Somaliland and the Changing Geopolitics of the Red Sea: By Michael Rubin

[00:00:00] Speaker 1: As-salamu alaykum wa-rahmatollah wa-barakatu. Good evening to everyone. On behalf of Hargaisi Debates, my great pleasure to welcome you all to tonight's discussion. We are honored by your presence and grateful that you have joined us for what promises to be a timely and thought-provoking conversation. As Hargaisi Debates, we believe that meaningful dialogue is one of the strongest foundations for informed decision-making, stronger institutions, and a more engaged society. Our mission is to create a platform where diverse perspectives can be shared openly and respectfully on issues that shape our country and the wider region. Tonight, we are especially privileged to host Mr. Michael Rubin, a distinguished scholar and foreign policy expert who has written extensively on international affairs, security, and the Horn of Africa. Over the years, Mr. Rubin has also become a respected friend of Somaliland through his consistent interest in the region, his engagement with Somaliland's democratic journey, and his willingness to contribute to informed discussions about its future. We are equally honored to be joined by Director-General Mohamed Abdir-Rahman from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Bashar Awil, who will moderate this evening's conversation and deliver the closing remarks, and Mr. Max Webb from the Israel Policy Forum and his friends. This evening is an opportunity not only to listen, but also to engage. Following the keynote address, Ambassador Bashar Awil will lead a moderated discussion with Mr. Rubin, after which we will open the floor for the questions from the audience. We hope tonight's dialogue will deepen our understanding of the issues before us, encourage constructive debate, and strengthen the culture of open discussion that Hargeysa Debates seeks to promote. Thank you once again for joining us, without further delay, it is my pleasure to invite the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mohamed Abdir-Rahman, to deliver his opening remarks. Thank you and enjoy the evening. [00:02:10] Speaker 2: Thank you very much. Bismillah ar-Rahim. I am also truly honoured and privileged to join you here to Hargeysa Debates, which I think is my first time, the same as Michael Rubin, even though I should have been here. And I have been invited a number of times in the past, but I highly, highly appreciate the important work you are doing. And I think, as you rightly put it, that it is important that we have thought-provoking discussions on issues around us, around the region and beyond. And it is much more important to hear from people like Michael Rubin, who has extensively written about Somalian, who has extensively supported Somalian's cause, and who has, or who is considered a true friend of Somalian. I came here to just open, but also to listen. I don't have a lot to contribute because it's so much important for all of us to listen his insights and what suggestions he has for us. But we also know that the region, the Red Sea, is just more than a trade route. It's becoming a security destination. It's becoming a security place where international and regional access are competing. And Somalian cities in this strategic position. We need to understand how we can better position ourselves, how we can harness, and how we can see that it's just more than a geography. We also know that Somalian's best practices and attributes relates to our democratic governance, our democratic credentials, our stability, and our economic opportunities that we have established in the region of Ghana, Africa, we also need to understand why this is important at this critical time. I would like to welcome, I think, Michael Rubin once more to visit Hargeisa, not only this time, but keep on coming back. Because you will see and you will hear that Hargeisa has changed, that young people in Somalian and our retainees from many parts of the world are engaging. Thank you very much and welcome. [00:04:48] Speaker 1: Thanks to the DG for his remarks and I would like now to welcome Mr. Michael Rubin and Ambassador Bashaawin to the stage. Sorry to start our conversation. [00:04:58] Speaker 3: Good evening, everyone. Thank you very much for all of you attending the Hargeisa debate tonight. And as the team have explained it, tonight we have Michael Rubin who is going to give us a presentation. And after that, we will move into the moderating session and the QA. So the floor is yours, Michael. [00:05:18] Speaker 4: Thank you so much, Ambassador. First of all, I'm thrilled to be here at the Hargeisa debates and I'm thrilled to be considered a friend of Somal land. But one also has to say that I'm not a friend of Somal land in isolation. I wouldn't be able to do what I have learned, not only because of my friends here, but by the many academics in Washington and elsewhere who have paved the road for Americans and others to engage with Somal land. People like Peter Pham, for example, or Matt Bryden, or Josh Maservi. The fact of the matter is, and what I constantly try to remind people, especially Somali diplomats in Washington, is while Somali diplomats in Washington may have to rely on lobbyists, Somal land can rely on friends and friends don't cost any money. At any rate, I'm a historian by training, which means I get paid to predict the past. And my critics would say I only get that right about 50% of the time. But I'm not going to repeat the history that everyone knows or the arguments that everyone knows. I'm not going to discuss the legality of Somal land's union with Somalia. Simply put, if repetition could bring repetition, that would have occurred many times over. And so while all those historical cases are important, and they're important to educate Americans, Canadians, Europeans, and the non-Somal land audience, I have traditionally operated in the realm of U.S. national security policy. And in U.S. national security policy, the emotionalism of a case often isn't the primary driving factor, nor, frankly, is the legality, the historical legality of the case necessarily the most important factor. One of the items that many in Africa and the Middle East find frustrating when it comes to the United States and the United States way of policy is while in Somaliland, for example, people have a long sense of history. And in the Horn of Africa, people have a long sense of history. Americans, essentially, ancient history starts four or maybe eight years ago. And therefore, whether one is a Democrat or a Republican, there's a conceit in Washington that one can enter the White House and have a blank slate as if there is no precedent to history and as if the public record simply has never existed. And that can be frustrating, for example, when people working on Somaliland policy don't know anything about the Isak genocide. But, of course, Somaliland isn't the only country that suffers this. The same thing holds true with Iraq or Iran or Afghanistan or India or what have you. Now, there's two crucial tests on the Red Sea right now, and they both revolve around Berbera. Now, Berbera's strategic importance is quite obvious. And again, I don't need to repeat what has already been discussed. What I want to try to do is outline some of the strategic thinking in Washington or some of the arguments that people in Somaliland might make in order to advance some of the debates and break through the impasses in the discussion in Washington. So, the two issues that are important with regard to Berbera and the Red Sea, number one is the Djibouti issue, and that, of course, is intricately interwoven with China. And the second issue is the Houthis. Now, when it comes to Djibouti and China, there's obvious competition here, and the competition isn't just China versus Taiwan, but it's also the fact that Djibouti revolves around its port. I mean, its port, of course, started as a coaling station that was established in opposition to the British coaling station at Aden. And without that port, Djibouti really has very little economically going for it. So, rather than compete with Berbera, they simply would rather try to avoid having that competition begin in the first place. And so, you have the, if you will, the new Cold War with China and the United States, China, and Taiwan, but at the same time, you have plain and simple commercial interests, and international businesses play dirty, plain and simple. I'm much more concerned right now, first of all, personally, I think that Berbera can out-compete Djibouti, and we increasingly see this in neutral rankings from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. When it comes to the Houthis, I have much more worry. Of course, we talk about the Houthis today in the context of the U.S. war with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and most recently, with the Houthis' threats to close the Strait of Hormuz and to blockade Saudi shipping. Now, of course, when you look at the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, that's something which has profound economic repercussions. Certain countries have very little alternative, especially, for example, Bahrain and Kuwait. But Saudi Arabia has the East-West Petro Line, which has been reconfigured and can ship 7 million barrels per day of crude, mostly to the port of Yanbu, 5 million of which can be exported, 2 million of which, 2 million barrels per day. So, Saudi Arabia has the East-West Petro Line, and Saudi Arabia has the capacity to refine itself. Now, there's two problems with Yanbu. Number one, if you ever have the opportunity to fly over it, it's lit up like a neon light against a black background, against the desert at night. Now, when I talk to Saudi security officials, because of the Sudan War, because of other instability in the region, the International Air Corridor goes down the Red Sea. Basically, a plane, a passenger plane, that is hijacked and diverts from the International Air Corridor could hit Yanbu in 90 seconds, which means that it's an incredibly difficult problem for the Saudis, because they only have 90 seconds to decide if a plane starts to veer off its intended course. And, I mean, this is an incredibly difficult problem set, which involves the Houthis. The other issue that involves the Houthis is it's not just the Bab al-Mandad. One of the problems that many analysts have been tracking is the increasing relationship of the Houthis to General Burhan in, especially in and around Port Sudan. And the reason why this is important is if you're doing counter-Houthi operations near the Bab al-Mandad, but the Houthis are either launching, laying mines or launching drones from Daos launched off Port Sudan, then this becomes a problem 600 kilometers north of the Bab al-Mandad. Now, the one concern, the overriding concern I have about the Houthis, I spent part of last summer in South Yemen. And I was working with, not working with, I was, I mean, operating with, doing research with the southern forces to survey the lines they have with the Houthis and to talk about them, to talk with the southern forces and other Yemenis about the problems they face. And, of course, about 30 some odd years ago now, even though I've forgotten most of my Arabic, I had studied Arabic in Sana'a, Yemen. Because how time flies, at the time in the early 1990s, when people would want to study, when Americans would want to study Arabic, they would go to either Syria or Yemen. Now, of course, things have changed. At any rate, while I've spent time in southern Lebanon and in the West Bank and Gaza, I would argue that Hezbollah and Hamas are artificial and can't survive the Islamic Republic of Iran. I spent some time interviewing former Hezbollah members in Nabataea, which is in southern Lebanon. And when they stopped getting paid in dollars and started getting paid in Lebanese pounds, 90% of them said, this isn't worth it anymore, we're going home. 10% were the ideologues who have kept on fighting. The problem with the Houthis is that they have a legitimacy that predates the Islamic Republic of Iran. When Americans talk about the Houthis, we often talk about them in terms of being an Iranian proxy. When Yemenis talk about the Houthis, even southern Yemenis, they look at them as a historical continuity that comes from the imamate that dominated Yemen in the 1950s and before, before the Yemeni Civil War. And what that means in practice is if the Islamic Republic fell, the Houthis aren't going to go away. And for Somaliland, this means that Berbera and Somaliland's geopolitical importance are going to continue to be important. Now, while I have never served in the U.S. military, I've spent a good deal of time in and around the military. Not only working in the Pentagon during the Iraq War, but where I gained much more education was when I started teaching for the U.S. Navy. Whenever an aircraft carrier or an amphibious assault ship would depart Norfolk, Virginia to go across the Atlantic Ocean or depart San Diego to go across the Pacific, I would travel with it either to a place like Rota, Spain, where I would helicopter off or to the first port of call. Now, one of the things, when I was on these ships, depending on weather, depending on exercise, I might be on the ship for about three weeks. Now, over the course of those three weeks, I would witness an operation, which the U.S. Navy does, which few other militaries can. It's called a replenishment at sea. Basically, what that means is when a U.S. ship, including an aircraft carrier, aircraft carriers might operate with nuclear power. But all the planes on the aircraft carrier operate with jet fuel, and that jet fuel is limited. For U.S. ship, for U.S. pilots to fly, they need to have a certain amount of takeoffs and landings every week. They can't simply sit and not practice while they cross the Atlantic or the Pacific. And so what this means is, regularly, U.S. Navy ships, aircraft carriers, amphibious assault vessels, need to have refueling done. And I can also tell you, having been on ships where, because of storms and weather, replenishment was delayed, that things get pretty miserable when you no longer have fresh fruit or fresh vegetables, or you're eating canned tuna fish three meals a day, several days each week. And so, replenishment at sea also includes how the ships are supplied. Now, again, I'm an Iran watcher by training. I'm not an Arabic speaker anymore. I'm a Persian speaker. In Iran, and I used to live in Iran. In fact, my Iranian friends still refer to me in Persian as "Pesari Shaitani Bozorg," or in Arabic, "Ibn Shaitani Akbar." The point of this is that when—I mean, I follow the Iranian press, and about a week ago, the Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araqchi, gave an interview in Persian, which was very informative, and one of the things he talked about was why the Islamic Republic of Iran had attacked Oman recently. And he said that there was a specific Omani company, which was servicing American ships. The question—and therefore, even though Oman is an ally of Iran—Iran decided to—I forget whether it was a missile or a drone, but they attacked the company. The response was that the company stopped, told the Iranians that they would no longer support American ships. The point of this is, in Yemen, the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Manda, where are American ships going to get supplied from? So suddenly, Berbera becomes much more important, as well as the corridor to Ethiopia, in terms of fresh food, in terms of soft drinks, in terms of paper for copying machines on the ships, because any military is a bureaucracy and they all need their memos. [00:21:26] Speaker ?: And so forth. [00:21:26] Speaker 4: And so, for that reason, Berbera has much more strategic importance now. And the question, then, to ask the State Department or to talk to the AFRICOM, quote-unquote, office, which is here, is about replenishment at sea. That's the one need which Somaliland can now fill. And if Somaliland doesn't do it, Kenya can. But why should you default to Kenya? The other issue coming up has to do -- and, by the way, one other issue I would be pressing would be port calls. When I talk to Edna, for example, she remembers back in the day, when American ships would come and dock in Berbera. When you do that, it often takes -- it also takes practice. How you actually -- I mean, practice on the part of the port in Berbera, but also on the part of the U.S. Navy. How do you approach the port of Berbera? How do you pull up to the dock? All of this takes practice. And if you can start with a small American ship and just let the American servicemen go see Lascaux, or what American servicemen often like to do, go and paint a school or do some sort of community service project, trust me, they're just going to be glad to get off a ship. And if they happen to eat camel along the way, they'll be happy. Anything's better than tuna fish. Now, the other issue, of course, is Bosasa and Puntland. But as ships are increasingly being diverted away from the Red Sea and even Yanbu, most of Saudi oil is sent to Asia, to China, which means if they want to go through the Bab al-Mandab from Yanbu, they're still going to have to suffer the Houthis. So some of them go through the Suez Canal and go all the way around. This has started the problem of piracy again. And so one of the issues which Somaliland can once again sell themselves on is how they are a bulwark against piracy. And unfortunately, while perhaps I believe in a more cooperative relationship with Puntland than many people in Somaliland do, it's still a problem which Puntland has had trouble addressing. And Puntland, let's face it, has at times been complicit in financing the piracy operations. Now, the other point I want to bring up is Greece and Cyprus. I was talking to a senior Greek official, and they were explaining, and the reason I bring up Greece and Cyprus is because, of course, Greece and Cyprus are important for the international shipping and cargo trade. The insurance for ships is normally 0.3% of the value of the cargo which that ship is holding. Because the Iranians and the Houthis have been targeting Greek and Cypriot ships, the average insurance rate for a Greek or Cypriot ship is around 1.2% the value of the cargo. And so this has commercial ramifications if Russians can ship things for one quarter of the insurance price of a Greek or Cypriot ship. Now, I've had conversations with Greek and Cypriot diplomats and politicians because I do work a lot on the Eastern Mediterranean. And they are allergic to Somaliland. And the reason I bring this up is because many of the people who are most optimistic about Somaliland and understand the value of its democracy and its achievements are normally on the same side as Greece and Cyprus. The Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqi Kurds, the Armenians, the Israelis, and so forth. But Greece and Cyprus have taken a hard line against Somaliland. And when I talk to them, they say it's simple. On one hand, we sympathize. But on the other hand, we don't want Turkey using recognition of Somaliland, even if it means just interaction at a conference as being an excuse to harden their position on the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. What this means for Somaliland diplomatically is it's a clear problem. And if you have a clear problem, you need a focus. So what is the argument that's being made repeatedly that Somaliland is not the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus? Somaliland is a completely democratic, but it's like Eritrea. It had a previous history of independence, of being an entity, whereas the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is like Donetsk or Luhansk, which are the Russian puppet states in Ukraine. To make an argument that Somaliland should have the confidence to say, and the Greeks and the Cypriots should have the confidence to say they are not analogous and you can work with us and it's important for your shipping. Now, what gives me hope is while the Turkish and the, I'm sorry, when the Greek and the Cyprian politicians are allergic to Somaliland, the congressmen who are part of the Hellenic, of the Greek caucus in the US Congress are much more flexible. And so one of the reasons why I'm looking forward to the forthcoming rumored trick of President Eero would be that engagement can go beyond just the usual suspects to break new diplomatic ground. Because as I've written recently, the likelihood of Somaliland rejoining, the likelihood of Texas rejoining Mexico is probably higher than the likelihood of Somaliland rejoining Somalia. But the last issue I would talk about before concluding is I really do believe that Egypt is a key factor and Egypt, like Greece and Cyprus, is one problem set that needs to be won over. I mean, to be blunt, when we see this growing Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia alliance, de facto if not formal, it becomes a major problem. And I've had discussions with the Egyptians, both the Egyptian military, Egyptian diplomats and Egyptian intelligence, basically arguing that when Egypt supplies Somalia with weapons, of course, of course, as you can see, of course, of course, of course, of course, of course, that's what's going on in the first place. [00:29:56] Speaker ?: So, given the fact that Hassan Sheikh Mohammed couldn't walk 100 meters from the Villa Somalia because he doesn't control that anymore, that Al-Shabaab runs Mogadishu. [00:29:56] Speaker 4: So, given that problem, then any weaponry going to Hassan Sheikh Mohammed is either going to the Turks or going to Al-Shabaab after some time, and then it can leak back and cause blowback in Egypt. Now, the reason why Egypt is acting in what I would argue is clearly a counterproductive way is because of their obsession with Ethiopia. And I don't need to go into the basics of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam or anything like that. The point here, however, is, I mean, the Somalilanders have a case that Egypt could gain much more influence, including Ethiopia, by working with Somaliland, by co-opting Somaliland, by making Somaliland the new Switzerland, the country where the diplomacy happens, than trying to force very sharp divisions in the Horn of Africa in a way that frankly won't work. Let me just conclude by mentioning Winston Churchill. And as an American standing up on the stage, some of you may know the quote, others don't. But Winston Churchill was once asked about the American way of foreign policy. And what Churchill responded is the Americans always do the right thing. They just try everything else first. So as we look at the situation right now, let's hope that the Americans are working through our pattern of trying schemes that will never work. And finally, we recognize that the only way moving forward for American strategic interests is recognition of Somaliland. And the fact that that coincides with Somaliland's historical and legitimate and democratic aspirations is all the better. But with that, thank you. [00:32:12] Speaker 3: Thank you, Michael, for the wonderful presentation. You've covered a lot and given us plenty to think about. I believe the first time we met was in Nairobi back in 2019, the Somaliland Investment Forum. That time we were talking about the investment that DP World has made in Berbera as well as the airport. It's been seven years since then. How much do you think that investment that's been made in the port of Berbera as well as the Berbera airport is helping the Somaliland case? [00:32:51] Speaker 4: It's been helpful. It's been helpful. Obviously, it hasn't resolved the problem now. I'm frustrated at the lack of civilian utility of the Berbera airport. At the same time, however, the Berbera airport has and the Berbera port are what first attracted the attention of the American strategic community. And then once the Americans come, they learn about everything else. And so that only solidifies the case. Of course, with the Berbera airport now, it also raises the issue of the airspace. And I, for one, as someone who obviously wasn't born in Somalia, came in along with many others here through Jigjiga, simply because of the unjust attempts to control Somaliland's airspace. What I would always advise is that Somaliland make the case that it's not just about Somaliland, it's about the precedent. So, for example, if China gets away with trying to control Somaliland airspace, are they going to do the same thing with Eswatini? Or in South America, one country which is becoming increasingly important to American national security is Paraguay, which recognizes Taiwan and also has its embassy in Jerusalem, Israel. But can China try to deny airspace and transit into Paraguay, which is a landlocked country? In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Turks have gotten into the act. And whenever they are upset with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Soleimaniya, they will deny overflight rights for any aircraft landing. And the same thing is true. We've seen Recep Tayyip Erdogan do this with planes carrying Israeli ministers and so forth. But if the United States doesn't, I mean, the State Department may look at Somaliland and talk about the one Somalia policy, which, by the way, has never been written. And if you look for its origin, it's simply a fantasy. But the important thing is to make Americans understand it's not just about Somaliland. It's about the international law and international order. And I'll be much more succinct on other questions. [00:35:41] Speaker 3: Okay. Thank you. You also mentioned about the, you know, how our region is changing and how the geopolitical landscape is shifting. You mentioned the problem of the Babylonian Strait of Hormuz, the problems with Iran and as well as the Houthis. You know, the Chinese factor in the Djibouti. How is, you know, this, how can Somaliland, you know, approach in a way that's helping its case when you see this geopolitical shift that's happening around it? In other words, how can the Somaliland maximize with this geopolitical shift that's happening? [00:36:21] Speaker 4: Okay. I mean, first of all, the real, the treasure of Somaliland are its diaspora in the United States and elsewhere. And I would, I always tell Somalilanders two things. First of all, Somaliland politics belong in Somaliland. They don't belong anywhere else. And so if you're in Columbus, Ohio, or if you're in Minneapolis, Minnesota, it doesn't matter which Somaliland political party you might be from. The only thing you should talk about is the case for Somaliland. And then the second part of that is every time you write an article or you participate in a Somaliland listserv where the only audience are Somalilanders, it's a wasted opportunity. The key is to educate people who aren't Somalilanders, who don't know about Somaliland, because when people understand the logic and not only the historical justice of Somaliland, but what it could mean for American national security and partnerships, then, I mean, people are astounded. Seldom in international relations are their magic formulas. But Somaliland and all of its achievements certainly represent one of them. [00:37:52] Speaker 3: Thank you. One more question that I have, and that's to do with the U.S. And I guess everyone here wants to hear your view of the U.S. policy towards Somaliland. You've obviously written a lot about the U.S. policy towards Somaliland. How do you see that policy evolving over the next few years? Okay. [00:38:15] Speaker 4: I think Somaliland has made a great deal of progress. And I would be remiss if I didn't call out and publicly mention Bashir Ghoth, who is the Somaliland representative to the United States. I should say I don't know when Bashir sleeps because I can send him a signal at 3:00 in the morning and I'll get a response at 3:05. I mean, the fact of the matter is the man is constantly awake and is extraordinarily active. What we need to do, and also I should say the man is extraordinarily, he's not just an ambassador of the Somaliland state. He's an ambassador of culture as well, which is hugely important. Now, when it comes to the U.S., the positive issue is the inroads that Somaliland has made in Congress, and with the Pentagon, and with various security and intelligence agencies. What needs to be worked on is that the congressional relations with Somaliland can't afford to be dominated by a single party. I happen to be a Republican, but it's just as important that the Democrats come to appreciate what Somaliland has achieved. And so while the Republicans may want to talk about the Iran war or the strategic importance of Berbera, what you have achieved in terms of conservation at a time when you are besieged and when smuggling, for example, wildlife smuggling could bring financial gain. The fact is what you have achieved with the Cheetah Conservancy and what you've achieved with intercepting Falcons and what you've achieved in other ways is something which progressive Democrats need to hear about. And at the same time, also provides opportunities in the future with regard to ecotourism and so forth. I know that Africa Parks, which run and govern many national parks across the continent, has been working with Somaliland, and Somaliland is making all the right steps. So that itself is hugely important. Now, when it comes to the state of the United States right now, the State Department is the impediment. The question is why. And a few names float. Some people will actually point their finger at the White House and say the problem is Seb Gorka, who is the senior director for counterterrorism. And they posit that Seb is afraid that if the United States recognizes Somaliland, Somalia will stop cooperating. But Seb, when I talk to him, swears that this is not his position and it's not him. Then the problem becomes the Africa Bureau in the State Department and the traditional groupthink. Again, like I said at the beginning, Americans think of history as not going back more than four years. And so a lot of diplomats are willing to talk about the one Somalia policy. But as Peter Pham often points out, it simply doesn't exist. Peter was working on Somaliland back in the 1990s. Challenge any diplomat to find where the one Somaliland policy is written and you're simply not going to find it. So part of this is educating the Africa Bureau and breaking through this inertia. And part of the problem also might be Marco Rubio. Because he may not see this as a priority. He doesn't want to rock the boat. But again, the key isn't simply throwing up your hands and walking away. No one said it was going to be easy. What you want to identify is who is the problem and then try to convince them. Now, I used to work for 22 years at a think tank called the American Enterprise Institute. And one of the people who was associated with the American Enterprise Institute was a former Supreme Court justice named Anthony Scalia, who was a conservative justice. And he had a quote which was up in the elevator in our building as a constant reminder. He said, I never attack people. I attack ideas because some very good people have bad ideas. And the goal is not to punish them, but to convince them. And so once you identify who the holdup is, then you need to be relentless with your arguments, never ad hominem, but your arguments about why they are wrong and Somal land is the way forward. [00:43:28] Speaker 3: So do you think at this point, the logical thing would be to engage the U.S. economically, security wise before going to the next step of asking recognitions? [00:43:41] Speaker 4: Yes. Yes. And by the way, one other problem, of course, is Turkey and President Erdogan's friendship with Trump. Let's put that aside for a second. While I, I mean, my personal desire would be to see Somal land independent tomorrow. [00:43:58] Speaker ?: Okay. [00:43:59] Speaker 4: But if we need to take a small step, personally, I'm against opening a U.S. consulate in Hargaisen. And the reason why I'm against this is a consulate answers to an embassy. And so if the embassy is still in Mogadishu, the people in Mogadishu would still control policy. I look instead to the model that the United States has with Taiwan, where we don't have a consulate in Taipei, despite our one China policy. But rather we have an American Institute. Which operates as a shadow embassy. But it's independent from our embassy in Beijing. And this way the Chinese can't pressure our policy on Taiwan. I don't want Somalia to be able to pressure our policy in Hargaisen. And Hargaisen. So I think we need a representation. The question then is a debate over the legal mechanism of that. And by the way, just tactically, if we start a debate where the question is consulate, office, or institute. That's positive because no matter which of those three it is, you're still talking about putting Americans formally here. [00:45:17] Speaker 3: And how much the efforts made by the Congress and the US Senate is paving the way for that forward, you know, in the coming years. [00:45:30] Speaker 4: The fact that Somaliland got mentioned in the National Defense Authorization Act, I think of 2023 or 2024, one of these defense laws, is hugely important. Because remember, the State Department doesn't make American foreign policy. It carries it out. The Congress makes foreign policy. And so if you can affect change in the Congress, and Congress can pass the right law, then the State Department, whether they like it or not, has to follow suit. [00:46:04] Speaker 3: Okay. Okay, let's take a pause and have a few questions from the audience. Please introduce yourself. Keep your questions brief, so we can hear from as many people as possible. We don't have a lot of time, so I'm just going to try and give everyone a chance. We have a mixed audience between young, old. [00:46:26] Speaker 5: My question is something that I asked the late president, Regal, when he was a president, before the Houthis even were in a discussion. That if we wanted to be in the picture, let's make some of the S&M disabled people carry out, not a high tacking, but actually, real bombing of the Saudi fuel tanks. Then we will be recognized as a factor to record. Now, the Houthis are doing what I was talking about in 1993, because they are bombing all the ships around to be recognized as a factor. You know, that matters, and they are becoming a real, real issue. So, my question to you, understanding Arabic, understanding diversity, understanding everything, what is the role of security issues Americans as a priority when it comes to issue of Somaliland? In terms of security, I'm not talking about any other issues. My second question will be your experience during the Balkan war. Germany recognized Croatia without waiting for Serbia, or waiting for the modern nation. Yeah. What is the hypocrisy between the European policy towards, you know, and the African, you know, policies towards an issue you have to wait for Somalia? Somalia will never recognize Somalia. She will never let go. We have 2005, fact-finding admission of the security of AU, which they are not using it, but other international community are also silent. Thank you very much. Excellent questions. [00:48:25] Speaker 4: When it comes first to security, I've always been critical in my writing of the United States rewarding countries for doing the wrong thing and ignoring countries that do the right thing. However, there are examples of East Timor, for example, which was able to achieve its independence, and with an independence leader that won a Nobel Prize without engaging in terrorism or attacking its neighbors. Rather, it went the other way around. And so, in this regard, I would actually argue that, on one hand, it's important to show yourself as a force for stability, but at the same time, I'm not a pacifist. You have every right to defend yourself and to make sure that you don't become martyred unnecessarily just because diplomats want to sit back and calibrate their policy to wishful thinking rather than reality. On the second issue, you know, I've written about this, and I agree with you, and I'm glad you brought this up. And the fact of the matter is, Germany caught the United States and others by surprise, which is one of the reasons why we had to scramble when Yugoslavia fell apart. But putting that history, and I agree with you on the hypocrisy. I'm not here to excuse it. What I would point out, and this is something to keep in mind with regard to the Iran War right now. When Bill Clinton launched the bombing of Serbia in 1999, he did so to protect the human rights of the Kosovar Albanians, who the Serbs were attacking. Now, when Bill Clinton made this announcement, he said under no circumstances would there be boots on the ground, the American colloquialism for putting troops into an area. And then after six weeks, as the Serbs kept attacking, Bill Clinton changed his mind and started talking about boots on the ground. And then it took some time to get American helicopters from Germany to Albania in order to participate in that mission. But ultimately, they went in and Kosovo became independent and separate. And the bombing in Serbia stopped. What's important to remember is when the bombing stopped in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian dictator, remained in power despite the American hope that he would be removed. But because the Serbian economy had been decimated and because many of Slobodan Milosevic's top supporters had been killed in the bombing, within a year he was ousted by his own people. And while Iran is not Serbian, one historical parallel I think about when I look at Iran now is Serbia where Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown by his own people after the bombing stopped. [00:52:00] Speaker 3: Before we move into the next question, I want to mention that we have Israeli policy forum group team here with us. Welcome. Welcome. And I would like to invite our speaker, Max Webb from this group. Max has been closely following the developments in the Middle East and in the Horn of Africa, and we are delighted to have him with us this evening. Max, can I invite you into the podium and say a few words? [00:52:31] Speaker 6: Hi, everyone. It's wonderful to be here tonight. This is my fifth time in Hargeisa, but my first time at the Hargeisa Debates. So I'm thrilled to be here and really grateful to be alongside such a powerhouse like Michael Rubin. And you mentioned that there were others that paved the way for you to be able to do this work. And for young researchers like myself, you are the one paving the way for us to be able to do this work. So we're really continuing this from generation to generation as we advocate for Somaliland's independence in Washington and across the United States. I also want to thank the people of Somaliland, one, for being friends of myself for many years. But since the recognition from Israel, I have felt so much warmth as a Jewish American, not just here in Hargeisa, where I've never felt more accepted as a Jewish American than anywhere else I've been in the world. But also in Washington and in the United States, seeing the people to people ties blossoming between our two communities is something incredibly beautiful. And at a time of rising anti-Semitism in the world and hate in the world, to have this as a model for peace and love, it means the world to me personally. I just actually left Israel Policy Forum a week ago because I'm going back to school to get my master's degree. But in my career so far, I have worked on Israeli-Palestinian issues primarily. And then on the side have been doing analysis on the Horn of Africa, Somaliland specifically, and Somaliland foreign policy. And it's one of my goals, as Michael also said, to ensure that in the United States, Somaliland remains a bipartisan issue. I think that is so important for the sustainability of Somaliland-U.S. relations to really get the most out of this relationship. As Michael mentioned, being a Republican, I am a young progressive Democrat. And I believe there's a great case to make for Democrats to support Somaliland across the political spectrum. And it thrills me to see the work that Bashir Gota is doing, engaging with people across the political spectrum. And the fact that we come from different annals of politics in the United States and are both here in support of Somaliland independence and finding strategies to further that message is just so important. So every year, in conjunction with the Hargeisa International Book Fair, I bring a group of young Americans who come from very different backgrounds to learn about Somaliland, to experience the culture, the hospitality, and then to go back to our homes and continue to spread the message. I also am trying to do this now with Israelis, now that Israel and Somaliland has a relationship. It is my goal to ensure that this becomes a multi-partisan issue in Israel. I want to make sure that people from all swaths of life in Israel, from the left to the right, understand the importance of this partnership. And I have many friends in civil society, NGOs, think tanks, etc. So hopefully we'll be seeing more from them in the coming years. But please find me after the program. I'd love to find ways to collaborate. I think it's helpful now that I don't have any official organizational affiliation, because I have a lot more freedom. I say the training wheels are off and I can really dive into this relationship building. But thank you for having me here and for having our group here. Thank you to Michael for this conversation, to everyone who's hosting us. And I've really appreciated and enjoyed the analysis. [00:55:49] Speaker 3: Before we let you go, Max, I want to just ask you one question. And that is, what's your experience like since you've been to Hargesa? [00:56:02] Speaker 6: My experience has changed a ton. I've always had a positive experience, I would say. There's no place in the world like Hargesa. When I speak to friends and family at home, they always say, "What the heck are you doing going to Somaliland? What is that about?" And that's why I want to bring my close friends here with me. And why I'm so lucky that I've been able to do that. Because when you come here, you feel how special the people are. How kind the people are. The ownership that people have over the national project. It's inspiring. It's something that I want to bring home. I love the food. I don't know why in the West we don't talk about Somali food more. It's delicious. It's better than all the rest of the African food. If I don't have Lachach and Sukkot every morning, I'm losing. And I really love it here. And to see the evolution of the city and the country over the past six years that I've been involved on these issues. Whether it's from infrastructure or restaurants or new businesses or new technology. Or my ability to publicly identify as an American Jew in Somaliland. Which I wasn't able to do five years ago. I went kind of Twitter viral for being Israel affiliated. And people didn't know what I was doing here. To now being welcomed on the street with people saying, "My Jewish brother, we love you. We are so happy that you are here. I mean, you are so accepted in this country." Has been a profound, profound transformation. So I am so happy to see where the next five, six years of this research takes me. And more the next step in relationship building with the people of Somaliland. So thank you all for having me, Mahat Saned. And it's great to be here. Thank you, Max. Thank you very much. As-salamu alaykum. [00:57:38] Speaker 7: Thank you, Michael Rubin, for being here. Quick question. And we shift the focus from the U.S. To our very, yeah, I don't know what to say. But our next door neighbor in Ethiopia. What are your insights on that? And please be more specific if you can. Thank you. [00:58:03] Speaker ?: What? [00:58:04] Speaker 4: Just what about it? What are your thoughts? Okay. Thank you very much. Thought number one is I worry about Ethiopia's internal security. For a long time I wasn't able to get a visa to Ethiopia because I was a little bit too critical at the prioritization of the use of force to force constitutional reform rather than doing it through the legislative body. I would hope that Abiy will have matured with time in terms of how he approaches the use of force versus how he approaches a more normal political coercion to affect change. The other thing that worries me in Ethiopia is the misjudgment about how some partners view Ethiopia. And when it comes to the president of Eritrea, for example, for Abiy to think that he is an equal in -- Abiy may think he is an equal. But when you look at the president of Eritrea, he doesn't look at Abiy as an equal. He looks at Abiy as someone who is much younger and much more junior and someone who shouldn't have the degree of respect, which Afwerki does -- Afwerki. And therefore, that misjudgment can sometimes open the door to further conflict. And so, look, I worry that -- I worry about Ethiopia. I also -- I mean, but that said, I mean, while Ethiopia once said that they wouldn't be the first country to recognize Somal land, but they wouldn't be the third country either. But unfortunately, that increasingly seems not to be true, as there's also a degree -- a lack of leadership. I think it's important to avoid using the word cowardice about actually doing the right thing and taking the moral stand that I think Ethiopia should take. [01:00:48] Speaker 8: Thank you so much, Mr. Rubin, for being here. My question is -- I mean, you're an American, so my guess is, of course, you would be advocating for the interest of the USA. But if you take that hat off for a minute, of course, the location that we are in, Somal land, is both a curse and also a benefit to some extent. And we've talked a lot about the benefits. But are there any, like, risks, you think, or like a line that you think maybe Somal land shouldn't cross for its own safety in the long term? [01:01:27] Speaker 4: Okay. That's an excellent question. I think the risks are pretty obvious given the neighborhood which you're in. What I always find frustrating in policy is what I would call self-deterrence, where you're so afraid of taking the risk or provoking a reaction that you end up remaining restrained in a way where you don't cover your goals. And the reason why this is dangerous is once your adversaries sense how worried you are, they exploit that. And so on one hand, you don't want to be reckless. But on the other hand, you don't want caution to be conflated with fear, because then adversaries will interpret that as something to exploit. So it's very, it's a very delicate balance. But this is also why, when I look at Bashi here, when I've met Mohamed Hagi before, also, of course, Mohamed Badawani, I see such capacity developing within the foreign ministry that gets stronger each and every year. And that's something that, with time, strengthens Somaliland, so it can act with the greatest nuance to its benefit in terms of this very difficult neighborhood. [01:02:58] Speaker 9: Thank you very much, Michael. A lot have been discussed about the strategic geography of Somaliland. And historically, we know that this geography attracted a lot of colonies in 1884, which split the Somali peninsula into five. Then we know that the main goal of the British administration in Somaliland was here. And after the independence, the British administration has gone. Somaliland got independence and recognition, joined it with Somalia. Then the government collapsed, everything finished. So, do you think that our strategic opportunity, after this new recognition, could create a kind of dependence on just ports, just like Djibouti? Because Somaliland has a lot to over, except the strategic port of Belgrade. We have mineralis, we have democratic values, we have other things that have not been discussed or discovered before. So, if the answer is yes, how can we avoid the dependence of just the strategic port of Belgrade. [01:04:10] Speaker 10: Thank you very much, Mr. Robin. My name is Mohamed Koudli. I'm an academic. I'm a former advisor at the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Former advisor of Somaliland, President and Special Envoy. I have been reading Somaliland and studying, actually, I did my PhD in 2019, about the Somaliland international recognition, sovereignty and democratization. And I really appreciate that the Hargeza Debate team invited me to give some comments on if I have any questions to you. I don't have much to say about it because a lot have been covered when it comes to Somaliland, when it comes to international recognition, democratization, sovereignty and all these questions. But when it comes to the changing geopolitics of the Red Sea, I'd rather say unchanging geopolitics because what was happening here for the last 35 years, ignoring Somaliland and Croatian. And at the same time, it's not actually changing, but whether we focus more on unchanging the Red Sea and unchanging the global political order. When you see the Somaliland question has been ignored for many, many years, especially from the West, either from the US, from the European countries and others. And I'd like to say it's actually thank you Israel for actually taking the lead of recognizing Somaliland. So then I would like to then put a question on that. Why more than 35 years plus that actually the the quote unquote international community or the West have been ignoring Somaliland when we feel all the criteria have been statehood and we have been doing surviving for more than 35 years plus without international recognition. Thank you. [01:06:18] Speaker 11: I just had a quick simple question. So how can Somaliland use soft power such as democratic credentials, stability and diaspora networks to strengthen its geopolitical relevance? [01:06:36] Speaker 4: I'll be very brief. I don't think the Somaliland is going to go the route of Djibouti with either over dependence on a single port or for that matter, over dependence on a single family. The fact of the matter is that isolation in some ways may have been an unlikely blessing for Somaliland because it allowed Somaliland to build up the capacity to handle a number of different industries with transparency. And the fact that Somaliland has established its own democratic legitimacy over the years has also created a culture and a political culture which is conducive. I should say that for a lot of the academics who are writing back in the early 1990s, one of the observations they had after the what was written about, the conference in Baroma, was that if cell phones had existed at that point, they weren't sure that Somaliland would have had successful compact which it had. Because diasporas at times can also be more radical and less pragmatic than people at home. And it was the lack of input at times on an hour by hour level from the diaspora that made some of the compromises possible. that led to the success of Somaliland. That said, it's clear Somaliland has growing capacity now. When it comes to the Red Sea, look, I'm not going to sit here and say that the West, the United States and so forth, ignored Somaliland for 35 years and then only Israel saw the opportunity. Look, in my case, I tried to get involved in Somaliland back in 2010 or so, and suddenly my emails were dropped and I never got responses. The fact of the matter is, and this was after friends of mine who were doing business here, I don't personally do business, but friends of mine said, you know I should come out and Somaliland at the time simply didn't seem to have the capacity, things got dropped. I should say that across administrations in Somaliland, the value of that engagement slowly became much more understood. At the same time, look, it's difficult. Because as the foreign ministry knows, lots of people would want to come here and they were essentially tourists with a backpack who had no intention of giving anything in return in terms of writing and so forth. And you always have to be cautious about that. That said, it took Somaliland a while to build up capacity, period. And momentum gathers. And then at the same time, it's not just all in Somaliland's control, some of it has to do with the opportunities that exist on the outside. In my case, while I was denied an ability to work with Somaliland back around 2010, 2011, I think around 2017, there were all these rumors that the Russians were going to try to get involved in the port of Zela. And I wrote a piece at the time, basically arguing from a very real politic reason, having been familiar with Somaliland from afar, that the United States should become much more involved before anyone else does. Because it's inevitable that someone's going to discover, quote unquote, discover Somaliland. And in this case, I got lucky because Bashir saw my article, called for a meeting, asked for a meeting, I had coffee with him, then I had coffee with him again, then I had coffee with him again, and the rest is history. With regard to the soft power issue, look, I gotta say, Edna is a one woman typhoon of soft power. And the fact that she has spent her Templeton Foundation prize money on expanding the hospital to give back, rather than on herself, is a story that also needs to be told. The fact of the matter is, you're doing all the right things on soft power. And I mean, the Abarso network has also been incredible when it comes to soft power. I only regret that right now the Trump administration has a visa ban that is undercutting, unjustly, Somaliland's ability to exercise that soft power. I was in Benghazi, Libya about two weeks ago, and what young academics in Benghazi were talking about is there's never been a Libyan student in the United States who has engaged in terrorism, or let alone really been convicted of a crime. There's been Saudis, there's been Pakistanis, and yet the Saudis and the Pakistanis are considered major non-NATO allies. So where's the logic in that when Somalia and Somaliland and Libya are banned, but the countries which participated, Egypt too, in the September 11th attacks are still welcome? And unfortunately, look, I'm not a diplomat, let's call it what it is, discrimination. And that needs, I mean, that goes for all of us Americans who are here to try to combat. [01:12:26] Speaker 12: Ruben, my question to you is, how much is the special relationship between the US and the UK beneficial to Somaliland's recognition? [01:12:38] Speaker 1: My question is something about something that you mentioned earlier, and that is the recent befriending between Turkey and, or the President of Turkey, Erdogan, and Donald Trump. We just seen last night, the comments from Donald Trump towards Erdogan, how could that influence the US-Somaliland relationship, knowing the engagement of Turkey in Somalia? [01:13:00] Speaker 4: Okay, great questions. I'll answer them briefly. Oh, okay. [01:13:04] Speaker 13: What's one thing you think Somaliland should be attached right now to make the most of this moment? [01:13:10] Speaker 14: Mr. Ruben, my question is, how do you feel about the British in terms of Somaliland has had a big expectation of the British. Somaliland feel that they fought and supported them during the Second World War. There is historic ties. Do you agree that we can say we expected a lot more from the British? And unfortunately, that didn't happen. [01:13:35] Speaker 4: Okay, great questions. Now I'll answer them. First of all, when it comes to the British, let me use the adage I used before about Anthony Scalia. Let's make it about countries rather than people. I won't attack countries, I'll attack ideas, because some very good countries have some very bad ideas. At this point, I think that the United Kingdom is on the wrong path. I think they're making a mistake. And ultimately, the goal is how to convince them they are making that mistake. When it comes to, and I should say this isn't the only place they're doing it, I have some trouble with the British, because in other places in the world, it seems that they have a sympathy, whether it's cynical or for whatever reason, with the Ikhwan, in a way that undercuts some of the more traditional Muslim communities across North Africa and elsewhere. So the British, I think, right now are on the wrong path in Somal land. That needs to be corrected. When it comes to Turkey, look, first of all, some of you may know that there's an $800,000 bounty on my head in Turkey, an actual arrest warrant, because I criticized Erdogan a little too much. And one of my Turkish friends told me a joke, which I'll repeat here, because you're intellectuals, about a Turkish academic, a Turkish professor, who went in, he made a tweet. And the tweet led to his being put in prison for 20 years, and on his first day in prison, he went into the prison library with a whole list of books, because he has 20 years to do where he has nothing to do but read. And he asked the prison librarian, do you have any of these books? And the prison librarian looks over the list and says, oh, I'm so sorry. We don't have any of these books. We only have the authors. And the fact of the matter is, sorry, because all the authors had also been arrested. The fact of the matter is, Turkey has changed considerably. What I would caution about, however, is while the United States is very bad at addressing ideology and addressing religion, because we have separation of mosque and state, and therefore our diplomats don't want to criticize someone like Erdogan, who is misusing religion. The fact of the matter is that the region is only going to know peace. And when I say the region, I'm not just talking about the Horn of Africa. When I'm talking about the Eastern Mediterranean as well, when Turkey is at peace, not only with its neighbors, but also with itself. And so, frankly, we need to quarantine and push back the ideology that Erdogan is spreading with the understanding that perhaps Erdogan is an anomaly, rather than necessarily the future of Turkey. Now, other questions. When it comes to what Somal land needs to do. Some of you may be familiar with Lech Walesa, who in 1981 was a Polish union leader in the dockyards of Gdansk, Poland. And he led something called the Solidarity Movement, which ultimately culminated in the fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Gulf. In 2006, on the 25th anniversary of Solidarity, I went to Poland for a conference, which was run by a colleague of mine named Radek Sikorski, who later became the foreign minister of Poland. And what this conference was about was the lessons learned about victory, because when Lech Walesa became president of Poland, he failed almost immediately. And we've seen this repeatedly in other countries, including arguably Ethiopia, that and in Eritrea, where you win a victory and then it goes bad because everyone is working so much on achieving the victory, the independence, the fall of the last regime, that they don't plan enough for the future. So what this conference involved were people from Zimbabwe, people from Iran, people from Cuba, talking with people from Poland, from East Germany, from Vietnam and others about how the problems they encountered when time changed. Now, I'm not here to be a tier leader for Somaliland, I'm an analyst. And so in answer to your question, which was an excellent question, Somaliland needs to be ready for the day after. And in my view, what is most important in being ready for the day after is addressing the problem of monopolies in the economy in order to pave the way for broader investment. Once Somaliland is on the international financial system, the SWIFT system and so forth. And it will take time. And I think it's inevitable. But I would argue that problems like this that people talk about openly here are problems that can't be deferred until you get your independence. The legal reforms and so forth need to occur now. The other issue I worry about is with regard to mobile money. I'm all for mobile money and what you've achieved with it. But I worry about regulation with regard to the record keeping. If anyone ever hacks or through cyber terrorism interferes with the systems so that there's not chaos, so that there's a record that as of three days ago, this is what everyone had in their account. Because you can imagine what could happen and the vulnerability if that's not addressed. It's not addressed. [01:19:53] Speaker 3: We still have time for a few more questions. That's what I've been told. So anyone else? I have to say this is far more engaging forum than I've been to and I've been to many forums, Michael. Thank you. Yeah, so credit to you. Okay. Sorry. So we have a slot to take three questions. Thank you very much, Michael. [01:20:26] Speaker 15: Thank you very much, Michael. I'm Yahya Mohammed. Sumerland Maritime Security Coalition Office Deputy Director. I have one comment, like a suggestion and a question. First, of course, the Sumerland part of the recognition case have been, you know, like articulated well. Sumerland has now shifted claiming or arguing that it is morally, you know, like legally viable for recognition and also their independence and historical for building a state, being democracy for over three decades, as well as like conducting free and fair elections and credible peaceful transfer of power. It now shifted this foreign policy to more on, you know, like, arguing that Sumerland lies a strategy location, as you said before, and you are treated that well. And also it is available resources that can lead to, you know, like aligning with U.S. and, you know, like foreign policy for mutual benefits for the resources and also controlling 850 kilometers of sea, which is safe now. And there is no terrorist activities, although the emerging activities of terrorism is really, you know, like happening in the Somali waters, Somali waters, but now Sumerland is safe. And also that's also an strategic opportunity that it can sustain. In short, my question is, if the United States could not take the bold decision of recognizing Somali land, can that be a leverage for other emerging global, you know, like powers, for example, we see in the banner, the global order is changing and shifting. In short, if the United States could not take that decision, this government or the next one, how can the other countries like China and others like Turkey could leverage and control the maritime, you know, like fatal maritime corridors including government? [01:22:38] Speaker 13: Okay. Thank you for being here. Thank you for being here. My name is Mohair. I would like to ask you, what would you like to recommend the Somali lands future towards regional competition, foreign interests and regional stability and how Somali lands balances it? Thank you for being here. Thank you for being here. [01:22:59] Speaker 16: There are recent, recently kind of cooperation between Houthis and Ash-Shabaab. So Houthis are transferring technology and drones to Ash-Shabaab. So I see it's kind of threat and the Houthis are also attacking, you know, Ash-Shabaab in the Persi and also attacking Israel. So since Somali land gets recognition from Israel, do you think Houthis will, you know, use Ash-Shabaab's leverage to attack Somali land? What's your opinion on that? [01:23:27] Speaker 4: Okay. Very good questions. First of all, there comes a tipping point that if the United States recognizes Somali land or frankly, if two or three other countries do, then I think that there's going to be almost on a weekly basis news of another country recognizing it. Most people recognize the justice of the Somali land case. And my response to Somali nationalists from Mogadishu is if you want Somali land to return to the Mogadishu fold, then you need to perform better than Somali land. But if Somali land is a democracy and an increasingly successful one, and Somalia is a kleptocracy, a failed state, no one's going to go back to that. And what I try to explain to American diplomats, to British diplomats, is forget the high politics of diplomacy. In the Horn of Africa, you don't have mortgages, meaning when you get married, when you buy a house, when you buy a business, you have to put all the money down at once and your family helps out. You can't borrow a million dollars from the bank and pay it back over 30 years. And so the way I always try to explain this to American officials is if you are a small lander and your family has scraped and sacrificed to allow you to get married, to start a business, to buy a house. No one is going, no American diplomat is going to convince you to take the risk to subordinate yourself to a country without financial law, to essentially a foreign country. And once they see things through that more realistic lens, they really don't have an answer for how they can expect Somali land to join with Somalia. When it comes regionally to stability, I mean, frankly, I see Somalia lands independence as a force for stability in the region. Some people will talk about changing borders, but the fact of the matter is your borders are already set by treaty and recognized in 1960 by all five UN Security Council members and 25 other countries. Now, even if that weren't the case, East Africa has always been the exception. So you look at Eritrea, you look at South Sudan. The fact of the matter is that I do think that this will stabilize. And when I was talking before about self-deterrence, this is what the United States and the State Department and Africa Bureau do, fearing that if they recognize Somal land, that it could lead to greater violence from Mogadishu. And the fact of the matter is Mogadishu, A, can never be appeased. B, this greater Somalia ideology has always led to war and bloodshed. And we can go back to the Ogadan War on that one. And we can go back to claims that proponents of greater Somalia have with regard to Kenya and with regard to Djibouti. When it comes to the Houthis, look, this is a worry about which you also need to be prepared. I mean, if the Houthis are able and willing to attack Saudi Arabia, and they have hundreds of times, it's a danger that, of course, everyone in power in Somal land is deeply concerned about. And while I'm not privy to even a small portion of the discussions, I know from my American sources that behind the scenes, the Somal land government has been working overtime to address this issue. And because you're not the first person to raise this question, and people have, I mean, people are very concerned about this. Again, going to self-deterrence, if you simply stand down and let the Houthis grow more powerful, eventually they are going to try to bully or attack Somal land. Because fundamentally there's an ideology at play that can't be negotiated away. [01:28:05] Speaker 3: So I think we are coming towards the end of the program. And as we came to the end of the evening's discussion, I would like to thank Michael Rubin for sharing his time and his experience as well as his perspective. It's always been a pleasure to have and to participate in forums like this. And thank you again. I would also like to thank Max Webb for his valuable discussions and the opportunity to give us his perspective of Somal land. We hope that you will come back, you and your team as well. But most importantly, I would like everyone to give an applaud to the Hargeza Debate for putting together a wonderful event. Thank you very much. They really exceeded beyond our expectations. I have participated many forums around the world. And to be honest, this really supersedes many of the international forums that I've been, especially with the audience and their participations and engagements with, you know, and interactions with Michael Rubin. Thank you all. I think we are coming towards the end of the program. We, you know, really have discussed a lot tonight. And Michael has explained how the geopolitical issues that are happening in Babylon and the street of Hermos is affecting the region. And most importantly, how is that going to impact in Somaliland. And we hope that, you know, the outcome of this discussion will be an opportunity for not only the government, but as Somalilanders to review and see what else can we do to maximize this opportunity. Because every crisis has an opportunity and I think this has an opportunity for Somaliland to make its case. So with that, let me say thank you all. Have a wonderful evening and good night. Thank you. [01:30:11] Speaker ?: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. It's a pleasure.