Judge Sentences Mom for Role in Pastor’s Abuse of Daughters

[00:00:00] Speaker 1: All right, as it's been stated, we're here in sentencing in the state of Tennessee versus Chantelle-Darlick, case number 9-1404-B. In determining what is an appropriate sentencing sentence for these offenses, I've considered the evidence presented at the trial, which the court presided over, as well as the sentencing hearing today. We have had, as approved today, we've got the pre-sentence report. We have the additional letters in support of Ms. Scarlett. We have testimony from our brother today, as well as the allocution statement from Ms. Scarlett that she made on my behalf. I consider all of those. I consider the pre-sentence report as amended. I would say that any factual finding that I make would come from my memory of the facts in the case proven at trial. Also, any discrepancy between the official version and facts that were not specifically proven at trial, certainly I would allow the facts proven at trial. I've considered the results of the validated risk and needs assessment conducted by the department. The principles of sentencing and arguments made as to sentencing alternatives, in this case alternatives really mean, of where Ms. Scarlett should be sentenced. The, uh, I've considered the, uh, I've considered the, uh, I've considered the nature characteristics of the criminal conduct involved, uh, the evidence, uh, offered as to mitigating and enhancing factors and statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee. Again, um, again, I've considered the allocution of Ms. Scarlett, uh, Ms. Scarlett, uh, on her own behalf. Elect, uh, she is the one who caused, uh, the facts that form the basis for those counts to occur. Um, not only is she not a minor participant, she is the participant, uh, that brings us here, uh, the fact of the court does not apply. I've considered factor 13, uh, and that is any other factor consistent with purposes of sentencing act, uh, the letters that were submitted, uh, the, uh, uh, I guess the programs that she assigned that for, uh, jail, uh, the help that she has given to other inmates. Uh, whether it be in learning, uh, Spanish, uh, or, uh, uh, uh, studying, uh, the Bible or, uh, having religious, uh, type meetings, uh, certainly I consider that and I give that, uh, very little weight. Uh, in considering the weight, uh, that I give, uh, uh, the, uh, enhancing factors, uh, that I found on the record, as well as the mitigating factors, uh, in, uh, considering counts 17 and 18, which are both, again, be felonies, uh, I find that an appropriate sentence is 12 years for each of those. Uh, in considering counts 19 and 20 aggravating child neglect and considering the, uh, aggravating factors and the mitigating factors given the weight that I've announced on the record, uh, I find a sentence at the top end of that range. It's appropriate for a sentence of 25 years, uh, again, counts 19 and 20. Uh, the court, uh, next has to, uh, whether several things to consider. One is, um, uh, merger. Uh, I don't know that there is, uh, much case law. And the state answered my in article question. I tried to pose a couple times probably progressively more in article each time. But in, uh, the, uh, the defense argues that one is within the other. In other words, uh, count 17, by its nature, the facilitation is within, uh, count, uh, 19. And that, uh, in the same, uh, token, count 20, uh, or excuse me, count 18 is entirely within 20. Um, in other words, the specific acts of facilitation of aggravated, um, break of a child, uh, those acts form the basis, at least in part, of count 19 and 20, and that being, um, the aggravated child neglect. Um, the, uh, the interesting, uh, I guess mental gymnastics the court was attempting, um, was number one, to elicit from the state. And they, and they answered, I think, uh, credibly, is, was the, were the facts that form count 17? And that is, um, allowing continued access to ABG after ABG told Chantelle Garlick and Benjamin Garlick essentially abused her where said access resulted. Benjamin Garlett subsequently making her perform an act of gallatio. Is that incorporated in count 19, wherein the aggravated child neglect includes acts of omission following the disclosure of Shantell Garlett being exceptionally abused by Benjamin Garlett. Is there a difference in elements of counts 19-20 and 17-18? I certainly believe that there are. In looking specifically at count 17, for instance, a period between beginning February 13, 2021 and end of February 13, 2021. Ending 8-14-2023 that Shantell Garlett lawfully and nominally furnished substantial assistance in the commission of a felony, knowing that another intends to commit a felony to an aggravated right of the child. And again, that specifically refers to the act of performing an act of gallatio upon Benjamin Garlett. In the court's opinion, facilitation, in this case, is to furnish substantial assistance, count 17, by a failure to act, okay, I guess in this case, by letting it go on. The specific act, the specific act, in count 17, the same with 18, that specific act, being, looking at the election, related to the specific act of penile genital penetration. So, the facilitation refers to a, uh, an assistant, furnishing substantial assistance to commit that specific act. If you look at 19 and 20, the elements of both, um, the same time period that Shantell Garlett, that Shantell Garlett, uh, neglected, uh, uh, in, uh, uh, uh, count, uh, 19, um, uh, I guess it is an aerial, uh, excuse me, uh, in such a manner as to adversely affect the child's health and welfare. And neglect was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, uh, or to seize those, uh, uh, as, different, uh, different, uh, different crimes, uh, accomplished, uh, uh, in such a manner as to adversely affect the child's health and welfare. And neglect was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. Uh, the court sees those, uh, as different, uh, different crimes accomplished in different manners. 17 and 18 refers to the facilitation of a specific act. Now, the court can't state, uh, neither can the state. The defense really can. Uh, that 17 and 18, uh, occurred on a specific date. And then 19 and 20, that don't require any, an election, uh, don't incorporate, uh, the specific acts found in 17 and 18. Uh, however, we know that 19 to 20, those specific counts, uh, incorporate the time period, uh, potentially over two years. Uh, of course the indictment alleges, uh, 213 of 21. Uh, we've discussed, uh, 213 of 21 is, uh, a date, uh, that, uh, is just the, uh, the birth date, uh, uh, uh, it ends with the date that, uh, police activity or that, uh, they were turned in. Uh, and looking at those, uh, elements, the court finds that they're separate offenses that are not appropriate, uh, to merge together based on the fact that, uh, uh, 19 and 20 incorporate a continuing, uh, uh, offense that occurred over those two-year period. 17 and 18 refer to the specific act, uh, that was elected by the state. Uh, and it's certainly reasonable to find, uh, that the neglect incorporated, uh, many, many more instances of, uh, sexual abuse that is found. Count 17 and 18. And so for those reasons, I'm going to deny the motion, uh, to merge, uh, those counts. And considering, uh, consecutive, uh, sentences, um, there's, uh, the dates are very important, uh, obviously, uh, as well as, uh, uh, well, the dates are important as to release eligibility. Uh, as to consecutive sentences, uh, part five or factor five, uh, uh, the effective date of that was well before, uh, the offenses. And so, uh, certainly counts 17 and 18, uh, can be ran consecutive to each other. I'll make that fine in just a moment. Uh, as to, uh, count 19 and 20. And looking at the factors where the court can consider consecutive sentences, uh, it's an interesting, uh, I guess conundrum the court has. Because unlike Benjamin Garland that has multiple separate counts, um, can the court find that, uh, Miss Garland has a, uh, record of criminal activity that is extensive? Um, if you consider, uh, uh, aggravated child neglect being a continuing, uh, offense, one offense, but it really continues over a period of time. Um, I don't know that the law would allow the court, uh, to find, uh, in the same way I found Benjamin Garland, uh, that that factor applies. Um, although the amount of criminal activity within the neglect, I think, was large as I found previously. Um, I don't know, I don't think that factually, uh, the law would allow that finding. In looking at five, the defendant is convicted of two or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor, uh, with consideration of the aggravated circumstances arising from the relationship between the defendant, uh, and the victim or victims. Um, in this case, um, the elements of aggravated child abuse in counts 19 and 20 are that, um, Miss Garland knowingly neglected, uh, the child in count 19 and the child in count 20. Um, uh, age included in such a manner as to adversely affect the child's health and welfare and said neglect was especially heinous and atrocious or untrue. Um, it would seem to me, uh, that if the court couldn't consider factor five as involving a statutory offense involving sexual abuse, uh, it would be because of the straight reading of the statute, uh, that says the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses involving sexual abuse. When I read that as common language that, I guess, any lawyer or judge wouldn't read that, it appears to me to apply to an offense, a statutory offense, that involves sexual abuse, not a set of facts that involves sexual abuse, but an offense. In and of itself, aggravated child neglect does not have the elements of sexual abuse of a minor. Uh, and so, uh, I'm gonna find that by law, uh, that that factor, um, does not apply to counts 19 and 20. And so, in considering, uh, that, um, uh, factor five does apply to 17 and 18, uh, the sentence that I'm going to hand out in, uh, 17 is, uh, again, a 12 year sentence to serve. Uh, those will be consecutive to one another, uh, for a 24 year sentence. Count 19, 25 years to serve. Count 20, 25 years to, uh, to serve. Uh, those will be concurrent, uh, to each other, and to counts, uh, 17 and 18. Uh, for really an effective 25 year sentence, uh, incorporated in that. So it will be 24 years, 17 and 18. Concurrent with the 25, 19 and 20. Um, that'll be a sentence to serve. Um, that'll be a sentence to serve. Now, release eligibility, uh, I'm gonna specifically find, uh, based on the testimony of the trial, uh, and really based on the argument of the state. Not that it's proof, but, uh, uh, that it certainly is more likely than not, based on these facts, uh, that, uh, these crimes, uh, encompass counts 17, uh, through 20, uh, occurred after July 1st of 2021. Uh, I don't disagree that if there is a, there is some question about that, that it should favor the defendant. Uh, the problem with this is that really the only reason that the state chose the date to put on the indictment was because it was her birthday, and she made the statement that it happened when I was three. Uh, however, if you take the two years that the defendant said it's been going on, um, really that's further away from the February date, uh, than even the July 1st date. Uh, I know we're not saying that exactly two years prior to August 13, 2023 or 14, uh, that this started to occur. I understand that. However, um, using the, uh, the logic that we don't know that it occurred that it started on the birthday of 2021, um, coupled with Ms. Garland's statement, it's certainly more likely that it occurred after July 1st of 2021. Uh, and so therefore I would define that the effective date of these offenses is, um, July 1st of 2021. Is there anything else I need to address from the state's perspective? I mean, you, I mean, you mean the effective date is post? Post, yes, yes. Uh, not in the state. Uh, there, she'll be rendered in from this order to provide a biological specimen in DNA analysis that we don't want to assess. Ms. Rocky, anything else I need to address? Thank you. Thank you. [00:18:38] Speaker ?: Thank you, Arnold. [00:18:39] Speaker 1: Or otherwise, we will be adjourned. Thank you, Arnold. All right. [00:18:44] Speaker ?: Otherwise, we will be adjourned. Thank you, Arnold. All right. Otherwise, we will be adjourned. Thank you, Arnold. All right. Otherwise, we will be adjourned.