Jay Clayton’s confirmation hearing for Director of National Intelligence

[0:20] Good morning. This hearing will come to order. I want to welcome all of you to today's hearing [0:26] on the nomination of Mr. Jay Clayton to be the Director of National Intelligence. [0:31] Before we begin, I would also like to recognize the devastating loss we all suffered over the [0:37] weekend on behalf of this committee to pay tribute to our former colleague Lindsey Graham. [0:42] Though Lindsey didn't serve on the Intelligence Committee, as a former chairman of the Senate [0:46] Judiciary Committee, he was a part of our extended family and he was obviously a champion [0:51] for intelligence officers just as he was for our troops. He was a true partner on issues such as [0:57] FISA, FBI, DOJ oversight. Lindsey ensured the intelligence community had the resources needed [1:03] to confront our adversaries. Lindsey was a true patriot who led with courage, loyalty, [1:08] and relentless optimism during his time both as an airman in the Air Force and in the United States [1:14] Congress. In remembrance of Senator Lindsey Graham's lifetime of service, I invite the members of this [1:20] committee to honor our colleague and friend by living up to the example he set and carrying forward [1:26] his love for God and for country. We also welcome his sister and new Senator Darlene, who we all had [1:33] the occasion to meet yesterday and who I know will carry forward his legacy in a way that would make him [1:38] immensely proud as he always was proud of his young sister. Today's hearing is an opportunity to [1:46] consider Mr. Clayton's qualifications. So I'd like to welcome him and his wife Gretchen to the Senate [1:52] Intelligence Committee. Mr. Clayton, thank you for once again answering the call to public service. [1:57] To your family and loved ones, including those watching from home, thank you for your support [2:01] during this process. I want to state for the record that Mr. Clayton has provided answers to our standard [2:07] 40-page committee questionnaire. He has answered in writing more than 200 advanced questions for the record [2:13] as well. He has completed his FBI background investigation. He has met with most members of this [2:18] committee and he has provided more than five years of tax returns. This is no small feat but was helped [2:24] in large part by the fact that this was his third time through the process. I want to thank all of those [2:30] persons and organizations who worked to move his nomination at very fast speeds. That includes our [2:38] committee staff, the staff at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the FBI, the Office of [2:44] Government Ethics, and the White House Counsel's Office. I'd also like to offer my prayers to outgoing [2:50] Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard's husband, Abraham, as he battles cancer, and thank [2:55] Ms. Gabbard for her efforts to streamline the ODNI as she turns, understandably, to her husband's care. [3:01] This committee is grateful for her decades of service to the country, both in uniform and as a civilian. [3:06] And I also want to take a moment to thank Bill Pulte for his leadership to date as the Acting Director of [3:11] National Intelligence. The additional steps he's taken to right-size the Office of the DNI will help [3:18] Mr. Clayton be successful on day one of assuming this position. Mr. Pulte has been highly communicative [3:24] and engaged with me and my staff during his tenure, for which I am grateful. Mr. Clayton, it is my [3:29] understanding that you intend to finish Ms. Gabbard's work to return the ODNI to its original size, scope, [3:35] and mission. I've long said that the right number of staff at the ODNI would number in the dozens, [3:40] maybe a couple hundreds at the maximum, but certainly not the thousands of recent years. [3:45] Congress intended the ODNI to be a lean and efficient organization to keep bureaucratic [3:49] intelligence agencies at bay. But some 20 years later, the ODNI has, unfortunately, become yet [3:55] another bloated agency that incentivizes bureaucratic make work as opposed to genuine intelligence work. [4:03] Mr. Clayton, given your many years as a seasoned professional in both government and private practice, [4:09] I'm eager to hear how your experiences will inform your plans to return the ODNI to those roots. [4:14] I look forward to working with you to provide any legislative relief that you deem necessary, [4:18] such as transferring centers or functions to other government agencies, [4:22] because while many functions that are needful occur at the ODNI, they don't necessarily need to [4:27] be occurring there. Additionally, I'm interested in hearing about your efforts to advance America's [4:32] national security in your current role as a United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. [4:37] As U.S. Attorney, Mr. Clayton has gone after some of the worst of the worst national security threats, [4:42] including foreign enemies who put innocent Americans at risk and have American blood on their hands. [4:46] For example, he's overseen the indictment of Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, secured the guilty plea [4:52] of Venezuelan general Hugo Carvajal, and overseen the prosecution of an Iran-backed terrorist [4:58] connected to multiple attempted terror attacks in the United States. Though these are just a few high-profile cases, [5:03] let me state for the record that Mr. Clayton has worked hand in glove with our intelligence agencies [5:08] and counterterrorism personnel to lock up criminals who threaten our national security. [5:13] I commend him and all those involved for this important work. I'm interested in hearing from [5:18] the nominee how he plans to apply this experience as the leader of the intelligence community. [5:23] Mr. Clayton, in addition to streamlining the ODNI, foremost on your to-do list, [5:28] will be helping refocus the intelligence community on operations by being a vocal and uncompromising [5:34] advocate for its resources. If confirmed, I'll expect you to make the case to the intelligence [5:39] and appropriations committees for why the funding requests in a supplemental funding bill are so vital. [5:45] As most of us know, the intelligence community operations are at an all-time high with great [5:50] successes. While the Pentagon received money from the working families tax cut, the intelligence community [5:55] did not. I'll say here publicly what I wrote to Acting Director Pulte and Director Ratcliffe last [6:00] month. I do not want to see any more reprogramming requests that borrow from one operational account [6:06] to fund another. There are plenty of underperforming and under-executing programs across the intelligence [6:11] community that can be a bill payer for needful operations until Congress can pass supplemental [6:17] appropriations bills. Now, before I turn it over to the Vice Chairman, I'd like to put on the record that in [6:22] all my experiences with Mr. Clayton, his reputation as someone who operated with morality, decency, [6:28] and integrity has proven to be true. The job Mr. Clayton has been nominated for today is not one which [6:34] he sought, but one which he has been gracious enough to take on. I'm confident that by the end of the day, [6:40] my colleagues will join me in seeking to get Mr. Clayton's nomination across the finish line. I now [6:45] recognize the Vice Chairman for his opening remarks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just echo what you [6:51] said at the beginning of this hearing in terms of the great loss we all feel on both sides of the [6:57] aisle of the passing of our friend Lindsey Graham. And as we commented yesterday, he was not on this [7:02] committee, but he sure as hell acted like he was on this committee on many times. Mr. Clayton, Jay, it's [7:10] good to see you again. It was great to have the opportunity to meet your wife Gretchen in the [7:13] anteroom. And I'm going to start with where the chairman started. And I have addressed this before, [7:28] but the process we've gone through to get you before this committee is really pretty remarkable. [7:35] I can't think of any other instance in the history of this committee where a president sends a nominee [7:44] up. And then in a bipartisan way, we say, we really want to move heaven and earth to get this nominee [7:52] moving through quickly because the importance of the position. And then the president decided that [7:57] Senate was moving too fast on his own nominee and pulls that nominee for a while, pulls down the [8:03] hearing and in the meantime, blows up the FISA reauthorization process, which is critically important. [8:11] Now, I know you had nothing to do with that. And we're probably as surprised as many of us. [8:15] So I guess congratulations about getting finally in front of this committee. [8:21] I also want to thank you for your partnership when you were SEC chairman and when we worked on [8:28] investments in human capital. But as I last talked to you, this job is very different than anything [8:37] I think you've done in your long career. And I'll have certain expectations of how you would perform [8:43] the duties of DNI. These are expectations I make clear to all IC principles throughout my time on [8:50] this committee, regardless of administration. First and foremost, as most know, this position of DNI was [8:56] created after the events of 9-11. And as such, Senator Collins had a large role in creating this [9:05] position. It said that it requires the DNI have extensive national security qualifications. [9:11] Because if you get this job, you're going to have intimacy with all of the nation's [9:17] top closely guarded secrets. Now, I know you've served in some very distinguished positions, [9:23] SEC chairman, U.S. Attorney for Southern District. I look forward to hearing how those positions will [9:29] meet that qualification and extensive national security experience. Second, as I mentioned, the DNI has [9:36] literally access to all our nation's secrets, things that are limited only to the Gang of Eight [9:41] State here in Congress. And I will hope that you will treat this sensitive information with the kind [9:47] of respect and security it deserves. As members know, one of my greatest concerns with President [9:54] Trump's appointment of Mr. Pulte is acting DNI, is that Mr. Pulte had no national security experience. [10:02] And if anything, it's what seemed to be his one qualification. He had a demonstrated record of [10:07] releasing private confidential mortgage information, so we could weaponize it for political purposes. [10:14] I can't think of a less qualified individual to be anywhere close to the DNI's role. In fact, [10:23] there's already reporting about Mr. Pulte's plan to do what intelligence on elections, some that's based [10:32] on how we might misuse some of that on some of our most sensitive sources. And just don't understand [10:39] how Mr. Pulte, and one of the reasons why I am anxious to get a permanent DNI, can end up figuring [10:44] out what is appropriate or not appropriate since he's been in the job for only three weeks. And again, [10:51] with no national security experience. Our nation's security depends on our ability to protect secrets [10:57] and protect the people who gather those secrets, whether it's allies, partners, or assets we have [11:02] recruited. Carelessly handling that information ultimately makes our country less safe. Lastly, [11:11] I urge you to stand strong in protecting the most sacred of the IC principles, speaking truth to power. [11:18] This commitment to truth is literally carved in stone at the CIA's headquarters. It is fundamental to not [11:25] only the functioning and credibility of the IC, but also to the security of the American people. [11:30] We have seen what happens when policy makers are allowed to shade intelligence for political reasons. [11:37] It results in endless wars, tens of billions of dollars in wasted taxpayer dollars, and literally [11:44] thousands of dead Americans. Unfortunately, we have seen repeated attempts by this administration [11:51] to politicize the IC, from a senior administration official telling IC officers to change their assessment, [11:58] because he feared it would make the president look bad. That's the absolute epitome of undermining [12:05] speaking truth to power. To the former DNI, literally inserting herself into an active domestic [12:13] law enforcement action in Fulton County and seizing voting machines in Puerto Rico. Nothing within the [12:19] gambit of the DNI. It's about foreign intelligence and foreign interference. And in fact, recent reports [12:26] suggest that the IC's annual analytic objective survey, where they go out to the whole IC community [12:34] and say, how do you think things are going, shows a substantial increase in the number of IC employees [12:41] who say they are concerned about the intelligence analysis being undermined by political interference. [12:48] Again, the opposite of why your role was created and the opposite of what the goals of the IC should be. [12:56] I hope that should you be confirmed, you will make it clear that this kind of politicization has no [13:01] place in the intelligence community. And I ask that you treat the thousands of IC career staff who will [13:06] be under your charge with the kind of respect and dignity they deserve. They are brave men and women [13:14] who have signed up to serve our country, and they never get the recognition that our men and women in [13:21] uniform get, but they do so much to protect our nation. And as I said at the outset, this is a very different [13:27] job than any you've had in the past. And in some ways, I believe it's more critical than being SEC [13:32] chair or U.S. attorney, because in many ways, the IC is our first line of defense in terms of keeping our [13:39] country safe. In order to make sure we keep our country safe, the IC must also maintain the trust and [13:47] credibility with the American people, which means objective analysis, keeping itself free from [13:54] politicization. I look forward to your answers. Congratulations again, and I yield back. [14:00] Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. I now recognize Senator Rounds, who would like to say a few words [14:05] about Mr. Clayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today, I have the privilege of introducing the Honorable Jay [14:12] Clayton, President Trump's nominee, to serve as the next Director of National Intelligence. I first met Jay [14:18] through my role on the Banking Committee when he was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the [14:24] Senate to be Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2017. He's a consummate professional [14:31] with a distinguished career in both the private and public sectors. The Senate previously confirmed [14:36] him on a bipartisan basis to serve as the SEC chair, and I'd like to think we were proven correct in judging [14:43] his character the first time around. It's no surprise President Trump would select him to serve in his [14:49] cabinet. The DNI has to be a trusted, unbiased voice to provide ongoing intelligence to the [14:55] President. I believe Jay will do a great work in this role. Jay is an accomplished lawyer with decades of [15:02] experience, and he currently holds one of the most high profile and demanding posts in the Department of [15:07] Justice as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. He made the most of his time in New York by [15:13] prosecuting some of America's worst enemies and threats to our national security. Muhammad al-Sadiya, [15:19] the Iranian Iraqi national responsible for over a dozen terrorist attacks in Europe and two attempted [15:24] attacks in America. Nicolas Maduro and other narco terrorists. These efforts required extensive [15:32] coordination with the intelligence community and larger national security enterprise including the [15:37] Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, [15:42] and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. If confirmed, Jay's experience at the helm in New York will serve him [15:48] well as DNI. Mr. Clayton chaired the SEC through a period of significant uncertainty for financial markets [15:56] during the depths of the COVID-19 epidemic in 2020. His success in leadership roles at the SEC and DOJ [16:04] is strong evidence of his ability to be an effective coordinator as the Director of National Intelligence. [16:10] Many of the most pressing national security threats we face today are cross-cutting issues [16:14] that involve technology and economics and go beyond the IC's traditional focus on foreign military [16:20] capabilities and foreign leadership intentions. Jay's time at the SEC and in the private sector has given [16:27] him valuable experience with issues that the DNI faces on a daily basis. Cyber threats from state and [16:35] non-state actors, illicit finance, economic competition with China, and the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence [16:43] by both our adversaries and our own intelligence community. He brings valuable insight into each of [16:50] these areas that will serve him and our country well. Jay holds a TS SCI clearance and has worked in highly classified [16:59] compartmented environments requiring discretion and security compliance. As a result, he knows firsthand [17:07] the critical importance of Section 702 and FISA. His extensive experience working across agencies [17:16] is a quality needed as DNI. He has a working relationship with CIA Director Ratcliffe that will make for a smooth [17:23] transition into this leadership role. While Jay may not have served in the intelligence community, he has the [17:30] right mix of practical experience working with the IC, including experience with the Justice Department and [17:36] coordination with the Department of the Treasury. His professional background is important to the growing demands [17:43] being placed upon the IC related to technology and economic competition. Further, his diverse experience in the [17:50] private sector, the SEC, and as a U.S. Attorney in a very active district give him the wealth of management, [17:58] leadership, and organizational experience to succeed in coordinating at all the different equities or with [18:05] all of the different equities that make up the intelligence community. In closing, I offer my strong [18:11] endorsement for Mr. Clayton to serve as the next Director of National Intelligence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [18:18] Thank you, Senator Round. Mr. Clayton, before we move to your opening statement, I need to ask you five standard [18:26] questions the committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. A simple yes or no answer for the record will [18:31] suffice. One, do you agree to appear before the committee here or in other venues when invited? Yes. Two, if [18:38] confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the committee and designate the staff when invited? [18:43] Yes. Three, do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the committee [18:49] in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Yes. Four, will you ensure that your office and your [18:56] staff provide such material to the committee when requested? Yes, I will. Five, do you agree to inform and fully brief to the [19:04] fullest extent possible all members of this committee of intelligence activities and covert actions [19:10] rather than only the chairman and the vice chairman? Yes. Thank you very much. After our hearing today, [19:16] it's my intention to convene a committee business meeting early next week to vote on the nomination of [19:21] Mr. Clayton and report it to the Senate for a floor vote. Mr. Clayton will now proceed to your opening statement, [19:27] after which I will recognize members by seniority before the gavel and by arrival after the gavel for five [19:33] minutes each. Mr. Clayton, the floor is yours. Thank you, Chairman Cotton. Vice, you move the mic a little closer. [19:41] How's this? Okay. Thank you, Chairman Cotton, Vice Chairman Warner, and the distinguished members of the committee. [19:48] I am honored to appear before you today as the nominee to be the director of national intelligence. [19:55] I would like to thank President Trump for placing his continued trust and confidence in me. [20:01] I am humbled by this nomination and grateful for the opportunity to continue serving our country. [20:08] I also want to thank my wife Gretchen and our children for their support and their commitment [20:15] to public service. I also thank the many women and men I have worked with at the SEC and the DOJ. [20:23] Together we have built great teams that have delivered for the American people. [20:29] Sarah Rounds, I thank you for those very kind words and for your commitment to the people of South Dakota [20:34] and our country. I have been fortunate to serve in a broad range of leadership roles in both the public [20:42] and private sectors. Each position has presented challenges and opportunities. If confirmed, I intend [20:49] to approach the DNI role in the same way I have approached these roles, mission-focused and team-oriented, [20:57] taking on the challenges and seizing the opportunities. The mission of the director of national [21:03] national intelligence is clear to ensure that the policy makers and institutions that the intelligence [21:11] community serves, especially the President, our military leaders and Congress, receive the best [21:18] possible intelligence in a timely, objective and independent manner. That mission and obligation will [21:26] be front of mind every day. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the coordination and communication [21:33] between the intelligence community and the people we serve. I will focus on enhancing the trust of the [21:39] American people in the ODNI, the intelligence community and our federal government generally. [21:47] I will have an open door and walk the halls policy. This has proven invaluable. I also look forward [21:54] to engaging with this committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence frequently. [22:00] I am confident that my experience has prepared me for this role, including my experience leading and [22:06] improving large organizations. Large, multifaceted organizations like our intelligence community [22:12] work well when they have, one, a commitment to the mission, two, clear strategic objectives that [22:19] further that mission, and three, metrics that facilitate the assessment and improvement of their operations. [22:26] I intend to work with the members of this committee to develop all three of those. A few specifics on [22:31] my national security experience. As the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, [22:36] I have gained significant national security experience, including in matters involving [22:41] foreign terrorist organizations, counterespionage, money laundering, bribery, and the abuse of our [22:48] communications platforms to create and sow distrust. We interact with the U.S. intelligence community [22:56] and counterterrorism officials continuously on dozens of important national security matters. In addition, [23:03] I have acted as the principal liaison with senior officials at Treasury, State, and the Department of [23:08] War on matters of national security. As chairman of the SEC, I advised the intelligence community on [23:15] various matters and directly confronted issues with national security implications, notably leading our [23:22] cybersecurity and cyber resilience for critical infrastructure in our financial services sector, combating [23:31] Chinese influence on and exploitation of our markets, and importantly maintaining economic stability and [23:39] confidence in our markets during the COVID-19 shutdowns. In the private sector, I also engaged in a broad [23:46] range of national security matters, including with officials from the Federal Reserve, the Department of [23:51] Justice, and Congress. As an example, between my time at the SEC and my return to government at the Southern [23:58] District, I testified before the House China Select Committee. Across these roles, I saw firsthand how [24:05] judgment, discipline, integrity, and most importantly, effective communication and cooperation across different [24:12] branches of government are essential to our national security. If confirmed, I will have those principles [24:19] front of mind every day. Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Clayton. You do [24:30] indeed have a lot of experience leading large organizations, though I hope by the end of your [24:35] tenure and two and a half years at the DNI you can add some experience leading small organizations, or at least [24:41] a much smaller one. As I observed in my opening remarks, and you mentioned in yours, in your current position as [24:47] the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, you've taken part in a number of national security related [24:53] investigations, including the prosecution of terrorists, narco-traffickers, and others who wish to do harm to the United [25:00] States and our citizens. I think it's probably important for many viewers to know that the Southern [25:05] District may be the number one national security related U.S. Attorney's Office in the country. Can you [25:12] speak to your interaction specifically with the intelligence community as part of these investigations, [25:17] and how critical intelligence community collection was for informing the evidence you obtained to pursue [25:25] convictions in these cases? Thank you. The short answer is extremely critical, and in the examples [25:34] that you mentioned, the examples that Senator Rounds mentioned, whether it's Maduro and Carvajal, whether [25:40] it's Alsadi, the, I'll just say, multi-faceted terrorist who we've recently captured, and our drug interdiction [25:49] efforts, combating cartels and the flow of deadly drugs, the intelligence community is essential to our [25:55] prosecutions in all of those cases. And if I may, it's the only game in town. The United States [26:02] intelligence community combating those global threats is essential, not just for the U.S., but as [26:10] was mentioned in Senator Rounds' remarks, keeping our European colleagues safe as well. Thank you. You also [26:15] mentioned your time at the SEC. Now, in my neck of the woods, that's the country's best football conference, [26:21] but here we're talking about the Securities and Exchange Commission. I think most observers would think, [26:26] well, you know, that's for the stock markets, and a Wall Street lawyer goes in, and hopefully gets fees [26:31] down, and markets do well, and combats fraud, and maybe tackles new issues like cryptocurrency. But I think [26:39] some viewers would be surprised at the amount of national security related matters you had to confront at the [26:46] SEC as well. Could you just go into a little bit more detail on that front too? Sure. Starting at the top, [26:52] national security and economic security are synonymous. National security and market function and market [27:00] integrity are synonymous. Our financial infrastructure is essential to our security as a nation. Going beyond that, [27:09] understanding the economic implications of actions and the likely knock-on effects is a big part of what I believe the [27:19] intelligence community should be providing to the consumers of information. Understanding the economic [27:26] consequences of actions is an essential part of intelligence, and it's something that I engaged in [27:33] frequently at the SEC. And while the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was set up in the [27:39] aftermath of the 9-11 attacks and the context of wars in the Middle East, isn't that particularly true [27:45] as we think about our struggle for mastery with China and also checking Russian aggression around the world, that economic [27:53] matters are vitally important when we're facing traditional and nation-state actors like Russia and China? [28:00] Senator Cotton, Chair Cotton, I could not agree more that our adversaries not only look at kinetic [28:08] and other what I would call traditional ways to harm Americans, they look at economic ways to harm Americans. [28:13] Thank you. The Vice Chairman alluded to an address the President will apparently be giving tomorrow [28:19] night that may or may not be based on some kind of intelligence that's going to be declassified. To [28:26] what degree, if any, have you been involved in the process for what may be discussed by the President [28:32] tomorrow night? I'm not involved in that. Because you're not currently the Director of National Intelligence. [28:38] I'm currently not the Director of National Intelligence. And in fact, to be involved would [28:41] violate a core principle, which is you take no actions, that would presume your confirmation. [28:47] I couldn't have said it better. Thank you for helping me establish that fact. The Vice Chairman. [28:56] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I said repeatedly, if you're confirmed, you've got to make sure that [29:06] you speak truth to power. And that means even if the truth is not the preferred narrative that somebody [29:14] wants to hear. So let me just ask you, it should be a simple question. Do you deny that Joe Biden won [29:20] the 2020 election? Senator, I'm not an election denier. Joe Biden was certified as the President [29:28] of the United States. Election denial is something we cannot have. So I will take that as you do not [29:38] deny that Joe Biden won the 2020 election. Yeah, I'm not. I'm not. I think, let me just be clear. [29:46] We have substantial work to do. And I've made it in improving our electoral processes. It's part of [29:53] national security. And I feel strongly about that. One of the things that again, this will come around [30:00] perhaps to what's happening tomorrow night as well. Classified information is critical. If we violate [30:10] classified information, that loses us allies, it makes us less strong. I fear that certain countries [30:16] already are not sharing as much information with us because of some of the things that have happened. [30:23] So let me ask you some straightforward questions. If confirmed, you commit to protecting all classified [30:27] information in accordance with established rules and procedures. Yes. If confirmed, you commit to [30:34] following established processes and procedures when it comes to declassifying information. Yes. And that [30:45] will then lead to the next because if you're going to follow official purposes, you cannot declassify [30:50] information for political purposes. Will you promise that you will not do that? Senator, I promise that my [30:58] declassification exercises will be consistent with the role. And I believe that there are [31:05] a number of protections in place across the intelligence community to ensure that intelligence [31:10] is not used for political purposes. And I intend to adhere to those. Well, that that is, you know, in many [31:18] ways, at least for me, that is the nub of this hearing. In preparing for this hearing, I have analyzed [31:26] the procedures that are in place for declassification and other actions that you would take as the [31:33] director of national intelligence. And I look forward to consulting with the people inside the [31:39] intelligence community and at the ODNI to ensure that we adhere to those principles. It's critically, [31:44] critically important because, again, we may see some of this tomorrow night or not. But we go around [31:54] those established procedures. We could burn sources and methods. We could lose allies. It is the [32:02] ramifications are so grave. And it has been treated in such a cavalier way that it's really [32:08] extraordinary, upsetting to me. Along with classified information comes the analytic tool. One of the [32:15] things that I pointed out in the recent IC annual survey, the number of IC analysts that are concerned [32:25] that their work may be threatened by politicization or if you don't reach the right conclusion, [32:33] that completely undermines the basis of what the intelligence community is set up with. So, [32:38] if confirmed, you commit that the ODNI's decisions and analysis will remain free from political pressure [32:45] and conspiracy theories. Senator, the role is to ensure that you, the president in particular, [32:54] the members of the cabinet, receive the best possible intelligence product available. And I do commit to [33:00] do that. And I do commit to do that. If you could bring the whole box a little bit. Sorry. I need a space for [33:06] the papers. I can't stress enough. If the IC workforce feels they're going to get political blowback [33:18] or get fired, which we have seen because they reach a conclusion that may not be what certain folks in [33:25] the administration want to hear, that undermines the whole work of the whole community. If I could [33:32] jump in on that. And I want to say that my experience at the SEC, my experience at the DOJ, is that the [33:39] people who have worked for me have great confidence that they can speak to me in a candid and free from any [33:49] worry that what they say to me in their professional capacity is going to result in any kind of [33:57] disagreement. I would say any, any kind of friction beyond the normal toing and froing that you have [34:06] in any organization. And I will say, let me add my comment to what Senator Round said. In working with [34:14] you at the SEC, I found that was how you operated and particularly in taking on certain issues that [34:20] might not have been politically popular. But this is, this is such a different role. And I, and I so, [34:27] I'm so concerned that you, that whoever ends up in this role is going to be under a set of pressures [34:34] that may be unprecedented. And we're going to need somebody extraordinarily strong. I'll come to my last [34:40] set of questions. And that is around election integrity. This job was set up to look at foreign [34:47] interference in our election. So it was more than stunning to me when the former director, [34:53] Director Gabbard showed up at a domestic, I believe political interference activities in Fulton County. [35:02] We're coming into election season. I want to make sure you are on the record. If confirmed, [35:09] you will commit, you will not interfere with or comment inappropriately on US elections. [35:13] Senator, you, you outlined the role, um, correctly. The role is to deal with foreign interference [35:21] in US elections, which is something I'm gravely concerned about. But that's the role. [35:29] And finally, you know, we cannot have the DNI trying to put his or her hands on the scales, [35:37] in terms of tipping the outcome of any American election, where you commit to not put those hands [35:45] on the scales. The role of the intelligence community is to provide information, not to engage [35:50] in policy or, or those things. So yes. Thank you. Thank you. I agree that the role is very different, [35:58] but that, I think that's true of most government roles. Um, and we never quite know how people [36:03] were performing them. And some of us have been very satisfied with nominees we've confirmed [36:08] in both parties, and some have been dissatisfied. But, you know, look at our former chairman, Marco [36:12] Rubio. Being a senator, I think we can all agree is very different from being the secretary of state [36:16] or being the national security advisor. And he's pitching a near perfect game in those roles, [36:20] if you ask me. But you can reason by analogy. You've been a Wall Street lawyer for a long time. [36:25] How long have you been a lawyer? Uh, goodness. Uh, 36 years, 33 years. And so you're governed by [36:32] attorney-client privilege. That's not classified material, but it is require you as an ethical [36:37] obligation. Have you ever had any issue in handing attorney-client material? No. And the material you're [36:43] handling in Wall Street, I mean, you're talking about market-moving material, millions or billions [36:48] of dollars. Billions and probably an aggregate trillions of dollars of information that you have [36:53] to be very careful not to allow to slip. Or very sensitive personal information about clients as [36:58] well. And no issues ever in the past dealing with those? None. Thank you. Senator Collins. Thank you, [37:09] Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Clayton. Mr. Clayton, I want to give you a little bit of history of the ODNI. [37:22] I was a co-author of the legislation that created the Director of National Intelligence, [37:31] along with Senator Joe Lieberman, Congresswoman Jane Harmon, and Congressman Pete Hoekstra in the House. [37:42] And it came about following hearings that we had and extensive analysis of a failure of [37:52] the more than 18 intelligence agencies to share vital information, information that perhaps could have [38:05] allowed the dots to be connected and the horrific terrorist attack of 9-11 to have been discovered [38:16] and deterred. I'll never forget a conversation that I had with Secretary of State Colin Powell. He said our [38:27] intelligence community needed an empowered quarterback to make sure that there was sharing of information [38:38] information and a collective collaborative approach to intelligence. Instead, what we had was a very siloed [38:51] approach. And that's why we worked so hard to draft the Terrorist Prevention and Intelligence Reform Act that [39:01] created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the NCTC, the National Counterterrorism Council, which would bring [39:13] agencies together. So I understand that ODNI has grown far bigger than we ever would have envisioned when we wrote that law. [39:27] But I am deeply disturbed that some administration officials and indeed some senators have called [39:38] for not just a reduction in the size of ODNI, but that we abolish it all together. There remains a critical [39:49] purpose and mission for ODNI to lead and manage the 18 separate intelligence agencies with worldwide operations that include space, [40:02] cyber and human intelligence domains. Do you commit to maintaining the vital role of ODNI and its NCTC? [40:15] The short answer that I'd like to elaborate is yes, I do. And having seen this from the outside now [40:27] in my roles and also preparing to hopefully take on this role, if we didn't have this role, we'd have to [40:34] invent it because there needs to be a focal point for coordination across the other 17 intelligence agencies. [40:41] There needs to be a place of oversight, a place to resolve conflict. I look at it as a Board of [40:49] Directors role. And to the extent that the ODNI has gotten into operations or started to play the roles of [40:55] some of those other agencies, it probably should pull back because it's difficult to be both operations [41:01] and oversight. But I think an oversight role is important. Thank you. The second issue I want to bring up with you [41:10] is the anomalous health incidents, also known as Havana syndrome, that have occurred since 2016 [41:20] and caused in some cases career-ending disabilities for our intelligence, our defense, our state department employees. [41:35] The intelligence community initially took these attacks and care for victims seriously. However, for various [41:44] reasons, this quickly seemed to turn into a very dismissive attitude throughout the federal government [41:53] with little forward progress. This led Senator Gillibrand and I to co-author the Havana Act of 2021 [42:03] to support the victims who are not receiving care nor compensation. I have been frustrated over the past few [42:13] years across both the Biden administration and the Trump administration by the excuses provided [42:22] and misinterpretations of AHI attacks and the slow implementation of Senator Gillibrand's and my bill. [42:33] Last week, Tulsi Gabbard rescinded two previous AHI Intelligence Community [42:42] assessments and started to reassess both previous and new intelligence related to AHIs. It's critical that we know about [42:57] possible foreign weapon capabilities and how to keep our hard-working personnel who are stationed in [43:07] the dangerous parts of the world safe from these dangerous attacks. But forward movement remains [43:16] very slow. The DINI confirms, it's your job to confirm that intelligence is objective, timely, and independent of [43:31] political considerations and based on all available sources. So with recent efforts to re-energize the research [43:42] on the causes and attribution of these devastating attacks on our personnel, do you plan to continue these efforts? [43:54] Well, I'm not privy, but I certainly plan to engage with you and Senator Gillibrand on this issue and I'm happy to do so. [44:02] I look forward to future discussions. There's a lot of history here. Thank you. [44:08] Thank you, Senator Collins. No stronger leader on national security, not just on this committee, [44:13] but your work on the HISGAC committee and especially the Appropriations Committee, like our friend Lindsey Graham, [44:17] the troops and intelligence officers have no better friends than Senator Collins. Thank you for your work. [44:22] Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Clayton, according to the press reports, [44:29] the FBI director spent eight hours last Friday at the White House investigating journalists. My view is [44:36] this is a flagrant attack of journalists in the First Amendment under the direction apparently of the [44:43] Trump administration. When were you directed to issue subpoenas to the journalists and by whom? [44:49] Senator, I believe you're referring to the reporting around the subpoenas relating to the subpoenas you [45:00] signed. The subpoenas that I signed. Those subpoenas are in connection with an ongoing national security [45:09] investigation. I'm happy to talk to you and this committee about our approach to the First Amendment [45:15] and our efforts in all cases to limit to the greatest extent possible any intrusion into the operation of the free press. [45:27] I'm I'm absolutely committed to and respect our First Amendment and the role of the press. [45:33] So let me ask you this. It's not even clear that the subpoenas that you signed followed the administration's policy, [45:42] which requires the government to first make all reasonable attempts to obtain information from other sources. [45:49] What specific actions did you take before you signed the subpoenas? [45:53] I can tell you that in all of these cases, we and not just one person, and this is the way I operate. [46:03] I operate by asking my team, what do you think? Any action in this regard, you can be assured that it was [46:13] a consultative exercise with the career prosecutors in my office. So that's what you did beforehand to [46:21] satisfy yourself that this was important to do, to send these journalists a subpoena and go to their [46:26] house? To issue the subpoenas. But let me say that this is, I don't want to get into this in too [46:35] great a detail because it's inappropriate. I don't want to get into details. I just want to find out what [46:40] went on. We followed the processes that we're required to follow. Let me go to the question of elections. [46:44] You've claimed in the past that vote by mail is tainted, and I haven't seen any evidence of this. [46:50] These are your exact quotations. You talk about dishonesty in mail-in voting, and at one point, [46:58] you talked specifically about a group that was doing it. I think it would be very helpful to get a sense [47:04] of who you're talking about. You said, and I quote, one group is using mail-in voting dishonestly. So you [47:12] basically said you got a group out there who are election bandits. Who are we talking about? [47:17] Now, I would like to see where you're pulling those quotes from because I've been very careful [47:22] in my words on this. I've been very careful. Look, we, election in tech, election in tech, [47:30] I'd like to see the whole, the whole passage. [47:32] Send you the material. [47:32] I'm happy to answer, but let me tell you. There are two parts to this. One is access, [47:43] which is extremely important. Access to the ballot is something that I know this body, [47:49] many people have worked hard for years and years. The other one is integrity. I'm a big believer [47:54] that we can have better access than we've ever had before and better integrity than we've ever had [48:01] before. And some of the constructs around our election, the integrity can be greatly improved. [48:09] Well, I want to see it because I want to know the names of the people that you're calling dishonest [48:14] because I'm the nation's first senator elected by mail. The second senator was a Republican, [48:21] and we don't believe that this is tainted by fraud. And I have time for one more question. [48:27] You said that the country was well served by this agreement that Donald Trump is not going to get [48:34] audited in terms of his taxes. You went through the whole process. Tell me if you continue to support [48:41] that position, that you believe that the president of the United States should be the only person in [48:46] the country who's exempt from audit? I certainly do not believe that the president of the United States [48:54] should be the only person in the country who is exempt from audits. Do you think he should be [48:59] exempt from audits? That's a yes or no question. In terms of that specific thing, that's now a [49:05] matter of litigation, and I'm not going to comment on it here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Moran. [49:13] Chairman, thank you. Mr. Clayton, thank you for your presence here today, your interest in serving the [49:17] country. I appreciate the conversation we had in the office. I appreciate the relationship and [49:22] conversations we had over the time in your past public service. In my office, I stress to you a [49:32] belief in the importance of our intelligence relationships around the globe, not just Five [49:38] Eyes but with many others. Over the past years, there have been reports in the press of allies [49:44] withholding intelligence or us suspending intelligence sharing. How do you view the relationship with our [49:52] allies? Do you see a partner services as a force multiplier or simply transactional in nature? [49:59] Senator Moran, I think I'll be able to give you a much better answer should I be confirmed and have [50:08] greater access to those relationships. I know the Five Eyes relationship historically has been extremely [50:16] valuable to the United States. In terms of bilateral sharing, like anything, I think that's something that [50:24] you have to assess constantly whether it's working. But there's no reason not to explore whether you [50:31] can have something that works. I assume you would say that it's desirable to have a relationship with [50:35] many, many countries around the globe and determine whether there's a relationship that can work in [50:40] which we're sharing intelligence information. I think that's really well said. In your answer to a written [50:47] question asking if you commit to making sure that Ukraine has the intelligence it needs to apply [50:53] pressure on Russia, you said, quote, to the extent directed by the President, arm Ukraine and other [51:00] partners with intelligence that illuminates Russian plans and intentions. I appreciate that you work for [51:07] the President, but I want to believe – I want to emphasize my belief that any such sharing is critical [51:15] and any suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine would require very serious justification. [51:22] And so my question is, if confirmed, do you commit to sharing with this committee [51:27] the rationale of any such suspension and do so before the suspension becomes public? Give us a chance to [51:37] have input in that consequential decision. I expect to have, I would say, frequent and substantive dialogue, [51:47] including around priorities. The priorities are set to reflect the priorities of the administration [51:55] and the priorities of the President, but I expect to continue to discuss any change in those priorities. [52:01] And, you know, again, I'm not privy to these things, but I don't have any expectation that that priority is [52:06] changing. I chair an appropriations subcommittee that funds the FBI, and I have a strong interest in [52:15] supporting its counterintelligence role. It's the lead counterintelligence agency in the U.S., but you [52:21] note in your answers that the National Counterintelligence and Security Center within ODNI is the, quote, [52:28] head of the U.S. government counterintelligence activities. How would you characterize the relative [52:35] roles of the FBI and the Security Center in counterintelligence, and what are the practical effects [52:43] of how that would work? Senator, my direct experience with counterintelligence, and obviously I can't [52:53] go into the specifics, but it's fairly extensive at the moment, is directly with the FBI. Some engagement [53:00] with the Center, but it's mostly directly with the FBI and Homeland Security. And that past experience, [53:08] that relationship lends you to what kind of conclusions in that regard? It's extremely important. [53:15] The threat is real. The threat to the safety and security of the American people is real. [53:21] And we need to be vigilant every day. And in fact, I could, I think my colleagues would be happy if [53:28] in your role, I made a pitch for more resources. If they would. Let me ask about your private sector [53:36] experience. And in preparation for the role that you may soon assume, have you identified any [53:42] opportunities where the intelligence community can leverage private sector capabilities to enhance [53:48] the IC's mission? Yes, without that, the obvious one is data and data analysis. Making connections [53:58] where they might not otherwise be apparent or where the ability to make those connections in the past [54:06] took weeks and months. And with some of the tools that we have today can take hours to make the same [54:12] connections, the same connections that are important to combating what I would say is espionage. [54:18] Mr. Clayton, thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Moran. Senator Heinrich. [54:23] Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Clayton, it is alleged, and I would add quite credibly, [54:29] that Jeffrey Epstein committed some very serious crimes at his Zorro Ranch property in my home state [54:35] of New Mexico. Yet there has never been a federal search of that property. And in fact, in 2019, [54:42] the Department of Justice directed New Mexico to pause its own investigation and has most recently [54:50] refused to provide the unredacted evidence needed for our Attorney General to effectively carry out his [54:57] investigation despite federal and state laws requiring disclosure. I understand that as U.S. Attorney for [55:05] the Southern District of New York, you led the investigation into Jeffrey Epstein. Can you commit [55:11] to providing any relevant information to the New Mexico Attorney General and the documents, unredacted [55:19] documents, that he has requested? I spoke to my team about this last night. [55:24] That request is for unredacted documents. Those documents are subject to several protections [55:33] for those redactions, including a protective order of the court. My folks, I think, as we speak, [55:39] are seeking dialogue with the Attorney General to see if we can reach an accommodation that is [55:44] consistent with those protective orders. I would seriously encourage that cooperation and that spirit of [55:52] working in cooperation between federal and state law enforcement, I think it is quite clear that it [55:58] is likely that there are survivors, witnesses, and co-conspirators whose names have been redacted that [56:05] are necessary for him to effectively complete that investigation. And Mr. Chairman, I would also ask [56:13] unanimous consent to enter into the record the letter from the New Mexico Attorney General to the [56:19] Department of Justice. Without objection, I guess. Mr. Clayton, in your role as U.S. Attorney for the [56:29] Southern District of New York, you were tasked to personally certify that the unsealed grand jury [56:36] material related to Jeffrey Epstein did not disclose victims' personal information. The judge in that case [56:43] stated that he added this protective order to ensure that an identifiable official within DOJ takes [56:51] ownership of the sensitive and vitally important process of reviewing discovery. Due to what the [56:58] Department of Justice later called technical or human error, the January 26th release of material included [57:06] e-mail addresses and even nude photos of potential Epstein victims. Lawyers for those victims said that [57:14] this flawed process re-traumatized the survivors and, quote, turned their lives upside down. You were in charge [57:23] of this process during which highly sensitive personal data was made public. Did you personally certify the [57:30] material as the judge ordered? The judge ordered certification of a subset of the materials, the materials [57:38] that were in the Southern District. So who takes responsibility for what I think was an unconscionable release of, [57:47] an unnecessary release of personal information for these victims? I think the Department of Justice [57:54] has addressed that from the overall perspective. You know, Harry Truman used to have a sign on his desk that [58:01] said the buck stops here. Who has a sign on their desk in this case? For the Southern District documents, [58:06] it was me. In a media interview a couple of months ago, you were asked your position on the President's [58:14] $1.8 billion fund for victims of weaponization. And you replied, when we are investigating people and [58:22] bringing charges against them, criminal charges against people from a financial point of view, you can be [58:28] they can be absolutely devastating. If people have been pursued inappropriately, I'm supportive of [58:33] there being relief for that financial cost. That's it, end quote. Do you believe that people convicted of [58:41] violent crimes related to the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol and on U.S. Capitol Police [58:50] were pursued inappropriately in any way? [58:53] Let me say this. Any physical violence against law enforcement is completely objectionable. [59:04] Would it be appropriate for that fund to be used in cases where people were duly convicted of violent [59:14] crimes in that case? Let me go back to my comment very quickly. I was not speaking of the fund. I was [59:19] speaking generally. I think this is a CNBC clip. And I stand by what I said, which is, if people have been [59:25] inappropriately and intentionally subject to prosecution, they should have recourse. [59:32] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [59:34] Mr. Chairman, I just want to let the witness know, we've got the Fed Chair upstairs, but I will be [59:40] right back. I want to make sure my colleagues know I'll be back directly. [59:44] Senator Budd. [59:46] Thank you, Chairman. It's good to see you again. I enjoyed our visit a few weeks ago in the office and also [59:53] when I was coming on to the House Financial Services and you were coming into the SEC. I enjoyed our [59:59] time that decade ago. So as we talked about a couple weeks ago, did the President ever ask you to [1:00:04] disband or dismantle the ODNI or the intelligence community? [1:00:11] No, Senator. The President has given me no instructions other than to do a good job. [1:00:17] Great. Thanks. A little while ago, [1:00:20] you and Chairman Cotton were talking about economic security being national security, those two being [1:00:27] synonymous. So we've got an intelligence community largely established 1947, around the Cold War period. [1:00:36] So what changes are necessary in the intelligence community to maintain economic security as well as [1:00:43] national security? [1:00:44] I don't want to say that the intelligence community is currently free from economic analysis and the [1:00:51] provision of intelligence. But I do believe that the economic effects of various events should be [1:01:03] more a part of intelligence assessments. Because economic effects, markets move immediately. Markets [1:01:12] react. And then people react to markets. I mean, most interestingly today for all of us is the price of [1:01:19] oil. Understanding the dynamics around the current and the long-term price of energy and the price of oil, [1:01:26] I think, is an essential part of any intelligence assessment. [1:01:32] Thank you. You know, the men and women in the intelligence community, they do an extraordinary work. [1:01:37] Most of the time, they don't get any recognition. But sometimes there's a few bad eggs. Edward Snowden, [1:01:44] Dave Rush, the gold bar guy. So as D and I, you'll also be the executive agent for security, [1:01:54] as I understand it. So what's your vision for this role to ensure the security clearance process [1:02:01] and also to make sure we find and mitigate head off these insider threats? [1:02:05] I think there are two processes that fall. One is classification and overseeing classification. The [1:02:13] other is overseeing security. It may not be, you know, super interesting. But we need to focus on [1:02:20] both of those. I think the consensus that I've heard from people who know more than I do, are [1:02:27] that both of those are in need of a refresh to be more effective. Thank you. I look forward to [1:02:32] staying in touch on that and appreciate your work. Thank you. I think Senator Budd raises an important [1:02:38] point. You know, we all love our troops. Troops go through the airport. They're in uniform. People buy [1:02:42] them a beer. They buy them a lunch. Some of us may have benefited from those freebies in uniform back [1:02:47] in the day. Our intelligence officers don't get that gratitude. So let me just take the moment to [1:02:51] join Senator Budd and express our thankfulness for everything they do since they're not out there [1:02:55] getting a beer and a sandwich bought for them when their airports are out on town. But we would be [1:03:02] exposed to many more threats if it wasn't for them. Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:03:07] I agree with your comments. Whenever I meet members of the intelligence community, [1:03:10] I say you don't get the flyovers at the football games, but we appreciate what you do. [1:03:15] Mr. Clayton, there's been some discussion earlier about the importance of analytical integrity, [1:03:19] telling truth to power. The Intelligence Community Directive 203, which goes back more than a decade, [1:03:26] says this, independent that any information from the intelligence community should be [1:03:33] independent of political consideration. Analytic assessments must not be distorted by nor shaped by [1:03:40] advocacy of a particular audience agenda or policy viewpoint. Analytic judgments must not be [1:03:47] influenced by the force of preference for a particular policy. You concur with that, I presume? [1:03:54] Yes. So I want to ask a follow-up question to the Vice Chairman. Who won the 2020 election? [1:03:59] I've answered that question. I'm not going to get into that. You have not answered that question. [1:04:05] Could you answer the question? Who won the 2020 election? Pretty simple question. [1:04:09] Yeah, I'm going to give you the same answer. The answer to the Chairman was he asked me if I was [1:04:16] an election denier. I am not an election denier. Joe Biden was certified as the President. He went [1:04:23] through his process. We went through our electoral process, and I can tell you that I was in my seat at [1:04:31] the SEC, and worked hard for the transition. I'm just asking a really simple question. Who won the 2020 election? [1:04:40] As I said to you, we went through our processes, and Joe Biden became the President of the United States. [1:04:45] And that's it. That's not an answer to the question of who, I'm asking you one more time. [1:04:50] Okay. Who won the 2020 election? I don't, I don't, I'm not, this is like, I'm just not, [1:04:54] I'm here to talk about my qualifications. One of your qualifications is you told us you're going to [1:04:58] tell the truth to power, and you won't answer a very simple question. I think I've, I think I've [1:05:02] answered it many times. You have not answered it. Okay. You have not answered it. Saying Joe Biden [1:05:08] was certified is not an answer. Okay. Why did you take it upon yourself to opine on the California [1:05:15] election process to CNBC? You said, you said, uh, during, he said, during the interview on CNBC, [1:05:22] you said that the U.S. is doing an absolutely terrible job on election integrity, and the American [1:05:27] people are right to question it. What's the basis of that statement? What's the evidence for that [1:05:31] statement? Let, let me give you the context of the way I look at this, because, because we should have [1:05:36] this kind of, of candid dialogue. Elections are a process for gathering, um, aggregating, and providing [1:05:44] data. And who does the Constitution entrust the responsibility for elections? To the states in the, [1:05:48] in the case we're talking about. Correct. To the states in the case we're talking about. But my experience, [1:05:55] my experience at the SEC, my experience at the DOJ, my experience in the private sector, [1:05:59] is that the government processes for, for gathering, aggregating, and providing data [1:06:05] need to be improved greatly. Are you talking about elections? I'm talking about all, I'm talking about [1:06:10] very bad inflation data. No, I'm talking about all government processes, including the one, one is, [1:06:14] I want some evidence, and there isn't time here in a minute and 49 seconds, but you have a lot of time [1:06:20] between now and when we move on your nomination. I would like a written analysis from you that gives [1:06:27] evidence of voter fraud. I, I don't, I don't, fraud in this country, Mr. Clayton, is the, to be clear, [1:06:31] Senator, is the, is the assertion that there's voter fraud. I, I am not, I did not, I did not make that [1:06:36] assertion. I said the, I, no, I said. You're doing an absolutely terrible job on election integrity. [1:06:42] What did that mean? That meant that the audit trail that we have available for our elections [1:06:47] in a number of places is not the kind of audit trail that you would expect in something that is [1:06:53] this important. That's what it meant. And I, I mean. So is there a problem of voter fraud in this country? [1:07:02] I don't think we can say definitively whether there is or is not until we have better processes. [1:07:07] We've had hundreds of analyses. We've had the Heritage Foundation study that found 1650 cases out of 2 [1:07:15] billion votes counted. I would love for the American people to have incredible confidence in the [1:07:20] integrity of our elections. I would too, and I would appreciate it if this administration would, [1:07:24] would cease undermining that confidence. I, I, I would like to work with this committee from [1:07:30] my perspective. Well, for the record, I wish you would share any evidence you have that undermines the, [1:07:37] that asserts that there was any problem of voter fraud significant enough to change the results [1:07:43] of an election in this country. Following up, why was your hearing postponed? What were you told? [1:07:51] You were going to meet with us in a few hours and suddenly it was pulled down. What, why did that [1:07:56] happen? Um, I was, I was requested and respected the request not to attend. Were you given any reason? [1:08:05] Um, I'm not going to get into the private conversations. And you, you testified earlier just to follow up [1:08:15] briefly. Uh, you've had no involvement whatsoever with this proposed speech tomorrow night by the [1:08:22] president. None, none, you haven't been consulted, discussed any involvement. Is that correct? [1:08:27] That is correct. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Bennett. [1:08:30] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to also thank you for your comments about Lindsey Graham at the beginning [1:08:37] of tonight's, uh, today's hearing. And I want to, we had a good discussion yesterday, Mr. Clayton, about [1:08:43] Ukraine. I'm not going to repeat that here, but, uh, I know that his view of the situation and the view of the [1:08:50] bipartisan support for Ukraine and the work that our intelligence committee, uh, community community [1:08:56] has done to support them is a really important project for all of us going forward. I wanted to [1:09:02] ask you, Mr. Clayton, about the subpoenas of the New York Times reporters. And, um, the reporting that I read [1:09:11] is that the, the, the Secret Service had raised concerns about the security of President Trump's, um, [1:09:20] fill-in for Air Force One and that there was a meeting at the White House with the FBI Director [1:09:27] Kash Patel and other DOJ officials to talk about that matter, to talk about the reporting that had come [1:09:35] from the AP. And I think earlier in an answer to Senator Wyden, you said that you had consulted with [1:09:43] the career attorneys at the Southern District of New York. My question is whether you consulted or anybody [1:09:49] in the Southern District of New York consulted with anybody in Washington DC at the White House or [1:09:56] the Department of Justice before those subpoenas were issued. They were issued, I think, within just [1:10:02] hours of the reporting that struck me as somebody who has worked at DOJ as an unusually, um, short period of [1:10:11] time. And, and, and particularly given the equities that are at stake, when, when journalists are subpoenaed, [1:10:18] the equities that are at stake when law enforcement is showing up at the doorstep of journalists, [1:10:25] uh, in this nation, I think it's very important for you to explain this in, in the context of this, [1:10:31] uh, nomination. Yeah. Understood. I can't get into the specifics of an investigation and ongoing matter. [1:10:42] Um, let me say that I'm confident that the pro procedures that we have in place to protect the [1:10:50] First Amendment and, and protect the freedom of the press and not result in intimidation of journalists [1:10:56] or the like were followed. Um, they depend on the circum, facts and circumstances, how much time you have. [1:11:02] The, the, those matters include ones you referenced, which is, are there other available sources for the [1:11:10] information that we seek and have we, have we sought that? The other aspect of this is, you know, the tailoring [1:11:18] of a particular subpoena and, and including the return date and when those people would be asked to appear [1:11:23] or provide documents. It's expected in these types of cases, at least from mine, that if there's counsel [1:11:30] involved, we can further tailor those requests to make it the least intrusive way possible. But, but let me just, [1:11:38] let me just finish if you don't mind, it is vitally important that if national security interests are at stake, [1:11:44] that there's not a, what I would say is a huge blind spot where someone can, someone can use the ability [1:11:52] to provide information to journalists to get it out there, including our adversaries, without any potential [1:11:59] for discovering how that happened. Well, I think this committee is well aware of the intelligence equities [1:12:06] that are at stake. We have no, no, you know, that's why we all of us do this work and provide this [1:12:10] oversight. But I think all of us would agree that the first amendment is not some sort of glaring loophole [1:12:19] that it's out there. That's something that we need to follow. And so I'll ask you again, Mr. Clayton, [1:12:24] did you or anybody at the Southern District of New York have conversations with anybody at the White House [1:12:30] or the Justice Department in Washington DC before you issued those subpoenas that resulted in New York [1:12:38] Times reporters being served process at their homes? I can, I can say it this way without getting [1:12:46] any investigation. The, the, the protocols require consultation with the Department of Justice in, [1:12:53] in Washington and we followed the protocols. And, and, and, and did anybody in Washington DC, [1:13:02] did anybody in Washington DC suggest to you or anybody on your team that you should issue subpoenas [1:13:09] in this case, following the AP reporting, following the AP reporting of the president coming back on an [1:13:18] airplane that was, uh, unsuitable for the protection, uh, and the defense of the president of the United [1:13:26] States? Yeah, I'm, I'm not going to get into the details of that. What I, what I can tell you is [1:13:30] that we followed those procedures and those procedures for the reasons that I believe firmly, [1:13:34] and you believe protecting, protecting the freedom of the press, being the least intrusive possible, [1:13:40] require consultation. And I would say, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is out, but the reason [1:13:45] this is relevant to, I think a lot of us or certainly to me is that this question of being [1:13:50] able to speak truth to power, you know, in the context of Intel, uh, I think is very similar to [1:13:56] the question about whether or not we're able to push back in a moment like this. Yeah. And I, and I [1:14:00] want to, I want to assure this committee that in these types of circumstances, that concept of least [1:14:06] intrusive possible is front of mind for me. Thank you, chairman. Thank you. Thank you, [1:14:11] Senator rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, look, first of all, I, I do think you're the right guy [1:14:18] for the job. And, uh, as I said in my earlier, uh, uh, recommendation of you to the entire committee, [1:14:26] but I want to give you an opportunity to talk a little bit about some of the new technologies [1:14:30] that are being involved that we're going to have to address. And I, I don't think we really talked a [1:14:34] lot about what, uh, artificial intelligence is going to do and the integration of artificial [1:14:38] intelligence, not just by, by our, uh, intelligence agencies, but also by our adversaries [1:14:45] and, uh, the focus that we're going to have to have on the amount of data that we collect [1:14:50] and how we're going to have to organize that. Can I, I, I know that you're brand new into this [1:14:55] discussion and that, uh, you're going to be learning it at a, at a high rate of speed, [1:15:00] but can you talk a little bit about your concepts about how we take this huge amount of data that we've [1:15:05] got and organize it, integrate it in such a fashion that it's available to be able to make an analysis [1:15:11] and to give the best advice to the leaders of this country. Can we talk about how you see the [1:15:16] integration of AI into this process? Uh, thank you. Um, let me start by saying, talking about it in an [1:15:25] area where I know, which is a huge data area, which is the way our markets operate and, and the resiliency [1:15:31] of our markets, um, and what I would say is their, their vulnerability to attack and AI is a game changer [1:15:38] and we should just all recognize that. I think, I think I commend the treasury secretary for, for leading [1:15:44] the way in this and, and the federal reserve and calling the banks in to talk about what that means. I [1:15:50] expect it's the same, or at least it resonates in the intelligence community, that, that AI is not only an [1:15:57] opportunity, but a threat when something's both an opportunity and a threat, you better get your arms [1:16:02] around it. Yeah. Look, I, the reason why I asked the question that way is, is I think that, that AI is, [1:16:09] uh, it, it not only is a game changer, but it, um, it's, it's going to be seen by the American public, [1:16:15] first of all, as, as a, as a threat, because they're going to see on social media, they're going to see [1:16:20] the misinformation that comes out, deep fakes and so forth. But the other side of it, which is the quality [1:16:26] of life that Americans are going to be able to receive because of improvements in our product, [1:16:31] productivity and so forth, is going to far outweigh what the, the negative benefit or the, the negative [1:16:37] implications are. But along with that comes the ability for our country to be able to gather huge [1:16:43] amounts of data, a lot of which is, uh, is going to be of concern to the American people because it's [1:16:49] going to be information on them. And they're going to be concerned that government is collecting [1:16:54] information on them. Well, at the same time, government, the IC community in particular, [1:17:00] has to be able to collect information, not so much on American people, but on the threats worldwide. [1:17:07] And I think this is going to cause people to say, okay, are, are you collecting data on us? [1:17:12] Are you collecting data on the rest of the world? And how do you separate that? A lot of that has to do [1:17:17] with a lot of the discussion regarding 702 and FISA and so forth. And I, and, and intelligent, [1:17:22] and artificial intelligence is just simply going to magnify that. Can we talk about how we approach [1:17:27] that? Because we need the artificial intelligence. We need to be better than our adversaries, collect [1:17:33] more data, collect it faster, analyze it better, but we still have to have those protections. And the [1:17:38] confidence of the American people that we're doing the right things with only the data that we're [1:17:42] supposed to be collecting, I think will add, will allow us to continue to move and to protect them. [1:17:49] Can we talk about how we do that and how you see that, please? [1:17:53] Well, I think the first thing is exactly what you said, Senator Rounds, recognizing that an issue that [1:17:59] we're dealing with, I think pretty well, but can always get better is, you know, collect the data [1:18:04] we need to provide a good intelligence product without, without violating people's Fourth Amendment [1:18:09] rights, but also in the, in the, in a way that we can control and monitor that. I expect it's just what [1:18:16] you said that AI is going to, is going to greatly amplify that collection ability, which amplifies [1:18:25] the need for oversight, um, and controls to protect our citizens. I think, I think we should just [1:18:31] recognize that that's the case. Yeah. Thank you. Look, Mr. Chairman, I, I just think that this is [1:18:36] something that I, I think our committee is going to be directly involved with. And I, I think on both [1:18:40] sides of the aisle, the, the implementation of this tool, as we speed up the delivery of the, of the [1:18:46] decision-making capabilities for our leaders, has got to be one that the American people will [1:18:50] continue to have confidence in. And I think that's part of the key reasons for having a discussion [1:18:54] like this is to let people know that we recognize that, that, that threat is out there and that we're [1:18:59] aware of it. And that, uh, as we collect the data that we have to, we're going to be very careful about the, [1:19:05] the coordination so that their rights are protected in this collection process. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:19:11] Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Gillibrand. [1:19:14] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, and thank you, uh, Mr. Clayton, for your service to our country. [1:19:20] I want to, um, just continue with the line of questioning that, um, Senator Bennett had about [1:19:28] the New York Times, uh, subpoenas. Um, you said you don't want to get into it. I understand that. But [1:19:34] the reason why we're asking these questions is because the subpoenas were issued so closely after a very [1:19:42] long meeting at the White House, there seemed to be an unnecessary urgency behind it. And I'd like [1:19:48] you to maybe comment on why there was this urgency, but more than that, they were served at the [1:19:55] reporters' homes. And that is fairly unusual. Um, that is not the least, uh, what term of art did you [1:20:01] use the least intrusive means serving at their homes? Normally a subpoena would be issued at [1:20:08] their place of business, a corporate office. Um, but again, delivering it to a private home seems [1:20:13] quite aggressive. Um, so can you address the urgency and the home, um, uh, service? [1:20:20] Uh, but what I, what I said before is I'm not going to get into the specifics of the, [1:20:30] and the circumstances of the matters being investigated. Understood. So I just want to [1:20:34] talk about the process because I get you don't want to talk about the substance. Yeah. And then [1:20:37] on the process, um, how quickly you would do something following the process depends on those [1:20:44] facts and circumstances of the investigation, including the potential spoliation, you know, [1:20:49] of information and the timeliness of the threat. I think I'm going to leave it at that, but I, [1:20:57] these are, this is not a, this was a judgment and it should always be a judgment that's made [1:21:03] collectively. That's the way I look at these things. Well, I would just, I would just urge that, [1:21:08] um, this doesn't sound like the proper independent legal process that we would normally expect [1:21:13] for issuance of a subpoena. The characteristics surrounding it seem rushed, aggressive, uh, with an [1:21:20] unnecessary urgency. And I would just caution you in your role. You are going to have many times [1:21:27] when, uh, you may be influenced to engage in investigation because the White House is unhappy [1:21:33] with a report. Um, the thing about the, this particular issue is that the plane was reported on [1:21:40] months ago, months and months ago about the concerns that because it was built by Qatar, [1:21:46] that it wouldn't have the same security, um, uh, aspects that one would need to protect a president. [1:21:54] And so this just doesn't ring true that your process was a thoughtful, deliberative and, uh, normal [1:22:02] oversight process. And that is why this committee is deeply concerned. Do you understand that? [1:22:06] I understand your concerns. I understand your concerns. I, I'm, I am, but I want you to, [1:22:11] I want to tell you, I am comfortable with where we are and I'm comfortable with how we are proceeding [1:22:15] from here. Okay. Well, we expect judicious, thoughtful, legal processes from this committee. [1:22:21] The second thing that this committee is concerned about, um, are this issue of election security. [1:22:27] Senator King tried to get you to say, did he win or not win the election? President Trump has an issue [1:22:34] with whether he wins or doesn't win elections and it's affected your office. And I need you to [1:22:38] understand how it's affected your office. After the 2016 election, there was allegations that there [1:22:44] was foreign interference by Russia and president Trump was very concerned that somehow his election [1:22:50] was not on the up and up. And so what he did in response when he became president was he eliminated [1:22:56] every aspect of your office's oversight of the election process from cyber threats. [1:23:03] You had personnel that were very knowledgeable about cyber threats, especially foreign influence. [1:23:09] Um, there were personnel at CISA, there were personnel at the FBI and they were all fired. [1:23:15] And then president Trump now wants to make sure that the 2020 election that nobody says [1:23:21] Biden won the election. So you can understand why this committee is concerned that you won't say [1:23:27] Biden won the election because it just reeks of this insecurity by the Trump administration about [1:23:32] election security. So when you say election security is important to you, I want to make sure that [1:23:37] you understand the ODNI has a responsibility towards cyber security, towards election security. [1:23:44] That's not about voter fraud, but about the influence of foreign countries on our election security. [1:23:50] Do you understand that? Um, absolutely. And it is a significant concern of mine. One of the things that [1:23:58] I did not get an opportunity to talk about before cybersecurity has been part of my private sector [1:24:04] and public sector practice for well over a decade, going on close to two decades. [1:24:10] So will you add that back to ODNI? Because it was taken out by, uh, Gabbard. [1:24:13] When I was talking, yes, when I was talking about processes and integrity of our election, [1:24:19] cybersecurity is front of mind. [1:24:21] So will you restore the cybersecurity, um, uh, complement to your job as well as the biosecurity [1:24:29] threats and as well as, um, the formal line influence center? [1:24:34] I can, I can commit to making an assessment and to the extent that more resources are needed [1:24:40] or more focus is needed or more coordination is needed. [1:24:44] Well, we would urge there are more resources and focus needed in those three areas. [1:24:48] And I look forward to dialoguing with you on that. [1:24:49] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator Lankford. [1:24:51] Mr. Chairman, thank you. [1:24:53] Mr. Clayton, good to see you again on it. [1:24:56] Uh, you have served the nation in multiple different roles, uh, before in leading SEC [1:25:00] and did a very good job there, uh, in Southern District of New York, [1:25:03] in the U.S. Attorney's Office. [1:25:04] Uh, you've got a very unique experience and background walking in on intelligence. [1:25:08] You've handled money laundering, drug kingpins. [1:25:10] You've handled international terrorist, foreign terrorist organizations, [1:25:13] counterespionage cases. [1:25:15] You've handled a lot of things as a prosecutor in this. [1:25:18] My question to you is how does that experience and knowing what is needed [1:25:22] to actually prosecute individuals affect how you approach this task [1:25:26] in helping the intelligence community trying to be able to gather information? [1:25:29] Um, great to see you. Thanks. [1:25:32] Good to see you again. [1:25:33] Uh, that, that, the role that you just described is, [1:25:38] is one that I believe draws on a lot of the experience that I have had as a counselor for years. [1:25:45] And that is that I want to be respectful that the intelligence community is about providing [1:25:50] information and analysis, not setting policy or making decisions. [1:25:54] Um, and I look forward to playing that role, um, as, as ODNI. [1:26:00] I think that my experience as a consumer of that type of information will help me provide the [1:26:07] information in the way that is best for the consumers I serve. [1:26:10] I, I always worry that people who are the providers of information are providing it for themselves [1:26:16] and not for the end user in the most effective way for the end user. [1:26:22] Maybe we're doing that. Maybe we're not. I hope we are. [1:26:24] But I, and I also want to say, as Senator Cotton noted and others have noted, [1:26:30] the women and men of the intelligence community are incredible. [1:26:33] I look forward to working with them, learning from them, [1:26:37] and figuring out how to provide that best, best possible intelligence product. [1:26:40] Okay. That'd be, that would be very helpful. [1:26:43] And it's helpful to all the policymakers, uh, to have the best, clearest, uh, non-safe, [1:26:49] if I can say it that way, uh, documents to just get the information out. [1:26:52] So people can make the decisions based on the information that we actually have. [1:26:56] Uh, that would be helpful. And as a consumer of that, I would assume, [1:26:59] uh, that makes a difference for you. Uh, ODNI started out as a very small entity [1:27:04] after the 9-11 attacks, as you know, well, it has grown to a multi thousand person organization. [1:27:10] There have been a lot of questions around this dais to try to figure out, [1:27:13] is it the right size? Uh, we have a lot of people that are detailed from a lot of our intelligence [1:27:18] agencies to the director of national intelligence office. Now we're trying to be able to figure out [1:27:22] that's the right places to continue to be able to pull people out of their agencies and pull them [1:27:27] over there or some of them be able to need to return back to their agencies. Obviously, [1:27:31] you're not there at this point, but you've led a lot of large organizations. Tell me process-wise [1:27:36] how you walk in to be able to look at, are we right size, right task? Do we have [1:27:40] people here that need to actually be there? How do you make those decisions? [1:27:46] Thank you. I tried to outline it in my opening remarks. What is our mission, the safety and [1:27:51] security of the American people? How do we, how do we deal with that every day? We provide [1:27:57] decision makers with the best possible intelligence product. What is the structure over the intelligence [1:28:04] community with the role that we have, which is supposed to be oversight and integration, not [1:28:10] operations? What is the structure that best serves that? That's how I intend to look at it. And [1:28:16] specifically, where, where do people return? Where do they stay? The analogy that is in my mind [1:28:23] is a board of directors that oversees a number of subsidiaries. In most cases that board of directors [1:28:30] is fairly lean and relies on reporting from the subsidiaries with, you know, some efforts to synthesize, [1:28:36] some committees, some, that, that is what is in my mind. Not, one thing you don't want to do as a [1:28:42] member of a board of directors, whether you're in oversight or empowerment or both, is get into the [1:28:47] day-to-day of management. You lose perspective. You have handled terrorism cases coming straight out of [1:28:54] Iran and threats that have come to us for 47 years. The United States and American citizens all around the [1:29:00] world have faced terrorism threats from Iran and the growth of the proxy terror organizations. [1:29:07] What can you tell us at this point, based on your experience in the Southern District of New York [1:29:11] and your prosecution side of things, and then also some of the work that you've done in the past, [1:29:16] just dealing with money laundering and the movement of money, the most effective way to be able to deal [1:29:21] with the threats that we're facing right now from Iran? The threat's real. That's, it's not hypothetical. [1:29:29] Look, all you need to do is look at the people who we have arrested in the last year and what they have [1:29:35] done. They intend to do our citizens harm. They are well-funded, and they are well-funded through [1:29:42] channels that we need to do a better job of monitoring. Our traditional banking channels, [1:29:48] I think, are fairly well monitored. There are new channels, I would say digital asset platforms, [1:29:55] other channels where funding takes place that we need to do a better job on. [1:29:59] Okay. Thank you. I'll go back. Senator Kelly. [1:30:03] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Clayton, thank you for being here. I've got a couple very basic questions, [1:30:12] and then I want to get a little bit of your opinion on the threats we face, if we have time. [1:30:16] So can you tell me why Joe Biden was certified as the winner of the 2020 election? [1:30:27] I really, I'm going back to my constitutional law here, but I don't want to continue to have debate [1:30:35] about this, but I believe he had the most electoral votes. So he won the election? [1:30:40] He followed our process, had the most of electoral votes, was declared the winner, and... [1:30:45] And who has the most electoral votes? Is it the person that wins or the person that loses? [1:30:50] I think that's your characterization. I really, I'm not going to continue to do this. [1:30:54] The reason why we struggle with this, and I think it's especially important in the job you're [1:31:01] nominated for, is because it seems that folks who are nominated for these positions just fundamentally [1:31:13] refuse to disagree with something the president says. And the problem I have with this is he isn't [1:31:21] in the room today. You're going to be in a room with him many times, and at times you should have [1:31:31] a difference of opinion. And if you can't disagree with him when he's not in the room, are you going [1:31:39] to be able to disagree with him when you're sitting across from him in the Oval Office or the Situation [1:31:46] Room? That's, that's what I struggle with because this job is different. This job, [1:31:51] it's not about softening the edges when the truth is unpleasant. It's about delivering information [1:31:59] and making sure the president understands that information. And by the way, people risk their [1:32:03] lives to get this information. And if it's not transmitted to the president, if he doesn't [1:32:10] understand it, I mean, there's going to be disagreements. We expect that. But I really struggle with this, [1:32:16] especially in your position, because you can't disagree with him on this because he doesn't like [1:32:23] the fact that he lost in 2020. As you said, Joe Biden was, was certified because he got the most [1:32:29] electoral votes. That means he won, but you still refuse to stay, say that. And I was sitting at the [1:32:38] SEC when this occurred. And I can tell you that I, maybe people worked harder, but I don't think [1:32:48] anybody I know worked harder to make an effective transition to my successor at the SEC. And in [1:32:56] terms of your question, I have every confidence that I will deliver on my job candidly, independently, [1:33:06] and with my best judgment. But just not in this room. Okay, let me move on. So I want to just see, [1:33:15] hear from you. What do you think our top threats are that we face as a nation today? Let's just talk [1:33:22] about the top three. From where I sit today, terrorism, from many sources. I believe that [1:33:35] we have done a good job of reducing the threat, but drug trafficking and the deaths from fentanyl into [1:33:44] the United States were an incredible threat. The combination, I'm not going to speak about any [1:33:49] specific, I'm illuminating that, I'm not going to say about any specific country, but the combination in [1:33:56] certain countries of cartels, military and business is very dangerous. Lastly, I would say our traditional [1:34:08] adversaries, Senator Kelly, that we've talked about. Terrorism, drugs, cartels, and traditional, [1:34:16] I assume you mean Russia, China? Russia, China, and Iran. And with regards to Russia and China, [1:34:23] I have about 40 seconds left. What specifically would you do as DNI to help our country deal [1:34:33] with those threats? Since we only have 30 seconds, just talk to me about Russia and Ukraine. [1:34:37] Russia, Ukraine, China. One thing that I elaborated before that I think I can be [1:34:42] extremely helpful on is the economic strategies that are involved in our engagement with them [1:34:54] across conflict and cooperation. We still cooperate extensively with China on the world stage [1:35:04] economically. Do you think the economic issue with Russia outweighs the national security risk to [1:35:10] our allies? I think that they are very closely tied. How do a number of these threat actors fund [1:35:18] themselves? It's energy, other things. I think you and I talked about this. Some of our, I would say, [1:35:32] most formidable threat actors are the ones who are the most well-funded. [1:35:35] All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Young. [1:35:42] Thank you, Chairman. Good to see you, Mr. Clayton. I am grateful for your longstanding service to our [1:35:48] country. Thanks to your family for all it's done and all it's prepared to do after you're confirmed. [1:35:57] I want to build on some of our conversations that we had in the office, which I found productive, [1:36:04] and turn to issues of technology and economic security, which you know are important to me. [1:36:13] As chairman of the SEC and more recently as a U.S. attorney, you had a lot of experience in advancing [1:36:21] American economic and technology security, especially from manipulative practices of our [1:36:28] strategic competitors and adversaries. Maybe you could just speak to that. [1:36:34] Senator Young, it troubles me and it very much troubled me that foreign actors, sometimes state-sponsored [1:36:42] actors, abused our securities markets, abused them in some traditional ways and non-traditional ways, [1:36:49] including what we refer to as pump and dump schemes, basically luring, you know, unsuspecting [1:36:55] American citizens into investing in securities that were not worth what they were, you know, projected to [1:37:01] be, taking that money, prices drop, running away, being offshore. As I said, one of the problems with our [1:37:09] global markets is our ability to go get bad actors that act from outside of the United States is very limited. [1:37:20] And I propose some measures to help the SEC crack down on this. They've not prioritized this in the [1:37:28] last year or so, so I'll continue to work that set, but I want to be supportive in this capacity, [1:37:33] this intelligence capacity that you'll assume, um, to, uh, help, uh, help our nation crack down on that. [1:37:41] From your tenure at SEC, uh, how might you approach ensuring that there's adequately intel support, [1:37:47] uh, to, uh, uh, our, our federal entities that aren't traditionally known as national security entities, [1:37:54] USDA, uh, commerce, uh, SEC? Yeah. Um, let me give you a recent example that we had in the Southern [1:38:03] District about commerce, um, and chips and our restriction on chip shipments to certain of our [1:38:10] adversaries. Um, that's an extremely important national security issue. We wouldn't be restricting [1:38:16] those chips if it were just a commercial issue. Um, it is a sort of capabilities issue and that's [1:38:23] something that we need, I believe, to continue to work with other agencies on. So it's, it's important [1:38:29] for me to hear you say that because conceptually, uh, I've, I, uh, I sit on a number of committees, [1:38:34] most of which deal with what I think an outsider would regard as strictly economic issues. I've [1:38:41] always approached them first and foremost from an economic, uh, from a national security perspective. [1:38:46] I think it's really important that all our agencies, uh, are first thinking about national [1:38:51] security before they think about anything else. So, um, I'm grateful for that mindset. Um, last thing I [1:38:58] want to turn to, uh, in our brief time today is following what is now law as it relates to [1:39:05] COVID declassifications. I authored a requirement in last year's Intel Authorization Act for ODNI to [1:39:15] review intelligence for public release relating to China's efforts to cover up the COVID pandemic and [1:39:24] interfere with our response. Uh, do you commit to following the law, uh, ensuring that this review [1:39:32] is completed as soon as possible and ensuring all appropriate intelligence is released so the [1:39:38] world can better understand China's bad behavior? Yes or no, please. Um, I, um, I have a hard time [1:39:46] with yes or no answers. Sorry. But what I, what I can say is, uh, I think there's a whole lot more to [1:39:53] learn from what happened in COVID and there's a lot of work for, I expect, um, I hope to know more. [1:40:00] There's a lot of work for our intelligence community to do to ensure that the American people [1:40:05] have access to that learning. And to the extent it should be classified, you have access to that [1:40:11] learning. I, I, I gave you important qualifiers there. Uh, so as soon as possible, that was a qualifier. [1:40:18] And because it can be difficult, especially in this format, uh, to internalize the question on that [1:40:24] trying to trip you up, no, no, no, on that. And then ensuring all appropriate intelligence is released. [1:40:31] I mean, you have a legal background. There's a lot of room there. Okay. I'll take, I'll take it. [1:40:36] All right. All right. Thank you. Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Uh, welcome, sir. [1:40:44] Uh, in a speech in September last year, you highlighted the great successes of the Southern [1:40:51] District of New York, uh, specifically calling out, and I quote, the successful prosecution of the [1:40:57] former president of Honduras and other high level Honduran officials for narcotics trafficking and [1:41:04] firearms charges for partnering with some of the largest and most violent cartels in the world [1:41:10] to distribute tons of cocaine to the United States. Is that correct? Yes. Yeah, I think so. I think that's [1:41:22] fair. Uh, now on November 28th, 2025, President Trump issued a full and complete pardon to Juan [1:41:30] Orlando Hernandez. Were you consulted about the pardon? Um, I'm not, I'm not going to get into [1:41:41] the pardon, um, process here. The, um, president's pardon power. I think there's, there's only a few [1:41:48] powers in our constitution that are unreviewable and absolute. That's one of them. And whether it's [1:41:54] President Biden, President Trump, or a future president, that's, that's their power. Are you [1:41:59] aware of any quid pro quo regarding the pardon? I'm not, I'm not aware of any, any such thing. Why [1:42:07] would the president of the United States pardon someone that you had convicted and described [1:42:12] as being involved in violent activities and allowing tons of cocaine to enter the United States? [1:42:19] Um, like, like I said, I'm not going to discuss a specific pardon thing. That's the president's [1:42:24] pardon power. Well, it seems to me that, um, all the rhetoric that we've heard about [1:42:34] fighting drugs. And in fact, we've killed over 200 people in the Caribbean and Pacific [1:42:40] because they were not presidents of countries, but minor dealers in, uh, or transporters of heroin. [1:42:48] And yet here's a, a king maker or a king piece who gets to walk. [1:42:54] Senator Reed, what I, what I can say, and I don't, I want to be very clear, I'm not talking about this [1:42:59] specific instance, but in our efforts to counteract the serious drug threat from south of our border, [1:43:09] we engage with the Department of State, others on matters of this type. It is a whole of government [1:43:19] approach to this type of threat. Thank you. Admiral Paparo, who's a extraordinary commander of [1:43:25] the Indo-PACOM indicated there in testimony for down service committee that allowing China to get [1:43:34] access to, uh, sophisticated chips would eventually come at the expense of American service members [1:43:41] in a conflict. So if we're giving chips to China, we're threatening or at least making it more difficult [1:43:49] to survive a lot of troops. President, uh, Trump, after speaking with Xi, announced a significant [1:43:55] apology change to sell H-200 chips to China. Do you agree with the transfer of these advanced [1:44:03] chips threatens our military security and more particularly the lives of our service members? [1:44:08] Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular decision, but you, you raise a point that I'm [1:44:16] very proud of what my office and our partners were able to do. Chips that were sanctioned and subject to, [1:44:22] um, criminal sanction for being diverted to China. We brought that case. I know. And you successfully [1:44:31] convicted people for taking the very same ships and getting them into China. The president of the United States [1:44:37] turns around and gives them to Xi. And the logic, I think, of your case was these ships would have been [1:44:43] detrimental to the security of the United States. Is that correct? Well, I mean, the logic of our case from a [1:44:49] prosecutor's point of view was it was illegal to do it. It was a priority for the Department of Commerce. [1:44:54] Um, and we brought the case. Thank you. Uh, one of the things that, uh, everyone in your business has [1:45:02] to do is speak truth to power, and particularly when it's very uncomfortable to do that. Uh, after [1:45:09] Operation Midnight Hammer, Lieutenant, uh, General Jeffrey Cruz of the Defense Intelligence Agency [1:45:16] allowed his analysis to go forward, which said that it did not obliterate the, uh, atomic nuclear [1:45:25] capacities of Iran. And he was summarily fired for speaking truth to power. Uh, it's interesting now [1:45:34] because we're at war with Iran. And one of the principles is that they have a nuclear capacity that [1:45:40] we didn't take out. Now, I think it appears General Cruz was, was truthful and he was punished [1:45:48] for being truthful. In your position, you're going to have to stand up to the President and say, [1:45:53] no, you can't do that. Are you prepared to stand up? Um, Senator, that's a, that's a hypothetical. [1:46:01] No, it's not a hypothetical. It happened. But let me just say, in my many years in public and private [1:46:09] sector, I've, I've given people my views in the appropriate form and the appropriate way. Um, [1:46:17] I'm completely comfortable that I'll continue to do that. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [1:46:21] Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, Mr. Clayton, welcome. Congratulations on your nomination. [1:46:29] You have an obligation to be honest and forthright with this committee, correct? Yes. Uh, and is it [1:46:42] the case in the Juan Orlando Hernandez case that the President of the United States, uh, pardoned a man [1:46:52] who had worked with the Sinaloa cartel to facilitate massive narco trafficking into the United States? [1:46:57] Um, I, I don't remember the specifics of that case. He was convicted in your district. He was [1:47:02] convicted. I'm just, we, we convict a lot of people for a lot of drugs. Convicted of narco trafficking. [1:47:07] Yes. Um, I, I believe so. No, so at massive scale. Yes. Well, you're telling me what I know. [1:47:13] That's kind of, um, I, he was, he was, I believe, I'll look, I'll take your word for it. He was a [1:47:19] convicted narco trafficker. Did the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, pardon a convicted [1:47:25] narco trafficker? I, I believe we just discussed that. The President provided a pardon. Yes. Yes or no. [1:47:33] Did the President of the United States pardon a convicted narco trafficker? Yes. Who won the 2020 [1:47:41] election? Uh, you know, we're not, I'm not, I'm not going to do this with you. This is a job [1:47:47] interview. We've established that you have an obligation to be honest and forthright with the [1:47:53] committee. Yes, you do have an obligation to be honest and forthright with the committee? Yes. Who [1:47:57] won the 2020 election? Like I said, I'm not, I'm not going to get into that with you. But you do have an [1:48:02] obligation to be honest and forthright with the committee? Is anything that I just said not honest or [1:48:07] forthright? Yes, you're not being honest or forthright. Who won the 2020 election? I think [1:48:10] I've answered the question. We can keep doing this. Well, we're going to keep doing it because [1:48:16] you're not being honest and forthright with the committee. I'm not going to engage in the theater. [1:48:21] It's a simple question, Mr. Clayton. And I've answered it. Who won the 2020 presidential election? [1:48:27] I've answered it. You're here asking for the support of senators to lead America's intelligence [1:48:34] community. We've established that you have an obligation to be honest and forthright with this [1:48:39] committee and with the American public, but you refuse to answer a simple matter of fact about [1:48:45] the 2020 election. Is that right? No, that's not right. Then answer the question. Who won the 2020 election? [1:48:51] I have answered the question. Answer it. What is your answer? I've given you my answer. What is your answer? [1:49:01] You refuse to answer a basic question about who won a presidential election, but you asked to lead [1:49:08] America's intelligence community? Isn't it humiliating to be unable to answer this question, [1:49:15] to have to indulge the president's delusions? We know, you know, everybody in this room knows [1:49:26] the truthful answer to that question. Why can you not give it? I think I gave you the answer. [1:49:32] Are you aware that Director Gabbard was present at the Fulton County raid in Georgia earlier this year? [1:49:39] You discussed that with me yesterday in your office. Are you aware that Director Gabbard was [1:49:47] present at the Fulton County raid earlier this year? You brought it to me. What is going on here? You've [1:49:54] said at the beginning of this you have an obligation to be honest and forthright with the committee. [1:49:58] I'm asking a very simple question. Are you aware that Director Gabbard was present at the Fulton [1:50:02] County raid earlier this year? Yes or no? Are you aware? You won't answer that question. I just said [1:50:07] I was made aware of it by you yesterday. The first time you learned that Director Gabbard was present [1:50:13] at that raid was in my office yesterday? It was the first time that, in my recollection, [1:50:18] I've thought about it recently. Now, was I aware of it before? What? You, I mean, you brought it to my [1:50:28] attention yesterday. Okay, so you had not known until... I had not, I had not thought about it until you brought it to [1:50:33] my attention yesterday. Your answers lack credibility. Your testimony lacks credibility. [1:50:38] You're being evasive and you're not being candid or forthright and everybody across the country is [1:50:42] going to watch this and know that. Are you aware that former Director Gabbard testified that her [1:50:48] presence at the raid was, quote, requested by the president? I'm not aware of that until now. [1:50:58] Okay, you are now aware of that. Yeah. Are you aware that members of this committee are already [1:51:03] probing Director Gabbard's potential misconduct in this matter? [1:51:05] No, I don't. I'm not privy to your probe. Are you aware that the general counsel and deputy [1:51:15] general counsel of your office have already provided testimony to this committee regarding this matter? [1:51:22] No. If the White House chief of staff or the president asks you to travel somewhere across [1:51:27] the United States and oversee the execution of a domestic search warrant on a sensitive election [1:51:32] facility, will you do it? Is that appropriate? Is that appropriate for the Director of National [1:51:37] Intelligence? That's a hypothetical. We all know it's not appropriate for the Director of National [1:51:42] Intelligence. Will you answer the question? Your time is expired. Will you give him the opportunity [1:51:46] to answer the question? Is this not material right now, sir? Is it appropriate for the Director of [1:51:52] National Intelligence to oversee the execution of domestic search warrants at sensitive election [1:51:59] facilities? Yes or no? I think you're asking me, as you just said in your first comment to me... [1:52:05] Yes or no? Is it appropriate? No? You are asking me to comment on a matter that you just said was [1:52:11] under investigation. No, I'm asking you... Okay, Senator, also, if your time is expired, [1:52:15] disqualifying. Vice Chairman, do you have anything to add? Senator King, I did not recognize you. I [1:52:22] recognize the Vice Chairman. Senator... Senator King, I did not recognize you. I recognize the Vice Chairman. [1:52:30] Mr. Vice Chairman, will you make the point? I will make a point. [1:52:34] I want to make a couple points. One, I strongly disagree with you about the issue of drug trafficking [1:52:44] being more important at this point than the threat of China or Russia. But that... You're going to... [1:52:49] I'm sorry, please. He asked me for the most ones. I did not rank them in order. [1:52:54] Well... Oh, I did not rank them in order. Let me just... I want to make one point, [1:52:57] then I want to come back to the point that my colleagues have been making. Because this is an area [1:53:02] that you're familiar with, in terms of Securities and Exchange Commission work. We are working [1:53:08] diligently on a bill to create a set of laws around digital assets. From your work at the [1:53:19] U.S. Attorney in the Southern District, from your focus on drug trafficking. Is it not the case [1:53:25] that many drug traffickers use digital assets to transfer funds? Yes. Is it not the case as we try to [1:53:35] work through this legislation to try to make sure there are barriers and restrictions that we should not [1:53:41] grant this new industry, which has a huge potential? I'm one of the few that says, [1:53:45] we've got to put some rules here, at least on this side of the aisle. That we should not open up [1:53:50] huge new loopholes that would allow self-dealing, adjacent transactions. [1:53:57] With your focus on drug trafficking, making sure that we don't create additional holes [1:54:03] for a tool that has already been abused, would that not be important from a national security standpoint? [1:54:08] Senator, having AML, KYC, anti-money laundering, know your customer across the financial service [1:54:17] sector and financial flows is essential to national security. And should be confirmed, [1:54:21] this is going to be happening very quickly, one way or the other. And I want to make sure that those [1:54:26] are, you would be able to weigh in. I just want to say this, I've known Mr. Clayton for some time. [1:54:33] I've worked with him. I've worked with him closely on when he was at the SEC, but I am bitterly [1:54:42] disappointed. And I don't, we've tried umpteen different ways to give to the ability to just [1:54:51] acknowledge that Joe Biden was the president. I've acknowledged, Senator, that Joe Biden was the [1:54:57] president. I've acknowledged that. And fairly and duly elected. And fairly and duly elected under our [1:55:02] process. Well, I'll have follow-up questions. I also have to say, as someone who's spent an enormous [1:55:13] amount of time on this election interference issue, that it strains credibility, and I trust you, [1:55:23] I know you, but it strains credibility to think that you were not aware of Director Gabbard's [1:55:30] intervention in the domestic election activities in Fulton County. And that that was subject of a [1:55:35] great deal of consternation and review. Again, maybe the framing of the senator's question, [1:55:43] you didn't appreciate. But, you know, if even if you weren't aware, in preparation for this hearing, [1:55:50] I would have thought, hey, we got to be ready for the Gabbard questions. Yeah, I, look, I don't want [1:55:58] to, it just wasn't something that was on my mind before the preparation for this hearing. The idea that [1:56:06] the, you acknowledged in your opening comments, and to me, that the role of the DNI is to look at [1:56:12] foreign malign influence. It is outward looking. It is not to participate in domestic law enforcement on a case [1:56:19] that I believe in. You can have a completely different view of this, and my Republican [1:56:22] colleagues probably do. But on a case of re-litigating a 2020 election activity in Georgia, [1:56:27] to say that that wasn't on your agenda of an issue that would be asked. [1:56:32] No, after Senator Rossoff raised it, it was. And to be clear, the ODNI's role is principally [1:56:42] outside the United States. Intelligence community role is principally outside the United States. [1:56:46] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Clayton, for your testimony today. [1:56:51] Mr. Chairman, do we have time for any follow-up questions? [1:56:54] No, they're not in the second round. The Capitol Police will receive the annoying, [1:57:00] or remove the annoying lunatic from the crowd. I apologize to lunatics for comparing that guy to [1:57:18] them. Mr. Clayton, thank you for your testimony today. As a reminder, we expect to have here, [1:57:24] have a vote next week. Members, questions for the records will be due today at 5.30. Mr. Clayton, [1:57:30] I trust you can respond to those no later than 5.30 on Friday. This hearing is adjourned.