House holds worldwide threats hearing with Gabbard, Patel and Ratcliffe

[0:00] the Honorable John Ratcliffe, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Honorable Kash Patel, [0:05] Acting Director of the National Security Agency, Lieutenant General William J. Hartman, [0:10] and Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General James H. Adams III. [0:14] Thank you all for being here. [0:15] It's a gross understatement to say that a lot has occurred since we met at this hearing last year. [0:20] Before I address the issues I had planned, I want to address Iran. [0:23] Once it was clear that diplomacy would not stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon [0:27] or holding the world under threat through ballistic missiles and terrorist networks, [0:31] President Trump took decisive action to eliminate the threat. [0:34] Make no mistake, Iran is committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. [0:38] It's been their policy, and it is their intent. [0:40] Anyone who thinks we weren't on borrowed time is refusing to acknowledge the failure of prior policies. [0:45] It's a simple fact that consecutive administrations had exhausted all other options to end this threat. [0:52] Our witnesses here are tasked with providing intelligence to inform decision makers. [0:56] If there's only one person in America, [0:57] who has the responsibility and the obligation to act when he believes there is a clear and present danger to our safety, [1:05] the Commander-in-Chief has that duty, and I commend his decisiveness in this most difficult of decisions. [1:10] I've been in briefings that the administration provided to all members, to this committee, and to the Gang of Eight. [1:16] The classified case is clear, even if it can't be fully discussed in the open. [1:20] The President made a difficult but necessary decision. [1:23] My Democrat colleagues have made it clear that they don't agree. [1:26] What we shouldn't disagree on is that the United States [1:28] has effectively been at war with the Iranian regime for the last 47 years. [1:32] The death to America is not just a slogan on a t-shirt that you buy at Tehran International Airport [1:38] or at the campus bookstore at Columbia University. [1:40] It's their ethos and their policy. [1:43] They are responsible for the deaths of countless Americans. [1:46] I want to thank the many service members and intelligence officers involved in Operation Epic Fury for their selfless service. [1:52] For those who have lost loved ones in this fight, please know that you are in our prayers, most sincerely. [1:57] Your loved ones died in service to the United States of America. [2:00] We honor them and you for their service. [2:03] Freedom-loving people everywhere are thankful for their sacrifice. [2:06] That said, there are a few other topics it's important for me to address. [2:09] First, after four years of Biden's wide-open borders and anemic foreign policy, [2:13] in just one short year, the Trump administration has secured our borders [2:17] and reasserted America as a decisive leader that commands respect on the world stage. [2:21] This administration has secured a stunning number of wins for the United States, [2:26] including reasserting the importance of freedom of speech, [2:28] the importance of the Western Hemisphere, [2:30] and disrupting China's predatory Belt and Road activities in our neighborhood, [2:33] negotiating a ceasefire in Gaza resulting in the freeing of the hostages held by the bloodthirsty Hamas terrorists, [2:39] and working with our NATO partners to more than double their defense spending against pressing threats from CCP and Russia. [2:47] I thank each of the witnesses here today for their parts in the reassertion of American leadership. [2:51] Second, our role here is to both authorize your authorities and resources and oversee their implementation. [2:57] One of those authorities is FISA 702. [2:59] Which expires in just over a month. [3:01] The President is seeking an 18-month clean extension to provide more time to assess the implementation [3:06] of the 56 reform measures included in the last reauthorization. [3:10] I'm working with a ranking member, House leadership, and Judiciary Chairman Jordan to support that request. [3:15] We look forward to an update from the panel today on compliance efforts, RISA implementation, and mission value. [3:21] Third, last year I made clear my expectation that we would work together to end the weaponization of the intelligence community, [3:27] improve analytic integrity, [3:28] and fix our broken counterintelligence enterprise. [3:31] Many in Congress and across our nation have lost trust in the intelligence community. [3:35] While we have made progress, there's still much work that remains to be done. [3:39] I hope to continue working with each of you to do the hard things necessary to protect American citizens while regaining their trust. [3:45] I also remain committed to tackling the issues that allow hostile foreign powers to operate so effectively against us, [3:51] including within the United States. [3:53] Specifically, foreign intelligence threats targeting the United States now surpass levels [3:57] seen at the height of the Cold War in both scale and complexity. [4:01] These threats include cyber penetrations of critical infrastructure, U.S. government systems, [4:05] and private sector innovators, as well as surveillance near sensitive military installations, [4:10] intelligence collection against foreign dissidents living in the United States. [4:13] Like in the Cold War, where conflict often gave way to irregular operations below the level of traditional warfare, [4:19] today's adversary tactics have made the homeland a contested environment. [4:24] We must properly resource and reform our nation's counterintelligence enterprise, [4:27] to meet that threat. [4:29] We must transform our approaches in order to confront adversarial intelligence services at scale, [4:34] driving back operational activities in the homeland and forcing our adversaries to rethink their risk calculus [4:39] for operating in the United States. [4:41] Unfortunately, in recent years, the counterintelligence enterprise lost a significant amount of credibility [4:46] with the American people due to the actions of those involved in cases like Crossfire Hurricane and Arctic Frost. [4:52] For our intelligence community to best serve America, the CIA community and the larger IC [4:56] must stay out of domestic policy debates and focus on unrelenting, aggressive mission execution. [5:03] For our intelligence community to best serve America, the CIA community and the larger IC [5:07] must stay out of those debates. [5:10] Director Gabbard, I want to particularly commend your efforts in this space. [5:14] Specifically, I want to thank you and President Trump for working with us to declassify the [5:18] HPSI Majority Staff Report on the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment on Russian Plans and Intentions [5:24] in the 2016 election. [5:26] The Majority Staff Report, which had been kept from the American people for eight years, [5:30] proves that the 2017 ICA, the public genesis of the Russia collusion hoax, was a politicized document. [5:37] Its key assessment on Putin's hopes for the 2016 election was built on, at best, abysmal analytic tradecraft [5:44] and, at worst, willful political charged intentions. [5:49] This was a necessary act of transparency to begin the process of rebuilding trust with the American people and the IC. [5:55] But please know the challenges facing each one of you that are testifying here is not lost on this committee. [6:04] Getting a large ship back on the right course is never easy. [6:06] The task can certainly be challenged by unforeseen obstacles and obstructions. [6:10] You know you are doing something right when all the weapons in the media's arsenal are pointed directly at you. [6:14] Thank you all for pressing forward. [6:17] We can walk and chew gum at the same time, and we must. [6:19] We must have our IC as aggressive as ever in pursuing its mission while holding those accountable who participated in its misuse. [6:25] I thank each of you for doing this. [6:26] And encourage you to all keep moving on both fronts. [6:29] Finally, now I want to speak to our remarkable IC workforce. [6:34] I'm immensely proud of the incredible work that you do, especially over the last year, to support critical military intelligence and law enforcement operations. [6:43] From Operations Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, Southern Spear, and Epic Fury, to the many other operations you've conducted in the shadows with no fanfare, [6:52] Americans will never be able to fully appreciate all you do to protect this nation. [6:57] I think I can speak for the entire committee when I say we extend our deepest gratitude. [7:01] America truly has the best of the best in our ranks. [7:04] It's for this primary reason I would like to address the House Intelligence Committee's ongoing investigation into the intelligence community's mishandling of anomalous health incidents, [7:13] also known as Havana Syndrome, and the mistreatment of AHI survivors. [7:18] I'm aware of the drastic increase in media reporting around this issue, and I'd like to first reiterate the committee's commitment to releasing additional unclassified information. [7:27] Our team has worked diligently to conduct this investigation with the utmost integrity, and we cannot be driven by outside timelines. [7:34] I commit to the workforce to release additional reports as appropriate. [7:39] Put simply, it's my clear opinion that individuals in the intelligence community were involved in a cover-up. [7:43] Manipulating intelligence processes and a breach of Intelligence Community Directive 203 to provide a desired outcome, rather than a forthright analysis to inform decision makers. [7:52] Our investigation, the vast majority of which remains appropriately classified, continues to show that the intelligence community is in a position to act. [7:58] It's important to note that the intelligence community's community assessment was constructed upon flawed analytic tradecraft. [8:03] This includes the use of study results from the National Institutes of Health that were manufactured through highly unethical means and in collaboration with individuals working for the CIA. [8:12] ICAs carry a great deal of weight. [8:15] While typically classified, the impact is increased exponentially when declassified and released as part of a public messaging effort, as was done with the AHI ICA. [8:25] As I have repeatedly stated since December of 2024, [8:28] the ICA and its follow-on updates caused real, serious harm to some of our nation's bravest. [8:33] Last month, I called for its immediate recall, and I reiterate my position today. [8:38] According to recent media reporting, Director Gabbard, your office has said your review of the ICA will be, quote, [8:43] comprehensive and complete, end quote, and that you remain committed to sharing findings from your review with the American people. [8:49] Thank you for that. [8:50] And separately, Director Ratcliffe, your team has also quoted in recent media reporting saying that you support the ODNI review and look forward to the report. [8:57] Thank you so much. [8:58] Thank you so much for that, Director. [9:00] I thank both of you for your commitment to this review's completion and publishing. [9:04] This issue is complex, and the underlying facts are not as simple as often portrayed in the public. [9:08] No fully informed analysis will make everyone happy. [9:11] That said, today I call for this review to be provided to the committee and strongly urge you to release the public. [9:16] Whatever portion of this review can be made unclassified, this is vital to rebuilding trust moving forward. [9:21] I want to thank our witnesses again for being here today. [9:24] And with that, I want to recognize the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Himes, for his opening statement. [9:30] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and a big welcome to all of our witnesses. [9:34] I hope that whatever else is said today that you will convey to your workforces our deep admiration and appreciation for their diligence, their commitment, and their sacrifice. [9:44] Sometimes this moment feels a little bit like that old Billy Joel song, we didn't start the fire. [9:48] North Korea, Red China, war in Ukraine, Greenland, Cuba, terrorism, burning drug boats, and of course, the massive fire that we did start, our latest Middle Eastern war. [9:58] Where to begin? [10:01] Our national elections are about seven days away. [10:03] And plenty of Americans are worried that President Trump may indeed, as he said, take control. [10:10] Meanwhile, we are not receiving the traditional indications or warnings of foreign intelligence efforts to interfere in those elections. [10:18] There have been several terrorist attacks in recent weeks. [10:22] And meanwhile, the FBI, our premier counterterrorism agency, has pivoted hard to immigration enforcement. [10:29] But I can't begin today with anything other than that fire that we did start, Iran. [10:37] The Constitution, to which every single one of us swears an oath, reserves decisions of war to the representatives of the people. [10:48] And that's not ink on parchment. [10:50] There are good reasons for that. [10:52] First, let's start with why. [10:55] Why did we and are we risking our blood and treasure on a deeply risky venture? [11:04] One that the President of the United States and the Director of National Intelligence have spent years telling us, [11:12] is a terrible idea. [11:17] The President has said that Iran was preparing an imminent attack on the United States. [11:23] That is not true. [11:24] As awful as the regime is and always has been, [11:29] not one of your agencies has produced a single report saying that Iran posed an imminent threat to the United States. [11:38] The President also claimed that Iran would soon possess a nuclear weapon. [11:43] Perhaps in weeks. [11:44] That is also not true. [11:47] It is not supported [11:48] by a single report from your agencies, [11:51] and it is certainly belied [11:53] by the repeated claim [11:55] that Iran's nuclear capability [11:57] was obliterated mere months ago. [12:02] Second, let's consider the consequences, [12:04] as the Congress should have done. [12:08] The Congress, not one man, [12:10] should consider whether our constituents in uniform will live or die. [12:17] The Congress, not one man, [12:19] should decide if Americans will spend an additional $30 a week [12:23] to fill their gas tanks. [12:26] The Congress, not one man, [12:28] should consider if it is wise to allow the Russians to sell their oil to India [12:34] so that they have millions of dollars with which to kill the Ukrainians [12:38] that we are now begging for help to defend ourselves against Iranian drones. [12:43] Finally, had the administration chosen to abide by the Constitution, [12:50] Congress might have considered the answer to General Petraeus' all-important question. [12:57] Tell me how this ends. [13:00] When the Iranian Navy is sunk [13:04] and the missile launchers are destroyed [13:07] and we have reobliterated the nuclear infrastructure, [13:12] do we declare victory and sail away? [13:15] How do we feel about a new supreme leader [13:18] who is more extreme and vicious [13:20] and dedicated to the development of a nuclear weapon than the last one? [13:24] Do we do a deal with him? [13:28] How do we get him to open the Strait of Hormuz? [13:30] Do we bomb more? [13:33] And if we sail away and declare victory, [13:34] are we back there nine months from now [13:37] to re-sink a rebuilt Navy [13:39] and re-bomb rebuilt missile launchers? [13:42] Is this going to be an every-nine-month thing [13:44] or is it going to be annual? [13:49] The very core purpose of the intelligence community [13:53] is to answer these questions [13:56] for the President, for us, and for the American people. [14:01] Right now, as we watch the dignified transfer of lost American patriots at Dover, [14:10] as we watch gasoline oil [14:13] approach $5 a gallon, [14:17] as we watch our allies mocking us on the world stage, [14:20] we need to know, [14:21] were those questions asked? [14:24] How did you answer them for the President of the United States? [14:28] And did he listen? [14:30] I understand that the administration may come to the Congress [14:35] to ask for funding of $200 billion for this war. [14:40] As you answer those questions for us today, [14:44] I'd ask you to remember that old saying, [14:46] if you want me there for the landing, [14:50] make sure I'm there at the takeoff. [14:54] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [14:55] I yield back. [14:57] Thank the gentleman for his comments. [14:59] Before I turn it over to Director Gabbard, [15:00] I would like to thank General Hartman [15:02] for nearly four decades of service. [15:04] I know you're retiring, I think, tomorrow. [15:06] You are here. [15:07] I just applaud your service to this nation [15:10] and your leadership at the NSA, [15:12] and thank you and wish you all the best in your retirement. [15:14] Thank you, Chairman. [15:15] I think tomorrow as well. [15:17] All right. [15:18] Thank you. [15:19] Director Gabbard, you're recognized. [15:22] Thank you very much. [15:23] Good morning. [15:24] Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes, [15:26] members, I'm here today to present [15:29] the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment [15:31] and joined by my colleagues, [15:33] the directors of the CIA, the DIA, FBI, and NSA. [15:37] This briefing is being provided in accordance [15:40] with ODNI's statutory responsibility. [15:43] What I'm briefing here today does not represent [15:45] my personal views or opinions, [15:47] but rather the assessments of the intelligence community, [15:50] of the threats facing the United States, [15:53] our homeland, and our interests. [15:55] In this assessment, [15:56] we're following the structure of priorities [15:58] that were laid out in the President's [15:59] National Security Strategy, [16:01] starting with threats to our homeland [16:03] and then shifting to global risks. [16:06] The defense of our homeland is of the utmost importance [16:08] to the American people, [16:10] and efforts by this administration over the last year [16:12] to bolster homeland defense [16:14] have yielded significantly positive results. [16:17] For example, the strict enforcement of U.S. policies [16:20] at the U.S.-Mexico border and regionally [16:22] have served as a deterrent [16:24] and drastically reduced illegal immigration. [16:26] Based on Customs and Border Patrol data, [16:30] January 2026's monthly encounters [16:33] are down 83.8% compared to January of 2025. [16:38] The drivers of migration are likely to continue. [16:41] Potential worsening instability [16:44] in countries like Cuba and Haiti [16:46] risk triggering migration surges. [16:48] Smugglers who often operate [16:50] as transnational criminal organizations [16:52] view chaos as an opportunity for profit [16:55] and will likely continue to profit [16:57] from these illegal immigration flows. [16:59] These TCOs continue to pose a daily and direct threat [17:04] to the health and safety of millions of U.S. citizens, [17:07] primarily by producing and trafficking in illegal drugs. [17:10] Under President Trump's leadership, [17:12] fentanyl overdose deaths have seen a 30% decrease [17:15] from September of 2024 to September of 2025. [17:18] His aggressive efforts to more directly and actively target [17:22] these transnational criminal organizations [17:24] and reduce the inflow of fentanyl precursors [17:27] has already had a significant impact, [17:29] which is likely to continue. [17:31] Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations [17:34] like the Sinaloa Cartel [17:36] and Jalisco New Generation Cartel [17:38] dominate the production and smuggling [17:40] of fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, [17:42] and cocaine into the United States. [17:44] Colombia-based TCOs and illegal armed groups [17:47] like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [17:50] and the National Liberation Army [17:52] are responsible for producing and trafficking [17:54] large volumes of cocaine into the U.S. [17:56] and European markets. [17:58] With some indicators that they are now attempting [18:01] to expand to the Asia-Pacific region. [18:04] Colombia remains the world's largest producer of cocaine, [18:07] and Colombian criminal groups have expanded [18:09] their trafficking relationships with neighboring [18:11] Ecuadorian and Brazilian gangs. [18:13] MS-13 is well established in cells in the United States [18:18] and uses violence to intimidate the Salvadoran diaspora, [18:22] engaging in murder, extortion, retail drug trafficking, [18:26] firearms offenses, and prostitution, [18:28] fueling increased violence and instability. [18:30] These and other TCOs present a very tangible [18:34] and individualized risk of violent crime [18:36] to everyday Americans and contribute [18:38] to regional instability. [18:40] As the President increases counter-drug [18:42] and counter-cartel pressures, they are likely [18:44] to seek ways to try to adapt their operations, [18:47] including shifting and decentralizing [18:49] production locations and trafficking routes [18:52] and methods. [18:55] The United States continues to face a complex [18:57] and evolving threat landscape with a geographically [18:59] diverse set of Islamist terrorist actors, [19:01] seeking to propagate their ideology globally [19:04] and harm Americans, even as Al-Qaeda and ISIS [19:08] organizationally remain weaker today than they were [19:12] at their respective peaks. [19:14] The spread of Islamist ideology in some cases, [19:18] led by individuals and organizations associated [19:20] with the Muslim Brotherhood, pose a fundamental threat [19:23] to freedom and foundational principles that underpin [19:25] Western civilization. [19:27] These Islamist groups and individuals use this ideology [19:30] for recruiting and financial support for terrorist groups, [19:32] and individuals around the world, and to advance [19:35] their political objectives of establishing an Islamist [19:38] caliphate which governs based on Sharia. [19:41] There are increasing examples of this in various [19:44] European countries. [19:46] President Trump's designation of certain chapters [19:48] of the Muslim Brotherhood as foreign terrorist [19:50] organizations is a mechanism to secure Americans [19:53] against this threat. [19:56] In response to setbacks of their capabilities [19:58] of conducting large-scale complex attacks, [20:01] the IC assesses that Islamist terrorist groups [20:03] have shifted towards focusing on executing information [20:06] operations to spread propaganda and inspire or enable [20:09] individuals located in or with access to the West. [20:13] U.S. counterterrorism operations are ongoing, [20:17] primarily in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria, [20:20] and have removed key terrorist leaders and operatives, [20:23] degrading the ability of Al-Qaeda and ISIS to quickly [20:26] reconstitute its leadership and launch large-scale [20:29] attacks against the homeland. [20:31] Strict U.S. border enforcement measures and increased [20:35] deportations of individuals with suspected links [20:38] to Islamist terrorists have reduced access to the [20:40] homeland and removed some potential sources of [20:43] future terror attacks. [20:45] Since January, U.S. officials have only had a [20:47] handful of encounters at our borders with individuals [20:50] associated with terrorist groups. [20:53] This is a positive trend. [20:54] However, our interagency-coordinated efforts [20:56] to identify, locate, and remove known or suspected [20:59] terrorists who are already in the U.S. continues [21:02] with vigilance. [21:04] In 2025, there were at least three Islamist terrorist [21:07] attacks in the U.S. [21:08] Law enforcement disrupted at least 15 U.S.-based [21:11] Islamist terrorist plotters. [21:14] Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some [21:17] online contact with Islamist terrorists inspired by [21:20] Islamist foreign terrorist organizations abroad. [21:23] Al-Qaeda and ISIS pose the biggest threat to U.S. [21:27] interests overseas in parts of Africa, the Middle East, [21:30] and South Asia, where these groups operate. [21:33] In the Middle East, AQAP in Yemen, ISIS-K in South Asia, [21:38] and ISIS in Syria are among the most likely groups [21:42] conducting external plotting. [21:44] ISIS in Syria, specifically, is likely seeking to rebuild [21:47] its ranks, expand support networks, and solicit funds [21:51] by re-engaging with and recruiting from the likely [21:53] hundreds of ISIS detainees and thousands of ISIS-linked [21:57] women and children who escaped or were released from prisons [22:00] and displaced persons camps. [22:03] Meanwhile, state actors present a risk broader in scope [22:07] by seeking new capabilities. [22:08] The U.S. secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure [22:11] safety in the homeland against strategic threats. [22:15] However, the IC assesses that Russia, China, North Korea, [22:18] Iran, and Pakistan have been researching and developing an [22:21] array of novel, advanced, or traditional missile delivery [22:24] systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put [22:27] our homeland within range. [22:29] The IC assesses that threats to the homeland will expand [22:32] collectively to more than 16,000 missiles by 2035. [22:36] The IC also assesses that the U.S. [22:39] will be able to deploy more than 3,000 missiles by 2035 [22:42] from the current assessed figure of more than 3,000 missiles. [22:46] The IC assesses that China and Russia are developing [22:49] advanced delivery systems meant to be capable of penetrating [22:52] or bypassing U.S. missile defenses. [22:56] North Korea's ICBMs can already reach U.S. soil. [22:59] The IC assesses that it is committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal. [23:04] Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development [23:07] potentially could include ICBMs with a range capable of striking the homeland. [23:12] The IC assesses that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch [23:16] and other technology it could use to begin to develop a militarily [23:20] viable ICBM before 2035 should Tehran attempt to pursue the capability. [23:26] However, these assessments will be observed and updated as the full [23:31] impact of Operation Epic Fury's devastating strikes on Iran's missile [23:35] production facilities, stockpiles, and launch capabilities is determined. [23:41] Shifting to the cyber domain, the IC assesses that China and Russia [23:44] Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups will continue to seek [23:48] to compromise U.S. government and private sector networks as well as [23:52] critical infrastructure to collect intelligence and create options for [23:56] future disruption and for financial gain. [23:59] The IC assesses China and Russia present the most persistent and active [24:04] threats and are continuing R&D efforts. [24:07] North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. [24:11] In 2025 alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole two billion [24:16] dollars which is helping to fund the regime including further development [24:20] of a strategic weapons program. [24:22] Financially or ideologically motivated non-state actors are becoming more [24:27] bold with ransomware groups shifting to faster high volume attacks that are [24:32] harder to identify and mitigate. [24:34] Innovation in the field of artificial intelligence will likely accelerate [24:37] the threats in the cyber domain. [24:39] It will increasingly shape cyber operations with both cyber operators and [24:44] defenders using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. [24:48] For example, in August of 2025, cyber actors used an AI tool to conduct [24:53] data extortion against international government, healthcare, and public [24:57] health emergency service sectors and religious institutions. [25:01] Shifting to the Arctic, the IC assesses that Russia, and to a lesser extent [25:06] China, aim to strengthen their presence in the region through increased [25:09] maritime trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity. [25:14] Russia, which has the longest coastline in the Arctic, has long sought [25:17] recognition of its security. [25:19] China, which has the most advanced military infrastructure, has the [25:21] strongest nuclear power, quote-unquote, polar great power status, and is [25:24] deploying more military forces and building new permanent infrastructure. [25:29] China, though not an Arctic country, has engaged in more limited efforts in [25:33] the region to advance its strategic and economic interests. [25:37] On the technology front, artificial intelligence capabilities are rapidly [25:41] advancing and changing the threat landscape. [25:44] As this is a defining technology that enables computers and machines to [25:47] simulate human learning, comprehension, problem solving, creativity, and [25:50] autonomy. [25:51] be critical to ensure that humans remain in control of how AI is used and of the machines [25:56] that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests of the American people across [26:00] all domains. [26:02] The IC assesses that China is the most capable competitor in this field and aims to displace [26:08] the U.S. as the global AI leader by 2030. [26:12] AI adoption at scale across the spectrum of usage poses serious risks. [26:17] AI has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design and has been used in recent [26:22] conflicts to influence targeting and streamline decision making, underscoring the risk and [26:27] likely threats that could manifest on the battlefield. [26:30] Early developers in quantum computers will give countries an extraordinary technology [26:35] technological advantage over others to quickly process national security information and [26:41] break current encryption methodology used to protect sensitive finance, health care, [26:46] and government information. [26:49] The global security landscape is volatile and complex with armed conflict growing more [26:53] common and posing potential threats against U.S. interests. [26:58] The space domain is becoming increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing [27:03] counter-space capabilities to challenge U.S. space efforts. [27:07] The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological warfare capabilities [27:11] continues to grow. [27:14] Turn now to the Western Hemisphere, where flagging economies, high crime rates, pervasive [27:18] organized crime, migration flows, corruption, and narcotics trafficking present a broad [27:23] spectrum of risks to U.S. interests. [27:25] The U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement review in 2026 will likely increase uncertainty in many [27:53] Latin American countries, especially those that rely on Mexico as an export destination [27:58] for intermediate goods for manufacture and onward export to the U.S. [28:02] China, Russia, and Iran are seeking to sustain economic, political, and military engagement [28:09] with Latin America. [28:11] The I.C. assesses that China's demand for raw materials is likely to drive continued [28:16] economic outreach, while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic [28:21] ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. [28:25] The I.C. assesses that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, military, and [28:30] technological powers to the United States. [28:31] China's efforts to increase its own regional positioning, global influence, and to fend [28:35] off threats to their interests. [28:38] While there are challenging areas where interests diverge, President Trump's diplomatic engagements [28:43] with President Xi have enabled progress on areas where mutual interests align. [28:48] The I.C. assesses that China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces across [28:53] all domains in pursuit of its goal to achieve world-class status by mid-century. [28:59] This includes building a force with the aim of being capable of deterring U.S. and other [29:03] allied forces in the region, and to achieve their stated objective of having the capability [29:08] to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. [29:11] However, the I.C. assesses that China likely prefers to set the conditions for an eventual [29:16] peaceful reunification with Taiwan, short of conflict. [29:20] An increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern regionally and [29:25] globally. [29:26] Its weapons of mass destruction, conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities, [29:31] and demonstrated willingness to use asymmetric capabilities are a key component of the I.C. [29:32] assessment. [29:34] The I.C. assesses that the U.S. and its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan, are a [29:40] key component of the I.C. assessment. [29:43] North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing. [29:45] In 2025, Kim took steps to improve ties with China, still North Korea's most important [29:50] trading partner and economic benefactor. [29:53] The I.C. assesses that North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine has [29:57] increased North Korean capabilities as their forces have gained combat experience in 21st [30:03] century warfare, along with equipment. [30:06] Pyongyang continues to develop and expand its strategic and strategic military capabilities. [30:07] The I.C. assesses that the U.S. and its allies, particularly South Korea, are a key component [30:08] of the I.C. assessment. [30:09] North Korea's partnership with Russia continues to develop and expand its strategic and strategic [30:10] weapons programs, including missiles that can evade U.S. and regional missile defenses. [30:15] Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally by military [30:20] and non-military means. [30:22] The I.C. assesses that the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is an escalatory [30:27] spiral and an ongoing conflict, such as Ukraine, or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, [30:33] including the deployment of nuclear weapons. [30:36] The I.C. assesses that Putin continues to invest in Russia's defense, which is a key [30:39] component of the I.C. assessment. [30:39] Of course, all持 Impeachment for Special Airичего and Pacific tymings [30:40] and operations, includingаци wire arms, J ﷺ defense-industrial base as well as novel [30:41] andpointing to "'stratio einzig', investors and [30:56] ID terrorists to Maria Ryder opposes Communists The I.C. assesses Russia has advanced systems, [31:03] hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities designed to negate U.S. military advantage. [31:04] Russia is also building extensive counter-space capabilities to contest U.S. space dominance. [31:08] It's development of a nuclear counter-space weapon poses the greatest single threat to [31:13] the world's space architecture. [31:14] ICSS is that Russia has maintained the upper hand in its war against Ukraine. [31:19] Ongoing U.S.-led negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv continue. [31:24] Until such an agreement is met, if an agreement is found, [31:27] Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow war of attrition [31:30] until they view their objectives have been achieved. [31:34] In the Middle East, conflict and instability will shape security, [31:36] political, and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. [31:40] The ICSS is that Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change in the region [31:45] that began with Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, [31:50] continued with the 12-day war last year, resulting in weakening Iran and its proxies. [31:56] The ICSS is that the regime in Iran appears to be intact but largely degraded [32:02] due to attacks by Israel and the U.S. on its leadership and military capabilities. [32:07] Its conventional military power projection capabilities have largely been destroyed, [32:13] leaving limited options. [32:15] Iran's strategic position has been significant, [32:16] the U.S.-led maximum pressure campaign and snapback of European sanctions [32:23] added additional pressure to an already bleak Iranian economy, [32:27] resulting in mass protests earlier this year that Tehran suppressed [32:31] by killing thousands of protesters. [32:34] Even if the regime remains intact, [32:36] internal tensions are likely to increase as Iran's economy worsens. [32:41] Even so, Iran and its proxies continue to attack U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East. [32:46] If a hostile regime survives, [32:48] it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort to rebuild its military, missiles, and UAV forces. [32:56] Prior to Operation Epic Fury, [32:58] the ICSS's Iran was trying to recover from the severe damage to its nuclear infrastructure [33:03] sustained during the 12-day war. [33:06] Iran maintained the intention to rebuild its infrastructure and nuclear enrichment capability [33:11] and continued to refuse to comply with its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, [33:15] refusing them access to key facilities. [33:20] The ICSS's that China, Russia, [33:22] and North Korea see the United States as a strategic competitor and potential adversary. [33:27] Iran has long viewed the U.S. as an adversary [33:30] and has engaged in active conflict with the U.S. as of this writing. [33:35] These four countries are likely to continue their selective cooperation with each other, [33:39] which could bolster their individual capabilities and threats to U.S. interests more broadly. [33:44] However, currently these relationships are primarily bilateral on selective issues [33:49] and depend on broader circumstances, divergent sovereign interests, [33:52] and the U.S. and its allies' cooperation. [33:53] In some cases, concerns over directly confronting the U.S. [33:58] These factors are likely to constrain their relationships. [34:02] Finally, conflicts on the continent of Africa are likely to persist through 2026 [34:06] due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support. [34:10] Tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, [34:14] which could rapidly accelerate to conflict. [34:17] Contentious national and federal elections in Somalia [34:20] could distract the federal government away from counterterrorism actions against al-Shabaab, [34:25] which continues conducting terror attacks while providing funding and propaganda support [34:29] to other elements of al-Qaeda in Yemen. [34:32] The civil war in Sudan continues even as external negotiations occur, [34:37] and ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel [34:39] have increased the intensity of their attacks, [34:41] against local security forces, [34:43] expanding their areas of operation and moving closer to cities with the U.S. presence. [34:49] African governments will use their wealth and critical minerals [34:52] to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefit. [34:55] Concurrent conflicts and crises across the continent will continue to put U.S. citizens [35:00] at risk and cause further instability. [35:04] In closing, as leaders of the intelligence community, we remain committed to providing [35:08] the President and policymakers with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to ensure [35:14] the safety, security, and freedom of the American people. [35:18] Thank you. [35:20] Thank you for your comments, Director Gabbard. [35:21] We appreciate that. [35:22] We'll now move to member questions, five-minute increments. [35:26] With that, I recognize myself for five minutes. [35:30] Director Patel, our state and local officials are on the front lines of increasingly dangerous [35:33] unrestricted warfare activities being undertaken by Chinese nationals, such as marijuana grow [35:38] operations protected by armed militants, secret police stations engaged in transnational repression, [35:44] Chinese-operated SIM farm sites, crypto mining facilities, and land purchases near strategic [35:49] locations. [35:50] The CCP is exploiting legal gray areas and the lack of awareness at the state and local [35:55] level to establish strategic cooperation. [35:56] Two states, in fact, New Hampshire and Florida, are now advancing legislation to establish [36:02] offices of counterintelligence, which would bolster a state's ability to confront foreign [36:06] adversaries without relying on the federal government. [36:09] Do you support that? [36:10] What can be done to better support the states and local officials? [36:14] Absolutely. [36:15] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [36:16] So we have infused funding into our entire program taking on the CCP, and while we are [36:24] well versed in the fact that we have our own government, we are also well versed in the [36:25] fact that we have our own government. [36:26] We have our capabilities with folks like CFIUS when it comes to the purchases of land around [36:31] military bases. [36:32] That only extends one mile under the current law, so the FBI had to get creative. [36:36] So what we did was directly engage with our state and local partners, and I'll give you [36:39] two examples. [36:40] A 400-acre farm in the state of Texas was owned by a CCP official, but because he was [36:46] outside the reach of the CFIUS law, the FBI executed an unlawful possession of firearms, [36:52] a criminal complaint, and received it. [36:54] We seized the land in its entirety. [36:56] And that CCP national is back in mainland China, and we are working to get him back [37:00] here. [37:01] In another example, off the coast of Louisiana, we worked with Governor Landry's team on drilling [37:06] sites off the coast of Louisiana because, again, they were outside the whole of CFIUS [37:10] in the one-mile radius. [37:12] And with the intelligence we were able to provide our state and local authorities, they [37:14] shut down that CCP drilling center, which we believed was actually used to provide and [37:20] steal data and intelligence from American lives. [37:22] So that's just a little bit of an example. [37:24] The marijuana grow houses. [37:25] We have six active ongoing. [37:26] We have six ongoing investigations in six multiple jurisdictions for specifically taking [37:30] down CCP-affiliated grow houses from Maine to Georgia and across the country. [37:34] So it sounds like, from your characterization of CFIUS, it's inadequate at this point. [37:38] Maybe we could do something legislatively here in this body to provide some broader [37:42] authority to address that challenge? [37:44] I would love that. [37:45] Okay. [37:46] Great. [37:47] Excellent. [37:48] Thank you. [37:49] Director Ratcliffe, in January 2021, in your role at DNI as the director, you sent this [37:52] committee a letter outlining your concerns about an intelligence community assessment, [37:55] in which, among other things, analysts tailored their analysis towards a preferred policy [38:00] outcome. [38:01] CIA management pressured analysts to withdraw their support from an alternative viewpoint, [38:06] and the full body of intelligence reporting wasn't considered. [38:09] Now in your role as CIA director, you have retracted several reports for political bias [38:13] and not meeting IC analytic standards. [38:16] That's good progress. [38:17] Retracting faulty reporting is a critical step, but I remain concerned about that it [38:21] maybe doesn't get to the root of the problem. [38:23] How many analysts were involved in the products you recently retracted? [38:25] I don't know the specific number, Chairman. [38:33] What remediation actions have taken place as a result? [38:35] Well, I've made the focus of, as you pointed out, both as DNI and now as CIA director, focused [38:42] on the importance of analytic objectivity. [38:49] As you pointed out, when I was the DNI, when I saw conduct from Russia and China, the exact [38:56] same conduct, result in different assessments. [38:58] That's not a good reflection on the analytic judgments. [39:05] What you referenced in my role as CIA director, withdrawing reports that we went back and [39:10] looked that didn't reflect the analytic standards that we would expect, I retracted those judgments [39:18] because they show bias and influence for political reasons or otherwise. [39:23] So that has continued to be a focus and will be. [39:27] I think that that message has been heard. [39:28] It's been received within our analytic community within the CIA and really across the CIA because [39:34] this administration has put a focus on taking politics out of our analytic judgments. [39:39] Excellent. [39:40] Thank you, Director. [39:41] I appreciate that. [39:43] I want to, as I made clear in my opening statement, I'm just trying to get this done in the little [39:47] time that I have remaining, the intelligence community assessment on AHI is deeply flawed [39:52] and I've called for its recall immediately to start for a fresh start. [39:57] Similar. [39:58] It's been a long time since the last year's session, but I'd like to get a yes or no answer [40:02] from each of you on whether you agree this ICA should be retracted. [40:06] Director Gabbard? [40:07] Yes. [40:08] Director Ratcliffe? [40:10] Say it again. [40:11] AHI? [40:12] ICA? [40:13] Yeah. [40:14] So for the ICA, I understand that Director Gabbard is reviewing that and I've deferred [40:22] all AHI investigations to her review. [40:25] So if in her judgment that is something that should be retracted, then that's fine. [40:28] Thank you. [40:29] Then I would agree with that. [40:30] Then yes. [40:31] Okay. [40:33] Director Patel? [40:34] Yes. [40:35] Thank you. [40:36] General Hartman? [40:38] Yes. [40:39] And General Adams? [40:40] Yes, sir. [40:41] Thank you. [40:42] I appreciate that. [40:43] Thank you all for your responses. [40:44] I'm going to recognize the ranking member for five minutes. [40:47] Thank you, Chairman. [40:50] Director Gabbard, as was well covered yesterday in January, you were present at the execution [40:54] of an FBI warrant at the Fulton County, Georgia, election office at the direction of the President [40:59] and to all appearances in connection with the President's false claim. [41:01] Thank you. [41:02] Thank you. [41:03] I have a question about the President's false claims about the 2020 election. [41:06] The unsealed affidavit submitted by the FBI made zero reference to foreign powers or outside [41:11] interference. [41:12] I don't want to relitigate the reasons why you were there, but I do want to know whether [41:16] as a result of your visit there is credible intelligence in your possession pointing to [41:20] foreign interference in Georgia in the 2020 election. [41:26] Thank you for the question, Ranking Member. [41:30] As you know, over each of the previous elections, there is an ongoing effort. [41:33] But is there intelligence in your possession relative to foreign interference in the 2020 [41:40] elections? [41:41] Madam, it is a very specific question. [41:42] Is there intelligence in your possession relative to foreign interference in the 2020 elections? [41:43] Very simple, straightforward question. [41:44] We are continuing to look at previous attempts to interfere in our elections and any ongoing [41:49] threats that may exist for the upcoming elections. [41:51] Okay, but can I assume that the answer to my question is no, that you have no specific [41:56] intelligence related to foreign meddling in the Georgia election? [42:01] We are continuing to look into this matter, okay [42:05] Director the ODNI has confirmed on the record that your office took custody of voting machines [42:13] From Puerto Rico last May. I'm not aware of any previous DNI taking similar actions [42:19] Did your office promptly notify the committee about taking custody of Puerto Rico's voting machines? [42:25] I don't believe we did however [42:29] This was done at the request of the Puerto Rico a USA attorney and it's a yes or no question [42:34] Yeah, the answer as you have it acknowledges. No, you did not inform the committee about the taking of a territories voting machines [42:40] Is there a specific foreign threat and I've read the reporting that you were looking for possible foreign threats [42:46] But is there a specific foreign threat that drove you to take this action? [42:50] there were questions about whether or not there were [42:53] vulnerabilities that a threat could have taken advantage of and that was the purpose for [42:57] They're requesting us to look into [42:59] the [42:59] Those vulnerabilities. Where are those voting machines now? [43:02] I believe they are held in a secure facility at ODNI [43:06] Have you or other ODNI officials taken any other state or territories voting equipment into custody? Not to my knowledge [43:15] I want to turn in the subject of elections to a paradoxical thing [43:21] You will all be aware that the US government is apparently going to grind to a halt [43:26] The president is going to sign no more bills. The Senate will spend two weeks [43:31] apparently debating the save Act [43:32] The save Act of course would make illegal [43:36] Foreigners voting in US elections, which is already illegal [43:39] So we are to do no more business because of apparently the existential threat to our democracy associated with foreigners voting in our elections [43:47] I am therefore puzzled by the fact that neither the [43:51] Unclassified nor the classified threat assessment makes any reference to risk or danger associated [43:58] with foreigners voting in our elections [44:01] director Patel [44:03] How many non citizens have been convicted of voting in US elections in the last ten years? [44:09] The conviction stats were with the department of justice. I defer to them on that [44:14] You are the director of the FBI [44:17] Give me a guess how many convictions in the last one year five years or ten years ballpark [44:22] I don't have that with me sir. Again. It's with the department. You don't have that way. Okay [44:26] director Patel, how many active investigations? [44:29] Does the FBI? [44:31] have into foreign [44:33] individuals voting in US elections we have a number of investigations [44:41] generally speaking ongoing about individuals across the country I'm [44:45] asking for that number I don't have that number with me but I have a number of [44:49] them you have a number of investigations okay is that number 10,000 is it closer [44:55] to 10,000 or closer to 10 it's probably somewhere in between okay will you [45:01] please provide the committee with that number yes sir okay director Patel would [45:05] it since you don't have the numbers would it surprise you to know that the [45:11] Heritage Foundation which is not exactly the Columbia University faculty lounge [45:16] found only 77 instances of non-citizen voting in the 24 years between 1999 and [45:23] 2023 each of which faced investigation by the appropriate authorities so [45:28] heritage has a number of 77 examples in 24 years does that number surprise you [45:35] no because it's [45:37] low I don't I don't understand your answer you asked me if are you disputing [45:42] are you disputing that the number is in the range of 77 examples of non-us [45:47] citizens voting in US elections in a 24-year period I just said that number [45:51] is low you think that number is low okay so why if this is a meaningful issue do [45:58] we have no and I guess I direct this to director Gabbard why is there no [46:01] mention of this thing that will grind the American government to a halt for a [46:05] two-week period in the worldwide threats analysis this [46:09] annual threat assessment was shaped around the national security strategies [46:14] prioritization of threats to our our nation and our nation's interests there [46:19] are multiple platforms and venues where there have been and there will be [46:23] reporting on threats to our foreign threats to our elections feel back [46:28] gentlemen yields vice chairman Kelly I'd first just like to say director Gabbard [46:35] um you being in Georgia was a part of your duties as dni to make sure that our [46:42] nations remain safe, secure, and free from every type of influence. That was why you [46:47] were there. Is that correct? [46:48] Yes. [46:50] Okay. I would argue, I want to talk about some of the points about the strikes [46:56] on Iran, the current attacks, epic fury. And I would state that not only are there imminent [47:03] threats from Iran, but there are actual threats. And I have been on the receiving end of those [47:08] threats. I was in Iraq in 2005, where Iranian-based and manned and equipped units attacked American [47:17] soldiers, including me, multiple times. I will also tell you, I went back in 9 and 10, [47:22] where EFPs developed by the Iranians struck my soldiers and our equipment. I would tell [47:29] you the Houthis have continued to strike Saudi Arabia. I will tell you Hamas and Hezbollah [47:35] has continued to strike throughout the Middle East. [47:38] And although we're not going to talk about that, we're going to talk about some of the [47:38] threats. [47:39] I'm not in an armed services here, and we had that yesterday. But I will tell you, because [47:42] we took out their ballistic missiles and their ability to defend from the air, that Europe [47:47] is no longer under threat from Iran, who showed they will strike everyone that they can by [47:52] striking all of their Arab neighbors in Azerbaijan and in Turkey and everywhere else. [47:57] With that being said, Director Ratcliffe, I think the CIA has had a great year in providing [48:03] intelligence, whether that's in Venezuela, the initial midnight hammer strikes. [48:08] Can you tell us some of the things the CIA has done over the past year that you're proud [48:15] of? [48:16] Congressman, good to see you again. Thank you for the question. Good to see all [48:19] of you and be back in the House. I guess I'll start by saying I think you all know there [48:26] was bipartisan concern when I took over the CIA that our human collection was in a downward [48:33] spiral and had been for some period of time. And you all wanted a more aggressive response. [48:36] I think you all know that. I think you all know that. I think you all know that. I think [48:37] you all know that. I think you all know that. I think you all know that. I think you all [48:38] know that. [48:39] I think you all know that. I think you all know that. Let's go ahead and [48:40] take a look at something. [48:41] I think you all know that. I think you all know that the CIA has a very aggressive CIA, [48:42] one that was focused on a core mission, one that was collecting the kind of intelligence [48:45] and stealing secrets that would provide a decisive strategic advantage that can contribute [48:51] to national security and foreign policy successes. [48:57] I do think that the CIA, I agree with you, has had a great year. And that's a credit [49:02] to our workforce. You talked about some of the very public successes like Operation Midnight [49:09] and Operation Absolute Resolve where our agency contributed to a frankly [49:15] flawless intelligence picture that allowed for flawless military operations [49:19] and I want to credit everyone here there's been bipartisan praise from this [49:25] committee even from those of you who may disagree with the underlying policies [49:29] but I think those successes are really emblematic of success that the agencies [49:35] had across the board on all national security matters in all national [49:39] security spaces it's not a just an opinion it's reflected in in our [49:43] statistics so when we talk about stealing secrets you need assets and and [49:49] sources on the ground around the world we're up 25% in that regard just in the [49:55] past year our foreign intelligence reporting meaning the the intelligence [50:00] that really matters to you as decision-makers and the president as [50:03] commander-in-chief that's up across the board that's up across the board and [50:05] across the board 25% other categories specific targets and adversaries like [50:12] China it's up a hundred percent areas like technology it's up a hundred [50:16] percent issues like counter-narcotics our operations are up by 70% with regard [50:22] to counterterrorism those are classified numbers that we'll get into in the [50:26] classified portion but those are triple digits we've accomplished more on the [50:30] counterterrorism front in the past year than in the prior four years combined [50:34] and [50:35] again really a credit to the CIA workforce morale at the agency is high [50:42] because people are doing the work that they signed up to do and this [50:45] administration is calling on them to do more I would say they are if I can [50:49] still your bat in final 45 seconds I have one question for director Patel [50:54] director Patale the current shutdown that is caused by us not funding TSA [51:00] border control DHS and all those things how hard is that [51:04] that made the job of counterintelligence, FBI, to protect us here in the homeland from [51:10] threats that came through our borders or internally and already existing in the United States? [51:15] Director Patel. [51:16] Thank you for the question. [51:17] When it comes specifically to the combination efforts between the Department of Homeland [51:20] Security and the FBI, we have 59 Homeland Security Task Forces that we have stood up [51:24] in every single state and then some that are co-led by the FBI and HSI. [51:29] And obviously having a stopgap in funding is hurting those abilities to go out there [51:34] and fight crime and pick up violent offenders across the country. [51:37] Even though the DHS workforce shows up every day, I think they've gone one month without [51:41] a paycheck now. [51:42] We also have things like our Southern Border Intelligence Center in Tucson, Arizona that [51:46] is our hub for intelligence collection operations on foreign terrorist organizations, specifically [51:54] the narco traffickers down in Mexico. [51:56] Thank you. [51:57] My time's expired. [51:59] Mr. Carson is recognized. [52:01] Thank you, Chairman. [52:02] The Trump administration has justified this war with Iran. [52:05] As never before. [52:05] It is necessary to stop an imminent threat. [52:07] But the administration has not provided this committee with any intelligence indicating [52:12] Iran was preparing a nuclear weapon, planning a preemptive attack on the United States or [52:17] possess any immediate capability to strike the U.S. homeland. [52:21] That raises very serious questions about what the analysis of the IC provided before the [52:25] decision to go to war was made. [52:29] Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, is there any evidence that Iran intended to conduct [52:33] a preemptive attack on the United States? [52:36] And I ask this because 13 service members have been killed in Trump's war, including [52:41] Captain Seth Kovall, a husband and a dad from my state of Indiana, and my constituents [52:47] want answers. [52:48] So is there any evidence that Iran intended to conduct a preemptive attack on the U.S. [52:53] prior to beginning this war, yes or no? [52:59] Congressman, the answer to this question needs to be reserved for a closed hearing. [53:05] I will say, however, the intelligence community does provide a preemptive attack on the United [53:09] States. [53:10] It does provide the assessments of the threats that exist to the President so that he can [53:14] make that determination within the body of information and intelligence and activities [53:19] within the region that ultimately he is responsible for. [53:23] What is an imminent threat and if there is an imminent threat, what actions need to be [53:27] taken? [53:31] Congressman, as the DNI said, there's a body [53:35] of intelligence that we'll be able to cover in the classified portion of this hearing [53:39] that reflects the determination. [53:41] Thank you. [53:42] It does reflect that in the likely event of a conflict between Iran and Israel, that [53:47] the U.S. would be immediately attacked, regardless of whether the United States stayed out of [53:52] that conflict. [53:53] Shifting gears to ranking, Member Himes' point, let me read to you from the 2025 annual [53:59] threat assessment under your watch last year, quote, Moscow's malign influence activities [54:05] will continue for the foreseeable future and will almost certainly increase in sophistication [54:10] and volume. [54:11] Moscow probably believes information operations efforts to influence U.S. elections are advantageous, [54:18] regardless of whether they affect election outcomes. [54:20] By contrast, this year's threat assessment makes no mention of foreign threats to elections. [54:26] Meanwhile, the IC has been publicly warning about foreign powers interfering in our elections [54:31] for nearly a decade, so the omission is very striking. [54:35] To that point, sitting here today, I'm not aware of any intelligence products in the [54:40] past year. [54:41] I'm not aware of any intelligence that has been allocated to foreign plans and intentions [54:45] toward current and future U.S. elections. [54:49] Director Gabbard, yes or no, ma'am, have you directed or been directed to stop or limit [54:53] dissemination of intelligence reports or finish intelligence reporting concerning foreign [54:59] plans and intentions about upcoming U.S. elections or foreign threats to the midterms? [55:04] No. [55:06] Director Patel, same question for the FBI, sir, yes or no, sir? [55:09] No, sir. [55:11] Director Ratcliffe, same question for the CIA, sir, yes or no? [55:12] No, sir. [55:13] No. [55:15] General Hartman, same question for NSA, yes or no, sir? [55:18] No, sir. [55:19] General Adams, same question for the DIA, yes or no, sir? [55:22] No, sir. [55:23] I yield back, Chairman. [55:24] Gentleman yields. [55:26] Ms. Stefanik. [55:27] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [55:29] Director Gabbard, when you began your testimony, you stated that your remarks do not represent [55:36] your personal beliefs. [55:38] That's the first time I've heard that at a committee hearing. [55:43] Why did you say that? [55:44] Or is there anything in the threat assessment? [55:46] Is there anything that you personally disagree with? [55:48] Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. [55:51] The reason I've said that is twofold. [55:53] Number one is, when I assumed this role as Director of National Intelligence, through [55:59] the confirmation process and beyond, many members of Congress rightly said, your personal [56:05] views and your politics in this role get checked at the door, and as Director of National Intelligence, [56:10] my responsibility is to report the intelligence community's assessments objectively and to [56:16] make sure that they are not politicized in any way, shape, or form. [56:20] Unfortunately, there are those who, for one reason or another, have tried to mischaracterize [56:27] the intelligence community's assessments and saying, well, this is just a political view [56:32] or trying to misdirect from what the intelligence community is reporting. [56:35] So I took the opportunity to state that from the outset, that this is the intelligence [56:39] community's assessments. [56:41] Thank you. [56:42] I also wanted to ask this because this week there was a high-profile resignation. [56:45] I'm sorry. [56:46] The resignation of Director of National Counterterrorism Center. [56:50] Now, I want to be clear from the outset. [56:51] I've communicated directly with President Trump my support for Operation Epic Fury, [56:56] and I was very not only disappointed, but how inappropriate this letter was, and I want [57:02] to read a statement and get your personal assessment, whether you agree or disagree [57:08] with that. [57:09] And that's this. [57:10] Early in this administration, high-ranking Israeli officials and influential members [57:13] of the American media deployed a misinformation campaign. [57:16] It wholly undermined your America First platform and pro-war sentiments to encourage a war [57:21] with Iran. [57:22] This echo chamber was used to deceive you into believing that Iran posed no imminent [57:26] threat to the United States and that you should strike now. [57:29] There was a clear path to a swift victory. [57:31] This was a lie, and it is the same tactic the Israelis used to draw us into a disastrous [57:35] Iraq war. [57:36] Now, I cannot say how much I disagree with that statement. [57:41] Do you agree or disagree with what this letter was put out by former Director Kent? [57:46] He said a lot of things in that letter. [57:50] Ultimately, we have provided the president with the intelligence assessments, and the [57:55] president is elected by the American people and makes his own decisions based on the information [58:01] that's available to him. [58:02] But do you agree with – does that statement he made, blaming Israel, concern [58:06] you? [58:07] Yes. [58:09] My next question is, I want to touch on the rise of terrorist attacks on the [58:13] homeland. [58:14] In the month of March alone, there were multiple high-profile Islamists. [58:18] You had Islamic terrorist attacks. [58:19] You had Temple Israel Synagogue in Michigan. [58:22] You had – in Texas, you had an ISIS-inspired attack where they threw an IED in New York [58:27] City. [58:28] What is your assessment as to the rise of Islamic terrorism on the homeland? [58:33] As you've pointed to, Congresswoman, this continues to be an extreme concern, not [58:39] only because of the rise of these attacks, but the mechanisms which they're carried [58:44] out. [58:45] And the challenges that the intelligence community has. [58:47] Thank you. [58:48] Thank you. [58:49] Thank you. [58:50] I think that the intelligence community has, in being able to try to detect some of [58:51] these threats and attacks in advance. [58:53] I'd like to defer to the FBI director on some of this because they have been very successful [58:58] in many cases over the last year in detecting them and preventing these attacks. [59:03] But due to the nature of the challenge in many of these attackers not having contact [59:12] with known foreign terrorist entities or individuals makes this a much more challenging. [59:15] Thank you. [59:16] Thank you. [59:17] Thank you. [59:18] Thank you. [59:19] Thank you. [59:20] Thank you. [59:21] Thank you. [59:22] This is a much more challenging threat to deal with. [59:23] And I want to turn to Director Patel. [59:24] I think that's a good important segue to get your assessment. [59:26] And I also want to add another aspect of the question. [59:28] We're working on a 9-11 commission review, 25-year review. [59:32] What other tools do you need to make sure that we are able to have the most robust affective [59:37] CT efforts? [59:38] Yeah. [59:39] Thank you, Congresswoman. [59:40] Just real quick. [59:41] So, last year we had 2,300 arrests related to foreign terrorist organizations. [59:44] We had 700 counterterrorism arrests. [59:46] And the FBI had 600 counterterrorist arrests. [59:47] FBI had 640 counter-terrorism disruptions where we stopped attacks on [59:51] the homeland. Specifically in December we stopped four in an 18-day span. What I [59:57] need is specifically highlighted in the Norfolk attack. In Norfolk an individual [1:00:02] who was convicted of terrorism and sentenced based upon that conviction [1:00:06] should have still been in prison. The Department of Justice in the first Trump [1:00:11] administration sought a sentence of 240 months. The judge in that case downward [1:00:15] departed and gave a variance to nearly half that sentence. If that had not [1:00:19] occurred that individual would still be in prison and a member of our uniformed [1:00:23] military service would still be alive. I want to work with the legislature to [1:00:27] figure out how to increase the sentencing for convicted terrorists and [1:00:30] also work on the denaturalization process for someone who should not be in [1:00:34] this country who wants to attack and kill American citizens and American [1:00:38] service members. Thank you. Yield back. Gentleman Yields, Mr. Castro. Thank you. [1:00:43] Thank you Chairman and thank you all for your testimony. [1:00:45] To [1:00:45] today I want to start with a question about Iran and discuss first how the war [1:00:52] began. Secretary Rubio told us that Israel was going to strike Iran [1:00:57] regardless and that doing so would have triggered Iranian retaliation against U.S. [1:01:02] forces already in the region and Director Ratliff you seemed to affirm [1:01:06] that in comments just a few moments ago. So rather than tell Israel to stand down [1:01:11] the president joined the war. The Congress and the American people still [1:01:15] don't know what the president's actual goals are. [1:01:17] And yet we have lost 13 U.S. service members. But here's what we do know the [1:01:25] president has said that he wants a deal. He said Iran wants to make a deal and [1:01:29] that he's not ready because quote the terms aren't good enough yet. Yet they [1:01:33] just killed Ali Larijani, the de facto leader of Iran who while not a [1:01:38] friend of the United States would have been the person to negotiate any [1:01:41] agreement with. The president explicitly said that the United States did not [1:01:46] strike Iran's energy infrastructure because, in his words, having to [1:01:50] rebuild it, quote, would take years. Yet this morning, Israel struck the South [1:01:55] Pars gas field, the world's largest natural gas reserve, triggering Iranian [1:02:00] attacks on Qatari gas facilities. Oil prices are up 15 percent in the last 24 [1:02:06] hours. In San Antonio, my hometown where I represent, the cost of gas has gone up [1:02:12] nearly 40 percent in three weeks. Last night, the president said the United [1:02:17] States knew nothing about the attack and called on Israel to stop similar attacks [1:02:22] on energy. Israel denies this and says that the attack was cleared by the [1:02:26] United States. So my question is, what does the intelligence community assess [1:02:31] Israel's goals in this war to be, and are those goals aligned with the [1:02:36] goals of the United States? I'm thinking carefully here about what can be said in [1:02:50] this open setting versus a closed setting. Are the goals aligned? The [1:02:57] objectives that have been laid out by the president are different from the [1:03:01] objectives that have been laid out by the Israeli government. [1:03:05] And how do they differ? We can see through the operations that the Israeli [1:03:10] government has been focused on disabling the Iranian leadership and taking out [1:03:17] several members, obviously, beginning with the Ayatollah, the supreme leader, [1:03:21] and they continue to focus on that effort. How does that differ from our [1:03:27] goals? The president has stated that his objectives are to destroy Iran's [1:03:33] ballistic missile launching capability. They're [1:03:37] to destroy Iran's ballistic missile production capability, and their [1:03:43] Navy, the IRGC Navy, and mine-laying capability. So the death and destruction [1:03:49] continues. The economic cost to the United States, to Israel, to the Gulf [1:03:54] States, and to the world continues to increase. So I want to ask you, to the [1:03:58] best of your knowledge, do you know whether Israel is supportive of the [1:04:05] president's call to make a deal with Iran? I don't know the answer to that. [1:04:11] I don't know Israel's position on that. And to what do you attribute Israel's [1:04:13] energy infrastructure, despite President Trump's call to keep those facilities off-limits? [1:04:20] I don't have an answer for that. [1:04:30] So they ignored the president, do you agree with that? [1:04:35] I'm not privy to any of their deliberations or what went into their calculus in launching [1:04:43] this or other attacks. [1:04:46] I'm not, we are not involved in the operational element of this. [1:04:50] We're providing continuously on a daily basis the intelligence assessments of the events [1:04:55] that are occurring and the effects of that. [1:04:57] I guess, I know the FBI can't because they're domestic, but can anybody else at the table [1:05:03] provide any insight into that? [1:05:09] I guess I'm not sure what the question you're asking, Congressman Castro. [1:05:14] I guess a couple of things. [1:05:17] The goals that the president set out are clearly defined, the DNI related those. [1:05:22] What was not included is a goal of the U.S. campaign. [1:05:26] Well, Director, let me start with this. [1:05:27] Let me start with this question. [1:05:28] The U.S. campaign was not engaged in... [1:05:29] Let me start with this question. [1:05:29] That's what my question is. [1:05:30] Regime change, which is... [1:05:31] Let me reclaim my time, Director, come on. [1:05:34] Do you know why Israel decided to strike that infrastructure despite the fact that the president [1:05:39] said it should be off limits? [1:05:41] I wouldn't speak for Israel and... [1:05:45] What do you guys know? [1:05:46] We're at war. [1:05:47] What do you guys know? [1:05:48] We'll have to take that for the record. [1:05:50] Yes, let's take it for the record. [1:05:53] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:05:54] I want to welcome the panelists here today. [1:05:58] Today is March 19th. [1:05:59] On April 19th. [1:06:00] FISA goes dark, 702 goes dark. [1:06:05] And it's been talked about many times, but up to 60% of the president's daily briefing [1:06:12] is derived from FISA 702. [1:06:16] And we look at the successes that we've had in protecting the homeland and also the conflicts [1:06:21] the U.S. has been involved with. [1:06:23] The flawless operation in Venezuela, Operation Fury in Iran, troop protection, the successes [1:06:32] we've had on the battlefield in Ukraine. [1:06:34] The recovery and release of the Hamas hostages in the tunnels in Israel, all derived from [1:06:44] FISA 702. [1:06:46] There is not a military operation that we've been involved with where FISA 702 was not, [1:06:53] as Director Ratcliffe has said, been indispensable to the United States and the protection of [1:06:58] our country. [1:07:00] Director Patel has also said FISA 702 is indispensable. [1:07:03] We're 30 days away from it going dark. [1:07:04] We're 30 days away from it going dark. [1:07:06] Director Ratcliffe, can you clarify the president's position on an 18-month clean [1:07:13] reauthorization and how that's going to proceed moving forward? [1:07:18] Congressman, thank you. [1:07:19] And thank you for highlighting this issue. [1:07:22] So the president is in favor of an 18-month clean reauthorization of FISA 702. [1:07:29] And I would add to that, I'm heartened by the fact to hear that the chairman of this [1:07:34] committee and the ranking member are in agreement with that. [1:07:38] And I know there's bipartisan support for that, and there should be. [1:07:42] And I know this is an important vote for you to take, but I would ask that you all consider [1:07:47] when you do that, that when you look at the fact that former DNIs and former CIA directors [1:07:54] and former FBI directors and DIA directors and NSA directors across Republican and Democrat [1:08:02] administrations are in support of FISA 702 in its current form. [1:08:07] Thank you. [1:08:07] Thank you. [1:08:07] Thank you. [1:08:07] Thank you. [1:08:07] Thank you. [1:08:07] Thank you. [1:08:08] Thank you. [1:08:08] Thank you. [1:08:08] Thank you. [1:08:08] Thank you. [1:08:08] Thank you. [1:08:08] Thank you. [1:08:08] Thank you. [1:08:08] Thank you. [1:08:09] Thank you. [1:08:09] Thank you. [1:08:09] Thank you. [1:08:09] Thank you. [1:08:10] Thank you. [1:08:12] Thank you. [1:08:12] Thank you. [1:08:12] Thank you. [1:08:13] Thank you. [1:08:13] Thank you. [1:08:13] Thank you. [1:08:13] Thank you. [1:08:13] Thank you. [1:08:13] And so I wish the reauthorization was longer than 18 months, Congressman. [1:08:18] I think that this is something that I wish you all would consider for longer than that, [1:08:22] so that regardless of who the president is, who the president is in the future, [1:08:27] he or she would have the benefit of, as you said, a tool that's indispensable [1:08:31] across administrations provides more than half of the important, actionable, [1:08:38] intelligence that the President and the Commander-in-Chief relies upon. [1:08:43] Thank you for that. [1:08:44] Director Gabbard, you're supportive of the 18-month extension the President's seeking [1:08:47] without a warrant requirement? [1:08:50] That is the President's position and that is the position of the intelligence community. [1:08:53] And you will be supporting that, correct? [1:08:55] I will support the President's decision to execute this. [1:08:58] Correct. [1:08:59] Thank you. [1:09:00] Director Gabbard, we implemented two years ago a number of reforms, actually 56 of them [1:09:06] that were part of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, RISA, and that was [1:09:11] done in a bipartisan way. [1:09:13] That was a reflection of what we thought were problems with FISA 702, going back during [1:09:19] the first Trump administration and even before that. [1:09:22] These reforms that have been put in place and that you have helped implement, I'm wondering [1:09:28] if you could talk specifically about those reforms on the cutting down of FBI agents [1:09:33] having access to querying of FISA information. [1:09:36] The fact that there are criminal penalties now for FBI agents that are engaged in inappropriate [1:09:42] activity as it relates to FISA. [1:09:45] Please tell us some of those reforms and how those have been implemented. [1:09:51] Director Patel. [1:09:53] Sorry, I thought you were asking Director Tienai. [1:09:55] Absolutely. [1:09:56] So we've gone above and beyond what RISA requires since I became director 13 months ago. [1:10:01] We not only require supervisory special agents to approve the query request of U.S. persons, [1:10:09] we also require the general counsel to do so. [1:10:10] We require the general counsel's office and lawyers to come in and agree with that request [1:10:13] before we can proceed. [1:10:14] Also we used to, before this, had a default which allowed queries when we were utilizing [1:10:21] our system to say it automatically searches 702. [1:10:24] You now have to actually opt in and select that box to make sure that you are intentionally [1:10:30] doing so. [1:10:31] On top of that, we've reduced the number of personnel at the FBI from 6,600 before I got [1:10:36] there to 3,500 that have access to it. [1:10:39] Not that use it. [1:10:40] Not that have access to it. [1:10:41] And we've also gone above and beyond what RISA requires in terms of if you misuse it [1:10:47] unintentionally or recklessly. [1:10:49] If you use it unintentionally, misuse it unintentionally, like you typed a name wrong in terms of spelling [1:10:54] or whatnot, your access is suspended and be retrained. [1:10:57] If you recklessly use it, you're immediately terminated your access forever. [1:11:01] Thank you. [1:11:04] Mr. Crow. [1:11:06] Thank you, Chairman. [1:11:07] Director Gabbard. [1:11:09] It is your job and the job of your agency. [1:11:12] And department to assess the views of Iranian leadership, their policy beliefs and policy [1:11:18] positions, correct? [1:11:19] Yes. [1:11:20] That includes now deceased Ali Khamenei of Iran, correct? [1:11:23] Yes. [1:11:24] And the now leader, his son, Mujtaba Khamenei, correct? [1:11:28] Yes. [1:11:29] The son is considered more of a hardliner than his father. [1:11:32] Isn't that correct? [1:11:34] Yes. [1:11:35] So hardline that even some of Iran's leaders thought he was too aggressive. [1:11:39] Isn't that correct? [1:11:40] That is the intelligence community assessment. [1:11:42] Yes. [1:11:43] Mujtaba, the son, is particularly close to the brutal Islamic Revolutionary Guard [1:11:47] Corps and their most hardline commanders, correct? [1:11:50] That is the intelligence community assessment. [1:11:52] He was involved in ordering violent crackdowns on Iranian protesters, including their murder, [1:11:57] correct? [1:11:59] Yes. [1:12:00] And we don't know if the son will continue his father's religious ban on developing [1:12:02] nuclear weapons. [1:12:03] Is that correct? [1:12:04] It is unknown at this time. [1:12:05] You testified before this committee last year that the elder, now deceased, Khamenei had, [1:12:12] in 2003, banned... [1:12:13] In 2003, banned the nuclear weapons program, or suspended it, correct? [1:12:16] There was a fatwa in place that stated that. [1:12:19] And that fatwa remained in place last year when you testified before this committee, [1:12:23] correct? [1:12:24] Yes. [1:12:25] And that fatwa remained in place recently, correct? [1:12:28] As far as I know, it has not been lifted. [1:12:30] Yeah, you're aware of no information that would lift that fatwa? [1:12:34] I'm not aware of any intelligence reporting that states that. [1:12:38] To be clear on the Mujtaba, the son, who has been named to replace him. [1:12:43] It is unclear of his status or his involvement. [1:12:47] He was injured very severely through one of the Israeli strikes. [1:12:52] And so the decision-making is unclear about what's happening in the Iranian leadership. [1:12:56] So it's unclear. [1:12:57] So we're less certain of the positions of Iranian leadership and their intentions than [1:13:02] we were 60 days ago, correct? [1:13:04] That's an accurate assessment. [1:13:07] One of your jobs is to create products assessing Iran and the threats it poses to the United [1:13:13] States, correct? [1:13:14] Yes. [1:13:15] And that includes potential outcomes for military action, correct? [1:13:22] It includes potential outcomes of a variety of scenarios. [1:13:26] And the likelihood of those outcomes? [1:13:29] Yes. [1:13:30] Generally, when you make assessments about threats facing the United States, you will [1:13:35] look at, in Iran in any instance, the likely scenarios that have come out of military action, [1:13:40] correct? [1:13:42] The intelligence community takes all of those factors into account when they create [1:13:45] these assessments. [1:13:47] Yes. [1:13:48] And when you look at the threats posed by foreign countries, you also assess timelines [1:13:51] to those threats, correct? [1:13:55] What do you mean by timelines? [1:13:56] Like a breakout time, for example, for nuclear weapons or the development of ballistic missiles. [1:14:01] Yes. [1:14:02] Based on the information available at any given time. [1:14:03] In the timeline also for potential terrorist attacks, correct? [1:14:09] Broadly, yes. [1:14:10] It is common practice for the IC to assess the timeline of all threats. [1:14:16] Nuclear weapons development, ballistic, right? [1:14:18] Yes. [1:14:19] Nuclear weapons development? [1:14:21] Based on the information available, yes. [1:14:24] Terrorist attacks? [1:14:25] Same applies. [1:14:26] Cyber attacks? [1:14:29] Timelines for all of those, correct? [1:14:31] When there is information available that point to that, yes. [1:14:34] In likelihood, as well as the timeline, correct? [1:14:38] Based on the information available. [1:14:40] Timing is important, is it not? [1:14:43] It is an important factor that goes into the assessment. [1:14:47] So it is your position sitting here today that you made no timeline determination, and [1:14:52] no determination as to threats that Iran had facing the United States, correct? [1:15:00] It's a very broad statement, but where the information is available, the intelligence [1:15:04] community factors that into their assessment products. [1:15:07] Did you or the IC make any assessments as to the timing of potential threats facing [1:15:13] the United States from Iran in the last 90 days? [1:15:16] I'm sure there was timelines factored into the intelligence assessments that were delivered. [1:15:24] Did any of them show imminence? [1:15:25] The imminent nature of a threat is determined by the President based on a totality of the [1:15:33] intelligence and information provided to him. [1:15:35] Did any of them show that there were attacks anticipated within the next 90 days from Iran? [1:15:42] It's too simplistic of a statement to say that, because it depends on various scenarios [1:15:46] occurring or not occurring. [1:15:48] Did those assessments show timelines for the threats that Iran posed to the United States? [1:15:54] The totality of threats? [1:15:55] Yes. [1:15:56] There were timelines involved where it applied and where that information was available. [1:16:01] But again, to your question about the determination of imminence, the President makes that determination [1:16:06] based on the totality of information and intelligence context that he has provided. [1:16:09] The bottom line is there is no imminent threat, and you know that, and there's no product [1:16:13] that shows that. [1:16:14] I yield back. [1:16:16] Mr. Fitzpatrick. [1:16:17] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:16:18] Thank you all for being here today. [1:16:19] I want to expand on the question from my colleague, Mr. LaHood, regarding FISA 702. [1:16:25] Obviously it is the imminent issue right before us. [1:16:27] It will expire in a month, unequivocally the most critical national security tool our [1:16:33] nation has to keep us safe from fentanyl, from foreign wars, and everything in between. [1:16:40] Mainly to, you know, to Director Ratcliffe, but any of you can answer this. [1:16:44] One of the most perplexing debates that I've been subject to in my time here is this debate [1:16:49] over what warrants are and when they're needed. [1:16:54] In the 250-year history of this country, and going back to the very origins of law and [1:16:59] enforcement, we have always had a warrant requirement, always had a warrant requirement [1:17:04] on the collection of evidence. [1:17:07] We have never had a warrant requirement on the querying of already lawfully collected [1:17:12] data, which is why we don't require police officers to get warrants when they run license [1:17:17] plates querying off of already lawfully collected DOT data. [1:17:22] It's why we don't require police officers to get a warrant to enter the evidence locker [1:17:27] in their police precincts. [1:17:29] Which contains already lawfully collected data. [1:17:32] It would literally shut down the system. [1:17:34] And that's not a warrant requirement, that's a secondary warrant requirement. [1:17:37] That's a warrant requirement on steroids. [1:17:40] So Director Ratcliffe, or any of you, I know you've been subject to these questions as [1:17:44] well. [1:17:46] Is it just a confusion over the difference between the collection of evidence versus [1:17:52] the querying of our already lawfully collected data? [1:17:56] Is it a lack of understanding of what incidental collection is? [1:18:00] Which is a fundamental precept of law enforcement. [1:18:04] But if we have a warrant requirement on steroids, for now the querying of already lawfully collected [1:18:09] data, just by the numbers, that would require an expansion of the federal judiciary by a [1:18:14] factor of 100. [1:18:16] It would literally shut down our law enforcement apparatus at perhaps the most dangerous time [1:18:21] in our nation's history. [1:18:22] So Director Ratcliffe, or any of you, if you could just walk me through your analysis there. [1:18:26] Well, I'll start, Congressman. [1:18:28] Thanks for the question. [1:18:29] And thanks for highlighting this important issue. [1:18:33] And as has been pointed out, reforms should be implemented where they're necessary. [1:18:40] And I think, speaking for myself, and I know Director Patel supported the reforms from [1:18:45] two years ago to make improvements, and they did. [1:18:49] And so some reforms should be considered. [1:18:52] A warrant isn't one of them. [1:18:56] And with respect to the reforms that have been implemented. [1:19:00] We're talking about, when we talk about Fourth Amendment rights and privacy concerns, we're [1:19:06] at a 99.9% compliance rate with respect to that. [1:19:11] So I would start by saying, why are you trying to fix what's not broken with something that [1:19:16] I can tell you from this seat, the fix would not work. [1:19:22] And I go back to my comment before, DNI's, CIA directors, FBI directors, the people that [1:19:28] have been in all of these chairs before. [1:19:30] Right. [1:19:31] On a bipartisan basis, agree that a warrant won't work and don't advocate for it. [1:19:37] Again, Congressman, you're correct. [1:19:40] This is lawfully collected information and we have, these things come at you very fast [1:19:46] and you have to make decisions very quickly and sometimes in a matter of hours. [1:19:53] You have to act on the information that you have lawfully, that has been lawfully collected [1:19:58] to interdict drug shipments or terrorism. [1:20:00] Right. [1:20:01] And the fact that you have a warrant for terrorist activities and a warrant requiring [1:20:03] you to go to the court to seek probable cause for information that has already been lawfully [1:20:09] collected only prevents that from happening. [1:20:11] I don't understand, I understand that it's well-meaning for people that are proposing [1:20:16] it. [1:20:17] But again, I would defer to the people who sit in these chairs and make these decisions [1:20:20] who would tell you that it doesn't work. [1:20:23] Anybody else want to comment on the warrant requirement? [1:20:25] So Congressman, I'd love to comment. [1:20:27] Thanks. [1:20:28] Thanks for the question. [1:20:29] I do just want to add a couple of points. [1:20:30] Agree with everything. [1:20:31] I agree with everything Director Radcliffe said. [1:20:33] You know, not only is this already collected data on foreign personnel outside of the United [1:20:40] States, but the data that is being queried has also already been analyzed to ensure that [1:20:47] it contains foreign intelligence value, which I think is a very important part of this. [1:20:53] And then when we query a U.S. person term, we're not querying for U.S. person information. [1:20:59] We're querying for foreign intelligence. [1:21:01] Okay. [1:21:02] And that has already been evaluated at least once to contain foreign intelligence in the [1:21:06] database that's being accessed. [1:21:08] And then the final piece that I think is important is that both the FISC and the Department of [1:21:13] Justice have established robust legal and compliance rules that we adhere to and that [1:21:20] is audited by DOJ for every query that we make. [1:21:24] Thank you. [1:21:25] I yield back. [1:21:26] Dr. Barra. [1:21:27] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:21:28] Director Gabbard, we've known each other for a long time. [1:21:31] We were both elected to Congress. [1:21:33] I served in 2012 and served together for a while. [1:21:36] I may not have always agreed with your positions, but I respected the consistency of some of [1:21:42] your positions. [1:21:43] Director Gabbard, following the January 3rd, 2020 drone strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, [1:21:49] you gave a speech on the House floor six days later, on January 9th, 2020. [1:21:54] In this speech that is currently in the congressional record and available for anyone to view, you [1:21:59] stated, quote, President Trump has committed an illegal crime. [1:22:03] President Trump has committed an illegal and unconstitutional act of war, pushing our [1:22:06] nation headlong into a war with Iran without any authorization from Congress, a war that [1:22:12] would be so costly and devastating it would make our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan look [1:22:17] like a picnic. [1:22:18] On February 28th, 2026, the Trump administration, under which you are the president's principal [1:22:25] intelligence advisor, launched an illegal and unconstitutional act of war, pushing [1:22:30] our nation headlong into a war with Iran without any authorization from Congress. [1:22:32] What a war. [1:22:33] Thank you. [1:22:34] authorization from Congress. [1:22:36] This war has already been costly and devastating. [1:22:38] Thirteen American service members have lost their lives, including Chief Warrant Officer [1:22:43] Robert Marzin from my home of Sacramento, California. [1:22:47] Approximately 200 service members have been wounded. [1:22:50] The Pentagon reported that the first six days of Operation Epic Fury cost $11.3 billion. [1:22:57] That averages almost $2 billion per day. [1:23:01] That was the first six days, and now we're in the 19th day of this war. [1:23:05] That's ballooned into a regional conflict, putting the lives of Americans and our allies [1:23:09] throughout the Middle East in danger. [1:23:12] Director Gabbard, do you still believe that strikes against Iran that don't have congressional [1:23:17] authorization constitute an illegal and unconstitutional act of war? [1:23:22] Congressman, thank you for the question. [1:23:25] The cost of war weighs very heavily upon me and my colleagues here, especially for those [1:23:33] of us who have experienced and seen the cost of war firsthand. [1:23:37] My own personal and political views, as I mentioned earlier, I was asked and required [1:23:44] by Congress and by the President in this role as the Director of National Intelligence to [1:23:50] check those views at the door to ensure that the intelligence assessments are not colored [1:23:55] by my personal views. [1:23:57] Director Gabbard, do you still believe that war with Iran would be so costly and devastating [1:24:02] that it would make our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan look like a picnic? [1:24:05] Yeah. [1:24:06] In this role, it is essential that I do not allow any of my personal views on any issues [1:24:13] to color or bias the intelligence reporting that we deliver to you and to the President. [1:24:19] Director Gabbard, in this hearing one year ago, I asked some questions, and I'll paraphrase [1:24:28] my exact question. [1:24:29] It's like, we should keep politics out of this. [1:24:31] Even if the President disagrees with a directive, if it goes against his personal wishes, if [1:24:37] he's considering an order that potentially is unconstitutional or illegal or compromises [1:24:42] our security, I want your word that you will always provide and give the honest advice [1:24:48] to the President, even if it will make him angry. [1:24:50] I asked you that question. [1:24:51] I'm going to read your answer. [1:24:55] And to your specific question, the answer is yes. [1:24:58] I will inform the President of that accurate, timely, unbiased intelligence reporting, whether [1:25:04] it is something that agrees with an assumption or a view or an objective or not. [1:25:08] That's my responsibility to him and to the American people. [1:25:12] Director Gabbard, there is no imminent threat of nuclear breakout. [1:25:18] Did you deliver that assessment to the President? [1:25:22] I have delivered the intelligence community's assessments to the President. [1:25:26] There was no imminent nuclear threat to the United States. [1:25:31] There was no evidence of imminence that Iran was going to attack American assets. [1:25:37] That was different from anything they've done over four decades. [1:25:40] That was going to attack our homeland. [1:25:43] There was no imminent threat. [1:25:44] Imminent is defined in the dictionary as something that is about to happen. [1:25:49] Not something that's been happening for four decades. [1:25:51] Not something that is going to happen three months from now. [1:25:54] Not something that's going to happen a year from now. [1:25:56] Imminent said this is about to happen. [1:25:58] Did you deliver that assessment to the President? [1:26:01] I delivered the intelligence community's objective analysis of the threats, the severity of those [1:26:07] threats and the scope, along with assessments of the different scenarios. [1:26:11] The President owes it to the American people to go on television, to explain to the American [1:26:19] people, to the service members who have died in action serving our country, why we're at [1:26:25] war with Iran. [1:26:26] He needs to go on television and explain that directly to the American people, what the [1:26:30] imminent threat was. [1:26:31] Gentlemen, as time has expired, I would advise members that a vote has been called. [1:26:38] It's a single vote, and if members want to shuttle back and forth so we can maintain [1:26:42] the continuity of the conversation. [1:26:43] The hearing will do that. [1:26:44] So if you start to see it, just to our witnesses, you know how this works, they'll be moving [1:26:49] in and out to go address that vote and then returning to their seat. [1:26:52] But at this time, I recognize Mr. Scott. [1:26:55] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:26:56] Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like to submit an article from Politico, dated [1:27:00] February 24th, 2026, and the title of it is, Head of State of the Union Dems Demand Trump [1:27:07] Make Iran Plans Public. [1:27:10] I think most Americans understand that if the President of the United States makes a [1:27:13] plan public, then the enemies get to see them as well. [1:27:18] Without objection. [1:27:19] Without objection. [1:27:20] And that was the date of the State of the Union. [1:27:22] Director Patel, I'm going to come to you very quickly, and then I'm going to move on. [1:27:26] But I listened closely to Senator Lankford's testimony yesterday about fraud and the other [1:27:34] things that are going on, and I want to bring your attention. [1:27:39] This was in March 25th of 2024. [1:27:41] An unsuspecting Uber driver named Lalitha Talanda-Hall drove to a house near Columbus, [1:27:47] Ohio, to pick up a package. [1:27:48] She had no idea that the 81-year-old man who lived there had just received a series of [1:27:53] phone calls from scammers who had threatened to kill him if he did not give the woman coming [1:27:58] to his house $12,000 in cash. [1:28:02] He killed the lady, so she's dead. [1:28:04] He now has life sentence. [1:28:06] Are you aware of any action or any investigation the Justice Department has taken to pursue [1:28:11] justice? [1:28:12] to bring the scammers and put them and make them pay for what they did i think you're referring to [1:28:19] congressman scam centers and scam compounds that are wreaking havoc on our citizens i'm referring [1:28:24] to this individual case this lady was murdered and a man now has life in prison i can't speak [1:28:29] to that individual case i can tell you what we're doing generally if you wish but as you know sir i [1:28:33] want to bring that case to your attention i think that we need to pursue that someone is dead and [1:28:37] someone else has life in prison um and it was the scammers that did it that my heart goes out to [1:28:43] both families but but the scammers are the ones that need to pay the price they're the guilty [1:28:47] party here uh director gabbard you made a lot of changes at odni changes that i think were necessary [1:28:54] that i want to give you a chance to talk about so what concrete steps in odni 2.0 what are you [1:29:01] taking what are they taking to address politicization weaponization of intelligence [1:29:06] and other authorized leaks [1:29:08] and how will these reforms help rebuild public trust in the intelligence community and help the [1:29:13] united states of america thank you very much for the question congressman i committed to all of you [1:29:18] before taking this role that i would execute on that to bring back odni's focus on its core mission [1:29:25] to cut the fat to cut away any detractions away from that and to ensure that our intelligence [1:29:31] community was providing objective timely and relevant intelligence to the president [1:29:36] and to policy makers [1:29:38] i conducted a ground-based review of the mission the capabilities and measuring effectiveness of [1:29:45] odni which resulted in a reduction of force by roughly 40 percent and a narrowing of focus and [1:29:52] reorganization that consolidated and coordinated the experts within the odni in order to be able [1:30:00] to deliver those effects leaking continues to be a prolific problem across the ic we have and continue [1:30:08] to implement tools and capabilities within the zero trust framework to be able to get after [1:30:16] those leakers and refer them to the department of justice for investigation and prosecution we've [1:30:23] seen we are continuing to focus on the issue of analytic tradecraft and the integrity of it once [1:30:32] again to make sure that the analysis that's being conducted is not being colored by anyone's [1:30:36] political or personal views on any of the issues that we're dealing with and we're continuing to [1:30:39] continue to conduct invest uh re-looks at different intelligence products that have been provided [1:30:44] in the past as the chairman mentioned one related to anomalous health incidents to identify [1:30:51] politicization of these products in the past and also make updates to intelligence community [1:30:57] directives to ensure that these things don't happen again could you speak briefly to uh china's [1:31:03] presence in the caribbean region and what are some of the things that are happening in the [1:31:09] in the western hemisphere uh i'll be able to speak to this more uh in the classified setting sir [1:31:16] okay right right cliff i'm gonna have questions for you there as well um we do not we have not [1:31:22] heard much about haiti lately in the news but it's very close to the united states my understanding [1:31:27] is that one in four haitians about two and a half million people now live in an area controlled by [1:31:32] an armed group can you speak to what is happening in haiti uh yes sir this was something that uh [1:31:39] we talked about within the annual [1:31:41] threat assessment uh haiti along with cuba continue to be areas of volatility haiti as [1:31:47] you mentioned specifically is being controlled by a gang and we've seen increasing threats [1:31:53] on u.s persons within haiti these two countries continue to create challenges where with increased [1:31:59] instability may be one of those drivers of increased migration flows to the u.s [1:32:06] thank you all for your service gentlemen's times expired now recognize mr gottheimer [1:32:12] thank you [1:32:13] thank you very much mr chairman uh if i can start uh by talking about uh something i was [1:32:20] disappointed in from the administration about comments made by members of of the administration [1:32:25] that israel drew the united states into conflict with iran seeming to buy conspiracy theories that [1:32:29] scapegoat israel while dismissing that iran poses a persistent threat to america and our service [1:32:34] members and diplomats in the region while the president then clarified this is not the case [1:32:39] and that america entered into a joint operations with our ally under our own accord may i ask you [1:32:44] again when this conflict chửltsdg minist the answer the question of what [1:32:50] �ئ paths for this conflict and so on i'd like to just ask one question i'm confident many still [1:32:54] seem confused about what precipitated this conflict and the threat iran posed to us directly [1:32:59] so if i could ask director radcliffe just a couple questions yes or no if that's okay with you [1:33:02] is the iranian regime committed to america's destruction in your opinion yes does the iranian [1:33:07] regime have american blood on their hands since its founding in 1979 yes has iran plotted [1:33:11] assassination attempts against americans on america's soil [1:33:14] Yes. So I want to clarify on that because there's been much talk about a fatwa against the [1:33:20] development of a nuclear weapon. Can you come back to that one second? Let me finish. Yes, you bet. [1:33:24] If left unchecked, do you think Iran would have the ability to develop missiles capable of reaching [1:33:28] the United States? Yes. Did Israel force the U.S.'s hand and make us take action as some have claimed? [1:33:33] No. Director Gabbard, do you agree with the CIA's director of assessment on that last question in [1:33:38] particular? Yes. Great. Do you want to go back to that point you want to make? Much had been made [1:33:42] by some about a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding the fatwa, [1:33:49] what we know, and the intelligence community is in agreement on this, is that Iran possesses at [1:33:54] least 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to weapons grade 60 percent, which doesn't have a civilian [1:34:02] use. The only use for that would be the development of nuclear weapons. Thank you, Director. [1:34:07] Director Gabbard, I want to raise serious concerns about your recent hiring of Dan Caldwell, [1:34:11] a strict [1:34:12] critic of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, who's argued that U.S. forces in the Middle East [1:34:16] are, quote, more of a burden than a benefit, has claimed that Iran's nuclear program does not pose [1:34:19] a risk to America, despite the ISC's assessment to the contrary. Dan has also said that our [1:34:24] relationship with Israel has no benefit to American national security. This follows the [1:34:27] resignation of Joe Kent this week, a senior ally of yours who is a conspiracy theorizing [1:34:31] white supremacist with a tattoo, Panzer, referring to Nazi tanks. He has made known his backwards [1:34:37] opinions of Israel in his resignation letter, scapegoating them for U.S. intervention in Iran [1:34:41] and Iraq. [1:34:42] Director, what role do you anticipate Mr. Caldwell playing in shaping intelligence assessments [1:34:46] or internal discussions related to Iran and Israel, and can you guarantee to this committee [1:34:50] that no individuals in your leadership are undermining the objectivity of intelligence [1:34:56] at this critical moment? [1:34:57] Sir, my understanding is one of my elements sought to hire Dan Caldwell months [1:35:03] ago for a purely administrative role that would not have any position over the intelligence [1:35:09] analysis or assessments on any topic. [1:35:12] Thank you. [1:35:15] Director, as you know, the Iranian regime has been responsible for the deaths that we've [1:35:18] talked about of scores of Americans since coming to power in 79. Iran and its terror [1:35:22] proxies must be crushed. I've been clear on that point in the last weeks and throughout [1:35:27] my time in Congress. I supported the decisive action taken on February 28th to remove key [1:35:32] regime leaders and degrade Iran's ballistic missile and naval capabilities. However, I [1:35:36] think it's really important the administration make its goals clear to Congress and to the [1:35:40] American people. Director, were you in a meeting to discuss a possible strike on Iran? [1:35:47] Uh, Congressman? [1:35:48] There were several meetings that were held in advance. I'm sure I was in at least [1:35:52] some of them. [1:35:54] Did the intelligence community brief the President on the potential impacts a conflict [1:35:58] could have on global supply chains and on oil and gas prices prior to the outbreak of [1:36:02] hostilities? [1:36:04] Uh, yes. [1:36:06] Were you in a meeting? Were you in any meetings where that came up? [1:36:08] Yes. That is the intelligence community's assessments and those were provided. [1:36:12] Director, did the IC, Director Radcliffe, if I can ask this to you, did the IC brief [1:36:17] the President on who would succeed the Supreme Leader if he was killed and the likelihood [1:36:21] that her placement would be a hardliner? [1:36:27] Did the IC brief the President on who would succeed the Supreme Leader if he was killed [1:36:30] and the likelihood that her placement would be a hardliner or could be a hardliner? [1:36:35] So to be clear, uh, the President's objectives with respect to Operation Epic Fury, uh, did [1:36:41] not include regime change. That may be different from what Israel's objectives were, but you [1:36:46] can, but yes, the President was briefed in the event that, uh, Supreme Leader- [1:36:50] Okay, that's good. That's great. Thank you so much. I'm sorry to cut you off. I just [1:36:53] have 20 seconds. Director Patel, does Iran pose a threat to the United States? Does Iran pose a threat to the United States? [1:36:54] Uh, yes. That's good. That's great. Thank you so much. I'm sorry to cut you off. I just have 20 seconds. Director Patel, does Iran pose a threat to the United States? [1:36:55] Does Iran pose a threat to the United States? [1:36:56] Yes. [1:36:57] Does Iran pose a threat to the United States? [1:36:58] Yes. [1:36:59] What are the steps that the United States and Iran take to protect, prevent, and disrupt [1:37:00] terrorist plots targeting Americans at home? [1:37:02] Uh, Iran, as the world's largest state sponsor of terror, does pose a continuing [1:37:05] threat to the homeland, and just last year, um, our Iran threat mission center housed [1:37:10] in the FBI, our fusion cell, um, saw a 43% increase in Iranian spy actors willing to [1:37:15] steal our information, and attack our citizens. So that's just one example, sir. [1:37:19] Thank you, Ayild. [1:37:20] Dr. Jackson? [1:37:22] Good morning. Um, first off, I want to say thank you all for your, for your [1:37:28] time today and thank you for our service to our country, much appreciated. [1:37:33] I thank the chairman for his opening remarks on anomalous health incidents, AHI. [1:37:41] As many of you are aware, one of my primary responsibilities in this particular committee, [1:37:47] I am the subcommittee chairman of oversight and investigations where the investigation [1:37:52] of AHI is and has been a central oversight effort. [1:37:57] So I am going to ask a quick question about this. [1:38:00] Director Ratcliffe, during the Biden administration, the CIA very poorly, in my opinion, handled [1:38:06] this issue. [1:38:07] Since then, a CIA doctor has provided perjured testimony under oath and obstructed our congressional [1:38:14] investigation. [1:38:15] A quick question for you. [1:38:17] Do you affirm that the CIA personnel are under no direction to make false statements to Congress [1:38:22] in order to conceal CIA equities or activities related to the handling of AHI during the [1:38:27] Biden administration? [1:38:27] Yes. [1:38:28] Thank you, sir. [1:38:29] I appreciate that. [1:38:30] I want to ask Mr. Patel, I've got a question for you here. [1:38:34] As a member of this committee, I also have a regional responsibility that includes Africa. [1:38:40] I'm very concerned about the radical Islamic terror threat that exists there and is growing [1:38:45] by the day. [1:38:46] Whether it's Al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as JNMI, AQIM, Al-Shabaab, or ISIS-inspired [1:38:52] groups such as ISIS West Africa, ISIS-Shahel, ISIS Somalia, or Boko Haram. [1:38:58] These are radical dangerous groups that want to kill Americans. [1:39:02] After four years of an open border during the Biden administration, where we know countless [1:39:06] individuals with terror ties, many to these groups cross our southern border, and at a [1:39:11] time when we are actively engaged with the largest state sponsor of radical jihadi terror, [1:39:19] can you confirm that the threat to the American people in this setting is much higher due [1:39:24] to the Democrats' current defunding of the Department of Homeland Security? [1:39:27] Yeah. [1:39:28] As I highlighted earlier, Congressman, the FBI works hand in glove with the Department [1:39:33] of Homeland Security and our 59 established Homeland Security task forces around the country, [1:39:38] and those officers are now going one month without pay, but they're still showing up [1:39:41] to work. [1:39:42] But yes, funding would absolutely help us protect the homeland. [1:39:45] Thank you. [1:39:46] I appreciate that. [1:39:48] One more question. [1:39:49] Anyone that feels inclined can answer this, but according to the Council on Foreign Relations, [1:39:54] another Africa-related question, 51 percent of global terrorism-related deaths occurred [1:39:58] in Africa. [1:39:59] And the number of deaths in Africa is about a third of the total deaths in the region, [1:40:00] including the Lake Chad Basin. [1:40:02] Does the intelligence community assess that Boko Haram, ISIS West Africa, and other terrorist [1:40:06] groups operating in the Lake Chad Basin are a threat to the U.S. interests, whether it's [1:40:10] here in the homeland or a regional U.S. interest? [1:40:13] If so, how does this lack of counterterrorism cooperation that we're currently experiencing [1:40:17] with the allied states of the Chehal, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso impact that? [1:40:23] And tied to that, how does the rise of alternative security forces, such as Russia's Wagner Group, [1:40:29] or now Africa Corps, how has that impacted our counterterrorism efforts in the region? [1:40:38] Congressman, the continued rise of these Islamist terrorist groups, as you've [1:40:42] pointed out, in Africa, West Africa, and around the world, continues to be a serious concern [1:40:47] and major focus of the intelligence community. [1:40:50] The challenges within the region are very complex because they have to do with governance [1:40:54] challenges in many of these countries. [1:40:57] They have to do with economic challenges as well as external influences, both with funding [1:41:02] and equipping of these terrorist organizations. [1:41:06] So yes, it has made our counterterrorism, longstanding counterterrorism efforts in these [1:41:11] regions, as well as those of our allies in this fight, such as the French and other countries, [1:41:17] far more difficult because of the very real threat within that region to U.S. persons. [1:41:25] If we are not able, if the U.S., if the Department of War is not able to coordinate with and [1:41:30] get the support of the government's [1:41:32] of these countries in order to tackle this terrorist threat, then it's not a safe or [1:41:38] operable environment for them to continue that fight. [1:41:42] Thank you. [1:41:43] And the assumption I'm working off of, too, is that the Russian influence via Wagner or [1:41:47] Africa Corps has made it very difficult for us to develop those relationships and get [1:41:52] those agreements so that we can continue to make sure that this is not being brought home [1:41:57] to the homeland. [1:41:58] Is that correct? [1:41:59] That is a factor of many. [1:42:00] Thank you. [1:42:01] I appreciate it. [1:42:02] I yield back. [1:42:04] Ms. Houlihan. [1:42:07] Thank you. [1:42:11] My question is basically starting with some HR questions, and they're first for Director [1:42:15] Patel. [1:42:17] If you could help me a little bit understand, I come out of the military-military family [1:42:20] as well, but I don't know very much about the FBI's HR process or the growing up of an [1:42:27] FBI expert. [1:42:29] Could you help me understand how long it takes for a senior counterintelligence expert, especially [1:42:34] one may be focused on a very narrow threat? [1:42:37] Ms. Houlihan. [1:42:38] Thank you, Congresswoman. [1:42:39] That varies. [1:42:40] Sometimes right out of Quantico, new agent trainees are placed on the counterintelligence [1:42:41] mission set, and some people come in from the fraud section. [1:42:42] So the answer varies. [1:42:43] It could take a couple of months to a couple of years. [1:42:44] Ms. Houlihan. [1:42:45] And then our next question is when a person comes up in your system in the military, it [1:42:46] was always the needs of the Navy or the needs of the Air Force. [1:42:47] It was never the needs of the airmen or the soldier or the sailor in terms of prioritizing [1:42:48] our readiness, in terms of making sure that we have met the needs of the military. [1:42:49] Ms. Houlihan. [1:42:50] Thank you, Congresswoman. [1:42:51] That varies. [1:42:52] Sometimes right out of Quantico, new agent trainees are placed on the counterintelligence [1:42:53] mission set, and some people come in from the fraud section. [1:42:54] So the answer varies. [1:42:55] It could take a couple of months to a couple of years. [1:42:56] It could take a couple of months to a couple of years. [1:42:57] Ms. Houlihan. [1:42:58] And then our next question is when a person comes up in your system in the military, it [1:42:59] was always the needs of the Navy or the needs of the Air Force. [1:43:00] It was never the needs of the airmen or the soldier or the sailor in terms of prioritizing [1:43:04] our readiness, in terms of making sure that we have met the mission. [1:43:08] Is the FBI similar? [1:43:09] Mr. Stuart Levy. [1:43:11] It is similar, ma'am. [1:43:12] It's a dynamic threat landscape. [1:43:13] So we flux and surge based on the CI, CT, cyber threats and other threats to the homeland [1:43:18] and violent crime mission has seen a surge as well. [1:43:21] Ms. Houlihan. [1:43:22] So my specific question is that there was a report that came out in the US that said [1:43:25] in February from CNN that the FBI had let go or fired dozens of agents and staff members [1:43:31] from a counterintelligence unit tasked with monitoring Iran. [1:43:35] And apparently the reason, at least reported in the press, was that these individuals had [1:43:40] been involved in the investigation of classified document handling from President Trump at [1:43:45] Mar-a-Lago and that this was the reason why they were summarily let go. [1:43:51] First of all, are you aware of those firings? [1:43:53] And are you... [1:43:54] Do you concur with the rationale or reason for those firings? [1:43:58] I'm aware of that. [1:43:59] And I know there's a pendency of litigation, so I'm not able to comment on them. [1:44:03] Did you yourself order those firings? [1:44:06] The FBI, every time there is someone who violates our code of conduct or ethical standard, conducts [1:44:11] an internal investigation with the careers there and they present a decision point to [1:44:16] me. [1:44:17] The Iranian Threat Mission Center has seen an increase of 43% in arrests for Iranian [1:44:22] spy actors. [1:44:23] So the Iranian Threat Mission Center has never been stronger. [1:44:25] So I'm not asking about... [1:44:28] I'm asking about whether those people were fired because they were involved in the investigation [1:44:33] of the document handling by President Trump, not for any behavior issues. [1:44:37] Is that your understanding as well? [1:44:39] Again, ma'am, I can't comment on them because those are in pending litigation. [1:44:45] I guess I'm a little stymied here, Director, because it feels as though right literally [1:44:50] when there was a possible pending war, I'm outside of this intelligence circle in many [1:44:57] ways. [1:44:58] I mean, I don't know if you're aware of this, but when you were on the Intelligence Committee, [1:45:03] you collectively must have been aware when these firings happened that there was a meaningful [1:45:07] chance that the US might be engaged with a war in Iran. [1:45:10] And having these very expert, super qualified folks summarily dismissed at this time, it [1:45:16] just feels like an odd choice in timing. [1:45:18] Were you aware at the time that this was going down, that this may end up weakening the mission [1:45:24] and the readiness of that group? [1:45:25] The mission, as I stated, has never been stronger. [1:45:27] And we're already talking about how the US is going to come to terms with this. [1:45:32] That's the reality, isn't it? [1:45:33] And I don't know if the estatutes say this, but the US kind of had the preludes to just [1:45:40] say, you know, we're going to act right now. [1:45:41] We have to get out of this war. [1:45:43] We have to put in this effort to do this now. [1:45:44] They want us to go back and do it in three weeks. [1:45:48] Because, obviously, we're not going to be in a position to say, here's what this is [1:45:52] going to do. [1:45:53] We are decompromise the US so that we can enforce this. [1:45:55] Because people are going to think that we're really not going to be able to do that. [1:45:57] I don't know. [1:45:58] This issue is a political issue and I just am worried that we are taking really good really qualified people and [1:46:06] picking fights with one another across across [1:46:09] Party lines what rather than making sure that we protect ourselves and keep ourselves safe [1:46:15] With the remainder of my time director Gabbard [1:46:17] I have a question regarding the fact that the Secretary of the Treasury loosened restrictions this week on Russian oil [1:46:23] Exports and now what the Russians are able to sell oil again [1:46:27] I did the I see assess that clearing the way for increased Russian oil sales would benefit Moscow possibly I [1:46:35] Don't believe there's been a formal I see assessment on this topic yet as it is [1:46:41] Underway, so I would highly encourage that because it feels as though by easing these sanctions [1:46:46] We are directly providing the Kremlin with revenue the revenue that will be used directly to kill or Ukrainian soldiers [1:46:54] And an increased likelihood that Putin will be successful in his war with Ukraine [1:46:58] I thank you for your time, and I yield miss Wagner. I thank you mr. [1:47:08] Chairman and I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today as we sit here in, Washington [1:47:15] our armed forces and our intelligence assets are [1:47:20] engaged in conflict with the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism Iran a radical ruthless and [1:47:29] murderous regime that has killed and maimed [1:47:33] thousands of United States troops and citizens [1:47:38] over the past 50 years [1:47:40] CIA director Ratcliffe, can you [1:47:45] Elaborate for the American people on the threat that Iran posed to our [1:47:52] American personnel in the region prior to [1:47:57] Operation epic fury the extent you can in open hearing [1:48:02] Sure congresswoman happy to address that I think is well documented and as you've encapsulated [1:48:09] Iran has been a constant threat for the last 47 years [1:48:14] Hundreds if not thousands of Americans killed certainly thousands of Americans maimed as a result of activities of [1:48:21] Iran and its IRGC [1:48:24] over the years [1:48:26] but particularly [1:48:28] no cessation with respect to the threats to US interests and [1:48:33] In the region not just from Iran, but from its proxies from Iraqi militia groups like Khattab Hezbollah [1:48:41] Lebanese Hezbollah [1:48:43] Hamas the Houthis all of these [1:48:47] Proxies if you will of the Iranian regime funded by the Iranian regime [1:48:53] committing committing assaults and attacks on American interests [1:48:57] persistently so they did pose [1:49:01] absolutely absolute threat a constant and immediate threat at all times [1:49:05] Thank You general Adams as director of the defense intelligence agency [1:49:10] Can you inform the American people about the threat our armed forces have eliminated thus far? Yes, ma'am [1:49:21] Representative Wagner thanks for the question, and I will like to go in detail. I'm going to cover a little bit here [1:49:27] We will be able to cover more detail in the classified session [1:49:30] But the goals that the president has set out it had that have been accomplished [1:49:35] in executed by the [1:49:36] the Central Command were aligned along the DNI's discussion earlier one [1:49:45] eliminate their ability to power project and that was inclusive of ballistic [1:49:51] missiles but it also includes their UAS's and so we have been very effective [1:49:56] we can talk about specific numbers in the class closed session okay their [1:50:01] ability to reproduce both missiles and UAS's has been we've been very [1:50:07] effective and you can tell from the the news in fact the chairman talked about [1:50:12] this morning we have sunk their Navy and so that those specific objectives have [1:50:17] been very well accomplished and we'll go into great detail in the general Hartman [1:50:21] as acting director of the National Security Agency can you explain how [1:50:26] weakening the Iranian regime is impacting the availability of resources [1:50:30] to our adversaries like China Mike please hey thanks for the question [1:50:42] obviously not at all [1:50:43] able to go into any classified discussion here but but certainly [1:50:47] weakening the regime and weakening the collaboration between Iran China Russia [1:50:54] other adversaries has a global effect of making the world safer yes thank you [1:50:59] very much thank you for all your insights and thank you for keeping our [1:51:02] troops and and our American people safe as you know I chair the first ever [1:51:08] subcommittee on open source intelligence over the past year [1:51:13] our subcommittee has been working tirelessly to ensure the intelligence [1:51:16] community is leveraging the vast amount of commercially available information to [1:51:20] the highest degree of efficiency and cost-effectiveness director Radcliffe as [1:51:25] a CIA is the functional manager of open source intelligence does the CIA CIA [1:51:30] know which data has been acquired across all agencies within the IC thanks for the [1:51:36] question congresswoman as you know the CIA's open source enterprise is driving [1:51:43] the open source collection across the the entire IC in support of the [1:51:48] administration's top priorities two of those priorities I've already talked [1:51:52] about counter narcotics and threats from adversaries use of emerging technologies [1:51:58] those collections as a result of our open source are up 70% and 40% 40 or 45% [1:52:04] collectively the CIA does lead the IC in pioneering new uses of AI to extend [1:52:13] to to extract insights from the vast amounts of open source data that are [1:52:18] there that we then share with analysts warfighters everyone across the ice I [1:52:23] thank you my time has expired I have a lot more questions dealing with open [1:52:26] source that we will do in closed session so I think I yield back mr. chairman [1:52:30] before I recognize mr. Gomez I want to make sure that all members have had an [1:52:33] opportunity to vote because they are prepared to close that vote on the floor [1:52:36] if you haven't please go do so at this time looks like we're good all right mr. [1:52:42] Gomez thank you mr. chairman Mr. Gomes I'm going to ask Mr. Gomes a question [1:52:44] Mr. Gomes I'm going to ask Mr. Gomes I'm going to ask Mr. Gomes I'm going to ask [1:52:47] Mr. Gomes I'm going to ask the question Mr. Chairman I just want to get right [1:52:50] into it Director Gabbard last year you testify that Iran was not building a [1:52:55] nuclear weapon do you stand by that statement yes or no context matters with [1:53:00] that Iran had all of I reclaimed my time I reclaimed my time to do so Mr. [1:53:07] Chairman I reclaim my time it's an easy answer you either stand by what you said [1:53:11] last year or not it is a serious question that requires the director [1:53:16] Gabbard I reclaim my time I reclaimed my time [1:53:20] President Trump was asked about your testimony. [1:53:24] He said you were wrong. [1:53:25] Were you lying or not? [1:53:29] I stand by the intelligence community's complete assessment. [1:53:32] Director Ratcliffe, when it came to the director's testimony, she said that Iran was not building [1:53:39] the nuclear weapon last spring in Congress. [1:53:43] And so the Supreme Leader has not authorized the nuclear weapons program. [1:53:49] Do you agree with what she said or not? [1:53:51] Yes or no? [1:53:52] The director's right here. [1:53:53] She can speak for herself. [1:53:54] Oh, so I thought this was an intelligence community briefing. [1:54:01] Let's let's move on. [1:54:03] Trump also said he didn't care what you thought or said. [1:54:07] Should he care about what you have to say when it comes to intelligence? [1:54:12] I continue to provide the president with the intelligence community's assessments on all [1:54:16] matters. [1:54:17] So let me just kind of get this straight. [1:54:21] The department, you said that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon last year. [1:54:28] President Trump said he didn't care what you thought. [1:54:30] And you're wrong. [1:54:32] They engage in Operation Midnight Hammer. [1:54:36] He then says it was obliterated. [1:54:38] We hear later reports that in open source reporting that it was only set back by a few [1:54:44] months. [1:54:45] Then at the beginning of this war, he said that there were weeks away. [1:54:51] I just want to kind of get a sense of were they weeks away of achieving a nuclear weapon? [1:54:59] Yes or no? [1:55:01] Congressman, this is a serious matter. [1:55:03] And you've made some very serious mischaracterizations here. [1:55:06] Yes or no? [1:55:07] Were they weeks away? [1:55:08] Yes or no? [1:55:09] And so it would be a disservice to you and the American people to answer this question [1:55:11] with a mere yes or no. [1:55:12] Reclaiming my time. [1:55:13] Reclaiming my time. [1:55:14] Were they weeks away or not? [1:55:16] The American people need to know if this was an imminent threat or not. [1:55:19] If they're weeks away or not. [1:55:21] If they're months away or not. [1:55:23] None of this dodging. [1:55:25] Were they an imminent threat? [1:55:27] Yesterday, you said that only the president, only the only person who can determine what [1:55:32] is imminent. [1:55:33] Yes or no? [1:55:34] What is an imminent threat is the president of the United States. [1:55:39] Do you stand by that statement? [1:55:40] Yes, I do. [1:55:43] Director Ratcliffe, do you agree with that assessment? [1:55:47] That the president is the only person that can determine if something is an imminent [1:55:50] threat or not? [1:55:52] The president's commander in chief gets to make a decision about what's an imminent [1:55:56] threat. [1:55:57] The intelligence. [1:55:58] So no. [1:55:59] Well, the intelligence. [1:56:00] Reclaim my time. [1:56:01] The intelligence. [1:56:02] Reclaim my time. [1:56:03] The intelligence community has provided a body of intelligence. [1:56:04] Reclaim my time. [1:56:05] Reclaim my time. [1:56:06] That supports the decision that the president made. [1:56:07] The reason why is that if the president can determine. [1:56:08] And ignore what you're doing, why do you guys even have a job? [1:56:11] Why are you even like, why do you even advise them? [1:56:13] So you're saying tomorrow the president of the United States can say China is an imminent [1:56:18] threat. [1:56:20] And then he can take his own, no matter what the intelligence says, he can take his own [1:56:24] action. [1:56:25] So that's what you're basically saying. [1:56:26] Okay. [1:56:27] Let's go on. [1:56:29] Director Gabbard, you said that North Korea has intercontinental ballistic missiles that [1:56:34] can reach the homeland yet. [1:56:37] The defense department said that. [1:56:39] Iran was at least 10 years away from achieving an intercontinental ballistic missile that [1:56:45] can reach the homeland. [1:56:46] Which one is a more serious threat, North Korea or Iran? [1:56:54] These threats are taken within the context of the total body of intelligence reporting. [1:57:00] So that's, it should be. [1:57:03] And that's my point. [1:57:06] It's not just about having the capability of building a weapon. [1:57:10] It's if they can actually deliver that weapon. [1:57:13] If they can, they, they have the intention of doing that. [1:57:18] How many weeks away are they? [1:57:21] I haven't like, we haven't, we haven't heard that there were weeks away. [1:57:25] We haven't heard that there are months away. [1:57:28] We're like, but that's what we're waiting for. [1:57:32] Imminent to me means is that they're, they're mobilizing troops. [1:57:37] They're moving things into position, artillery. [1:57:40] They're getting, getting ready to attack. [1:57:43] But everything that we've heard. [1:57:45] Yeah. [1:57:45] Is that this is not the case. [1:57:48] Gentleman's time has expired. [1:57:49] Mr. Klein. [1:57:50] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:57:54] Thank you all for being here and for the work you do. [1:57:56] Um, it's a Marvel that just one year of strong leadership from the white house has shifted [1:58:00] the conversation in this room from that of appeasement and passivity from the Biden administration [1:58:04] that of American strength brought about by the, uh, doctrine in Venezuela and operation [1:58:09] Eric epic fury in Iran. [1:58:11] And it's not lost on me that as we sit here, we have one side of the dais talking a big [1:58:16] game on threats. [1:58:17] And yet they're unwilling. [1:58:18] They're willing to defend our department of Homeland Security. [1:58:19] Uh, I want to thank president Trump's leadership in each of your efforts because of your efforts, [1:58:24] Americans are safer today with two less despots to deal with. [1:58:27] Nevertheless, there remains work to be done while Venezuela and Iran are in decline aggression [1:58:32] from adversarial nations like China and Russia and near constant threats of terrorism and [1:58:36] cyber warfare continue to persist. [1:58:41] The Chinese Communist Party in particular remains a top adversary that routinely deals [1:58:44] in bad faith. [1:58:45] And this was highlighted most recently by white house office director of national drug [1:58:49] poll control policy. [1:58:51] When she delivered recent remarks in Vienna saying, quote, we know that China's weak export [1:58:55] controls and lacks enforcement allow its chemical industry to foster friendships with the drug [1:59:00] cartels. [1:59:01] At the same time, China's overtly overly effective controls over rare earth minerals. [1:59:05] We wreak havoc on legitimate industries and quote, of course, we're now seeing reports [1:59:10] of a new synthetic opioid called cyclorphine that is said to be 10 times more potent than [1:59:15] fentanyl and undetectable on fentanyl test strips. [1:59:18] As you know, president Trump may meet with president. [1:59:21] He will be in the near future where trade and export controls will most certainly be [1:59:25] discussed. [1:59:26] Director Gabbard, what is your assessment of the quality and quantity of AI compute [1:59:33] that China can indigenously manufacture? [1:59:40] The majority of this question should be addressed in a closed hearing. [1:59:45] We the intelligence community's assessment is that China continues to rapidly advance [1:59:50] its AI capability. [1:59:51] Do you assess that export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and AI capabilities [1:59:53] will continue to advance its AI capability? [1:59:54] Yes. [1:59:55] Thank you. [1:59:56] The intelligence community's assessment and AI compute have been effective slowing the [1:59:59] development and deployment of Chinese AI. [2:00:02] The intelligence community's assessment is that one of the effects of those export controls [2:00:08] is China has increased its focus on developing its own organic capability. [2:00:14] What do you assess would be the economic and national security impacts if the US decided [2:00:18] to loosen export controls and allow the sale of Nvidia Blackwell GPUs or large numbers [2:00:24] of H200s to China? [2:00:26] I don't believe there's an intelligence community assessment on that specific scenario. [2:00:32] I think that these national security implications should weighed heavily when conducting [2:00:37] these talks, considering that fentanyl overdoses are only down in the US thanks to the president's [2:00:41] leadership in securing our borders and taking the fight directly with the cartels in our [2:00:45] hemisphere, and not the empty words and actions of the Chinese Communist Party. [2:00:52] Our adversaries are constantly conducting cyber operations on US government and private [2:00:56] sector networks to steal information or money. [2:00:58] This means that if the US goes behind China, the Chinese Communist Party can spend nearly [2:00:59] $400 million for itsCómo does this make sense for us Titan markets? [2:00:59] disruptive cyber attacks. We've just been tracking the Chinese typhoon actors for several years, [2:01:05] and just last week, the Wall Street Journal reported that salt typhoon actors, which were [2:01:09] responsible for targeting U.S. telecom, may have accessed sensitive FBI networks. I may have more [2:01:14] to follow up on in the closed session. For now, I want to discuss how the overall U.S. government [2:01:18] posture is going to change based on President Trump's cyber strategy, which was released last [2:01:22] week. I've been frustrated for some time about the unwillingness of prior administrations [2:01:26] to decisively take action, including the use of offensive cyber operations. Director Patel, [2:01:32] beginning with you, what can we expect from the FBI moving forward to be more aggressive [2:01:35] on both defensive and offensive cyber activity? Thank you, Congressman. So, as you stated, [2:01:41] the President just launched a new national security cyber strategy, and within that is what [2:01:44] the FBI just launched 60 days ago. It's the most comprehensive cyber program we've ever put out [2:01:49] called Winter Shield. And what we do, connecting pillar one and pillar four of the President's [2:01:54] strategies, is go on offense and defense. And so what we've done... [2:01:56] What we've done already is while we are always going after nation-state actors, we also have to [2:02:01] engage with the private sector communities, because they are going after the private sector as well. [2:02:06] We've held 355 engagements in the last 60 days with enterprises across America to harden their [2:02:11] networks. And as you recall, just a couple of months ago, our banking infrastructure was hit by [2:02:16] a ransomware attack from overseas. In one weekend, the FBI disrupted and kicked off every one of [2:02:21] those bad actors from that network, saving the American people their valued billions in the [2:02:26] bank vaults. So, this is some of the things we're doing, but we need constant engagement with the [2:02:31] private sector. [2:02:32] Great. General Hartman, what efforts are underway at NSA to bolster intelligence [2:02:36] collection and threat detection in coordination with other federal agencies to target adversary [2:02:42] cyber operations? [2:02:43] Congressman, thanks. [2:02:44] Briefly. [2:02:45] Significant effort to really focus our cybersecurity director working very closely with Director [2:02:53] Patel and our Cybersecurity Collaboration Center, which has... [2:02:57] That's thousands of analyst-to-analyst relationships with private organizations across the country. [2:03:03] We need more work, not just from an offensive standpoint, but working across government [2:03:08] and certainly working across private industry. And we're both dedicated and resourced to doing [2:03:12] that, Congressman. [2:03:13] Thank you for what you do. [2:03:14] I yield back. [2:03:15] Gentleman yields. Mr. Quigley. [2:03:16] Thank you. Lightning round, please. General, I understand tomorrow is your last [2:03:20] day before retirement? [2:03:21] Yes, Congressman. [2:03:23] I can think of better ways to finish things for you, but we appreciate your being [2:03:27] here. [2:03:28] And I respectfully ask you and each of you, if you have full-time personnel dedicated [2:03:34] to analyzing and collecting foreign threats on the 2026 elections. And if so, just yes [2:03:42] or no, and how many personnel we have. [2:03:46] Congressman, I'll get yes. I'll get you the exact number, but certainly we have people [2:03:49] paying attention to those threats. [2:03:50] Thank you. [2:03:51] Congressman, yes, we have an election crimes coordinator in each one of our 56 field offices [2:03:56] and election crimes coordinators at headquarters. [2:03:57] Thank you. [2:03:58] Yes. We have... [2:03:59] We have personnel dedicated both to election security as well as foreign intelligence related [2:04:04] to election influence. [2:04:05] Thank you. [2:04:06] Yes, we do as well. I don't know the numbers, but what we do collect then we [2:04:11] contribute to the larger IC coordination. [2:04:14] Thank you. [2:04:17] Representative Quigley, we do not, to my knowledge, have anyone at DIA on that [2:04:23] topic. [2:04:24] A question again for all of you. Well, first, Dr. Gabbard, you've seen the reports [2:04:31] about whether or not Russia... [2:04:33] Yes. [2:04:34] ...has helped Iran in targeting in the current war in Iran. Can you confirm that, [2:04:40] or is that something we're going to save for a closed session? [2:04:42] We'll save that for the closed session, sir. [2:04:45] But within that context, on CNBC, Steve Witkoff said on a recent call with President [2:04:55] Trump, Russian leaders denied they were sharing this target information, shock, surprise, [2:04:59] awe, that they would do that about U.S. military assets with the Iranians. Mr. Witkoff said, [2:05:05] quote, [2:05:06] So you know, quote, we can take them at their word. Let's hope they're not doing this. [2:05:13] Just from your own sense, and for many of you who have been fighting in the Cold War [2:05:17] for a long time, a long-lost sense of a Reagan doctrine, just, General, is it your sense [2:05:27] that you can take Putin at his word on anything involving military, diplomatic, or intel assessments? [2:05:40] Hey. [2:05:41] From an intelligence standpoint, we don't take anyone at their word from a foreign standpoint. [2:05:47] We execute intelligence operations to provide that information to decision-makers. [2:05:53] I appreciate that. Mr. Patel, Director? [2:05:57] I agree with the General. [2:05:58] Yes, I agree. We don't take anyone at their word. And from an intelligence standpoint, [2:06:05] we don't rely on single sources of intelligence and always look for multiple sources to confirm. [2:06:10] Director? [2:06:12] Yeah, Congressman, I actually answered this question. [2:06:14] Yesterday, I don't take Putin, Xi, Kim Jong-un, Supreme Leader, any foreign adversary leader [2:06:21] at their word, rely on our intelligence to reflect what those adversaries are actually [2:06:27] doing. [2:06:28] General? [2:06:29] We absolutely do not take any of those enemies at their word. [2:06:33] Can I get a hallelujah? [2:06:34] Mr. Gabbard, let me, I understand that you have to put your own personal views aside [2:06:44] in your position. [2:06:45] Yes. [2:06:47] But I honestly think that the issue [2:06:49] that our grandchildren are going to be most upset about us with is climate change. So, [2:06:54] you know your quote, and when you talked about climate change, as a member, it threatens [2:07:00] the safety and security of the planet, especially in places like Hawaii, where we are already [2:07:04] experiencing its devastating effects. But respectfully, it's not in worldwide threats. [2:07:11] It used to be in worldwide threats. So, let me, just help me understand, who makes the [2:07:18] final decision on what goes in here and what doesn't? [2:07:19] Mr. Gabbard? [2:07:20] Congressman, it's a collection of the intelligence [2:07:26] community's assessments that the National Intelligence Council and our experts there [2:07:31] work on. This year, we've structured the annual threat assessment around the President's [2:07:36] national security strategy to address the most tangible and direct threats to our security [2:07:42] and our interests. [2:07:43] I get that part. Did you make the case that [2:07:47] maybe climate change should be considered a worldwide threat when we are, this collective [2:07:52] process? [2:07:53] Did you make the case with what you said not that long ago? [2:07:57] Yeah. Once again, we focused on the most tangible and direct threats, given the [2:08:01] complexity of those threats that exist here and on the homeland and around the world. [2:08:06] So, that's stating that climate change isn't in any way a tangible threat now or [2:08:12] in the future. It's basically saying, we think so little of it as a threat, we don't even [2:08:17] mention it. [2:08:19] I think the changing of the climate, the weather, the environment is a factor that [2:08:23] goes into... [2:08:24] The different intelligence community assessments [2:08:27] on effects. [2:08:28] Gentleman's time has expired. Ms. Tinney. [2:08:33] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you so much to our briefers and for your service [2:08:38] to our country in multiple cases for some of you and everyone who serves in the intelligence [2:08:45] community to give the support to everyone that's serving. I fully support President [2:08:49] Trump's efforts through your agencies over the last 18 days. We have to emphasize it's [2:08:55] only been 18 days. [2:08:57] And I think it was a courageous decision. And to the American people, I know many have [2:09:02] recited this, but for the past 47 years, Iran has been the world's largest sponsor of terrorism. [2:09:10] The Islamic Republic of Iran has operated with impunity. They've destabilized the Middle [2:09:15] East, brutalized their own citizens, and had the blood of countless Americans and others [2:09:20] on their hands. And now they're paying the price for that despotism. And I want to thank [2:09:24] our service members and President Trump in making these difficult and difficult decisions. [2:09:25] Thank you. [2:09:25] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:26] Thank you. [2:09:27] Thank you. [2:09:27] Thank you. [2:09:27] Thank you. [2:09:27] Thank you. [2:09:27] Thank you. [2:09:27] Yeah. [2:09:27] Thank you. [2:09:28] Thank you. [2:09:29] Thank you. [2:09:29] Thank you. [2:09:29] Bye-bye. [2:09:29] Take care. [2:09:29] Bye. [2:09:29] But it is also stunning what the Iranian people and so many in the Middle East and around [2:09:33] the world have suffered from the regime. And I want to point out that in 2022, when [2:09:39] Amani was killed in the hands of the so-called morality police by the Iranian regime, it [2:09:45] spurned, I would say probably one of the most profound women's rights movements of our time. [2:09:53] So many women stood up in the face of certain death, or at least impressive. [2:09:59] definitely having an eye gouged out, like so many others, to stand up. [2:10:03] And I am so grateful that these people now have an opportunity to actually have some kind of regime [2:10:10] that would give them a chance at freedom after all these years. [2:10:13] And I wanted to ask Director Gabbard, some of these people and many of these people [2:10:19] do not seem to have access to outside information. [2:10:23] Can you characterize what the access would be to the Internet or cell phones [2:10:28] for those in Iran who have no idea about anything [2:10:31] and are only receiving the propaganda from the regime? [2:10:34] Congressman, I can expand on this in the closed setting, [2:10:37] but I will say briefly that throughout the period of protest that we saw previously [2:10:43] and during this ongoing conflict, the access of the Iranian people [2:10:48] to basic things like power or Internet or cell phone access is extremely limited. [2:10:54] So I wouldn't ask the General, since General James [2:10:58] — [2:10:59] In this same vein, do you think that the internet suppression by the Iranian regime [2:11:05] is an objective that would be protecting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps? [2:11:11] Yes, ma'am. It's a TTP, and we will go into great detail in the classified, [2:11:18] but it's definitely a TTP to maintain control. [2:11:21] Thank you. I appreciate that. I look forward to that. [2:11:23] I want to turn to the northern border, which I represent, [2:11:26] most of the northern border with the state of New York, [2:11:29] across the Lake Ontario shoreline. [2:11:31] We know that many, many on the foreign terror watch list, [2:11:35] in 2024, 358 suspects were found and arrested on the northern border. [2:11:41] Fiscal year 2025, that number has been reduced to 307. [2:11:45] I wanted to ask Director Patel, how would you characterize the type of those types of people [2:11:51] that you have obtained, arrested, or encountered on the northern border? [2:11:56] Cartels, Islamic terror, organized crime? [2:11:58] How would you characterize those people, if you can? [2:12:02] Thank you, Congresswoman. [2:12:03] With the solidification and reinforcement of the southern border, [2:12:06] the northern border has become a target of opportunity for foreign terrorist organizations, [2:12:11] cartels, those that wish to conduct espionage activities, basically all of the above. [2:12:16] How would you characterize the partnership of our Canadian friends to the north [2:12:21] and their willingness to stop these individuals, especially in the last year or so? [2:12:25] At the FBI, we have engaged with the RCMP, [2:12:27] and their intel services at levels never seen before, [2:12:30] to specifically focus on the fentanyl productions north of our border. [2:12:35] The cartels have shifted their operations to produce the lethal fentanyl that kills so many Americans. [2:12:41] So that's one example where we're focused and locked in with our partners north of the border. [2:12:45] Thank you very much. I appreciate that. [2:12:46] One last thing I just wanted to ask. [2:12:47] Upstate New York is now the new home to Micron, [2:12:50] one of the world's three leading memory manufacturers and the only U.S. leading memory company. [2:12:56] Memory produced in Micron is an integral component of the GPUs [2:13:01] used to train America's dominant frontier models. [2:13:04] I'd love to find out, Director Ratcliffe, [2:13:09] what would be the economic and national security implications if China were to catch up on the U.S. [2:13:15] on memory, GPUs, critical minerals, all those things that go into everything leading up to this, [2:13:22] including the advent of AI? [2:13:24] Well, what you've seen, [2:13:26] Congresswoman, is that when China can take advantage of things in the supply chain like critical minerals, [2:13:32] they'll do that. [2:13:34] This is particularly problematic in the area of all emerging technologies and AI in particular. [2:13:42] Obviously, whoever is dominant in the technology fields in the future will dictate the rules in the international marketplace. [2:13:50] It would be devastating if China were ahead of us. [2:13:53] Thank you. I appreciate it. I yield back. [2:13:55] Mr. Cohen. [2:13:57] Thank you, Mr. Chair. [2:14:00] Dr. Patel, you had a question from Dr. Jackson about the shutdown we're in now with Homeland Security. [2:14:07] And I believe you said that this time this would be harmful to America because of the threat from Iran. [2:14:17] Is that correct? [2:14:18] Did I recall that correctly? [2:14:19] Generally, yes, sir. [2:14:20] How many days before we invaded Iran did you know we were going to launch an invasion? [2:14:26] We can get into those details in a classified setting, but I work with my colleagues across the spectrum here [2:14:32] to give me advance warnings so that we can reinforce it. [2:14:35] Was it two days, three days, a month? [2:14:37] It was sometime before that, sir. [2:14:39] Sometime before that. [2:14:41] With that knowledge, why did you fire at least a dozen agents in Counterintelligence Unit 12 that specializes in Iran counterintelligence, [2:14:50] which makes us much less secure and safe with this war going on from Iranian attacks potentially against our country? [2:14:57] As I said earlier, Congressman, I don't work on timelines when these terminations occur. [2:15:01] There are internal investigations conducted by the careers at the FBI that highlight unethical or inappropriate conduct, [2:15:07] and it's up to me to make the decision. [2:15:09] But our Iran Threats Mission Center has never been more resourced. [2:15:12] As I've highlighted, a 43 percent increase in counterespionage arrests from Iran alone [2:15:16] and 360 ongoing terrorism investigations with Iran-affiliated individuals. [2:15:20] And the people you fired, those 12 people, they were experts on Iran, were they not? [2:15:24] I don't believe so. [2:15:25] They worked in counterintelligence, did they not? [2:15:27] I'm taking you at your word, sir. I'm not familiar with every single word. [2:15:31] You're the chief director. I'm not. [2:15:32] You should know the answer. You fired the people. Where did they work? [2:15:36] People were terminated for violating their ethical obligations and the high standards that they have. [2:15:40] Was the ethical violations that they dealt with the case of the classified documents that were found at the bathroom in Mar-a-Lago, [2:15:47] was that the ethical issue? [2:15:50] As I said earlier, all those matters are pending litigation, so I'm not going to comment on them. [2:15:54] Director Gabbard, are you familiar with CI-12? [2:15:59] I'm not, Congressman. [2:16:02] Okay. Let me ask you this question. [2:16:07] In the Intelligence Community's unclassified annual threat assessment from last year, it said, [2:16:11] quote, Iran's large conventional forces are capable of inflicting substantial damage to an attacker, executing regional strikes, [2:16:19] and disrupting shipping, particularly energy supplies, to the Strait of Hormuz. [2:16:24] It seems the IC was entirely correct in its assessment about Iranian retaliation in the Strait. [2:16:31] Did the IC's assessment about Iranian capabilities in the Strait of Hormuz change in the past year? [2:16:36] No, Congressman. [2:16:39] Did Iran still have the capability to threaten shipping in the Straits of Hormuz with missiles, mines, and small boats? [2:16:46] Their capabilities have been largely degraded, but yes, they still have means to threaten passage through the Strait of Hormuz. [2:16:54] And how long can they keep the Strait closed? [2:16:59] Based on current events, I'd have to get an updated assessment from the Intelligence Community on that. [2:17:05] Did you have an analysis of the impact of a war on global supply chains and the price of oil and gas? [2:17:12] I believe that assessment may have come from the IC. [2:17:15] That assessment may have come from the Department of Treasury or Energy. [2:17:18] It didn't come through your office? [2:17:22] It came from their element within the Department of Energy or Energy. [2:17:28] Do you know if the President was briefed on those assessments? [2:17:33] I believe so, but I can't confirm. [2:17:35] So if he was briefed on those assessments that that was a problem and the Straits of Hormuz could be shut off [2:17:41] and that's causing a great problem in the world's economy with oil prices going up to $120 or something a barrel [2:17:49] and an effect on all countries' economies, [2:17:52] why would the President not have taken actions to strengthen defense around the Strait of Hormuz? [2:18:00] All I can say is that the President ultimately is responsible for making the decisions [2:18:06] based on the totality of information and intelligence that he has available to him. [2:18:11] The intelligence that he has available to him, that's a scary thought. [2:18:15] Does the IC know where Iran's enriched uranium is? [2:18:20] The IC has high confidence that we know where it is. [2:18:24] And can you tell us that in classified? [2:18:27] We can speak more about this topic in the classified setting. [2:18:30] Okay. [2:18:31] Could it be we have methods of destroying it? [2:18:36] This is a conversation for a closed setting, sir. [2:18:43] Do you have an idea what the purpose of the Marines being sent, the units that are being sent over there, [2:18:49] is the idea that we will put troops with boots on the ground in Iran? [2:18:53] ODNI and the IC is not involved in the operational planning and movements of the Department of War. [2:19:00] Absolutely. [2:19:01] It's the very core assets. [2:19:02] Thank you. [2:19:03] I'll be very honest with you. [2:19:04] When you read us your original comments, it was kind of scary because of all the craziness that goes on in the world. [2:19:10] I can't wait for the classified setting. [2:19:12] Thank you. [2:19:13] Mr. Perry. [2:19:15] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:19:16] It's good to see some old colleagues. [2:19:18] And thank you for your service, gentlemen and ma'am. [2:19:22] I'm going to start with General Hartman, General Adams. [2:19:25] Do you know how many days it's been since Russia went into Ukraine? [2:19:29] I'll answer it for you. [2:19:32] It's 1,480 days. [2:19:33] 1980. Do you know how much money the United States government has spent, the taxpayers [2:19:39] have spent in the war in Ukraine? I'm going to round it for you. It's about $200 billion. I mean, [2:19:45] maybe it's a lot more, maybe it's a little less. It's hard to tell around this place. [2:19:50] To the best of your knowledge, was Russia an imminent threat to the United States [2:19:55] when they went into Ukraine, to the best of your knowledge? Sir? [2:20:07] Congressman, I wasn't in this position. [2:20:09] I understand. [2:20:09] When that decision was made. [2:20:12] I'm saying to the best of your knowledge. I know it goes back 1,480 days. [2:20:16] So certainly, I don't think it was in the best interest of the United States for [2:20:19] Russia. [2:20:20] Was Russia an imminent threat is what I'm asking? [2:20:23] Not my decision to make or advice to provide. [2:20:27] Okay. How about you, General Adams? [2:20:31] Like General Hartman, I was in a different position many four years ago. [2:20:37] And to make that assessment, I guess, can I ask you to clarify? Are you saying [2:20:43] was Russia going to attack the United States 1,480 days ago? [2:20:50] Not to my knowledge. [2:20:51] Yeah. All right. You recall who the president was at that time, [2:20:56] gentlemen? I'll help you out. It was President Biden. Do you know who the Speaker of the House [2:21:01] was at that time? The name Ms. Pelosi ring a bell? Do you recall this Congress declaring war, [2:21:13] Russia and Ukraine, 1,480 days ago or any time between then and now? I don't either. Do you know, [2:21:22] gentlemen, how many? [2:21:24] Uniformed service members have been killed or maimed attributed to Iran, the IRGC, [2:21:32] their proxies, et cetera, roughly. Any idea? Could we say probably 1,000 killed, if not [2:21:40] over 10,000 killed and maimed? Probably a reasonable assessment. You know how many [2:21:47] uniformed service members have been killed by Russia in the last 1,480 days? American [2:21:53] uniformed service personnel? I'm just asking. I don't know of any, but do you know of any? [2:22:00] It seems to me that there's almost like a political narrative being constructed here. And I just want [2:22:07] to, you know, point out this. It seems like a bit of an irony. I'm going to go to the director of the [2:22:14] FBI. It's good to see you, Mr. Patel. Crossfire hurricane, round river, plasmic echo, Arctic frost [2:22:23] seem to have emanated from the counterintelligence division of the FBI. Is that a reasonably correct [2:22:32] assessment, generally speaking? [2:22:33] Generally speaking, Congressman, I want to be careful here because there are a number [2:22:37] of ongoing investigations. [2:22:38] I understand. There's a filing system that prohibited, well, with prohibited access. [2:22:46] Is it possible that that politicized investigation and filing system violated Sixth Amendment [2:22:53] rights to the discovery and Congress's Article I oversight authorities if possible? [2:22:58] Without giving you a definitive answer that rests with the DOJ, let me just talk about [2:23:03] prohibited case files real quick. [2:23:04] Sure. [2:23:05] Prohibited case files are basically files that prior directors had created to essentially hide what was [2:23:12] going on. They do not exist in our sentinel systems. They do not exist anywhere. And if you search for that [2:23:18] specific case, it won't even come up, which is why I, as the first FBI director to do so, have terminated [2:23:23] prohibited case files. And as you know, I'm wed to constitutional oversight here at Congress and have [2:23:28] delivered 50,000 pages, which is 400% more increase than my two predecessors combined. [2:23:33] Director, would ensnaring individuals... [2:23:35] Organizations based solely on their political affiliations or viewpoints be a potential violation of the Fourth Amendment? [2:23:42] I believe so. [2:23:44] Have any of the personnel associated with these activities, and I understand that investigations may be ongoing, have they been removed from duty pending the outcome investigation? [2:23:55] Yes, many have. [2:23:57] Okay. Moving on. I'm concerned about a lab that was found in a clandestine Chinese bio lab that was found in California and then one that was found later. [2:24:07] Was it last month in a concentration camp? [2:24:10] It was last month in Las Vegas in Nevada. [2:24:15] Are you concerned about a lack of vision or imagination in agents that solely work [2:24:22] on a case, and can't see that china has the capability and the impetus to do these things [2:24:31] all around the country. [2:24:34] Have you done anything about that? [2:24:35] Changing that? [2:24:36] That training or that operational conduct of agents? [2:24:37] We're the ones that figured it out, not just in Las Vegas, but places like Michigan, where we arrested multiple individuals who were pretending to be researchers at the University of Michigan while bringing in lethal pathogens and trying to steal our trade secrets and our agricultural secrets, which is national security. [2:24:50] So this FBI is laser-focused on the Chinese threat, especially related to biolabs and agricultural theft. [2:24:56] Appreciate the response. I'll yield the balance. [2:24:59] Mr. Fallin. [2:25:02] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:25:02] You know, I would be remiss if I didn't mention Operation Absolute Resolve and the arrest and capture of Nicolas Maduro and his wife. [2:25:11] It was incredibly complex. It was bold. It was unprecedented. It was a wild success. [2:25:17] It really harkens thoughts of Ray, Donna, and Tebbe 50 years ago, except this actually remarkably exceeded that in its success. [2:25:26] It was historic, and it altered undeniably the geopolitical landscape in the United States. [2:25:32] So our military and our IC should be lauded, and I want to offer a hearty and deserved congratulations to all of you that are testifying before us today. Thank you. [2:25:47] Director Ratcliffe, I want to just visit with you a little bit. [2:25:49] First, I do want to take a point of personal privilege. [2:25:52] I attended Coach Holtz's funeral one day. [2:25:54] He was very proud of you. [2:25:58] How long has Iran been pursuing a nuclear weapon, Director? [2:26:05] Congressman, let me respond. [2:26:07] I appreciate the kind remarks, and I also want to congratulate the people of the 4th District of Texas for getting a lot better representation than they ever did from the guy that was previously in that seat. [2:26:21] Notwithstanding, as I talked about, a fatwa that was issued, I believe, in 2004, Iran has had a dedicated nuclear program beyond civil limits for the development of nuclear weapons. [2:26:36] They currently possess. [2:26:37] at least 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium at 60% weapons grade that would be capable of putting together 10 nuclear weapons. [2:26:49] Director, what nation state has achieved 60% enrichment and then not produced a nuclear weapon? [2:26:57] I'm not aware of any. [2:26:58] There's none. [2:26:59] You get to 60%. [2:27:00] There's a reason you're at 60%, because you are pursuing nuclear ambitions. [2:27:04] So we have sanctions have been imposed in the past. [2:27:08] And yet. [2:27:09] That pursuit continued. [2:27:10] Their economy was teetering. [2:27:12] The pursuit continued. [2:27:14] Their people were suffering. [2:27:16] The pursuit continued. [2:27:18] Under the Bush, Obama, Trump 45. [2:27:20] Biden now, Trump 47. [2:27:22] That pursuit continued. [2:27:24] Then last June, Operation Midnight Hammer. [2:27:26] Nuclear program was dealt a significant setback. [2:27:28] But not only that. [2:27:30] The autocratic, illegitimate regime in Tehran witnessed first hand that the American resolve under this administration should be taken very seriously. [2:27:36] That's why I'm here today. [2:27:38] I want to read you a few quotes. [2:27:40] Iran will never be permitted to build a nuclear weapon. [2:27:43] Barack Obama, 15. [2:27:45] The message to Iran should be loud and clear. [2:27:47] We will never allow you to acquire a nuclear weapon. [2:27:49] Never. [2:27:51] Hillary Clinton. [2:27:53] Iran will never get a nuclear weapon on my watch. [2:27:55] Iran can never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. [2:27:57] Joe Biden. [2:27:59] Make no mistake. [2:28:01] As president, I will never hesitate to take whatever action is necessary to defend American forces and interests from Iran. [2:28:03] Kamala Harris. [2:28:05] I will never hesitate to take whatever action is necessary to defend American forces and interests from Iran. [2:28:07] Kamala Harris. [2:28:08] I will never hesitate to take whatever action is necessary to defend American forces and interests from Iran. [2:28:10] Kamala Harris. [2:28:12] So last June we have Midnight Hammer. [2:28:14] And not only did they see the resolve, [2:28:16] they saw that we were committed to actually taking action, and not just the words at this time. [2:28:18] They saw that we were committed to actually taking action, and not just the words at this time. [2:28:22] And even after all of that, [2:28:24] did they abandon their pursuit and their nuclear program? [2:28:27] did they abandon their pursuit and their nuclear program? [2:28:29] They absolutely did not, Congressman. [2:28:31] I think you point out [2:28:33] the success of Operation Midnight Hammer [2:28:35] is that one of the things that we assess in the intelligence community [2:28:37] is that one of the things that we assess in the intelligence community [2:28:39] broadly, is that since that operation, Iran has been unable to enrich a single kilogram [2:28:47] of uranium to 60 percent since that operation. But as you correctly point out, Congressman, [2:28:54] notwithstanding that, our intelligence is also clear that they have not lost their ambition [2:29:00] and that the activities to rebuild or reconstitute their nuclear facilities [2:29:08] and centrifuges is something that the intelligence, there's a body of intelligence that I think [2:29:14] confirms that. Then we had eight months of negotiations and attempted diplomacy. They [2:29:19] proved fruitless, and yet the pursuit continued. And then, Director, is there any intelligence or [2:29:26] evidence that the Supreme Leader and his thug mullahs, after all that, [2:29:31] at the beginning of the day, were able to do that? [2:29:32] I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. [2:29:32] At the beginning of this year, we're going to finally stop their pursuit of their nuclear [2:29:38] weapon in their program. No. So we have some folks here that are splitting hairs about eminent [2:29:45] threat. You know what? Was it a grave threat, Director, in your opinion? Nuclear weapons are [2:29:50] a grave threat in the hands of religious ideologues. 60 percent enrichment. No nation-state that [2:29:56] achieved that hadn't produced a nuclear weapon. We can either talk about it, kick the can down the [2:30:00] road, and let them get a nuclear weapon and get danger close to it on the precipice, or we can [2:30:05] take action now, and this is what this administration chose to do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield [2:30:08] back. Mr. Stubbe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Every day, the brave men and women of our intelligence [2:30:14] community, armed forces, and federal law enforcement work to protect our homeland [2:30:17] from a constant and evolving array of threats. But since Democrats chose to shut down the [2:30:21] Department of Homeland Security, those threats have grown more acute. Our country has already [2:30:26] experienced four terrorist attacks since the shutdown began. The consequences are no longer [2:30:30] hypothetical. They are unfolding in real time. At a moment when the global threat environment is [2:30:35] intensifying, terrorist organizations are resurging, and adversaries continue to encourage [2:30:39] violence against Americans. Congress should be reinforcing our defenses. Instead, Democrats have [2:30:44] sidelined the very department responsible for keeping the homeland safe. Not a single Democrat [2:30:49] here on this committee voted to reopen the Department of Homeland Security. That was not [2:30:53] an accident. It was a political decision made at the expense of the safety and security of the [2:30:58] American people. As threats to our homelands rise and our enemies grow more emboldened, this decision [2:31:05] is action with dysfunction. Each day, the threat environment worsens, and with it, the risk to the [2:31:10] American people, which is indefensible. Do each of you agree that the reckless Democratic shutdown of [2:31:15] the Department of Homeland Security has affected your agency's ability to detect, deter, and respond [2:31:21] to threats against the homeland? Specifically, has it impacted intelligence sharing, operational [2:31:26] coordination, or your capacity to prevent attacks? General Hartman. [2:31:32] Congressman, it hasn't had a significant impact on the foreign intelligence mission of the National [2:31:36] Security Agency. [2:31:37] Director Patel. [2:31:38] The shutdown has had a significant impact on how we protect and defend the homeland. [2:31:42] Director Gabbard. [2:31:44] This has directly affected the intelligence elements within the Department of Homeland [2:31:49] Security negatively. [2:31:50] Director Ratcliffe. [2:31:52] I would agree with the Director of National Intelligence. [2:31:54] General Adams. [2:31:57] No significant impact on the Defense Intelligence Agency and the foreign threat that we analyze. [2:32:04] So, Director Gabbard, you, in your opening statement, talked about the threats to the [2:32:07] homeland and the changes that you've made as it relates to the border and the [2:32:10] changes you've made as it relates to the border and the changes you've made as it relates to the [2:32:10] border and the changes you've made as it relates to the border and the changes that the President [2:32:11] has made after four years of open border policies under President Biden during which [2:32:16] cartels and gangs expanded their operations into American cities. [2:32:20] What specific actions has ODNI taken to disrupt these criminal cartels and networks [2:32:25] and stop the fentanyl poisoning and murdering U.S. citizens? [2:32:28] Thank you for the question, Congressman. [2:32:30] We've taken several actions to be able to get after this threat that the President made a [2:32:36] priority. [2:32:37] Number one being making historic shifts in [2:32:41] intelligence collection towards addressing this threat. [2:32:44] I believe it is the biggest shift in intelligence [2:32:47] capabilities that we've ever seen, or certainly in a long time. [2:32:52] The integration and cooperation between our National Counterterrorism Center [2:32:57] with the DEA and other Department of Homeland Security elements is also unprecedented. [2:33:04] We have taken and coordinated the collection of individuals known and suspected terrorists, [2:33:10] known and suspected cartel members' leaders, and inputted that into the TIDE system, [2:33:15] which has radically increased and improved our ability to identify those [2:33:19] who are cartel and gang members trying to enter our country, and those who may already be in our [2:33:25] country. [2:33:26] National Counterterrorism Center has been working, again, [2:33:28] in coordination with our interagency partners to get after the financial [2:33:32] networks that these cartels and gangs rely upon to be able to continue to fund. [2:33:38] As Director Patel has spoken in previousALK Привет. [2:33:39] Thank you. [2:33:40] Patel has spoken about, we have national counterterrorism elements that sit within the Joint Terrorism [2:33:47] Task Forces and support the interagency efforts to continue to get after this threat very [2:33:53] effectively. [2:33:54] MR. [2:33:55] Thank you. [2:33:56] Director Patel, Mr. Cohen was asking you about a recent firing of counterespionage agents [2:34:00] with Iranian expertise. [2:34:02] You and the FBI are taking and will continue to take all required steps to keep the American [2:34:06] people safe during President Trump's historic military action against an oppressive and [2:34:10] evil Iranian regime. [2:34:11] Is that correct? [2:34:12] MR. [2:34:13] Absolutely. [2:34:14] And there's 36,000 people employed at this FBI, and I reject the notion wholeheartedly [2:34:19] that the determination of those that were weaponizing law enforcement are the only ones [2:34:22] that can do the mission. [2:34:23] There's a 43 percent increase in counterintelligence and espionage arrests just related to Iran [2:34:28] alone, which is a record year for the FBI. [2:34:30] MR. [2:34:31] Well, and you plussed up nearly 1,000 agents in the field throughout the United [2:34:33] States since this has occurred? [2:34:34] MR. [2:34:35] Yes, sir. [2:34:36] MR. [2:34:37] And there's a document that you posted on X, and I think that's what you have [2:34:40] on your website. [2:34:40] MR. [2:34:41] Yes, sir. [2:34:42] MR. [2:34:43] And there's a document that I have in front of you about all of the wins and the [2:34:44] changes that the FBI has made under your leadership and President Trump's leadership during 2025 [2:34:48] and the little time that I have remaining. [2:34:49] Could you just highlight some of that for the American people? [2:34:51] MR. [2:34:52] Thank you. [2:34:53] Under the Trump administration, this FBI has literally had a historic year. [2:34:55] We have 112 increase – 112 percent increase in violent offenders arrested last year alone, [2:35:00] a 20 percent decrease in homicides, 20 percent decrease in robberies. [2:35:05] We have disrupted 1,800 criminal gangs. [2:35:07] That's a 210 percent increase. [2:35:09] We've seized enough fentanyl. [2:35:10] To kill 178 million Americans, that's a 31 percent increase. [2:35:14] We have gone after the most vulnerable in our society, protecting children, a 490 percent [2:35:19] increase in arrests on those that prey on our children online. [2:35:23] We have located, found, and identified 6,200 missing kids. [2:35:27] That's a 30 percent increase. [2:35:28] We have dismantled and taken down 1,700 child predators. [2:35:33] That's a 17 percent increase. [2:35:34] And those that wish to traffic our young American citizens and women, 300 human trafficking. [2:35:40] That's a 15 percent increase. [2:35:41] And 7 – 7 of the FBI's top 10 most wanted fugitives in the world have been apprehended [2:35:42] in the last 13 months. [2:35:43] To put that into perspective, there was four in the prior four years. [2:35:44] So this FBI, under President Trump, is fully stocked to get after every single fight we [2:35:45] have. [2:35:46] And these are just some of the statistics. [2:35:47] So I thank you for letting me highlight those. [2:35:48] Thank you. [2:35:49] My time has expired. [2:35:50] MR. [2:35:51] Mr. Crenshaw. [2:35:52] Thank you all for being here in this marathon, two-day marathon. [2:35:53] Thank you. [2:35:54] Thank you. [2:35:55] Thank you. [2:35:56] Thank you. [2:35:57] Thank you. [2:35:58] Thank you. [2:35:59] Thank you. [2:36:00] Thank you. [2:36:01] Thank you. [2:36:02] Thank you. [2:36:03] Thank you. [2:36:04] Thank you. [2:36:05] Thank you. [2:36:07] Thank you. [2:36:09] Thank you. [2:36:10] Thank you. [2:36:11] Thank you. [2:36:12] MAJOR CENTER WITH FIZZA [2:36:13] My pleasure. [2:36:14] I think we were at an irritating two-day marathon. [2:36:15] I appreciate y'all. [2:36:16] I want to talk about FIZZA, because we all have scars on our back from two years ago [2:36:18] when we were authorized FIZZA. [2:36:20] I anticipate it being easier this time. [2:36:21] But I still want to go over the myths that the public believes and that many members [2:36:27] of this Congress believe. [2:36:29] Mr. Patel, I'll focus on you here. [2:36:32] Myth number one has to do with 702 vs. FIZZA Title I. [2:36:38] Trump was targeted with FIZZA 702. [2:36:40] 702. Is that a myth? That's a myth. It's not true. Well, just real quick, how was President [2:36:47] Trump targeted under a crossfire hurricane? Under FISA Title I, Title III authorities, [2:36:53] information was presented to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a search warrant, [2:36:57] to surveil individuals associated with the Trump campaign, which was later revealed through the [2:37:01] House Intelligence Committee's work, that the information collected was not only unverified, [2:37:05] but individuals lied in that application, individuals that were government officials. [2:37:09] I think it's worth pointing out that whether this process was FISA or in regular court, [2:37:16] it was still lies told by the people trying to get the warrant. It had nothing to do with FISA, [2:37:21] it was simply the people trying to get the warrant were lying. Okay, myth number two, [2:37:25] a query means that we're spying on Americans, means we're reading in their inboxes, [2:37:31] we're getting inside their text messages, all of that. Is that true? [2:37:35] No, I'm going to borrow General Hartman's answer. A query of 702, [2:37:39] is pursuant to lawfully collected information of non-U.S. citizens overseas. [2:37:46] Right, so if you query an American citizen, are you accessing their inbox? [2:37:51] No. You're just seeing if they have spoken to somebody who was a foreign intelligence officer, [2:37:58] let's say, and you would know they've spoken to them because they would show up [2:38:02] as part of that conversation. In foreign intelligence collection. [2:38:05] In foreign intelligence collection. And if you wanted to get inside their inbox, [2:38:11] you would have to get an actual warrant. [2:38:13] Under current law, right? A U.S. person. [2:38:16] A warrant or a subpoena process, yes sir. [2:38:19] Okay, so that's a really important distinction. [2:38:22] Congressman, if I could just, but you wouldn't use FAA 702 to do that? [2:38:26] Correct. [2:38:28] To get in the, I just want to be clear about that. [2:38:30] Yes, you would not. You would use your regular court process. [2:38:33] No authority under 702 to collect intelligence intentionally against U.S. persons. [2:38:38] Absolutely. [2:38:39] Right, yeah, so when somebody, and let's say their name rhymes with, I don't know, Tucker, [2:38:46] Tucker Carlson, is claiming that the CIA is spying on him, I would, I'm going to guess [2:38:52] here because I don't know, I'm going to guess that the most likely scenario is that in the [2:38:56] process of him speaking with Iranian intelligence officials, it is incidentally collected. [2:39:02] Nobody is spying on Tucker Carlson or his inbox, to my knowledge at least. [2:39:06] Number three, another myth, a warrant requirement, should it be required by law, is, it's, for [2:39:13] a simple query, that should be easy to get, right? [2:39:17] What's the problem? [2:39:18] It's easy to get a warrant, we do it all the time. [2:39:20] Would it be easy? [2:39:23] In my opinion, no, but. [2:39:26] And the reason it wouldn't be easy is because oftentimes these queries are part of a very [2:39:31] typical analytical process, and they would not meet the judicial standards of probable cause. [2:39:38] And I've seen many examples of this. [2:39:39] I would love if you guys had some examples that are declassified. [2:39:43] I've seen them in a classified session. [2:39:46] So I guess my, my, my point is, and now that we've debunked these, we're going to talk about [2:39:49] these myths, is you put that warrant process on a simple query, you're taking away our [2:39:55] analysts' ability to connect the dots, to connect the dots from the outside actors, [2:39:59] which we, we can collect on, they have no constitutional protections, but you're removing [2:40:04] our ability to connect them with the inside actors, which is kind of where it matters. [2:40:08] It's like, it's like giving up when you're, when you're, when you're right at the goal [2:40:12] line. [2:40:13] That makes zero sense to do, and that's exactly what this would do. [2:40:17] Do you, I've already, I've already heard Director Ratcliffe's answer on this. [2:40:19] But 18 months, reauthorization, clean reauthorization, does that, I don't know where that number [2:40:25] came from, but is, would you rather have it longer? [2:40:29] As Director Ratcliffe said, I'd like five or 10 years. [2:40:31] Okay. [2:40:32] Me too. [2:40:34] We went over that really quickly and well. [2:40:38] I yield back. [2:40:39] Thank you. [2:40:43] Mr. Hill. [2:40:44] Thank you, Chairman. [2:40:45] Thank you, panel, for being with us this morning. [2:40:46] And let me start with Director Gabbard. [2:40:48] You've heard from Mr. Stubbe, you've heard from Admiral Jackson, you've heard from Ms. [2:40:52] Tinney. [2:40:53] All this aspect of. [2:40:54] And I think you know, we've had a very, very good discussion about who we've encountered [2:40:57] at our borders, north and south, and during the Biden administration with the open border [2:41:00] that has been overly discussed today at length, there's this known and suspected terrorist. [2:41:07] And I want to congratulate the Trump administration for getting, I think, 1300 people identified [2:41:12] out of the country under your 13 months. [2:41:15] So congratulations on that. [2:41:17] But for three years in both classified and unclassified sessions here, I've raised this [2:41:21] issue that we don't have the data and we don't track it. [2:41:24] track it in a fused way, meaning border patrol, TSA, FBI and follow-up, DOJ and prosecutions. [2:41:33] And we don't really have that at our fingertips for oversight purposes. [2:41:38] And I asked you at last year's Worldwide Threats, would you commit to helping us achieve as [2:41:44] the ODNI that fused data. [2:41:47] You agreed, but it was only three days ago I got that commitment from you in writing. [2:41:52] So let me ask you again, can you help drive that process across the bureaucracy to get [2:41:57] that regularly provided to the Intelligence Committees? [2:42:00] MS. [2:42:02] Sir, thank you for the follow-up on that. [2:42:03] We have continued to work to improve that consolidated use of systems that will better [2:42:11] help us identify who is in our country, who are known or suspected terrorists, to include [2:42:17] those who are members or leaders of cartels and gangs and drug traffickers. [2:42:22] And we're continuing to do that. [2:42:22] MS. [2:42:22] Thank you. [2:42:23] MS. [2:42:24] And we're continuing to – we're continuing to pursue that, particularly with [2:42:27] the Department of State and their screening and vetting practices, as well as the Department [2:42:31] of Homeland Security's. [2:42:34] I will say that there has been a drastic improvement in our own screening and vetting systems, [2:42:39] and that coordination is occurring. [2:42:42] But there are still some silos that need to be broken down. [2:42:44] SECRETARY BLINKEN Also, in follow-up to the discussion today, [2:42:48] I heard my friend from California, Mr. Barra, assert that President Trump's action in [2:42:54] Epic Fury was unconstitutional. [2:42:56] Do you think it was unconstitutional, the decision taken by the President? [2:42:59] MS. [2:43:01] That's a legal question, sir, that I believe has been asked and answered by the [2:43:05] White House Counsel. [2:43:06] SECRETARY BLINKEN But don't you think in Article II, Power and the War Powers Act, [2:43:09] the President has the right to defend American interests, allied interests? [2:43:12] MS. [2:43:13] He does. [2:43:14] SECRETARY BLINKEN And he can do that for 60 days? [2:43:15] And do you – did the President – and you consult with the Gang of Eight in Congress [2:43:19] before the President took military operations? [2:43:22] MS. [2:43:24] My understanding is the Secretary of State – [2:43:26] SECRETARY BLINKEN Yes. [2:43:27] MS. [2:43:28] – fulfilled that responsibility. [2:43:29] SECRETARY BLINKEN Yes. [2:43:30] I think that's clear. [2:43:31] I don't recall President Obama, for example, declaring war for seven months of operations [2:43:35] in Libya. [2:43:36] So I think there's a lot of hypocrisy here as we try to defend American interests. [2:43:44] Mr. Klein asked you about and made a good comment, I thought, about – and he talked [2:43:49] to Director Patel about this – on this issue of Winter Shield and doing a better job of [2:43:57] coordinating offensive and defensive operations. [2:43:59] MS. [2:43:59] Yes. [2:44:00] SECRETARY BLINKEN And I think the Department of Defense has done a good job of coordinating [2:44:01] offensive and defensive cyber here in the homeland. [2:44:03] And I think that's another place, Director, where I think you should play an outsized [2:44:06] role to coordinate, again, this issue of all operations. [2:44:10] I'm very concerned that we don't have a fused – I'm going to use that word again [2:44:14] – civil defense posture on cyber defense, because we're too compartmentalized. [2:44:22] We're too siloed between who's with the military and not with the military, who's [2:44:27] got classifications and who doesn't. [2:44:29] MS. [2:44:30] me on trying to design a way for our governors, our private sector, the FBI, to work better [2:44:37] on countering state actors in our private sector. [2:44:41] MS. [2:44:42] Yes, sir. [2:44:43] I would look forward to working with you on that. [2:44:45] And we'll just comment this would have to be done in conjunction with the Department [2:44:49] of Homeland Security and CISA, given their statutory responsibilities. [2:44:54] The integration and coordination with the private sector remains one of the biggest [2:44:57] imperatives, but also in some cases challenges for folks who choose not to work with the [2:45:04] U.S. government. [2:45:05] MR. [2:45:06] I agree. [2:45:07] I sit on the CISA, you know, subcommittee here. [2:45:08] I just am very concerned about it. [2:45:10] And I think our whole committee has been concerned about the assessment we have on offensive [2:45:13] cyber, so we look forward to that. [2:45:16] Finally, Director Ratcliffe, thanks for you being here, and it's wonderful to see you. [2:45:20] Thanks for our decade of friendship. [2:45:22] I want to say that I've traveled significantly with the Chairman to Latin America, and I [2:45:27] want to say your state. [2:45:27] I've had a lot of conversations throughout the Western Hemisphere doing an outstanding [2:45:31] job. [2:45:32] Would you say that we're back on track countering great power rivals in the Western Hemisphere? [2:45:36] MR. [2:45:38] I would. [2:45:39] Thank you for the compliments for the workforce that I'm privileged to lead. [2:45:43] And I do think the President's policies in making the Western Hemisphere a priority are [2:45:50] really clear. [2:45:52] Obviously the success of Operation Absolute Resolve. [2:45:56] It's funny, Congressman. [2:45:57] No one's talking about Venezuela because things are going so well in Venezuela. [2:46:04] But it really shows the commitment that the President has to taking care of business for [2:46:08] American interests in our own hemisphere. [2:46:10] And it's not limited to Venezuela. [2:46:12] It's throughout Central and South America. [2:46:16] And I think that you'll continue to see continued progress with respect to that. [2:46:20] Thank you. [2:46:21] And I thank all of you for your service to your country. [2:46:22] And I yield back. [2:46:26] MR. [2:46:27] Thank you, Mr. Hill. [2:46:28] Before we dismiss, I'm going to ask all members of the audience to please stand. [2:46:28] Thank you, Mr. Hill. [2:46:29] Thank you, Mr. Hill. [2:46:29] All members of the audience, all members and staff, to remain seated until the witnesses [2:46:33] have cleared, giving them an opportunity to proceed to our closed setting, which we will [2:46:40] reconvene at 1130 to resume in HVC 304. [2:46:47] With that said, please remain seated until the witnesses have cleared. [2:46:51] And this proceeding is adjourned.