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'I don't even think it's disputable' losing 2020 was the best outcome for Trump: Haberman & Swan

NBC News June 29, 2026 12m 2,457 words
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About this transcript: This is a full AI-generated transcript of 'I don't even think it's disputable' losing 2020 was the best outcome for Trump: Haberman & Swan from NBC News, published June 29, 2026. The transcript contains 2,457 words with timestamps and was generated using Whisper AI.

"And joining me now are New York Times reporters Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan. They are the authors of the new book, Regime Change, Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump. Maggie and Jonathan, thank you both for being here. Had a little time off this week, dove into this incredible..."

[0:00] And joining me now are New York Times reporters Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan. [0:04] They are the authors of the new book, Regime Change, Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald [0:09] Trump. Maggie and Jonathan, thank you both for being here. Had a little time off this week, [0:13] dove into this incredible read. It is so good, and I'm so glad that you're here to talk about it. [0:18] I want to start with the midterms. It's interesting coming off our conversation with [0:21] Senator Marshall. Your reporting suggests that President Trump may not share the same [0:25] concerns that Republicans have about maintaining their majorities this fall. You write, quote, [0:31] Trump had already climbed his own mountain with his improbable comeback in 2024. [0:35] If Republicans were wiped out in the 2026 midterm elections or in 2028, [0:40] he could simply boast that they couldn't win without him. Trump could barely be stirred to even [0:45] think about the midterms. Jonathan, does President Trump actually care whether or not Republicans win [0:51] in the fall? Well, it's not black and white, and it's not to say he doesn't care at all. [0:55] But what we found in our reporting for the book is that his closest aides, his top aides, [1:01] wish he cared more. Okay? And there was a very revealing comment that Trump made last year when [1:09] Republicans did extremely poorly in the off-year elections. He said, people have been saying they [1:16] can't win without Trump on the ballot. And he said, that's a great honour. Okay? So play that forward [1:22] a little bit. He obviously doesn't want to get impeached again. But at the same time, you know, [1:29] he's not going to get convicted. There's no universe in which he gets convicted. The Supreme [1:33] Court gave him sweeping immunity in 2024. We have reporting in our book that he has told people [1:39] privately that he's going to pardon anyone who came within 250 feet of the Oval Office. He uses [1:46] different distances. Sometimes he says 200 feet. Sometimes he says 25 feet. But there's some [1:52] radius around the Oval Office, which is a pardon zone. Yeah. So really what he's spending his time [1:58] doing is trying to make his own imprint on Washington, physical and figurative, and on the world. [2:04] Yeah. So one of the other striking portraits in your book is of Vice President J.D. Vance. He appears [2:10] to be someone, at least on some level, willing to tell President Trump things he doesn't [2:13] necessarily want to hear. The best example, of course, being Iran. You write, quote, [2:18] Vance believed a regime-changed war with Iran would be a disaster. In front of his colleagues, [2:23] Vance had warned Trump that a war with Iran could break apart his political coalition [2:27] and would be seen as a betrayal by many voters who had bought into his promise of no new wars. [2:34] How did Vice President Vance's willingness to push back ultimately affect his standing with President [2:39] Trump? So it's a really interesting dynamic because he was not the only person who opposed [2:45] this war in Trump's world, to be clear. In our reporting, and we write about this in the book, [2:50] none of Trump's senior advisors, none of his cabinet really thought this was a good idea. Although we [2:55] should make clear that the people who were let into these discussions were so tiny as a group that it [3:01] excluded the Treasury Secretary and the Energy Secretary, the people who would have to manage the [3:05] aftereffects of an energy fallout from this war because they were concerned about leaks. But Vance [3:12] was the only one who really vocally took issue with this with Trump. And it irritated Trump. It [3:19] cost Vance with Trump. But he was the only person who was really sort of rattling the cages. [3:25] There were other advisors who did make cases against this. We should note that Dan Kane did lay out [3:31] the scenarios for what could happen. Munitions, depletion, which clearly the U.S. is seeing right [3:37] now in a real way, despite the fact that the administration keeps insisting otherwise. The fact [3:42] that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz. So the president will keep saying he wasn't warned. He [3:47] absolutely was warned. But Dan Kane is not Mark Milley of Term 1. He is not engaging in these angry [3:53] arguments with Donald Trump. And you do sort of see that play out. But there is an interesting [3:58] dynamic between the vice president and the secretary of state, Marco Rubio. Many view them [4:02] as one of his potential successors. In any way, did the Iran debate maybe tilt that competition [4:08] toward Secretary Rubio? Trump likes to play games with people. That's not new to anybody. He has been [4:13] doing this version of poll testing. Who do you like? Do you like Marco or do you like J.D. Vance? In fact, [4:19] we have this pretty remarkable scene in the book where at a dinner with Rupert Murdoch and a bunch of other [4:24] people in the Blue Room of the White House last October. Vance is there. Rubio is there. Several [4:31] other people are there. And Trump starts asking Murdoch, you know, what do you think of Vance? And [4:36] Murdoch, who did not want Vance to be the VP, says that J.D. has the potential to be great. And Trump [4:41] says, what about Marco? And Murdoch just sort of flatly says Marco is brilliant. So I don't know that [4:47] it needed too much tilting. I will say there is nothing in our reporting that suggests that Rubio is [4:52] doing the things one would be doing to run. And it is still Vance is to lose, which also doesn't [4:57] necessarily thrill Trump, who doesn't, as Jonathan said, like the idea of somebody coming next. [5:02] Yeah. Well, let's talk about the backdrop of Iran. And that's President Trump's relationship [5:06] with the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. And you describe a very tense phone call between [5:12] the two leaders when President Trump suspected that Netanyahu was trying to back out of negotiations [5:17] around the ceasefire in Gaza. I'm sure many people have seen this quote many times. I'm going to read it [5:21] anyway. Bellowing, Trump told Netanyahu that he was sick of his antics. I've done everything to [5:26] protect you. You better effing going along with this. It's been going on for too effing long. [5:32] Everybody's sick of you. Everybody's sick of you, BB, Trump said. All the Jews are sick of you. [5:38] Even the two Jews on this call are sick of you. Trump added, referring to Kushner and Wyckoff. [5:44] And Jonathan, you've gone on to write that President Trump has used his leverage with Netanyahu in a way [5:48] that President Biden never could have. Why is that? In that instance, he did. And what was [5:53] really notable about that instance was it was the first time that Trump had used his leverage [5:57] against BB. He got him to go along with the hostage deal with Hamas. And they released, [6:02] it was a genuine accomplishment. They got the final hostages out of Gaza. And we write about how [6:07] Trump in that moment squeezed him. What's been notable for the rest of the presidency until pretty [6:11] recently is Trump hasn't used his leverage with Netanyahu. The first bombing campaign last June, [6:19] Operation Midnight Hammer, initially Trump was very skeptical about going to war in Iran. And he'd [6:24] been warned by people like Tucker Carlson and others that this would ruin his presidency. He wanted to do [6:30] a deal with Iran. Netanyahu did a months-long charm offensive. He brought him a gold-plated pager [6:37] that they used to blow up different Hezbollah operatives and others. And so in the end, [6:45] Trump decided to go along with it. He didn't use any of his levers against Netanyahu. So that was a [6:50] very interesting moment because you can see what he's capable of. Israel can't fight alone. It's just [6:56] a fact. There's a perception that they can. But when you actually look at the numbers and what they're [7:00] using in terms of air defenses, they absolutely cannot fight this war alone. But Trump, so far, [7:05] it's mostly been rhetorical. He hasn't really used his full leverage. [7:08] Let's talk now about the Epstein files. That's been an issue that has been very difficult [7:12] for the Trump administration. President Trump's decision to move on from the Epstein files, [7:17] that launched a series of top secret meetings in the Situation Room. Maggie, [7:22] what did those moments reveal about how Trump's top advisors handled that crisis? [7:27] So you have to set this picture here, Ryan. This had been something that top officials in the [7:33] Trump government, J.D. Vance, Kash Patel, the FBI director, Dan Bongino, the deputy FBI director. [7:38] They had spent years talking about how there was a secret cabal of pedophiles. And once they were in [7:43] charge, they would open this up and make this visible. Trump, to be fair, had never actually [7:48] really quite gone that far. He had talked about it more in 2015, but it kind of went away. [7:52] He certainly didn't reject it, though. [7:53] He said, I'll look into it. Yeah. I mean, it was, as he often does, he sort of leaves it on the, [7:58] as an option. And there were a number of senior officials in Trump's White House who didn't [8:03] understand what a driving force this was for the MAGA base, for Trump's own base. Trump wanted [8:09] nothing to do with any of this. He didn't want anything out. He was snapping at people who would [8:12] talk about it. And then he started attacking his own supporters and saying this is a hoax. So we write [8:18] about a series of meetings in the White House Situation Room, which is intended to deal with [8:23] national security crises, with foreign wars, you know, with sensitive matters, but not usually [8:28] matters about, you know, Epstein PR crisis comms. And there were several of these, but we zeroed in [8:36] on a few. These start, the ones we write about, right after the White House has used all of its [8:42] political capital on the one big, beautiful bill, which, you know, was what they would have [8:45] rather been talking about. Instead, they find themselves, and it's the top levels of government, [8:50] uh, J.D. Vance, White House Chief of Staff, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General Kash Patel, [8:56] uh, you know, several lawyers, and that's like half the crew who are in some of these, [9:01] talking about how to get themselves out of this. And this goes on and on and on. And all it does [9:08] is allow a greater clamor, uh, among Trump's supporters, including this surreal meeting that [9:16] we end up writing about where they were planning on putting out some public-facing website with [9:21] things old and new. And, you know, they were discussing what universe it would be. And then [9:25] somebody had looked up in that mock website they were setting up Trump's name, and up pops up this [9:31] unverified, already public claim, uh, with an allegation that Trump, you know, was made second [9:37] hand. But it was about Trump, and that was sort of the end of that. Yeah. If there's a thesis in [9:43] your book, and there are so many great points that you raise and so many inside conversations that you [9:48] guys reveal, it's this idea that perhaps losing the 2020 election ultimately ended up benefiting Trump. [9:55] What you write is, the indictments, the convictions, the assassination attempts, the four years of [10:01] exile that allowed him to shed the restraining forces of his first term, to assemble a team of [10:06] true loyalists who'd spent years studying the levers of government and plotting how to seize them, [10:11] all of it had paradoxically made Trump stronger, more ruthless, and more commanding than he could [10:18] have been otherwise the most powerful president of our lifetimes. Trump himself has kind of hinted at [10:24] this, right? That maybe losing, well, he would never say that he lost, but not retaining the White [10:29] House in 2020 had made him more powerful. Was losing the 2020 election the best thing that ever [10:34] happened to Trump? I don't even think it's disputable. I mean, if he had won that election, [10:40] he would have been hobbled. He was already pretty unpopular. COVID was raging. Inflation was raging. [10:46] Instead, Biden was the one who ate all of those conditions. And now, the whole point of this book, [10:52] the title, Regime Change, is we're watching presidential power expressed in a way that [10:57] we haven't seen in our lifetime. When George W. Bush took America to a war in Iraq and Afghanistan, [11:02] it went through Congress, the branch of government that under the Constitution authorizes wars. [11:08] Trump didn't even talk to Congress. He just did it. When he went and snatched a sovereign head of [11:12] state out of his bedroom in his pajamas in the middle of the night, he didn't talk to Congress. [11:16] He just did it. When he started a trade war with the whole world, he didn't talk to anyone. He just [11:21] did it. And then, of course, it takes weeks and months for the court system to catch up. He just [11:26] changes facts on the ground. So he is governing like no president in our lifetime. And it occurred [11:31] to us that we were covering a form of regime change in our own country. There's no universe he [11:37] would have been able to pull that off if he had just won a consecutive term. [11:41] And, Meg, I'll let you have the last word. [11:42] No, I was actually thinking about exactly this listening to your interview with Roger [11:45] Marshall. One of the things that that interregnum period let him do is continue grinding out [11:50] any pockets of resistance to him in the Republican Party. And you saw it systematically. Remember, [11:56] one of the first things that he did was start targeting the people who had voted to impeach him. [12:01] And he would merrily write about, you know, 10 to go or something like that when he had to win. [12:05] And he couldn't do a lot of what he was doing even without going to Congress. Congress in other [12:11] times would have voiced an objection even without being consulted. You do hear some of that now, [12:17] a little, but it's not at all what it would have been under other circumstances. Yeah, [12:20] I would argue a very little. Yes, that's an excellent point. Maggie Haberman, Jonathan Swan, [12:25] this is an excellent read, a terrific reporting, really well put together. Thank you guys so much for [12:29] being here. We thank you for watching and remember, stay updated on breaking news and top [12:35] stories on the NBC News app or watch live on our YouTube channel.

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