million we're going to have to – on that one, because of the urgency in moving funds to keep the place stable, [1:32:50] is going to require us to undertake a retroactive audit of how that money was spent, the first $300 million. [1:32:55] But there's probably another $2.5 to $3 billion down the pike at some point, which will have front end through this process I described. [1:33:01] I'm not sure if you were here where I described it. [1:33:03] And we're still finalizing it, but basically the way it would look is we would send them a letter saying on the sanctioned oil proceeds, [1:33:09] this is what it could be spent on, and you have to agree to contribute – you have to agree to pay for an auditing system to make sure that that's how it's being spent. [1:33:17] That's the process we're trying to create. [1:33:19] Again, on Friday we'll mark the four-week mark of this all began. [1:33:22] I understand, you know, we live in a world where items move very quickly. [1:33:25] This was front page news three weeks ago when we scheduled this hearing, and today other items have captured the attention, but we remain focused on it. [1:33:33] It's only been three or four weeks, but that's the process we're setting up with Treasury, and obviously as we finalize it we'll provide that to you. [1:33:39] But this is not permanent. [1:33:40] This is not the system we want to see in place in the long term. [1:33:42] We want to see a normal country. [1:33:44] What was your third question? [1:33:45] Cuba. [1:33:46] Cuba. [1:33:48] Okay. [1:33:49] I'll tell you about Cuba. [1:33:55] Secretary Rubio, as you know, in our home state this was very popular. [1:34:00] The, you know, Cubans, Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, you know, basically everybody in Latin America has been fighting. [1:34:08] A lot of them are in Miami, as you know, because they had to leave these countries because of socialism and lack of opportunity. [1:34:14] So what the president did, the willingness of the president with your support and with Pete Hedges' military was very, very, very well thought of. [1:34:21] So the first thing I think I want to say is on behalf of Floridians, thank you for what you guys did. [1:34:26] Now the next is everybody has these ridiculously high expectations, which we all do. [1:34:31] We would love to have a free and fair election tomorrow. [1:34:35] You know, there was – you knew that, you know, there was going to be an election. [1:34:39] There was no oppression. [1:34:40] Everybody wanted to run. [1:34:41] They could run. [1:34:43] So give us – tell – how should – how should Venezuelans and Cubans and Nicaraguans look at this? [1:34:51] And what – how patient should they be? [1:34:54] And what would be sort of the milestones you would give them to look at to say we are making progress? [1:35:00] Well, first I would remind everybody let's just go back six months, eight months, a year ago at this time. [1:35:06] The Venezuelan challenge for us was frozen. [1:35:08] It was a frozen situation. [1:35:10] We had a regime that was entrenched. [1:35:12] Its opposition was either in hiding or had been forced overseas. [1:35:15] Edmundo Gonzalez lives in Spain. [1:35:17] Maria Corina is no longer – she's very brave. [1:35:19] She stood there as long as she could, but she had to leave. [1:35:21] The others are in jail. [1:35:24] They were increasing their relationships and outreach with Iran and, accordingly, have existing ones with Russia, Cuba, and China. [1:35:31] And other than more sanctions and more speeches and more threats and whatever, it was a frozen situation. [1:35:39] And the people who were in jail for the first time in literally a decade, there is the opportunity that something could change. [1:35:46] There's not the guarantee that something will change, but there is the opportunity that something will change. [1:35:50] We have changed that dynamic, which goes back to the question that Senator Merkley had about Cuba. [1:35:54] What we are looking for is the opportunity for a change in dynamic. [1:35:57] That's a country that's been backwards. [1:35:59] It has no functional economy. [1:36:01] The people – you can call them Marxists. [1:36:04] We can call them Communists. [1:36:06] But not even Lenin would recognize this version of communism and Marxism that they've instilled in Cuba. [1:36:09] It's an economic model that hasn't worked anywhere on the planet. [1:36:12] The suffering in the rural areas of Cuba are acute and they're deep. [1:36:16] And it's not because of the embargo. [1:36:18] It's because they don't know how to run an economy. [1:36:20] How is it the fault of the U.S. embargo that Cuba, one of the world's largest sugar producers, now imports sugar? [1:36:27] Because no sector of their society works. [1:36:29] It's frozen and it's broken. [1:36:31] But in the case of Venezuela, we have a glimmer of hope now, the opportunity to change the dynamic. [1:36:36] Now, will that require smart decisions on our part? [1:36:39] Ultimately, it will require decisions made by Venezuelans. [1:36:42] Both those currently in charge of the interim authorities and those who may be in charge in the future as well to step forward. [1:36:48] It is our sincere belief that the only way you're going to have a free, prosperous Venezuela that's allied with the United States [1:36:55] is one in which every sector of their society is represented in their politics. [1:36:59] And that includes many people who currently live abroad. [1:37:01] And even the opposition – people like to say the opposition. [1:37:04] The opposition is very diverse. [1:37:06] There are members of the opposition that were once part of Chávez. [1:37:08] They were once part of Chavismo and turned against it. [1:37:10] There are members of the opposition that have never been Chavistas, like Maria Corina Machado, and have been very forceful against it. [1:37:15] So that broad sector has to be represented as well. [1:37:18] So you have to have a process of internal reconciliation that allows these voices to begin to participate in the political life of that country. [1:37:25] And that ultimately brings us to a point in which you can have a country where all of these elements of their society are represented in their politics. [1:37:33] And look, there's a percentage of the Venezuelan population – I don't know what the number is, whether it's 15 or 20 – [1:37:37] that may not have liked Maduro, but are still committed to Chavista ideology. [1:37:42] And they'll be represented in that platform as well. [1:37:45] They may not win elections, but they'll be involved in this. [1:37:48] That'll be up to the Venezuelan people. [1:37:50] But our desire here is to have – it's the end state. [1:37:53] We want a Venezuela that has legitimate democratic elections. [1:37:56] Sometimes elects leaders that are friendly to the United States. [1:37:59] Sometimes elects leaders that maybe are not, you know, the person we would have wanted to win. [1:38:03] But that's not unique for us. [1:38:05] That happens all over the world. [1:38:06] We're not disputing that Petro is the best. [1:38:08] He's the legitimately elected president of Colombia. [1:38:10] And yet he doesn't always say nice things about us. [1:38:12] But we also want a Venezuela that's prosperous and a Venezuela that's aligned with the United States. [1:38:18] And a year ago at this time, this was frozen. [1:38:20] Now we have a real opportunity not just to create change systemically within that country through our help but their efforts, [1:38:27] but also one that is no longer a base of operation, the central base of operation for every geopolitical adversary we have. [1:38:34] And that's what Venezuela was under Maduro. [1:38:36] And that's what we hope and intend to change. [1:38:38] So would you, if you're a Venezuelan that lives in Miami, so what you would say is that you're working hard. [1:38:47] There's a lot of variables outside your control. [1:38:50] But you'd say right now political prisoners are being released, never fast enough. [1:38:54] The oppression is being reduced, not fast enough. [1:38:58] Opposition leaders are speaking up more and more. [1:39:01] So we're making progress. [1:39:02] And you're going to continue to control the oil to make sure that we continue down this path. [1:39:09] What I would say is that we share the same goal and the same outcome we want for Venezuela. [1:39:13] And the question is we have to do it through a realistic process that has the highest chance of success. [1:39:18] Okay, the way to view it, if you use the medical analogy, is this is a critically ill patient that has suffered some very serious things. [1:39:24] They've broken their leg, but they also have a ruptured, you know, spleen or something. [1:39:28] You've got to deal with the life-threatening first before you deal with a broken leg. [1:39:32] And even when you deal with a broken leg, there's going to be a period of rehabilitation. [1:39:35] You don't just go from having your leg repaired in a surgery. [1:39:38] To running on a treadmill the next day. [1:39:40] There's going to have to be a process here. [1:39:42] But the process has an arrow moving towards accomplishments, achievements, and positive things. [1:39:47] What I would say to the people who I know quite well as you do is for the first time in over a decade and a half, there is the real possibility of transformation. [1:39:55] And a lot of it will depend on them. [1:39:57] Because there are many people living in Florida and across the country who would like to go back and be a part of Venezuelan economic life. [1:40:03] Many of them are eager to do so. [1:40:05] And they're going to need them. [1:40:07] And Venezuela is going to need them to come back and rebuild the businesses that were taken or lost. [1:40:11] And engage themselves in both civic and economic life. [1:40:14] But again, I remind everybody, on Friday we'll mark the four weeks since this happened. [1:40:18] I get it. [1:40:19] We all want like something immediately. [1:40:20] But this is not a frozen dinner you put in a microwave and in two and a half minutes it comes out ready to eat. [1:40:25] And these are complex things. [1:40:26] And we've seen this play out. [1:40:28] I've used the example of Paraguay and Spain. [1:40:30] There are others where there's a transition from autocracy to democracy. [1:40:34] It's not linear. [1:40:35] It's... [1:40:36] There are ups and downs along the way. [1:40:38] But it's trending in the right direction so far with the recognition that, you know, more work needs to be done. [1:40:44] Thanks for your hard work. [1:40:45] Senator Booker. [1:40:46] I just want to start by saying what's playing... [1:40:51] I'd frankly be playing to Senator Rubio and playing to members here is that it should not have taken this long to have this hearing. [1:40:58] Fundamentally, we have a crisis, I believe, in our democracy right now, which is the failure of Congress to do its job. [1:41:05] To provide checks and balances. [1:41:07] Oversight. [1:41:09] To provide the kind of constitutionally mandated work that we should be doing to keep a balanced government. [1:41:17] We have operations right now that are literally costing the American taxpayer tens of millions of dollars a day. [1:41:23] The buildup in the Caribbean alone is hundreds of millions of dollars a month. [1:41:27] But we're not providing that kind of oversight that's necessary. [1:41:30] So from our power to the purse, to our important work of providing a check and balance to an administration, [1:41:36] what we're seeing right now is unacceptable and speaks to what I think is a growing constitutional crisis in our country, [1:41:42] which is a Congress that is just lying down for the administration to do whatever it wants, whenever it wants. [1:41:48] I want to pick up on my colleague's questioning because I actually know from years of conversations with you, [1:41:54] your heart about human rights in countries like Venezuela, Mr. Secretary. [1:41:59] And you issued a travel warning, a level four travel advisory. [1:42:05] From your department's website that says right now in Venezuela, there's a high risk of wrongful detention, torture, terrorism, kidnapping, [1:42:13] arbitrary enforcement of laws, crime and more. [1:42:17] And when we hear from the president that he is in charge, that you all are running this government to that extent, [1:42:25] I have a lot of concerns when it comes to the rampant human rights violations that are persisting. [1:42:32] Cabello is Maduro's son. [1:42:35] He's Venezuela's key hardline enforcer. [1:42:37] He's continued to intimidate and suppress Venezuelan voices. [1:42:41] He remains in control of Venezuela's security forces, security services, the collectivos. [1:42:47] We're seeing extraordinary examples that the constant oppression of the people is continuing as these folks are remaining in control of the country. [1:43:00] So I just want to know what is the plan to address in a much more aggressive manner, [1:43:05] these severe human rights violations, and to try to stop these armed militias? [1:43:12] Because if we are doing things to stabilize their government, if we're turning over resources and money to the very groups that are creating these horrors, [1:43:21] that seems to me against America's values, and it seems to me something that should be unacceptable to Congress on both sides. [1:43:30] Yeah, well, absolutely. [1:43:31] The Venezuela I described that we want to see emerge from this is one in which none of that has happened. [1:43:34] If you think about travel advisories, travel advisories are us imagining worst-case scenarios. [1:43:39] We have a duty to warn American citizens when they travel to a place that does have a history of Americans being arrested, of Americans being taken. [1:43:46] And they may be taken by a deliberate action of a government or entity related to the regime. [1:43:51] They may be taken by criminal gangs that control parts of that society. [1:43:54] For example, you know, they have these collectivos, as they're called, which basically are these armed motorcycle gangs that are allowed to act with impunity in return for their support for the Maduro regime in the past. [1:44:03] You have the ELN and the FARC and other drug trafficking organizations, including Train.Agua, that are involved. [1:44:09] So these are real risks that we have a duty to warn Americans, because here's what we didn't want to see. [1:44:14] And I don't mean to interrupt you. [1:44:16] We have this announcement that Maduro has been taken. [1:44:18] All of a sudden, people conclude, oh, he's gone. [1:44:20] Let's flood over there. [1:44:21] Let's all go over there. [1:44:22] And we could expose people to dangers. [1:44:24] But this is the hypocrisy that I see. [1:44:26] At the same time that you're issuing these human rights cautions about what's going on there for Americans, [1:44:33] you have a president that's lifting temporary protective status for Venezuelans. [1:44:38] Many of them are individuals that have lived in our country for years, if not decades. [1:44:43] When I hear from the Venezuelan community, I hear an outrage that at the very same time that you are affirming here that these armed militias are running around suppressing voices, [1:44:54] we have an administration that has said very clearly that they're not only going to be lifting temporary protective status for Venezuelans living in the U.S., [1:45:02] but instead of protecting long-time American residents, they are, quote, excuse me, [1:45:08] the administration is putting people back on deportation flights and sending them into that madness. [1:45:14] Does that make sense to you? [1:45:15] Well, first of all, the travel advisories for American citizens traveling there and the threats posed to Americans, what you're describing is – [1:45:21] But why lift temporary protective status? [1:45:23] Well, the problem with temporary protective status was it was granted to so many people in such vast numbers so quickly without proper vetting by the previous administration. [1:45:32] That there's a real concern that there were gang members that had received TPS simply because of the nation they came from and the time in which they came. [1:45:39] It became so big and so massive. [1:45:41] The overwhelming majority of Venezuelans are not members of Trained at Agua, but there were Trained at Agua and other criminal elements embedded in the TPS system. [1:45:48] And the numbers were so large that the administration felt it had to cancel the program in order to appropriately vet it through on the individual cases. [1:45:54] Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, this might not surprise you. [1:45:56] I don't trust this administration and the way they use terms like terrorist. [1:46:00] I've seen them calling Americans citizens. [1:46:02] Domestic terrorists who are people trying to peacefully protest. [1:46:06] The problem we have right now is the administration continues to make policies that seem to contradict their words. [1:46:13] And yet we don't have a process in place for Congress to do its job because people are not calling folks in for these hearings and not providing the kind of oversight that we need. [1:46:23] It is very frustrating to me that we still have a repressive regime in power in Venezuela suppressing human rights. [1:46:31] Yet we are still – [1:46:32] We are cooperating with them. [1:46:34] We are funding them. [1:46:35] And we're not calling out the ridiculousness of the violence that's going on there. [1:46:40] At the same time, we're taking people who have lived in our country for years and years and years and sending them back into that hell where they can be targeted, where they can be abducted, where they can be held for hostage because they know they have American family members that are still here. [1:46:56] This is a situation ripe for where we are being complicit in continuing human rights violations. [1:47:01] And that needs to stop. [1:47:03] And I think – [1:47:04] Just on two points. [1:47:05] We're not cooperating with them to continue doing what they're doing now. [1:47:08] We're cooperating with them to transition away from what's happening now. [1:47:11] And as I said, we're not even four weeks into this thing. [1:47:14] And if it continues to look like this in six months, nine months, a year from now, if progress isn't being made, we'll have very different feelings about it. [1:47:21] But what we're cooperating on is not the continuation of what's happening. [1:47:24] It's a movement away from all this and transitioning ultimately to something that looks nothing like this. [1:47:29] That's the goal. [1:47:30] But it's been less than four weeks. [1:47:31] I mean, we think we've made substantial progress in a very short period of time. [1:47:34] But I acknowledge we want to make a lot more progress. [1:47:36] This is not the end state that we want. [1:47:38] Senator Cornyn. [1:47:41] Mr. Secretary, I want to expand a little bit on the question that Senator Barrasso raised about Venezuelan oil. [1:47:52] But primarily what I want to do is focus on something that's come to be known as the shadow fleet or ghost fleet of Russian and Iranian oil that's been used – [1:48:04] that's subject to sanctions, which has, with the complicity of Venezuela, been used to evade sanctions to help fund the Russian war against Ukraine [1:48:15] and help Iran remain the number one state sponsor of international terrorism and fund its proxies, which have been responsible for so much death and misery in the Middle East. [1:48:28] So it strikes me that Venezuela, even though it has a lot of oil, [1:48:33] Maybe. [1:48:34] is involved in trying to assist its allies, namely Iran and Russia, in circumventing these sanctions to help them fund their nefarious activities, both in the Middle East and in Ukraine. [1:48:46] But obviously they're also a source of additional energy, which is needed by China. [1:48:51] Can you help us understand that better? [1:48:54] And is the law enforcement operation to arrest Nicolas Maduro and the current status of our – [1:49:05] the current engagement with Venezuela helping us deal with that ghost fleet or the evasion of sanctions? [1:49:12] Yeah, on the first point. [1:49:13] On the second point, absolutely it's helping us deal with it, because it's a complex situation to describe. [1:49:18] The oil in Venezuela, we all think, is under the control of one entity, and some of it is. [1:49:23] But you literally have a place in which certain individuals – the glue that held the regime together was corruption and graft. [1:49:29] Like, people said, I want to be – I'm supportive of this regime. [1:49:32] And they didn't – not because they liked Nicolas Maduro, but because Nicolas Maduro – [1:49:33] Right. [1:49:34] – set up a system that guaranteed them a profit. [1:49:38] Some people were making that profit from drugs. [1:49:40] Some of them were making it from stealing money from their food program called CLAP. [1:49:44] Some of them were making their money from an oil field that was literally given to them in exchange for buying them their loyalty. [1:49:50] Some were making their profits from all three, so – and other activities. [1:49:54] So there's no doubt that his removal has created the conditions to begin to move away from that. [1:49:59] That's why we sanction their oil. [1:50:01] The ghost fleet exists for the following reason. [1:50:03] When something is sanctioned, when we say it is illegal for them to move this oil, none of the traditional legitimate tankers will carry that oil. [1:50:12] They won't touch it because they don't want to be sanctioned by the United States. [1:50:15] So you have to turn to these pirates. [1:50:17] You have to basically turn to these ships that are either falsely flagged, meaning they're flying the flag of Liberia but they don't really have a Liberian flag, [1:50:24] or are stateless in their capacity. [1:50:28] And they have to turn to them, and they turn to these vessels. [1:50:32] And these vessels are made up of crews from all over the world. [1:50:34] We seized one where the majority of the crew members were Ukrainian. [1:50:37] We've seized others. [1:50:39] The majority of them are Russians, and a mix, and what have you. [1:50:42] And so what's happened is a lot of this oil is going – a lot of this shadow fleet oil is going even outside the PDVSA system. [1:50:49] And those are the ones that we have now been seizing as well as the ones that are involved outside the PDVSA system. [1:50:55] Our goal is to rope all of this illegal oil into a channel that goes into this account that ultimately goes to the benefit of the Venezuelan people. [1:51:03] This is an interim step. [1:51:05] This is not the way we want the oil industry to look like in perpetuity. [1:51:08] This is simply a way to provide revenue so that there isn't systemic collapse while we work through this recovery and transition phases. [1:51:15] So there's no doubt that while Maduro was there, we had no cooperation on any of this. [1:51:19] Zero cooperation. [1:51:21] But I will tell you this. [1:51:22] Since the time Maduro was removed, not a single, not a single illegal ship has headed towards Venezuela. [1:51:29] And the ones that you hear us seizing are all the legacy ones that took off or have been seized. [1:51:33] They've been seized in the past. [1:51:34] So we have got a really good handle on this as a result of it. [1:51:37] And what's really changed is the dynamic that the Venezuelan interim authorities are now actually helping us identify shadow fleet ships that they want us to seize and feed into this new interim mechanism. [1:51:50] So let me turn to Iran. [1:51:52] Obviously the – obviously the president authorized a strike against Iranian nuclear – the Iranian nuclear program in what I consider to be a magnificent demonstration. [1:52:07] Of American military power. [1:52:09] And even though the arrest of Nicolas Maduro was not primarily a military operation, but they provided the support to law enforcement authorities as they executed an arrest warrant against Nicolas Maduro, [1:52:25] likewise I think most Americans were very proud of what – how the U.S. government and particularly the U.S. military have performed. [1:52:35] But I know the president is very concerned about this. [1:52:37] I'm very concerned about the – what's happening to the demonstrators in Iran. [1:52:41] And of course there are some estimates that as many as 30,000 Iranian demonstrators have been executed by the regime. [1:52:50] But I know the president is being presented with a range of options. [1:52:55] We notice a lot of movement into the region by our navy and other authorities. [1:53:02] But what happens if the supreme leader is removed in Iran? [1:53:07] What happens next? [1:53:08] Well, that's an open question. [1:53:09] I mean, no one knows who would take over, obviously. [1:53:11] Their system is divided between the supreme leader and the IRGC that responds directly to him. [1:53:16] And then you've got these, you know, quasi-elected individuals, the ones that wear the suits on television, who are part of their political branches, [1:53:24] but ultimately have to run everything they do by the supreme leader. [1:53:27] So I don't think anyone can give you a simple answer as to what happens next in Iran if the supreme leader and the regime were to fall, [1:53:33] other than the hope that there would be some ability to have somebody within their systems [1:53:37] that you could work towards a similar transition. [1:53:39] I would imagine it would be even far more complex than the one we're describing now, [1:53:42] because you're talking about a regime that's in place for a very long time. [1:53:45] So that's going to require a lot of careful thinking if that eventuality ever presents itself. [1:53:49] On the issue of our presence in the region, here's the baseline I want to set for everybody. [1:53:53] The baseline is this. [1:53:54] We have 30,000 to 40,000 American troops stationed across eight or nine facilities in that region. [1:53:59] All are within the reach, theoretically, not theoretically, in reality, [1:54:02] all are within the reach of an array of thousands of Iranian, [1:54:06] one-way UAVs and Iranian short-range ballistic missiles that threaten our troop presence. [1:54:15] We have to have enough force and power in the region just on a baseline to defend against that possibility, [1:54:22] that at some point, as a result of something, the Iranian regime decides to strike at our troop presence in the region. [1:54:29] The president always reserves the preemptive defensive option. [1:54:32] In essence, if we have indications that in fact they're going to attack our troops in the region, [1:54:35] to defend our personnel in the region. [1:54:37] We also have security agreements, the Defense of Israel Plan and others, [1:54:41] that requires to have a force posture in the region to defend against that. [1:54:44] And so I think it's wise and prudent to have a force posture within the region that could respond [1:54:49] and potentially, not necessarily what's going to happen, [1:54:52] but if necessary, preemptively prevent the attack against thousands of American servicemen [1:54:58] and other facilities in the region and our allies. [1:55:00] I hope it doesn't come to that. [1:55:02] But that's, I think, what you're seeing now, [1:55:04] is the ability to posture assets in the region to defend against what could be an Iranian threat against our personnel. [1:55:10] They certainly have the capability to do it because they've amassed thousands and thousands of ballistic missiles [1:55:15] that they've built despite the fact that their economy is collapsing. [1:55:18] They keep spending money on that. [1:55:20] Thank you. [1:55:21] Gentlemen, do I understand that you're yielding to Senator Duckworth? [1:55:26] Is that correct, both of you? [1:55:28] Senator Van Hollen? [1:55:29] Are you going to yield to Senator Duckworth? [1:55:32] Okay. [1:55:33] Senator Duckworth. [1:55:34] I thank my colleagues. [1:55:35] My daughter has dental surgery, so they're being very kind so I can get her through that. [1:55:39] Thank you. [1:55:40] Mr. Secretary, last March, the President invoked the Alien Enemies Act, [1:55:45] a notorious wartime law last used for Japanese internment. [1:55:49] He said that he was responding to the Maduro regime's supposed invasion or other acts of war against the United States. [1:55:57] But in recent weeks, you, the Department of Justice, and our friends across the aisle [1:56:01] have repeatedly said that we are not at war with Venezuela. [1:56:04] Secretary Rubio, [1:56:05] So if that is true and we are not at war with Venezuela, [1:56:08] will you advise the President to rescind his invocation of the Wartime Alien Enemies Act? [1:56:13] Well, that was a mechanism to remove people from our country that prevent grave danger. [1:56:17] So, for example, we know for a fact that Trinidad Agua is a very dangerous gang. [1:56:21] In fact, I believe, if I'm not mistaken, I may have been the first member of Congress... [1:56:24] This is a wartime act, Mr. Secretary. [1:56:27] Are we currently at war with Venezuela? [1:56:31] No, we're not in a state of war in Venezuela. [1:56:33] Okay. [1:56:34] The President described the Alien Enemies Act as a wartime power, our Supreme Court. [1:56:38] And before now, the Alien Enemies Act was only invoked during the War of 1812, World War I, World War II, [1:56:44] when it was used to intern thousands of innocent civilians. [1:56:48] Are you really arguing that the President should be able to wield an internment law? [1:56:51] No, no, no, but we're talking about two separate things here. [1:56:53] So you're talking about the state of Venezuela or are describing the regime. [1:56:57] I am talking about the Alien... [1:56:58] No, no, but what the President designated... [1:56:59] The President invoked the Alien Enemies Act. [1:57:01] I know, Senator, but let me be clear with you. [1:57:02] It's a very clear wartime power. [1:57:03] What the President was talking about are these gangs and these narco-trafficking groups that are waging war on the United States. [1:57:08] There's no doubt. [1:57:09] These groups have waged war on the United States. [1:57:11] They have waged... [1:57:12] For example, Trinidad was not just a criminal gang presence in our street. [1:57:15] It is a criminal gang directly responsible for narco-trafficking. [1:57:18] Mr. Secretary, the Trump administration has acknowledged that the vast majority of the men it rounded up and deported to torture under this law had no criminal records whatsoever. [1:57:26] We didn't torture anybody. [1:57:27] Independent, over 75%. [1:57:29] Who did we torture? [1:57:30] We haven't tortured anybody. [1:57:31] We've arrested people that are members of... [1:57:33] We've arrested people that are members of gangs and we've deported them. [1:57:34] We don't want gang members in our country. [1:57:35] Independent investigations have found that many of the men were here legally. [1:57:38] If the administration is willing to lie about who it's targeting under this law, what protections do totally innocent people have against abuse? [1:57:44] Again, I want to ask you, will you advise the President to rescind his invocation of the wartime Alien Enemies Act? [1:57:52] No, of course not. [1:57:53] I mean, these are people that are threats to the national security of the United States, but I've described this in hearings in the past, including before you guys... [1:57:58] So you're saying that we are at war? [1:58:00] We are... [1:58:01] When it comes to narco-trafficking groups and criminal gangs that are targeting the United States for criminal crimes... [1:58:05] We're in a state of war. [1:58:06] There's no doubt about the fact that we're confronting them in a war-like setting because they're waging war on... [1:58:08] So then, do the international laws of war apply and do the Geneva Conventions apply? [1:58:11] They're waging war against us and they're enemy combatants as a result of it. [1:58:14] And the fact of the matter is that we are confronting these irregular groups, and that's one of the great challenges of the new century in this hemisphere in particular, [1:58:20] is that these non-state actors who possess state-like capabilities in terms of their weaponry pose a grave danger to the United States. [1:58:27] I don't think any American would dispute that we have cartels that pose a threat to the national security of the United States. [1:58:32] Will then the President comply with all of the other laws when it comes to... [1:58:35] Warfare. [1:58:36] I mean, you're saying that he can invoke this wartime power. [1:58:43] No, I'm saying... [1:58:44] You're asking me... [1:58:45] I'm here to discuss foreign policy and what's in the realm of the Department of State. [1:58:48] Well, you don't think... [1:58:49] I think your question is better directed at the Department of Justice. [1:58:50] You don't think invoking the Alien Enemies Act... [1:58:51] But I would tell you that... [1:58:52] Which is a wartime... [1:58:53] Which is something that... [1:58:54] Yeah, but you're asking me a question that's... [1:58:55] Can be invoked during wartime... [1:58:56] All right, but you're asking me a question that's more of a... [1:58:57] And it's only been invoked during the War of 1812, World War I, and World War II. [1:59:00] You're asking me a question... [1:59:01] It's only been invoked three times, and this President is invoking it. [1:59:04] Okay, you're asking me a question about the domestic application of a law that's best [1:59:08] directed at the Department of Justice. [1:59:09] It's not a complication. [1:59:10] It's not a complication. [1:59:11] It's very simple. [1:59:12] Because you're asking me something to opine on something that's in the realm of the Department [1:59:13] of Justice in terms of its domestic application. [1:59:15] I can tell you that the United States is most certainly confronting terrorist and criminal [1:59:21] organizations operating in our hemisphere that pose a grave danger to the United States. [1:59:25] Anyone who believes that gangs that flood our country with fentanyl or cocaine are not [1:59:28] threats to the United States is not living in reality and certainly does not reflect the [1:59:32] opinion of most Americans. [1:59:33] The President already said... [1:59:34] The President already said that he was ready to put American troops in Venezuela again. [1:59:37] So we're at war right now. [1:59:38] When did he say that? [1:59:40] So if things don't go well with the Chavistas you've empowered... [1:59:42] When did the President say he was going to put troops in Venezuela? [1:59:43] What is your criteria for returning to a military option and putting boots on the ground? [1:59:49] I don't recall the President saying he was going to put troops in Venezuela. [1:59:52] Where did he say that? [1:59:53] I'm asking you what are your... [1:59:54] But that's what you said. [1:59:55] I didn't remember the President saying that. [1:59:56] Yeah, the President has already said that he was ready to put American troops in Venezuela [1:59:58] again. [1:59:59] No, I think the President has said that he retains the right as Commander-in-Chief to [2:00:01] protect the United States against any imminent threats. [2:00:04] Maybe that involves troops. [2:00:05] Maybe that involves air power. [2:00:06] We hope, but we don't anticipate that being the case in Venezuela. [2:00:08] I worry that you are playing fast and loose with our nation's military. [2:00:12] Well, I just gave you testimony here... [2:00:13] And let me just say... [2:00:14] I just want to conclude by saying... [2:00:15] Yeah, but I just gave you testimony of how well things are moving forward, not as fast [2:00:19] as everybody would like. [2:00:20] Yeah, but you also said that in six or nine months if things don't go well you're going [2:00:22] to have to do something else. [2:00:23] And the President has already said that he's not ruling out the military option. [2:00:26] And you've also just said that, yes, we are at war. [2:00:28] The President has wartime powers. [2:00:29] But every President retains the power to use military to protect... [2:00:31] So it's reasonable for me to ask you... [2:00:33] And I gave you a very specific example. [2:00:35] Every President retains the right to defend the United States against an imminent threat. [2:00:38] Yes, if there are Iranian... [2:00:40] Just to give you an example, Iranian drones deployed in Venezuela that could threaten [2:00:43] the United States, we most certainly will address that, even if it's located in Venezuela. [2:00:47] But we hope we don't get to that point. [2:00:49] We don't expect to get to that point. [2:00:50] We're not trending in that direction. [2:00:52] That's a fact. [2:00:53] But that said, you know, on the one hand... [2:00:54] The people of America are worried that this is a President who engages in yet another [2:00:58] forever war, Mr. Secretary. [2:01:00] We don't need to be in another forever war. [2:01:02] And that is the pathway that we are going towards. [2:01:04] And let me just say... [2:01:05] Well, how are we going towards a forever war if we're dealing with... [2:01:07] We're dealing with Elsie Rodriguez every day. [2:01:08] Well, you're not ruling out another option. [2:01:10] You're not going to ask him to rescind his invocation of the Alien Enemies Act. [2:01:14] That puts Americans in jeopardy. [2:01:16] And let me just say something about the President's recent comments about NATO allies. [2:01:20] When I served in Iraq, there were Polish forces there with us. [2:01:23] There were British forces there with us. [2:01:25] There were Spanish forces there with us. [2:01:26] I personally landed in Elsie, España, which came under direct attack by insurgents, Polish [2:01:33] troops who worked with the Illinois military. [2:01:35] And the Illinois National Guard, for 30 years, died in Afghanistan, Mr. Secretary. [2:01:40] All the President wants is for NATO to have more capabilities. [2:01:41] All I just want to say is that our NATO allies have stood beside us, and we need to maintain [2:01:46] the strength of that alliance. [2:01:47] I get it. [2:01:48] All the President wants is for our allies... [2:01:49] Senator, your time's up. [2:01:50] Not making much progress here. [2:01:51] Well, let me just say, the President just wants our allies to have more capabilities [2:01:55] to be involved in operations like that, God forbid, in the future if necessary. [2:01:58] That's not what he said. [2:01:59] That's not an unreasonable request. [2:02:00] He said that they stayed a little behind, and they certainly did not come to our defense. [2:02:03] Well, not every country in Europe. [2:02:04] They did. [2:02:05] Not every country in NATO participated in those missions. [2:02:07] Not did. [2:02:08] Denmark suffered some of the greatest military casualties. [2:02:12] There's no doubt that many of our allies have stepped forward and provided assistance [2:02:15] to us, and there are many others that simply don't have the capability to do it now or [2:02:18] in the future. [2:02:19] That's not what the President said. [2:02:20] Senator Lee... [2:02:21] That's what he was pointing to. [2:02:23] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:02:24] Thank you, Secretary Rubio, for being here. [2:02:25] I also want to thank you for reaching out to me the night of the execution of the arrest [2:02:30] warrant against Nicolas Maduro. [2:02:32] I could tell when we talked that you had been up all night. [2:02:36] And you... [2:02:36] It was kind of you to reach out to me and describe what had happened that evening. [2:02:42] I've long been a believer in the fact that the United States has been abundantly blessed [2:02:48] by geography. [2:02:49] God and nature's God have blessed the American continent with two vast oceans, one to our [2:02:56] east, one to our west, that have protected us from the old powers of other parts of the [2:03:01] world. [2:03:02] We should use those to our advantage. [2:03:05] At times in our past, we have. [2:03:07] We have somewhat neglected the Western Hemisphere in recent decades, and I'm pleased that you [2:03:13] and President Trump have been refocusing on the Western Hemisphere. [2:03:18] As we look at burden sharing in other parts of the world and pivot some of this focus [2:03:25] back to our own hemisphere, tell me what that looks like. [2:03:29] Tell me what it looks like to orient some of our burden sharing toward our own hemisphere. [2:03:34] Well, I think you're seeing some of it now. [2:03:36] Look, our hope is eventually not to have a military presence of the kind you've seen [2:03:42] in the Caribbean to deal with this very acute matter. [2:03:44] But the truth of the matter is that it was surprising in the first place, right? [2:03:48] If these ships and these assets were deployed in the Indo-Pacific or in the Mediterranean [2:03:52] or in the Middle East somewhere, no one would blink an eye. [2:03:54] They'd say, well, that's normal. [2:03:55] That's what we always do. [2:03:56] The fact that they were deployed in the Western Hemisphere was a shock to everybody because [2:03:59] we haven't done it. [2:04:00] In fact, according to South Com, they've rarely have ever had assets permanently deployed [2:04:05] to them. [2:04:06] They may have been transiting through at some point, but not permanently deployed. [2:04:08] So, I think that's a good point. [2:04:08] To deal with a very acute matter. [2:04:10] And that is, and these are, you know, these things become interrelated here at some point, [2:04:13] but they are separate in many ways. [2:04:15] And it's part of what I was trying to explain to Senator Duckworth. [2:04:19] These, we have a real reality in our region of these transnational criminal terrorist [2:04:25] organizations that in many cases possess weapons that you ascribe to a nation state, not to [2:04:30] a gang, who pose a grave threat to the national security of the United States, but also to [2:04:35] the stability of the region. [2:04:36] If you walk through the region, what is the primary threat in Colombia? [2:04:38] Transnational criminal organizations. [2:04:40] What is the threat to Mexico? [2:04:42] What is the threat to the Caribbean basin? [2:04:43] These groups have to be confronted. [2:04:45] They have to be confronted forcefully. [2:04:47] What's the threat in Haiti to systemic collapse? [2:04:50] And that is these criminal gangs that basically control territory and threaten the ability [2:04:54] to even form a government there in that regard. [2:04:56] So it's endemic throughout the region and it ultimately impacts the United States through [2:05:00] mass migration, through drug trafficking and other related criminal organizations. [2:05:04] And so we need to have a force posture that can confront that and that can provide assistance [2:05:08] in conjunction with other partners. [2:05:10] We also need more countries that are willing to cooperate with us and collaboratively work [2:05:14] on these things. [2:05:15] The way Ecuador is now doing, the way El Salvador has done, the way Trinidad and Jamaica and [2:05:19] other countries, the way we historically have dealt with Colombia, by the way, and continue [2:05:22] to do in many respects. [2:05:24] So we hope Venezuela will be one of those. [2:05:27] Imagine if a future or even the current interim authorities or a future legitimate government [2:05:32] of Venezuela cooperated with the United States against Trinidad and Agua, cooperated with [2:05:37] the United States against the East. [2:05:38] We need to have a presence in the Indo-Pacific, many of you travel overseas and are constantly [2:05:56] being told by our Indo-Pacific allies they want to see a sustained commitment of the [2:06:00] United States to the region. [2:06:02] We still have obligations and needs that we need to address when it comes to the Middle [2:06:07] East. [2:06:08] We need to address the threat of the rise of terrorism potentially in the African continent. [2:06:13] And then, of course, you point to the Western Hemisphere. [2:06:15] So that doesn't mean we're abandoning NATO or abandoning Europe. [2:06:17] It does mean that we are going to have to, at some point, readjust our force posture [2:06:21] in the world to deal with all of these realities. [2:06:24] And as a result, is why I keep making the point, the stronger our allies and more capable [2:06:28] our allies in NATO are, the more flexibility we'll have to do that. [2:06:31] We'll still be there with our assurances. [2:06:33] We'll still be there with our presence. [2:06:34] We'll still have some of the largest military deployments in the world will be in Europe. [2:06:38] We'll still be there with our allies. [2:06:39] But we are going to need some flexibility to do this over time. [2:06:42] And we've told this to our allies. [2:06:44] And we've told them there'll be no surprises. [2:06:45] And most of them understand it, frankly. [2:06:47] They do. [2:06:48] And that's why they're moving very quickly in many cases to rearm and reinvigorate themselves. [2:06:53] Over the last five to 10 years, we've seen China gain pretty significant footholds [2:06:59] by historical standards in South America, in Central America, in parts of the Caribbean. [2:07:05] Sometimes this occurs simultaneously with and in the same time. [2:07:07] And that's why we're moving very quickly in many cases to rearm and reinvigorate themselves. [2:07:08] Over the last five to 10 years, we've seen China gain pretty significant footholds by historical [2:07:08] standards in South America, in parts of the Caribbean, in parts of the Caribbean, [2:07:09] and in the same place. [2:07:11] And we're also moving very quickly in the same places as drug cartels. [2:07:14] Places where drug cartels are the strongest. [2:07:16] How would you describe the connection between those two things? [2:07:18] Are they correlated? [2:07:19] Or is there a causal? [2:07:20] Well, the correlation may be to the extent that you have usually when you have strong [2:07:23] narco organizations or drug trafficking organizations, you also have very weak states that are in [2:07:29] some cases vulnerable to corruption. [2:07:31] So the general Chinese practice has been you go into a country, you offer to build a bunch [2:07:36] of stuff that you end up building poorly. [2:07:38] And to get that contract, you do it as a market share thing, not because you can make money [2:07:42] off it, but because it puts you in place at the expense of everybody else. [2:07:45] You sometimes have to bribe people locally in order to get that, and it gives you a foothold [2:07:49] into that country and allows you to expand into other sectors. [2:07:52] In some cases, frankly, it has been like in telecommunications because Huawei shows up [2:07:55] with a deal, and no Western company shows up with a deal that's affordable, and so they [2:07:59] go with Huawei because they want to have 4G, not to mention 5G. [2:08:03] Huawei provides a product that's not the best, but it's good enough and they can afford it, [2:08:06] and it's subsidized by the Chinese government. [2:08:08] So we've seen that play out in place after place. [2:08:10] It became quite acute, for example, in the Panama Canal Zone, where a Chinese company [2:08:15] ended up owning both ports on the Pacific and on the Caribbean side and Atlantic side [2:08:20] of that canal, which is of grave concern to the United States. [2:08:23] So I do think you've seen their presence, largely through economic means over time, [2:08:28] create leverage over nations in the country who become emboldened and either trapped in [2:08:31] debt traps or trapped in bad contracts they can't get themselves out of, and always in [2:08:36] sectors that are valuable to China. [2:08:38] That include railways. [2:08:38] That include rare earths, critical minerals, energy, and infrastructure. [2:08:43] Senator Shantz. [2:08:44] Thank you. [2:08:46] Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member, Secretary, good to see you again. [2:08:49] I want to ask about the oil. [2:08:51] Under U.S. law, funds received by the government must be deposited with the Treasury. [2:08:55] Earlier you testified that the funds are being held short-term in Qatar, and then will move [2:09:00] to a Treasury-blocked account. [2:09:03] What is the statutory authority for the administration relying on Qatar to hold the funds? [2:09:09] It's not our funds. [2:09:10] The funds are in an account that's owned and signed. [2:09:14] It's an account that belongs to Venezuela. [2:09:16] But it has U.S. sanctions as a blocking mechanism on it. [2:09:19] And one of the primary reasons why it was in a third country initially, until we could [2:09:22] create the mechanism to move it to a U.S. presence, is twofold. [2:09:26] One, we have an issue we're working through on recognition. [2:09:29] What is exactly? [2:09:30] You have to recognize a government, but we don't recognize this government. [2:09:33] We recognize the 2015 National Assembly. [2:09:34] So we have to find some creative way legally to meet that standard. [2:09:38] The other is, frankly, creditors. [2:09:40] If any of that money touched a U.S. bank, even if it was an account in the name of the [2:09:43] Venezuelans, it would immediately be seized upon by a number of creditors, who eventually [2:09:47] will have to take care of. [2:09:48] But in the short term, that would impede the ability of the Venezuelan authorities to receive [2:09:53] the funds they need to operate. [2:09:54] So do you have the... [2:09:55] I mean, this is what I'm trying to get at, right? [2:09:59] Either it's American money, in which case it's subject to the Miscellaneous Receipts [2:10:03] Act, and there are all kinds of things that attend to that. [2:10:06] You're saying it's Venezuela's money, but it does sound like, according to the EO, according [2:10:10] to the President's statements, you are in charge of that money. [2:10:15] What authority are you relying on to be in charge, almost in a sort of receivership kind [2:10:21] of arrangement, of how funds are both received and expended for a foreign country? [2:10:26] Like wouldn't you have to come to Congress to establish that kind of relationship? [2:10:30] No. [2:10:31] Well, no, because the money never enters our hands. [2:10:32] We only control the disbursement of the money. [2:10:34] We don't control the actual money in the sense of, like it comes into our bank account. [2:10:37] Sure. [2:10:38] But if you're... [2:10:39] Is somewhere in the statute or the Constitution the authority to control disbursements of [2:10:46] a foreign country? [2:10:47] Well, they've agreed to this, and that's the key. [2:10:49] They've agreed to this arrangement in which the sanctions that are placed on this oil [2:10:53] is what blocks its distribution. [2:10:54] So we've agreed to release sanctions and allow the disbursement of the funding as long as [2:10:58] they're spending it in a certain way. [2:11:00] So I understand it's novel, but it's the best we could come up with in the short term to [2:11:03] ensure that they're... [2:11:04] Is there a written agreement that memorializes this? [2:11:07] Yes. [2:11:08] Yes. [2:11:09] I believe... [2:11:10] I believe that's the most important one, most certainly, once we transition that to [2:11:12] US accounts. [2:11:13] Secretary, my understanding is the committee doesn't have this agreement. [2:11:16] Well, I can... [2:11:17] I wonder if we do or we don't. [2:11:18] Yeah. [2:11:19] We do not have that. [2:11:20] And you probably wouldn't because it's a Treasury matter. [2:11:21] Treasury's handled it, but I can most certainly talk to Treasury about providing you the information. [2:11:25] Also, you're the National Security Advisor, so you do have a role here in coordinating [2:11:29] between the departments. [2:11:31] So it's not just like you can punt this to Treasury. [2:11:33] Yeah, I just didn't bring the document with me. [2:11:34] Oh, I got it. [2:11:35] I just want you to land it and get it to the committee because, look, you're being transparent. [2:11:38] I think this is novel. [2:11:39] I think it's functional. [2:11:40] I think it's funky. [2:11:41] I think it may not even be permissible. [2:11:43] But I don't know until I see the document, and I'd like you to just land it for us if [2:11:47] that's all right. [2:11:48] Yeah. [2:11:49] No, like I said... [2:11:50] And by the way, by the time I get it to you, hopefully we won't even have that account [2:11:53] anymore. [2:11:54] It'll be in a one... [2:11:55] A bit more traditional where we can use our sanctions as leverage on how the money's being [2:11:59] spent. [2:12:00] I'm just going to move on to a couple of other issues. [2:12:02] Your comments that Havana should be concerned about the Maduro operation is fueling speculation [2:12:07] that this administration will turn its sights to Cuba next. [2:12:11] Will you make a public commitment today to rule out U.S. regime change in Cuba? [2:12:18] Regime change? [2:12:19] Yes. [2:12:20] Oh, no. [2:12:21] I think we would love to see the regime change. [2:12:22] We would like to... [2:12:23] That doesn't mean that we're going to make a change, but we would love to see it change. [2:12:24] There's no doubt about the fact that it would be of great benefit to the United States if [2:12:28] Cuba was no longer governed by an autocratic regime. [2:12:31] But you know what we mean by regime change. [2:12:33] We don't mean, I wish someone else were in charge. [2:12:36] When we talk about regime change, we're talking about using the power of the United States, [2:12:40] usually kinetic power. [2:12:42] But often other kinds of coercion, and I'm not even saying that that's always not in [2:12:48] our interest. [2:12:49] I'm just saying, I'm not asking you whether we would prefer a different kind of government. [2:12:54] I'm asking whether you are trying to precipitate the fall of the current regime. [2:12:59] Yeah, but that's statutory. [2:13:00] The Helms-Burton Act, the U.S. embargo on Cuba is codified. [2:13:04] It was codified in law, and it requires regime change in order for us to lift the embargo. [2:13:09] Okay. [2:13:11] We have not received any information on the Board of Peace. [2:13:13] Do you commit to informing us about what the heck this is? [2:13:16] Yeah. [2:13:17] It's the Board of Peace. [2:13:18] Okay. [2:13:19] Thank you. [2:13:20] Well, I mean, I'll just note that Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bulgaria, [2:13:26] Cambodia, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Morocco, Mongolia, [2:13:31] Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam, there [2:13:37] are a lot of countries with whom we normally work very closely and with whom we are aligned [2:13:42] geopolitically. [2:13:43] And in terms of values that are not on the Board of Peace, and so I think it's reasonable [2:13:48] for us to wonder whether something in terms of a, I don't know, competitive structure [2:13:54] to sort of either undermine the U.N. or circumvent the U.N., I just worry that a lot of our friends [2:14:00] are not on that list, and some of our adversaries are. [2:14:03] So two points. [2:14:04] The impediment that they have is, first of all, it's just chartered by the U.N. [2:14:09] The U.N., it's a U.N. resolution that actually created the mechanism by which the Board was [2:14:13] set up. [2:14:14] And the primary and sole focus of that Board right now is to administer phase two and phase [2:14:19] three of the plan in Gaza. [2:14:21] And we welcome, all these countries have been invited, some in Europe have chosen not to [2:14:24] join it, either because they have constitutional, they require constitutional approval of their [2:14:29] parliament in order to join, depending on some leaders, like for example, I'm thinking [2:14:33] there are a couple countries in Europe that could not join until they got permission from [2:14:37] their vote, and other cases because they are concerned about what you just pointed out. [2:14:41] They argue and they want to know, is this a replacement? [2:14:42] Is this a replacement? [2:14:42] Is this a replacement? [2:14:43] Is this a replacement for the U.N.? [2:14:44] This is not a replacement for the U.N., but the U.N. has served very little purpose in [2:14:49] the case of Gaza, other than the food assistance, and so we think it's critical to have something [2:14:53] that's in charge of that. [2:14:54] One final ten-second question. [2:14:57] We are hopefully about to enact appropriations law, either this Friday or soon after that, [2:15:07] and I just want your commitment to work with my team and anyone else who has jurisdiction [2:15:11] on the implementation of the SFOPs bill. [2:15:13] Yes, of course, and we're very happy you're about to pass it. [2:15:16] Even if you pass none of the other budgets, you should pass that one, isn't it? [2:15:19] Thank you. [2:15:20] I agree. [2:15:21] You could have gone a little further than that, Secretary. [2:15:25] Senator Curtis. [2:15:26] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:15:27] Thanks. [2:15:28] Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service. [2:15:29] You and I overlapped in the Senate by only a couple of days, and as a result, I've only [2:15:34] had the luxury of— [2:15:35] Those were my two best days in the Senate, by the way. [2:15:38] As a result, I've only had the luxury of watching you from a distance, but I will tell you unequivocally, [2:15:42] I appreciate it. [2:15:43] Thank you. [2:15:44] I'm grateful for your role. [2:15:46] I believe unequivocally that you and President Trump have made the world a safer place. [2:15:53] I push back on the false narrative that we're not respected. [2:15:57] I think we're respected far more than we were around the world, and so I'm grateful for that. [2:16:03] I don't know how you get around the world the way that you do. [2:16:07] You must have some type of superpower, and I'm grateful for the time you've spent with [2:16:11] us this morning. [2:16:13] All of that said, I do have a basic concern that I'd like to raise with you. [2:16:19] I now chair the Western Hemisphere, which you previously chaired the subcommittee, and [2:16:25] I'm often struggling to get briefings, clear information, or meaningful cooperation from [2:16:30] the administration and the State Department. [2:16:33] Let me give you three specific examples. [2:16:35] I suspect most of these are out of your visibility, so I want to bring them to your attention. [2:16:41] Senator Kaine and I, who's the ranking member, tried to do a hearing on this. [2:16:42] I don't know if you can hear me. [2:16:43] Senator Kaine and I tried to do a hearing on Venezuela late last year. [2:16:46] We were told the State Department would not participate in that hearing. [2:16:50] I'm trying to put together a hearing right now on the prioritization of the Western Hemisphere, [2:16:55] which I think would be very helpful to the administration, and we're struggling to get [2:16:59] the State Department to participate in that. [2:17:03] I couldn't get a briefing on the drug boat operations until the Kaine War Power Resolution, [2:17:11] and then all of a sudden we got a briefing. [2:17:13] But I didn't get that because I was the chair of the Western Hemisphere. [2:17:18] And I want to be clear, I support what's happening with Maduro and what's going on there, but [2:17:22] I do think the administration could get Congress to be a better partner by informing us better. [2:17:30] And from my perspective, I'm struggling to see that, and I would ask you, if you were [2:17:35] the chair of the Western Hemisphere, would you be okay with that, a reaction like that [2:17:40] from the State Department, and what would you suggest I do? [2:17:42] Yeah. [2:17:43] I think one of the challenges we face, particularly on Venezuela, on the prioritization on the [2:17:47] Western Hemisphere, you'll get that briefing. [2:17:49] I don't know why they said that you haven't been able to get it, but we can figure that [2:17:52] out pretty quickly. [2:17:54] But I would say both on Venezuela and the drug boat operation, here's the challenge [2:17:57] that we face. [2:17:59] This is a committee, as you said, I was there for many years, that has oversight over the [2:18:02] State Department. [2:18:03] The drug boat operation, which I support, but is not a State Department operation. [2:18:09] I think now that I'm here testifying with you, there's a lot of State Department involvement [2:18:12] in the issue of transition. [2:18:14] There's a lot of discussion and all the projects that we're doing in Venezuela, but everything [2:18:17] that led up to that point was not primarily within the jurisdiction of the Department [2:18:21] of State. [2:18:22] These were Department of War and Department of Justice operations that were ongoing. [2:18:26] For us, the struggle in those cases would be to provide you witnesses that could say [2:18:29] anything meaningful on a topic that was largely from an interagency perspective in the realm [2:18:34] of other agencies. [2:18:35] Now, if you were in some of the other committees, I don't know if they've got those hearings, [2:18:39] those that perhaps can tell you that are on armed services and the like. [2:18:43] So I think that was the struggle, both in December with a hearing on Venezuela policy [2:18:47] and again now with the drug boat one, on the issue of the broader context of our priorities [2:18:56] in the Western Hemisphere. [2:18:57] I think that's something we most certainly can and will provide because it features prominently [2:19:01] in our national security strategy. [2:19:03] I think we have a lot of good stories to tell about the Western Hemisphere. [2:19:06] I'll just be clear. [2:19:07] We haven't even been able to get that from the State Department. [2:19:10] To get what? [2:19:11] Help on a hearing for... [2:19:12] No. [2:19:13] No. [2:19:14] You'll get it. [2:19:15] You'll get it. [2:19:16] Okay. [2:19:17] We'd love to have your commitment moving forward that we could have that type of cooperation [2:19:22] that the Western Hemisphere... [2:19:23] Yeah. [2:19:24] I just got to make sure that the people were... [2:19:25] Look, I don't want you to have a meaningless hearing if you're asking about something that's [2:19:27] not in our... [2:19:28] It's like having a hearing on agriculture in front of the State Department. [2:19:33] We have limited involvement because from an interagency perspective, in the case of the [2:19:37] drug boats and Venezuela at the time you requested, this was primarily a Department of War function. [2:19:41] And so... [2:19:42] But in the case of the priorities on the Western Hemisphere. [2:19:44] So that will happen. [2:19:45] Okay. [2:19:46] We look forward to doing that. [2:19:47] Let's move on. [2:19:49] You mentioned Russia, China, Iran a little bit earlier. [2:19:53] I'm very concerned as you are about their influence in the Western Hemisphere. [2:19:58] If we put Venezuela aside for just a moment, can you talk about where we're seeing the [2:20:02] influence particularly of China in the Western Hemisphere and what progress we've made or [2:20:06] what we need to be thinking about? [2:20:08] Well, China specific? [2:20:11] All of them are important. [2:20:12] Yeah. [2:20:13] But specifically on China. [2:20:14] I mean, look. [2:20:15] In Iran and Russia, in Iran, their primary foothold in the region was Venezuela. [2:20:19] Let me just put that up front. [2:20:20] And it involved more than just selling weapons and all this other stuff. [2:20:23] I mean, in many cases, there's clear evidence now that they were providing passports, Venezuelan [2:20:27] passports with false identities to people who operated on behalf of both Iran and Hezbollah. [2:20:33] And so deep concerns about that and that needs to stop and end. [2:20:36] In the case of Russia, their primary presence of influence in the region is Venezuela and [2:20:40] to some extent, Nicaragua and Cuba, which is where they operate. [2:20:43] In the case of China, they do have a presence in Cuba. [2:20:45] They have this debt relationship with Venezuela where they were basically taking Venezuelan [2:20:50] oil as payment on debt. [2:20:52] And then they were reselling it at a huge profit because they were buying it on discount. [2:20:57] That has now obviously ended. [2:20:59] And if their debt is legitimate, a future Venezuelan government will have to address [2:21:03] it and deal with it as part of a broader restructuring of their debt. [2:21:06] But in the short term, that has now ended. [2:21:07] But the primary way that China plays in the Western Hemisphere is through commercial relations. [2:21:12] They engage themselves in a country. [2:21:13] They're very interested in telecommunication. [2:21:15] They're very interested in building and controlling key infrastructure. [2:21:19] They're very interested in critical mineral rights. [2:21:21] And they've secured many leases for many years because of neglect on our part in allowing [2:21:24] them to do that. [2:21:25] And it's given them leverage and a presence in many of these countries. [2:21:28] I will say that I think that influence in our hemisphere has eroded over the last year. [2:21:34] For example, Panama left the Belt and Road Initiative. [2:21:37] We have new leaders in Chile, in Paraguay, I'm sorry, in Chile and in Honduras that have [2:21:44] expressed a strong interest in the Belt and Road Initiative. [2:21:46] We have a strong desire to realign with the United States in our priorities and we have [2:21:49] great relationships with Argentina, Paraguay and other countries in the region who are [2:21:53] also very cooperative. [2:21:54] And we've had great cooperation from the Panamanian authorities as well, including a case before [2:21:59] the Supreme Court, I don't know if the final has been submitted, that could lead to the [2:22:03] eviction and removal of a Chinese-controlled company that controlled both ports at the [2:22:08] Panama Canal. [2:22:09] Thank you. [2:22:10] I wish we had more time. [2:22:11] I'm out of time. [2:22:12] I yield. [2:22:13] Thank you. [2:22:14] Senator Van Hollen. [2:22:15] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:22:16] I would like to, as I said, discuss corruption in the White House and its intersection with [2:22:21] our foreign policy. [2:22:22] The President and his family have used the office of the presidency to pocket $1.4 billion [2:22:30] plus since he was sworn in. [2:22:33] New York Times analysis entitled Trump's Plundering of America indicates that some of that is [2:22:38] a result of the President selling corruption here at home, but much of it relates to the [2:22:44] President selling out U.S. interests overseas. [2:22:46] Thank you. [2:22:46] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:22:47] Thank you very much. [2:22:48] I really appreciate it. [2:22:49] Then, we look to this statement from Trump and want to look at why he has that power [2:22:50] to do that. [2:22:51] Let me just give you a quick summary of the US-U.S. policy. [2:22:52] First, the plan is to subsidize the US with a $20 trillion tros� to make a killing for [2:22:53] his family, including giving away sensitive US semiconductor and AI technologies to the [2:22:54] UAE while the UAE pumped $2 billion dollars into one of the Trump family ventures. [2:23:00] And then there are all the other Trump deals that are intertwined with tariff or foreign [2:23:04] policy matters, golf courses in Saudi Arabia and Vietnam, Trump hotels and office buildings [2:23:10] in other countries, and of course there is the $400 million jet from Qatar. [2:23:15] The list goes on and on. [2:23:17] By any measure, this is the most corrupt administration in American history. [2:23:22] We also see the president wielding U.S. power overseas in a way that advances the interests [2:23:27] of his billionaire buddies at the expense of American interests. [2:23:32] It was Ron Lauder, who has business ventures in Greenland, who reportedly first put the [2:23:36] idea of grabbing Greenland into President Trump's mind. [2:23:40] And in the case of Venezuela, President Trump has said he talked to oil executives about [2:23:45] toppling Maduro and going into Venezuela before anyone in Congress knew. [2:23:51] We know that in President Trump's mind, opposing Maduro was not about stopping the flow of [2:23:57] fentanyl or drugs in the United States. [2:23:59] He cut the budget for DEA. [2:24:02] He pardoned the former Honduran president convicted of drug running. [2:24:07] And the new president, Delcy Rodriguez, has herself been long suspected by DEA of being [2:24:12] involved in drug smuggling. [2:24:15] She's also a long-time president. [2:24:16] She's a long-time hardened communist leader. [2:24:18] So this operation certainly was not about bringing more freedom and democracy to Venezuela. [2:24:22] In fact, the president told us what it was all about at his big press conference after [2:24:27] seizing Maduro. [2:24:28] The president said it was about oil, oil, oil. [2:24:33] He used the word oil 19 times, never mentioned democracy or freedom or human rights. [2:24:41] And so the pattern of corruption is clear. [2:24:44] Now, President Trump has said publicly that he had... [2:24:46] President Trump has said publicly that he had... [2:24:47] President Trump has said publicly that he had... [2:24:48] He only made sh Gonzalez pronounce the president's ownhoe복 [2:24:48] iko [2:25:14] He didn't just amusement into Venezuela. [2:25:14] He used the word oil as a tevex, as aным key percentage. [2:25:15] Now, guess what the Secretary's raised on us? [2:25:15] He's raised this to our level, I think, but this is what a mah気 [2:25:16] meant, and I think that the oldarnast thing will never be important to the vast majority [2:25:16] He's not스 [2:25:17] That's not a simple yes or no question. [2:25:17] But I can answer it quickly, and that is, the president always elicits opinions from [2:25:18] all sorts of people, including, for example, Chevron has an active license, [2:25:18] in Venezuela. [2:25:19] They operate in Venezuela. [2:25:21] They've been doing so even when the sanctions were in place. [2:25:23] So of course you would ask Chevron, what is your opinion of Delcy Rodriguez? [2:25:27] What is your opinion of their economy and of their prospects? [2:25:29] But the notion that somehow the president authorized this challenge at the urging of [2:25:33] oil executives is absurd. [2:25:34] That never happened. [2:25:35] Mr. Secretary, I'm asking whether you were with the president. [2:25:38] That never happened. [2:25:39] I couldn't be with him because it never happened. [2:25:42] The oil executives were not involved whatsoever in any of the planning on this matter. [2:25:46] None. [2:25:47] Did the president, as he said publicly, inform them about the U.S. operations? [2:25:53] I think all of those executives learned about this operation the same time everybody else [2:25:57] did. [2:25:58] Well, President Trump has said the opposite in public. [2:26:00] No, no, no. [2:26:01] Yes, he has. [2:26:02] I mean, he said it. [2:26:03] I think it was aboard Air Force One on an airplane. [2:26:05] It's on public record. [2:26:06] You can take a look. [2:26:07] Look, Paul Singer, who you know, gave $8 million toward Trump's 2024 campaign. [2:26:14] Conveniently through his hedge fund, he's acquired Citgo out of bankruptcy. [2:26:18] Which is suddenly very, very valuable. [2:26:22] Did you or President Trump have any communications with Paul Singer about Venezuelan oil in the [2:26:27] months leading up to the military action in Venezuela? [2:26:30] I can tell you I did not. [2:26:31] And I would be very surprised what the president did in that regard. [2:26:34] And in fact, that that Singer position that you've outlined, which is not just him, but [2:26:37] other creditors, was actually we were was blocked. [2:26:40] We don't want to see it's one of the reasons why we had to do this account in a third country [2:26:45] in the interim. [2:26:46] Because we don't want it to be something that's picked apart by creditors. [2:26:50] I appreciate that. [2:26:51] And we're to monitor it carefully. [2:26:56] There's also VTOL. [2:26:57] They've been given a license to for Venezuelan oil about worth about $250 million VTOL senior [2:27:03] partner John Addison gave 6 million to the Trump aligned PACs in the last cycle. [2:27:08] And the list goes on and on, Mr. Secretary, and I have to say that when you have the President [2:27:14] of the United States himself, after taking Maduro, get up and say this was about oil, [2:27:19] oil, oil, it does make all of us ask the question whether he put men and women in the middle [2:27:27] in the US military at risk, simply so he could grab that oil. [2:27:32] Well that one there. [2:27:33] But yeah, and I don't know if you were here. [2:27:34] I think you were here the whole hearing I don't think you had left. [2:27:37] Number one, the only reason why we use traffic and VTOL is simply because in the short term, [2:27:42] we had to move 50 million barrels of oil that were stuck. [2:27:45] And Venezuela needed to turn that into cash so that they wouldn't have systemic collapse. [2:27:49] And the fastest way to do it in the short term is for the traders to do it because that's [2:27:52] in the business that they're in. [2:27:53] That is not the permanent structure. [2:27:55] The permanent structure we want to see is a normal oil industry where it's sold directly. [2:27:59] No companies have licenses down there. [2:28:01] They have an arrangement to pay royalties and they move the oil directly to their refineries [2:28:04] or sell it in the global market, not through middlemen. [2:28:07] The only reason why they were used in this instance is because we had an acute short [2:28:10] term problem, which is how do we provide funding from their own revenue? [2:28:15] Not ours. [2:28:15] To keep their government afloat. [2:28:17] So in essence, we allowed Venezuela to use their own oil to generate revenue to pay teachers [2:28:21] and firefighters and police officers and keep the function of government operating [2:28:25] so we didn't have systemic collapse. [2:28:27] But that system with those traders, that is not the long term plan here at all. [2:28:31] My only point, Mr. Secretary, is those folks who gave a lot of money to the Trump campaign [2:28:36] have done very well as a result of what's happened. [2:28:39] Thank you. [2:28:40] Senator Daines. [2:28:41] Secretary Rubio, good to have you up here. [2:28:42] I just returned from India. [2:28:44] I had a chance to visit with leadership there as well as spend time with our new ambassador, [2:28:49] Sergio Gore. [2:28:50] He's off to a great start and a very profitable visit. [2:28:53] I hope to debrief in it soon if I might. [2:28:57] By the way, I think if we were to pick an MVP of the West Wing, Secretary Rubio, my [2:29:01] vote's for Marco Rubio. [2:29:03] We have a lot of MVPs, don't we? [2:29:04] I know you do. [2:29:05] I know you do. [2:29:06] We get a vote on one. [2:29:07] I think you've done a great job this first year. [2:29:08] Very proud to claim my former colleague and now our Secretary of State. [2:29:12] Secretary Rubio. [2:29:13] As you've noted, there are numerous reasons and good reasons why the U.S. is the arbiter [2:29:18] of Venezuelan petroleum sales. [2:29:21] With the new export sales framework, the Venezuelan government is now looking to other options [2:29:27] to reimburse some of our adversaries, Iran, Russia, as well as Iran's proxies, to include [2:29:34] petroleum byproducts, which contain valuable minerals and so forth, flexi coke. [2:29:40] Has the administration considered expanding? [2:29:43] The export controls to additional petroleum byproducts? [2:29:47] Well, I'm sure we would, except that I can tell you a couple things that are happening. [2:29:51] They have, in essence, represented to us, and we have seen an action in the work that [2:29:55] they're doing directly with Secretary Wright, who's handling this portfolio on a daily basis. [2:29:59] He has a deep historic and career knowledge of this field, is that on all of these things [2:30:04] regarding natural resources, their preference and their partner of choice moving forward [2:30:09] will be the United States and Western companies, that that's what they intend to do. [2:30:13] And so, as a point of example, and I said this earlier in the hearing, you may not have [2:30:15] been here, today, they used to get 100% of the diluent, you know, to have very heavy [2:30:19] crude and so it has to be mixed with light crude in order to make it, you know, refinable [2:30:24] and movable. [2:30:25] And they were getting 100% of it from Russia, primarily because of sanctions. [2:30:28] They prefer to have ours. [2:30:29] Why? [2:30:30] Number one, it's closer. [2:30:31] Number two, it's higher quality. [2:30:32] Today, 100% of that diluent is coming from the United States. [2:30:37] They were involved in a very complex gold market in which they were mining for gold [2:30:42] and silver. [2:30:43] And it was being exported almost entirely through Turkey. [2:30:46] And we believe the Iranians were using that as a laundering operation for themselves ultimately [2:30:50] as well, potentially. [2:30:52] And certainly we know that they had an interest in the oil industry as well. [2:30:54] We are on the verge of a process in which that will be sold through U.S. markets in [2:30:58] a legitimate way that won't go to finance and support. [2:31:01] I think we'd like to apply that model to various things. [2:31:03] But the end goal in all of this is, number one, not to spend any American money. [2:31:08] And number two, for Venezuela to have a normal, legitimate economy that's not benefiting cronies, [2:31:13] not benefiting corruption, and is not benefiting our geopolitical adversaries. [2:31:17] So far, the interim authorities have expressed a desire to cooperate with us on all of these [2:31:21] fronts. [2:31:22] You identify an area you want to work with, they say yes. [2:31:24] And we're making progress on all of it. [2:31:26] We've faced no impediments to date in regards to expanding that relationship. [2:31:29] Yeah. [2:31:30] Thank you, Secretary Rubio. [2:31:31] Thank you. [2:31:32] And maybe we'll talk with Secretary Wright. [2:31:33] We think there may be some workarounds in terms of what's happening there with some [2:31:37] of these petroleum byproducts. [2:31:38] We call it Flexi-Co, it has vanadium in it. [2:31:40] And so we could talk with Secretary Wright. [2:31:42] Which absolutely would be... [2:31:43] It's something they're trading right now to our adversaries like Iran, Iranian proxies, [2:31:48] as well as the Russians. [2:31:50] But thank you. [2:31:51] And we're off to a great start, as you say. [2:31:52] We're playing a long game here. [2:31:54] And you're playing it very, very well. [2:31:56] I want to pivot now to EU energy. [2:31:59] I chair the subcommittee here in this committee for Europe. [2:32:04] Next we're going to have a hearing. [2:32:05] We're looking about having a conversation on EU regulations that are hindering energy [2:32:09] security that's benefiting now, of course, the Russians. [2:32:13] We're going to have a discussion on EU regulations that are hindering the development of alternative [2:32:14] supply chains. [2:32:15] Mr. Secretary, here's my question. [2:32:17] As Russia continues its war on Ukraine, how important is it for Europe to develop a pro-energy [2:32:23] posture to ensure they have energy security? [2:32:25] Well, I would argue that one of the reasons why we have a war on Ukraine is because Russia [2:32:29] thought they could get away with it because of how dependent Europe was on them for energy. [2:32:33] And they felt there's no way the Europeans are going to come hard at us because they're [2:32:35] too dependent on us for energy. [2:32:37] So I think most certainly it served as a contributing factor to the war happening, among others, [2:32:41] obviously. [2:32:42] The second point is the point the President has repeatedly made. [2:32:44] We love Europe. [2:32:45] We want Europe to be strong. [2:32:47] We share a lot of common bonds, both through history and culture and also through our alliances. [2:32:51] And part of our concerns is that Europe is becoming increasingly vulnerable when it comes [2:32:55] to their energy supplies, increasingly vulnerable both for domestic economic growth, which will [2:32:59] allow them to sustain investments in defense and be more reliable partners, but also vulnerable [2:33:04] to Russian oil and other things of this nature. [2:33:07] So we are concerned, though it's not our decision to make. [2:33:10] We are concerned. [2:33:11] We are concerned that the EU policies in general are leaving Europe more vulnerable at a time [2:33:15] when they should be getting stronger in their ability to resist pressure from both Russia [2:33:19] and China. [2:33:20] Secretary, thank you. [2:33:21] And we hope to have that discussion next week at the subcommittee level. [2:33:24] Last question is back to one of my favorite topics, back to Central Asia. [2:33:29] We had a great dinner at the White House with the five Central Asian presidents that you [2:33:32] were at, President Trump as well as Vice President Vance. [2:33:35] I had an honor to be there with you all. [2:33:38] They're making a major shift right now in terms of having a closer diplomatic and economic [2:33:41] relations with the United States. [2:33:43] That all fits in part of the geopolitical puzzle as well as the energy supply as well. [2:33:49] Here's my question. [2:33:50] How important is it that we end these Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions as it relates to our relationship [2:33:55] with Central Asia? [2:33:56] And for background here, Senator Murphy and I are cosponsors of that bill. [2:34:01] We hope to actually get this done and on the president's desk. [2:34:04] It's an ancient Soviet era restriction that is not relevant at all, but frankly is hindering [2:34:09] our relationship with this important Central Asian country. [2:34:11] No, we agree. We agree. And like I said, one of these areas that you've been focused on for a long time, Ambassador Gore, that, as you know, is in India, is also an envoy to these three countries, just came back from Tajikistan a couple of days ago. [2:34:21] So I think that absolutely we would like to see that because it would allow us to do even more. [2:34:25] Yeah, great. Thank you, Chairman. [2:34:27] Thank you. Senator Rosen. [2:34:30] Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member, and thank you, Secretary Rubio, for being here. [2:34:36] I'm going to get right into it because I want to build on Senator Van Hollen's line of questioning. [2:34:40] President Trump pardoned the former Honduran president after he was convicted of trafficking roughly 400 tons of cocaine into the United States, [2:34:49] cocaine that contributed to the deaths of tens of thousands of Americans year after year. [2:34:55] Yet the president and his cabinet authorized a military operation to capture Nicolas Maduro in order to arrest him for virtually the same crime. [2:35:03] So yes or no, because I have a bunch of questions here. [2:35:06] To the best of your knowledge, was Hernandez convicted of trafficking approximately? [2:35:11] He was convicted of trafficking roughly 400 tons of cocaine into the United States. [2:35:13] I'm not involved in the pardon process. I can tell you that the president... [2:35:16] No, I'm just asking if he... [2:35:17] Yeah, but I don't do yes or no. I don't play games. This is not a game show. [2:35:20] Do you know he was... Okay, so I'm just going to tell you he was... [2:35:23] So I can answer your question because I know what you're getting at, but go ahead and ask... [2:35:25] He was convicted. I know... [2:35:27] The president felt that he was unfairly treated. I can't... But I can't give you much insight because I'm not involved in the pardon process. [2:35:33] Would you not concede, can you not understand how the American people and how the world are clearly going to be frustrated by the hypocrisy of the president? [2:35:37] And how the world are clearly going to be frustrated by the hypocrisy of this when one man is convicted and pardoned and another man captured and how it undermines United States credibility on the world stage? [2:35:48] But the difference is that, again, I can't opine on the specifics of his case because I wasn't involved in the pardon, but he was not a sitting office holder. [2:35:55] He was not even the president of Honduras when that decision was made either to convict him. [2:35:59] The difference between him and Nicolas Maduro is he was actively engaged in narco-trafficking. It was an ongoing endeavor. [2:36:04] I think it does undermine our credibility. [2:36:07] I'm going to move on to some foreign policy decision making here because despite the fact that you famously or infamously have numerous jobs in the administration, your Secretary of State, your National Security Advisor, [2:36:20] it is increasingly unclear who's actually directing U.S. foreign policy under President Trump. [2:36:26] We have a special envoy, Special Envoy Woodcock. He's reportedly conducted Russian-Ukraine talks in Switzerland beyond your awareness. [2:36:34] He and Jared Kushner have been described as managing the president's government. [2:36:37] Meanwhile, Ambassador Barak is leading on Syria policy, while Special Envoy Boulos is appearing to lead on our Africa policy. [2:36:45] So I have to ask you, I know the answer to this, but I'm going to ask you, are you the lead for U.S. government on foreign policy? [2:36:53] Well, no. The lead on U.S. foreign policy is named Donald J. Trump, the President of the United States. [2:36:57] On the individuals you've described, these are very valuable teams. [2:37:00] We have an excellent, if I can answer, because I think it's important. It's a legitimate question. [2:37:04] I have the distinction, but I think both the two. [2:37:07] I have the benefit of being the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State. [2:37:10] As National Security Advisor, my job is to coordinate the interagency function of national security, and that involves foreign policy. [2:37:16] So I speak to Steve Woodcock and Jared Kushner in the case of Gaza, and now Russia, probably ten times a day. [2:37:23] Do you outrank them? [2:37:24] We have multiple meetings and coordination. All of it is we build a team, we gather facts, we present options, and then we take them to the president. [2:37:31] It is the president who directs the foreign policy of the United States. That's always been the case, by the way. [2:37:36] You can't overrule their decisions? Do you outrank the special envoys and ambassadors? Do they get your input? [2:37:42] Well, as an example. [2:37:43] Do they care about your input, or do they go straight to the president? [2:37:45] There's no time in which the president is presented an option by one of us at the exemption of everybody else. [2:37:51] It depends on the portfolio. But in every one of these portfolios, we have a team approach to this, which is the way the system is supposed to work. [2:37:57] It's not the way it's always worked. [2:37:58] You have had in the past tensions between the National Security Council that became operational and the Department of State. [2:38:04] In this particular case, there's not much conflict between the two because it's the same thing. [2:38:07] It's the same person. [2:38:08] What we basically try to do in every one of these unique missions is we create a consensus team around it, and then we present the president options together. [2:38:18] It's the president's decision, nobody else's. [2:38:20] There's no overruling here. The president makes the decision. [2:38:23] Our job is to present them options. [2:38:24] Shouldn't they report to you? Shouldn't there be a line of command and a line of transparency? [2:38:28] They report to me every day. [2:38:29] Where does the buck stop? [2:38:30] But they report to me every day in terms of keeping me apprised of what's happening. [2:38:34] I give advice. I give, in some cases, direction. [2:38:36] They involved heavily. [2:38:37] For example, the special envoys rely almost exclusively on State Department personnel to assist them in all of their efforts. [2:38:43] For example, on the Board of Peace, we helped them position the entire gathering last week and all of the work that's going to happen now. [2:38:50] On every one of these issues, it's not linear. [2:38:53] No single individual other than the president has the ability to dictate our foreign policy. [2:38:57] Our job is to come to a consensus view on the best way forward. [2:39:01] Whether there are disputes, those are presented to the president, and he makes the decisions. [2:39:04] Let's talk about the Board of Peace then. [2:39:06] Because all treaties and statutes have to be approved by Congress. [2:39:10] And the president is starting a new Board of Peace. [2:39:13] We would need that authority. [2:39:16] The authority for the filing stems from the International Organization's Immunities Act. [2:39:20] But it's my understanding it only provides the president with such authority when participation in an organization has been approved by treaty or statute. [2:39:29] Treaties and statutes must be approved by Congress. [2:39:32] So when will the administration be requesting Congress pass legislation? [2:39:35] To authorize the president to extend this benefits to the Board of Peace, creating the Board of Peace. [2:39:42] And when will it be sent? [2:39:43] Well, actually, the Board of Peace was chartered and set up by the UN Security Council. [2:39:49] Through a vote of the UN Security Council as the deliberation. [2:39:51] So it's an international organism recognized by the Security Council of the United Nations. [2:39:55] Which is something I think many of you should be supportive of the fact that we're doing it. [2:39:58] The president is claiming his authority is from the International Organization's Immunities Act. [2:40:03] And this law only provides the president authority when U.S. participation has been approved by treaty or statute. [2:40:10] I know my time is up. [2:40:12] Please consider working with us to do these things. [2:40:17] You know what it is to be a senator. [2:40:19] You know what that collaboration and cooperation mean. [2:40:23] And I think that all of us expect that respect from you and would really appreciate it. [2:40:30] Thank you. [2:40:31] Thank you, Senator Rosen. [2:40:32] Secretary, you've been very generous with your time. [2:40:35] We have just a couple of few comments to wind up here. [2:40:38] Senator Shaheen. [2:40:40] Yes, I agree. [2:40:41] Thank you. [2:40:42] I hope that you will come more often before this committee. [2:40:47] But I just wanted to clarify a couple of things. [2:40:50] One is that under the case act, the State Department is required as are other agencies to give documents like the one that Senator Schatz was raising for the agreement between Venezuela and the U.S. to this committee. [2:41:06] We have not yet received it. [2:41:08] So I hope that we will see it in the near future. [2:41:12] The other thing, with respect to the exchange between you and Senator Rosen, I can tell you that we have, as the minority staff requested on multiple occasions, updates from the State Department on the special envoy's negotiations on the Ukraine war with Russia. [2:41:33] And we have been denied access to any of that information. [2:41:38] I would hope that, number one, that would be available because I think everybody's interested in trying to support efforts to end this war in Ukraine. [2:41:50] This should not be an adversarial position. [2:41:53] And number two, I would also hope that, like Senator Curtis, that you would be willing to have someone from State come before the committee. [2:42:03] We have not had a hearing on negotiations over the war in Ukraine since I've been on this committee. [2:42:10] And since the President took office. [2:42:13] And so I hope you will make that commitment to come, have State come and be part of a hearing on the war in Ukraine and the negotiations there. [2:42:23] Yeah. [2:42:24] And we would love to do that. [2:42:25] And I'll make sure that happens. [2:42:26] And I will tell you it's a – I can give you a brief update. [2:42:29] I know it's late, but I don't mind. [2:42:30] I mean, we can continue to talk about this a little bit because it's important. [2:42:33] It's a very fluid situation, unfortunately. [2:42:35] I mean, as you know, it's moving very quickly. [2:42:37] My sense of it is that, for the most part, I just don't know. [2:42:39] For the most part, I discussed the security guarantees piece, which was part of a meeting and efforts that took place in the early part of this year. [2:42:46] I think the one remaining item remains the one you're all familiar with, and that is territorial – a territorial claim on Donetsk in particular. [2:42:53] And I know there's active work going to try to see if both sides' views on that can't be reconciled. [2:42:59] It's still a bridge we haven't crossed. [2:43:01] It's still a gap. [2:43:03] But at least we've been able to narrow down the issue set to one central one. [2:43:07] And it will probably be a very difficult one. [2:43:10] But nonetheless, it's one that work is going on. [2:43:12] There was a meeting late last week in the UAE, which I think for the first time in many years was trilateral, involved the U.S. presence. [2:43:18] Jared was there and Steve Woodcoff were there, along with representatives of Russia and Ukraine. [2:43:23] They were going to follow up talks again this week in that regard, bilateral. [2:43:27] There might be a U.S. presence, but it won't be Steve and Jared. [2:43:30] And we continue to try to move that forward. [2:43:32] I want to speak in frankness with you. [2:43:34] Some of this stuff that's being talked about, it's easier for the parties engaged. [2:43:38] It's easier for the parties engaged. [2:43:40] It's easier to find flexibility on some of these matters if they're not being deliberated in the public on a constant basis. [2:43:46] Because it creates political pressures internally on both sides. [2:43:50] As you can imagine in Ukraine, the notion that you would even consider a change in land after all that's gone in the war, it's difficult. [2:43:58] And in the case of Russia, they've been telling their people for two and a half years that they're winning this war overwhelmingly. [2:44:03] So people are going to wonder why are we giving up land if we're winning so strongly. [2:44:07] So there's some dynamics there at play that are important. [2:44:09] But I think if you need more information on that, we'll provide it. [2:44:12] Just know that this has been so fluid that an update like the one I just gave you could be outdated in 72 hours if some new development occurs. [2:44:19] But your point is taken and we'll be responsive to that. [2:44:22] I appreciate that. [2:44:23] I think the other point of a hearing is it gives people a chance to ask questions that we're hearing, as you know, from our constituents, from other people, and try and get answers. [2:44:33] And I appreciate that it's a changing dynamic and that that's always going to be the case. [2:44:37] And that there are issues. [2:44:38] I know that there are issues on both in Ukraine and in Russia with respect to what comes out in public. [2:44:45] But given the amount of money that the United States has put into supporting this effort, given the support among the American people and given the support in Congress, it seems to me that we owe people the ability to have a public hearing and to ask questions. [2:45:02] Thank you. [2:45:03] Thank you. [2:45:04] I appreciate that. [2:45:05] Secretary Rubio, I don't answer this question. [2:45:08] I don't feel it's appropriate. [2:45:09] But did I understand you to say that the portion of the discussions regarding settlement in Ukraine, regarding security for Ukraine, are essentially agreed to by both sides? [2:45:22] Because that's news to me and it's a big news item if that's a fact. [2:45:27] Well, I think you could argue they're agreed to from our side of the equation. [2:45:32] There's obviously a Russian dynamic at play here. [2:45:34] Of course, any security guarantees would come into play after the conference. [2:45:37] Of course. [2:45:39] And so there's that component to it. [2:45:41] But the broader point I was making is that in all these discussions about security guarantees that people are putting out there, it's pretty clear that the only security guarantee that people keep pushing forward is one that involves a deployment of some European troops on the ground but with a very strong U.S. backstop. [2:45:57] My point being, it was in the broader context of the NATO alliance, and that is we have to understand that even something like that in Europe, they don't have the capabilities of doing a real security guarantee. [2:46:08] Without a U.S. backstop, which tells you the capability gap that needs to be closed. [2:46:14] And it's one of the reasons why the President keeps pointing to NATO and its need for our partners to get stronger. [2:46:19] And it is true. [2:46:20] They've committed to 5% spending. [2:46:21] That's obviously going to take some time. [2:46:23] But that's really the broader point I was trying to make in that regard. [2:46:26] But every notion of security guarantee that's been talked about and that the Europeans have pushed is one that requires a strong commitment by the United States as a backstop, which, you know, in essence means we would be committed. [2:46:37] Right. [2:46:38] Potentially in a conflict, in a future conflict. [2:46:42] And that's something that I think needs to be understood in the context of what I've just described as the problems with NATO capabilities. [2:46:48] Very clear. [2:46:49] Thank you very much. [2:46:50] Thank you again for your time. [2:46:52] I'm going to leave the record open until close of business tomorrow. [2:46:55] If there are questions, I'd appreciate it if you'd assist in getting answers to those questions. [2:47:01] Great job. [2:47:04] Thank you for spending the time with us. [2:47:06] We sincerely appreciate it. [2:47:08] American people are lucky to have you as the Secretary of State. [2:47:11] And with that, the meeting is adjourned.