Senate Select Committee hosts open hearing on worldwide threats — NBC News

[10:58] putting them out of business but the war has revealed cracks in the Trump [11:02] coalition just yesterday a top US counterterrorism official who reports to [11:06] Gabbard resigned he pointed to the war in Iran the war is also sparking and [11:10] security concerns growing here and abroad State Department is ordering all [11:14] US embassies worldwide to immediately undertake a security review that's [11:19] according to a cable seen by NBC News let's bring in our Capitol Hill [11:23] correspondent Julie circuit so Julie right now we hear the ranking member [11:26] Senator Warner speaking in a moment we will hear from DNI Gabbard and we do [11:31] have an idea of what she's going to talk about it including the latest in Iran [11:34] what can you tell us we do her draft opening statement that we just obtained [11:38] is several pages but one thing that immediately stood out to me is her [11:41] mention of Iran you'll recall the last time that Capitol Hill had her in the [11:45] hot seat that senators and lawmakers had a chance to press her was nearly a year [11:49] ago where Tulsi stated that she did not believe that Iran was imminently [11:53] producing a nuclear weapon or trying to obtain one [11:56] later the administration pushed back today in her draft remarks she will say [12:00] that Russia China North Korea Iran and Pakistan have been researching and [12:04] developing an array of novel advanced or traditional missile delivery systems [12:08] with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland within range this [12:13] is exactly what the administration has been saying of course the underlying [12:17] reason for the start of this war in Iran is going to be something that Gabbard is [12:21] pressed on she also as you mentioned is going to face questions on Joe Kent this [12:25] is somebody that's [12:26] previously Gabbard had shared views with when it comes to Iran when it comes [12:30] to foreign interventionism after he had resigned over his disagreements with the [12:34] start of the war she posted a very lukewarm statement on X backing up the [12:38] president's strategy and so certainly this is something she's going to get [12:41] questions on today speaking of Mark Warner who is the top Democrat on the [12:45] Intelligence Committee he started his remarks talking about election [12:48] interference he's been talking since presumably about Iran about threats to [12:52] the homeland in light of the war starting overseas we've seen several [12:56] instances of that unfortunately but on election security he did say the Tulsi [13:00] Gabbard in her role as director of national intelligence should be focused [13:04] on protecting elections from foreign election threats or interference not [13:08] domestic he's referencing to those images we saw of Tulsi Gabbard down in [13:13] Georgia trying to examine election centers we also know that her office had [13:18] obtained voting machines from Puerto Rico and is looking over those as well [13:20] so Democrats taking issue with her role in that space especially given President Trump's election [13:26] denialism back in 2020 and so all of these things are going to be on the plate for senators today [13:31] yeah a variety of topics let's go to our senior national security correspondent courtney cuby [13:35] who's also standing by courtney when we talk about the war in iran we have to talk about [13:40] the intelligence and the information the u.s had to make the decisions to go to war what are you [13:45] watching for today i think the key question among a whole series of answers that we're hoping to get [13:51] today about iran is in fact the idea of imminence so we have now heard from president trump and some [13:58] of his senior national security officials that there that iran was planning an attack [14:03] either on the u.s israel allies in the region u.s assets in the region something but they keep using [14:10] the word imminent that something was it was pending and and was potentially going to present [14:16] a direct and real threat in a short period of time why that is so critical right now [14:21] it has been a question we've had since the day that this war started now two and a half weeks [14:25] ago but why it's so critical now is the resignation yesterday publicly of joe kent the head of the [14:31] national counter-terror center he specifically said that he had seen no information or intelligence [14:37] that indicated that an attack from iran was imminent i suspect that will be one of the [14:41] early questions that we'll get uh to director of national intelligence tulsi gabbard she tweeted [14:47] several hours after joe kent resigned and she said that it's [14:51] up to president trump to make make the determination about whether something is [14:55] imminent or not but i suspect the senators will try to drill down including who you're seeing [14:59] there on the screen right now senator warner i suspect he will be one of the earliest questioners [15:04] there and this is going to be a real point of contention throughout this it's not just that [15:09] we will get i anticipate that we will get questions about the remaining uranium stockpile [15:15] in iran throughout the course of this war so far the u.s has focused primarily on the more [15:21] traditional military strikes so the ballistic missiles the drones the mines we saw them [15:26] attacking uh cruise missiles uh anti-ship cruise missiles yesterday along the strait of [15:31] hormuz but we have not seen any strikes against the nuclear program and when the trump administration [15:36] continues to argue that they will not allow iran to have a nuclear weapon what does that mean how [15:43] will they accomplish that and i suspect that will be a part of what we hear here today as well joe [15:48] all right courtney and julie please continue to [15:51] listen to the president's opening statement [15:53] we will hear from dni gabbard giving her opening statement in a moment but first let's listen in [15:57] as senator mark warner wraps up his opening statement clearly something that's pretty damn [16:03] important right now we're dismissed because they had previously participated in the investigation [16:09] of the president's mishandling of classified information elsewhere the bureau's budget is [16:16] being slashed last year it cut over 500 million dollars with the largest decreases from cyber [16:24] counter-terrorism and counter-espionage [16:26] they're also being slashed by the bureau's board of directors and director of security [16:30] the bureau's board of directors and director of security are saying that they're not getting [16:33] scarce resources are being squandered on things like a 60 million dollar jet for the director's [16:38] personal travel so we can go golfing in scotland or parting with athletes in milan in fact according [16:44] to a whistleblower account those fights became so frequent they even delayed the bureau's response [16:50] to major incidents like the charlie kirk assassination or shooting at brown university [16:55] credible reports also indicate that highly trained fbi agents [16:58] and unprecedented use of personnel whose training intended are actually intended for hunting violent [17:05] criminals and neutralizing terrorists unfortunately this dysfunction has not been limited to the fbi [17:13] both the national security agency and the defense intelligence agency and this is no reflection [17:19] on the two gentlemen sitting in front of us were both left leaderless for months after the [17:24] president fired their directors one at the behest of a 9 11 conspiracy theorist and the other [17:32] in the black hole for providing a fact-based assessment that contradicted the president's [17:39] claims about obliterating iran's nuclear program clearly if the program had been truly obliterated [17:48] the president wouldn't be bombing again right now and again more than one-third of the personnel at [17:55] sisa created by congress to protect critical infrastructure like power water and election [18:00] systems have been forced out that seems like a real mistake as we still grapple with the intrusion [18:08] and the recent iranian cyber attack on striker and we are now seeing in real time the cost to the [18:16] state department thousands of american citizens were trapped in a literal war zone with little [18:22] assistance from their own government for a time those calling the state department hotline for [18:27] assistance were greeted with a pre-recorded message that said quote please do not require [18:32] rely on the u.s government for assisted departure or evacuation this was a foreseeable security [18:40] crisis when you start a war of choice when there was no imminent threat you should be able to [18:49] prepare to make sure you get americans out of the war zone that same attitude pushing some of our [18:57] closest friends into the arms of our most capable foes has profound consequences two of our most [19:04] significant allies canada and the uk are currently working to sign trade deals with china because [19:12] they no longer believe the united states is a dependable partner that's a remarkable [19:17] statement in 2026 and in the president's war of choice with iran a war that has already killed [19:25] 13 service members cost americans taxpayers billions of dollars and scrambled supply chains [19:33] from oil to fertilizer to aluminum nobody answered the call when the president asked [19:39] our allies to help reopen the strait of hormuz as the president's own counterterrorism chief [19:46] acknowledged in his resignation yesterday iran posed no imminent threat to the united states [19:53] unfortunately our allies have been alienated and distracted by the administration's unilateral [20:02] threats like invading greenland and the result is clear americans have been left more exposed [20:08] in an already dangerous conflict now what i say what i just outlined is quite a list and it's a [20:15] partial one at that matter of fact we've got a full list we'd like to share with all the press [20:19] so what does this all mean it matters because i believe the warnings contained in this year's [20:27] annual threat assessment [20:29] i believe our ic when they say the global security environment is becoming more complex [20:36] and that armed conflict is becoming more global and i also agree with the assessment when it says [20:42] that to succeed we must think prudently and prioritize our efforts on the topic of the [20:49] annual threat assessment i want to close where i began by noting that since the first time [20:55] since 2017 in the aftermath of russia's intervention in our 2016 elections the annual [21:04] injury policy for american elections has triggered public vegansans all over are [21:09] ef nut klatschter all across the world the actual threat assessment includes nothing nothing about [21:18] adversary attempts to influence american elections now i don't believe this omission means that the [21:24] threat has disappeared it means that the intelligence community is no longer being [21:29] allowed to speak honestly about it and it raises serious questions and i will be asking about the [21:35] your priorities director cavities in terms of what you're choosing to prioritize instead thank you mr. [21:39] I would simply like to remind members that we will handle questions as we did last year [21:44] seniority at the time of the gavel and [21:48] Alternating between Democrats and Republicans will have one round of questions seven minutes per round [21:52] I will not entertain questions after seven minute time has expired [21:57] Furthermore, I expect to convene the closed session in our usual location [22:02] promptly 30 minutes after the open session begins [22:05] Director Gabbard the floor is yours. Thank you chairman cotton by sure Warner members of the committee. Good morning [22:13] I'm here today to present the 2026 annual threat assessment joined by the directors of the CIA [22:20] FBI DIA and NSA [22:24] before I continue on behalf of the intelligence community want to extend our thanks to general Hartman for his [22:30] 37 years of service in uniform and closing out his 37 years with tremendous leadership of the [22:38] NSA this briefing is being provided in accordance with ODNI statutory responsibility [22:44] I'd like to remind those who are watching what I am briefing here today conveys the intelligence communities [22:50] Assessment of the threats facing the US citizens our homeland and our interests [22:54] Not my personal views or opinions in this assessment [22:59] We're following the structure of priorities that were laid out in the president's national security strategy [23:04] Starting with threats to our homeland and then shifting to global risks [23:09] the defense [23:10] Of our homeland is of the utmost importance to the American people and efforts by this administration [23:16] Have shown over the last year the results of bolstering homeland defense in the security of the American people [23:22] For example the strict enforcement of US policies at the US Mexico border and regionally have served as a deterrent [23:31] drastically reducing illegal immigration [23:33] Based on customs and Border Patrol data January [23:36] 2026 is monthly encounters are down [23:39] 83.8% compared to [23:42] January [23:43] 2025 [23:44] Encounters declined at 79% compared to 2024 the drivers of migration are likely to continue potential worsening instability in countries like [23:54] Cuba and Haiti risk triggering migration surges and [23:58] Smugglers who have long operated as transnational criminal organizations continue to view chaos as an opportunity for profit and [24:06] Will continue to look to profit from illegal immigration flows [24:11] these transnational criminal organizations [24:13] continue to pose a daily and direct threat to the health and safety of millions of US citizens [24:19] primarily indirectly by producing and trafficking in illegal drugs [24:23] Under President Trump's leadership fentanyl overdose deaths have seen a 30% decrease from September 2024 to September 2025 [24:33] President Trump's aggressive efforts to more directly and actively target these transnational criminal organizations and reduce the inflow of fentanyl precursors [24:42] Has already had a significant impact [24:44] which is likely to continue [24:46] We've seen fentanyl potency also decrease likely due to disruptions to the production supply chain [24:53] US efforts to work with China and India to halt the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals to North America are [25:01] demonstrating some improvement [25:02] But there is more work to be done as sadly there are still tens of thousands of fentanyl related deaths in America every year [25:11] Mexico based TCOs like the Sinaloa cartel and Jalisco new generation cartel dominate the [25:16] production and smuggling of fentanyl heroin [25:19] Meth and cocaine into the United States [25:23] Colombia based TCOs and illegal armed groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army are [25:30] responsible for producing and trafficking large volumes of cocaine to the US and European markets [25:36] With now some indicators of attempts to expand their market to the Asia Pacific region [25:42] Colombia remains the world's largest producer of cocaine and Colombian criminal groups have expanded their trafficking [25:48] relationships with [25:50] neighboring Ecuadorian and Brazilian gangs as you know [25:55] MS-13 is well established in cells within the United States and uses violence to an [26:00] intimidate the Salvadoran Diaspora [26:02] engaging in murder extortion [26:05] retail drug trafficking firearms offenses and prostitution fueling increased violence and instability [26:10] these and other TCOs continue to present a very tangible and individualized risk of violent crime to everyday Americans and [26:18] contribute to regional instability [26:20] As the president increases his focus on counter drug and counter cartel pressures, they're likely to seek ways to try to adapt their operations, including shifting production locations and trafficking routes and methods. [26:34] The United States continues to face a complex and evolving threat landscape with a geographically diverse set of Islamist terrorist actors seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm Americans, even as Al Qaeda and ISIS remain weaker today than they were at their respective peaks. [26:53] The spread of Islamist ideology, in some cases led by individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, poses a fundamental threat to freedom and the foundational principles that underpin Western Islam. [27:05] Islamist groups and individuals use this ideology for recruiting and financial support for terrorist groups and individuals around the world and to advance their political objectives of establishing an Islamist caliphate which governs based on Sharia. [27:22] There are increasing examples of this in various European countries, and President Trump's designation of certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organizations is a mechanism to secure Americans against this threat. [27:34] In response to setbacks to their capabilities... [27:38] recognizes other terrorist elites and makes them our起來 with the ability to createolis infrastructure that would allow us to engage and destroy people. [27:41] Islamist terrorist groups have shifted toward focusing on executing information operations to spread propaganda and inspire or enable individuals located in or with access to the West. [27:57] U.S. Counterterrorism efforts, primarily in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Syria, in 2025 were instrumental in removing key terrorist leaders and operatives, degrading the ability of Al Qaeda and ISIS quickly reconstitute its leadership and Motivating Al Qaeda and ISIS to take back its schools and schools and predefined [28:07] development. [28:09] I will now close by thanking Joe Biden. [28:10] And thanks to hisratice that he did jump overnight. [28:10] and plan large-scale attacks against the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. [28:15] Strict U.S. border enforcement measures and increased deportations of individuals with [28:19] suspected links to Islamist terrorists have reduced access to the homeland and removed [28:24] some potential sources of future terrorist attacks. [28:28] Since January, U.S. officials have only had a handful of encounters at our borders with [28:32] individuals associated with terrorist groups. [28:36] This is a positive trend, however, our interagency coordinated efforts to continue to identify, [28:41] locate, and remove known or suspected terrorists who may already be in the United States continues [28:46] with vigilance. [28:47] In 2025, there were at least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the United States. [28:55] Law enforcement disrupted at least 15 U.S.-based Islamist terrorist plotters. [29:00] Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some online contact with Islamist terrorists [29:06] inspired by Islamist foreign terrorist organizations abroad. [29:10] For example, in the recent attempt to attack a synagogue in Michigan. [29:13] The shooter had familial ties to a Hezbollah leader. [29:18] Al-Qaeda and ISIS pose the biggest threat to U.S. interests overseas in parts of Africa, [29:22] the Middle East, and South Asia where these groups operate. [29:26] In the Middle East, AQAP in Yemen, ISIS-K in South Asia, and ISIS in Syria are among [29:32] the most likely groups conducting external plotting. [29:36] ISIS in Syria is likely seeking to rebuild its ranks, expand support networks, and solicit [29:42] funds by reengaging with and recruiting from the likely hundreds of ISIS-based terrorist [29:44] groups. [29:45] ISIS-linked women and children who were released or escaped from prisons and displaced person [29:53] camps were previously run by Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria. [29:59] Meanwhile, state actors perceive a risk broader in scope by seeking new capabilities of kinetic [30:05] and cyber warfare. [30:06] The USA's secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure safety in the homeland against strategic [30:14] threats. [30:15] However, the intelligence community assesses that Russia, China, and Syria have their own [30:18] China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan have been researching and developing an array of novel, [30:24] advanced, or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads [30:29] that put our homeland within range. The IC assesses that threats to the homeland will [30:34] expand collectively to more than 16,000 missiles by 2035 from the current assessed figure of more [30:40] than 3,000 missiles. The IC assesses that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems [30:47] meant to be capable of penetrating or bypassing U.S. missile defenses. North Korea's ICBMs can [30:53] already reach U.S. soil, and the IC assesses that it is committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal. [31:01] Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs [31:05] with a range capable of striking the homeland. The IC assesses that Iran has previously demonstrated [31:12] space launch and other technology it could use to begin to develop a militarily viable ICBM [31:18] before it can be deployed. The IC assesses that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch [31:18] and other technology it could use to begin to develop a militarily viable ICBM before it can be deployed. [31:18] The IC assesses that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch and other technology it could use to begin to build a militarily viable ICBM before [31:18] 2035, should Tehran attempt to pursue that capability. However, these assessments will [31:27] clearly be updated as the full impact of Operation Epic Fury's devastating strikes on Iran's missile [31:31] production facilities, stockpiles, and launch capabilities is determined. These nations [31:37] collectively will likely seek to understand U.S. plans for advanced missile defense for the homeland, [31:42] probably for the purpose of shaping their own missile development programs [31:46] and assessing U.S. intentions regarding deterrence. Shifting to the cyber domain, the IOC, [31:51] The I.C. assesses that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and non-state ransomware groups [31:56] will continue to seek to compromise U.S. government and private sector networks, as well as critical [32:01] infrastructure to collect intelligence, create options for future disruption and for financial [32:07] gain. [32:09] The I.C. assesses that China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats and [32:13] are continuing their R&D efforts. [32:16] North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. [32:20] In 2025 alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole two billion dollars, [32:25] which the I.C. assesses is helping to fund the regime and include further development [32:29] of its strategic weapons programs. [32:32] Financially or ideologically motivated non-state actors are becoming more bold, with ransomware [32:38] groups shifting to faster high volume attacks that are harder to identify and mitigate. [32:45] Innovation in the field of artificial intelligence will likely accelerate these threats in the [32:49] cyber domain. [32:51] The I.C. assesses that it will. [32:52] Include. [32:52] Increasingly shape cyber operations with both cyber operators and defenders using these [32:56] tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. [33:00] For example, in August of 2025, cyber actors used an A.I. tool to conduct a data extortion [33:06] operation against international government, health care and public health emergency service [33:10] sectors as well as religious institutions. [33:15] Moving to the Arctic, the I.C. assesses that Russia and to a lesser extent China aim to [33:19] strengthen their presence in the region through increased maritime trade, natural resource [33:24] production and military activity. [33:27] Russia, which has the longest coastline in the Arctic, has long sought recognition of [33:30] its polar great power status and is deploying more military forces and building new permanent [33:37] infrastructure. [33:38] China, though not an Arctic country, is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance [33:43] its own strategic and economic interests. [33:49] The I.C. assesses that China is the most capable competitor in the field of artificial intelligence. [33:55] The I.C. assesses that A.I. capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing. [33:59] The threat landscape as this is a defining technology that enables computers and machines [34:04] to simulate human learning, comprehension, problem solving, creativity and autonomy. [34:10] It will be critical to ensure that humans remain in control of how A.I. is used and [34:14] of the machines that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests of the American people [34:19] across all domains. [34:20] A.I. adoption at scale across the spectrum of usage poses serious risks. [34:26] A.I. has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design. [34:30] It has been used. [34:30] It has been used in recent conflicts to influence targeting and streamline decision making, [34:36] underscoring the risk and likely threats that could manifest on the battlefield. [34:41] Early developers in quantum computers will give countries an extraordinary technological [34:47] advantage over others to quickly process national security information and break current encryption [34:53] methodology used to protect sensitive finance, health care and government information. [35:01] The global security landscape is volatile. [35:03] And complex with armed conflict growing more common and posing potential threats against [35:08] U.S. interests. [35:10] Strategic competition and regional and smaller powers are becoming more willing to use force [35:14] to pursue their interests, heightening the risk of conflict. [35:18] The I.C. assesses the space domain is becoming increasingly contested with China and Russia [35:24] developing counter space capabilities to challenge U.S. space efforts. [35:29] The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological warfare capabilities, [35:34] continues to grow. [35:35] I'll turn now to our neighborhood in the western hemisphere where flagging economies, high [35:40] crime rates, pervasive organized crime, migration flows, corruption, narcotics trafficking, [35:45] all of these present a spectrum of risks to U.S. interests and where strategic competitors [35:51] seek to gain greater influence in the region. [35:54] The I.C. assesses that Latin America and the Caribbean almost certainly will see hotspots [35:58] of volatility in the coming year. [36:02] Since Maduro's arrest, the I.C. assesses a shift in Venezuela's security and security [36:06] leadership towards cooperating with the U.S. to open its economy, to develop the country's [36:12] oil and gas extraction capability, and we've seen their movement in releasing political [36:17] prisoners. [36:18] The U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement review in 2026 will likely increase uncertainty in many [36:24] Latin American countries, especially those that rely on Mexico as an export destination [36:29] for intermediate goods for manufacture and onward export to the U.S. [36:33] China, Russia, and Iran are likely seeking to sustain [36:38] economic and economic stability. [36:38] The I.C. assesses that China's demand for raw materials is likely to continue to drive [36:47] its economic outreach, while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic [36:52] ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. [36:55] The I.C. assesses that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, military, and [36:59] technological power to increase its own regional positioning and global influence to fend [37:05] off threats to their interests, while there are challenging areas where interests diverge, [37:11] and the U.S. is likely to pursue a joint military-progressing agreement with China. [37:12] President Trump's diplomatic engagements with President Xi to work toward U.S. interests [37:16] have enabled progress where those interests align. [37:18] The I.C. assesses that China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces across [37:24] all domains in pursuit of its goal to achieve world-class status by mid-century. [37:30] This includes building a force with the aim of being capable of deterring U.S. and allied [37:34] forces in the region, and to achieve their stated objective of developing the ability [37:39] to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. [37:41] However, the IC assesses that China likely prefers to set the conditions for an eventual [37:47] peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict. [37:51] The IC assesses that an increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern [37:55] regionally and globally. [37:58] Its weapons of mass destruction, its conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities [38:03] and demonstrated willingness to use asymmetric capabilities poses a threat to U.S. and its [38:08] allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. [38:12] North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing. [38:15] And in 2025, Kim took steps to improve ties with China, still North Korea's most important [38:20] trading partner and economic benefactor. [38:24] The IC assesses that North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine has [38:28] increased North Korea's capabilities as their forces have gained combat experience in 21st [38:33] century warfare, along with equipment. [38:37] In 2024, North Korea deployed more than 11,000 troops to Russia to support combat operations [38:42] in Kursk. [38:44] Pyongyang. [38:44] Pyongyang continues to develop and expand its strategic weapons programs, including [38:47] missiles that can evade U.S. and regional missile defenses. [38:52] It is continuing to work to increase its nuclear warhead stockpile and maintains biological [38:58] and chemical weapons capabilities. [39:01] Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally by military [39:06] and non-military means. [39:08] The IC assesses that the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is the potential [39:13] of an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict. [39:15] It is possible that an déjà vu conflict, such as Ukraine, or a new conflict that led [39:19] to direct hostilities including the potential deployment of nuclear weapons. [39:23] The IC assesses that Putin continues to invest in Russia's defense industrial base, as well [39:29] as novel capabilities that may pose a greater threat to the U.S. homeland and forces abroad [39:34] than conventional weapons. [39:36] Russia has advanced systems, hypersonic missiles and undersea capabilities designed to negate [39:41] U.S. military advantage. [39:42] Moscow also relies on other tools to exert its military defenses and modern talents for [39:43] betternESS. [39:43] Russia has helped Ukraine in winning back the war in thexa war in Makh-T saber, and [39:44] aWhy US tanks have an all-agre engages Russia'sòng war room. [39:44] On disgusting measures, Kybyramov is wrapped in a great good нам 2–examples [39:45] countries such as Bulgaria, for example, in the White House,ただ [39:46] exert pressure, using gray zone tactics to further its goals and compete below the level of armed [39:51] conflict. Russia is also building an extensive counter space capabilities to contest U.S. space [39:58] dominance. Its development of a nuclear counter space weapon poses the greatest single threat to [40:04] the world's space architecture. During the past year, the IC assesses that Russia has maintained [40:10] the upper hand in the war against Ukraine. U.S.-led negotiations between Moscow and Kiev [40:16] are ongoing. Until such an agreement is met, Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow [40:21] war of attrition until they view their objectives have been achieved. In the Middle East, conflict [40:27] and instability will shape security, political, and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. [40:32] The IC assesses that Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change in the region [40:37] that began with Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and continued with the 12-day [40:44] war last year, resulting in weakening Iran and Afghanistan. [40:47] The IC assesses the regime in Iran appears to be intact but largely degraded due to attacks on its [40:55] leadership and military capabilities. Its conventional military power projection [41:00] capabilities have largely been destroyed, leaving limited options. Iran's strategic position has [41:07] been significantly degraded. The U.S.-led maximum pressure campaign and snapback of European [41:13] sanctions added additional pressure to an already bleak Iranian economy, resulting in mass protests [41:19] earlier this year. [41:20] The IC assesses that the regime remains intact, the IC assesses that internal tensions are likely [41:29] to increase as Iran's economy worsens. Even so, Iran and its proxies continue to attack U.S. and [41:39] allied interests in the Middle East. The IC assesses that if a hostile regime survives, [41:44] it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort to rebuild its military, missiles, and UAV forces. [41:51] Prior to Operation Epic Fury, [41:54] the IC assesses that the regime remains intact, the IC assesses that the regime remains intact, [41:54] the IC assesses that the regime remains intact, the IC assesses that the regime remains utilizing [41:56] foreign revenues, savingacious and effective dovies, pawing up cash Treasury part of its [42:25] financialalls. [42:25] The IC assesses that the regime remains intact, the IC assesses that the regime remains unstable, [42:26] efforts may have nitpicking its history and ongoing military activity are likely to continue to be [42:26] continue their selective cooperation with each other, which could bolster their individual [42:30] capabilities and threats to U.S. interests more broadly. However, currently these relationships [42:36] are primarily bilateral on selective issues and depend on broader circumstances, divergent [42:42] sovereign interests, and in some cases, concerns over directly confronting the United States. [42:48] These factors, the ICSSs are likely to constrain their relationships. Finally, conflicts on the [42:55] continent of Africa are likely to persist through 2026 due to poor governance, economic demands, [43:01] and external support. Tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which could rapidly [43:07] accelerate to conflict. Contentious national elections in Somalia could distract the [43:12] federal government away from counterterrorism actions against al-Shabaab, which continues to [43:17] conduct terror attacks while providing funding and propaganda support to other elements of [43:22] al-Qaeda in Yemen. The civil war in Sudan continues, even as external [43:27] newsreel is being released. [43:27] Negotiations occur. ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel have increased the intensity of their [43:33] attacks against local security forces, expanding their areas of operation and moving closer to [43:39] cities with the U.S. presence. The ICSSs that African governments will likely use their wealth [43:45] and critical minerals to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefit. Concurrent [43:50] conflicts and crises across the continent will continue to put U.S. citizens at risk [43:54] and cause further instability. In closing, as leaders of the [44:00] intelligence community, we remain committed to providing the president and policymakers with [44:05] timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to inform decision-making and to ensure the safety, [44:10] security, and freedom of the American people. Thank you. [44:14] Thank you, Director Gabbard. General Adams, Camden, Arkansas, is the home of brand-new [44:19] production lines for the Israeli missile defense interceptors. Could you please explain how [44:25] Critical Arrow and Iron Dome systems being built in Camden are for the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. [44:28] are for not only Israel's defenses, but the defense of hundreds of thousands of American citizens and [44:35] troops in the region? Chairman Cotton, thank you for that question. And I have to say that the [44:43] Arrow system and the Iron Dome system are critical defensive systems that prevent [44:48] adversary power projection from impacting the targets in the friendly areas in Israel. [44:56] The Arrow system itself is a [44:59] high altitude, primarily against MRBMs, and it's proven to be very, very effective against those [45:07] systems. The Iron Dome is more of a closer-in system, protecting against rockets and things [45:13] of that nature. But the combination of those two with U.S. systems creates a shield to prevent those [45:22] attacks from the Iranians impacting key areas in areas where they're protecting. [45:28] Thank you, General Adams. [45:30] I was recently in Camden with Secretary HEGSATH as part of his Arsenal of Freedom tour, [45:33] and they are great Arkansans who do great work to keep our nation safe. [45:38] General Hartman, we've often spoken about our pressing need for more [45:43] cyber security manpower and part-time formation such as the Arkansas Air National Guard's 223rd [45:48] cyberspace operation squadron are a great way to grow the force. What recommendations do you have [45:55] to grow the cyber protection teams and develop more capacity for local and [46:00] emissions chairman cotton thank thanks for the question I did hear a little bit [46:07] about the great team in Arkansas there and I know 855 CPT operates from that [46:11] formation and so for us certainly looking at a number of different [46:15] initiatives one ensure that we can share all of the relevant top-secret classified [46:20] information and other sort of indications and warning that the [46:24] organization's need but I will tell you I'm an advocate for inability to [46:29] establish some sort of joint reserve cyber organization and so that at [46:34] cyber comm we can ensure that those organizations have all of the advanced [46:39] training that they need to ensure that those organizations have access to all [46:44] of the intelligence that they need and to ensure that we control some level of [46:48] funding at both cyber common NSA that can be used to mobilize those personnel [46:53] to handle the most difficult problems that we're faced with and we have been [46:57] working with Congress on some of that language [46:59] and the [46:59] department and we appreciate it sir thank you general Hartman as I said in [47:03] my opening we only have this one public hearing a year even though the committee [47:08] hears from each of you several times that the year in classified settings so [47:13] we don't often have a chance to tell the American people what great work their [47:18] intelligence professionals are doing for them so director Ratcliffe could could [47:22] you take the opportunity to maybe join in the excellent briefings that Secretary [47:27] Hegseth and General Kane have provided on a regular basis [47:30] over the last couple months on the military aspects of both the Maduro raid [47:35] an operation epic fury to explain the CIA's contributions to those operations [47:40] thank you Senator you know last year when I was here and in my confirmation I [47:47] promised you all and you got all asked for a more aggressive CIA one that was [47:53] focused on core mission getting back to the business of stealing secrets to be [47:59] able to provide our policymakers with the skills they need to deal with the [48:00] with a decisive strategic advantage that would allow and advance and contribute [48:07] to foreign policy and national security successes. To the credit of the CIA [48:14] workforce, the CIA has delivered. Some of those successes have been very public. As [48:21] you mentioned, Senator, Operation Midnight Hammer, Operation Absolute [48:26] Resolve, flawless military operations like that are hostage to a flawless intelligence [48:34] picture. And the CIA, as you know from classified briefings, contributed in myriad ways to the [48:40] success of that. But what I would say to you is those successes are just emblematic of [48:45] the phenomenal progress and success really by every measure, every metric, every standard [48:52] across every national security space with regard to the work of [48:56] the CIA. [48:56] Senator, you mentioned some of it in your opening. The increase of our assets stable [49:03] and our human sources up by 25%. Our FI collection across the board, our foreign intelligence [49:09] collection up by 25% overall. And in important categories like China, for instance, up 100%. [49:18] In areas like tech and AI, up 45%. On the counter narcotics front, our operations up [49:24] by 70%. [49:26] With regard to counterterrorism, those are classified numbers that I'll share with you [49:31] in the classified portion of this hearing, but they're off the charts good. The best [49:37] way I can summarize it, Senator, is I had a 32-year veteran of the agency retire this [49:42] year and he said to me, I hate to go. I don't know if this is the best year that the CIA [49:47] has ever had, but it's the best year I can ever remember. And I think that reflects the [49:52] current morale of the CIA. It's a workforce that knows it's doing a great job. And I think [49:54] that's what I'm going to do. I'm going to do my best. I'm going to do my best. I'm going [49:55] to do my best. I'm going to do my best. I'm going to do my best. I'm going to do my best. I'm going to do my best. I'm going to do my best. [49:56] I'm going to do my best. I'm going to do my best. I'm going to do my best. I'm going [49:57] to do my best. I'm going to do my best. I'm going to do my best. I'm going to do my best. [49:58] It knows that it's being allowed to do what they signed up to do, which is provide that [50:03] decisive strategic advantage to our country for great successes that everyone can see. [50:09] So I thank you for the opportunity to let me recognize the CIA workforce. [50:14] Thank you. Director Ratcliff, I want to address one specific threat from Iran, the threat [50:18] of an intercontinental missile, which is really just the combination of two technologies. [50:23] One thrust to get something into space and a reentry vehicle. [50:26] to get it back to earth Iran has always had a space launch program which is [50:31] flimsy cover for the first part of that intercontinental missile program I [50:35] haven't seen any Iranian astronauts in space lately and second they have [50:39] medium-range ballistic missiles which already have a reentry vehicle so if you [50:43] crudely married those two technologies together I've heard some analysts say [50:48] that Iran could have had a functioning intercontinental missile to threaten the [50:53] United States in as few as six months would you agree with that assessment [50:57] well you're you're right to be concerned about Iran's development of longer-range [51:01] ballistic missiles senator if if a lot if Iran were allowed to develop at the [51:06] IBR IRBM ranges which is 3,000 kilometers it would it would threaten [51:12] most of Europe and yes as you mentioned we know that Iran is gaining experience [51:18] in these larger more powerful booster technologies through its [51:23] so-called space launch vehicle program if left unimpeded yes senator they would [51:31] have the ability to range missiles to the continental US it's one of the [51:37] reasons why degrading Iran's missile production capabilities that is taking [51:43] place right now in operation epic fury is so important to our national security [51:47] thank you vice chairman thank you mr. chairman for gab director Gabbert the [51:55] whole country knows that you were recently involved in a FBI operation to [52:00] seize ballots in Fulton County Georgia yet this was despite the fact that the [52:05] warrant showed no foreign interference or nexus matter of fact the warrant was [52:11] based entirely on conspiracy theories that have already been examined and [52:17] rejected repeatedly now where is the authority for you to involve yourself [52:22] and a domestic law enforcement activity thank you vice chairman I appreciate the [52:30] question as you know I've addressed [52:32] every issue you've raised in detail in a letter but I'm grateful for the [52:36] opportunity to do it in this forum as you stated Congress provided by statute [52:42] ODNI with the responsibility of election security and counterintelligence in 2021 [52:49] as you also know ODNI has purview I know the history very well but could you just [52:55] ODNI also has purview and overview over to domestic [53:03] related agencies the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI both of [53:06] which have purview over election security responsibilities to ensure the [53:11] integrity of our elections I want to correct one of your statements that [53:15] you've made multiple times which is false I did not participate in a law [53:20] enforcement activity nor would I because that does not exist within my [53:24] authorities are the photos are the photos of you I was I was at Fulton County sir at the request of [53:33] and to work with the FBI to observe this action that had long been awaited I was not aware of what [53:41] was in the warrant or what was it specific request what was the specific request that was made by the [53:47] president for you to show up in Fulton County to go and observe the FBI's activities on this issue [53:52] so why do you have the answer why the president was knowing about your questions affidavit before [53:58] it was even served I'm not aware that the president knew about an affidavit before it was served then [54:03] sending you to Fulton County. This occurred the day that the FBI had it [54:08] approved, their warrant approved by a local judge, and they began to execute [54:13] this. To address your question, sir, about the foreign nexus question. In order for [54:18] us to better understand the vulnerabilities in our election systems [54:22] that may exist today as we look to 2026, and yes we are very focused on trying to [54:27] make sure that this election is one that the American people have faith in. [54:31] I've got a number of questions. Director Cameron, I have a number of questions. Let me ask my [54:34] next question, please. You have not provided any of the required reports or [54:43] briefings to this committee on foreign interference. This is the first threat [54:50] assessment since 2017 that didn't even mention foreign interference. Last year [54:58] when you were in, already confirmed, it mentioned it at high level. Are you [55:03] saying there is no foreign threat to [55:05] our elections in the midterms this year? As I stated in the outset of my remarks, [55:11] this year's annual threat assessment matches the prioritization of threats [55:16] and threats. Please answer the question, yes or no, is there foreign threat [55:18] interference to our elections this year? Please allow me to answer the [55:23] question, sir. The intelligence community has been and continues to remain focused [55:27] on any collection and intelligence products that show a potential foreign [55:32] threat for those who are. So far there has been none then because you've made no [55:36] decision. [55:36] The intelligence community has made no decision. [55:38] If you want to ask the questions, you should have stayed in Congress. Please answer the questions. [55:42] I didn't ask you a question, sir. I'm trying to answer your questions. [55:45] So you're saying the failure to provide any reports or the failure to have any mention of a foreign threat assessment. [55:52] I would draw the conclusion there must be no foreign threat to our elections in [55:57] 26. So that brings me a question that I have for both you, ma'am and Director Patel. [56:01] There are reports that in 2020 the president was preparing an executive [56:08] of order potentially seize ballots or bring in federal forces. There is a published report [56:14] that there is a similar EO being drafted right now about 2026, citing China. Director Patel, [56:21] do you have any knowledge of that draft EO? Thank you, Vice Chairman. I do not, sir. [56:27] Director Gabbard, do you have any? I do not. Thank you. Let me move to Iran. Now, I understand [56:32] and I appreciated Director Gabbard's comments yesterday about agreeing that the president has [56:39] sole authority, I guess, in his bones to declare whether something is an imminent threat. [56:45] I did not agree with your friend, Mr. Kent, but I did not, again, I agreed with him yesterday [56:52] on the fact that there was no imminent threat. I guess what I am concerned about one thing is [56:58] even in your printed testimony today on page six and your last paragraph on page six as a result [57:07] of Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran's nuclear investment program was obliterated, [57:10] there's been no efforts to try to rebuild their enrichment capability. You omitted that [57:16] paragraph from your oral opening. Was that because the president said there was an imminent threat [57:24] two weeks ago? No, sir. I recognize that the time was running long and I skipped through some of [57:29] the portions of my oral delivered remarks. You chose to omit the parts that contradict [57:36] the president. The president continues to say as well that, you know, he had no idea, [57:42] he was shocked that the Iranians had moved to take over the Strait of Hormuz. [57:47] Did you provide any intelligence that would say that it would be, [57:52] that it was not likely that the Iranians would try to move on the Strait? [57:57] I'm not aware of those remarks and I think those of us here at the table [58:01] can point to the fact that historically the Iranians have always threatened [58:05] to leverage their control. Why would the president say he was amazed? I'm not aware of those remarks. [58:11] What about the comments the president made that said that, [58:13] he was surprised again, reports, that Iran struck the adjacent Gulf states? [58:19] Again, I'm not aware of those remarks. We have been and continue to provide the intelligence. [58:22] Well, let me ask you this. Did you brief the president? Did you brief the president? [58:26] Did you brief the president if he starts a war of choice that the likely result would be that [58:34] Iran would strike adjacent Gulf nations and close the Strait of Hormuz? Did you brief him on those [58:42] two facts that I think have been consistently the, [58:45] the assumptions of the intelligence community i have not and won't divulge internal conversations [58:52] i will say that those of us within the intelligence community continue to provide the [58:57] president with all of the best objective intelligence available to inform his decisions [59:02] senator collins thank you mr chairman director gabbert you just testified that isis and al-qaeda [59:14] are significantly weaker and reflecting that view you have devoted declining budgets personnel [59:27] and emphasis on countering terrorism yet the fact is that isis is growing and operating in somalia [59:40] afghanistan syria pakistan and iraq al-qaeda is surging [59:47] in afghanistan the arabian peninsula and throughout central africa the houthis in yemen [59:57] and the rest of the iranian proxies remain a serious threat focusing as you have done on [1:00:07] great power competitors seems to have diverted resources from the fight against terrorism a fight [1:00:18] against terrorism and it's very much still going on as i have said repeatedly it is terrorists who [1:00:30] want and can kill americans today we've just seen the terrorists in michigan attacking the synagogue [1:00:40] in addition we've been listening to the worldwide threats assessment hearing um and we're going to [1:00:46] continue to listen in on this but we do want to have a discussion with our capital hill correspondent [1:00:48] julie tarry um what is your take on this um uh you know this is something that we just heard [1:00:52] there something that had sort of piqued our interest um actually before senator mark warner [1:00:56] even asked these questions um of ms gabbard essentially that when um and julie just so [1:01:02] our viewers know we as well as members of the senate get essentially the written plan here [1:01:07] the remarks prior to us actually hearing uh tulsi gabbard deliver them we we had this printed out [1:01:12] version and we noticed something in there that um there was essentially a paragraph that discussed [1:01:17] iran's nuclear capabilities something that then was skipped over by ms gabbert in this particular time and i hope we can get a listen to her thoughts from the public and the public in the public as well of the government. [1:01:18] Gabbard during her opening remarks. She pointed to the fact that she was running long, so she [1:01:23] skipped over things. Just so our audience knows, she was slated to speak for about 15 minutes [1:01:27] at the point that she finished. It was 22 minutes. Julie, what do you make of this? [1:01:32] Yes, Savannah, that's exactly right. So in those prepared remarks that were reported by Reuters [1:01:36] ahead of time, so again, usually these draft remarks, we do not report them ahead of time [1:01:41] because we know they are subject to change upon delivery. But again, this was already out there. [1:01:45] A committee aide told me that the Senate Intelligence Committee received these remarks [1:01:49] from Gabbard late last night, so well after Joe Kent, who was under her, of course, [1:01:53] as the head of the counterterrorism department, resigned. And in her prepared remarks, [1:01:58] she was supposed to say that as a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, remember that was [1:02:02] the operation last summer in which the U.S. launched those military strikes, that severely, [1:02:07] according to administration officials, depleted their uranium enrichment capability. She was [1:02:11] supposed to say there have been no efforts since then by Iran to try to [1:02:15] rebuild their enrichment capability. She as well said that the entrances to those underground [1:02:20] facilities that were bombed had been buried and shuttered with cement. What she ultimately ended [1:02:24] up saying is that prior to Operation Epic Fury, again, that was the official name of the war that [1:02:30] began a couple of weeks ago with Iran, the IC, the Intelligence Committee, assesses that Iran [1:02:34] was trying to recover from the severe damage to its nuclear infrastructure sustained during that [1:02:39] war. She also said that they refused to continue to comply with its nuclear obligation. So again, [1:02:44] a very crucial point. [1:02:45] I think that's a crucial omittal because essentially what Gabbard was prepared to say directly [1:02:49] undercuts and contradicts statements we heard not only from the president himself, but also [1:02:54] from his top officials like Secretary of State Rubio, things that they told members of Congress, [1:02:58] both behind closed doors and in public view, saying that Iran was so close to potentially [1:03:04] having its nuclear weapons program that it was an imminent threat to the United States. [1:03:08] They also, of course, mentioned their ballistic capabilities. And that is why they had to act [1:03:12] when they did, cutting off those negotiations and any hope of a deal with Iran. [1:03:15] I think that's a diplomatic solution at that time. Gabbard chose not to say that. But of course, [1:03:20] all eyes really are on her statements on Iran, because previously, prior to joining the [1:03:24] administration, she held a very anti-foreign interventionist view, particularly when it [1:03:29] comes to Iran. The last time we heard from Gabbard in the halls of Congress was nearly a year ago, [1:03:33] where she told lawmakers point blank that she did not believe that Iran was rushing to build out its [1:03:39] nuclear weapons program and the administration, including the president, swiftly contradicting [1:03:43] her. So this is really important, and it is not just a matter of time until we get to the end of [1:03:44] this. [1:03:45] I think it's also notable that she chose not to read those remarks, saying she omitted them for [1:03:48] time, but something that Senator Mark Warner, who's a top Democrat, zeroed in on. [1:03:52] All right, Julie Serkin from Capitol Hill for us, where this hearing continues. Let's bring in our [1:03:57] senior national security correspondent, Courtney Kuebe. Courtney, obviously, a headline here is [1:04:01] that this particular hearing, this worldwide threats assessment hearing, is happening amid [1:04:05] the Iran war, now about three weeks long at this point. And so these remarks that weren't said, [1:04:12] just as important as what has been said. [1:04:15] What do you make of this portion that was skipped over, and what we did learn there from the director [1:04:20] of national intelligence about the war in Iran? [1:04:22] So this has been one of the big arguments since this war started. From the very first night when [1:04:29] President Trump made that social media video, and then in the hours after that, we heard from [1:04:33] many of his top administration officials talking about the justification for the war in Iran. One [1:04:38] of the things that they talked about was that they would not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. [1:04:42] But the real dispute here is exactly how close, [1:04:45] Iran was to having it, and not just that, whether the intent was actually there. So you'll recall [1:04:50] during Operation Midnight Hammer last June, the US struck three of the Iranian nuclear facilities. [1:04:55] Now, we've heard since then from the director general of the IAEA, the nuclear watchdog group, [1:05:02] an impartial group, that about half of that uranium, the highly enriched uranium, is believed [1:05:08] to be at Isfahan, one of those facilities. The other half, they're not really sure where it is, [1:05:15] and one or two of the other facilities. So that leaves about 220 kilograms of this highly enriched [1:05:20] uranium that is believed to be buried at Isfahan. At this point, we still have no confirmation that [1:05:27] Iran was trying to get into that, that they had made any real efforts or real progress into getting [1:05:33] back to that uranium that, again, is buried at Isfahan. And also, it's not 100% clear whether [1:05:39] any of it is still there and completely intact. So this all goes back to the argument about, [1:05:45] where Iran was when it comes to their nuclear program and what their actual breakout time [1:05:49] was. I was also really struck, Savannah, by the talk about the possibility of Iran getting an [1:05:54] intercontinental ballistic missile. Because it's not just Iran potentially having a nuclear weapon, [1:05:59] it's their ability to deliver it as far away as to the continental United States. [1:06:03] Now, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, which I would point out, the head of the DIA is [1:06:08] sitting right there at the table with, with Tulsi Gabbard. They believe that should Iran decide to [1:06:14] pursue, [1:06:15] an ICBM, it would still be a matter of several years before they would have a real stockpile of [1:06:20] these longer-range ballistic missiles that could deliver to the United States. Tulsi Gabbard [1:06:26] repeated that here as well. Should Iran decide to, Tehran, she actually said, pursue that capability. [1:06:34] So it's not even clear if they were making real inroads to a long-range ballistic missile that [1:06:39] would be able to deliver a nuclear weapon. Again, hopefully we'll get more fidelity on these [1:06:44] questions. But, [1:06:45] these are some of the critical issues since, since even before this war began, [1:06:49] that we've been asking about where exactly Iran was on both these critical capabilities. [1:06:53] Absolutely. And again, Courtney, it's why we're asking these questions, [1:06:57] why we stopped to have this discussion, because while on the one hand, it's just skipping over [1:07:02] some testimony that had not yet been delivered. It has, contains some of the biggest questions [1:07:06] and answers that we still don't have from the Iran war. Courtney Kuby, thank you very much. [1:07:10] Let's listen back in now to the Worldwide Threats Assessment hearing. [1:07:13] Executing regional threats. [1:07:15] And disrupting shipping, particularly energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. In other [1:07:22] words, every problem we're seeing now was not only foreseeable, but was actually predicted [1:07:30] by the intelligence agencies. So director, in the lead up to the start of this war three weeks ago, [1:07:38] did the intelligence agencies stick to their assessment that in response to an attack, [1:07:44] the Iranians had the capability? [1:07:45] Shut down the Strait of Hormuz. [1:07:47] Thank you, Senator Widen. The intelligence community has continued to provide the [1:07:54] president and his team with the intelligence related to this operation in Iran before and [1:08:01] on an ongoing basis. [1:08:02] So right now we're in a global energy crisis. We're paying more for gas. The economy is in [1:08:09] danger. And it seems to me, and I heard you discuss this with Senator Warner too, [1:08:15] that there's a lot of hedging going on. [1:08:18] There's a lot going on with respect to entirely foreseen consequences of the war. [1:08:22] And that strikes me, Madam Director, as what amounts to a historic mistake. [1:08:27] Now, my second question is, did the intelligence agencies assess [1:08:31] that the Iranians could respond to a regime change attack from us by attacking U.S. forces [1:08:36] and other American and other Americans in the region? [1:08:40] The IC assessment has always taken very seriously the threat of the Iranian regime's missile [1:08:47] capabilities. [1:08:48] And I'm wondering if you could talk about that and how our American troops within the region [1:08:55] may be put at risk. [1:08:56] Again, you know, it seems to me with Americans dying in the war, it's hard to see how you can [1:09:01] sit here and say that the intelligence agencies couldn't provide a clear warning that if attacked, [1:09:08] the Iranians would respond by attacking our people. [1:09:11] Now, on Monday, Madam Director, Donald Trump was asked about Iranian strikes on the Gulf States. He [1:09:17] said, and I quote, [1:09:19] No, no, no. The greatest experts, nobody thought they were going to hit the Gulf States. [1:09:24] You all are supposed to be the greatest experts. That's what we have you there for. [1:09:29] Director Gabbard, did the intelligence agencies assess that Iran could conduct [1:09:33] strikes on our own partners in the region if it was attacked? [1:09:37] The intelligence community has continued to assess the potential threats to the region, [1:09:42] the existing threats to the region, and providing those assessments to the policy makers and [1:09:47] decision makers. [1:09:48] Let me move on to, [1:09:51] to several others of you with respect to 702 of FISA, and I'm just going to start with you, [1:09:56] General Hartman. When Congress last reauthorized Section 702 of FISA, [1:10:01] it included a provision that expanded the type of companies and individuals [1:10:05] who could be forced to assist the government in its spying. [1:10:10] Has this expansion resulted in any intelligence, General Hartman? [1:10:14] Senator, thanks for the question. Just to be clear, this provision provided us [1:10:22] an ability [1:10:23] to collect foreign intelligence on personnel outside of the United States. [1:10:28] This is the major 702 issue in terms of expansion. What was the effect of what was done? [1:10:35] Senator, I would prefer to talk to you about exact specifics in the closed session. [1:10:41] I'm happy to do that. Let's understand, though, this is a dangerously broad provision [1:10:48] that could be used to rope in anybody with access to a cable box, a Wi-Fi, [1:10:53] a Wi-Fi router or a server. [1:10:56] It was jammed into the 2024 reauthorization bill at the last minute. [1:11:00] Senators were told they had no choice but to support it. [1:11:04] And now, two years later, we've just had testimony from a very respected individual [1:11:10] who's saying so far it has had no value. [1:11:14] So, colleagues, we are getting ready to have another discussion on this, and this ought to [1:11:18] be a warning to every senator that not every new spying power that is sold is urgent and critically, [1:11:24] and critical actually is. [1:11:26] Senator, could I please respond to that? [1:11:27] Of course. [1:11:28] So, Senator, I just want to be clear. It provided us no additional authority that doesn't involve [1:11:36] collecting intelligence on foreigners that are outside of the United States of America. [1:11:40] Fine. Director Patel, a question for you. [1:11:43] In 2023, your predecessor testified that, and I quote, [1:11:47] to my knowledge, we do not currently purchase commercial database information [1:11:52] that includes location data [1:11:54] derived from internet advertising. [1:11:56] Is that the case still? [1:11:59] And if so, can you commit this morning to not buying Americans' location data? [1:12:04] Thank you. [1:12:08] The FBI uses all tools, Senator, thank you for the question, to do our mission. [1:12:13] We do purchase commercially available information that's consistent with the Constitution and the [1:12:18] laws under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and it has led to some valuable intelligence [1:12:23] for us to be utilized with our private and partner sectors. [1:12:26] So, you're saying that the agency will buy American's location data. [1:12:32] I believe that that's what you've said in kind of intelligence lingo, and I just want to say as [1:12:38] we start this debate, doing that without a warrant is an outrageous end run around the Fourth Amendment. [1:12:45] It's particularly dangerous given the use of artificial intelligence to comb through massive [1:12:50] amounts of private information. This is exhibit A for why Congress needs to pass our bipolar [1:12:56] bipartisan bicameral bill the government surveillance reform act I have time I believe for one more question director [1:13:03] Patel you three weeks ago [1:13:06] Indicated you were dissatisfied about having your phone records subpoenaed [1:13:09] Do you think the government ought to get a court order to collect phone records? [1:13:14] Senator my experience the government does get court orders to obtain [1:13:19] phone records one last question [1:13:23] General Adams for you in 2021 your agency confirmed that it had purchased and searched [1:13:28] Domestic location data it is still your agency's position that you can buy Americans location data without a warrant [1:13:35] And if so, are you still doing it senator? [1:13:38] Thanks for the question with regards to commercially available information and publicly available information [1:13:44] The purchases that this agency that my agency makes is it in alignment with the Constitution and protects US persons information [1:13:51] So but you're buying location data, correct? I mean we've now had that [1:13:57] Referred to twice and I don't think [1:13:59] There's any question that you're doing it [1:14:02] all of the [1:14:04] Purchases purchasing of commercially available information by the agency is passed through legal channels and is in complete compliance with laws [1:14:11] Thank you. Mr. Chairman general Hartman. I want to give you a chance to answer more specifically what senator Wyden said you did answer it [1:14:18] Indirectly does anything in section 702 give the government the authority to [1:14:24] Target any American with a cable box or a Wi-Fi router chairman [1:14:32] In 702 gives us the authority to target an American with a cable router or a Wi-Fi device [1:14:37] Thank you, and I would observe about commercially available data that the keywords are commercially available [1:14:44] if any other person can buy it and [1:14:48] the FBI can buy it and it helps him locate a depraved child molester or [1:14:55] Savage cartel leader. I would certainly hope the FBI is doing anything they can to keep Americans safe. It's not much different [1:15:03] from long-standing Supreme Court precedent that for instance says [1:15:07] Law enforcement can go through trash that you put on the side of the curb because you no longer have a privacy interest in it [1:15:13] Senator Cornyn, thank you all for your service to our country and the people you represent [1:15:21] You have our we are in debt to all of you. I want to ask you director raclette yesterday [1:15:28] the head of the National Counterterrorism Center resigned saying that Iran did not represent an imminent threat to [1:15:37] The United States. Is there any anything to indicate that Iran had ceased in its nuclear? [1:15:44] Ambitions or in its desire to continue to build ballistic missiles capable of threatening [1:15:50] American troops and allies in the Middle East the senator. No, in fact the intelligence reflects the contrary [1:15:59] So you disagree with mr. Kent? I do I would think any fair minded assessment of the situation [1:16:08] even based on open source [1:16:10] Would reflect the danger Iran poses the regime poses to the United States. Isn't it true? [1:16:16] They've basically been at war with the West since 1979 during the Iranian Revolution and have [1:16:22] American blood on their hands. That's absolutely correct [1:16:25] I think Iran has been a constant threat to the United States for an extended period of time and imposed an immediate threat [1:16:33] At this time the threat assessment says that al Qaeda and Isis maintain the intent to launch [1:16:44] Operations targeting the u.s. But it's most likely to occur through u.s. Based lone offenders [1:16:51] I want to ask you director Patel [1:16:54] It seems like there's been a raft of [1:16:59] incidents recently [1:17:00] on March the 1st in Austin, Texas where I live a lone gunman wearing a [1:17:07] Sweatshirt saying property of Allah and who the t-shirt he wore underneath had an Iranian flag [1:17:14] killed three innocent people [1:17:16] And injured 12 more and then we know in in Virginia the old Dominion shooting [1:17:25] Somebody who unbelievably was sentenced to 11 years in federal prison for attempting to support Isis [1:17:30] But then was released only to commit another terrorist attack. We all are familiar with what's happened in Michigan in [1:17:38] New York and I applaud the [1:17:44] important role that the FBI has played in stopping [1:17:48] Some terrorist attacks, but obviously the FBI can't be everywhere all the time [1:17:54] Would you please talk about the your? [1:17:58] cooperation and [1:18:00] collaboration with Homeland Security [1:18:02] Investigations in [1:18:04] Countering terrorist attacks against the United States Thank You senator. Absolutely [1:18:08] It is essential that the FBI cooperates with the entire age or interagency [1:18:13] But as to your question about DHS specifically what we have stood up around the country are 59 homeland security tests [1:18:19] Forces in 59 separate locations. These are joint terrorism task force essentially the JTTF model was [1:18:26] Expanded so the FBI owns 56 Joint Terrorism Task Forces in each of our field offices on top of that. We have 50 59 [1:18:34] HSTF's which are co-led by the FBI and [1:18:38] DHS and what that allows us to do is things like we did down in New Orleans just over the holiday period where we served [1:18:45] for a six-week period of time [1:18:47] And where we dropped the murder rate by double? [1:18:49] Digit points and also is the first time that Mardi Gras in its entire history had not one homicide [1:18:54] So when you bring the powers of the Homeland Security folks DHS and the FBI together [1:18:58] This is the purpose of it to get after not just the terrorism threat [1:19:02] But the violence and the criminal activity in our cities and that's why we're in 59 cities across the country [1:19:07] And it's working in places like Memphis and every other city. We have it. Are you aware of the fact that? [1:19:14] Homeland Security investigation is a major directorate within immigration and customs enforcement [1:19:19] Yes, sir. Yes, sir. And are you aware that? [1:19:24] Senate Democrats have uniformly voted not to fund the Department of Homeland Security [1:19:31] including [1:19:33] Homeland Security investigations TSA [1:19:37] FEMA and other functions of the Department of Homeland Security [1:19:41] Senator, I'm aware that employees of DHS are one month without pay. They're not being paid, right? Yes, sir [1:19:48] And we were all seeing the what's happening? [1:19:52] at airports where people are having to wait hours at a time because of the the fact that these [1:19:59] TSA agents are overburdened, but what I wanted to [1:20:04] focus on with you is is the refusal to fund the functions of the Department of Homeland Security including Homeland Security [1:20:13] investigations making [1:20:14] Americans less safe [1:20:16] Absolutely. So give us an example of some of the [1:20:28] cooperation that you all have engaged [1:20:30] in with [1:20:31] The FBI has engaged him with the Homeland Security investigations [1:20:35] I'm looking at a at an article here that talks about the 190,000 [1:20:41] Afghan nationals that were admitted to the United States and literally unvetted [1:20:47] and and there are examples of individuals within that [1:20:54] 190,000 who committed to terrorist attacks against [1:20:58] against the United States and against [1:21:00] American citizens [1:21:02] Is that the sort of thing that you are investigating with HSI? [1:21:07] Senator that's one of the many things we're investigating with HSI DHS CBP ice [1:21:12] Give me some other examples of the collaboration on what other topics including the in addition to [1:21:19] Terrorism attacks what we're allowed to do with our DHS partners senator is enable their [1:21:24] massive workforce to supplement ours and what they're allowed to do is share intelligence on what you just things that you just talked about [1:21:30] about the [1:21:32] hundred-plus thousand [1:21:33] Illegals that came in from Afghanistan during the Afghanistan withdrawal [1:21:38] Unfortunately, they weren't vetted thoroughly [1:21:40] So what we're doing is going back with our DHS partners and vetting absolutely every single one of them to the best that we can [1:21:46] But unfortunately, we're not able to go out into the country and find every single one of these individuals [1:21:51] But we need more than 12,000 FBI agents to do that job [1:21:55] Which is why we are utilizing the hundred thousand or so [1:21:59] 1811 s at the Department of Homeland Security to give us the information they have from their immigration records [1:22:05] from their travel records from their travel logs overseas and within the country and what we're able to do is [1:22:11] remove these individuals off the streets in every single state across the country to include violent gang members to include trend a [1:22:17] Raghava to include Isis affiliated individuals to include al Qaeda related affiliated individuals and hopefully we do it before [1:22:25] And not after like the tragedy that we witnessed in Washington DC [1:22:29] Or an individual from Afghanistan was allowed to enter into our country and shot multiple members of our uniformed military service. Thank our King [1:22:37] Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I do need to point out in response to some of the previous comments [1:22:43] Twice in the last two weeks as recently as last Thursday [1:22:46] Senator Perry Patty Murray the Appropriations Committee put a bill on the floor that would have fully funded [1:22:52] TSA FEMA CISA and the Coast Guard for the rest of the year [1:22:56] leaving the focus on the dispute that we have with the [1:23:00] conduct of [1:23:01] ice [1:23:02] as separately so [1:23:05] Inexplicably to me that bill was blocked by my Republican colleagues. It would have as I say fully funded [1:23:13] TSA FEMA says a Coast Guard and then focus the the attention on [1:23:18] The situation with ice. So I just want to be clear on who's blocking funding for those four agencies [1:23:29] I'd like to ask [1:23:31] Ms. Gabbard and and [1:23:32] Director Radcliffe [1:23:33] director both of you [1:23:35] Were either of you in the room or your designees when the president was making the final decision about [1:23:42] Taking this action against Iran on February 27th 28th. Was there an Intelligence Committee? [1:23:51] Intelligence community present in that in those deliberations. Mr. Mr. Radcliffe your response Senator King [1:24:01] probably in dozens and dozens [1:24:03] of [1:24:05] briefings with the president [1:24:06] I don't know there was a single meeting where there was a single time where a decision [1:24:12] Were those dozens of meetings right during the lead-up to this to this war? [1:24:18] I know you've met many times what I'm talking about it in the two weeks or so before the decision to go into Iran [1:24:25] again [1:24:27] Countless meetings with the president during that period during that period director Gabbard your [1:24:35] Were you present in those discussions? [1:24:37] Likewise. Yes [1:24:38] the reason I'm asking the question is there seemed to be a discrepancy between what the Intelligence Committee has a community has reported over the years and [1:24:46] What the president has said in terms of his of this action for example Senator Wyden read the [1:24:54] report from a year ago that [1:24:56] strikes against neighboring states and [1:24:59] action to close the Strait of Hormuz was predicted by the intelligence community and yet the president says nobody knew [1:25:05] And my question is did you tell him anybody want to answer that question? [1:25:14] Senator I'll answer the question so [1:25:19] with regard to briefings [1:25:21] The president gets a briefings constantly about intelligence now the comments that you talked about [1:25:26] I had not heard what I can tell you is that [1:25:31] Iran had specific plans to hit US interests in [1:25:35] energy sites across the region [1:25:37] and that's why the Department of War and the [1:25:40] Department of State took measures for force protection and personnel protection in advance of operation epic fury [1:25:47] I think that's what's most important any any predictions to the president about the Strait of Hormuz [1:25:53] All you got to do is look at a map and you'll see that the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz [1:25:58] Was that was that part of the briefing? [1:26:01] Director Gabbard, I think the director Ratcliffe made the point here is that? [1:26:07] This has long been an assessment of the I see [1:26:11] that Iran was [1:26:12] Would likely hold the Strait of Hormuz as leverage my question is was that communicated to the president in the lead up to this? [1:26:18] As of that long-standing assessment that the I see has continued to report that the Department of War took the pre-emptive [1:26:26] Planning measures that it did well [1:26:29] They've stated that they did not plan for the Strait of Hormuz. The president said who knew that was going to happen [1:26:35] Anyway, let's move on does the president take a [1:26:39] Daily brief from the intelligence community. This is a this is a yes or no question [1:26:46] Yeah, the president I [1:26:49] Would say senator in my estimation on average I briefed the President of the United States on intelligence [1:26:57] Probably on average [1:26:59] 10 to 15 times a week where I have conversations with him about [1:27:04] specific discrete issues sometimes [1:27:07] There are dedicated sessions that last hours in length [1:27:11] Sometimes I'm briefing him on specific issues sometimes three or four times a day [1:27:16] But I would say on average [1:27:17] My interactions where I'm briefing the president on important national security matters [1:27:22] Happens probably on average 10 to 15 times per week. Thank you. Could you update us on the intelligence on Russian? [1:27:31] Intelligence sharing with Iran in the current conflict. What do we know? [1:27:37] Senator if if there is that sharing going on [1:27:41] That would be an answer that would be appropriate for a closed session. Well, it's been in the public press [1:27:49] This is an open source that it's occurring [1:27:52] Is it occurring again if it is occurring that would be an answer appropriate for a closed session [1:28:00] What I can tell you is that according [1:28:04] To the Department of War any support that Iran may be receiving is not inhibiting their operational effects [1:28:13] Okay, that's sort of the first cousin of a yes, I guess [1:28:20] According to intelligence analysis can regime [1:28:22] changes the [1:28:38] Resume change or the elimination of the estimated 1000 pounds of highly enriched Uranium be [1:28:46] accomplished without boots on the ground that Senator the [1:28:52] Discussion about the Iranian nuclear capability [1:28:55] We intend in the closed session to talk about that in great deal with regards to [1:28:55] I'll see you towards the end [1:28:56] you in an hour. Finally, there was very little, if anything, in the report, in the assessment [1:29:05] about climate change, and that's been in past reports. There is a lot of discussion about [1:29:10] migration. The estimates are that climate migrants, because of the changes in the climate [1:29:17] and the atmosphere, and particularly in the center equatorial area of the Earth, will [1:29:23] range from 200 million to a billion people by 2050. Do you believe that is a national [1:29:30] security threat that should be addressed? The Syrian refugees were about 6 million, [1:29:36] and they upset the politics of Europe for several years. We're talking about 200 million [1:29:41] to a billion people on the move. I believe that's something we should be discussing and [1:29:46] that the intelligence community should be assessing. Director Gabbard? [1:29:51] Yes, Senator. There are a number of drivers [1:29:54] of things that we should be discussing. The intelligence community should be assessing. [1:29:54] Things like migration. It would be an extensive and voluminous annual threat assessment if [1:30:01] we included every single one. This annual threat assessment is focused, again, on priorities [1:30:07] laid out by the President's national security strategy and on the effects that we can take [1:30:13] action, operational action, to protect U.S. interests. [1:30:18] Well, I would suggest combating climate change is something we can take action on. Thank [1:30:23] you, Mr. Chairman. [1:30:24] In a matter of media reports about Russian or Chinese collaboration with Iran, I would [1:30:32] point out that the media is not a classification authority. And that kind of story, whether [1:30:40] true or not, might be better suited for the FBI to investigate on whether there's been [1:30:46] unlawful disclosures of classified information. I would also say it sounds like something [1:30:52] Russia and China would do. Communist Russia used to do it during the Cold War, and communist [1:30:55] China has always done stuff like that. [1:30:57] Thank you. [1:30:58] Thank you. [1:30:58] Thank you. [1:30:58] On the Patty Murray legislation, not only would it have defunded ICE and CBP, it would [1:31:02] have also defunded Homeland Security Investigations, which do critical work on our streets to protect [1:31:07] our communities from financial crimes, from predators, from transnational gangs as well. [1:31:13] So while we would all like to see the TSA and the Coast Guard and other critical parts [1:31:17] of Homeland Security as well, we do not want to defund the police, this time the immigration [1:31:21] police. [1:31:22] Senator Moran. [1:31:23] Chairman, thank you. [1:31:24] Thank you. [1:31:25] I believe that it's in the U.S. [1:31:28] national interest, our security interest, for Ukraine to be successful in defeating [1:31:34] the Russian invasion. [1:31:36] I'm concerned with the consequences of Operation Epic Fury on that ability of Ukraine to succeed [1:31:43] in defending its borders. [1:31:45] And General Adams, in broad terms, not necessarily, not classified terms, what are the consequences [1:31:52] to the supply chain, to the capability of the United States to supply NATO allies and [1:32:00] to Ukraine, as a result of Operation Epic Fury? [1:32:06] My question is that usual problem of how do we do both? [1:32:11] Are we doing both? [1:32:13] Is U.S. support maintained or diminished for Ukraine as a result of Epic Fury? [1:32:19] Senator, thank you for that question. [1:32:23] And we do continue to, beyond Epic Fury, observe what is happening across the world in crises [1:32:32] like Ukraine. [1:32:33] And I think that's a very important question. [1:32:35] I think the Russian-Ukraine. [1:32:36] Unfortunately, for the situation there now, just based on the force composition and the [1:32:43] delta between the Russian forces and the Ukrainian forces, the advantage is to the Russians. [1:32:52] As we get into the classified hearing, we can talk a little more specifically about [1:32:57] the items with regards to the supply chain and with regards to the information that's [1:33:03] being collected by the Defense Intelligence Agency. [1:33:06] We look at the foreign threat and what their capabilities are. [1:33:10] From a multi-int perspective, we look a little bit less at friendly capabilities. [1:33:17] And I would defer questions with regards to U.S. supply chain limitations with regards [1:33:24] to logistics and the effort that the Secretary of War is having with regards to trying to [1:33:28] boost the U.S. defense industrial base. [1:33:30] I would defer those to the department. [1:33:31] Thank you. [1:33:32] Thank you. [1:33:33] Is there anything else you'd like to discuss? [1:33:34] Well, General, please be prepared for the classified session for me to continue [1:33:41] to pursue this. [1:33:42] I mean, I don't – our supply chain issues are not classified in the sense that every [1:33:47] hearing I'm in as a defense appropriator has officials from the Department of Defense [1:33:52] testifying about the need for further assistance. [1:33:55] And really, I'm asking for the facts of what has happened as a result of Operation [1:34:02] Fury, Epic Fury. [1:34:03] I mean, the – [1:34:04] Okay. [1:34:04] Okay. [1:34:05] Okay. [1:34:05] So, what have you seen in the last few weeks in our supply to Ukraine and our NATO allies [1:34:10] who are supplying Ukraine? [1:34:12] Yes, sir. [1:34:15] The department is executing a comprehensive – in fact, the second war has gone around [1:34:21] the nation to boost the defense industrial base. [1:34:24] We know for a fact that we have to increase our defense industrial base capability. [1:34:31] Its impact based on the munitions expended during Epic Fury will be – I mean, it's going [1:34:36] to be – it will be an impact. [1:34:38] But we need to boost it. [1:34:40] The efforts are underway to boost it. [1:34:42] And – [1:34:43] Well, I'm interested in helping accomplish that goal. [1:34:47] Director Ratcliffe, perhaps along the same line, I assume among – let me first of all [1:34:55] compliment you on your public service. [1:34:57] I appreciate you. [1:34:59] And that's not my usual town hall meeting when I get a compliment from somebody who [1:35:03] then follows it with a but. [1:35:05] I am interested in being of help. [1:35:08] And in regard to your conversations in preparation for Epic Fury, I'd be interested in knowing [1:35:16] if the consequences to our abilities to defend the United States against Russia or China [1:35:22] or other adversaries was taken into account. [1:35:26] How is that diminished or increased by Operation Epic Fury, and particularly in this instance [1:35:33] about what it means – was the conversation had about what it means to our ability to [1:35:38] help Ukraine defend? [1:35:40] Well, I think that's a good question, and I think that's a good question in itself. [1:35:46] U.S. support for Ukraine includes military and other assistance, but also we've undertaken [1:35:54] economic sanctions against Russia for their invasion of Ukraine. [1:35:59] And Epic Fury has caused a significant increase in oil prices, and the administration has [1:36:05] waived sanctions against Russian oil companies, which have reported to say that Russia is [1:36:13] receiving $150 million. [1:36:14] That's $150 million per day, additional dollars, as a result of the waiver. [1:36:20] What can you tell me about our plans or your understanding of what's transpiring as a result [1:36:30] of Operation Epic Fury in regard to those oil revenues that are now being generated in favor [1:36:36] of Russia and the lifting of the sanctions, at least for a temporary period of time? [1:36:41] Senator, thanks for the compliment, I think. [1:36:43] I think that's a good question. [1:36:44] I think that's a good question. [1:36:45] I think that's a good question. [1:36:47] I think that's a good question. [1:36:48] I'll start with a couple things. [1:36:49] What I would tell you is the same military and intelligence professionals who delivered, [1:36:57] not just for the administration, but for the American people, a flawless intelligence [1:37:02] picture and flawless military operations in Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Absolute [1:37:08] Resolve are the same folks involved with Operation Epic Fury. [1:37:14] And so I hope that provides you some measure of comfort with regard to that. [1:37:15] Thank you. [1:37:16] Thank you. [1:37:17] regard to how detailed, how thoughtful the approach was to the current operation. [1:37:26] And that's why I think that to mischaracterize it as it is being done in the media is a disservice [1:37:32] to the folks involved in what is a very specific campaign that is different than the two that [1:37:39] I mentioned before. [1:37:41] It's why the president came out and said, this isn't over in a matter of hours. [1:37:44] This is a four- to six-week campaign. [1:37:47] And that it would come at some cost, because the goal of the president and the administration [1:37:55] is to address a 47-year problem, the most destabilizing force in the Middle East for [1:38:01] the last 47 years, one that has, frankly, been watered, fed, and nurtured by policies [1:38:10] of prior administrations that has allowed them to become the threat that they have. [1:38:14] So, I say all of that sort of in context to understanding that we have to address that, [1:38:20] but at the same time, to your point on what's going on with regard to Russia and Ukraine, [1:38:26] and you've mentioned the oil issue. [1:38:29] Sometimes policymakers have to take steps that, while they may benefit adversaries like [1:38:35] Russia or China, do so because they also think it will benefit U.S. citizens, and in this [1:38:42] case, with respect to keeping... [1:38:44] I'm sorry. [1:38:45] ...the economy on track and keeping oil prices low. [1:38:48] So what I can tell you is the intelligence is thoughtfully considered, and I think that [1:38:53] policymakers have taken that, and I'm confident that we can walk and chew gum at the same [1:39:00] time, pursue objectives in the Middle East, and provide support with regard to the conflict [1:39:08] in Russia and the Russian aggression in Ukraine. [1:39:11] Senator Bennett. [1:39:13] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:39:15] I appreciate that. [1:39:16] Director Ratcliffe, you just described the specific campaign that the president is engaged [1:39:25] in, the country is engaged in, with respect to Iran. [1:39:28] I think the campaign has been won, in my view, without a specific rationale for the American [1:39:35] people. [1:39:37] Nineteen days into President Trump's unauthorized war with Iran, and by which I mean there has [1:39:43] been no congressional approval. [1:39:46] At least 13 American service members are going to be on the front lines of the United States. [1:39:47] Thank you. [1:39:48] Many of them are dead, and many others are injured. [1:39:51] President Trump has offered no credible justification for an imminent threat, no clear goals, no [1:39:59] strategy or timeline. [1:40:01] His message keeps changing I think in really damaging ways. [1:40:06] President Trump said Iran's nuclear facilities had been, quote, totally obliterated in June [1:40:12] 2025, but when he launched this latest war, he said, we need to eliminate the imminent [1:40:18] threat of those totally obliterated nuclear facilities. President Trump has [1:40:25] threatened to seize Iranian oil and demanded our allies reopen the Strait of [1:40:30] Hormuz. He said that I'm demanding that these countries come in and protect [1:40:34] their own territory because it's their territory. It's the place from which they [1:40:40] get their energy. By the way, he wasn't just asking for our allies to protect or [1:40:44] to bail them out in the in the Straits of Hormuz. He was asking China to bail [1:40:49] them out in the Straits of Hormuz. And then he said maybe we shouldn't even be [1:40:54] here at all because we don't need it. We have a lot of oil. And he said we do not [1:41:00] need the help of anyone. President Trump has declared we've won the war. We won it [1:41:06] in the first hour. But then he said we're not leaving until the job is finished. He [1:41:12] said that there is practically nothing left to bomb. [1:41:15] you [1:41:15] know, we're not leaving until the job is finished. He said we're not leaving until the job is finished. [1:41:16] But then he threatened to bomb Iran again, quote, just for fun. I think words that [1:41:21] probably have never come out of a military leader in the history of the [1:41:25] United States of America. It shouldn't come out of the mouth of a civilian [1:41:31] leader. President Trump said he will end the war when I feel it, feel it in my [1:41:36] bones. And anytime I want to end it, it will end. But, Director, the war is not [1:41:43] ending. It is escalating with thousands of U.S. Marines, [1:41:47] reportedly sailing toward Iran on an unclear mission, a mission that's become less clear [1:41:54] over days, not more clear. Our airstrikes wiped out Iran's missiles and supreme leader. [1:42:01] Nobody here, and certainly me, is shedding a tear for him. But the Iranian people now [1:42:08] live under martial law. And, by the way, no surprise to our intelligence agencies that [1:42:14] that's the case. And the first and the and the first of a puppet leader who's going to [1:42:19] be the leader who's chosen by the IRGC. No surprise to anybody on the [1:42:24] Intelligence Committee. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and is holding the [1:42:29] global economy hostage. No surprise to anybody who knows anything about U.S. [1:42:35] intelligence. Launching drones at our embassies and military bases. No [1:42:40] surprise. The president is surprised. Nobody who has looked at our intelligence [1:42:45] is surprised. Iran's nuclear program is damaged. [1:42:50] To be sure. But it still has a uranium stockpile. We heard today from the DNI at the very beginning [1:42:58] of this conversation that the regime is in place, and they are going to rebuild their [1:43:03] military capabilities, the ones that we are destroying right now. [1:43:08] The question I think is raised, director, about your specific engagement is whether [1:43:13] it will become a perpetual war, because what Iran will do is exactly what they have always [1:43:19] done. [1:43:21] which the DNI is saying they will do again. [1:43:24] In its briefings to the committee, [1:43:26] the Intelligence Committee has been clear-eyed [1:43:28] about what would happen in the Straits of Hormuz, [1:43:32] has been clear-eyed about whether or not our military bases, [1:43:36] our embassies, and our personnel in the region [1:43:41] would be placed at risk and in harm's way, [1:43:44] even though the administration did very little to protect them. [1:43:50] I know, Director Radcliffe, [1:43:53] that you warned President Trump [1:43:56] that if Israel assassinated the Supreme Leader, [1:44:00] the RRGC would replace him [1:44:03] with potentially a harder-line puppet. [1:44:06] In fact, I think what was clear is that the likelihood [1:44:09] was that it would be a hard-line puppet. [1:44:12] Do you disagree with that characterization [1:44:14] of the intelligence? [1:44:17] To that specific question, what we knew was, [1:44:21] first of all, I guess I have to address, [1:44:23] upfront, [1:44:24] so much of what you related in there, [1:44:27] the difference between political rhetoric versus... [1:44:30] Not political rhetoric. [1:44:31] I'm quoting the President of the United States. [1:44:33] Political rhetoric versus military... [1:44:36] Director, I'll ask you a question. [1:44:38] The difference between that and military [1:44:40] and intelligence execution. [1:44:42] But here's the most important thing. [1:44:43] You mischaracterize this as saying [1:44:45] there aren't clearly defined goals. [1:44:47] The defined goals are very clear. [1:44:49] Degrade and destroy the missile inventory [1:44:51] and drone inventory, delay and degrade... [1:44:53] Degrade and degrade the military industrial base [1:44:56] and factories that produce that, [1:44:58] degrade and destroy the IRGC Navy [1:45:02] that could control the... [1:45:03] These are all defined goals [1:45:05] that were set out specifically. [1:45:08] The premise of the question is that... [1:45:10] May I have my time back, Mr. Chairman? [1:45:11] I can't get a word in edgewise. [1:45:14] He won't answer the question, [1:45:15] and then he's taking a minute of my time. [1:45:17] You're both big boys. [1:45:18] You can handle it yourself. [1:45:19] Okay, well, Director, I agree that you are, [1:45:22] and I appreciate what you're saying. [1:45:23] Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. [1:45:23] Thank you. Thank you. [1:45:24] And I would... [1:45:26] I'm not... [1:45:29] My point is not what your characterization of the war is. [1:45:32] My point is what the character... [1:45:34] Your question about regime change? [1:45:35] I'm not asking you anymore, Mr. Director. [1:45:38] I'm sorry because I'm out of time [1:45:40] because of how you use the time. [1:45:42] The complete lack of clarity should matter to everybody. [1:45:47] President Trump, most of all, [1:45:49] he is the person that got elected on the criticism [1:45:53] that we had fought two wars [1:45:55] in the Middle East that had lasted for 20 years. [1:45:59] And now we're hearing the testimonies [1:46:01] to get their ballistic missiles [1:46:03] to not even get to the nuclear stuff. [1:46:07] We're going to have to be in a perpetual war with Iran. [1:46:10] And I don't think that's where the American people are on this. [1:46:14] This is a serious threat. [1:46:16] This is a serious threat to us and to Israel. [1:46:20] The question is how to handle it. [1:46:22] And President Trump said, [1:46:24] we are not the policemen of the war. [1:46:25] The world. [1:46:26] He ran on that. [1:46:28] And now he's turned us into the world's policemen, [1:46:31] into its jury, into its judge, into its executioner. [1:46:36] And just because we have the most advanced military [1:46:40] in the world, it doesn't mean that we should be [1:46:44] in a perpetual war all around the world. [1:46:46] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:46:48] Senator Rounds. [1:46:50] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:46:53] I'd like to maybe follow up a little bit. [1:46:56] The same line of questioning, [1:46:57] but I want to do it in a little bit different manner. [1:47:00] I've had the opportunity, like all of the other members [1:47:02] on this committee, to see the threats [1:47:05] that we discuss regularly in the classified settings. [1:47:10] I also, sitting on the Armed Services Committee, [1:47:12] have the opportunity to see what our capabilities are [1:47:15] and what we have to do in order to respond to those threats. [1:47:21] Director Ratcliffe, let me just begin. [1:47:23] I think it's been very clear from the beginning that, [1:47:27] even though there were supposedly [1:47:29] diplomatic activities going on, behind the scenes, [1:47:33] it was very clear, and I just ask if you would disagree [1:47:35] or agree with me on this, it was very clear [1:47:38] that Iran, while they were talking, [1:47:40] they had no intentions of following [1:47:42] through diplomatically with eliminating any [1:47:45] of their nuclear aspirations, correct? [1:47:49] Senator, that's correct. [1:47:51] And in the classified session, we can go into detail, [1:47:53] but you've characterized it right. [1:47:55] Diplomatically, they were saying one thing. [1:47:57] The intelligence was reflecting quite the contrary. [1:48:01] Okay. Second of all, with regard to the capabilities, [1:48:04] earlier in the 12-day war, [1:48:06] a lot of their defensive capabilities had been taken out. [1:48:10] Their air defenses had been taken out. [1:48:14] The use of our aircraft in that area was safer [1:48:17] because those defensive capabilities, [1:48:20] most of them had been significantly reduced, [1:48:22] meaning our young men and women who are flying those aircraft [1:48:27] were safer. [1:48:28] Is it fair to say that they were rebuilding [1:48:30] their defensive capabilities as well at that time? [1:48:35] Yes. So I'll just comment on that. [1:48:38] So much is being made. [1:48:40] Any characterization that Operation Midnight Hammer [1:48:43] was anything but a wild success is wildly inaccurate. [1:48:50] So as a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, [1:48:55] at the time of that, in the preceding four years, [1:48:59] Iran was able to use at least 440 kilograms of enriched uranium [1:49:04] to deliver a nuclear weapon. [1:49:06] And that's the amount of enriched uranium that's been documented [1:49:09] and admitted to by the Iranians. [1:49:11] They enriched uranium at least 440 kilograms at 60% [1:49:17] for use that could be used for weapons grade [1:49:20] to deliver a nuclear weapon. [1:49:22] As a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, [1:49:25] we sit here today with Iran having exactly the same amount [1:49:28] or incapable of enriching uranium to 60% [1:49:32] as a result of Operation Midnight Hammer. [1:49:35] Okay. Let me go on because I think this is an important part of this. [1:49:38] You also have to have a way of delivering a weapon. [1:49:41] It's fair to say that they have short-term [1:49:44] and intermediate-range ballistic missile availability today. [1:49:48] Were they building additional short-range [1:49:51] and mid-range ballistic missiles? [1:49:56] Yes. [1:49:57] Were they continuing to develop them? [1:49:59] Continuing to develop them and at rates that were alarming. [1:50:04] And what about our ability to respond to those? [1:50:07] We have very good defensive capabilities, [1:50:10] but it takes time for us to build our defensive capabilities. [1:50:13] Were they building their offensive capabilities [1:50:16] while they were negotiating with us at a faster rate [1:50:19] than we could build defensive capabilities? [1:50:21] Yes. [1:50:24] Were they continuing to work at and deliver additional resources [1:50:28] to terrorist organizations? [1:50:30] That were affiliated with them in the region? [1:50:32] Yes. [1:50:34] So in other words, while they were supposedly diplomatically working with us [1:50:37] during that entire time, they were continuing with regard [1:50:42] to their nuclear intentions. [1:50:44] They were building additional missile systems to deliver [1:50:48] or conventional weapon systems to threaten their neighbors. [1:50:51] Their defensive capabilities were going to be increased, [1:50:54] making our young men and women at risk [1:50:57] when at some point in the future we would have to [1:51:00] basically go in and clean the mess up. [1:51:03] There was an opportunity here, [1:51:05] and I think the President made the right choice [1:51:07] when he decided at this time that simply for our advantage [1:51:12] and for the young men and women that have to go in and do this, [1:51:15] that this was a safer time, if there ever is such a thing as a safer time, [1:51:19] but the right time for our nation to respond to this threat. [1:51:24] Is that an appropriate way of putting it, sir? [1:51:26] I agree with that. [1:51:28] Thank you. [1:51:29] I think the President made the right choice. [1:51:31] It is never a good time for a war. [1:51:35] But at some point you've got to look at what your best possibilities are [1:51:38] for protecting those young men and women who are in harm's way. [1:51:42] Let me move on for just a minute. [1:51:44] Director Radcliffe, let me just ask you this, [1:51:46] because there's been a discussion, [1:51:48] and we've never been able to talk about this in an unclassified setting, [1:51:51] and I recognize it's sensitive, but 60 Minutes, [1:51:54] there's been a report about Havana Syndrome [1:51:58] and about individuals who are within the agency [1:52:01] and within state departments that have actually had significant illness [1:52:06] and some attributed, they believe, to outside sources. [1:52:11] I don't think we have been able to, in an unclassified setting, [1:52:16] at least acknowledge that we take these issues seriously. [1:52:20] Is there anything you can share in this unclassified setting [1:52:23] to assure the people of the State Department and your agency [1:52:27] that this is not something which is being ignored? [1:52:31] Thanks for the question. [1:52:32] I can. [1:52:33] I appreciate the opportunity to address that. [1:52:37] Yes. [1:52:38] I'm very careful about what we can say. [1:52:41] We can go into further detail in the classified session. [1:52:45] But this is something that when I became the director, [1:52:49] as you're aware, Senator, [1:52:51] there are disparate opinions across the IC [1:52:54] about what the cause of these AHIs may or may not be. [1:52:58] Otherwise known as Havana Syndrome. [1:53:01] Havana Syndrome, yeah. [1:53:03] AHI. [1:53:04] And the question of whether or not they could be the result [1:53:07] of a directed energy weapon from a foreign adversary. [1:53:10] So when you, having been the DNI, [1:53:12] understanding the role of the DNI is to coordinate across the IC [1:53:16] when there are disparate opinions among agencies. [1:53:19] Director Gabbard and I had a conversation [1:53:21] where she agreed that she would undertake [1:53:24] a comprehensive review of that issue across the IC [1:53:29] to make sure that it is getting the attention that it deserves. [1:53:32] And I know that she has undertaken that [1:53:34] and will be able to brief you in further detail [1:53:36] in the classified session. [1:53:38] Thank you. [1:53:39] And one last thought, this is only a comment, [1:53:41] but to General Hartman, [1:53:43] your time in service has been very, very special. [1:53:47] Working with you on the Cybersecurity Subcommittee [1:53:49] of the Armed Services Committee, [1:53:51] I commend you for everything you have done. [1:53:53] You are truly a hero. [1:53:55] And you have served your country very, very well. [1:53:58] Thank you for your service. [1:53:59] Thank you, Senator. [1:54:00] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:54:01] Senator Kelly. [1:54:02] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:54:04] And thank you for [1:54:06] being here today to all of our witnesses. [1:54:09] So for more than a decade, [1:54:11] the United States has tried to make a pivot to Asia [1:54:14] in its national defense strategy [1:54:17] in order to confront significant threats from China. [1:54:21] For years, administrations of both parties [1:54:24] have identified China as the top threat facing our country [1:54:27] and worked to build relationships across Asia [1:54:30] and deter Chinese aggression. [1:54:32] At the same time, [1:54:35] we have bolstered our European allies [1:54:37] and asked them to contribute more to their defense [1:54:40] to deter Russia. [1:54:43] Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, [1:54:45] would you agree that China and Russia [1:54:48] are our primary geopolitical rivals? [1:54:51] Director Gabbard. [1:54:55] Yes, they are our primary strategic competitors. [1:54:57] Thank you. [1:54:58] Director Ratcliffe. [1:55:00] I would agree with that, [1:55:01] although I don't think they're equal [1:55:02] in terms of the threats that they pose. [1:55:04] Thank you. [1:55:05] So that brings us to the war with Iran. [1:55:08] So this has created one of the largest ever [1:55:11] supply shocks to the global oil supply, [1:55:15] which has sent gas prices skyrocketing for Americans. [1:55:19] But not everybody is losing. [1:55:21] Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, [1:55:24] is it accurate that Russia has gained billions of dollars [1:55:27] in additional oil revenue due to price spikes [1:55:29] as a result of the war and loosened sanctions? [1:55:33] Director Gabbard. [1:55:36] That is what has been reported. [1:55:41] I defer to the Secretary of Treasury and Energy [1:55:45] on that front for details. [1:55:47] Director Ratcliffe. [1:55:48] Yeah, I'm not an economist, [1:55:49] not going to try and do those calculations. [1:55:53] But as I talked about earlier, [1:55:54] sometimes there are decisions made [1:55:56] that will benefit adversaries at the same time [1:55:58] policymakers think that it will benefit the American people. [1:56:00] It's clear, I think we'd all agree [1:56:02] that sanctions were loosened, [1:56:05] and that means more money into the coffers [1:56:09] of Vladimir Putin. [1:56:11] Would you agree that if he has more funding, [1:56:14] he is likely to put that [1:56:16] into his war effort against Ukraine? [1:56:18] Director Gabbard. [1:56:19] I would defer to an actual intelligence assessment [1:56:24] on what they would believe his intentions are. [1:56:27] Director Ratcliffe. [1:56:30] Yeah, I wouldn't speculate on that. [1:56:31] You wouldn't speculate? [1:56:32] Okay. [1:56:33] Okay. [1:56:35] And is it accurate that China is continuing [1:56:37] to receive preferential oil flows from Iran [1:56:39] despite the conflict as Iran allows its own tankers [1:56:42] to transit the strait? [1:56:44] Director Gabbard. [1:56:47] I'm going to go back and forth between the two of you. [1:56:49] There has been some reporting of [1:56:54] China, India, and other countries [1:56:57] being able to move their tankers through the strait. [1:57:00] However, it is unclear the volume [1:57:03] or the measure of that. [1:57:05] Okay, so it sounds like it's accurate. [1:57:06] Thank you. [1:57:07] I'm going to move on. [1:57:08] Director Gabbard, you tweeted yesterday [1:57:10] that President Trump concluded [1:57:12] there was an imminent threat [1:57:14] and made a decision to attack Iran [1:57:16] after carefully reviewing [1:57:18] all of the information before him. [1:57:20] I think the country deserves to know [1:57:22] what the information was. [1:57:23] I'm going to ask a series of questions [1:57:26] and just want a yes or no. [1:57:28] We don't need any explanation, [1:57:31] just yes or no, [1:57:33] starting with were you asked, [1:57:37] I'm not asking if you did brief this, [1:57:39] were you asked to brief [1:57:41] on whether Iran would close [1:57:43] the Strait of Hormuz? [1:57:45] I'm not going to comment on what the President did [1:57:49] or didn't ask me on any topic. [1:57:51] I'm not even, I'm not asking if you briefed it. [1:57:53] I'm just asking if there was a request. [1:57:55] I understand that. [1:57:56] By the White House. [1:57:57] Director Ratcliffe, [1:57:58] were you asked to brief [1:58:02] on whether Iran would close [1:58:04] the Strait of Hormuz? [1:58:07] The briefings to the President [1:58:09] of the White House typically don't come [1:58:11] at the request of the White House, [1:58:12] so typically when we get intelligence [1:58:14] that we want the President to be aware of, [1:58:16] the intelligence community brings that [1:58:18] to the President. [1:58:19] Did you produce the analysis [1:58:21] for the Straits of Hormuz? [1:58:22] There has been and continues to be analysis [1:58:24] with respect to that. [1:58:26] Were you asked to brief on how [1:58:28] our adversaries and allies [1:58:29] would respond to the war in Iran? [1:58:34] I imagine I'll get the same answer. [1:58:38] So it's, just to point out here, [1:58:41] it's challenging to forget about actually [1:58:43] what was in the brief for a second. [1:58:45] We're having a hard time finding out [1:58:47] not only if you briefed the President on something, [1:58:50] but even if the White House asked [1:58:55] if they could be briefed on something [1:58:57] or if analysis was produced. [1:58:59] So I just want to point out here, [1:59:01] this is about six days. [1:59:03] Can I comment on that? [1:59:04] I'll go back to the point. [1:59:06] It's the same approach that we took [1:59:08] to the prior operations, [1:59:10] which to your credit, Senator, [1:59:12] you have praised the intelligence [1:59:14] and military communities [1:59:16] in Operation Midnight Hammer [1:59:18] and Operation Absolute Resolve. [1:59:21] It's the same approach [1:59:22] and the same professionals [1:59:23] in terms of how they approached [1:59:24] this particular operation. [1:59:26] We're trying to figure out [1:59:27] if the President knew what the downside was [1:59:30] of the Strait of Hormuz being closed. [1:59:33] And I'm having a hard time finding out [1:59:35] whether the White House asked [1:59:36] or whether there was a brief, [1:59:38] whether the President knew. [1:59:40] Did he know this was going to happen [1:59:42] or did he just disregard it? [1:59:44] And I just want to point out something [1:59:46] that was released about six days ago. [1:59:48] This is a fundraising email [1:59:51] from the President, [1:59:52] from the President of the United States. [1:59:55] And in this email here, [1:59:56] where there's multiple links to donate money, [1:59:59] it says, [2:00:01] as a National Security Briefing member, [2:00:04] you'll receive [2:00:05] my private National Security Briefings. [2:00:10] Director Gabbard or Director Radcliffe, [2:00:16] do you think the public should be able to, [2:00:19] supporters of the President [2:00:20] should be able to pay [2:00:21] and receive his private [2:00:23] National Security Briefings? [2:00:25] I assume these are briefings, [2:00:27] Director Radcliffe, [2:00:28] that you provide to the President [2:00:29] that is now going to be provided [2:00:31] to somebody who makes a donation. [2:00:33] Regardless of what that, [2:00:34] I don't know what that document is, [2:00:36] but regardless of what it says, [2:00:38] it didn't happen. [2:00:39] Well, no, this is new. [2:00:41] But what I'm telling you is that [2:00:43] the Hatch Act would prevent me [2:00:45] in an apolitical role [2:00:46] from engaging in that. [2:00:47] I'm not aware that anything like that happened. [2:00:50] Yeah, this says, [2:00:51] unfiltered updates. [2:00:52] So, Director Gabbard, [2:00:55] do you have any comment [2:00:56] on whether unfiltered updates [2:00:58] of private National Security Briefings [2:01:01] should be made to individuals [2:01:03] that donate to the President? [2:01:05] I'm not familiar with that document and... [2:01:08] It's been made very public six days ago. [2:01:11] We'll get you a copy here [2:01:14] because I agree with you, [2:01:15] Director Radcliffe, [2:01:17] that the Hatch Act should prohibit [2:01:20] this type of conduct. [2:01:22] Thank you. [2:01:23] Senator Lankford joins us [2:01:24] from what I gather [2:01:25] is a very exciting confirmation hearing [2:01:27] for Senator Mullen. [2:01:28] It is, actually. [2:01:29] For all of you, thank you. [2:01:31] Thank you for the time [2:01:32] that you give to the country [2:01:33] to be able to serve, [2:01:34] for your families [2:01:35] and the sacrifice that you make [2:01:36] to be able to do this [2:01:37] and all the professionals [2:01:38] that you serve. [2:01:39] Please pass on our gratitude to them [2:01:40] because they work incredibly hard [2:01:41] and difficult tasks in this. [2:01:43] I want to talk about something [2:01:44] that's a little closer to home on this. [2:01:46] A lot of Oklahomans that I talk to, [2:01:48] and quite frankly, [2:01:49] folks even outside the state on it, [2:01:50] when they think about threats, [2:01:52] they, as strange as this may sound [2:01:54] to those of us that deal with missiles [2:01:56] and ballistics, [2:01:58] they think about the threat [2:01:59] to their family [2:02:00] and to their income [2:02:01] and to who they are. [2:02:03] And a lot of it is international scammers [2:02:06] that are now reaching [2:02:07] into the United States [2:02:08] to be able to gather data [2:02:09] or to be able to steal money from them. [2:02:12] AI has accelerated this dramatically. [2:02:14] And I know the Worldwide Threats [2:02:16] has mentioned this [2:02:17] and some of the challenges [2:02:18] that we face on it. [2:02:19] But the challenge is getting bigger. [2:02:21] FBI had noted that in 2024, [2:02:24] it was almost $17 billion [2:02:26] that was assumed lost to scammers, [2:02:29] a lot of those internationals. [2:02:30] Some estimates are as high [2:02:31] as $50 billion on it. [2:02:34] AI continues to be able [2:02:35] to accelerate the capabilities [2:02:36] of these scammers [2:02:37] and the capabilities on it. [2:02:38] Open AI even noted [2:02:40] now that they're putting online ads [2:02:42] saying, [2:02:43] if you've been scammed, [2:02:45] here's a way to recover your money. [2:02:47] And that is actually a scam. [2:02:49] It's taking them to a fake FBI page [2:02:52] where they can then turn in [2:02:54] and to say, [2:02:55] if you've been scammed, [2:02:56] here's how the FBI [2:02:57] is going to actually come help you [2:02:59] to recover it. [2:03:00] But even that page is fake [2:03:01] and they're going to be able [2:03:02] to steal their information. [2:03:03] This is accelerating at a pace [2:03:05] that's pretty dramatic [2:03:06] with the use of AI on this. [2:03:08] Director Patel, [2:03:09] I know that you guys are on it. [2:03:11] I know that there's [2:03:12] multiple entities on it, [2:03:13] but this is a big challenge. [2:03:14] And a lot of Americans [2:03:15] are very, very concerned [2:03:16] about the threat to their families. [2:03:18] They may have their parents [2:03:20] that are more vulnerable [2:03:21] at this time and being targeted. [2:03:23] How do we take some of this on [2:03:25] to be able to confront [2:03:26] what's happening online [2:03:27] to be able to attack people [2:03:29] and to be able to scam them? [2:03:30] Thank you, Senator. [2:03:31] And it's with any other [2:03:32] high priority operation [2:03:35] that the FBI runs, [2:03:36] whether it's CICT [2:03:37] or we're talking about scamming [2:03:38] and scam centers here. [2:03:39] One, you have to drown [2:03:41] and get online [2:03:42] with your online covert employees [2:03:43] and platforms. [2:03:44] And we've increased funding. [2:03:45] And we've also, [2:03:46] what we've done strategically [2:03:48] is move people out of Washington, DC [2:03:50] on the intel analyst front [2:03:51] and the support staff front [2:03:52] to places like Oklahoma. [2:03:53] Actually, every single state [2:03:54] across the country [2:03:55] has received a plus up [2:03:57] because of that. [2:03:58] And what we've created [2:03:59] is the Internet Crime Complaint Center [2:04:01] of the IC3, [2:04:02] which I know you're familiar with [2:04:03] and referenced. [2:04:04] So what we're doing [2:04:05] on the homeland [2:04:06] is going out into the streets [2:04:07] of America [2:04:08] on the online platforms [2:04:09] in America [2:04:10] and shutting down [2:04:11] those networks [2:04:12] and shutting down [2:04:13] the capability of AI [2:04:14] to interfere. [2:04:15] But I think [2:04:16] the bigger term project, [2:04:17] what we're doing overseas, [2:04:18] that's the key to this. [2:04:19] Right. [2:04:20] The scam center compounds [2:04:21] are largely located [2:04:22] in Cambodia and Burma [2:04:23] and on the Thai border. [2:04:24] I've already engaged [2:04:25] with the premiers [2:04:26] of each and every one [2:04:27] of those countries. [2:04:28] We've done so [2:04:29] to switch off access [2:04:30] to the Internet [2:04:31] with those governments [2:04:32] to make sure [2:04:33] that those compounds, [2:04:34] they're literal compounds [2:04:35] that are being built [2:04:36] and we can get into that [2:04:37] in the classified center, [2:04:38] that are fleecing Americans [2:04:41] and senior citizens [2:04:42] all the way from Southeast Asia [2:04:44] because they are backed [2:04:45] by the CCP [2:04:46] to build those compounds [2:04:47] because they know [2:04:48] it's going to hurt [2:04:49] everyday Americans. [2:04:50] So us, [2:04:51] which we have successfully [2:04:52] already eliminated [2:04:53] and scuttled, [2:04:54] excuse me, [2:04:55] numerous compounds [2:04:56] in Cambodia and Burma [2:04:57] and Thailand [2:04:58] is the big picture, [2:04:59] the big part [2:05:00] of the lift overseas. [2:05:01] What we're going to do [2:05:02] is go into those countries [2:05:04] and shut down [2:05:05] a single scam center compound. [2:05:07] Which is very helpful [2:05:08] and every American [2:05:10] is thinking about this [2:05:11] and talking about it. [2:05:12] Director Patel, [2:05:13] I'm going to stay with you. [2:05:14] The counter narcotics work [2:05:15] has been phenomenal [2:05:16] in the past year and a half. [2:05:18] The amount of methamphetamine [2:05:20] and fentanyl [2:05:21] that have been seized [2:05:22] coming across our border [2:05:23] has been dramatic [2:05:25] and that has a real effect [2:05:26] to what's actually coming [2:05:28] at families in my state on it. [2:05:30] What I'm interested in is [2:05:32] how are you partnering [2:05:33] with local law enforcement [2:05:34] to continue to accelerate [2:05:36] this process? [2:05:37] What does that look like [2:05:38] for FBI? [2:05:39] Absolutely, Senator. [2:05:40] The counter narcotic mission [2:05:41] can't be complete [2:05:42] without state [2:05:43] and local law enforcement. [2:05:44] So we are embedding [2:05:45] more task force officers [2:05:46] across the country [2:05:47] on the specific [2:05:48] counter narcotics mission. [2:05:49] We've also stood up [2:05:50] with our interagency partners [2:05:52] in Tucson, Arizona, [2:05:54] the Southern Border [2:05:55] Intelligence Center, [2:05:56] specifically on the [2:05:57] counter narcotic mission [2:05:58] so that we can utilize [2:05:59] the Department of War [2:06:00] and interagency capabilities [2:06:01] on the law enforcement front. [2:06:02] That's why we seize [2:06:03] enough fentanyl in 2025 [2:06:06] to kill 178 million Americans. [2:06:08] That's a 31% increase [2:06:09] year over year. [2:06:10] And here's a statistic [2:06:11] that everybody [2:06:12] should be proud of. [2:06:13] Opioid overdose deaths [2:06:15] from last year [2:06:16] dropped 20 points, [2:06:18] 20 points from across [2:06:19] the country. [2:06:20] And in Oklahoma [2:06:21] specifically, Senator, [2:06:22] we seized enough kilograms [2:06:24] of cocaine [2:06:25] to include a 232% increase [2:06:28] in the state of Oklahoma alone [2:06:30] and enough fentanyl [2:06:31] to kill 500,000 people. [2:06:33] We can't do that [2:06:35] unless we have great [2:06:36] police partnerships, [2:06:37] which has been a priority [2:06:38] of mine, which is why [2:06:39] I've embedded police officers [2:06:41] here at headquarters [2:06:43] from around the country [2:06:44] to make sure we have [2:06:45] that connectivity. [2:06:46] And I've shortened [2:06:47] the task force officer [2:06:48] onboarding pipeline [2:06:49] from one to two years [2:06:50] to 90 days. [2:06:51] We need them. [2:06:52] Yeah, we do. [2:06:53] Director Ratcliffe, [2:06:54] the annual threat assessment [2:06:56] highlights this year [2:06:58] the Muslim Brotherhood [2:06:59] in particular [2:07:00] and calls out some of their [2:07:03] financial material support [2:07:04] on this. [2:07:05] That may be surprising [2:07:07] to some folks here, [2:07:08] but it's not surprising [2:07:09] to folks all across [2:07:10] the Middle East [2:07:11] in the threat [2:07:12] that the Muslim Brotherhood [2:07:13] continues to pose [2:07:15] to so many governments [2:07:16] and entities across [2:07:17] the world on that. [2:07:18] How is the Muslim Brotherhood [2:07:20] financing itself [2:07:23] and its acts of terrorism? [2:07:25] And is there something [2:07:28] that we need to do here [2:07:29] to be able to make sure [2:07:31] that we're protecting [2:07:32] Americans in the threat? [2:07:33] Senator, I think with regard [2:07:38] to the Muslim Brotherhood abroad, [2:07:41] you know, we view that [2:07:43] just as we do other proxies [2:07:45] across the Middle East, [2:07:48] the Houthis and other groups, [2:07:51] and I can relate to you [2:07:53] that the CIA is very focused [2:07:56] on the counterterrorism front. [2:07:58] You weren't here before. [2:08:00] I said in the classified portion [2:08:02] I would get into [2:08:03] the CIA's success [2:08:07] with regard to groups [2:08:08] like the Muslim Brotherhood [2:08:10] in a classified setting [2:08:11] where I can share with you [2:08:14] the impact that we're having, [2:08:16] and across the board [2:08:19] with regard to terrorist groups [2:08:23] and our counterterrorism activities, [2:08:25] I can publicly characterize it [2:08:27] as saying we've had, [2:08:29] we've accomplished more [2:08:30] in the last year [2:08:31] than in the four years [2:08:33] of the prior administration [2:08:34] combined. [2:08:36] So hopefully it gives you [2:08:37] some measure of comfort [2:08:38] about how we're approaching things [2:08:40] and the effectiveness [2:08:41] that we've had in the last year [2:08:44] in that regard, [2:08:45] and I'll look forward [2:08:46] to getting into detail [2:08:47] in the classified portion. [2:08:49] I look forward to that. [2:08:50] Thank you. [2:08:51] Senator Reid. [2:08:53] Thanks very much, [2:08:54] Mr. Chairman. [2:08:55] Ladies and gentlemen, [2:08:56] thank you. [2:08:57] The Washington Post reported [2:08:58] earlier this week [2:08:59] in their words, [2:09:00] the U.S. intelligence assessments [2:09:02] say Iran's regime likely [2:09:04] will remain in place for now, [2:09:06] weakened but more hard-line, [2:09:08] with the powerful Islamic Revolutionary [2:09:10] Guard Corps security forces [2:09:12] exerting greater control. [2:09:14] Director Gabbard, [2:09:16] do you stand by that reported [2:09:18] intelligence community assessment? [2:09:21] I don't stand by any leaked [2:09:23] so-called intelligence [2:09:25] to the media. [2:09:26] I do stand by the intelligence [2:09:28] communities assessment [2:09:29] that was included [2:09:30] in the annual threat assessment [2:09:32] that speaks directly to this issue [2:09:34] that as of this moment, [2:09:36] the regime maintains power [2:09:38] within Iran, [2:09:40] even though they are vastly degraded [2:09:42] on almost every front. [2:09:44] Do you think that the killing [2:09:46] of the Ayatollah and his wife [2:09:49] and other family members [2:09:52] and key people contributed [2:09:54] to the picking of a hard-line successor? [2:10:00] Senator, [2:10:01] the intelligence communities assessment [2:10:04] has pointed to [2:10:07] a number of different scenarios [2:10:10] that went into play [2:10:13] with the selection of the successor. [2:10:15] The details of that [2:10:17] we can discuss in a closed hearing [2:10:19] with regard to the intelligence reporting. [2:10:21] Is the regime in Iran [2:10:28] now trying to [2:10:30] vote the deceased Ayatollah [2:10:34] as a martyr [2:10:36] who should be followed, [2:10:38] and does that help them [2:10:40] facilitate support? [2:10:44] Senator, [2:10:45] the Iranians are certainly [2:10:47] using that as a call to action. [2:10:50] The effects of that [2:10:52] from an intelligence standpoint [2:10:55] remain to be seen. [2:10:57] There is a tradition in Shia, though, [2:10:59] to honor martyrs. [2:11:00] One of their greatest celebrations [2:11:02] is the martyrdom [2:11:04] of the grandson of Muhammad. [2:11:06] Is that correct? [2:11:07] That's right. [2:11:09] So we might have played into [2:11:11] their cultural biases [2:11:13] erroneously. [2:11:14] General Adams, [2:11:15] what conditions [2:11:16] the U.S.S. would need [2:11:17] to be present [2:11:18] to make the regime collapse [2:11:20] or necessitate, [2:11:22] excuse my voice, [2:11:23] unconditional surrender? [2:11:25] And can it be done [2:11:26] with air power alone? [2:11:27] Senator, [2:11:31] we have, [2:11:32] at the Defense Intelligence Agency, [2:11:34] put together a number of scenarios [2:11:36] coordinated across the I.C. [2:11:38] with regards to what we would forecast [2:11:40] the future would be. [2:11:42] One of the, [2:11:43] there are four specific goals [2:11:45] that we've been told [2:11:47] to track and analyze [2:11:48] with regards to the goals [2:11:50] of the U.S. effort. [2:11:52] They've been articulated [2:11:54] earlier in the hearing, [2:11:55] so I won't hammer on those. [2:11:57] But with regards to [2:11:58] the collapse of the regime, [2:12:00] specific perpetuation, [2:12:02] like what would precipitate that, [2:12:05] we would like to, [2:12:06] I would prefer to talk about that [2:12:08] in the classified hearing. [2:12:09] Well, I understand, [2:12:11] but there's a very basic question here. [2:12:14] Will air power alone [2:12:16] be able to destroy this regime, [2:12:21] given the culture, [2:12:22] the politics, [2:12:23] the temperament of these people? [2:12:26] The Iraq-Iran war lasted [2:12:28] for eight years [2:12:29] with a million casualties. [2:12:32] Do you think air power alone [2:12:34] will do it? [2:12:35] Senator, [2:12:40] the capabilities [2:12:41] that our joint force brings to bear [2:12:45] can accomplish many missions. [2:12:48] To forecast exactly what [2:12:50] can and can't accomplish this goal, [2:12:55] I prefer not to guess [2:12:59] or prognosticate on that. [2:13:01] Recognize your professional position. [2:13:07] U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff [2:13:10] recently stated that Russian leaders [2:13:12] told Trump on a call [2:13:14] that they were not sharing [2:13:15] intelligence with Iran. [2:13:17] Witkoff said, [2:13:18] quote, [2:13:19] we can take them at their word. [2:13:21] Director Gabbard and Radcliffe, [2:13:23] do you take President Putin at his word? [2:13:25] I'll go ahead and answer. [2:13:30] No, I don't take Vladimir Putin [2:13:33] at his word. [2:13:36] Are they providing intelligence [2:13:39] to the Iranians? [2:13:40] We talked about this before. [2:13:42] In the classified session, [2:13:44] what we can go into is [2:13:47] that the Iranians are requesting [2:13:49] intelligence assistance [2:13:51] from Russia, [2:13:52] from China, [2:13:54] and from other adversaries [2:13:56] of the United States. [2:13:57] And whether or not [2:14:01] those countries are [2:14:03] is something we can talk about [2:14:04] in the classified portion. [2:14:06] But you've made an assessment. [2:14:09] You've analyzed traffic communications [2:14:11] and you can... [2:14:12] I know the answer [2:14:13] and happy to discuss that with you [2:14:15] in the classified portion. [2:14:18] Yes, sir, go ahead. [2:14:21] Go ahead. [2:14:22] Thank you. [2:14:23] One of the aspects of this [2:14:25] is the collateral effects, [2:14:27] particularly in Russia [2:14:29] and Ukraine. [2:14:31] We were just talking about Russia [2:14:33] probably or possibly [2:14:34] providing intelligence [2:14:36] that may be interfering [2:14:37] or inflicting casualties [2:14:39] on our forces. [2:14:40] Russia is also benefiting [2:14:42] from the lifting of sanctions [2:14:44] on their ability to sell oil [2:14:46] throughout the world. [2:14:47] I heard one estimate [2:14:48] of a $20 billion surge [2:14:50] in their potential revenues. [2:14:53] Ukraine, on the other hand, [2:14:55] is facing perhaps [2:14:57] a disruption [2:14:59] to its supply chain of missiles [2:15:01] and other equipment [2:15:02] because they're being devoted [2:15:03] to this operation. [2:15:04] So, General Adams, [2:15:06] can you just give me [2:15:07] your impression [2:15:09] of the effect of the battle [2:15:11] on Russia and Ukraine [2:15:13] at the moment of this battle? [2:15:17] Well, from our collections, [2:15:19] the effect of the epic fury [2:15:23] on the Russian-Ukrainian battle [2:15:31] has been indirect, [2:15:33] not direct. [2:15:35] We do track very carefully [2:15:38] what benefits or, [2:15:41] as you alluded to, [2:15:43] the collateral effects [2:15:45] of what we're doing [2:15:47] and how it impacts. [2:15:49] There is a lot of, [2:15:52] from both the Russians [2:15:53] and the Chinese, [2:15:54] observations of what we're doing [2:15:56] and figuring out [2:15:58] what they can learn from that. [2:16:00] So I think that's [2:16:01] a collateral effect [2:16:03] as we expose [2:16:04] what the joint force displays [2:16:06] on the battlefield. [2:16:08] And I think we can talk [2:16:14] in a little more detail [2:16:16] as we move to [2:16:17] the classified session [2:16:18] some of the things [2:16:19] that we're collecting [2:16:20] specifically about [2:16:22] what those effects are. [2:16:24] Thank you very much, sir. [2:16:25] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:16:26] Senator Ossoff. [2:16:28] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:16:29] Thank you all for being here. [2:16:30] Before I ask you a few questions, [2:16:32] I want to call everyone's attention again [2:16:34] to this fundraising email [2:16:36] signed by the president [2:16:38] that Senator Kelly mentioned earlier [2:16:41] in which the president [2:16:42] of the United States [2:16:44] invites his campaign donors [2:16:46] to, quote, [2:16:47] claim your spot, [2:16:49] claim your spot, [2:16:51] join now [2:16:52] to receive private [2:16:53] national security briefings [2:16:57] to his political donors [2:16:59] featuring a photo [2:17:00] of the president [2:17:02] at a dignified transfer ceremony [2:17:04] with a flag-draped coffin [2:17:06] of an American service member [2:17:09] killed in action [2:17:10] returning to their family. [2:17:11] And the American people [2:17:12] need to know [2:17:13] that the president [2:17:14] of the United States [2:17:15] is fundraising [2:17:16] for his political campaign [2:17:18] and his PAC [2:17:19] using images [2:17:21] of American service members [2:17:23] killed in action [2:17:24] and it's a disgrace. [2:17:25] Now, Director Gabbard, [2:17:29] I'd like to reground this [2:17:31] in your core responsibilities. [2:17:33] Under the law, [2:17:35] you are responsible [2:17:36] for providing national intelligence [2:17:38] to the president. [2:17:39] Correct? [2:17:42] Yes. [2:17:43] And to the heads [2:17:44] of executive branch departments [2:17:45] and agencies? [2:17:46] Yes. [2:17:47] And to the chairman [2:17:48] of the Joint Chiefs [2:17:49] and senior military commanders? [2:17:50] Across the IC, yes. [2:17:51] And to the Senate [2:17:52] and the House [2:17:53] and relevant committees? [2:17:54] Correct? [2:17:55] Yes. [2:17:56] And the law states [2:17:57] that the national intelligence [2:17:58] you provide to Congress, [2:17:59] quote, [2:18:00] should be timely, [2:18:01] objective, [2:18:02] and independent [2:18:03] of political considerations. [2:18:04] Correct? [2:18:06] Yes. [2:18:07] And you noted [2:18:08] in your opening statement [2:18:09] you're here fulfilling [2:18:10] a statutory responsibility [2:18:11] and that your testimony, [2:18:12] in fact, [2:18:13] is a testament [2:18:14] to the intelligence community's [2:18:16] assessment of threats. [2:18:17] That's right. [2:18:18] Correct? [2:18:19] And that opening statement [2:18:20] as submitted to the committee [2:18:21] in advance of this hearing [2:18:22] stated that as a result [2:18:23] of last summer's airstrikes, [2:18:24] quote, [2:18:25] Iran's nuclear enrichment program [2:18:26] was obliterated, [2:18:27] end quote. [2:18:28] Correct? [2:18:30] That's right. [2:18:31] And is that, [2:18:32] in fact, [2:18:33] the assessment [2:18:34] of the intelligence community? [2:18:35] Yes. [2:18:36] So the assessment [2:18:37] of the intelligence community [2:18:38] is that Iran's [2:18:39] nuclear enrichment program [2:18:41] was obliterated [2:18:42] by last summer's airstrikes? [2:18:43] Yes. [2:18:44] And the opening statement [2:18:45] is that there's been [2:18:46] no effort since then [2:18:47] to try to rebuild [2:18:48] their enrichment capability, [2:18:49] end quote. [2:18:50] Correct? [2:18:51] That's right. [2:18:52] And that's the assessment [2:18:53] of the intelligence community? [2:18:55] Yes. [2:18:56] The White House stated [2:18:57] on March 1st of this year [2:18:58] that this war was launched [2:19:00] and was, [2:19:01] quote, [2:19:02] a military campaign [2:19:03] to eliminate [2:19:04] the imminent nuclear threat [2:19:05] posed by the Iranian regime, [2:19:06] end quote. [2:19:07] That's a statement [2:19:08] from the White House. [2:19:09] Quote, [2:19:10] the imminent nuclear threat [2:19:12] posed by the Iranian regime. [2:19:14] Was it the assessment [2:19:15] of the intelligence community [2:19:16] that there was [2:19:17] a, quote, [2:19:18] imminent nuclear threat [2:19:19] posed by the Iranian regime? [2:19:22] The intelligence community [2:19:23] assessed that Iran [2:19:24] maintained the intention [2:19:25] to rebuild [2:19:26] and to continue [2:19:27] to grow [2:19:28] their nuclear enrichment [2:19:29] capability. [2:19:30] Was it the assessment [2:19:31] of the intelligence community [2:19:32] that there was a, quote, [2:19:33] imminent nuclear threat [2:19:34] posed by the Iranian regime, [2:19:35] yes or no? [2:19:36] Senator, [2:19:37] the only person [2:19:38] who can determine [2:19:39] what is and is not [2:19:40] an imminent threat [2:19:41] is the president. [2:19:42] False. [2:19:43] This is the worldwide [2:19:44] threat-searing [2:19:45] where you present [2:19:46] to Congress [2:19:47] national intelligence, [2:19:48] timely objective [2:19:49] and independent [2:19:50] of political considerations. [2:19:51] You've stated today [2:19:53] that the intelligence community's [2:19:54] assessment [2:19:55] is that Iran's nuclear [2:19:56] enrichment program [2:19:57] was obliterated [2:19:58] and that, quote, [2:19:59] there had been no efforts [2:20:00] since then [2:20:01] to try to rebuild [2:20:02] their enrichment capability. [2:20:03] Was it the intelligence [2:20:04] community's assessment [2:20:06] that nevertheless, [2:20:08] despite this obliteration, [2:20:10] there was a, quote, [2:20:11] imminent nuclear threat [2:20:12] posed by the Iranian regime, [2:20:13] yes or no? [2:20:14] It is not [2:20:15] the intelligence community's [2:20:16] responsibility [2:20:17] to determine [2:20:18] what is and is not [2:20:19] an imminent threat. [2:20:20] That is up to the president [2:20:21] based on a volume [2:20:22] of information [2:20:23] that he receives. [2:20:24] It is precisely [2:20:25] your responsibility [2:20:26] to determine [2:20:27] what constitutes [2:20:28] a threat [2:20:29] to the United States. [2:20:30] This is the worldwide [2:20:31] threats hearing [2:20:32] where, [2:20:34] as you noted [2:20:35] in your opening testimony, [2:20:37] quote, [2:20:38] you represent [2:20:39] the IC's [2:20:40] assessment [2:20:41] of threats. [2:20:42] You are here [2:20:43] to represent [2:20:44] the IC's [2:20:45] assessment [2:20:46] of threats. [2:20:47] That's a quote [2:20:48] from your own [2:20:49] opening statement. [2:20:50] And so my question [2:20:51] is, [2:20:52] as you're here [2:20:53] to present [2:20:54] the IC's assessment [2:20:55] of threats, [2:20:57] was it the assessment [2:20:58] of the intelligence [2:20:59] community [2:21:00] that, [2:21:01] as the White House [2:21:02] claimed on March 1st, [2:21:03] there was a, quote, [2:21:04] imminent nuclear threat [2:21:05] posed by the Iranian regime, [2:21:07] yes or no? [2:21:08] Once again, [2:21:09] Senator, [2:21:10] the intelligence community [2:21:11] has provided [2:21:12] the inputs [2:21:14] that make up [2:21:15] this annual threat assessment. [2:21:16] You won't answer [2:21:17] the question. [2:21:18] It is the nature [2:21:19] of the imminent threat [2:21:20] assessment. [2:21:21] The president [2:21:22] has to make [2:21:23] that determination [2:21:24] based on a collection [2:21:25] and volume [2:21:26] of information [2:21:27] and intelligence [2:21:28] that he is provided with. [2:21:29] You're here [2:21:30] to be timely, [2:21:31] objective, [2:21:32] and independent [2:21:33] of political considerations. [2:21:34] Exactly what I'm doing. [2:21:35] No, [2:21:36] you're evading [2:21:37] a question [2:21:38] because to provide [2:21:39] a candid response [2:21:40] to the committee [2:21:41] would contradict [2:21:42] a statement [2:21:43] from the White House. [2:21:44] Let me ask you [2:21:45] about your presence [2:21:46] in Fulton County [2:21:47] on January 28th [2:21:50] of this year. [2:21:51] You were present [2:21:52] at the FBI's raid [2:21:53] on the Fulton County [2:21:54] Elections Office [2:21:55] on January 28th, [2:21:56] correct? [2:21:57] I was present [2:21:58] for part [2:21:59] of the FBI [2:22:00] exercising a warrant [2:22:01] approved [2:22:02] by a municipal judge [2:22:03] to obtain [2:22:04] an investigation. [2:22:05] Yes, [2:22:06] and the FBI [2:22:07] was there executing [2:22:08] that warrant [2:22:09] to seize ballots [2:22:10] and materials [2:22:11] associated [2:22:12] with the 2020 election, [2:22:13] correct? [2:22:14] Yes. [2:22:16] And are you aware [2:22:17] that members [2:22:18] of this committee [2:22:19] have already [2:22:20] opened inquiries [2:22:21] into your election-related activities? [2:22:22] Yes. [2:22:23] On February 2nd, [2:22:24] you sent a letter [2:22:25] to Senator Warner [2:22:26] regarding your presence [2:22:27] at the raid. [2:22:28] Was that letter accurate? [2:22:29] I don't recall [2:22:30] the exact date, [2:22:31] but if I sent a letter [2:22:32] that had my signature, [2:22:35] it was accurate. [2:22:36] You stated in the letter [2:22:37] that your presence [2:22:38] at the raid [2:22:39] was, quote, [2:22:40] requested [2:22:41] by the president, [2:22:42] correct? [2:22:43] Yes. [2:22:44] When did the president [2:22:45] request your presence [2:22:46] at the raid? [2:22:47] The day of the raid, [2:22:48] the warrant execution [2:22:49] commencing. [2:22:50] The day of the raid? [2:22:51] Yes. [2:22:52] And when [2:22:53] did the president [2:22:55] request your presence [2:22:56] at the raid? [2:22:57] Yes. [2:22:58] He called you [2:22:59] on the phone? [2:23:00] I'm not gonna disclose [2:23:01] how the message [2:23:02] was delivered, [2:23:03] but it was a request [2:23:04] from the president [2:23:05] and his administration [2:23:06] to go and help oversee [2:23:07] this warrant [2:23:08] being executed [2:23:09] along with the deputy [2:23:10] director of the FBI. [2:23:11] Is it your role [2:23:12] to oversee... [2:23:13] And to thank the FBI agents [2:23:14] who were conducting [2:23:15] this warrant? [2:23:16] Is it your role [2:23:17] to oversee [2:23:18] the execution [2:23:19] of criminal warrants? [2:23:20] It is my role, [2:23:21] based on statute [2:23:22] that Congress has passed, [2:23:23] to oversee the execution [2:23:24] of criminal warrants. [2:23:25] So you [2:23:26] oversaw the raid, [2:23:27] correct? [2:23:28] You just testified [2:23:29] you oversaw the raid? [2:23:30] Portions of it. [2:23:31] Okay. [2:23:32] Did you handle any ballots [2:23:33] or election-related materials? [2:23:35] No. [2:23:36] You were inside [2:23:37] an FBI evidence truck, [2:23:38] correct? [2:23:40] You were photographed [2:23:41] inside an FBI evidence truck? [2:23:42] It was an empty truck, [2:23:43] yes. [2:23:44] The president stated, [2:23:45] quote, [2:23:46] you looked at votes [2:23:47] that wanted to be checked out. [2:23:48] The senator's time [2:23:49] is expired. [2:23:50] Did you look at votes [2:23:51] as the president stated? [2:23:52] Senator Ossoff, [2:23:53] your time has expired. [2:23:54] You respond [2:23:55] to the record [2:23:56] to that question [2:23:57] is my question. [2:23:58] I'm happy to respond [2:23:59] to questions for the record. [2:24:00] Thank you, [2:24:02] Director Gabbard. [2:24:04] Thank you. [2:24:05] Vice Chairman? [2:24:06] I just want to, [2:24:07] I'm not going to go back [2:24:08] to this issue. [2:24:09] I'm sure we'll address [2:24:10] in the closed setting. [2:24:12] But I am very disappointed. [2:24:13] This is the only one time [2:24:14] a year [2:24:15] the public gets to hear [2:24:16] from you guys [2:24:17] in this kind of setting. [2:24:18] And the fact [2:24:19] that we have repeated [2:24:20] public reporting, [2:24:23] including a major story [2:24:24] in the Wall Street Journal [2:24:25] today [2:24:26] about China [2:24:27] and Russia [2:24:29] assisting [2:24:30] Iran, [2:24:31] which seems obvious [2:24:33] and evident [2:24:34] and none of you [2:24:35] would confirm [2:24:36] that publicly [2:24:37] I think [2:24:39] doesn't give [2:24:40] the American people [2:24:41] the full challenges [2:24:42] of this war. [2:24:43] I would add [2:24:47] what I said earlier [2:24:48] that the media [2:24:50] is not a classification [2:24:51] authority [2:24:52] but [2:24:53] certainly sounds [2:24:54] like something [2:24:55] Russia and China [2:24:56] would do [2:24:57] and they have done [2:24:58] for decades [2:24:59] in the past [2:25:00] to Americans. [2:25:01] To wrap up [2:25:02] a little business [2:25:03] here before we adjourn [2:25:04] the open session [2:25:05] we will [2:25:06] go to the usual [2:25:07] location [2:25:08] for the closed session [2:25:09] that's at 1256 [2:25:10] promptly. [2:25:11] I do want to note [2:25:12] for the record [2:25:13] that Senator Young [2:25:14] cannot join us. [2:25:15] He is at [2:25:16] Dover Air Force Base [2:25:17] for the dignified [2:25:18] transfer of remains [2:25:19] for one of our [2:25:20] fallen heroes [2:25:21] a Hoosier. [2:25:22] And I would invite [2:25:23] everyone to join [2:25:24] Senator Young [2:25:25] in praying [2:25:26] for the family [2:25:27] and friends [2:25:28] of that soldier [2:25:29] and all the soldiers [2:25:30] who have given their life [2:25:31] in the defense [2:25:32] of our freedom [2:25:33] and security. [2:25:34] General Hartman [2:25:35] thank you [2:25:36] given your impending [2:25:37] retirement [2:25:38] since this is your [2:25:39] last appearance [2:25:41] for the committee. [2:25:42] I'm sure you hope [2:25:43] and I'm sure [2:25:44] that the thing [2:25:45] you'll miss most [2:25:46] about your long career [2:25:47] in uniform [2:25:48] is testifying [2:25:49] before Congress. [2:25:50] I remind members [2:25:51] that questions [2:25:52] for the record [2:25:53] will be due [2:25:54] by the close of business [2:25:55] on Friday March 20 [2:25:56] and the audience [2:25:57] will remain seated [2:25:58] for a moment [2:25:59] so that our witnesses [2:26:00] and members [2:26:01] may exit [2:26:02] and proceed [2:26:03] promptly [2:26:04] to the closed session. [2:26:10] This open session [2:26:11] will be held [2:26:12] to the complete [2:26:13] extent [2:26:14] of the actual [2:26:15] date of the [2:26:16] hearing. [2:26:17] The hearing [2:26:18] focused on [2:26:19] key questions [2:26:20] surrounding the war [2:26:21] in Iran [2:26:22] specifically [2:26:23] Iran's [2:26:24] nuclear capabilities. [2:26:25] Director of [2:26:26] National Intelligence [2:26:27] Tulsi Gabbard [2:26:28] said the Iranian [2:26:29] regime [2:26:30] appears to be [2:26:31] intact [2:26:32] but largely [2:26:33] degraded. [2:26:34] Notably [2:26:35] Gabbard [2:26:36] omitted a portion [2:26:37] of her prepared [2:26:38] statement [2:26:39] that had said [2:26:40] program. While CIA Director John Ratcliffe said intelligence shows Iran has not stopped its [2:26:46] nuclear ambitions or desire to continue building ballistic missiles. Now, when pressed, Ratcliffe [2:26:52] says he disagrees with the top counterterrorism official Joe Kent, who resigned yesterday [2:26:57] and who had said Iran does not represent an imminent threat to the U.S. We also learned [2:27:03] new details about U.S. intelligence going into the attack on Iran. Gabbard saying intelligence [2:27:08] showed it was likely that Iran would seek to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, but did [2:27:13] not answer whether that was communicated to President Trump before he green-lighted the [2:27:16] attacks. And Ratcliffe said Iran had specific plans to hit energy sites across the region. [2:27:23] Let's bring in our Capitol Hill correspondent, Julie Sirkin. Julie, of course, with the backdrop [2:27:27] of this being the ongoing war in Iran, so many questions there, some notably not addressed [2:27:32] in the opening statement by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and also some [2:27:37] questions there that clearly were not addressed. [2:27:38] Thank you. [2:27:38] In addition to what you said, I'll just start where you left off, Savannah. When you're [2:27:45] talking about that part that she omitted, I know we talked about it at length, but just [2:27:48] quickly, because Democrats kept pressing her on this issue. It's not just that she omitted [2:27:53] what she was going to say and essentially countering what the administration's been [2:27:56] saying in the reason for the start for this war. What was Iran's imminent threat to the [2:28:00] U.S.? She actually did comment on it, though. She said that according to the intelligence [2:28:06] community, that they assessed that Iran was trying to recover. [2:28:09] From the severe damage to the nuclear infrastructure it sustained as a result of those U.S. military [2:28:14] strikes last summer. So she didn't just omit it. She changed what she was going to say [2:28:18] to be more in line with what the Trump administration has been saying. Some other notable points, [2:28:22] and you touched on it, the Strait of Hormuz. It's been a key topic, and it's been reported [2:28:26] that allegedly the administration did not know that Iran was planning to seize the Strait, [2:28:32] to attack ships that were trying to move through, therefore causing the global energy supply, [2:28:37] gas prices, oil prices to jump. [2:28:39] She said they did know that. She again pointed, saying it was the president's call as to whether [2:28:44] the intelligence concluded that there was an imminent threat. She got some pushback [2:28:48] from Democrats there. She also said, as pressed by Democrats multiple times, if those sanctions [2:28:54] that were lifted on Russian gas and oil to allow other countries to buy the oil that [2:28:59] was already at sea, if that benefits our adversaries, including Russia, specifically their ongoing [2:29:05] aggression, their campaign in Ukraine. [2:29:09] We'll talk about that in the closed session. Other items, as you mentioned, that they didn't [2:29:12] address, that they instead said and told lawmakers they will talk about in a classified session, [2:29:17] how our adversaries are benefiting from the war. I mentioned Russia. China is also a question. [2:29:22] The officials also wouldn't confirm what has been publicly discussed as Democrats pressed them, [2:29:27] whether Russia is helping Iran locate ships, as we've reported, trying to help them with [2:29:33] intelligence capabilities. President Trump had addressed this himself previously, downplaying it, [2:29:37] said, look, the U.S. helps. [2:29:39] Ukraine. But in this setting, Gabbard and Ratcliffe, the head of the CAA, refusing to [2:29:44] talk about it at the end there. We heard Mark Warner and Tom Cotton make a comment about [2:29:48] that. The other things that they're going to talk about in the closed session, the imminent [2:29:52] threat and the origins for this war. This is an ongoing story as different administration [2:29:56] officials shift their reasoning for starting this military campaign that they did not come [2:30:01] to Congress to get approval on. To that vein, the question of boots on the ground, they [2:30:06] were specifically pressed, the officials there, whether the U.S. is going to talk about it [2:30:09] or not, is up to them. They were asked to address the public objectives the Trump [2:30:12] administration is hoping to achieve in Iran, whether those can be achieved without putting [2:30:16] boots on the ground, this is something officials have kept open in classified briefings that have [2:30:20] been held on the Hill. In this case, they said this is something they will address in closed [2:30:25] session. So unable to give an answer for the American public there, and, of course, also the [2:30:30] issue of what Tulsi Gabbard is doing with election security. John Ossoff, who is a Democrat [2:30:35] from Georgia, who was on the ballot in the midterm elections, trying to press her there because there [2:30:38] were photos there that showed her there. For the first time, the president has already sent a [2:30:39] that were circulated showing Gabbard in Georgia trying to examine some of their election practices [2:30:44] there, as well as reporting that her office is examining voting machines out of Puerto Rico. [2:30:49] That's something they said they will continue to talk about in the closed session. But just [2:30:52] to highlight something that we heard from the top Democrat, Senator Mark Warner, at the very end [2:30:57] there, this is one of the very few opportunities that members of Congress get to question somebody [2:31:03] like Tulsi Gabbard, somebody like Director Ratcliffe in such a public setting to talk [2:31:07] about all of these topics, different worldwide threats, as they talked about, from the border [2:31:12] to fentanyl to cartel, so many different issues that they've discussed. And Warner said he was [2:31:16] disappointed that they refused to give answers to so many different topics in this one open session [2:31:21] on worldwide threats that they have just once a year. Savannah? All right, Julie, thank you so [2:31:26] much. Let's bring in our senior national security correspondent, Courtney Kuby. Courtney, so many [2:31:30] questions here still about Iran's nuclear capabilities, as well as the intelligence [2:31:34] available to the intelligence community, and then therefore made available to [2:31:37] the public. Thank you so much for joining us. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. [2:31:37] Yeah, that's right. So, I mean, two key parts of that. They did admit that prior to the U.S. and [2:31:46] Israel launching this war in Iran, there were indications that Iran could lash out and [2:31:51] retaliation by striking energy facilities or the energy infrastructure throughout the region. They [2:31:58] also acknowledged that, look, this is no secret. Iran has militarized and used the Strait of Hormuz [2:32:05] as a point of leverage for decades. It is now a point of leverage for the rest of the world. [2:32:08] It is no secret, it is no surprise, but they acknowledged that was something that they [2:32:12] were aware of in advance. [2:32:14] I mean, you know, fascinating, just to point out, Iran was threatening the Strait of Hormuz [2:32:19] during President Trump's first presidency. [2:32:21] So again, this is well known to them. [2:32:24] Former National Security Advisor John Bolton, under President Trump's first term, acknowledged [2:32:28] that he briefed him on the threats to the Strait of Hormuz multiple times when he was [2:32:32] in that role only a few years ago. [2:32:34] So acknowledgement that both of those were true. [2:32:38] I was also struck again by the continued discussion about their ballistic missile program. [2:32:44] You know, for years we have heard from experts and analysts talking about the concern about [2:32:50] Iran's nuclear program, but military officials have been telling us for years that they are [2:32:55] more concerned about their ballistic missile program because they were building an arsenal, [2:32:59] they were getting further, longer range systems, they were getting more advanced systems, they [2:33:05] were advancing the ways that they were able to launch them mobile. [2:33:08] Mobile launchers, solid fuel rockets, all these different things that were causing increasing [2:33:12] concern among the U.S. military because it provided Iran with a real serious threat not [2:33:18] just to the region but to Europe, and the worry was that it would extend all the way [2:33:21] to the United States. [2:33:22] Now, the Defense Intelligence Agency has said they didn't believe that Iran would really [2:33:26] have that capability to maintain a campaign of long-range weapons against the United States, [2:33:33] the continental U.S., for a matter of years still. [2:33:36] Nothing that we heard here today changed that. [2:33:38] But the director of CIA, John Ratcliffe, maintained that there still was this imminent threat. [2:33:43] Savannah, what I took away as a big takeaway from this hearing today is that the Trump [2:33:48] administration was looking at the ballistic missile and the drone program as something [2:33:53] that shored up or supported the nuclear program, and they felt as if they needed to go after [2:33:59] that conventional force, the ballistic missiles, the drones and other, the Navy, the Air Force [2:34:03] and everything, so that Iran would not have the ability to pursue a nuclear weapon. [2:34:08] That's what they were leading to in this, but no one said it explicitly, Savannah. [2:34:12] Courtney, also wondering, when we discussed the Strait of Hormuz, what really was such [2:34:20] a pinpoint there, it seemed, for senators in the room was just, had the president been [2:34:26] explicitly told that any type of activity there in Iran, any type of military action [2:34:32] could potentially lead to the Strait of Hormuz being in the situation that we see it in now [2:34:36] essentially shut down by Iran? [2:34:37] Yes. [2:34:38] And of course, that that's not so important to Americans who may have just been hearing [2:34:41] about the Strait of Hormuz so frequently from all of us on TV for the first time is [2:34:45] because that is the reason that we are seeing the price of crude oil go up, therefore the [2:34:49] price at the pump, and this bigger concern, could that lead to further inflation here [2:34:53] at home? [2:34:55] What did you take away from what the intelligence community knew about the Strait of Hormuz [2:34:58] and what you think may have been communicated to the president or asked by the president? [2:35:03] So while they wouldn't explicitly say, yes, I was involved in briefing the president about [2:35:07] this. [2:35:08] They ultimately acknowledge that the intelligence community in the United States has long believed [2:35:14] that Iran will use the Strait of Hormuz as a point of leverage, exactly what's happening [2:35:18] here. [2:35:19] I think the question that unfortunately we didn't get an answer to here is not just did [2:35:23] the Trump administration know that the Strait of Hormuz would likely be threatened or potentially [2:35:29] even virtually closed down as we've seen now for more than a week, but did they underestimate [2:35:34] either the length of time that would happen? [2:35:36] Right. [2:35:37] We're talking about the severity of the impact around the entire world that that would have, [2:35:41] not just as you mentioned on fuel prices, but we're also talking about jet fuel prices. [2:35:46] We're talking about how that trickles down to, you know, mom and pop going to the grocery [2:35:50] store when everything is more expensive to get their food to that grocery store, their [2:35:54] grocery prices go up. [2:35:56] So the real question is, is really, was there an acknowledgement within the Trump administration, [2:36:02] whether it was from the ICE, the intelligence community or the national security apparatus, [2:36:05] that, yes, it was an acknowledgement? [2:36:06] Right. [2:36:07] That Iran would hold the Strait of Hormuz as leverage here. [2:36:11] And here are the possibility of weeks long impact that could have not just on the United [2:36:16] States, but around the world. [2:36:18] But again, they refused to talk about their briefings to President Trump. [2:36:22] Tulsi Gabbard repeatedly saying she didn't want to talk about her conversations with [2:36:25] him. [2:36:26] The director of CIA, I thought it was a fascinating little bit of insight that we got into his [2:36:30] intelligence sort of the his briefings to President Trump. [2:36:34] He said that he has conversations or briefings with him. [2:36:36] Right. [2:36:37] That he has conversations with him 10 to 15 times per month about various things. [2:36:41] And the majority of the time he or the intelligence community comes up with some sort of a piece [2:36:47] of information or a situation that they want to inform him of, as opposed to the president [2:36:52] requesting that information about a certain situation or a certain incident. [2:36:57] I agree. [2:36:58] Interesting intel there. [2:36:59] Certainly. [2:37:00] Courtney Kuby, thank you very much. [2:37:02] That's going to wrap our coverage of the Worldwide Threats Assessment hearing. [2:37:05] We are going to return you to NBC News Daily. [2:37:06] Now. [2:37:07] I'm your host, Savannah Sellers. [2:37:08] Thanks for being with us. [2:37:09] With those states here in the U.S., it's going to take a couple of years for kids born now [2:37:15] for their teeth to form. [2:37:17] But in areas like Calgary, like you mentioned, that's one of Canada's biggest cities, it [2:37:22] voted to ban fluoride in water systems in 2011. [2:37:25] A decade later, the evidence was clear. [2:37:28] The effects on teeth were obvious. [2:37:30] The City Council there reversed its ban in 2021. [2:37:33] Meanwhile, Vicky, as you mentioned, you know, we have 21 states here in the U.S. that are [2:37:35] subject to fluoride. [2:37:36] So, let's take a look at those states. [2:37:37] U.S. with legislation in the works to ban community water fluoridation. So certainly [2:37:42] something to keep our eyes on. Absolutely. And we'll be counting on you to do so for us. Erica [2:37:47] Edwards, thank you so much. Illinois Democrats have officially chosen a candidate to fill the [2:37:53] state's open Senate seat being vacated by retiring Senator Dick Durbin. NBC News projects Lieutenant [2:37:59] Governor Juliana Stratton as the winner of the highly contested Democratic primary. She defeated [2:38:05] two.