Marco Rubio testifies at Senate hearing on Venezuela

[7:49] State Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. Good morning, everyone, [7:54] and welcome, everyone. Today, we have important business to do. Before I start, I will tell [8:02] everyone, those of you in the audience, we're so glad to have you here. Thanks so much for coming. [8:08] This is a public hearing. It is also the official business of the United States of America, [8:13] and as a result of that, the committee has a zero-tolerance policy for interruptions [8:18] or for attempts by anyone in the room to communicate with somebody up here or the [8:24] witness. So as a result of that, if you do disrupt, you will be arrested. You'll be banned [8:31] for a year. However, I'm told that we have some guests today who have completed their ban [8:36] and are back with us again today. We hope you've had the time to think about your indiscretions [8:42] and will behave yourself today. If you don't, as a persistent violator, you'll be banned for [8:49] three years. [8:49] So in any event, welcome to everyone, and certainly, Secretary Rubio, we're glad to [8:58] have you here, and welcome back. The new co-pilot I got, Pete, is doing just fine in the seat [9:04] you used to sit in, and I'm glad to have him. Thank you so much for being here. We were [9:08] a little afraid we were going to lose you to the Miami Dolphins there for a while, but [9:11] I guess that went a different direction, so it's certainly our gain. I'd like to start [9:18] the hearing. [9:19] I'd like to start this hearing on the Venezuela situation by recognizing the brave men and [9:24] women who participated in this operation. The intelligence gathering, planning and execution [9:29] were incredible. Only the U.S. could have pulled off this mission, and that's only because [9:35] of the dedication and professionalism of each and every one of our service members. As we [9:40] know, much of their work is done in secret, but I do hope these people will receive the [9:45] accolades that they so rightly deserve. [9:47] I also want to acknowledge the members of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department [9:48] of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Defense. I want to acknowledge the leadership of President [9:52] Trump that he has shown and also you, Secretary Rubio. It's no easy job keeping drugs and [9:58] narco-terrorists off our streets and keeping Americans safe. Thank you for extraditing [10:03] Nicolas Maduro and bringing him to account for his many crimes against the American people. [10:10] Let me reiterate a point that I've made many times on the Senate floor. President [10:14] Trump's actions against narco-terrorists and his capture of Maduro have made America safer. [10:19] Every American should be thanking Donald Trump and Marco Rubio for what they have done. [10:25] There are a lot of Americans today who wouldn't be alive if not for your commitment and dedication [10:34] to stemming the flow of drugs into our country. [10:38] The actions in Venezuela were limited in scope, short in duration, and done to protect U.S. [10:45] interests and citizens. What President Trump has done in Venezuela is the definition of [10:49] the President's Article II. [10:50] The Constitutional Authorities, as Commander-in-Chief, and wholly consistent with what other presidents' [10:56] efforts and what they have done and actions they have taken to protect the American people [11:01] from threats in our own hemisphere. [11:04] In fact, President George H.W. Bush authorized similar but much broader and more extensive [11:08] military operations to arrest and bring Panama's Manuel Noriega to the United States to stand [11:15] trial for drug-related charges. [11:18] In that case, President Bush deployed a new military force, the U.S. military, to destroy [11:19] the U.S. military. [11:20] more than 9,000 troops into Panama for more than a month. [11:25] At the time, all leaders of the Senate, including Democrats, praised that move. [11:31] Unlike in Panama, President Trump authorized a much more limited military action in Venezuela, [11:37] with only about 200 troops inside the country for a couple of hours and a firefight that [11:42] lasted less than 27 minutes, with no loss of life on the United States side, but significant [11:48] casualties on the other side. [11:50] This military action was incredibly brief, targeted, and successful. [11:54] When bad guys are in the business of flying drugs into the United States, drugs that kill [11:58] our children, hurt our country, violate U.S. laws, and destabilize our hemisphere, then [12:05] they'll have to be held to answer for those actions, and that's what's being done now. [12:10] Maduro was not recognized as a legitimate leader of Venezuela by President Trump or [12:14] even by President Biden or by most of the international community. [12:18] It is a service to the world. [12:20] It is a service to the world. [12:20] And I have the confidence that this legitimate leader is no longer in power. [12:24] Now the United States has a tremendous opportunity before us in Venezuela. [12:28] Because of the complexity of this operation, there has been some confusion as to how it [12:32] will be done. [12:33] I've been impressed by the way you, Secretary Rubio, have explained the plan to me going [12:38] forward right from the start. [12:40] It is clear and it's doable. [12:42] I know you will lay that out for us here today. [12:45] Venezuela's natural resources have frequently been used to bolster the economy of our adversaries, [12:49] especially China. [12:50] China. Through President Trump's actions, we have effectively cut off that supply, giving [12:55] the United States tremendous leverage. [12:57] After our lengthy engagements in the Middle East in years past, many Americans are rightfully [13:02] concerned about so-called forever wars. I know this administration is laser-focused [13:08] on avoiding those experiences. [13:10] With Nicolas Maduro out of power, the United States has the opportunity to better protect [13:14] America by bringing stability to Venezuela. [13:17] The country has a history of democracy, capitalism, and a respect for human rights. It is only [13:23] during the last two dictatorships that it has lost these attributes. [13:27] The Venezuelan people are not strangers to these concepts and long to have them reinstated. [13:33] They have you and President Trump to thank for giving them another chance. [13:39] It is all our hope that the Venezuelan people will soon be able to hold free and fair elections [13:43] for their leaders. [13:44] To get there, Venezuela may require U.S. and international oversight to ensure these [13:48] elections are indeed free and fair, unlike their most recent elections. [13:58] Secretary Rubio, thank you for being here today. I look forward to a productive discussion. [14:03] And with that, I'd like to hear the distinguished ranking members' views on these matters. [14:09] Senator Shaheen. [14:10] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome back, Secretary Rubio. Thank you for being here. I certainly [14:15] agree with the Chairman in terms of his comments relative to Nicolas Maduro. He was bad for [14:20] Venezuela, he was bad for the region, and he was bad for the United States. I think [14:25] the question we have to ask now is, was the raid to arrest him worth the cost? And I also [14:32] share the Chairman's admiration for the military operation that took him out. [14:40] But the U.S. naval blockade around Venezuela and the raid have already cost American taxpayers' [14:46] hundreds of millions of dollars. Outside estimates are as high as a billion dollars. [14:51] And yet, the Maduro regime is essentially still in power. All the same people are running [14:56] the country. Maduro's vice president, now the interim president, has taken no steps [15:01] to diminish Iran, China, or Russia's considerable influence in Venezuela, one of the reasons [15:08] that has been given for the mission. Her cooperation appears tactical and temporary and not a real [15:15] shift in Venezuela's future. [15:17] In the process, we've traded one dictator for another. [15:22] So it's no wonder that so many of my constituents are asking, why is the president spending [15:26] so much time focused on Venezuela instead of the cost of living and their kitchen table [15:31] economic concerns? [15:34] Unfortunately, I think this has been a pattern across the administration, losing sight of [15:38] what actually advances America's interests and delivers results for the American people. [15:44] Take the elimination of personnel and departments that were critical to our national security, [15:49] for example. [15:52] These are cost-effective tools, like Voice of America, that help us advance America's [15:56] interests globally. And Mr. Secretary, as you remember, you strongly supported most [16:01] of these programs when you were on this side of the dais. The administration says those [16:06] cuts were about saving money. But the total federal spending last year went up by 4 percent, [16:12] not down. We spent more, not less. As a result, our adversaries, like China, are expanding [16:18] their influence. [16:20] There's broad bipartisan agreement in Congress that China is the central strategic challenge [16:25] of our time. [16:26] The president himself has said that as well, but we're cutting foreign aid and diplomacy [16:32] tools. We're leaving embassies without leadership. We're shutting down counterdisinformation [16:37] programs. We are driving talent away from the United States while Beijing is actively [16:42] recruiting it. [16:43] And I would just like to point out this is a picture of the globe. These are countries [16:50] where China [16:51] ambassadors in those countries. All of the red, those are China and places where [16:58] their diplomats are on the ground except of course for China which is in blue and [17:03] they don't need to put diplomats there. This map, this is where we have [17:09] diplomats. You can see the red is where we're filled and look at all of the [17:16] white where we do not have ambassadors on the ground. We're even giving China [17:24] some of our most advanced semiconductors. And after a year of tariffs that were [17:29] supposed to make us stronger, China has posted the largest trade surplus in [17:34] history and American families are paying more at a time when the prices were [17:40] already too high. Since the start of the tariff campaign in 2025, U.S. [17:45] manufacturing employment has fallen by anywhere from 50 to 70,000 jobs [17:49] depending on whose estimates you look at. That's a trend that undercuts promises [17:54] that tariffs would continue to be in place. [17:55] We're pushing our closest allies into their arms. Just look at Canada whose [18:07] business with the state of New Hampshire has been really critical. They recently [18:12] cut a trade deal with China because they no longer view the United States as a [18:17] reliable partner. Pushing allies away like that is not strategic competition. [18:23] It is unilateral disarmament. We see the same gap between rhetoric [18:28] and action. We see the same gap between rhetoric and action. We see the same gap [18:28] between rhetoric and action. We see the same gap between rhetoric and reality and how this [18:29] administration deals with other authoritarian regimes. At a time when [18:33] Iran is violently cracking down on protests, the U.S. is coming to [18:38] agreements to deport Iranians in this country back to Iran. People who will [18:43] face prosecution and interrogation by Iranian security forces. And yet [18:49] President Trump told the Iranian people that help was on the way. But the United [18:54] States has largely stood on the sidelines as the interior situation has [18:58] deteriorated. [19:00] Americans are right in thinking that the Trump administration is tougher on our [19:04] allies than on most of our adversaries. I just returned from Denmark where I met [19:10] with Danish and Greenlandic leaders. Senator Coons was also on that trip. He [19:14] led it. What I heard directly is that President Trump's threats to take [19:18] Greenland have shaken public confidence in the United States to the core. And [19:24] this from an ally who first recognized the new United States of America in 1792. [19:30] Has fought on our side in both World Wars and in Afghanistan. And I heard from [19:36] one Danish-American woman whose son holds both citizenships and is approaching [19:40] conscription age that she's worried that her son might one day be forced to [19:44] choose between the two countries that he loves. That kind of fear would have been [19:50] unthinkable two years ago. Or ten years ago. Or 50 years ago. There is no [19:57] strategic objective in Greenland that cannot be achieved through cooperation. [20:02] The only thing these threats have accomplished is weakening trust in the United States. [20:08] That trust is the foundation of our alliances. And at a moment when Russia is waging the largest [20:14] land war in Europe since World War II, we should be strengthening allied unities. Instead, [20:20] we're undermining it. European allies are worried about open conflict with the United States. [20:26] Canadian trading partners are turning toward China instead of the U.S. And the constant [20:31] threat of new tariffs raising prices and making [20:34] it impossible for businesses to invest is ever present. So from Venezuela to Europe, [20:41] the United States is spending more, risking more, and achieving less. That does not project strength. [20:49] It hands our adversaries exactly what they want. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [20:55] Thank you, Senator Shaheen. We're now going to hear from Secretary Rubio. After that, [20:59] we'll do a round of five-minute questions. And so with that, Secretary Rubio, welcome back to the [21:06] committee. [21:07] I'd love to hear what you have to say. [21:08] Thank you. I appreciate it. And I'll be brief in my opening statement, [21:11] so we can leave more time for questions. I've submitted a written statement, [21:14] but I'm not going to use it. I'm just going to talk to you guys for a few minutes. [21:17] All right. Here we go. [21:20] You know the drill. Off to jail. [21:25] That's a war crime. [21:26] That's a one-year ban from the committee. [21:28] Anyone who is a persistent violator will be banned for three years. So I don't know [21:34] whether the guy falls in that category. Looks like it. [21:37] After three years, he'll find a more productive means of employment. [21:40] Secretary Rubio, we have two hearings a week, you know. You seem to have a more robust following [21:46] than most of our witnesses that come before us. But anyway, hand it over. [21:51] There'll be a couple more. So I just thank you for stopping the clock. But I appreciate [21:57] it. So and I know there's a lot of other topics you're going to ask me about, so we can talk [22:01] about those, including the ones that Senator Shaheen just outlined. But let me just talk [22:06] about Venezuela in particular. Please. [22:07] Thank you. [22:07] Thank you. [22:07] Thank you. [22:07] Thank you. [22:07] Thank you. [22:07] Thank you. [22:08] Thank you. [22:08] Thank you. [22:08] Thank you. [22:08] Thank you. [22:08] Thank you. [22:08] Thank you. [22:08] Thank you. [22:09] I think we can talk, if you want. I'm sure your questions will be about what happened [22:12] before and led up to in the operation. I want to focus my comments this morning on what [22:16] happens now moving forward, because you're going to ask about the going back. And let [22:21] me just say this. What is our goal going in? We had in our hemisphere a regime operated [22:28] by an indicted narco-trafficker that became a base of operation for virtually every competitor, [22:33] adversary, and enemy in the world. It was, for Iran, their primary spot of operation [22:37] in the Western Hemisphere was Venezuela. [22:39] For Russia, their primary base of operation in the Western Hemisphere, along Cuba and [22:44] Nicaragua, was Venezuela. In the case of China, China was receiving oil at a huge, about $20 [22:51] a barrel discount. And they weren't even paying money for it. It was being used to pay down [22:55] debt that they were owed. This is the oil of the people of Venezuela, and it was being [22:59] given to the Chinese as barter at a $20 discount per barrel in some cases. And so you had basically [23:06] three of our primary opponents in the world. [23:10] One of them was the United States, operating from our hemisphere from that spot. It was [23:13] also a place where you had a narco-trafficking regime that openly cooperated with the FARC [23:18] and the ELN and other drug trafficking organizations using their national territory. It was an [23:23] enormous strategic risk for the United States, not halfway around the world, not in another [23:28] continent, but in the hemisphere in which we all live. And it was having dramatic impacts [23:32] on us, but also on Colombia and on the Caribbean basin and all sorts of other places. It was [23:37] an untenable situation, and it had to be addressed. [23:40] And it was addressed. And now the question becomes what happens moving forward. As I've [23:45] described to you in previous settings and in individual conversations, we had three [23:48] objectives here. The final, I'll work it backwards, because the end state here is we [23:53] want to reach a phase of transition where we are left with a friendly, stable, prosperous [24:00] Venezuela and democratic, in which all elements of society are represented in free and fair [24:05] elections. By the way, you can have elections. You can have elections all day. But if the [24:09] opposition has no action, you can't have elections. [24:10] If you don't have access to the media, if opposition candidates are routinely dismissed [24:15] and unable to be on the ballot because of government, those aren't free and fair elections. [24:21] That's the end state that we want, free, fair, prosperous, and friendly Venezuela. We're [24:26] not going to get there in three weeks. It's going to take some time. And so objective [24:30] number one was stability. In the aftermath of the removal of Maduro, the concern was [24:34] what happens in Venezuela? Is there civil war? Do the different factions start going [24:37] at each other? Are a million people crossing the border into Colombia? Are we going to [24:39] have a civil war? Are we going to have a civil war? Are we going to have a civil war? Are [24:40] we going to have a civil war? Are we going to have a civil war? Are we going to have a civil war? [24:40] The president of Venezuela, the president of вся Colombia, all of that has been avoided. [24:43] And one of the primary ways that it has been avoided is the ability to establish direct, [24:47] honest, respectful, but very direct and honest conversations with the people who today control [24:53] the elements of that nation. Meaning the law enforcement, the government apparatus, etc. [24:59] And one of the tools that's available to us is the fact that we have sanctions on oil. [25:03] There is oil that is sanctioned that cannot move from Venezuela because of our quarantine. [25:08] And so what we did is we entered into an arrangement with them. [25:10] the arrangement is this. On the oil that is sanctioned in quarantine, we will allow you to [25:14] move it to market. We will allow you to move it to market at market prices, not at the discount [25:19] China was getting. In return, the funds from that will be deposited into an account that we will [25:25] have oversight over, and you will spend that money for the benefit of the Venezuelan people. Why was [25:30] that important? Venezuela was running out of storage capacity, okay? They were producing oil, [25:35] they were drilling oil, they had nowhere to put it, they had nowhere to move it, and they were [25:38] facing a fiscal crunch. They needed money in the immediacy to fund the police officer, the [25:42] sanitation workers, the daily operations of government. And so we've been able to create a [25:46] short-term mechanism. This is not going to be the permanent mechanism, but this is a short-term [25:50] mechanism in which the needs of the Venezuelan people can be met through a process that we've [25:55] created, where they will submit every month a budget of this is what we need funded, we will [25:59] provide for them at the front end what that money cannot be used for, and they've been very [26:03] cooperative in this regard. In fact, they have pledged to use a substantial amount of those funds [26:07] to purchase [26:08] medicine and equipment directly from the United States. As in fact, one of the things they need [26:14] is dilutin, or dilutin, depending how you want to pronounce it. And that basically is the light [26:19] crude that you need to mix with their heavy crude in order for the oil to be able to be mixed and [26:23] moved. They're getting, they used to get 100% of that from Russia. They are now getting 100% of [26:28] that from the United States. So we're using that short-term mechanism both to stabilize the [26:34] country, but also to make sure that the oil proceeds that are currently being generated [26:38] through the licenses will now begin to issue on the sanctioned oil goes to the benefit of the [26:43] Venezuelan people not to fund the system that existed in the past. The second is a period of [26:49] recovery. And that is the phase in which you want to see a normalized oil industry. Again, [26:53] this is look, we've got plenty of oil. There's plenty of oil all over the world. Canada produces [26:58] heavy crude. So it's not like Venezuela's oil is unique in that regard, despite the fact they have [27:02] the largest known reserves in the world. It's not irreplaceable. But we understand that that is the [27:07] lifeline, their natural resource is oil. So the next phase of what we're doing is we're going to [27:08] are going to allow Venezuela to be [27:09] stable and prosperous moving forward. [27:12] And so what we hope to do is transition [27:14] to a mechanism that allows that to be sold in a normal way, [27:17] a normal oil industry. [27:19] Not one dominated by cronies, not one dominated [27:21] by graft and corruption. [27:23] To that end, the authorities there deserve some credit. [27:26] They have passed a new hydrocarbon law that basically [27:28] eradicates many of the Chavez era restrictions [27:32] on private investment in the oil industry. [27:34] It probably doesn't go far enough [27:36] to attract sufficient investment, [27:37] but it's a big step from where they were three weeks ago. [27:40] So that's a major change. [27:41] We can address some of the other components, [27:43] but I'll run out of time. [27:44] But one of parts of the transition phase, [27:47] or the recovery phase, is beginning [27:49] to create space for different voices [27:51] inside of Venezuelan politics to have an ability to speak out. [27:55] Part of that is the release of political prisoners. [27:57] By some estimates, up to 2,000. [27:59] They are releasing them. [28:00] They are releasing them probably slower than I would like them [28:02] to, but they are releasing them. [28:04] And in fact, you're starting to see some of the people being [28:06] released beginning to speak out. [28:07] We are starting to see some of the people going out [28:09] and participating in political life in the country. [28:11] We have a long ways to go. [28:12] Look, we can talk in more detail about all of these things. [28:15] Suffice it to say, I'm not here to claim to you [28:17] this is going to be easy or simple. [28:18] I am saying that in 3 and 1 1⁄2, almost four weeks, [28:21] we are much further along on this project [28:23] than we thought we would be, given the complexities of it, [28:26] going into it. [28:27] And I recognize that it won't be easy. [28:28] I mean, look, at the end of the day, [28:29] we are dealing with people over there [28:30] that have spent most of their lives [28:32] living in a gangster paradise. [28:33] So it's not going to be like from one day to the next. [28:36] We're going to have this thing turn around overnight. but I think we're making [28:37] making good and decent progress. It is the best plan, and we are certainly better off [28:41] today in Venezuela than we were four weeks ago. And I think and hope and expect that [28:46] we'll be better off in three months and six months and nine months than we would have [28:49] been had Maduro still been there. So thank you. [28:51] Well, thank you, Secretary Rubio. We'll now do a round of questions, five minutes [29:00] each. I'd like to start, and I'd ask you to go—I understand we're not in a classified [29:05] setting, but I think a lot of people had no understanding of the groundwork that was [29:13] done before the actual action took place. I was incredibly impressed with what you told [29:20] me about how you, the president, negotiated with parties there on the ground, particularly [29:28] the parties who were going to be in charge after Maduro was removed. [29:35] And I wonder if you could talk about that for a minute, understanding that we aren't [29:40] in a classified setting. And I'd like to, if you could, say a few things about that. [29:46] Well, one of the things I've come to maybe more fully appreciate that I didn't [29:50] when I was here in the Senate was the number of contingencies that the Department of War [29:53] plans for all over the world. The overwhelming vast majority of them will never come to fruition, [29:57] but there's all kinds of contingencies that are planned for. [30:00] And one contingency that had to be planned for is the fact that sitting in Venezuela, [30:05] with a 50-minute meeting, you're going to have to go to a meeting, and you're going [30:05] to have to get on the phone, and you're going to have to take a nap. You're going to have [30:06] to take a nap. [30:07] And there's a $20 million reward on his head was an indicted narco trafficker. In fact, [30:09] I believe it's the largest reward we've ever issued for anybody. I would remind everybody, [30:13] the Biden administration had a $25 million reward on an indicted narco trafficker, the [30:18] same person. [30:19] And so, you know, multiple administrations from both parties have wanted this man arrested. [30:24] And one of the options the president had before him was the opportunity, if things didn't [30:28] work out, to go in and remove this individual, because he was wanted in a law enforcement [30:32] operation. Now, obviously, a law enforcement operation against the deputy president and [30:35] the de facto head of a, you know, of a regime is not as simple as going after some fugitive [30:40] hiding in a closet somewhere. It required planning and it required eliminating anything [30:45] that was a threat to the forces that were going in to extract them. I want to be clear [30:49] and I'll share with you what I've shared publicly. We made multiple attempts to get Maduro to [30:54] leave voluntarily and to avoid all of this because we understood that he was an impediment [31:00] to progress. You couldn't make a deal with this guy, okay? This guy has made multiple [31:03] deals. He's broken every one of them. As a point of example, he made a deal with the [31:06] Biden administration and here was the deal that he made. It was a bad deal. We knew he [31:09] wouldn't keep it. He made the following deal. Pardon my nephews, his nephews, who are convicted [31:15] narco-traffickers, convicted already and serving time in jail. Pardon them. Pardon [31:20] and release Alex Saab, who was his money man, his bag man, primarily in charge of the portfolio [31:25] with Iran. Release these people. He, in turn, agreed to release some political prisoners, [31:32] which he did. Many of them were subsequently exiled. [31:35] Many of them were subsequently exiled or re-arrested and that he would hold free and [31:37] fair elections, which he did not. In fact, he basically disqualified Maria Karina Machado [31:42] and any other candidate. And Edmundo Gonzalez ends up being the nominee for the opposition [31:46] party simply because they forgot to ban him and they forgot to put him on the ban list. [31:51] And despite that, he loses an election that everyone around the world recognizes as an [31:54] illegitimate election. So he's made previous deals. In fact, he's broken so many deals, [31:59] not even the Vatican has been willing to interact with Maduro in the past because he's broken [32:04] so many of these deals. [32:05] He's just simply not a guy you can make a deal with. He had no intent of keeping it. [32:08] What he wanted to do was tap us along and buy three years of time until he could deal [32:12] with a new administration that he thought may be more favorable, etc. He was an impediment [32:16] to progress. None of the things we're talking about now, not the release of political prisoners, [32:21] not the transition of the oil industry to a legitimate oil industry, not the erosion [32:26] of Iranian, Russian, or Chinese influence, none of these things would have been possible [32:30] as long as Maduro was there. And so this was one option that was available to the president. [32:35] You're exhausting every other option to remove this individual from the scene. Again, I'm [32:41] not here to tell you these are all going to be roses along the way and it's all going [32:43] to go perfectly. But for the first time in 20 years, we are having serious counter-narcotic [32:48] talks with Venezuelan authorities about going after narcotics organizations. For the first [32:56] time in 20 years, we are having serious conversations about eroding and eliminating the Iranian [33:01] presence, the Chinese influence, the Russian presence as well. In fact, I would tell you [33:05] that there are many elements there in Venezuela that welcome a return to establishing relations [33:11] to the United States on multiple fronts. We are at the end talking about a Western country [33:15] that has a long history of cooperation and work with the United States. At one time, [33:18] Venezuela, pre-Chavez, was a very strong U.S. ally. And we hope to get back to that point. [33:23] We're not there. This thing still is in its infancy. But I certainly think a lot of progress [33:26] has been made in that regard. [33:28] I was impressed with your description of the fact how careful you were in the operation, [33:35] not to dismantle the regime. [33:35] I was impressed with your description of the fact how careful you were in the operation, [33:36] not to dismantle either institutions or infrastructure because you wanted to see the Venezuelan people [33:40] take that over and get back on their feet again. I think that was really a wise decision [33:49] to make and have it as surgical as it was. The last thing I'd ask about, if you could [33:56] touch on for just a minute, is I know you spent a considerable period of time negotiating [33:59] with the people that were going to do day-to-day operations, the Venezuelans who were going [34:05] to fill the vacuum. How's that going, and how do you feel about where we are there? [34:11] Well, first of all, let me understand something. I spent 14 years in the U.S. Senate [34:14] going after these people pretty hard, along with many of you. So, I mean, I understand [34:19] who they are, and I understand this portfolio from a personal level quite well. So we're [34:23] very realistic about what we're dealing with here. [34:25] We also understand that in geopolitics, sometimes that's required. And in this particular case, [34:30] there are an alignment of interests. And we certainly think that the approach we're taking [34:34] is preferable to some of the other issues that we're dealing with here. And I think, [34:35] also, some of the other alternatives that people speculate about are fear. And I would [34:39] say, at this point, I do have to characterize, again, being realistic, clear-eyed, and understanding [34:43] that there will be impediments and unexpected events along the way. What we have found so [34:48] far is cooperation, respect, dialogue. And it's not just me. As has been reported in [34:54] the media, Director Ratcliffe traveled to Caracas and met with leaders there and discussed [34:58] important items of potential cooperation. I've also discussed, and I think I've alerted [35:03] some of you, that we have... [35:05] Laura Doge, who was our ambassador to Nicaragua in the past and to Honduras, will be taking [35:12] over the event affairs unit, first in Bogota, but ultimately in Caracas. We've had a team [35:17] on the ground already there. We already had 70 locally employed that sort of maintained [35:21] that facility. But we have a team on the ground there assessing it. And we think very quickly [35:25] we'll be able to open a U.S. diplomatic presence on the ground, which will allow us to have [35:30] real-time information and interact, by the way, not just with officials in the regime, [35:35] the interim authorities, but also interact with members of civil society, the opposition. [35:40] We think we're going to be much further along when we get them along the way. They've been [35:43] very cooperative on that front. [35:44] Obviously, there's some hard asks along the way. We'll see what the response is to those. [35:48] But whether it's General Cain with his counterpart, or Director Ratcliffe, or myself with the... [35:54] with Delcy Rodriguez, we've established what I think so far has been a very respectful [35:58] and productive line of communication as we go through this stabilization phase and towards [36:03] the recovery phase. [36:05] But there's a lot of work to be done here. And, you know, we ultimately are going to [36:09] judge actions, not words. And that's what we're hoping to work towards. [36:14] Well done. Senator Shaheen. [36:16] Thank you. I'm pleased that we are looking at a diplomatic presence in Venezuela in the [36:23] near future. I think that's very important. But the DEA has reportedly identified Delcy [36:28] Rodriguez as a significant actor in the drug trade. Do you agree with that? And if you [36:35] do, how... [36:36] How are we to assure the American people that the money that's going to Venezuela is [36:42] not going to any of the cartels or drug running? [36:45] Yeah. And that... Well, first of all, on the first point, I would say she's not indicted [36:49] the way Maduro and his wife were. [36:50] I understand. [36:51] So I'm not going to speculate about newspaper articles and what law enforcement is working [36:54] on. If, in fact, there were such an investigation, you know, I mean, that's something that we [36:57] would speculate on. Suffice it to say that this was not a normal system. We all should [37:03] stipulate to that, OK? That regime, as everyone understood, was held together by corruption. [37:07] The glue that kept people together was not loyalty to Maduro. It was the fact that these [37:11] five guys had five separate oil fields that were assigned to them. These people had drug [37:14] runs. [37:15] No, I understand that. [37:16] So that's going to be clear... [37:17] But I'm not defending the regime. In fact, I'm concerned that we haven't really changed [37:21] the regime enough and that America's dollars are going, still going to drug runners and [37:28] to significant organizations who we don't want to have benefit from the funding that [37:35] we're selling now of oil. And... [37:37] And providing to the Venezuelan government. [37:39] Yeah, look, you know, I acknowledge that we are dealing with, as I told you, with individuals [37:42] that have been involved in things that in our system would not be acceptable, would [37:45] not be acceptable to us in the long term. By no means is our policy to leave in place [37:48] something permanent that's as corrupt as you've described. We are in the transition and stabilization [37:55] phase. We are just acknowledging reality. And that is you have to work with the people [37:58] that are in charge of the elements of government. [38:00] OK, but can you reassure people that money is not going, continuing to go to the drug cartels? [38:06] Right. So that's the, that's the process that I outlined to you. So on the sanctioned [38:10] oil, the oil that requires U.S. permission to move, that oil, the proceeds of that oil, [38:16] which by the way is being sold at market price, not at the discount Venezuela was being forced [38:19] to sell, is being deposited into an account that ultimately will become a U.S. Treasury [38:24] blocked account here in the United States. We will, they will submit, we will at the [38:28] front end say this is what this money can be spent on, on these things. We will submit [38:33] to them, they will submit to us a budget request. [38:36] We want to use this money for these things. And as part, and part of the proceeds will [38:40] go to fund a audit process to make sure that that's how the money is being spent. [38:45] So that's how we intend to handle those funds in the short term. [38:47] There's an actual audit process that's been set up? [38:50] It will be set up. And we have a couple options. You know, one option is the XM Bank. They [38:55] have expertise as bankers in being able to do some of that part, option. There may be [38:59] some others in place. We haven't finalized what that audit process would be. We've only [39:03] made one payment. And that payment we did, and retrospectively [39:06] will be audited. But it was important we made that payment because they had to meet [39:09] payroll. They had to keep sanitation workers, police officers, government workers on staff. [39:14] It was a $300 million payment. [39:16] Right. So it's been reported that the oil sold for $500 million, that $300 million went [39:21] to Venezuelan government. What happened to the other $200 million? [39:25] It's still sitting in the account is my understanding at this time. [39:27] The account in Qatar? [39:29] Well the account, yes. But that will ultimately be, that's a short term account. Ultimately [39:33] it will be a US Treasury blocked account in the United States. [39:36] And it will also be audited? [39:37] Correct. Well the audit will be on the expenditures. At the front end we'll tell them this is what [39:42] the money can be spent on. Again, I'm not talking about all the other revenues the Venezuelan [39:46] government may have. We're talking about the revenues from the sanctioned oil. At the front [39:50] end we will say this is what the allowable expenses are. And then they will agree to [39:53] fund as part of the overall cost, they will pay for and fund an audit system acceptable [39:59] to us to ensure that that's how the money was spent. [40:01] And can you report to this committee once that audit system is set up? [40:04] Oh absolutely, yeah. [40:05] Okay. [40:07] I'd like to change the topic in my short time that I have left because when you were [40:11] a member of this committee you authored legislation to prevent President Trump from unilaterally [40:16] leaving NATO, you and Senator Kaine. Do you still believe that the US benefits from NATO? [40:22] We do. I mean the problem with, but NATO needs to be reimagined as well in terms of the obligations. [40:27] And this is not new to this president. Multiple presidents have complained about it. [40:30] I agree. [40:31] I think this president just complains about it louder than other presidents. [40:33] Well I'm just trying to be clear, get a clear answer on where this is going. [40:36] Get a clear answer on where this administration stands relative to NATO because it's been [40:41] a very fuzzy message over the last year. And do you agree that we're stronger in confronting [40:48] China when we do so with like-minded partners and that China is still the number one threat [40:53] that we face in the United States? [40:55] Yeah, but our like-minded partners have to have capability. And that's been part [40:58] of the problem is the erosion in European defense capabilities because they've taken [41:02] vast amount of the monies. These are rich countries. And because of the NATO umbrella, [41:06] they, it gave them the flexibility to spend a tremendous amount of their revenues on social [41:10] programs and not on defense. Now maybe that trend line will begin to change. [41:13] Well, it's already begun to change, frankly. And thanks. And I think the president deserves [41:18] credit for that, for the fact that there is now a commitment for 5% of GDP to be spent [41:23] on defense. But part of that strength also comes not just from having the, the mechanism, [41:31] the military might, but it also comes from the unity with our allies. And to the extent, [41:36] to which- [41:37] That unity is undermined, like the talk about Greenland and antagonizing Denmark, then it [41:42] undermines NATO's ability. And the only people who are excited about that are Vladimir Putin [41:47] and President Xi. [41:48] Yeah. Well, I would say that I think our alliances in NATO ultimately are something [41:52] that's going to work out. Our partners understand the importance of the U.S. presence in NATO. [41:56] Without the U.S., there is no NATO. And we understand that in order for NATO to be stronger, [42:00] our partners need to be stronger. And one of the things we've explained to our, to our [42:03] allies in NATO is the United States is not simply focused on Europe. [42:06] We also have defense needs in the Western Hemisphere. We have defense needs in the Indo-Pacific. [42:11] And it will require us. We, we may be the richest country in the world, but we don't [42:14] have fi-, unlimited resources. And as we reassign these- [42:17] Which is exactly why we want to have allies and partners to help us as we're looking at [42:22] conflicts around the world. And when we antagonize our allies and partners, and when we send [42:27] Canada to do a trade deal with China instead of coming to New Hampshire or the United States, [42:32] it weakens our ability to confront our adversaries. [42:35] Yeah. [42:36] But our allies have to be two things. They have to be willing to step up, but they also [42:39] have to be capable of stepping up. And frankly, many of them have not. I mean, Spain is still [42:43] not doing the 5%. I mean, there are countries that are still not doing. And in fact, Mark [42:47] Rutte yesterday pointed out that if, without the United States, the countries of Europe [42:51] would have to spend 10% of their GDP for the next 20 years to be able to make up the whole. [42:56] So I do think there needs to be a rebalancing, and hopefully we'll have cooperation. I think [43:00] we will. Rutte's a, has done a great job of managing all of it. [43:02] And I'm not arguing that point with you. As I said, I agree with you. I agree with you. [43:04] I agree with you. [43:05] I agree with you. [43:06] I agree with what the president has asked of our European allies. What I'm arguing with [43:10] you about is that his rhetoric is undermining NATO and our partnerships with our allies. [43:17] And that's a problem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [43:20] Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ricketts. [43:21] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary Rubio, for being here. [43:26] So the, some of the comments from the, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle [43:31] are difficult to square with the record. The goalposts didn't move, nor did Maduro, [43:38] change. The only thing that changed was President Trump acted on what members of both parties [43:44] said needed to be happen, that needed to happen. And did so, by the way, with an operation [43:50] that will go down in history as one of the most impressive and tactically proficient [43:55] to be ever carried out. So, Secretary Rubio, I'd like to get your response to a few yes [43:59] or no questions. I know that's typically not your nature, but please bear with me here [44:02] a moment, okay? [44:03] All right. Let's hear them first. [44:04] I hate game shows. Go ahead. [44:06] For, for, for— [44:07] For— [44:08] For— [44:09] For years, the United States had a standing bounty on Nicolas Maduro, correct? [44:13] Have what? I'm sorry? [44:14] A standing bounty on Nicolas Maduro. [44:16] Oh, yes. [44:18] And that, this bounty was increased by both the Biden and Trump administrations, [44:21] correct? [44:23] Correct. [44:24] And despite that bounty, did Maduro remain in power? [44:26] Yes. [44:28] Did he continue to support drug traffickers? [44:30] Oh, yes. [44:31] Was the Operation Absolute, was Operation Absolute Resolve a law enforcement operation [44:37] supported by the military? [44:38] It was. [44:39] Did that operation successfully remove Maduro and his wife and his wife? [44:42] Yes. [44:43] And they were taken into custody? [44:44] Yes. [44:45] Great questions. [44:46] Thanks. [44:47] Were any service members, law enforcement officers killed in that operation? [44:51] No. [44:54] Not any of ours. [44:55] None of ours, right. [44:56] Has there largely been a broad support across Latin America for Maduro's removal? [45:00] Yes. [45:01] And is the United States better off with Nicolas Maduro in custody? [45:06] Yes. [45:08] And Venezuela, too. [45:10] Right. [45:11] I realize that you'll hear differing views during this hearing, but I want to at least [45:17] offer my personal congratulations to you and everybody who helped carry this out, because [45:21] the world is better off without Nicolas Maduro. [45:24] A few weeks ago, you briefed the Senate on your three-phase plan. [45:27] You've been talking about it here today on stabilization, recovery, and the transition [45:31] in Venezuela. [45:33] Is there anything this Congress can do to be helpful in executing on that plan? [45:38] There will be in time. [45:39] There's no doubt about it. [45:40] On the stabilization front, you know, in order to stabilize it, for example, we're going [45:43] to have to begin to provide some licenses through OFAC. [45:46] So, as an example. [45:47] If a company wants to go down and explore the opportunity to do some economic activity [45:53] in Venezuela, they will require a license from Treasury to be able to do that. [45:58] And so that doesn't require congressional action, but I wanted you to be aware of it [46:00] when you start to see some of these things. [46:02] Some of these are just exploratory. [46:03] The second is, I think in time, look, Venezuela is a very wealthy country. [46:07] This is not a country that's going to require money from the United States to rebuild, to [46:12] stabilize, to transition. [46:13] It really isn't. [46:14] It has the ability to be, and it has been historically, the wealthiest country in the [46:17] Western and South America, in many cases. [46:22] The problem is that the wealth of the country was being stolen. [46:24] And so part of both the recovery and the transition phase is ensuring that you leave in place [46:29] a prosperous, you know, free, democratic, allied with the United States and friendly, [46:34] but also prosperous Venezuela, where the resources of the country are being utilized responsibly [46:40] and to the benefit of the people and their economy. [46:43] So in time, you know, I imagine we will be coming back to you with specific legislation [46:47] that may be required to assist in that function. [46:50] But we don't expect that this is going to require any spending on our part. [46:54] On the contrary, unlike many of the other parts of the world who've gotten involved, [46:58] Venezuela is—we're not spending any money in Venezuela right now, other than whatever [47:01] it costs to stand up our embassy. [47:03] Let me switch gears on you a little bit. [47:06] One of the common criticisms after Maduro's capture was that this would incentivize communist [47:11] China to take similar actions in Taiwan. [47:14] My opinion—this couldn't be further from the truth, for starters. [47:16] Communist China is a very powerful country. [47:17] Communist China doesn't care about international law or norms. [47:20] They've demonstrated that repeatedly, just ask the Philippines. [47:23] Nor does it believe in international law, even applies to Taiwan. [47:27] But most importantly, Xi Jinping's calculus on whether to take kinetic action against [47:31] Taiwan rests solely on whether or not he believes he will be successful or not. [47:35] In this sense, the tactical proficiency displayed during Operation Absolute Resolve may have [47:39] actually given Xi more pause to take than in taking action in Taiwan, because despite [47:46] its massive military buildup, the PLA continues to— [47:47] I'm sorry. [47:48] I'm sorry, I'm sorry. [47:49] I think the PLA continues to lack the experience so clearly on display that the United States [47:52] demonstrated in Maduro's capture. [47:55] And the PLA leaders that do have combat experience, like General Zhang, just got purged, or at [48:01] least one of them did. [48:02] So, Secretary Rubio, do you believe that the operation to take Maduro into custody will [48:06] have any impact on communist China's actions or intentions toward Taiwan? [48:11] No. [48:12] Look. [48:13] The situation on Taiwan is a Xi legacy project that he's made very clear that that's what [48:16] he intends to do. [48:17] And that's going to be irrespective of anything that happens in the world. [48:21] Your point, though, is well taken, and that is the U.S., in conducting this operation, [48:24] I think was certainly startling to China, to Russia, to Iran, to any adversary around [48:29] the world, because the U.S. is the only country in the world, the only country in the world [48:32] that could have done this operation. [48:33] Mr. Chairman, if I could just real briefly—I just mentioned General Zhang getting [48:40] purged here. [48:41] He was obviously a very important official in China. [48:43] Can you share with us just your assessment on what that means, that Xi just purged one [48:48] of these— [48:49] Well, this is, I think, part of a pattern we've seen over the last few years, which [48:51] is a purge of leaders in their military. [48:53] They're spending a lot of money on their military, and obviously some of these guys [48:57] are stealing that money, and they're trying to address that. [48:59] So it's an issue internally in their system. [49:01] They're obviously not sharing with us or talking to us in depth about any of that, [49:05] but it's certainly something we watch with interest. [49:06] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [49:08] Thank you, Senator Ricketts. [49:09] Senator Coons. [49:10] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [49:11] Thank you, Secretary Rubio. [49:12] Good to be with you again. [49:13] My basic question is, what are we doing here? [49:18] What is the point? [49:19] What is the goal of this hearing? [49:21] As you know well, having served on this dais alongside me for 14 years, this is an oversight [49:26] hearing. [49:28] And the point, the purpose of oversight is to encourage, if necessary, to compel consultation [49:34] between the administration and Congress. [49:37] And I just wanted to raise with you at the outset, of course the Commander-in-Chief has, [49:43] under Article 2— [49:44] Yes. [49:45] —the power to defend the American people against an imminent threat or an incoming [49:49] attack. [49:50] How else could we be kept safe? [49:51] But our Article 1 power requires consultation. [49:56] I'll agree with all of my colleagues. [49:58] Nicolas Maduro's a bad guy. [50:00] He was indicted. [50:01] There was a bounty on his head over several administrations. [50:04] His removal, flawlessly executed by American troops—thankfully, none of them hurt—did [50:10] cost the lives of 75 to 100 Venezuelans and Cubans. [50:13] It was a dangerous act. [50:14] It was a dangerous and high-risk maneuver. [50:17] I am glad that it ended as well as it possibly could. [50:20] But the point here, that I want to make first, is that it was rehearsed for months. [50:26] The administration had a number of contingencies it was trying to navigate through. [50:30] But over the course of months, when the administration was taking strike after strike after strike [50:34] against drug-trafficking boats, in several instances where senior leaders of the administration [50:40] briefed this committee and others, we were told that military action—to remove the [50:41] military from the United States—was not effective. [50:42] We were told that military action to remove the military from the United States was not [50:43] effective. [50:44] We were told that military action to remove the military from the United States was not [50:45] effective. [50:46] We were told that the Hearing grant to remove Maduro was not on the table. [50:48] We were told that the campaign to try and deter drug trafficking was not going to include [50:54] the exact military action that followed. [50:57] Yet, it was being rehearsed. [50:59] If there was time to practice, then there was time to consult. [51:04] Consulting with Congress is not just some high-minded principle. [51:07] It's not a nice-to-have. [51:09] It's a got-to-have. [51:11] We were the first California to say to the Luo people that this was limited in scope, [51:14] and that had to be 부분ally removed. [51:15] Would you please acknowledge the Democrats when they said, can't they conduct a mandatory [51:16] hearing, or, is this a good plan? [51:17] and duration, that it was executed flawlessly, [51:19] and we should all be happy about the result. [51:21] That much I agree with. [51:23] But our president continues to threaten [51:26] Delcy Rodriguez and the remnant of the Maduro regime [51:29] with military force if they don't comply. [51:31] We should know what are the policies, [51:34] what is the path, what is the plan forward. [51:37] You and I both know the long and painful history [51:40] of wars that began and seemed to be resolved [51:44] and then opened up into excruciating, expensive, [51:48] years-long conflicts. [51:50] In Iraq in particular, in Libya and elsewhere, [51:53] things do not always go as planned. [51:55] And so consultation with Congress that is truthful [51:58] and forthcoming and transparent is critical. [52:02] In your service in this body, you knew that, [52:04] you experienced it, I was in the room [52:06] as you held to account members of previous administrations [52:09] for not coming forward as they should have. [52:11] So look, in order to avoid our men and women [52:16] in our armed forces going into harm's way [52:18] doubting whether they have the support of the Congress, [52:22] consultation, hearings, and deliberations are required. [52:26] I understand the risk of leaks. [52:29] That's a risk every administration takes. [52:30] But at the end of the day, our framers entrusted [52:33] the power of the declaration of war to this body, [52:36] not to the executive. [52:38] And where there is the time to consult, [52:40] there has to be consultation. [52:42] Second, I just wanted to talk about allies and alliances. [52:46] I was just in Europe, I led a bipartisan delegation, [52:50] as Senator Shaheen referenced, to Denmark. [52:53] And our president's comments about NATO, about Denmark, [52:57] and his attempts to coerce Denmark into giving up [53:02] Greenland are appalling. [53:04] They profoundly harmed our security. [53:07] And I am asking you to do everything [53:09] you can to reinforce our commitment to NATO. [53:14] I was concerned that you just said [53:15] NATO needs to be reimagined. [53:18] Let's just be clear about the record. [53:20] You know as well as I, Article [53:21] 5 has only been invoked once. [53:23] And it was in defense of us after we were attacked. [53:27] Danes and soldiers from almost every other NATO ally [53:31] deployed and served, fought, and died. [53:34] 52 Danes. [53:36] And for me, the most emotional moment of my visit to Denmark [53:39] was laying a wreath at the memorial [53:41] to the Danes who served, fought, and died alongside Americans. [53:45] So when our president says we never [53:46] asked for anything from NATO, and they never [53:48] gave us anything, and you suggest that they aren't [53:51] carrying their weight. [53:52] Whether it's in bases, or in access, or in troops, [53:57] or in service, it is allies that will keep us safe [54:00] in the Indo-Pacific, our treaty allies, Korea, and Japan, [54:04] and Australia, and the Philippines [54:06] are going to be critical to Indo-Pacific security [54:08] against our principal threat, China, and in Europe. [54:13] I am worried that the very foundations of trust [54:16] are being shaken. [54:18] Our democracy depends on consultation with Congress [54:21] that is truthful and timely, and the confidence of our allies, [54:24] depends on them knowing where we're going next. [54:28] Today, an armada is steaming towards Iran. [54:30] Our president is on social media threatening Iran. [54:33] And I hope I can count on you, Mr. Secretary, [54:36] to consult with us and inform us before our next actions, [54:40] whether against Nigeria, Colombia, Cuba, Iran, [54:44] or anywhere else. [54:45] And I hope and believe that I can count on you [54:48] to reinforce the sanctity of NATO. [54:51] Not to reimagine it, but to reinforce it. [54:53] Thank you. [54:55] Thank you. [54:56] Let me unpack the three points you touched upon. [54:58] Consultation, NATO, Greenland. [55:01] Alliances in Greenland. [55:01] Let me tell them to consult. [55:02] Look, this has been a point of tension, [55:04] not just in this administration and Congress, [55:06] but in multiple administrations, as you rightly pointed out. [55:09] I was a big fan of consultation when I was sitting over there. [55:12] Now, it's a different job, different time. [55:14] But that's not necessarily the point. [55:16] This is a very unique situation that we faced here. [55:19] The fact of the matter is that our mission, [55:21] and the one you were briefed on and talked about, [55:23] that mission remains ongoing. [55:24] And that is the counter-narcotic mission [55:26] that we continue to carry out. [55:27] And as controversial as it may be, [55:29] you may not all be fans of it, obviously, [55:31] but it is happening in the Eastern Pacific. [55:33] And it is also happening in the Caribbean Basin. [55:35] The problem is, or the good news is, [55:37] there aren't a lot of drug boats moving in the Caribbean Basin [55:39] anymore. [55:40] And that's what we had briefed Congress upon. [55:41] This specific mission that you've talked about, [55:44] one of the reasons why you rehearsed it [55:45] is to see if it's even feasible, to basically go to the president [55:48] and say, is this something that's even an option on the table? [55:50] The truth of the matter is that this mission could not [55:54] have been briefed to Congress, because even [55:56] it wasn't even in the realm of possible [55:58] until very late in December, when all of our efforts [56:02] to negotiate with Maduro had failed, [56:03] and the president was finally presented these options [56:05] and made these decisions. [56:06] It was also a trigger-based operation. [56:08] It may never have happened. [56:09] It required a number of factors to all align [56:12] at the right place at the right time in a very limited window. [56:16] And it wasn't even clear if it was ever going to be possible. [56:18] There's also the aspect which I do not control, [56:20] and that is deference to the Department of War [56:22] on operational security. [56:24] Despite the fact that we had kept this [56:25] quite constrained, the truth of the matter [56:27] is that this was leaked. [56:28] We now know it was leaked by a contractor at the Department [56:31] of War that, had it been published, [56:34] would have endangered the lives of people [56:36] and or would have probably canceled the ability [56:38] to carry out the mission. [56:40] So this is a real tension, and one [56:41] that I'm doing the best I can to try to manage, [56:44] within the constraints of two things, operational security [56:47] and also decisions being made. [56:50] There are multiple contingencies for events all over the world, [56:53] including some that none of us think [56:54] were ever going to come to fruition. [56:55] And in this particular case, one of the reasons [56:58] why you rehearse these things in advance [56:59] is to know whether it's even possible, is this even doable, [57:01] and what are the risks associated with doing, [57:03] so you can present options to the president, who ultimately [57:06] makes these decisions. [57:07] In the case of reimagining NATO, it most certainly [57:09] has to be reimagined. [57:10] And the reason why it has to be reimagined [57:11] is not because its purpose is reimagined. [57:13] Its capabilities have to be reimagined. [57:15] Let me give you as a point of example. [57:17] There's a lot of talk about security guarantees. [57:19] And it's something that there's general agreement about now [57:21] with the case of Ukraine. [57:23] But those security guarantees basically involve the deployment, [57:25] the deployment of a handful of European troops, [57:29] primarily French in the UK, and then a US backstop. [57:32] But in fact, the security guarantee is the US backstop. [57:35] It is not the, and I'm not diminishing the fact [57:38] that some countries in Europe are [57:40] willing to place troops in a post-war Ukraine. [57:42] What I'm pointing out is, that is irrelevant [57:45] without the US backstop. [57:47] And so, and the reason why you need such a strong US backstop [57:50] is because our allies and our partners [57:52] have not invested enough in their own defense capabilities [57:54] over the last 20 or 30 years. [57:56] Now, hopefully that's going to change. [57:58] Hopefully that is changing. [57:59] And in some cases, and in some particular countries, [58:01] it's already changed. [58:02] But this is a fact that we cannot ignore. [58:05] NATO is going to be stronger if our allies are more capable. [58:08] Especially, and here's the reality, [58:09] whether we want to accept it or not, [58:11] we have interests all over the world. [58:12] We have interests in the Middle East. [58:14] We have interests in the Western hemisphere. [58:15] And we most certainly have interests in the Indo-Pacific. [58:17] A number of you have already pointed out [58:19] that China is the chief challenge. [58:21] We can't have the same soldiers or the same ships [58:24] in both Europe and in the Indo-Pacific. [58:26] We have to pick. [58:27] No matter how many ships we build, [58:29] no matter how many capabilities we grow, [58:31] we're going to have to make these adjustments. [58:33] And the stronger our partners are in NATO, [58:35] the more flexibility the United States will have [58:37] to secure our interests in different parts of the world. [58:39] That's not an abandonment in NATO. [58:41] That is a reality of the 21st century [58:44] and the world that's changing now. [58:45] In the case of Greenland, [58:46] I'll say we're in a good place right now. [58:48] We had excellent meetings with the General Secretary of, [58:50] Secretary General of NATO. [58:52] In fact, even as I speak to you now, [58:54] there'll be some technical level meetings [58:56] between us and our partners in Greenland [58:58] and Denmark on this issue. [59:00] And I think we have in place a process [59:02] that's going to bring us to a good outcome for everybody. [59:05] The President's interest on Greenland has been clear. [59:07] It's a national security interest. [59:09] It's a long-standing interest that predates this administration. [59:12] It's one that our allies acknowledge is real. [59:14] I think we're going to get something positive done. [59:16] We're going to begin that process [59:18] in a very professional, straightforward way. [59:20] It begins today, and it'll be a regular process. [59:22] We're going to try to do it in a way [59:24] that isn't like a media circus [59:25] every time these conversations happen, [59:27] because we think that creates more flexibility [59:29] on both sides to arrive at a positive outcome. [59:31] And I think we're going to get there. [59:33] And I thought it was noteworthy and important [59:35] that despite your concerns, [59:37] the President at his speech in Davos made very clear [59:39] that the United States was not going to use force [59:41] or military force in Greenland. [59:43] So I think we're going to wind up in a good place. [59:45] We've got a little bit of work to do, [59:47] but I think we're going to wind up in a good place. [59:49] And I think you'll hear the same from our colleagues [59:51] in Europe very shortly. [59:53] Mr. Secretary, the Gang of Eight has never leaked. [59:55] It is critical that you consult with Congress. [59:57] For us to be safe, our allies have to trust us. [59:59] And for this committee to do our work, [1:00:01] we have to trust you. [1:00:03] Let's work together to restore that trust. [1:00:05] Senator McCormick. [1:00:08] Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. [1:00:10] Defending American interests [1:00:12] in the face of Russian, Iranian, and Chinese [1:00:14] encroachment in the Western Hemisphere [1:00:16] is a key to the Trump corollary [1:00:18] of the Monroe Doctrine. [1:00:20] But Venezuela's new interim leader, [1:00:22] in her public commentary at least, [1:00:24] defends their ties to Russia, Iran, [1:00:26] and the PRC, and had said this week [1:00:28] had enough of U.S. interference. [1:00:30] So, beyond the oil leverage [1:00:33] which you talked about in your testimony, [1:00:35] what steps is the administration taking [1:00:37] to demand from [1:00:39] the interim government to put incentives [1:00:41] in place to ensure that they [1:00:43] prevent malign actors, foreign [1:00:45] terror organizations, and so forth from [1:00:47] continuing to have [1:00:49] influence and safe haven [1:00:51] in Venezuela? [1:00:53] Yes, there's leverage. [1:00:55] And I wouldn't just say oil. [1:00:57] In Venezuela, in order for them [1:00:59] to normalize it will require cooperation [1:01:01] with the United States. [1:01:03] But it's not just leverage, it's also their national interest. [1:01:05] It's an alignment of their interests. [1:01:07] The truth of the matter is that the United States [1:01:09] will be a far better partner for a future [1:01:11] Venezuelan government that's free and democratic [1:01:13] and even for the current authorities [1:01:15] than some of the partners they've signed up with now. [1:01:17] Frankly, [1:01:19] we think it's not in [1:01:22] Venezuela's interest to have an Iranian [1:01:24] presence or the sale of Iranian weaponry [1:01:26] or anything like that into their country. [1:01:28] We think and can argue [1:01:30] that some of these criminal elements, which they've [1:01:32] allowed to act with impunity in parts of their country, [1:01:34] is a deal with the devil. [1:01:36] In the short term, it provided revenues to some [1:01:38] corrupt regime officials, but in the long term [1:01:40] has created real destabilization [1:01:42] not for just them, by the way, but also for [1:01:44] Colombia. Just understand something. [1:01:46] The FARC dissidents and the ELN operate [1:01:48] with impunity from Venezuelan territory. [1:01:50] They control Venezuelan territory. [1:01:52] And some of that was through deals with [1:01:54] individuals aligned with the regime because they made money [1:01:56] off of that. But we don't think that's [1:01:58] the long term interest. [1:02:00] And what's been expressed to us by leaders of the [1:02:02] interim authorities is that they agree. [1:02:04] And now we're going to test it. Despite the public commentary, [1:02:06] there's a recognition, you think, in progress. [1:02:08] Look, we all have politics. [1:02:10] Even in places like that. Suffice it to say [1:02:12] what I've said from the very beginning, and that is [1:02:14] we are going to judge based on actions [1:02:16] not words. And that's going [1:02:18] both ways. You can tell us you're going to do all these great things. [1:02:20] If you don't do them, you didn't do them. [1:02:22] Or you can say, I'm not going to do these great things, [1:02:24] but if you do them, you did them. [1:02:26] And I think we've made, I think we can point [1:02:28] to some things now that show you, just as [1:02:30] an example. Think about it. Within [1:02:32] two and a half weeks of Maduro's [1:02:34] removal, they passed reforms [1:02:36] to the hydrocarbon laws, which [1:02:38] basically rolled back [1:02:40] many of the Chavez era restrictions [1:02:42] on private ownership and investment [1:02:44] in their country. [1:02:46] It doesn't go far enough. It probably needs to [1:02:48] do more. But that's extraordinary. That never would have [1:02:50] happened two or three weeks ago. It certainly [1:02:52] wouldn't have happened if Maduro was still there. [1:02:54] So I think these are signs of progress. [1:02:56] Do they still have political prisoners? [1:02:58] They do. But many are increasingly [1:03:00] being released every single day. And some [1:03:02] are actually being released and beginning to speak out again. [1:03:04] And we're going to watch very closely how they're treated [1:03:06] and how that happens. Because that'll be part of how we judge [1:03:08] them and their actions. You touched on my second [1:03:10] question, which is this long [1:03:12] history of, a very [1:03:14] sordid history for outside investors [1:03:16] coming into Venezuela. And the President [1:03:18] and you had a meeting with our [1:03:20] energy leaders in the [1:03:22] Oval Office to talk about the [1:03:24] opportunity to invest. And there was, you know, [1:03:26] worries about the safety of [1:03:28] investing. What steps [1:03:30] beyond what you just [1:03:32] described in terms of the hydrocarbon law, [1:03:34] security guarantees for workers, [1:03:36] any sorts of certainty [1:03:38] that investors are gaining which is [1:03:40] going to allow them to have the confidence to move [1:03:42] on the opportunities of Venezuela? Yeah, I mean, [1:03:44] the first step is some of these investors or potential [1:03:46] investors need to get a license from OFAC [1:03:48] to be able to even explore this. Then they need to be able to [1:03:50] go down there and meet with people and see what's happening [1:03:52] and make that determination. Here's what I [1:03:54] would say. Venezuela has a lot of oil. They do. [1:03:56] But there's a lot of oil in other places. [1:03:58] Companies are only going to invest somewhere [1:04:00] if they know we're going to invest, [1:04:02] we're going to make our money back with a profit, and our [1:04:04] land isn't going to be taken from us. And if you try to, [1:04:06] there's a court we can go to and contracts we can [1:04:08] enforce. That's the level of certainty [1:04:10] that we're talking in terms of security. [1:04:12] And that's part of this transition [1:04:14] process. That's part of this recovery process [1:04:16] is to normalize their industry. [1:04:18] Because if not, they'll just invest the money [1:04:20] in Guyana. Or they'll just invest the money [1:04:22] in some other part of the world that has oil. They're not [1:04:24] going to risk it. So it's to their benefit [1:04:26] to have set up a normal [1:04:28] transparent [1:04:30] process that encourages foreign [1:04:32] investment, not just in oil, by the way, in other [1:04:34] natural resources, but in other sectors of their [1:04:36] economy. I mean, it's unlimited, [1:04:38] whether it's retail, whether it's banking. [1:04:40] I mean, a country that's prosperous in generating [1:04:42] economic activity holds the promise [1:04:44] of all sorts of economic activity. [1:04:46] Let me try to squeeze in one more question, if I could, [1:04:48] just in my remaining seconds. Just very briefly, [1:04:50] we've heard such differing accounts, [1:04:52] and the President has spoken strongly, you have [1:04:55] as well, on the deaths in Iran [1:04:57] and the horrible atrocities that are being [1:04:59] committed. Can you give us some sense [1:05:01] of, we see reports of thousands, [1:05:03] tens of thousands, what's the State Department's [1:05:05] best estimate of what's happened [1:05:07] on the ground? Well, I don't know. In the thousands, [1:05:09] for certain. And [1:05:11] look, I think regimes, including [1:05:13] that one in Iran, have learned [1:05:15] that when you start shooting people in the head [1:05:18] with snipers, it's effective. [1:05:20] I mean, it works. And they've done it. And it's horrifying. [1:05:22] And that's what we've seen. That [1:05:24] regime is probably weaker than it has ever [1:05:26] been. And the core problem they face, [1:05:28] unlike the protests you saw in the past [1:05:30] on some other topics, is that they [1:05:32] don't have a way to address the core [1:05:34] complaints of the protesters, which is that their [1:05:36] economy's in collapse. And the reason why there's [1:05:38] economies in collapse is because they [1:05:40] spend all their money and all their resources [1:05:42] building weapons [1:05:44] and sponsoring terrorist groups around the world [1:05:46] instead of reinvesting it back into their society. [1:05:48] And as a result, have taken on massive global [1:05:50] sanctions, which has isolated their economy [1:05:52] and their country. And so, that's [1:05:54] what the Iranian people are demanding, is that [1:05:56] they stop doing that and start caring about them [1:05:58] and get these sanctions off them. And this regime [1:06:00] is unwilling to do it. So, the core [1:06:02] challenges, the protests [1:06:04] may have ebbed, but they will spark up again [1:06:06] in the future. Because this regime, unless [1:06:08] they are willing to change and or leave, [1:06:10] have no way of addressing the legitimate [1:06:12] and consistent complaints of the [1:06:14] people of Iran who deserve better. [1:06:16] Thank you. Thank you. Senator Murphy. [1:06:18] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Listen, I think [1:06:20] the scope of the project that you are [1:06:22] undertaking in Venezuela is without [1:06:24] precedent. You are taking their oil [1:06:26] at gunpoint. You are holding and selling that [1:06:28] oil, putting, for now, the receipts in an office [1:06:30] in an offshore Middle Eastern account. You are [1:06:32] deciding how and for what purposes that money [1:06:34] is going to be used in a country of 30 million [1:06:36] people. I think a lot of us believe that that [1:06:38] is destined for failure. And I know that you are [1:06:40] telling us today just to be patient, but [1:06:42] a month later, we have no [1:06:44] information on a timetable for a democratic [1:06:46] transition. Maduro's people are still [1:06:48] in charge. Most of the political prisoners [1:06:50] are in jail. And by the way, those that have [1:06:52] been let out have a gag order [1:06:54] on them from the government. The opposition [1:06:56] leader is still in exile. [1:06:58] This looks already like [1:07:00] it is a failure. You say you're [1:07:02] in serious talks, but as you note, [1:07:04] the Venezuelans are great at [1:07:06] being in serious talks. They almost [1:07:08] never deliver. So [1:07:10] I'm just going to give you my three questions [1:07:12] and hope that you'll answer them [1:07:14] because I do think we want to try [1:07:16] to understand how to judge [1:07:18] the efficacy of this [1:07:20] as time goes on, because I worry you won't [1:07:22] be back before this committee [1:07:24] anytime soon. And [1:07:26] to understand whether this is just facilitating [1:07:28] corruption, both in Venezuela [1:07:30] and here at home. So here are my [1:07:32] three questions. First, [1:07:34] reports are that you've given [1:07:36] no-bid licenses [1:07:38] to two companies to sell [1:07:40] Venezuela's oil. One of [1:07:42] them is a massive donor to the [1:07:44] president. To many Americans, that [1:07:46] reeks. And so my question [1:07:48] is, can you commit that partners [1:07:50] for future sales are going to be chosen [1:07:52] through a fair, open [1:07:54] selection process? Second, [1:07:56] if Delcy Rodriguez, [1:07:58] who is an unelected [1:08:01] leader, the head of [1:08:03] Maduro's torture operation, [1:08:05] is still in power six months from [1:08:07] now, does that mean that [1:08:10] your policy is a success [1:08:12] or failure? How do we judge [1:08:14] when we've had enough [1:08:16] of Rodriguez? And third, [1:08:18] in your testimony, you reserved the [1:08:20] right to use force again [1:08:22] in the future, if the [1:08:24] Venezuelan government isn't complying [1:08:26] with your requests. [1:08:29] So if, for instance, they [1:08:31] refuse to give you access to the oil [1:08:33] in the future, if they said, [1:08:35] we're just going to keep it for ourselves, [1:08:37] would this cause you to consider [1:08:39] military action? And do you concede [1:08:41] that if you're using military action [1:08:43] simply to try to compel cooperation [1:08:45] from the government, you absolutely [1:08:47] need congressional authorization [1:08:49] for that? So if you can answer those three questions. [1:08:51] Yeah, so the first question was about the trading [1:08:53] companies, the second is about Delcy still [1:08:55] in power six months from now, and the third [1:08:57] is on the use of [1:08:59] force. Okay. On the first one, the [1:09:01] two traders. So here's the problem we face. [1:09:03] The problem we face in the short term [1:09:05] is they had no place to put oil. [1:09:07] They were running out of storage capacity for their oil. [1:09:09] We had to move that oil to market very [1:09:11] quickly. The only way to move it to market [1:09:13] very quickly is to plug into these [1:09:15] two primary trade companies that could [1:09:17] sell it in the open market. That is not [1:09:19] the permanent outcome here. That is a short-term [1:09:21] fix to a short-term problem, which is [1:09:23] they were literally storing oil. They brought [1:09:25] in tankers, and had tankers sitting offshore [1:09:27] just to hold their oil. At some point [1:09:29] their capacity to produce was going to be shut [1:09:31] down, and their ability to generate revenue. So we [1:09:33] had to move that oil very quickly. The long-term [1:09:35] plan is not those two trading companies. [1:09:37] The long-term plan is for them to have a [1:09:39] normal energy program that sells directly [1:09:41] into the market. Directly. [1:09:43] To refineries and to companies that are exploiting [1:09:45] and exploring it. For example, Chevron [1:09:47] has operations there that never stopped. [1:09:49] They seek to expand those operations. They [1:09:51] don't need those trading companies. [1:09:53] So those trading companies were a short-term fix [1:09:55] for a very acute problem because we wanted [1:09:57] to prevent societal collapse because [1:09:59] they had no money for revenue. On the [1:10:01] second point about her being still in power, [1:10:03] look, let me say this a couple things. [1:10:05] This is not unprecedented. I can point to a number [1:10:07] of places. Spain, Paraguay, two examples [1:10:09] of places in which there was a transition [1:10:11] from an autocratic [1:10:14] regime to a democratic regime, and it took time. [1:10:16] I can't give you a timeline of how long [1:10:18] it takes. It can't take forever. [1:10:20] It's not even been four weeks [1:10:22] since Maduro was reduced. Six months, a year, two years? [1:10:24] Well, I think we need to be, let me put it to you this way, [1:10:26] we need to be much further along six months from now, [1:10:28] even three months from now. That may not be satisfactory [1:10:30] to you, but I'm saying we have to be much further along [1:10:32] three, four, five months. Three or four, five months [1:10:34] from now cannot look like what today looks like. [1:10:36] And I think there's acknowledgement on both sides of that. [1:10:38] I can probably give you a better answer, [1:10:40] and this is not deflecting, when we finally [1:10:42] have people on the ground like the ambassador [1:10:44] and the team around her on a daily basis [1:10:46] that are interacting. Because one thing is for me to pick [1:10:48] up the phone and talk to Delcy Rodriguez three times [1:10:50] a week. Another thing is to have someone on the ground [1:10:52] on a daily basis that's following these events, [1:10:54] is talking to civil society, but [1:10:56] also engaging with interim [1:10:58] authorities. But the fact of the matter [1:11:00] is that, yes, we want to see quick progress. [1:11:02] As you said, it's unprecedented, okay? [1:11:04] All I'm saying to you is, before this, [1:11:06] this was stagnant. Before this, [1:11:08] we had spent 14 years, you were involved in some of those [1:11:10] efforts, 14 years trying to change [1:11:12] the dynamic in Venezuela. [1:11:14] 13, 12, 11, 10, that was a big part of my [1:11:16] career and the Senate was spent on this. [1:11:18] This is the first time in over a decade [1:11:20] that we see even the glimmer [1:11:22] of an opportunity to change conditions. [1:11:24] A lot of that will depend on us, but a lot of that will depend [1:11:26] on them. And it also will depend on the rest [1:11:28] of Venezuelan society. How quickly can we [1:11:30] get all these Venezuelans that want to go back to [1:11:32] Venezuela and participate in [1:11:34] civic and economic life back to Venezuela? [1:11:36] That's going to be critical here. [1:11:38] We recognize that. So, yes, we have to [1:11:40] be much further along in six months. We expect to [1:11:42] be further along. And if we're not, I'll [1:11:44] tell you. We'll tell you. On the third point [1:11:46] of use of force, look, the President never [1:11:48] rules out his options as Commander-in-Chief [1:11:50] to protect the national interest of the United States. [1:11:52] I can tell you right now with full certainty, [1:11:54] we are not postured to, nor [1:11:56] do we intend or expect to have to [1:11:58] take any military action in Venezuela [1:12:00] at any time. The only military [1:12:02] presence you'll see in Venezuela is our Marine [1:12:04] Guards at an embassy. Okay? That [1:12:06] is our goal. That is our expectation. [1:12:08] And that is what everything that outlines towards. [1:12:10] That said, if an Iranian drone [1:12:12] factory pops up and threatens our forces [1:12:14] in the region, the President retains the option [1:12:16] to eliminate that threat. I'm asking a more [1:12:18] specific question, because in your testimony, you suggest [1:12:20] that you would use force to compel [1:12:22] cooperation. For instance, [1:12:24] with oil sales. Do you [1:12:26] agree that you have to come to Congress [1:12:28] to get authorization [1:12:30] if you were simply using force to try to compel [1:12:32] cooperation? Well, there's two things. There's the [1:12:34] look, there's a, there's, [1:12:36] under the War Powers Act, no, under the War Powers [1:12:38] Act, if we're going to be involved in something, [1:12:40] that's going to put us in there [1:12:42] involved in a sustained way. We have [1:12:44] to notify you within 48 hours after the fact, [1:12:46] and then if it's going to last longer than 60 days, [1:12:48] we have to come to Congress with it. We don't [1:12:50] anticipate either of these things having to happen. [1:12:52] Everything is moving in a very different trajectory [1:12:54] right now. On the other hand, if we tell [1:12:56] them we don't want to see drones from Iran, [1:12:58] as an example, pointed at the United States, [1:13:00] or threatening our forces, or our presence [1:13:02] in the region, or our allies' presence in the [1:13:04] region, and they refuse to comply with that, [1:13:06] the President does reserve the option in [1:13:08] self-defense to eliminate that threat. [1:13:10] We don't see that. We don't anticipate it. [1:13:12] But it could happen. But we hope not. [1:13:14] We don't want it to happen. On the contrary, [1:13:16] if we had to take military action, it would set us back [1:13:18] on all these other things that we're talking about. [1:13:20] I can tell you, military action is not good for, [1:13:22] you know, recovery and transition. [1:13:24] That's not what we hope to see. It's certainly not our [1:13:26] goal here. But a lot of that will depend on them. [1:13:28] But I think it would require [1:13:30] the emergence of an imminent threat [1:13:32] of the kind that we do not anticipate [1:13:34] at this time. But that's not... [1:13:36] They get a vote on that, too. [1:13:38] Senator Brasso. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. [1:13:40] Mr. Secretary, great to see you. Congratulations. [1:13:42] What you and President Trump have demonstrated [1:13:44] in the past year is clearly peace [1:13:46] through strength. And I appreciate the leadership [1:13:48] from both of you. We talk a lot about [1:13:50] Venezuelan oil. You know, I focus [1:13:52] a lot on energy going to China. [1:13:54] And three-quarters of all the oil that went [1:13:56] from Venezuela out of the country there [1:13:58] last year, 75 percent of it, [1:14:00] went to China. They got it at deep discounts. [1:14:02] There's lots of money back to Venezuela. [1:14:04] Through oil for loan deals. [1:14:06] Since the start of this blockade, [1:14:08] basically, Venezuela crude shipments [1:14:10] to China have fallen dramatically. [1:14:12] Can you... [1:14:14] Talk a little bit about the impact this has [1:14:16] on China's broader energy strategy. [1:14:18] Just to be clear, it's a quarantine, not a blockade. [1:14:20] A blockade is an act of war. [1:14:22] It's a quarantine. And it's been very effective [1:14:24] in the sense that it's given us [1:14:26] this leverage. In fact, can I just add something? [1:14:28] And this might be to Senator Murphy's [1:14:30] question as well. The Venezuelan [1:14:32] authorities are now identifying [1:14:34] ships that they want us to grab. [1:14:36] In fact, about a week [1:14:38] and a half ago, we grabbed one of these ships [1:14:40] that was... Because here's what happened [1:14:42] in the aftermath of Maduro. [1:14:44] About five ships took off without [1:14:46] authorization from the Venezuelans. [1:14:48] Because they were controlled by some network [1:14:50] in the country. With the cooperation [1:14:52] of the interim authorities, we seized [1:14:54] one of those ships, we brought it back [1:14:56] into Venezuelan waters, handed the [1:14:58] ship off to the Venezuelans, who in turn fed [1:15:00] it into this mechanism, this short-term [1:15:02] mechanism that I described to you, was created [1:15:04] so we're seeing cooperation on that front. [1:15:06] Now, I think your question more specifically was about [1:15:08] China. Yeah, so look, China can buy [1:15:10] Venezuelan oil, but they're going to have to buy it like [1:15:12] everybody else in the world is going to have to buy it. Not the deep discounts. [1:15:14] Yeah, at the normal price. [1:15:16] And that money is going to [1:15:18] flow back to the benefit of the Venezuelan people [1:15:20] in a structured way. And I know that [1:15:22] in the short term, that will involve this mechanism [1:15:24] we've described. In the long term, [1:15:26] our intention is that it would be governed by [1:15:29] a democratically elected [1:15:31] government. You know what I mean? [1:15:34] Like a normal country would handle it. [1:15:36] But it's not just about oil. There's other [1:15:38] economic, the full spectrum. [1:15:40] I mean, Venezuela was, [1:15:42] and still, we're not talking about [1:15:44] some third world country here. I mean, we're talking about [1:15:46] a country that doesn't just have wealth, it has memory, [1:15:48] it has history of economic activity, [1:15:50] of people who own chains of pharmacies. [1:15:52] I know some of these people, people who own chains [1:15:54] of retail stores, including American [1:15:56] retailers who had a presence there. [1:15:58] We just want it to be a normal, prosperous [1:16:00] country again, not a playground for Iran, Russia, [1:16:02] and China in our own hemisphere. [1:16:04] And we're going to try to help them get that, because [1:16:06] we think it serves our national interest. [1:16:08] That will require actions on our part, [1:16:10] not money, but ultimately that will [1:16:12] require them. This is ultimately going to be on [1:16:14] the Venezuelan people and Venezuelan society [1:16:16] and Venezuelan leaders to make this happen. [1:16:18] We're going to be there to help and assist and create [1:16:20] the parameters for it, and we feel like we're making [1:16:22] really good progress. If we make as much [1:16:24] progress over the next four weeks as we've [1:16:26] made in the last three and a half weeks, [1:16:28] I'll feel very good about that. If it slows [1:16:30] down or gets complicated, I'll certainly let you [1:16:32] know. But our anticipation is that we're [1:16:34] going to be able to continue to work cooperatively with them [1:16:36] because it's in their interest and ours. [1:16:38] But I will point out to this. After this operation [1:16:40] happened, look at the people who criticized it. [1:16:42] I mean, there were others. China, [1:16:44] Russia, Iran, [1:16:46] Hamas. These were the people that were [1:16:48] upset about this strike and this raid [1:16:50] and what we did. And [1:16:52] I can tell you that in many countries in the [1:16:54] Western Hemisphere, there was great pleasure [1:16:56] in the fact that Maduro was removed and [1:16:58] that it didn't involve an all-out war and an invasion. [1:17:00] Since you mentioned Iran, and Senator [1:17:02] McCormick mentioned Iran as well, a lot of oil is [1:17:04] still going from Iran to China. [1:17:06] A million barrels a day last [1:17:09] year. Lots of that money goes back to Iran, [1:17:11] to the dictators, the people [1:17:13] that are actually killing others on the street. [1:17:15] Can you talk a little bit about what we can do to prevent [1:17:17] that from continuing to go and what we're doing to support [1:17:19] the Iranians? Well, some of that is sanctioned oil. [1:17:21] This requires the willingness to enforce those sanctions. [1:17:23] And obviously, that comes with a [1:17:25] cost-benefit analysis. The Iranians are also capable [1:17:27] of seizing ships and doing that in [1:17:29] retribution. But that's certainly something that [1:17:31] will be under consideration. And others have done that [1:17:33] in the past. And we have seized, for example, [1:17:35] weapons shipments in the past that involve [1:17:37] Iranian obscures. And in fact, [1:17:39] some of the ships... Remember, all of [1:17:41] these ships that we're seizing with the oil are [1:17:43] with court orders. They're either one or two things. [1:17:45] We either have a court order [1:17:47] from a federal judge that allows us to seize it [1:17:49] because it's in violation of a sanction, or [1:17:51] it's a flagless vessel in the shadow fleet. [1:17:53] And we were... Many of these ships [1:17:55] here involve Iran. And some [1:17:57] of that oil was going to be ultimately [1:17:59] transferred to the excess refining [1:18:01] capacity that China currently has. [1:18:03] Since you mentioned the word shadow fleet, [1:18:05] Senator Shaheen and I have legislation [1:18:07] on subsea cables. I've asked you about that [1:18:09] the last time we were here. The sabotage [1:18:11] being done, directly being targeted. [1:18:13] I know that Sweden and Finland have both [1:18:15] detained Russian ships along those lines. [1:18:17] We're going to have a markup on that bill [1:18:19] tomorrow. Is that something you continue to support, [1:18:21] our efforts to go after... It is, and it'll feature... [1:18:23] It's featured prominently in the agenda, both at the [1:18:25] G7 this year, as it did somewhat [1:18:27] last year. But again, this year in the G7 will be [1:18:29] one of the top items we'll be discussing. [1:18:31] And we've also been pushing it as a priority [1:18:33] for NATO to consider. [1:18:35] The two new things we want NATO to make a priority [1:18:37] this year in our conversations are [1:18:39] the undersea cable infrastructure [1:18:41] and Arctic security. And the third is [1:18:43] critical minerals and supply chains. Because [1:18:45] ultimately, you can spend all the money in the world on weapons [1:18:47] if you can't make them because you're missing some [1:18:49] chip that requires some mineral [1:18:51] that China controls, you're in a lot of trouble. [1:18:53] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator Kaine. [1:18:56] Thank you. We started this operation [1:18:58] on September 2nd [1:19:00] with the attack on Venezuelans [1:19:02] in boats in open waters. [1:19:04] And now, [1:19:06] we are nearly five months in. [1:19:08] This week is five months. [1:19:10] Finally, a public hearing. [1:19:13] Wow, how novel. [1:19:15] Finally, a public hearing in the Senator House. [1:19:17] This is the first public hearing [1:19:19] we've had. Two hundred [1:19:21] folks who are on secret designated [1:19:23] combatant lists have been killed. U.S. troops [1:19:25] have been injured. Hundreds of millions of dollars [1:19:27] have been spent. An armada [1:19:29] amassed. The announcement of a new [1:19:31] Monroe Doctrine, which does not land [1:19:33] well in the Americas. Democrats [1:19:35] have been asking over and over again, [1:19:37] can we have a public hearing? [1:19:39] Can we share what we know with the American [1:19:41] public? Finally, a public [1:19:43] hearing. But even that hearing is [1:19:45] constrained. I'd like [1:19:48] to talk about the complete [1:19:50] weakness of the legal [1:19:52] rationale about the strikes on boats [1:19:54] in international waters, but I can't [1:19:56] because the administration has only [1:19:58] shared it with members in a [1:20:00] classified setting. I can't [1:20:02] tell you why the domestic [1:20:04] rationale is hollow and the international [1:20:06] rationale is hollow. [1:20:08] I can't tell you why the rationale [1:20:10] for attacking Venezuela is [1:20:12] hollow because, again, the [1:20:14] rationale has been shared with us [1:20:16] in a closed setting. [1:20:18] I can't share with you the [1:20:20] grim details of the [1:20:22] murder of shipwrecked survivors [1:20:24] in open waters that we all know [1:20:26] because we've seen the videos and [1:20:28] we've questioned the U.S. military [1:20:30] officials involved about [1:20:32] legality because the [1:20:34] administration will not release that [1:20:36] publicly. They release [1:20:39] the boat strike videos publicly, but [1:20:41] they hid the second strike [1:20:43] that killed struggling shipwrecked [1:20:45] survivors, even from Congress, [1:20:47] for nearly three [1:20:49] months, but I can't really talk to you [1:20:51] about it. I can't talk to you about the [1:20:53] weakness of the targeting criteria [1:20:55] being used to attack boats [1:20:57] in the Caribbean and Pacific. [1:20:59] I would encourage any colleague, if you have not, [1:21:01] go to the classified setting and [1:21:03] ask for a briefing on each strike and [1:21:05] ask this question, what was the evidence that [1:21:07] there were narcotics on that craft? [1:21:09] You will be very surprised [1:21:12] if you ask that question [1:21:14] about every strike. [1:21:16] And so even in this first public [1:21:18] hearing, five months in, there's a lot [1:21:20] we can't talk about. If it was such a [1:21:22] righteous operation, [1:21:24] why is the administration and the [1:21:26] majority in this Senate [1:21:28] so jealously protecting [1:21:31] the details about it [1:21:33] from being revealed to the American public? [1:21:35] I have Virginians deployed [1:21:37] in this operation. I can't answer [1:21:39] their families' questions. [1:21:41] Thank God we're having a [1:21:44] public hearing five months in. [1:21:46] This is supposed to be the greatest [1:21:48] deliberative body in the world. [1:21:50] Mr. Secretary, who won the July [1:21:52] 2024 Venezuelan presidential election? [1:21:54] I think the whole world [1:21:56] would acknowledge it was [1:21:58] Armando Gonzalez. [1:22:00] Who lost that election? [1:22:03] Maduro. [1:22:05] And his Vice President, [1:22:07] Delcy Rodriguez. [1:22:09] Now, you have made the decision, [1:22:11] the administration has made the decision [1:22:13] in the aftermath of the attack that Delcy [1:22:15] said about her, [1:22:17] on January 14, [1:22:19] about Delcy Rodriguez who lost the election [1:22:21] with Maduro. We just had a great conversation today [1:22:23] and she's a terrific person. I mean, [1:22:25] she's somebody that we have worked with very well. [1:22:27] Let me tell you what Delcy Rodriguez [1:22:29] said the day after [1:22:31] Venezuela was attacked. [1:22:33] Governments around the world are simply shocked [1:22:35] that the Bolivarian Republic [1:22:37] of Venezuela is the victim and target [1:22:39] of an attack of this nature which [1:22:41] undoubtedly has Zionist [1:22:43] undertones. [1:22:45] What the hell did [1:22:47] Delcy Rodriguez mean when she said this [1:22:49] attack had Zionist undertones? [1:22:52] I'm assuming you have no idea. [1:22:55] Oh, I have an idea what she meant. [1:22:57] What's the question? [1:22:59] What does she mean when she says this attack [1:23:01] has Zionist undertones? [1:23:03] I'd have to answer in a broader context. [1:23:05] No one here is telling you that this is [1:23:07] what we want to see in the long term. [1:23:09] This is not a campaign to leave in place [1:23:11] the system that's currently in place. [1:23:13] Let me switch. [1:23:15] Go ahead. [1:23:17] I'm ready to switch now [1:23:19] to talk about somebody that you know well. [1:23:21] I thought you raised an important point. [1:23:23] You know well and you respect well [1:23:25] Maria Corina Machado. [1:23:29] Here's what President Trump said about her. [1:23:31] Won the Nobel Prize in the aftermath [1:23:33] of the attack on Venezuela. [1:23:35] I think it would be very tough for her to be the leader. [1:23:37] She doesn't have the support within or the respect [1:23:39] within the country. [1:23:41] She's a very nice woman, but she doesn't [1:23:43] have the respect. [1:23:45] What did President Trump mean by that? [1:23:47] First of all, I've known Maria Corina for probably 12 years, [1:23:49] have dealt with her probably more than anybody [1:23:51] as much as anybody on this committee [1:23:53] has for certain, and I'll be meeting with her today [1:23:55] in fact, and we met with her a couple weeks ago. [1:23:57] So, here's the reality though, [1:23:59] and I think what the President was pointing to, [1:24:01] and I think Maria Corina would acknowledge this. [1:24:03] I talked to her last week. [1:24:05] She was very disappointed in those comments [1:24:07] and so were Venezuelans in my state. [1:24:09] She didn't share that with me or with us, [1:24:11] but I would sell this to you. [1:24:13] What the President is acknowledging is that today [1:24:15] as it stands, whether we like it or not, [1:24:17] the elements of control in that country, [1:24:19] the people with the guns, the people that control the guns [1:24:21] and the institutions of government there, [1:24:23] are in the hands of this regime. [1:24:25] So we either, you know, on the one hand, [1:24:27] we're getting criticized, some people are saying [1:24:29] we don't want regime change. [1:24:31] On the other hand, we're being criticized for not [1:24:33] undertaking regime change. [1:24:35] What we're trying to trigger here is a process [1:24:37] of stabilization, recovery, and transition [1:24:39] to something where Maria Corina and others can be a part of. [1:24:41] You have respect for her, don't you? [1:24:43] Sure. [1:24:45] Okay, great. My last question is this. [1:24:47] And so does the President, by the way. [1:24:49] Here's what he said after that meeting. [1:24:51] We're talking to her, [1:24:53] and maybe we can get her involved in some way. [1:24:55] I'd love to be able to do that. [1:24:57] Maybe we can do that. [1:24:59] We'll set the terms for this Nobel Prize winner [1:25:01] having a leadership role. [1:25:03] Last question is this. [1:25:05] You talked about the speech in Davos. [1:25:07] Here's something the President said in Davos. [1:25:09] I'm helping NATO until the last few days [1:25:12] when I told them about Iceland. [1:25:14] They loved me. [1:25:17] They're not here for us on Iceland. [1:25:19] That I can tell you. [1:25:21] They're not here for us on Friday [1:25:23] because of Iceland. [1:25:25] So Iceland has already cost us a lot of money. [1:25:28] The President repeatedly mistook Iceland [1:25:30] for Greenland, right? [1:25:32] We're not mad at Iceland. [1:25:34] They haven't cost us any money. [1:25:36] The President just mistook the two countries [1:25:38] for each other, correct? [1:25:40] Yeah, he meant to say Greenland, [1:25:43] but I think we're all familiar with Presidents [1:25:45] that have verbal stumbles. [1:25:47] We've had Presidents like that before. [1:25:49] Some made a lot more than this one. [1:25:52] Our Founders debated extensively [1:25:55] over which branch of government [1:25:57] should have the power to declare [1:25:59] or initiate war. [1:26:01] Virtually unanimously they decided [1:26:03] and what was entered into the Constitution [1:26:05] was that the declaration or initiation of war [1:26:07] would be the power of Congress. [1:26:09] Now we have many advocates, [1:26:11] many of whom are here today, [1:26:13] who have been advocates for an expansive [1:26:15] notion of Presidential power. [1:26:17] They often argued that wars [1:26:20] are not really wars, [1:26:22] that they're kinetic actions or drug busts. [1:26:24] I think, though, if you reverse the circumstances, [1:26:26] it becomes very difficult [1:26:28] for these arguments to hold up. [1:26:31] So I would ask you, [1:26:33] if a foreign country bombed our air defense missiles, [1:26:35] captured and removed [1:26:37] our President, [1:26:39] and blockaded our country, [1:26:41] would that be considered an act of war? [1:26:43] Well, I think your question is about the... [1:26:45] I will acknowledge you've been very consistent [1:26:47] on all these points the entire career. [1:26:49] So, no matter who's in charge. [1:26:51] So I will point to two things. [1:26:53] The first is, it's hard for us [1:26:55] to conceive that an operation [1:26:57] that lasted about four and a half hours [1:26:59] and was a law enforcement operation to capture [1:27:01] someone we don't recognize as a head of state, [1:27:03] indicted in the United States, [1:27:05] wanted with a $50 million bounty... [1:27:07] My question would be, if it only took four hours [1:27:09] to take our President, very short, [1:27:11] nobody dies on the other side, [1:27:13] nobody dies on our side, it's perfect. [1:27:15] Would it be an act of war? [1:27:17] We just don't believe that this operation [1:27:19] comes anywhere close to the constitutional definition of war. [1:27:21] But would it be an act of war if someone did it to us? [1:27:23] Nobody dies, few casualties, [1:27:25] and now, boom, it's a perfect military operation. [1:27:27] Would that be an act of war? [1:27:29] Of course it would be an act of war. [1:27:31] I'm probably the most anti-war person in the Senate, [1:27:33] and I would vote to declare war [1:27:35] if someone invaded our country [1:27:37] and took our President. [1:27:39] So I think we need to at least acknowledge [1:27:41] this is a one-way argument. [1:27:43] One-way arguments that don't rebound, [1:27:45] that you can't apply to yourselves, [1:27:47] that cannot be universally applicable [1:27:49] are bad arguments. [1:27:51] So my next question would be, [1:27:53] let's say it's not a war, [1:27:55] and we're just going to define it away [1:27:57] and say it's not a war. [1:27:59] That's one of the arguments. [1:28:01] So it's a drug bust. [1:28:03] What if a foreign country indicts our President [1:28:05] for violating a foreign law? [1:28:08] Should we extradite our President, [1:28:10] or should we be okay if they come in and get him by force? [1:28:12] Look, I think ultimately we're always going to act [1:28:14] in our national interest. [1:28:16] And so if somebody comes after our national interest, [1:28:18] like the case you've described, [1:28:20] which obviously does not exist at this time, [1:28:23] but the case you've described, [1:28:25] the U.S. always has the right to act in its national interest [1:28:27] I don't know about this equivalency. [1:28:29] Does this justify them doing it? [1:28:31] We're always going to do what's best for the United States and America. [1:28:33] We're always going to protect our system. [1:28:35] But the point isn't, and you're exactly right, [1:28:37] we will act in our national interest, and we should. [1:28:39] So I'm not disagreeing with you at all. [1:28:41] What I'm saying is that our arguments are empty then. [1:28:43] The drug bust isn't really an argument. [1:28:45] It's a ruse. [1:28:47] The war argument, not a war is a war, [1:28:49] is a ruse. It's not a real argument. [1:28:51] And we do what we do [1:28:53] because we have the force. [1:28:55] We have the might. [1:28:57] It's in our interest. [1:28:59] So we wouldn't let anybody come in, [1:29:01] bomb us, blockade us, and take our president. [1:29:03] We've had arguments about [1:29:05] legitimate, illegitimate presidents, [1:29:07] bad elections, rigged elections. [1:29:09] So there's all kinds of same arguments [1:29:11] that we've had in our country that they've had in Venezuela. [1:29:13] But we wouldn't argue [1:29:15] for an indictment. [1:29:17] And these things aren't idle speculation. [1:29:19] Netanyahu's been indicted by the ICC. [1:29:21] And one of the reasons I object [1:29:23] to being part of the ICC, [1:29:25] and I would say you and the administration probably agree, [1:29:27] is we're not going to let any international counsel [1:29:29] indict our president [1:29:31] and arrest him somewhere on foreign soil. [1:29:33] We're not going to do that. [1:29:35] Most of us probably object to [1:29:37] indicting Netanyahu in that way as well. [1:29:39] So I think the arguments are invalid. [1:29:41] So we did get the legal opinion [1:29:43] that Senator Kaine referred to, [1:29:45] the OLC opinion, [1:29:47] Office of Legal Counsel. [1:29:49] And I think a lot of it's been released. [1:29:51] Plus they came to our caucus and talked most openly [1:29:53] about everything they had classified. [1:29:55] So I will talk about at least one of the arguments. [1:29:57] One of the arguments is that [1:29:59] it's a constitutional war, [1:30:01] therefore it doesn't rise to the constitutional notion [1:30:03] of us declaring or having to initiate the war. [1:30:05] It just doesn't rise. [1:30:07] And one of their main arguments [1:30:09] was not enough people died. [1:30:11] And so there is some number [1:30:13] that they, they aren't specific, [1:30:15] but there is some number, [1:30:17] I would assume, although I'm not positive, [1:30:19] but the 50, 60,000 soldiers who died in Vietnam [1:30:21] might be enough for them to call that a war. [1:30:24] But here's the problem. [1:30:26] It isn't the number. [1:30:28] See, our founders gave us the power [1:30:30] to initiate or declare war. [1:30:32] They didn't give us other powers [1:30:34] to execute the war. [1:30:36] Those are left to the president. [1:30:38] But if we have to wait to see how many people are killed, [1:30:40] we have to wait, as they describe it, [1:30:42] as the scope, nature, and extent, [1:30:44] if we have to wait to see the scope, nature, and extent, [1:30:46] the war has been going on for some time, [1:30:48] it's hard to vote to initiate a war [1:30:50] that's been going on. [1:30:52] And we can say this war is over, [1:30:54] but we're still blockading it, [1:30:56] and we may go back in. [1:30:58] You know, we put 2,000, [1:31:00] we leave 2,000 troops in. [1:31:02] Are we going to call that war and initiate it? [1:31:04] So the definition of war is very important. [1:31:06] And I think we have to acknowledge [1:31:08] the problems with our argument. [1:31:10] Calling things kinetic action [1:31:12] is a disservice to our soldiers. [1:31:14] You weren't really wounded in war. [1:31:16] You don't have a medal of honor for war. [1:31:18] You have a medal of honor for a kinetic action. [1:31:20] So I think, let's call it what it is. [1:31:22] And let's vote on these things. [1:31:24] But I think we're in violation [1:31:26] of both the spirit and the law of the Constitution [1:31:28] by bombing a capital, [1:31:30] blockading a country, [1:31:32] and removing elected officials. [1:31:34] And we certainly wouldn't tolerate it, [1:31:36] nor would I if someone did it to us. [1:31:38] We didn't remove an elected official. [1:31:41] We removed someone who was not elected, [1:31:43] and it was actually an indicted drug trafficker [1:31:45] in the United States. [1:31:47] Our laws, indicted under our laws. [1:31:49] Look, Bolsonaro says [1:31:51] that da Silva is not really [1:31:53] the president of Brazil. [1:31:55] Our president said Biden wasn't really the president. [1:31:57] Hillary Clinton said in 2016 [1:31:59] Trump wasn't the president. [1:32:01] So you have these arguments, [1:32:03] and I agree with you. [1:32:05] He probably was, and most likely was. [1:32:07] Most assuredly was a bad election. [1:32:09] He wasn't really elected. [1:32:11] But at the same time, if that's our predicate, [1:32:13] and you don't have to come to us [1:32:15] because it's a drug bust, [1:32:17] we're just removing somebody, [1:32:19] you can see where it leads to. [1:32:21] And it leads to chaos. [1:32:23] And that's why we have rules like the Constitution. [1:32:25] So we don't get so far out there [1:32:27] and I would argue for 70 years [1:32:29] we've been going the wrong way. [1:32:31] It isn't just this president, [1:32:33] but it's a debate that I think is worth having. [1:32:38] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:32:40] And I want to associate myself [1:32:42] with the comments of Tim Kaine. [1:32:44] The fact that we're five months into this [1:32:46] and this is the first oversight hearing [1:32:48] is really a complete failure [1:32:50] of the responsibility of Congress. [1:32:52] Failure of this committee to demand oversight, [1:32:54] but also a reflection of the reluctance [1:32:56] of the administration to engage [1:32:58] in the proper consultation with Congress. [1:33:00] And I know that we'll see you [1:33:02] at least every six weeks or so, [1:33:04] not every five months. [1:33:06] I also feel like the strategy [1:33:08] of keeping basically these very weak [1:33:10] arguments secret [1:33:12] so that they can't be discussed openly [1:33:14] for the legal justifications. [1:33:16] I've gone down and read them [1:33:18] and there's a reason, [1:33:20] obviously you'd be incredibly embarrassed [1:33:22] if those were public. [1:33:24] So make them public. [1:33:26] Let's have an actual transparency [1:33:28] here in the United States of America. [1:33:30] What has gone on? [1:33:32] We had a dictator we didn't like. [1:33:34] We've replaced it with a dictator [1:33:36] we think we can manipulate. [1:33:38] And if that doesn't work, [1:33:40] we'll do something else [1:33:42] in order to pry open that economy for oil. [1:33:44] And I must say that you said [1:33:46] something I liked. [1:33:48] So let me emphasize that. [1:33:50] I'm making progress. [1:33:52] You said no U.S. taxpayer dollars [1:33:54] will be used, [1:33:56] no spending on our part [1:33:58] to kind of prop up Venezuela. [1:34:00] Can you restate your commitment to that? [1:34:02] Yeah. They're not going to need it. [1:34:04] For example, we're not spending money [1:34:06] in Venezuela right now. [1:34:08] I mean, obviously, look, [1:34:10] I think you're putting aside embassy operations [1:34:12] and all of that. [1:34:14] And by the way, there may be some program [1:34:16] through foreign aid that some of you [1:34:18] might be interested in in the future. [1:34:20] We don't think that Venezuela is the kind of country [1:34:22] that needs that. [1:34:24] This is a very wealthy country. [1:34:26] Thank you. [1:34:28] I'm glad you restated that because I think that we will not, [1:34:30] in Venezuela, [1:34:32] and I must say that's a very unpopular idea [1:34:34] among my constituents. [1:34:36] I think America needs a lot of investments [1:34:38] in infrastructure here. [1:34:40] And I think you have a way too rosy sense [1:34:42] of the oil economy there. [1:34:44] Many experts have said, look, [1:34:46] without 10-year prospect horizon of stability, [1:34:48] without Canada deciding to ship a lot more [1:34:50] of its heavy oil from, [1:34:52] instead of to the Gulf, [1:34:54] doing it to Asia so that we prop up [1:34:56] the kind of demand in the Gulf, [1:34:58] without keeping Iran off the international stage [1:35:00] of cost of oil, [1:35:02] the value is higher, [1:35:04] all of those factors would have to be there [1:35:06] for our oil companies to want to [1:35:08] invest their own money. [1:35:10] So I think they'll be coming to the administration. [1:35:12] I think you'll all be trying to find some way [1:35:14] to subsidize them, [1:35:16] but I'm glad what you said today that you're not going to do it [1:35:18] and I want to hold the administration accountable to that. [1:35:20] Second, on terms of the $500 million fund, [1:35:22] $300 million, [1:35:24] my understanding, [1:35:26] has gone back to the central bank of Venezuela [1:35:28] and they have essentially exchanged it [1:35:30] for boulevards [1:35:32] to key industry players. [1:35:34] I don't think we have any transparency [1:35:36] on what corporations [1:35:38] or entities [1:35:40] got that hard currency, [1:35:42] and yet you did say there's going to be [1:35:44] a lot of transparency. [1:35:46] You also said, if I understood right, [1:35:48] that those funds are eventually going to be [1:35:50] brought back into the structure [1:35:52] of U.S. control [1:35:54] as part of our, [1:35:57] well, formal structure [1:35:59] of funds. [1:36:01] In that sense, [1:36:03] the Constitution says, [1:36:05] no money should be drawn from the Treasury [1:36:07] but in consequence of appropriations made in law. [1:36:09] So are you going to make sure [1:36:11] that if that money comes back into [1:36:13] kind of full U.S. control, [1:36:15] not an offshore account the way it is now, [1:36:17] that we're going to abide by the Constitution? [1:36:19] Third point here [1:36:21] is that [1:36:24] one of the things that transpired [1:36:26] is cutting off the oil to Cuba. [1:36:28] And I know you have a strong interest [1:36:30] in making life difficult [1:36:32] for the leadership in Cuba. [1:36:34] Can you lay out for us [1:36:36] what other things you might be planning [1:36:38] in that regard [1:36:40] and how those fit into an overall plan? [1:36:42] Yeah, well, I'll try to do that in a minute. [1:36:44] Let me just say on the rosy projections [1:36:46] of oil, [1:36:48] it's not rosy projection. [1:36:50] I mean, it's either going to happen or it's not. [1:36:52] In essence, there's no world in which [1:36:54] the United States is subsidizing investment [1:36:56] in Venezuelan oil. [1:36:58] It's very simple. [1:37:00] All companies will go in and say, [1:37:02] to one end, make money, [1:37:04] pay back our investment plus a profit at the back end, [1:37:06] and then depending on the terms [1:37:08] of that investment, they'll make a decision [1:37:10] about whether it makes sense for that or not. [1:37:12] Right now, what you have in Venezuela [1:37:14] is a corrupt and broken oil company [1:37:16] run by the government that basically takes [1:37:18] this money, doesn't reinvest in it at all, [1:37:20] and basically sprinkles it to its people [1:37:22] to keep the glue that keeps the regime together. [1:37:24] We want it to become a normal oil economy. [1:37:26] That's what the ultimate goal is here. [1:37:28] And in a normal oil economy, companies [1:37:30] are going to go in, they're going to look at Venezuelan law, [1:37:32] they're going to look at Venezuelan authorities, [1:37:34] and they're going to make a determination about whether or not [1:37:36] it's worth their investment. [1:37:38] That's the normalization process that we're talking about. [1:37:40] That's going to be up to them. [1:37:42] If they want to have a normal oil economy [1:37:44] as opposed to one that is basically used [1:37:46] as a way to feed graft in a very inefficient way [1:37:48] but didn't care about that. [1:37:50] If they do it the right way, we think it has great promise [1:37:52] and potential over the long term especially [1:37:54] because these investments take a long time. [1:37:56] But the U.S. doesn't have to put any money [1:37:58] to encourage companies to go in and invest [1:38:00] nor is there any interest in doing so. [1:38:02] I don't think that's even been discussed [1:38:04] or considered by anybody. [1:38:06] Your second point was, [1:38:08] well, I wrote it here but now. [1:38:10] It's the $300 million being redistributed [1:38:12] to corporations in Venezuela. [1:38:14] The second one was what, I'm sorry? [1:38:16] Lack of accountability over that. [1:38:18] The $300 million has already been distributed. [1:38:20] So that's not the permanent structure [1:38:22] we want to see. [1:38:24] In the long term, we just want them [1:38:26] to have a normal industry [1:38:28] where the companies are involved in there, [1:38:30] they're selling it directly to the market [1:38:32] and what we're worried about now [1:38:34] is the sanctioned oil, [1:38:36] the oil that's under our sanction. [1:38:38] So we have to monitor how that money moves. [1:38:40] So yes, the first $300 million moved [1:38:42] for the following reason. [1:38:44] We would all agree we didn't want to see systemic collapse. [1:38:46] Like one of the things a lot of you told me [1:38:48] you were worried about on the short term is [1:38:50] this is going to trigger internal chaos in Venezuela. [1:38:52] A million people are going to storm [1:38:54] the border with Colombia. [1:38:56] Colombia even stood up troops to their border [1:38:58] to prevent it. [1:39:00] Brazil was worried about it as well. [1:39:02] But the government had enough money to meet payroll [1:39:04] and meet their basic needs [1:39:06] as part of the stabilization. [1:39:08] We should not confuse stabilization with transition. [1:39:10] This is not what the permanent structure [1:39:12] is going to look like. [1:39:14] The Treasury is handling the structuring of that account. [1:39:16] So I would refer you to them [1:39:18] and I can get you an answer for them [1:39:20] as to what the legal framework of that Treasury [1:39:22] would look like. [1:39:24] You just mentioned money to meet payroll [1:39:26] is very different than what we've heard about [1:39:28] the money being used to give hard currency [1:39:30] to key corporations inside of Venezuela. [1:39:32] Which would not be meeting payroll. [1:39:34] This is where complete oversight is required. [1:39:36] We'd like to have transparency [1:39:38] over how that's made. [1:39:40] Remember the first 300 million we're going to have to [1:39:42] on that one because of the urgency in moving funds [1:39:44] to keep the place stable is going to require us [1:39:46] to undertake a retroactive audit [1:39:48] of how that money was spent. [1:39:50] The first 300 million. [1:39:52] But there's probably another 2.5 to 3 billion [1:39:54] down the pike at some point [1:39:56] which will have front end through this process [1:39:58] I described. [1:40:00] I'm not sure if you were here where I described it. [1:40:02] I'm saying on the sanctioned oil proceeds [1:40:04] this is what it could be spent on [1:40:06] and you have to agree to contribute [1:40:08] you have to agree to pay for an auditing system [1:40:10] to make sure that that's how it's being spent. [1:40:12] That's the process we're trying to create. [1:40:14] Again, on Friday we'll mark the four week mark [1:40:16] of this all began. [1:40:18] I understand we live in a world where [1:40:20] items move very quickly. [1:40:22] This was front page news three weeks ago [1:40:24] when we scheduled this hearing and today [1:40:26] other items have captured attention [1:40:28] but we remain focused on it. [1:40:30] So it's only been three or four weeks. [1:40:32] When we finalize it we'll provide that to you [1:40:34] but this is not permanent. [1:40:36] This is not the system we want to see in place [1:40:38] in the long term. [1:40:40] We want to see a normal country. [1:40:43] What was your third question? [1:40:45] Cuba. [1:40:52] Secretary Rubio, as you know [1:40:54] in our home state this was very popular. [1:40:56] Cubans, Venezuelans, Nicaraguans [1:40:58] basically everybody in Latin America [1:41:00] has been fighting [1:41:02] a lot of them are in Miami [1:41:04] as you know [1:41:06] because they had to leave these countries [1:41:08] in lack of opportunity. [1:41:10] So what the President did, the willingness [1:41:12] of the President with your support [1:41:14] and with Pete Hedges' military [1:41:16] was very, very, very well thought of. [1:41:18] So the first thing I think I want to say [1:41:20] is on behalf of Floridians [1:41:22] thank you for what you guys did. [1:41:24] Now the next is everybody has these [1:41:26] ridiculously high expectations [1:41:28] which we all do. [1:41:30] We would love to have a free and fair election [1:41:33] tomorrow. [1:41:35] You knew there was no oppression [1:41:37] everybody wanted to run, they could run. [1:41:39] How should Venezuelans [1:41:41] and Cubans [1:41:43] and Nicaraguans [1:41:45] look at this and how [1:41:47] patient should they be [1:41:49] and what would be the milestones [1:41:51] you would give them to look at [1:41:53] to say we are making progress? [1:41:55] First I would remind everybody [1:41:57] let's just go back six months, eight months [1:41:59] a year ago at this time [1:42:01] the Venezuelan challenge for us was frozen. [1:42:03] It was a frozen situation. [1:42:05] We had a regime that was entrenched [1:42:07] its opposition was either in hiding [1:42:09] or forced overseas. [1:42:11] Edmundo Gonzalez lives in Spain. [1:42:14] Maria Corina is no longer, she's very brave [1:42:16] she stood there as long as she could [1:42:18] but she had to leave. [1:42:20] The others are in jail. [1:42:22] They were increasing their relationships [1:42:24] and outreach with Iran [1:42:27] and accordingly have existing ones [1:42:29] with Russia, Cuba and China. [1:42:31] And other than more sanctions [1:42:33] and more speeches and more threats [1:42:35] and whatever it was a frozen situation. [1:42:37] Now for the first time in literally a decade [1:42:39] there is the opportunity that something could change. [1:42:41] But there is the opportunity that something will change. [1:42:43] We have changed that dynamic. [1:42:45] Which goes back to the question that Senator Merkley had [1:42:47] about Cuba. What we are looking for [1:42:49] is the opportunity for a change in dynamic. [1:42:51] That's a country that's been backwards. [1:42:53] It has no functional economy. [1:42:55] You can call them Marxists [1:42:57] we can call them communists [1:42:59] but not even Lenin would recognize [1:43:01] this version of communism and Marxism [1:43:03] that they've instilled in Cuba. [1:43:05] It's an economic model that hasn't worked anywhere on the planet. [1:43:07] The suffering [1:43:09] in the rural areas of Cuba are acute [1:43:11] and they're deep. [1:43:13] And it's not because of the embargo [1:43:15] it's because they don't know how to run an economy. [1:43:17] How is it the fault of the U.S. embargo [1:43:19] that Cuba, one of the world's largest sugar producers [1:43:22] now imports sugar? [1:43:24] Because no sector of their society works. [1:43:26] It's frozen and it's broken. [1:43:28] But in the case of Venezuela we have a glimmer of hope now [1:43:30] the opportunity to change the dynamic. [1:43:32] Now what that requires is smart decisions on our part [1:43:34] but ultimately it will require [1:43:36] decisions made by Venezuelans. [1:43:38] Both those currently in charge of the interim authorities [1:43:40] and those who may be in charge in the future [1:43:42] as well to step forward. [1:43:44] It is our sincere belief that the only way [1:43:46] you're going to have a free, prosperous [1:43:48] Venezuela that's allied with the United States [1:43:50] is one in which every sector of their society [1:43:52] is represented in their politics. [1:43:54] And that includes many people who currently live abroad. [1:43:56] And even the opposition, [1:43:58] people like to say the opposition, [1:44:00] the opposition is very diverse. [1:44:02] There are members of the opposition that were once part of Chavismo [1:44:04] and turned against it. [1:44:06] There are members of the opposition that have never been Chavistas [1:44:08] like Maria Corina Machado and have been very forceful against it. [1:44:10] So that broad sector [1:44:12] is represented as well. [1:44:14] So you have to have a process of internal reconciliation [1:44:16] that allows these voices to begin to participate [1:44:18] in the political life of that country. [1:44:20] And that ultimately brings us to a point [1:44:22] in which you can have a country [1:44:24] where all of these elements of their society [1:44:26] are represented in their politics. [1:44:28] And look, there's a percentage of the Venezuelan population [1:44:30] I don't know what the number is, [1:44:32] whether it's 15 or 20, [1:44:34] that may not have liked Maduro, [1:44:36] but are still committed to Chavista ideology. [1:44:38] And they'll be represented in that platform as well. [1:44:40] They may not win elections, [1:44:42] but they'll be involved in this. [1:44:44] That'll be up to the Venezuelan people. [1:44:46] But our desire here is to have... [1:44:48] What's the end state? [1:44:50] We want a Venezuela that has legitimate democratic elections. [1:44:53] Sometimes elects leaders that are friendly to the United States. [1:44:55] Sometimes elects leaders that maybe are not [1:44:57] the person we would have wanted to win. [1:44:59] But that's not unique for us. [1:45:01] That happens all over the world. [1:45:03] We're not disputing that Petro is the legitimately elected president of Colombia [1:45:05] and yet he doesn't always say nice things about us. [1:45:07] But we also want [1:45:09] a Venezuela that's prosperous [1:45:11] and a Venezuela that's aligned with the United States [1:45:13] and a year ago at this time, [1:45:15] this was frozen. [1:45:17] Now we have a real opportunity, [1:45:19] not just to create change systemically within that country [1:45:21] through our help but their efforts, [1:45:23] but also one that is no longer a base of operation, [1:45:25] the central base of operation [1:45:27] for every geopolitical adversary we have. [1:45:29] And that's what Venezuela was under Maduro. [1:45:31] And that's what we hope and intend to change. [1:45:33] So would you, [1:45:36] if you're a Venezuelan that lives in Miami, [1:45:38] so what you would say is [1:45:40] that you're working hard, [1:45:42] there's a lot of variables [1:45:44] in your control, [1:45:46] but you'd say right now, [1:45:48] political prisoners are being released, [1:45:50] never fast enough, [1:45:52] the oppression is being reduced, [1:45:55] not fast enough, [1:45:57] opposition leaders are speaking up more and more, [1:45:59] so we're making progress and you're going to continue [1:46:01] to control the oil [1:46:03] to make sure that we continue down this path. [1:46:05] What I would say is that we share the same goal [1:46:07] and the same outcome we want for Venezuela [1:46:09] and the question is, [1:46:11] we have to do it through a realistic process [1:46:13] that has the highest chance of success. [1:46:15] The way to view it, [1:46:17] if you use the medical analogy, [1:46:19] is this is a critically ill patient [1:46:21] that has suffered some very serious things. [1:46:23] They've broken their leg, [1:46:25] but they also have a ruptured spleen or something. [1:46:27] You've got to deal with the life-threatening first [1:46:29] before you deal with a broken leg. [1:46:31] And even when you deal with a broken leg, [1:46:33] there's going to be a period of rehabilitation. [1:46:35] You don't just go from having your leg repaired in a surgery [1:46:37] to running on a treadmill the next day. [1:46:39] There's going to have to be a process here. [1:46:41] But the process has an arrow moving towards [1:46:43] accomplishments, achievements, and positive things. [1:46:45] And what I know quite well, as you do, [1:46:47] is for the first time in over a decade and a half, [1:46:49] there is the real possibility of transformation. [1:46:51] And a lot of it will depend on them. [1:46:53] Because there are many people living in Florida [1:46:55] and across the country who would like to go back [1:46:57] and be a part of Venezuelan economic life. [1:46:59] Many of them are eager to do so. [1:47:01] And they're going to need them. [1:47:03] Venezuela is going to need them to come back [1:47:05] and rebuild the businesses that were taken or lost [1:47:07] and engage themselves in both civic and economic life. [1:47:09] But again, I remind everybody, [1:47:11] on Friday we'll mark the four weeks [1:47:13] since this happened. I get it. [1:47:15] We'll mark something immediately. [1:47:17] But this is not a frozen dinner you put in a microwave [1:47:19] and in two and a half minutes it comes out ready to eat. [1:47:21] These are complex things. [1:47:23] And we've seen this play out. [1:47:25] I've used the example of Paraguay and Spain. [1:47:27] There are others where there's a transition [1:47:29] from autocracy to democracy. [1:47:31] It's not linear. [1:47:33] In some cases there are ups and downs along the way. [1:47:35] But it's trending in the right direction so far [1:47:37] with the recognition that more work needs to be done. [1:47:39] Thanks for your hard work. [1:47:42] Senator Booker. [1:47:44] I just want to start by saying what's playing, [1:47:46] frankly, be playing to Senator Rubio [1:47:48] and playing to members here [1:47:50] is that it should not have taken this long [1:47:52] to have this hearing. [1:47:55] Fundamentally we have a crisis, I believe, [1:47:57] in our democracy right now [1:47:59] which is the failure of Congress to do its job. [1:48:01] To provide checks and balances, [1:48:03] oversight, [1:48:05] to provide the kind of [1:48:07] constitutionally mandated work [1:48:09] that we should be doing to keep a balanced government. [1:48:11] We have operations [1:48:13] right now that are literally costing [1:48:15] the American taxpayer tens of millions of dollars [1:48:17] a day. [1:48:19] The buildup in the Caribbean alone [1:48:21] is hundreds of millions of dollars a month. [1:48:23] But we're not providing that kind of oversight [1:48:25] that's necessary. [1:48:27] So from our power to the purse [1:48:29] to our important work of providing a check and balance [1:48:31] to an administration, [1:48:33] what we're seeing right now is unacceptable [1:48:35] and speaks to what I think is a growing [1:48:37] constitutional crisis in our country [1:48:39] which is a Congress that is just lying down [1:48:41] for the administration to do whatever it wants [1:48:43] whenever it wants. [1:48:45] I want to ask you about your colleagues questioning [1:48:47] because I actually know from years of conversations [1:48:49] with you your heart about human rights [1:48:51] in countries like Venezuela, [1:48:53] Mr. Secretary. [1:48:55] And you issued a travel warning, [1:48:57] a level four [1:48:59] travel advisory from your [1:49:01] department's website that says [1:49:03] right now in Venezuela there's a high risk [1:49:05] of wrongful detention, torture, [1:49:07] terrorism, kidnapping, [1:49:09] arbitrary enforcement of laws, [1:49:11] crime and more. [1:49:13] And when we hear [1:49:15] from the president that he is in charge, [1:49:17] that you all are running this government [1:49:19] to that extent, [1:49:21] I have a lot of concerns when it comes [1:49:23] to the rampant human rights [1:49:25] violations that are persisting. [1:49:27] Caballo is [1:49:29] Maduro's key hardline enforcer. [1:49:31] He's continued to intimidate [1:49:33] and suppress Venezuelan voices. [1:49:35] He remains in control of Venezuela's [1:49:37] security forces, security services, [1:49:39] the collectivos. [1:49:41] We're seeing extraordinary [1:49:43] examples [1:49:45] that the constant oppression [1:49:47] of the people is continuing [1:49:49] as these folks are [1:49:51] remaining in control [1:49:53] of the country. [1:49:55] So I just want to know [1:49:57] what is the plan to address [1:49:59] in a much more aggressive manner [1:50:01] these severe human rights violations [1:50:04] and to try to stop [1:50:06] these armed militias. [1:50:08] Because if we are doing things [1:50:10] to stabilize their government, [1:50:12] if we're turning over resources [1:50:14] and money to the very groups [1:50:16] that we have, [1:50:18] that seems to me [1:50:20] against America's values [1:50:22] and it seems to me [1:50:24] something that should be unacceptable [1:50:26] to Congress on both sides. [1:50:28] Absolutely. [1:50:30] The Venezuela I described [1:50:32] that we want to see emerge from this [1:50:34] is one in which none of that is happening. [1:50:36] If you think about travel advisories, [1:50:38] travel advisories are us imagining [1:50:40] worst-case scenarios. [1:50:42] We have a duty to warn American citizens [1:50:44] when they travel to a place that does have [1:50:46] something related to the regime. [1:50:48] They may be taken by criminal gangs [1:50:50] that control parts of that society. [1:50:52] For example, they have these colectivos [1:50:54] as they're called, which basically [1:50:56] are these armed motorcycle gangs [1:50:58] that are allowed to act with impunity [1:51:00] in return for their support for the Maduro regime [1:51:02] in the past. [1:51:04] You have the ELN and the FARC [1:51:06] and other drug trafficking organizations [1:51:08] including train.agua that are involved. [1:51:10] So these are real risks that we have a duty [1:51:12] to warn Americans. [1:51:14] Here's what we didn't want to see. [1:51:16] Let's flood over there. [1:51:18] Let's all go over there. [1:51:20] And we could expose people to dangers. [1:51:22] But this is the hypocrisy that I see. [1:51:24] At the same time that you're issuing [1:51:26] these human rights cautions [1:51:28] about what's going on there for Americans, [1:51:30] you have a president that's lifting [1:51:32] temporary protective status for Venezuelans. [1:51:34] Many of them are individuals [1:51:36] that have lived in our country for years [1:51:38] if not decades. [1:51:40] When I hear from the Venezuelan community, [1:51:42] I hear an outrage that at the very same time [1:51:44] that you are affirming here [1:51:46] that Venezuelans are vicious, [1:51:48] are running around suppressing voices, [1:51:50] we have an administration that has said [1:51:52] very clearly that they're not only going to be [1:51:54] lifting temporary protective status [1:51:56] for Venezuelans living in the US, [1:51:58] but instead of protecting long-time [1:52:00] American residents, [1:52:02] they are, quote, [1:52:04] excuse me, the administration [1:52:06] is putting people back on deportation flights [1:52:08] and sending them into that madness. [1:52:10] Does that make sense to you? [1:52:12] Well, first of all, the travel advisories [1:52:14] for American citizens traveling there [1:52:16] Why lift temporary protective status? [1:52:18] Well, the problem with temporary protective status [1:52:20] was it was granted to so many people [1:52:22] in such vast numbers, [1:52:24] so quickly, without proper vetting [1:52:26] by the previous administration, [1:52:28] that there's a real concern that there were [1:52:30] gang members that had received TPS [1:52:32] simply because of the nation they came from [1:52:34] and the time in which they came. [1:52:36] It became so big and so massive. [1:52:38] The overwhelming majority of Venezuelans [1:52:40] are not members of Trained at Agua, [1:52:42] but there were Trained at Agua [1:52:44] and other criminal elements embedded in the TPS system. [1:52:46] So, we have to counsel the program [1:52:48] in order to appropriately vet it through [1:52:50] on the individual cases. [1:52:52] Mr. Secretary, this might not surprise you. [1:52:54] I don't trust this administration [1:52:56] and the way they use terms like terrorists. [1:52:58] I've seen them calling American citizens [1:53:00] domestic terrorists, [1:53:02] who are people trying to peacefully protest. [1:53:04] The problem we have right now [1:53:06] is the administration continues to make policies [1:53:08] that seem to contradict their words, [1:53:10] and yet we don't have a process [1:53:12] in place for Congress to do its job [1:53:14] because people are not calling folks in [1:53:16] and not providing the kind of oversight [1:53:18] that we need. [1:53:20] It is very frustrating to me [1:53:22] that we still have a repressive regime [1:53:24] in power in Venezuela, [1:53:26] suppressing human rights, [1:53:28] yet we are cooperating with them, [1:53:30] we are funding them, [1:53:32] and we're not calling out the ridiculousness [1:53:34] of the violence that's going on there. [1:53:36] At the same time, we're taking people [1:53:38] who have lived in our country [1:53:40] for years and years and years [1:53:42] and sending them back into that hell [1:53:44] where they can be targeted, [1:53:46] and those are hostage because they know [1:53:48] they have American family members [1:53:50] that are still here. [1:53:52] This is a situation ripe for where [1:53:54] we are being complicit in continuing [1:53:56] human rights violations, [1:53:58] and that needs to stop. [1:54:00] Just on two points. [1:54:02] We're not cooperating with them [1:54:04] to continue doing what they're doing now. [1:54:06] We're cooperating with them to transition away [1:54:08] from what's happening now. [1:54:10] And as I said, we're not even four weeks into this thing, [1:54:12] and if it continues to look like this [1:54:14] in six months, nine months, a year from now, [1:54:16] what we're cooperating on [1:54:18] is not the continuation of what's happening. [1:54:20] It's a movement away from all this [1:54:22] and transitioning ultimately to something [1:54:24] that looks nothing like this. [1:54:26] That's the goal. But it's been less than four weeks. [1:54:28] I mean, we think we've made substantial progress [1:54:30] in a very short period of time, [1:54:32] but I acknowledge we want to make a lot more progress. [1:54:36] This is not the end state that we want. [1:54:41] Senator Cornyn. [1:54:43] Mr. Secretary, I want to expand a little bit [1:54:45] on the question that Senator Barrasso raised [1:54:47] about Venezuelan oil. [1:54:49] But primarily what I want to do [1:54:51] is talk about something that's come to be known [1:54:53] as the shadow fleet or ghost fleet [1:54:56] of Russian and Iranian oil [1:54:58] that's been used, [1:55:00] that's subject to sanctions, [1:55:02] which has, with the complicity of Venezuela, [1:55:04] been used to evade sanctions [1:55:06] to help fund the Russian war [1:55:08] against Ukraine [1:55:10] and help Iran remain [1:55:12] the number one state sponsor [1:55:14] of international terrorism [1:55:16] and fund its proxies, [1:55:18] which have been responsible [1:55:20] for so much death and misery [1:55:22] in the Middle East. [1:55:24] So it strikes me that Venezuela, [1:55:26] even though it has a lot of oil, [1:55:28] has been more involved [1:55:30] in trying to assist its allies, [1:55:32] namely Iran and Russia, [1:55:34] in circumventing these sanctions [1:55:36] to help them fund their nefarious activities [1:55:38] both in the Middle East [1:55:40] and in Ukraine. [1:55:42] But obviously they're also a source [1:55:44] of additional energy [1:55:46] which is needed by China. [1:55:48] Can you help us understand that better [1:55:50] is the law enforcement operation [1:55:52] to arrest Nicolas Maduro [1:55:55] and the current status [1:55:57] of our engagement [1:55:59] with Venezuela [1:56:01] helping us deal with that [1:56:03] ghost fleet [1:56:05] or the evasion of sanctions? [1:56:07] Yeah, on the first point. [1:56:09] On the second point, absolutely [1:56:11] it's helping us deal with it [1:56:13] because it's a complex situation [1:56:15] to describe. [1:56:17] The oil in Venezuela we all think [1:56:19] is under the control of one entity, [1:56:21] but it's not. [1:56:23] The glue that held the regime together [1:56:25] was corruption and graft. [1:56:27] People said, I'm supportive of this regime [1:56:29] not because they like Nicolas Maduro [1:56:31] but because Nicolas Maduro set up [1:56:33] a system that guaranteed them a profit. [1:56:35] Some people were making that profit from drugs. [1:56:37] Some of them were making it from [1:56:39] stealing money from their food program [1:56:41] called CLAP. [1:56:43] Some of them were making their money [1:56:45] from an oil field that was literally [1:56:47] given to them in exchange for buying [1:56:49] their loyalty. [1:56:51] His removal has created the conditions [1:56:53] to begin to move away from that. [1:56:55] That's why we sanction their oil. [1:56:57] The ghost fleet exists for the following reason. [1:56:59] When something is sanctioned, when we say [1:57:01] it is illegal for them to move this oil, [1:57:03] none of the traditional legitimate [1:57:05] tankers will carry that oil. [1:57:07] They won't touch it because they don't want [1:57:09] to be sanctioned by the United States. [1:57:11] So you have to turn to these pirates. [1:57:13] You have to basically turn to these ships [1:57:15] that are either falsely flagged, [1:57:17] meaning they're flying the flag of Liberia [1:57:19] but they don't really have a Liberian flag, [1:57:22] in their capacity. [1:57:24] And they have to turn to them. [1:57:26] And they turn to these vessels. [1:57:28] And these vessels are made up with crews [1:57:30] from all over the world. [1:57:32] We seized one where the majority of the crew [1:57:35] members were Ukrainian. [1:57:37] We've seized others, the majority of them [1:57:39] are Russians, and a mix, and what have you. [1:57:41] And so what's happened is a lot of this oil [1:57:43] is going, a lot of this shadow fleet oil [1:57:45] is going even outside the PDVSA system. [1:57:47] And those are the ones that we have now [1:57:49] been seizing as well as the ones that are [1:57:51] involved outside the PDVSA system. [1:57:53] So we've turned this oil into a channel [1:57:55] that goes into this account that ultimately [1:57:57] goes to the benefit of the Venezuelan people. [1:57:59] This is an interim step. [1:58:01] This is not the way we want the oil industry [1:58:03] to look like in perpetuity. [1:58:05] This is simply a way to provide revenue [1:58:07] so that there isn't systemic collapse [1:58:09] while we work through this recovery [1:58:11] and transition phases. [1:58:13] So there's no doubt that while Maduro was there [1:58:15] we had no cooperation on any of this. [1:58:17] Zero cooperation. [1:58:19] But I will tell you this. [1:58:21] Since the time Maduro was removed, [1:58:23] this ship has headed towards Venezuela. [1:58:25] And the ones that you hear us seizing [1:58:27] are all the legacy ones that took off [1:58:29] or have been seized in the past. [1:58:31] So we've got a really good handle on this [1:58:33] as a result of it. [1:58:35] And what's really changed is the dynamic [1:58:37] that the Venezuelan interim authorities [1:58:39] are now actually helping us identify [1:58:41] shadow fleet ships that they want us to seize [1:58:43] and feed into this new interim mechanism. [1:58:46] So let me turn to Iran. [1:58:48] Obviously the President authorized a strike [1:58:54] against Iranian nuclear weapons. [1:58:56] The Iranian nuclear program [1:58:58] and what I consider to be [1:59:00] a magnificent demonstration [1:59:02] of American military power. [1:59:05] And even though the arrest [1:59:07] of Nicolas Maduro [1:59:09] was not primarily [1:59:11] a military operation, [1:59:13] but they provided the support [1:59:15] to law enforcement authorities [1:59:17] as they executed an arrest warrant [1:59:19] against Nicolas Maduro. [1:59:21] Likewise, I think most Americans [1:59:23] were very proud of [1:59:25] how the U.S. government [1:59:27] and particularly the U.S. military [1:59:29] have performed. [1:59:32] But I know the President is very concerned [1:59:34] about what's happening to the demonstrators [1:59:36] in Iran. [1:59:38] And of course there are some estimates [1:59:40] that as many as 30,000 Iranian demonstrators [1:59:42] have been executed [1:59:44] by the regime. [1:59:46] But I know [1:59:48] the President is being presented [1:59:50] with a range of options. [1:59:52] We notice a lot of movement [1:59:54] into the region by our Navy [1:59:56] and other authorities. [1:59:58] What happens if the Supreme Leader [2:00:00] is removed in Iran? [2:00:02] What happens next? [2:00:04] Well, that's an open question. [2:00:06] I mean, no one knows who would take over. [2:00:08] Obviously, their system is divided [2:00:10] between the Supreme Leader [2:00:12] and the IRGC that responds directly to him. [2:00:14] And then you've got these [2:00:16] quasi-elected individuals, [2:00:18] the ones that wear the suits on television [2:00:20] who are part of their political branches, [2:00:22] but ultimately have to run everything [2:00:24] they do by the Supreme Leader. [2:00:26] So I don't think anyone can give you [2:00:28] the hope that there would be some ability [2:00:30] to have somebody within their systems [2:00:32] that you could work towards a similar transition. [2:00:34] I would imagine it would be even far more complex [2:00:36] than the one we're describing now [2:00:38] because you're talking about a regime [2:00:40] that's in place for a very long time. [2:00:42] So that's going to require a lot of careful thinking [2:00:44] if that eventuality ever presents itself. [2:00:46] On the issue of our presence in the region, [2:00:48] here's the baseline I want to set for everybody. [2:00:50] The baseline is this. [2:00:52] We have 30,000 to 40,000 American troops stationed [2:00:54] across eight or nine facilities in that region. [2:00:56] All are within the reach. [2:00:58] We are within the reach of an array of thousands [2:01:00] of Iranian one-way UAVs [2:01:03] and Iranian short-range ballistic missiles [2:01:05] that threaten our troop presence. [2:01:07] We have to have enough force and power [2:01:09] in the region, [2:01:11] just on a baseline, [2:01:13] to defend against that possibility. [2:01:15] That at some point, [2:01:17] as a result of something, [2:01:19] the Iranian regime decides to strike [2:01:21] at our troop presence in the region. [2:01:23] The President always reserves [2:01:25] the preemptive defensive option. [2:01:27] In essence, if we have indications [2:01:29] that in fact they're going to attack [2:01:31] our troops in the region, [2:01:33] to defend our personnel in the region. [2:01:35] We also have security agreements, [2:01:37] the Defense of Israel Plan and others, [2:01:39] that requires to have a force posture [2:01:41] in the region to defend against that. [2:01:43] And so I think it's wise and prudent [2:01:45] to have a force posture within the region [2:01:47] that could respond and potentially, [2:01:49] not necessarily what's going to happen, [2:01:51] but if necessary, preemptively prevent [2:01:53] the attack against thousands of American servicemen [2:01:55] and other facilities in the region [2:01:57] and our allies. [2:01:59] What you're seeing now is the ability [2:02:01] to posture assets in the region [2:02:03] to defend against what could be [2:02:05] an Iranian threat against our personnel. [2:02:07] They certainly have the capability to do it [2:02:09] because they've amassed thousands and thousands [2:02:11] of ballistic missiles that they've built [2:02:13] despite the fact that their economy's collapsing. [2:02:15] They keep spending money on that. [2:02:17] Thank you. [2:02:20] I'm Joe Fryer in New York. [2:02:22] We're listening to Secretary of State Marco Rubio [2:02:24] testifying on Capitol Hill, [2:02:26] speaking briefly about Iran there, [2:02:28] but overall talking about the Trump administration's plans [2:02:30] for Venezuela after its leader, [2:02:32] Nicolás Maduro, was captured and indicted [2:02:34] on drug charges here on U.S. soil. [2:02:36] He's urging patients, noting this isn't [2:02:38] a frozen dinner that's ready to eat [2:02:40] in a matter of minutes. [2:02:42] During his testimony, Rubio also warned [2:02:44] about possible U.S. military action in Venezuela [2:02:46] if its new leaders, especially interim [2:02:48] President Delcy Rodríguez, stray from [2:02:50] the Trump administration's goals for that country. [2:02:52] But he also suggested there are no plans [2:02:54] or intentions to do that just right now. [2:02:56] Let's go straight to... [2:02:58] We are at war with Venezuela. [2:03:00] Secretary Rubio, if that is true [2:03:02] and we are not at war with Venezuela, [2:03:04] will you advise the President to rescind his [2:03:06] invocation of the Wartime Alien Enemies Act? [2:03:08] Well, that was a mechanism to remove people [2:03:10] from our country that prevent grave danger. [2:03:12] So, for example, we know for a fact [2:03:14] that Tren del Agua is a very dangerous gang. [2:03:16] In fact, I believe, if I'm not mistaken, [2:03:18] I may have been the first member of Congress... [2:03:20] This is a wartime act, Mr. Secretary. [2:03:22] Are we currently at war [2:03:24] with Venezuela? [2:03:26] No, we're not in a state of war in Venezuela. [2:03:28] You described the Alien Enemies Act [2:03:30] as a wartime power, our Supreme Court. [2:03:32] And before now, the Alien Enemies Act [2:03:34] was only invoked during the War of 1812, [2:03:36] World War I, World War II, [2:03:38] when it was used to intern [2:03:40] thousands of innocent civilians. [2:03:42] Are you really arguing that the President [2:03:44] should be able to wield an internment law? [2:03:46] No, no, no, but we're talking about two separate things here. [2:03:48] So you're talking about the state of Venezuela [2:03:50] or are describing the regime. [2:03:52] I am talking about the Alien... [2:03:54] The President invoked the Alien Enemies Act. [2:03:56] It's a very clear wartime power. [2:03:58] What we're most talking about are these gangs [2:04:00] and these narco-trafficking groups [2:04:02] that are waging war on the United States. [2:04:05] There's no doubt. These groups have waged war on the United States. [2:04:07] For example, Trinidad was not just a criminal gang [2:04:09] presence in our street. [2:04:11] It is a criminal gang directly responsible for narco-trafficking. [2:04:13] Mr. Secretary, the Trump administration [2:04:15] has acknowledged that the vast majority of the men [2:04:17] that rounded up and deported to torture [2:04:19] under this law had no criminal records whatsoever. [2:04:21] We didn't torture anybody. [2:04:23] Over 75%. [2:04:25] Who did we torture? We haven't tortured anybody. [2:04:27] We've arrested people that are members of gangs [2:04:29] and deported them. We don't want gang members in our country. [2:04:31] Independent investigations have found that many of the men were here legally. [2:04:33] If the administration is willing to lie about [2:04:35] who it's targeting under this law, [2:04:37] what protections do totally innocent people have against abuse? [2:04:39] Again, I want to ask you, [2:04:41] will you advise the President to rescind [2:04:44] his invocation of the wartime Alien Enemies Act? [2:04:46] No, of course not. I mean, these are people [2:04:48] that are threats to the national security of the United States. [2:04:50] I've described this in hearings in the past [2:04:52] including before you guys... [2:04:54] So you're saying that we're at war? [2:04:56] When it comes to narco-trafficking groups [2:04:58] they're targeting the United States for criminal activity. [2:05:00] We're in a state of war. There's no doubt about the fact [2:05:02] that we're confronting them in a war-like setting. [2:05:04] Do the international laws of war apply and do the Geneva Convention apply? [2:05:06] They're waging war against us and they're enemy combatants [2:05:08] as a result of it. And the fact of the matter is [2:05:10] that we are confronting these irregular groups [2:05:12] and that's one of the great challenges of the new century [2:05:14] in this hemisphere in particular is that these [2:05:16] non-state actors who possess state-like [2:05:18] capabilities in terms of their weaponry [2:05:20] pose a grave danger to the United States. [2:05:22] I don't think any American would dispute [2:05:24] that we have cartels that pose a threat to the national security of the United States. [2:05:26] Will the President comply with all of the other [2:05:29] laws of when it comes to warfare? [2:05:31] I mean, you're saying [2:05:33] that he can invoke [2:05:35] this wartime power. [2:05:38] No, I'm saying... You're asking me... [2:05:40] I'm here to discuss foreign policy and what's in the [2:05:42] realm of the Department of State. [2:05:44] I think your question is better directed at the Department of Justice. [2:05:46] But I would tell you that... [2:05:48] Yeah, but you're asking me a question that's... [2:05:50] Alright, but you're asking me a question that's... [2:05:52] Alright, but you're asking me a question that's... [2:05:54] You're asking me a question... [2:05:56] You're asking me a question... [2:05:58] Okay, you're asking me a question that's... [2:06:00] You're asking me a question about the domestic application of a law [2:06:02] that's best directed at the Department of Justice. [2:06:04] It's not a complication. It's very simple. [2:06:06] Because you're asking me something to opine on something that's in the realm of the [2:06:08] Department of Justice in terms of its domestic application. [2:06:10] I can tell you that the United States [2:06:12] is most certainly [2:06:14] confronting terrorist and criminal [2:06:16] organizations operating in our hemisphere [2:06:18] that pose a grave danger to the United States. [2:06:20] Anyone who believes that gangs that flood our country with [2:06:22] fentanyl or cocaine are not threats to the United States [2:06:24] is not living in reality and certainly [2:06:26] does not reflect the opinion of most Americans. [2:06:28] The President already said that he was ready [2:06:30] to put American troops in Venezuela again. [2:06:32] So we're at war right now. [2:06:34] So if things don't go well with the Chavistas [2:06:36] you've empowered, what is your criteria [2:06:38] for returning a military option? [2:06:40] What is your criteria for returning [2:06:42] to a military option and putting boots on them? [2:06:44] I don't recall the President saying he was going to put troops in Venezuela. [2:06:46] Where did he say that? [2:06:48] But that's what you said. I didn't remember the President saying that. [2:06:50] The President has already said that he was ready to put American troops [2:06:52] in Venezuela again. [2:06:54] No, I think the President has said that he retains the right as Commander in Chief [2:06:56] to protect the United States against any imminent threats. [2:06:58] Maybe that involves troops. Maybe that involves air pads. [2:07:00] Maybe that involves military power. [2:07:02] We hope, but we don't anticipate that being the case in Venezuela. [2:07:04] I worry that you are playing fast and loose [2:07:06] with our nation's military. [2:07:08] I just want to conclude by saying [2:07:10] Yeah, but I just gave you testimony of how well things are moving forward [2:07:12] not as fast as everybody would like. [2:07:14] But you also said that in six or nine months [2:07:16] if things don't go well you're going to have to do something else. [2:07:18] And the President has already said that he's not ruling out the military option [2:07:20] and you've also just said that [2:07:22] yes, we are at war. The President has wartime powers. [2:07:24] But every President retains the power to use military to protect [2:07:26] So it's reasonable for me to ask you [2:07:28] And I gave you a very specific example. [2:07:30] He retains the right to defend the United States against an imminent threat. [2:07:32] Yes, if there are Iranian [2:07:34] just to give you an example, Iranian drones [2:07:36] deployed in Venezuela that could threaten the United States [2:07:38] we most certainly will address that. [2:07:40] Even if it's located in Venezuela. [2:07:42] But we hope we don't get to that point. [2:07:44] We don't expect to get to that point. [2:07:46] We're not trending in that direction. That's a fact. [2:07:48] But that said, on the one hand [2:07:50] people here are unhappy we're cooperating with Venezuela [2:07:52] and yet another forever war, Mr. Secretary. [2:07:54] We don't need to be in another forever war. [2:07:56] And that is the pathway that we are going towards. [2:07:58] And let me just say [2:08:00] You're not going towards a forever war [2:08:02] if we're dealing with Elsie Rodriguez every day. [2:08:04] You're not going to ask him to [2:08:06] rescind his invocation of the Alien Enemies Act. [2:08:08] That puts Americans in jeopardy. [2:08:10] And let me just say something about [2:08:12] the President's recent comments about NATO allies. [2:08:14] When I served in Iraq [2:08:16] there were Polish forces there with us [2:08:18] there were British forces there with us [2:08:20] there were Spanish forces there with us. [2:08:22] I personally landed in Elsie, España [2:08:26] which came under direct attack by insurgents. [2:08:28] Polish troops who worked with the Illinois military [2:08:30] with the Illinois National Guard [2:08:32] for 50 years died in Afghanistan [2:08:34] Mr. Secretary. [2:08:36] All the President wants is for NATO to have more capabilities. [2:08:38] He wants our allies to have more [2:08:40] and we need to maintain the strength of that alliance. [2:08:42] Your time's up. [2:08:44] Not making much progress here. [2:08:46] Well let me just say [2:08:48] the President just wants our allies to have more capabilities [2:08:50] to be involved in operations like that [2:08:52] God forbid in the future if necessary. [2:08:54] That's not an unreasonable request. [2:08:56] He said that they stayed a little behind and they certainly did not come to our defense. [2:08:58] Well not every country in Europe [2:09:00] not every country in NATO participated in those missions. [2:09:02] Denmark suffered [2:09:04] some of the greatest military casualties. [2:09:06] There's no doubt that many of our allies [2:09:08] have stepped forward and provided assistance to us [2:09:10] and there are many others that simply don't have the capability [2:09:12] to do it now or in the future. [2:09:14] That's not what the President said. [2:09:16] Thank you Mr. Chairman. [2:09:19] Thank you Secretary Rubio for being here. [2:09:21] I also want to thank you for reaching out to me [2:09:23] the night of the execution of the arrest warrant [2:09:25] against Nicolas Maduro. [2:09:27] I could tell when we talked [2:09:29] that you had been up all night [2:09:31] and it was kind of you to reach out [2:09:33] to me and describe what had happened [2:09:35] that evening. [2:09:37] I've long been a believer in the fact that [2:09:39] the United States has been abundantly [2:09:41] blessed by geography. [2:09:44] God and nature's God [2:09:46] have blessed the American continent [2:09:48] with two vast oceans [2:09:50] one to our east, one to our west [2:09:52] that have protected us from the old [2:09:54] powers of other parts [2:09:56] of the world. We should use those [2:09:58] to our advantage. [2:10:00] At times in our past we have [2:10:02] somewhat neglected [2:10:04] the western hemisphere in recent decades [2:10:06] and I'm pleased that [2:10:08] you and President Trump have been [2:10:10] refocusing on the western hemisphere. [2:10:12] As we look at [2:10:14] burden sharing in other parts [2:10:16] of the world and [2:10:18] pivot some of this focus back to [2:10:20] our own hemisphere, tell me [2:10:22] what that looks like. Tell me what it looks like [2:10:24] to orient [2:10:26] some of our burden sharing toward [2:10:28] our own hemisphere. [2:10:30] Well I think you're seeing some of it now. [2:10:32] It's not to have a military presence [2:10:36] of the kind you've seen in the Caribbean [2:10:38] to deal with this very acute matter. [2:10:40] But the truth of the matter is that it was surprising [2:10:42] in the first place. If these ships [2:10:44] and these assets were deployed in the Indo-Pacific [2:10:46] or in the Mediterranean or in the Middle East [2:10:48] somewhere, no one would blink an eye. [2:10:50] They'd say that's normal, that's what we always do. [2:10:52] The fact that they were deployed in the western hemisphere [2:10:54] was a shock to everybody because we haven't done it. [2:10:56] In fact, according to Southcom, they've rarely [2:10:58] ever had assets permanently deployed to them. [2:11:00] They may have been transiting through at some point [2:11:02] but not permanently deployed. To deal with a very [2:11:04] serious matter. And that is, and these things [2:11:06] become interrelated here at some point [2:11:08] but they are separate in many ways. [2:11:10] And it's part of what I was trying to explain [2:11:12] to Senator Duckworth. [2:11:14] We have a real reality in our region [2:11:16] of these transnational [2:11:19] criminal terrorist organizations [2:11:21] that in many cases possess weapons [2:11:23] that you ascribe to a nation state [2:11:25] not to a gang, who pose a grave [2:11:27] threat to the national security of the United States [2:11:29] but also to the stability of the region. [2:11:31] If you walk through the region, what is the primary [2:11:33] threat in Colombia? Transnational criminal organizations. [2:11:35] What is the threat to Mexico? [2:11:37] What is the threat to the Caribbean basin? [2:11:39] These groups have to be confronted. [2:11:41] They have to be confronted forcefully. [2:11:43] What's the threat in Haiti to systemic collapse? [2:11:45] And that is these criminal gangs that basically [2:11:47] control territory and threaten the ability [2:11:49] to even form a government there in that regard. [2:11:51] So it's endemic throughout the region [2:11:53] and it ultimately impacts the United States [2:11:55] through mass migration, through drug trafficking [2:11:57] and other related criminal organizations. [2:11:59] And so we need to have a force posture that can [2:12:01] confront that and that can provide assistance [2:12:03] and conjunction with other partners. [2:12:05] We now need more countries that are willing to [2:12:07] cooperate with us and collaboratively work on these things. [2:12:09] The way Ecuador is now doing. [2:12:11] The way El Salvador has done. [2:12:13] The way Trinidad and Jamaica and other countries. [2:12:15] The way we historically have done with Colombia, by the way. [2:12:17] And continue to do in many respects. [2:12:19] So we hope Venezuela will be one of those. [2:12:21] Imagine if a future or even the current [2:12:23] interim authorities or a future [2:12:25] legitimate government of Venezuela [2:12:27] cooperated with the United States [2:12:29] against Trinidad Agua. [2:12:31] Cooperated with the United States against the ELN, [2:12:33] the FARC and the drug trafficking organizations. [2:12:35] How much easier it would be to confront [2:12:37] these challenges that we face. [2:12:39] But it will require some force posture in the region. [2:12:41] I think the one area, [2:12:43] if your question is in the context of NATO, [2:12:45] the one area we have to recognize is that [2:12:47] we need to have a presence in the Indo-Pacific. [2:12:49] Many of you travel overseas and are constantly [2:12:51] being told by our Indo-Pacific allies [2:12:53] they want to see a sustained commitment [2:12:55] of the United States to the region. [2:12:57] We still have obligations and needs [2:12:59] that we need to address when it comes to the Middle East. [2:13:01] We have a growing threat of [2:13:03] the rise of terrorism potentially [2:13:05] in the African continent. [2:13:07] And then of course you point to the Western Hemisphere. [2:13:09] So that doesn't mean we're abandoning NATO [2:13:11] or abandoning Europe. It does mean [2:13:13] that we are going to have to at some point [2:13:15] readjust our force posture in the world [2:13:17] to deal with all of these realities. [2:13:19] And as a result is why I keep making the point [2:13:21] the stronger our allies and more capable our allies [2:13:23] in NATO are, the more flexibility we'll have to do that. [2:13:25] We'll still be there with our assurances. [2:13:27] We'll still be there with our presence. [2:13:29] We'll still have some of the largest military deployments [2:13:31] in the world will be in Europe with our allies. [2:13:33] But we are going to need some flexibility [2:13:35] to do this over time. [2:13:37] And we've told this to our allies. [2:13:39] And we've told them there'll be no surprises. [2:13:41] And most of them understand it. Frankly, they do. [2:13:43] And that's why they're moving very quickly in many cases [2:13:45] to rearm and reinvigorate themselves. [2:13:47] Over the last five to ten years [2:13:49] we've seen China gain [2:13:51] pretty significant footholds [2:13:53] by historical standards [2:13:55] in South America, in Central America, [2:13:57] in parts of the Caribbean. [2:14:00] Sometimes this occurs simultaneously [2:14:02] with and in the same places [2:14:04] as drug cartels [2:14:06] places where drug cartels [2:14:08] are the strongest. [2:14:10] How would you describe the connection [2:14:12] between those two things? [2:14:14] Are they correlated or is there a causal? [2:14:16] Correlation maybe to the extent that you have [2:14:18] usually when you have strong narco organizations [2:14:20] or drug trafficking organizations [2:14:22] you also have very weak states [2:14:24] that are in some cases vulnerable to corruption. [2:14:26] So the general Chinese practice has been [2:14:28] you go into a country, [2:14:30] you offer to build a bunch of stuff [2:14:32] that you end up building poorly [2:14:34] and to get that contract you do it as a market share thing. [2:14:36] Not to make money off it [2:14:38] but because it puts you in place [2:14:40] at the expense of everybody else. [2:14:42] You sometimes have to bribe people locally [2:14:44] in order to get that [2:14:46] and it gives you a foothold into that country [2:14:48] and allows you to expand into other sectors. [2:14:50] In some cases frankly it has been [2:14:52] like in telecommunications [2:14:54] because Huawei shows up with a deal [2:14:56] and no western company shows up [2:14:58] with a deal that's affordable [2:15:00] and so they go with Huawei [2:15:02] because they want to have 4G [2:15:04] not to mention 5G. [2:15:06] For example the Panama Canal Zone [2:15:08] where a Chinese company ended up [2:15:10] owning both ports on the Pacific [2:15:12] and on the Caribbean side [2:15:14] and Atlantic side of that canal [2:15:16] which is of grave concern to the United States. [2:15:18] So I do think you've seen their presence [2:15:20] largely through economic means over time [2:15:22] create leverage over nations in the country [2:15:24] who become emboldened [2:15:26] and either trapped in debt traps [2:15:28] or trapped in bad contracts they can't get themselves out of [2:15:30] and always in sectors that are valuable to China [2:15:32] that include rare earths [2:15:34] and critical minerals [2:15:36] and energy and infrastructure. [2:15:38] Senator Schatz, thank you. [2:15:42] Thank you Chairman, Ranking Member, Secretary [2:15:44] good to see you again. [2:15:46] I want to ask about the oil. [2:15:48] Under US law funds received by the government [2:15:50] must be deposited with the treasury. [2:15:52] Earlier you testified that the funds are being held [2:15:54] short term in Qatar [2:15:56] and then will move to a treasury blocked account. [2:15:58] What is the statutory authority [2:16:00] for the administration relying [2:16:02] on Qatar to hold the funds? [2:16:04] It's not our funds. [2:16:06] The funds are in an account that's owned [2:16:08] it's an account that belongs to Venezuela [2:16:10] but it has US sanctions [2:16:12] as a blocking mechanism on it [2:16:14] and one of the primary reasons why it was in a third country [2:16:16] initially until we could create the mechanism [2:16:18] to move it to a US presence [2:16:20] is two-fold. [2:16:22] One, we have an issue we're working through [2:16:24] on recognition. [2:16:26] You have to recognize a government [2:16:28] but we don't recognize this government [2:16:30] we recognize the 2015 National Assembly [2:16:32] so we have to find some creative way legally [2:16:34] to meet that standard. [2:16:36] The other is frankly creditors. [2:16:38] If it was in the name of the Venezuelans [2:16:40] it would immediately be seized upon [2:16:42] by a number of creditors who eventually [2:16:44] will have to take care of [2:16:46] but in the short term that would impede [2:16:48] the ability of the Venezuelan authorities [2:16:50] to receive the funds they need to operate. [2:16:52] This is what I'm trying to get at. [2:16:54] Either it's American money [2:16:56] in which case it's subject to the [2:16:58] Miscellaneous Receipts Act [2:17:00] and there are all kinds of things that attend to that. [2:17:02] You're saying it's Venezuela's money [2:17:04] but it does sound like according to the EO [2:17:06] according to the President's statements [2:17:08] what authority are you relying on [2:17:10] to be in charge [2:17:12] almost in a sort of receivership [2:17:14] kind of arrangement [2:17:16] of how funds are both [2:17:18] received and expended [2:17:20] for a foreign country. [2:17:22] Wouldn't you have to come to Congress [2:17:24] to establish that kind of relationship? [2:17:26] No, because the money never enters our hands. [2:17:28] We only control the disbursement of the money [2:17:30] we don't control the actual money [2:17:32] like it comes into our bank account. [2:17:34] Do you think that you have somewhere [2:17:36] in the statute or the constitution [2:17:39] to control disbursements [2:17:41] of a foreign country? [2:17:43] Well, they've agreed to this [2:17:45] and that's the key. [2:17:47] They've agreed to this arrangement [2:17:49] in which the sanctions that are placed on this oil [2:17:51] is what blocks its distribution. [2:17:53] We've agreed to release sanctions [2:17:55] and allow the disbursement of the funding [2:17:57] as long as they're spending it in a certain way. [2:17:59] I understand it's novel [2:18:01] but it's the best we can come up with in the short term. [2:18:03] Is there a written agreement [2:18:05] that memorializes this? [2:18:07] Secretary, my understanding [2:18:09] is the committee doesn't have this [2:18:11] agreement. [2:18:13] You probably wouldn't [2:18:15] because it's a Treasury matter. [2:18:17] Treasury's handled it but I can most certainly [2:18:19] talk to Treasury about providing you the information. [2:18:21] Also, you're the National Security Advisor [2:18:23] so you do have a role here in coordinating [2:18:25] between the departments [2:18:27] so it's not just like you can punt this to Treasury. [2:18:29] I just didn't bring the document with me. [2:18:31] I just want you to land it and get it to the committee [2:18:33] because look, you're being transparent. [2:18:35] I think this is novel. I think it's funky. [2:18:37] But I don't know until I see the document [2:18:39] and I'd like you to just land it for us [2:18:41] if that's alright. [2:18:44] Like I said, and by the way, by the time I get it to you [2:18:46] hopefully we won't even have that account anymore. [2:18:48] It'll be in one a bit more traditional [2:18:50] where we can use our sanctions [2:18:52] as leverage on how the money's being spent. [2:18:54] I'm just going to move on [2:18:56] to a couple of other issues. Your comments [2:18:58] that Havana should be concerned about [2:19:00] the Maduro operation is fueling speculation [2:19:02] that this administration will turn its sights [2:19:04] to Cuba next. [2:19:07] Will you make a public commitment today [2:19:09] to rule out U.S. regime change in Cuba? [2:19:11] Regime change? [2:19:13] Yes. [2:19:15] Oh no, I think we would love to see the regime change. [2:19:17] That doesn't mean that we're going to make a change [2:19:19] but we would love to see it change. [2:19:21] There's no doubt about the fact that it would be [2:19:23] of great benefit to the United States [2:19:25] if Cuba was no longer governed by an autocratic regime. [2:19:27] But you know what we mean by regime change. [2:19:29] We don't mean, I wish someone else were in charge. [2:19:31] When we talk about regime change [2:19:33] we're talking about using the power of the United States [2:19:35] usually kinetic power [2:19:37] but often other kinds of coercion [2:19:39] and I'm not even saying [2:19:41] that that's always not in our interest [2:19:43] I'm just saying [2:19:46] I'm not asking you whether we would prefer [2:19:48] a different kind of government. [2:19:50] I'm asking whether you are trying to precipitate [2:19:52] the fall of the current regime. [2:19:54] Yeah, but that's statutory. [2:19:56] The Helms-Burton Act, the U.S. embargo on Cuba [2:19:58] is codified. [2:20:00] It was codified in law and it requires regime change [2:20:02] in order for us to lift the embargo. [2:20:04] Okay, we have not received any information [2:20:06] on the Board of Peace. [2:20:08] Do you commit to informing us about [2:20:10] what the heck this is? [2:20:13] Yeah, it's the Board of Peace. [2:20:15] I'll just note that [2:20:17] Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, [2:20:19] Belarus, Bulgaria, Cambodia, [2:20:21] Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, [2:20:23] Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Morocco, [2:20:25] Mongolia, Pakistan, Paraguay, [2:20:27] Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, [2:20:29] UAE, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. [2:20:31] There are a lot of countries [2:20:33] with whom we normally work [2:20:35] very closely and with whom [2:20:37] we are aligned geopolitically [2:20:39] in terms of values that are not [2:20:41] on the Board of Peace. [2:20:43] And so I think it's reasonable for us [2:20:45] to wonder whether something [2:20:47] in terms of a, I don't know, [2:20:49] competitive structure to sort of [2:20:51] either undermine the U.N. [2:20:53] or circumvent the U.N. [2:20:55] I just worry that a lot of our friends [2:20:57] are not on that list. [2:20:59] And some of our adversaries are. [2:21:01] So, up to two points. [2:21:03] The impediment that they have is, [2:21:05] first of all, this was chartered by the U.N. [2:21:07] It's a U.N. resolution that actually [2:21:09] created the mechanism by which the Board was set up. [2:21:11] It's a place to administer phase two [2:21:13] and phase three of the plan in Gaza. [2:21:15] And we welcome, all these countries [2:21:17] have been invited, some in Europe [2:21:19] have chosen not to join it, [2:21:21] either because they have constitutional, [2:21:23] they require constitutional approval [2:21:25] of their Parliament in order to join, [2:21:27] depending on some leaders, like for example, [2:21:29] I'm thinking there are a couple countries [2:21:31] in Europe that could not join [2:21:33] until they got permission from their vote. [2:21:35] In other cases, because they are concerned [2:21:37] about what you just pointed out, [2:21:39] they argue and they want to know, [2:21:41] but the U.N. has served very little purpose [2:21:43] in the case of Gaza, [2:21:45] other than the food assistance. [2:21:47] And so we think it's critical to have something [2:21:49] that's in charge of that. [2:21:51] One final ten-second question. [2:21:54] We are hopefully about to enact [2:21:56] appropriations law, [2:21:58] either this Friday or soon after that. [2:22:00] And I just want your commitment [2:22:03] to work with my team [2:22:05] and anyone else who has jurisdiction [2:22:07] on the implementation of the SFOPs bill. [2:22:09] Yes, of course. [2:22:11] And we're very happy you're about to pass it. [2:22:13] Thank you. [2:22:15] I agree. [2:22:17] You could have gone a little further than that, [2:22:19] Secretary. [2:22:21] Senator Curtis. [2:22:23] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:22:25] Thank you, Mr. Secretary. [2:22:27] Thank you for your service. [2:22:29] You and I overlapped in the Senate [2:22:31] by only a couple of days, [2:22:33] and as a result, [2:22:35] I've only had the luxury of watching you [2:22:37] from a distance. [2:22:39] But I will tell you unequivocally, [2:22:41] I'm grateful for your role. [2:22:43] Unquivocally, [2:22:45] that you and President Trump [2:22:47] have made the world a safer place. [2:22:49] I push back on the false narrative [2:22:51] that we're not respected. [2:22:53] I think we're respected far more [2:22:55] than we were around the world. [2:22:57] And so I'm grateful for that. [2:22:59] I don't know how you get around the world [2:23:01] the way that you do. [2:23:03] You must have some type of super power. [2:23:05] And I'm grateful for the time [2:23:07] you've spent with us this morning. [2:23:09] Now, all of that said, [2:23:11] I do have a basic concern [2:23:13] with you. [2:23:15] I now chair the Western Hemisphere, [2:23:17] which you previously chaired, [2:23:20] the subcommittee. [2:23:22] And I'm often struggling [2:23:24] to get briefings, clear information, [2:23:26] or meaningful cooperation [2:23:28] from the administration [2:23:30] and the State Department. [2:23:32] Let me give you three specific examples. [2:23:34] I suspect most of these are out of your visibility, [2:23:36] so I want to bring them to your attention. [2:23:38] Senator Kaine and I, [2:23:40] who's the ranking member, [2:23:42] tried to do a hearing on Venezuela [2:23:44] in a Senate hearing. [2:23:46] I'm trying to put together a hearing [2:23:48] right now on the prioritization [2:23:50] of the Western Hemisphere, [2:23:52] which I think would be very helpful [2:23:54] to the administration. [2:23:56] And we're struggling to get the State Department [2:23:58] to participate in that. [2:24:00] I couldn't get a briefing [2:24:02] on the drug boat operations [2:24:04] until the Kaine War Power Resolution. [2:24:06] And then all of a sudden [2:24:08] we got a briefing, [2:24:10] but I didn't get that [2:24:12] because I was the chair of the Western Hemisphere. [2:24:14] I don't know what's happening with Maduro [2:24:16] and what's going on there, [2:24:18] but I do think the administration [2:24:20] could get Congress to be a better partner [2:24:22] by informing us better. [2:24:24] And from my perspective, [2:24:26] I'm struggling to see that. [2:24:28] And I would ask you, [2:24:30] if you were the chair of the Western Hemisphere, [2:24:32] would you be okay with that [2:24:34] from the State Department? [2:24:36] And what would you suggest I do? [2:24:38] I think one of the challenges we face, [2:24:40] particularly on Venezuela, [2:24:42] on the prioritization on the Western Hemisphere, [2:24:44] you haven't been able to get it, [2:24:46] but we can figure that out pretty quickly. [2:24:48] But I would say both on Venezuela [2:24:50] and the drug boat operation, [2:24:52] here's the challenge that we face. [2:24:54] This is a committee, as you said, [2:24:56] I was there for many years, [2:24:58] that has oversight over the State Department. [2:25:00] The drug boat operation, which I support, [2:25:02] but is not a State Department operation. [2:25:05] I think now that I'm here testifying with you, [2:25:07] there's a lot of State Department involvement [2:25:09] in the issue of transitioning [2:25:11] and all the projects that we're doing in Venezuela. [2:25:13] But everything that led up to that point [2:25:15] was the jurisdiction of the Department of State. [2:25:17] These were Department of War [2:25:19] and Department of Justice operations [2:25:21] that were ongoing. [2:25:23] And so for us to struggle in those cases [2:25:25] would be to provide you witnesses [2:25:27] that could say anything meaningful [2:25:29] on a topic that was largely from an interagency perspective [2:25:31] in the realm of other agencies. [2:25:33] Now if you were in some of the other committees, [2:25:35] I don't know if they've got those hearings, [2:25:37] those that perhaps can tell you [2:25:39] that are on armed services and the like. [2:25:41] So I think that was the struggle [2:25:43] both in December with a hearing on Venezuela policy [2:25:45] and one on the issue of the broader context [2:25:47] of our priorities in the Western Hemisphere. [2:25:51] I think that's something we most certainly can [2:25:53] and will provide because it features prominently [2:25:55] in our national security strategy. [2:25:57] And I think we have a lot of good stories [2:25:59] to tell about the Western Hemisphere. [2:26:01] I'll just be clear. [2:26:03] We haven't even been able to get that [2:26:05] from the State Department. [2:26:07] To get what? [2:26:09] Help on a hearing for... [2:26:11] No, you'll get it. [2:26:13] We could have that type of cooperation [2:26:16] that the Western Hemisphere... [2:26:18] Yeah, I just got to make sure that the people were... [2:26:20] Look, I don't want you to have a meaningless hearing. [2:26:22] If you're asking about something that's not in our... [2:26:24] It's like having a hearing on agriculture [2:26:26] in front of the State Department. [2:26:28] We have limited involvement [2:26:30] because from an interagency perspective, [2:26:32] in the case of the drug boats and Venezuela [2:26:34] at the time you requested, [2:26:36] this was primarily a Department of War function. [2:26:38] But in the case of the priorities on the Western Hemisphere, [2:26:40] that will happen. [2:26:42] We look forward to doing that. [2:26:45] China, Iran, a little bit earlier. [2:26:47] I'm very concerned, as you are, [2:26:49] about their influence [2:26:51] in the Western Hemisphere. [2:26:53] If we put Venezuela aside for just a moment, [2:26:55] can you talk about where we're seeing [2:26:57] the influence, particularly of China, [2:26:59] in the Western Hemisphere [2:27:01] and what progress we've made [2:27:03] or what we need to be thinking about? [2:27:06] Well, China specific? [2:27:08] All of them are important, [2:27:10] but specifically on China. [2:27:12] I mean, look, when Iran and Russia... [2:27:14] In Iran, their primary foothold in the region was Venezuela. [2:27:16] It's more than just selling weapons [2:27:18] and all this other stuff. [2:27:20] I mean, in many cases there's clear evidence now [2:27:22] that they were providing passports, [2:27:24] Venezuelan passports with false identities [2:27:26] to people who operated on behalf of both Iran and Hezbollah. [2:27:28] And so, deep concerns about that [2:27:30] and that needs to stop and end. [2:27:32] In the case of Russia, [2:27:34] their primary presence of influence in the region [2:27:36] is Venezuela and, to some extent, [2:27:38] Nicaragua and Cuba, [2:27:40] which is where they operate. [2:27:42] In the case of China, [2:27:44] they do have a presence in Cuba. [2:27:46] It's just payment on debt. [2:27:48] And then they were reselling it at a huge profit [2:27:50] because they were buying it on discount. [2:27:52] That has now obviously ended. [2:27:54] And if their debt is legitimate, [2:27:56] a future Venezuelan government will have to address it [2:27:58] and deal with it as part of a broader restructuring [2:28:00] of their debt. [2:28:02] But in the short term, that has now ended. [2:28:04] But the primary way that China plays in the Western Hemisphere [2:28:06] is through commercial relations. [2:28:08] They engage themselves in a country. [2:28:10] They're very interested in telecommunication. [2:28:12] They're very interested in building and controlling [2:28:14] key infrastructure. [2:28:16] They've cleared many leases for many years [2:28:18] because of neglect on our part [2:28:20] in allowing them to do that. [2:28:22] And it's given them leverage and a presence [2:28:24] in many of these countries. [2:28:26] I will say that I think that influence in our hemisphere [2:28:28] has eroded over the last year. [2:28:30] For example, Panama left the Belt and Road Initiative. [2:28:32] We have new leaders in Chile [2:28:34] and Paraguay [2:28:36] I'm sorry, in Chile and Honduras [2:28:38] that have expressed [2:28:40] a strong desire to realign [2:28:42] with the United States and our priorities. [2:28:44] And we have great relationships with Argentina, [2:28:46] Paraguay, and other countries in the region [2:28:48] who are also very cooperative. [2:28:50] And we've had great cooperation from the [2:28:52] Panamanian authorities as well, [2:28:54] including a case before the Supreme Court [2:28:56] I don't know if the final has been submitted [2:28:58] that could lead to the eviction and removal [2:29:00] of a Chinese-controlled company [2:29:02] that controlled both ports at the Panama Canal. [2:29:04] Thank you. I wish we had more time. [2:29:06] I'm out of time. I yield. [2:29:08] Thank you. Senator Van Hollen. [2:29:10] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:29:12] Mr. Secretary, I want to discuss [2:29:14] corruption in the White House [2:29:16] policy. The President and his family [2:29:18] have used the office of the [2:29:20] Presidency to pocket [2:29:22] 1.4 billion [2:29:24] plus dollars since he [2:29:26] was sworn in. The New York Times analysis [2:29:29] entitled, Trump's Plundering of America [2:29:31] indicates that some of that [2:29:33] is a result of the President selling [2:29:35] corruption here at home [2:29:37] but much of it relates to the President [2:29:39] selling out U.S. interests overseas [2:29:41] to make a killing for his family. [2:29:43] Including giving away sensitive [2:29:45] U.S. semiconductor and [2:29:47] technologies to the UAE [2:29:49] while the UAE pumped 2 billion [2:29:51] dollars into one of the Trump [2:29:53] family ventures. [2:29:55] And then there are all the other Trump deals [2:29:57] that are intertwined with tariff [2:29:59] or foreign policy matters. [2:30:01] Golf courses in Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. [2:30:03] Trump hotels and office buildings [2:30:05] in other countries. And of course [2:30:07] there's the 400 million dollar jet [2:30:09] from Qatar. The list goes [2:30:11] on and on. By any measure, [2:30:13] this is the most corrupt [2:30:15] administration in American history. [2:30:17] We also see the President wielding [2:30:19] U.S. power overseas in a way [2:30:21] that advances the interests of his [2:30:23] billionaire buddies at the expense [2:30:25] of American interests. It was [2:30:27] Ron Lauder, who has business ventures [2:30:29] in Greenland, who reportedly first put [2:30:31] the idea of grabbing Greenland [2:30:33] into President Trump's mind. And in the case [2:30:35] of Venezuela, President Trump [2:30:37] has said he talked to oil executives [2:30:39] about toppling Maduro and [2:30:41] going into Venezuela before [2:30:43] anyone in Congress knew. [2:30:45] We know that in [2:30:48] President Trump's mind, opposing [2:30:50] Maduro was not about stopping the flow [2:30:52] of fentanyl or drugs in the United States. [2:30:54] He cut the budget for [2:30:56] DEA. He pardoned the [2:30:58] former Honduran President convicted [2:31:00] of drug running. And the new [2:31:02] President, Delcy Rodriguez, [2:31:04] has herself been long suspected [2:31:06] by DEA of being involved [2:31:08] in drug smuggling. She's also [2:31:10] a longtime hardened communist leader, [2:31:12] so this operation certainly was not [2:31:14] about bringing more freedom and democracy [2:31:16] to Venezuela. In fact, the [2:31:18] President told us what it was all about [2:31:20] at his big press conference [2:31:22] after seizing Maduro. [2:31:25] The President said it was about [2:31:27] oil, oil, oil. He used the word [2:31:29] oil 19 times. [2:31:31] Never mentioned democracy or [2:31:33] freedom or human rights. [2:31:36] And so the pattern of corruption [2:31:38] is clear. Now, President Trump [2:31:40] has said publicly that [2:31:42] he had communications with folks from [2:31:44] the oil industry about going into Venezuela [2:31:46] before anyone here [2:31:48] in Congress was notified. [2:31:51] Mr. Secretary, simple yes or no [2:31:53] question. Were you with President Trump [2:31:55] during any of those conversations [2:31:57] he had with people [2:31:59] with oil interests in Venezuela [2:32:01] about the possibility of deposing [2:32:03] Maduro? That's not a simple yes [2:32:05] or no question, but I can answer it quickly. [2:32:07] And that is, the President always elicits [2:32:09] opinions from all sorts of people, [2:32:11] including, for example, Chevron has an active [2:32:13] license in Venezuela. They operate [2:32:15] in Venezuela. They've been doing so [2:32:17] even when the sanctions were in place. [2:32:19] So of course you would ask Chevron, what is your opinion [2:32:21] of Chelsea Rodriguez? What is your opinion of their [2:32:23] economy and their prospects? But the notion [2:32:25] that somehow the President authorized this challenge [2:32:27] at the urging of oil executives is absurd. [2:32:29] That never happened. Mr. Secretary, [2:32:31] I'm asking whether you were with [2:32:33] the President. That never happened. [2:32:35] I couldn't be with him because it never happened. [2:32:37] The oil executives were not involved whatsoever [2:32:39] in any of the planning on this matter. [2:32:41] None. Did the President, as he said [2:32:43] publicly, inform them [2:32:45] about the U.S. [2:32:47] operations? I think all of [2:32:49] those executives learned about this operation [2:32:51] at the same time everybody else did. [2:32:53] Well, President Trump has said the opposite in public. [2:32:55] No, no, no. Yes, he has. I mean, he [2:32:57] said it. I think it was aboard Air Force [2:32:59] One on an airplane. It's on public record. You can [2:33:01] take a look. Look, Paul Singer, [2:33:03] who you know, gave [2:33:05] $8 million toward Trump's [2:33:07] 2024 campaign [2:33:09] conveniently through his hedge fund. [2:33:11] He's acquired Citgo out of bankruptcy, [2:33:13] which is suddenly very, very [2:33:15] valuable. Did you or President [2:33:17] Trump have any communications with Paul [2:33:19] Singer about Venezuelan oil [2:33:21] in the months leading up to the military [2:33:23] action in Venezuela? I can tell you [2:33:25] I did not, and I would be very surprised [2:33:27] what the President did in that regard. And in fact, [2:33:29] that Singer position that you've outlined, [2:33:31] which is not just him but other creditors, [2:33:33] was blocked. We don't [2:33:35] want to see. It's one of the reasons why we had to do this [2:33:37] account in a third country [2:33:39] in the interim, is because we don't want it [2:33:41] to be something that's picked apart by [2:33:43] creditors. I [2:33:45] appreciate that, and we'll [2:33:47] monitor it carefully. [2:33:50] There's also VTOL. They've been [2:33:52] given a license for Venezuelan oil [2:33:54] worth about $250 [2:33:56] million. VTOL's [2:33:58] senior partner, John Addison, gave [2:34:00] $6 million to the Trump-aligned PACs in the last [2:34:02] cycle. And the list goes on and [2:34:04] on, Mr. Secretary. And I [2:34:06] have to say that when you [2:34:08] have the President of the United States himself [2:34:10] after taking Maduro [2:34:12] get up and say this was about oil, [2:34:14] oil, oil, it does [2:34:17] make all of us ask the question whether [2:34:19] he put men and women [2:34:22] in the U.S. military at risk [2:34:24] simply so he could grab that [2:34:26] oil. Well, that oil, yeah. And I [2:34:28] don't know if you were here. I think you were here the whole [2:34:30] hearing. I don't think you had left. [2:34:32] Number one, the only reason why we used Traffi [2:34:34] and VTOL is simply because [2:34:36] in the short term, we had to move [2:34:38] 50 million barrels of oil that were stuck. [2:34:40] And Venezuela needed to turn that into cash [2:34:42] so that they wouldn't have systemic collapse. [2:34:44] And the fastest way to do it in the short term is for [2:34:46] the traders to do it, because that's in the business that they're in. [2:34:48] That is not the permanent structure. [2:34:50] The permanent structure we want to see is a normal [2:34:52] oil industry where it's sold directly. No company [2:34:54] has licenses down there, they have [2:34:56] an arrangement to pay royalties, and they [2:34:58] move the oil directly to their refineries or sell it [2:35:00] in the global market, not through middlemen. [2:35:02] The only reason why they were used in this instance [2:35:04] is because we had an acute short term problem [2:35:06] which is, how do we provide funding [2:35:08] from their own revenue, not ours, [2:35:10] to keep their government afloat? So in essence, [2:35:12] we allowed Venezuela to use their own oil [2:35:14] to generate revenue to pay teachers [2:35:16] and firefighters and police officers [2:35:18] and keep the function of government operating [2:35:20] so we didn't have systemic collapse. But that [2:35:22] system with those traders, that is not the [2:35:24] long term plan here at all. [2:35:26] My only point, Mr. Secretary, is [2:35:28] those folks who gave a lot of money to the Trump [2:35:30] campaign have done very well [2:35:32] as a result of what's happened. Thank you. [2:35:34] Thank you. Senator Daines. [2:35:36] Secretary Rubio, good to have you up here. [2:35:38] I just returned from India, had a chance to [2:35:40] visit with leadership there as well as spend [2:35:42] time with our new ambassador, [2:35:44] Sergio Gore. He's off to a great start [2:35:46] and a very profitable visit. [2:35:48] Hope to debrief you soon if I might. [2:35:50] By the way, I think [2:35:52] if we were to pick an MVP of the West [2:35:54] Wing, Secretary Rubio, [2:35:56] my vote's for Marco Rubio. [2:35:58] We have a lot of MVPs, don't we? I know you do. [2:36:00] We get a vote on one. I think you've done a great job [2:36:02] this first year. Very proud [2:36:04] to claim my former colleague and now our Secretary [2:36:06] of State. Secretary Rubio, [2:36:08] as you've noted, there are numerous [2:36:10] reasons and good reasons why the U.S. [2:36:12] is the arbiter of Venezuelan [2:36:14] petroleum sales. With the [2:36:16] new export sales framework, the [2:36:18] Venezuelan government is now looking to [2:36:20] other options to [2:36:22] reimburse some of our [2:36:24] adversaries, Iran, Russia, [2:36:26] as well as Iran's proxies, [2:36:28] to include petroleum byproducts [2:36:31] which contain valuable [2:36:33] minerals and so forth, flexi-coke. [2:36:35] Has the administration considered [2:36:37] expanding the export [2:36:39] controls to [2:36:41] additional petroleum byproducts? [2:36:43] Well, I'm sure we would except that [2:36:45] I can tell you a couple things that are happening. They have [2:36:47] in essence represented to us [2:36:49] and we have seen an action in the work that they're doing [2:36:51] directly with Secretary Wright, who's [2:36:53] handling this portfolio on a daily basis. He has a [2:36:55] deep historic and career knowledge [2:36:57] of this field, is that on [2:36:59] all of these things regarding natural resources, [2:37:01] their preference and their partner of choice [2:37:03] moving forward will be the United States [2:37:05] and Western companies. That that's [2:37:07] what they intend to do. As a point of example, and I [2:37:09] said this earlier in the hearing, you may not have been here, [2:37:11] today, they used to get 100% of the [2:37:13] diluent, you know, to have very heavy crude [2:37:15] and so it has to be mixed with light crude [2:37:17] in order to make it, you know, refinable [2:37:19] and movable. And they were getting 100% [2:37:21] of it from Russia, primarily because of the sanctions. [2:37:23] They prefer to have ours. Why? [2:37:25] Number one, it's closer. Number two, it's higher [2:37:27] quality. Today, 100% [2:37:29] of that diluent is coming from the United [2:37:31] States. They were involved in a very complex [2:37:33] gold market in which [2:37:35] they were mining for gold and [2:37:37] silver and it was being exported [2:37:39] almost entirely through Turkey. And we [2:37:41] believe the Iranians were using that as a laundering [2:37:43] operation for themselves ultimately as well, [2:37:45] potentially. And certainly we know that they [2:37:47] had an interest in the oil industry as well. [2:37:49] We are on the verge of a process in which [2:37:51] that will be sold through U.S. markets in a [2:37:53] legitimate way that won't go to finance [2:37:55] and support. I think we'd like to apply [2:37:57] that model to various things. But the end goal [2:37:59] in all of this is, number one, not to [2:38:01] spend any American money, and number two, [2:38:03] for Venezuela to have a normal, legitimate [2:38:05] economy that's not benefiting [2:38:07] cronies, that's not benefiting corruption, [2:38:09] and is not benefiting our geopolitical adversaries. [2:38:11] So far, the interim [2:38:13] authorities have expressed a desire to cooperate [2:38:15] with us on all of these fronts. You [2:38:17] identify an area you want to work with, they say yes. [2:38:19] And we're making progress on all of it. We've faced [2:38:21] no impediments to date in regards to [2:38:23] expanding that relationship. [2:38:25] Thank you. [2:38:27] And maybe we'll talk with Secretary Wright. [2:38:29] We think there may be some workarounds in terms [2:38:31] of what's happening there with some of these [2:38:33] petroleum byproducts, what's called Flexi-Co, [2:38:35] and some we could talk with Secretary Wright, [2:38:37] which absolutely would be something they're [2:38:39] trading right now to our adversaries like Iran, [2:38:41] Iranian proxies, as well as the Russians. [2:38:43] But thank you. [2:38:45] And we're off to a great start, as you say. [2:38:47] We're playing a long game here. [2:38:49] And you're playing it very, very well. [2:38:51] I want to pivot now to [2:38:53] EU energy. [2:38:55] We have a subcommittee here in this committee [2:38:57] for Europe. [2:38:59] Next, we're going to have a hearing. [2:39:01] We're looking about having a conversation on EU [2:39:03] regulations that are hindering energy security [2:39:05] benefiting now, of course, the Russians and [2:39:07] hindering the development of alternative supply [2:39:09] chains. [2:39:11] Mr. Secretary, here's my question. [2:39:13] As Russia continues its war on Ukraine, how [2:39:15] important is it for Europe to develop a pro-energy [2:39:17] posture to ensure they have energy security? [2:39:19] Well, I would argue that one of the reasons [2:39:21] why we have a war in Ukraine is because Russia [2:39:23] thought they could get away with it because of [2:39:25] how dependent Europe was on them for energy. [2:39:27] And they felt there's no way the Europeans are [2:39:29] going to come hard at us because they're too [2:39:31] dependent on us for energy. [2:39:33] So I think most certainly it served as a contributing [2:39:35] factor to the war happening, among others, obviously. [2:39:37] The second point is the point the President has [2:39:39] repeatedly made. [2:39:41] We love Europe. [2:39:43] We want Europe to be strong. [2:39:45] We share a lot of common bonds, both through [2:39:47] history and culture and also through our alliances. [2:39:49] And part of our concerns is that Europe is becoming [2:39:51] increasingly vulnerable when it comes to their [2:39:53] energy supplies, increasingly vulnerable both for [2:39:55] investments in defense and being more reliable [2:39:57] partners, but also vulnerable to Russian oil and [2:39:59] other things of this nature. [2:40:01] So we are concerned. [2:40:03] Though it's not our decision to make, we are [2:40:05] concerned that EU policies in general are leaving [2:40:07] Europe more vulnerable at a time when they should [2:40:09] be getting stronger in their ability to resist [2:40:11] pressure from both Russia and China. [2:40:13] Secretary, thank you. [2:40:16] And we hope to have that discussion next week at [2:40:18] the subcommittee level. [2:40:20] Last question is back to one of my favorite topics, [2:40:22] back to Central Asia. [2:40:24] We had a great dinner at the White House with the [2:40:26] five Central Asian presidents that you were at, [2:40:28] President Trump, as well as Vice President Vance. [2:40:30] I had an honor to be there with you all. [2:40:32] They're making a major shift right now in terms of [2:40:34] having a closer diplomatic and economic relations [2:40:36] with the United States. [2:40:38] That all fits in part of the geopolitical puzzle [2:40:40] as it relates to energy supply as well. [2:40:42] Here's my question. [2:40:44] How important is it that we end these Jackson-Vanik [2:40:46] trade restrictions as it relates to our relationship [2:40:48] with Central Asia? [2:40:50] And for background here, Senator Murphy and I are [2:40:52] co-sponsors of that bill. [2:40:54] We hope to have that conversation. [2:40:56] We hope to actually get this done and on the [2:40:58] President's desk. [2:41:00] It's an ancient Soviet-era restriction that is not [2:41:02] relevant at all, but frankly is hindering our [2:41:04] relationship with these important Central Asian [2:41:06] countries. [2:41:08] Yeah, no, we agree. [2:41:10] We agree in that, like I said, one of these areas [2:41:12] that you've been focused on for a long time, [2:41:14] Ambassador Gore, that as you know is in India, [2:41:16] is also an envoy to these three countries, just [2:41:18] came back from Tajikistan a couple days ago. [2:41:20] So I think that absolutely we would like to see [2:41:22] that because it would allow us to do even more. [2:41:26] Yeah, great. Thank you. [2:41:28] And thank you, Secretary Rubio, for being here. [2:41:30] I'm going to get right into it because I want to [2:41:32] build on Senator Van Hollen's line of questioning. [2:41:34] President Trump pardoned the former Honduran [2:41:36] President after he was convicted of trafficking [2:41:38] roughly 400 tons of cocaine into the United States. [2:41:40] Cocaine that contributed to the deaths of tens of [2:41:42] thousands of Americans year after year. [2:41:44] Yet the President and his Cabinet authorized a [2:41:46] military operation to capture Nicolas Maduro in [2:41:48] order to arrest him for virtually the same crime. [2:41:50] So I think that's a very important point. [2:41:52] I think that's a very important point. [2:41:54] I think that's a very important point. [2:41:56] I think that's a very important point. [2:41:59] Yes or no, because I have a bunch of questions here. [2:42:01] To the best of your knowledge, [2:42:03] was Hernandez convicted of trafficking [2:42:05] approximately 400 tons of cocaine [2:42:07] into the United States? [2:42:09] I'm not involved in the pardon process. [2:42:11] I can tell you that the President... [2:42:13] Yeah, but I don't do yes or no. [2:42:15] I don't play games. This is not a game show. [2:42:17] Do you know he was... [2:42:19] Okay, so I'm just going to tell you he was... [2:42:21] So I can answer your question because I know [2:42:23] what you're getting at, but go ahead. [2:42:25] He was convicted. I know... [2:42:27] The President felt that he was unfairly treated. [2:42:29] Can you not understand how the American people [2:42:31] and how the world are clearly [2:42:33] going to be frustrated by the hypocrisy of this [2:42:35] when one man is convicted and pardoned [2:42:37] and another man captured [2:42:39] and how it undermines United States credibility [2:42:41] on the world stage? [2:42:43] But the difference is that, again, [2:42:45] I can't opine on the specifics of his case [2:42:47] because I wasn't involved in the pardon, [2:42:49] but he was not a sitting office holder. [2:42:51] He was not even the President of Honduras [2:42:53] when that decision was made either to convict him. [2:42:55] The difference between him and Nicolas Maduro [2:42:57] is he was actively engaged in narco-trafficking. [2:42:59] I think it does undermine our credibility, [2:43:01] but I'm going to move on [2:43:03] to some foreign policy decision making here [2:43:05] because despite the fact that you [2:43:07] famously or infamously [2:43:09] have numerous jobs in the administration, [2:43:11] your Secretary of State, [2:43:13] your National Security Advisor, [2:43:15] it is increasingly unclear [2:43:17] who's actually directing [2:43:19] U.S. foreign policy under President Trump. [2:43:21] We have a special envoy, [2:43:23] Special Envoy Wyckoff. [2:43:25] He's reportedly conducted Russian-Ukraine talks [2:43:27] in Switzerland beyond your awareness. [2:43:29] He and Jared Kushner have been described [2:43:31] as managing the President's Gaza plan. [2:43:33] Meanwhile, Ambassador Barrack [2:43:35] is leading on Syria policy [2:43:37] while Special Envoy Boulos [2:43:39] is appearing to lead on our Africa policy. [2:43:41] So I have to ask you, [2:43:43] I know the answer to this, [2:43:45] but I'm going to ask you, [2:43:47] are you the lead for U.S. government [2:43:49] on foreign policy? [2:43:51] No, the lead on U.S. foreign policy [2:43:53] is named Donald J. Trump, [2:43:55] the President of the United States. [2:43:57] On the individuals you've described, [2:43:59] I have the distinction, [2:44:02] but I think both the benefit [2:44:04] of being the National Security Advisor [2:44:06] and the Secretary of State. [2:44:08] As National Security Advisor, [2:44:10] my job is to coordinate [2:44:12] the interagency function of national security [2:44:14] and that involves foreign policy. [2:44:16] So I speak to Steve Wyckoff [2:44:18] and Jared Kushner in the case of Gaza [2:44:20] and now Russia, [2:44:22] probably 10 times a day. [2:44:24] We have multiple meetings and coordination. [2:44:26] All of it is we build a team, [2:44:28] we gather facts, we present options, [2:44:30] we make decisions, [2:44:32] and then we go straight to the United States. [2:44:34] That's always been the case, by the way. [2:44:36] You can't overrule their decisions? [2:44:38] Do you outrank the Special Envoys and Ambassadors? [2:44:40] Do they get your input? [2:44:42] Do they care about your input [2:44:44] or do they go straight to the President? [2:44:46] There's no time in which the President [2:44:48] is presented an option by one of us [2:44:50] at the exemption of everybody else. [2:44:52] It depends on the portfolio. [2:44:54] But in every one of these portfolios, [2:44:56] we have a team approach to this, [2:44:58] and in this particular case, [2:45:00] there's not much conflict between the two [2:45:02] because it's the same person. [2:45:04] What we basically try to do [2:45:06] in every one of these unique missions [2:45:08] is we create a consensus team around it [2:45:10] and then we present the President options together. [2:45:12] It's the President's decision, [2:45:14] nobody else's. [2:45:16] There's no overruling here. [2:45:18] The President makes the decision. [2:45:20] Shouldn't they report to you? [2:45:22] Shouldn't there be a line of command [2:45:24] and a line of transparency? [2:45:26] They report to me every day. [2:45:28] I give advice. [2:45:30] I give, in some cases, direction. [2:45:32] They're involved heavily. [2:45:34] For example, the Special Envoys rely almost exclusively [2:45:36] on State Department personnel [2:45:38] to assist them in all of their efforts. [2:45:40] For example, on the Board of Peace, [2:45:42] we helped them position the entire gathering last week [2:45:44] and all of the work that's going to happen now. [2:45:46] On every one of these issues, [2:45:48] it's not linear. [2:45:50] No single individual other than the President [2:45:52] has the ability to dictate our foreign policy. [2:45:54] Our job is to come to a consensus view [2:45:56] on the best way forward, [2:45:58] and he makes the decision. [2:46:00] Let's talk about the Board of Peace, then, [2:46:02] because all treaties and statutes [2:46:04] have to be approved by Congress. [2:46:07] And the President is starting a new Board of Peace. [2:46:09] We would need that authority. [2:46:11] The authority for the filing stems [2:46:13] from the International Organizations Immunities Act. [2:46:15] But it's my understanding [2:46:17] it only provides the President [2:46:19] with such authority [2:46:21] when participation in an organization [2:46:23] has been approved by treaty or statute. [2:46:25] Treaties and statutes must be approved by Congress, [2:46:27] so when will the administration [2:46:29] be requesting Congress pass legislation [2:46:31] to authorize the President [2:46:33] to extend this benefits [2:46:35] to the Board of Peace, [2:46:37] creating the Board of Peace, [2:46:39] and when will it be sent? [2:46:41] Well, actually, the Board of Peace [2:46:43] was chartered and set up by the UN Security Council [2:46:45] through a vote of the UN Security Council [2:46:47] as the deliberation. [2:46:49] So it's an international organism [2:46:51] recognized by the Security Council [2:46:53] of the United Nations, [2:46:55] which is something I think many of you [2:46:57] should be supportive of, the fact that we're doing it. [2:46:59] This law only provides the President [2:47:01] authority when U.S. participation [2:47:03] has been approved by treaty or statute. [2:47:05] I know my time is up. [2:47:07] Please consider working with us [2:47:09] to do these things. [2:47:11] You know what it is to be a Senator. [2:47:13] You know what that collaboration [2:47:15] and cooperation mean. [2:47:17] And I think that all of us [2:47:20] expect that respect [2:47:23] from you and would really appreciate it. [2:47:25] Thank you. [2:47:27] Thank you, Senator Rosen. [2:47:29] Secretary, you've been very generous with your time. [2:47:31] We have just a couple of few comments [2:47:33] to wind up here. [2:47:35] Senator Shaheen. [2:47:37] Yes, I agree. Thank you. [2:47:39] I hope that you will come more often [2:47:41] before this committee. [2:47:43] But I just wanted to clarify a couple of things. [2:47:45] One is that under the Case Act, [2:47:47] the State Department [2:47:50] is required, as are other agencies, [2:47:52] to give documents [2:47:54] like the one that Senator Schatz [2:47:56] was raising for the agreement [2:47:58] between Venezuela and the U.S. [2:48:00] to this committee. We have not yet [2:48:02] received it. [2:48:04] So I hope that we will see it [2:48:06] in the near future. [2:48:08] The other thing, [2:48:11] with respect to the exchange [2:48:14] between you and Senator Rosen, [2:48:16] I can tell you that we have, [2:48:18] as the minority staff requested [2:48:20] on multiple occasions, [2:48:22] updates from the State Department [2:48:24] on the Special Envoy's negotiations [2:48:26] on the Ukraine war [2:48:28] with Russia. [2:48:30] And we have been denied access [2:48:32] to any of that information. [2:48:34] So I hope that, number one, [2:48:37] that would be available [2:48:39] because I think everybody's [2:48:41] interested in trying to support [2:48:43] efforts to end this war in Ukraine. [2:48:45] This should not be an adversarial [2:48:47] position. [2:48:49] And number two, I would also hope [2:48:51] that, like Senator Curtis, [2:48:53] that you would be willing to [2:48:55] have someone from State [2:48:57] come before the committee. [2:49:00] We have not had a hearing on negotiations [2:49:02] over the war in Ukraine [2:49:04] since I've been on this committee [2:49:06] since the President took office. [2:49:08] And so I hope you will [2:49:10] make that commitment to [2:49:13] have State come and [2:49:15] be part of the hearing [2:49:17] on the war in Ukraine [2:49:19] and the negotiations there. [2:49:21] We would love to do that [2:49:23] and I'll make sure that happens. [2:49:25] I can give you a brief update. [2:49:27] I know it's late, but I don't mind. [2:49:29] We can continue to talk about this a little bit [2:49:31] because it's important. [2:49:33] It's a very fluid situation, unfortunately. [2:49:35] As you know, it's moving very quickly. [2:49:37] We've been talking about this [2:49:39] piece, which was part of a meeting [2:49:41] and efforts that took place [2:49:43] in the early part of this year. [2:49:45] I think the one remaining item [2:49:47] remains the one you're all familiar with, [2:49:49] and that is a territorial claim [2:49:51] on Donetsk in particular. [2:49:53] And I know there's active work going [2:49:55] to try to see if both sides' views [2:49:57] on that can't be reconciled. [2:49:59] It's still a bridge we haven't crossed. [2:50:01] It's still a gap, but at least [2:50:03] we've been able to narrow down [2:50:05] the issue set to one central one. [2:50:07] We had a meeting late last week in the UAE, [2:50:09] which I think for the first time in many years [2:50:11] is trilateral, involved the U.S. presence. [2:50:13] Jared was there and Steve Woodcoff were there, [2:50:15] along with representatives [2:50:17] of Russia and Ukraine. [2:50:19] They were going to follow up talks again this week [2:50:21] in that regard, bilateral. [2:50:23] There might be a U.S. presence, [2:50:25] but it won't be Steve and Jared. [2:50:27] And we continue to try to move that forward. [2:50:29] I want to speak in frankness with you. [2:50:31] Some of this stuff that's being talked about [2:50:33] it's easier for the parties engaged [2:50:35] to find flexibility on some of these matters [2:50:37] if they're not being deliberated in the public [2:50:39] on a constant basis [2:50:41] because it creates political pressures [2:50:43] internally on both sides. [2:50:45] As you can imagine in Ukraine, [2:50:47] the notion that you would even consider [2:50:49] a change in land after all that's gone in the war [2:50:51] is difficult. [2:50:53] And in the case of Russia, they've been telling [2:50:55] their people for two and a half years [2:50:57] that they're winning this war overwhelmingly, [2:50:59] so people are going to wonder why are we [2:51:01] giving up land if we're winning so strongly. [2:51:03] So there's some dynamics there at play that are important. [2:51:05] But I think if you need more information on that, [2:51:07] you need to know that this has been so fluid [2:51:09] that an update like the one I just gave you [2:51:11] could be outdated in 72 hours [2:51:13] if some new development occurs. [2:51:15] But your point is taken and we'll be responsive to that. [2:51:17] I appreciate that. [2:51:19] I think the other point of a hearing [2:51:21] is it gives people a chance to ask questions [2:51:23] that we're hearing, as you know, [2:51:25] from our constituents, from other people, [2:51:27] and try and get answers. [2:51:29] And I appreciate that it's a changing dynamic [2:51:31] and that that's always going to be the case [2:51:33] and that there are issues on both in Ukraine [2:51:35] and in Russia [2:51:37] with respect to what comes out in public. [2:51:39] But given the amount of money [2:51:41] that the United States has put into [2:51:43] supporting this effort, [2:51:45] given the support among the American people, [2:51:47] and given the support in Congress, [2:51:49] it seems to me that we owe people [2:51:51] the ability to [2:51:53] have a public hearing and to ask questions. [2:51:55] Thank you. [2:51:57] I appreciate that. [2:51:59] Secretary Rubio, [2:52:01] don't answer this question if you don't feel it's appropriate, [2:52:03] but did I understand you to say [2:52:05] that the [2:52:07] portion of the discussions [2:52:10] regarding settlement in Ukraine, [2:52:12] regarding security for Ukraine, [2:52:14] are essentially agreed to [2:52:16] by both sides? [2:52:18] Because that's news to me [2:52:20] and it's a big news item if that's a fact. [2:52:22] Well, I think you could argue [2:52:24] they're agreed to [2:52:26] from our side of the equation. [2:52:28] There's obviously a Russian dynamic at play here. [2:52:30] Of course, any security guarantees [2:52:32] would come into play after the conflict were to end. [2:52:34] Of course. [2:52:36] And so there's that component to it. [2:52:38] What I'm saying is that in all these discussions [2:52:40] about security guarantees that people are putting out there, [2:52:42] it's pretty clear that the only security guarantee [2:52:44] that people keep pushing forward [2:52:46] is one that involves a deployment of some [2:52:48] European troops on the ground, [2:52:50] but with a very strong US backstop. [2:52:52] My point being, [2:52:54] in the broader context of the NATO alliance, [2:52:56] and that is, we have to understand that [2:52:58] even something like that, in Europe, [2:53:01] they don't have the capabilities of doing [2:53:03] a real security guarantee without a US backstop, [2:53:05] which tells you [2:53:07] the capability gap that needs to be closed. [2:53:09] And it's one of the reasons [2:53:11] why the President keeps pointing to NATO [2:53:13] and its need for our partners to get stronger. [2:53:15] And it is true, they've committed to 5% spending. [2:53:17] That's obviously going to take some time. [2:53:19] But that's really the broader point I was trying to make [2:53:21] in that regard. [2:53:23] But every notion of security guarantee that's been talked about [2:53:25] and that the Europeans have pushed [2:53:27] is one that requires a strong commitment [2:53:29] by the United States as a backstop, [2:53:31] which in essence means [2:53:33] we would be committed, potentially, [2:53:35] in a conflict, in a future conflict. [2:53:37] And that's something that I think needs to be understood. [2:53:39] In the context of what I've just described [2:53:41] as the problems with NATO capabilities. [2:53:44] Very clear. Thank you very much. [2:53:46] Thank you again for your time. [2:53:48] I'm going to leave the record open [2:53:50] until the close of business tomorrow. [2:53:52] If there are questions, I'd appreciate it [2:53:54] if you'd assist in getting answers [2:53:56] to those questions. [2:53:58] Great job. [2:54:00] Thank you for spending the time with us. [2:54:02] We sincerely appreciate it. [2:54:04] The American people are lucky to have you [2:54:06] as the Secretary of State. [2:54:08] And with that, the meeting is adjourned.