World Economic Outlook Press Briefing — October 2026

[00:00:00] Speaker ?: Thank you. [00:00:30] Speaker 1: Okay, I think we have a quorum, and we are going to start. Let me see how I pronounced it. Good morning for those who are joining us here in Bangkok. Good afternoon or good evening for those who are joining us around the world. I want to start thanking the Thailand and the Thai authorities for hosting us today. I'm Jose Luis de Aro with the Communications Department, and we are gathered here today for the launch of the latest edition of the World Economic Outlook titled Resilience Under Restraint, Urgent Choices. So if you haven't had access to the latest copy, I will recommend for all of you to go to imf.org. There you're going to find the latest World Economic Outlook, also Silvana's blog, and other assets that might be helpful for your reporting. And what's best that to be talking about the World Economic Outlook and this latest edition, that I'll be here today with Silvana Tenreiro. She is the new Economic Counselor, Chief Economist, and Director of the Research Department. Next to her are Petia Koeba-Brooks. She is the Deputy Director of the Research Department. And last but not least, we have Denise Egan. She is the Division Chief, also with the Research Department. To keep the tradition going, Silvana is going to start with some opening remarks, and then we will open the floor to your questions. So within further ado, Silvana, the floor is yours. [00:02:12] Silvana Tenreiro: Thank you very much, Jose Luis. Good morning, everyone. The global economy has been resilient, but that resilience is under strain, with risks tilted to the downside. Global activity is projected to grow at 3.1% this year, 40 basis points lower than last year. And it's forecast to rise by 3.4% in 2027. This is the net result of two key forces that are shaping the outlook. First, the increase in the prices of energy and other commodities triggered by the war, which is akin to a negative global supply shock, driving up prices and hampering activity. Second, the tech boom, mostly driven by AI, which acts as a positive demand shock, driving up both prices and activity, particularly trade and investment. While these demand and supply forces pull activity in opposite directions, both forces put upward pressures on inflation. Global headline inflation is projected to rise to 4.7% this year and to fall to 4.1% in 2027. The projections for core inflation are 3.9% and 3.7% for 2026 and 2027, respectively. In part, as a result of this demand and supply forces, borrowing costs in several advanced economies have risen at a time of elevated debt. The interaction of high public debt and higher financing costs, in turn, has heightened fiscal concerns and risks. The outlook is highly uneven across countries, reflecting differences in exposure to commodity prices and AI-related activity, as well as borrowing costs. Energy exporters not in the conflict region and countries closely integrated in the AI cycle are expected to fare better. While energy importers and those with limited participation in the AI tech boom face weaker growth prospects. Many low-income countries and fragile states fall into the latter group. The risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside, underscoring three main limits to resilience. First, with renewed tensions in the Middle East, prices of crude oil, gas and refined oil products, such as diesel and jet fuel, have risen sharply. A more prolonged disruption of production and transport in the Middle East could lead to even higher prices of energy and other commodities. Until now, many margins of adjustment in energy markets have helped cushion the shock. Rerouting of energy supplies, increased energy production in other countries, inventory drawdowns, substitution to other sources of energy, including renewables, and higher energy efficiency, have all helped contain the impact of the shock. Without these margins, we estimate that this year's global growth would have been 60 basis points lower at 2.5% instead of 3.1%. But some of these margins, in particular, inventories and energy efficiency gains, are reaching their limits. Extreme weather events triggered by El Nino could cause further disruption in commodity markets, exacerbating supply pressures. A second limit to resilience stems from the composition of growth. The AI-related boom through investment and trade has been a key driver of global growth. But AI supply chains are highly concentrated in a few countries, sectors and firms, which creates potential choke points. Moreover, a market value correction and AI threats to cybersecurity could weigh on growth and add financial stability risks. The third limit to resilience is fiscal. Higher borrowing costs and interest rate payments could crowd out critical spending in other areas and reduce fiscal buffers for future shocks. In Chapter 1 of the WIO report, we illustrate further vulnerabilities by considering a risk scenario in which higher commodity prices and concerns with the fiscal outlook lead to a reassessment of public borrowing risks. This causes an increase in both the term premium and inflation expectations. In that scenario, growth in advanced and emerging economies would be 50 to 60 basis points lower by 2027 relative to the baseline forecast, with inflation materially higher. This confluence of risk calls for decisive action. Fiscal policy must be restrained to contain demand pressures at a time of highly inflationary risks. Countries with high debts and deficits need to initiate a fiscal consolidation and make sure that deficits and ultimately debt are on a downward trajectory. Any support measure, if needed, should be temporary and targeted to protect the most vulnerable while preserving price signals. In turn, monetary policy should remain firmly focused on price stability in line with central banks' mandates. The monetary policy stance should be sufficiently restrictive to prevent second-round effects and ensure a timely return of inflation to target. The appropriate stance will vary across countries. Certain levels of inflation, labour market tightness and exposure to technology and commodity shocks are all key policy guideposts. More than ever, central bank independence is vital in achieving inflation targets. To support medium-term growth, countries should continue to build fiscal buffers, safeguard financial stability, enhance private sector dynamism, and strengthen supply-side resilience. Let me conclude by stressing the main message. The economy has been resilient, but that resilience is reaching its limits. The task ahead is to move from coping to rebuilding, restoring fiscal space and supply-side resilience, and in that way, strengthen countries' ability to grow sustainably. Thank you. [00:09:08] Speaker 1: Over to you. Thank you, Silvana. So, before we open the floor to your questions, let me remind some ground rules. If you want to ask a question, raise your hand. If we call on you, identify yourself and the outlet that you represent. To keep things organized, we're going to start with two rounds of global questions, and then we're going to be moving to regions and countries. So, also, I want to remind you that we are here to discuss the World Economic Outlook. So, if you have questions regarding country programs or institutional issues, this is not the forum. You're going to have plenty of opportunities this week during those regional press conferences and the managing director's press conferences this week. So, we're going to start with global questions. Who has global questions? I'm going to go through two rounds. So, I'm going to start with the gentleman here. I'm going to go through here. Hi, thank you very much. [00:10:03] Speaker ?: I have a question with AFP. [00:10:07] Speaker 3: You talked about these two kind of complicated forces that were on the, what we don't make up with this year, the demand side and supply side, the demand side on the island state. Just to give us a sense of the effect of the AI boom here, you talked about on the demand side, if the AI boom were normal, if that effect wasn't there, what would the ability on the island state would have taken for? [00:10:29] Speaker 1: Okay, so now, center of the room, I'm going to go to the first lady here in the first row, and then I will go to the guy, to the person on the back. Where is the mic? Yeah. We're going to be grouping questions, so we make this a little bit of a speed dating thing. [00:11:02] Speaker 4: Hi, Jorgelina Rosario with Bloomberg. Following up on AI, basically asking directly if AI was not into the 2026, 2027 factor, would the world economy be on recession? And secondly, MD Schorcheva yesterday mentioned a slow tsunami on jobs. This is mainly for advanced economies, but this will also have an impact on EM, even if AI is not as developed as in advanced economies. What type of preparedness are you advising for both advanced and emerging economies if the AI boom does not prove to generate the productivity that it's expected? Thank you. [00:11:42] Speaker 1: Okay, just one more question. I'm going to go to a gentleman behind there, and then we will move to that side of the room. [00:11:49] Speaker 3: Hi, David Lauder with Reuters due service. Just following up on Horlina's question about potential for a global recession if AI completely comes unraveled and we have major asset price reductions, how prepared are countries to respond to that? Is there any particular region or country that still has fiscal space left, or is this the reason why we need to start to rebuild? Thank you. [00:12:20] Speaker 1: Okay, we have those three questions on the opposite forces of the global economy, AI, and the potential of a recession if things go wrong. [00:12:30] Silvana Tenreiro: Thank you. So, let's start with AI, and let's start with the facts and the hard data, and then I'll move to the forecast and what's in perspective. So, AI has had a big role in global trade and growth. Just to give you a sense of magnitude, global trade grew between 2023 and 2025 by 8.3% cumulatively. So, global trade in goods related to AI grew by 29%. Without that global trade in AI-related products, the overall trade would have been only 4.6% instead of 8.3%. So, these are big numbers. So, more prospectively, looking to the future, what we do in the forecast, in the WIO, is look at different scenarios for AI. In our baseline, we assume that, in the baseline forecast, we assume that this boom dissipates over time. What we do in the scenario analysis is assume that that boom lasts for longer. That's the scenario A, and it's coupled with actual productivity gains from AI. In that case, you have further expansion in activity that is not inflationary. We have a second scenario, scenario B, in which we still have this demand boom, but that doesn't come with the gains in productivity. And so, the gains there for growth are smaller, and that comes with higher levels of inflation. And the third scenario, which perhaps relates to what David had in mind, is one in which there's a reassessment of the profitability gains from AI. So, what you will see in the simulations is effects on the level, not on growth. So, there are no really growth effects in here. You can play with the numbers and scale up or down the shock, but, I mean, that's the exercise that we have done. And it's basically an unwind of this boom that we are seeing. In terms of jobs, the research department has done a lot of work on the impact of AI on jobs, and it's updating that work. It put together an index of preparedness, and you might want to look at that work. I don't have the exact numbers here, but definitely something that we can share with you, and it's publicly available. I don't know if you would like to add something? Okay. [00:15:35] Speaker 1: Okay. So, second round of global questions. No one here. I'm going to go to the gentleman on the one, two, three, fourth row, and then I will go to this side of the room. [00:15:52] Speaker 5: Hi, this is Tsubasa from Kyoto News. Yep. Thank you for taking my question. I'd like to elaborate more about the recent rise in long-term interest rate. As government bond yields increase across a number of countries, so what risks and implications do you see for global growth and the financial stability? In this environment, how should major central banks such as the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan conduct monetary policy? Thank you. Okay. I'm going to go here. Thank you very much. [00:16:49] Speaker 6: Yes. [00:16:50] Speaker ?: Yes. [00:16:51] Speaker 6: Yes. Yeah. Yeah. You can hear me. from BTV Bulgaria. So, since the beginning of the year, we have a pressure on the oil prices because of the Middle East. If this continues for, for example, six more months, what will happen? [00:17:15] Speaker 1: Thank you. Last question from these global rounds go to a gentleman on there. Yeah. Thank you. [00:17:26] Speaker 7: Faisal Islam, BBC News. Just following up the question on fiscal policy. I'm struck looking at your databank that the major G7 countries, half of them aren't actually reducing their deficits, according to your data, between 2025 and 2031. What is your call to the major G7 countries? And just to get a kickstart on the national questions, the UK obviously stands apart from that with a 4% deficit reduction. Do you think, you know, what does that say about the UK as regards to the G7? [00:17:59] Speaker 1: About the UK, we will go then to the European region and we can gather those questions. But we have a question on the long-term bond yields, another on oil prices if they continue, and fiscal policy for G7. Okay. [00:18:14] Silvana Tenreiro: So on the first question on the increase in interest rates, I think it's important to think about the drivers behind that increase in interest rate, because that helps us understand the effects as well. So there are essentially three main drivers. One is growth itself. The investment boom driven by AI has been a big driver of demand and that pushed up on interest rates. Moreover, within the demand forces, we have seen higher government spending since the pandemic, which has also added to demand and hence interest rates. This is in a way a reversal of what we had before the pandemic, when we were talking about the secular stagnation, weak demand, low interest rates. But now that demand is stronger and we have higher equilibrium rates coming from that stronger demand. The second element that has been very important is energy prices of energy prices and also other commodity prices. Part of this negative supply shock that we're talking about, which constraints capacity globally and pushes up inflation and calls for also for a response of central banks. So that's the second force behind. And the third component is the premium component, this interaction between high debt and high interest rates. Given that interaction and the risks that they pose, mean that investors are calling for a premium on bonds. So that's the extra. And then another component of that premium is that in a setting with supply shocks, bonds are not very good hedges against the cycle. And hence again, there is a compensation for that that investors are asking. So you have those three elements, three main elements, one is growth itself. So when we think about, okay, will borrowing costs hamper growth? Well, it's offsetting part of the growth, but you know, it's the result of that growth. Whereas obviously the part that comes from energy prices is a purely supply side shock. How should monetary policy react? Again, to the, you know, first part on raising demand factors, that's, you know, classical demand shock and monetary policy kind of set by being more restrictive. The energy shock is a supply shock and inflation is driven by the supply side. So in there, monetary policy has to be a little bit more cautious and manage that demand side in order to make sure that inflation returns back to target. There are no second round effects and no de-anchoring of expectations. But obviously you achieve that by restricting demand and hence exacerbating the falling activity that the shock itself is causing. And so, yeah, going back to your question, how should monetary policy react, you know, in principle, it should be more restrictive in order to make sure that inflation returns to target. As we said before, we expect inflation to pick up this year and also next year. And so it's important that central banks following their mandate keep a sufficiently restrictive stance. There was a question. [00:22:05] Speaker 1: Commodities, what will happen if the oil prices are still high? [00:22:08] Silvana Tenreiro: Yes, so that's exactly that question is, we will try to address with the scenario in chapter one of the WIO report. So you can see it in box, box 1.2, table 1.21. So we look at the scenario in which commodity prices remain high for an extra roughly six months. So we and actually they are higher by 17 and 40% in each of the two years, 2026 and 2027. And you can see in the table the impact on advanced economies and emerging markets. So we have downgrades on the, or that will lead to a downgrade to growth and an increase in inflation in both groups of countries. We add to that scenario another layer in which on top of the commodity price increase, we also see an increase in the term premium and inflation expectations. And that leads to the higher numbers that you can see at the end of the table. But I invite you to look at the report and we have a bigger discussion of the assumptions that go into the exercise. [00:23:29] Speaker 1: And then G7 recommendations, fiscal recommendations. [00:23:33] Silvana Tenreiro: So the overall message is that countries, you know, should, that with high debts and high risks associated to those debts, should start a fiscal consolidation to make sure that deficits and ultimately debts are in a downward trajectory. As you pointed out, we have a table on fiscal policy in the report, table 1.8. So in that second panel, you can see the UK, it has the deficit, the debts have stabilized in primary surplus just as at our prediction for this year. So as you know, the UK has already started the consolidation process and it's the country that basically stands out in that table, along with India as well. [00:24:28] Speaker 1: Okay, so we have 20 minutes and we have to go through all the regions in the world. So we're going to do this relatively quick. We're going to start with Asia Pacific. We are here in Thailand. So if you have questions about the region or a specific countries in Asia Pacific, please raise your hand. I see the stand up so it's easy to identify you. And then we will go here on the front. [00:24:56] Speaker 8: Hi. My question is about the report that you call for rebuilding buffer before the next shock. How much room do countries like Thailand can absorb next shock? And what should we rebuild first? [00:25:17] Speaker 1: Thank you. Perfect. So now we're going to go here on the front row. I'm going to take the lady in red jacket. [00:25:24] Speaker 9: Thank you. On China, so could you walk us through the latest growth projection on China, 4.5% for this year? And specifically, how are the major forces highlighted in your report? The geopolitical tensions, trade fragmentation and AI technology cycle playing a role shaping this outlook. Thank you. [00:25:49] Speaker 1: And then we have received also a question through the press center from John Hub news agency about the outlook for South Korea. So we have Thailand and rebuilding buffers, China and South Korea. Thank you. [00:26:04] Silvana Tenreiro: So let me start with an overlook of the region, given that we have a few countries in the questions. Overall, this is the region that has grown the most. We have a upward revisions for many countries in the region and there are the same stories here, except that the AI component is very, very strong in Asia. So this region has been incredibly resilient, even though they are net importers of energy and other commodities. Since the AI boom has more than offset the weaknesses coming from or the headwinds from the commodity markets. So we have China and India. They are the big engines of growth here. Growth has been revised up sizeably for China and sorry, for India. We are expecting India to grow by 7% this year and next year. China, China's growth for this year is projected to be 4.5% and next year 4%. And then we have a set of countries that have very well integrated in the AI supply chain. And those have seen significant upward revisions, notably here, Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, and to some extent also Thailand. So this country's AI has been a big driver of this strong performance and big drivers of the forecast revisions, upward revisions. Let me say a couple of words on Thailand. So Thailand last year had a deflation. This year we are expecting it to come out of that deflationary state. Growth is projected to be 2.1% this year and 2.1% next year. Coincidentally, inflation is also 2.1, so 2.1 everywhere this year. Next year we expect inflation to go down to 1.7%. It has coped well again, despite being an importer of energy and it has been helped by this AI boom that is really strong in this part of Asia. Other countries within Asia have not been as successful as being part of this, but certainly there is a big mass there benefiting from the AI boom. [00:28:58] Speaker 1: Okay, so because we're running out of time, I'm going to combine two regions. I'm going to go to Europe and the Middle East. So if you have questions on Europe and the Middle East, raise your hand. I see my UK reporters, they're ready. So let's get some questions on the UK and then I think that we have a question on the Middle East on the front row. Let's do this because we have 15 minutes and 39 seconds. [00:29:27] Speaker 10: Thank you. Hi, Ed Conway from Sky News just on the UK. So you said given that there are rising debt levels and bond yields arising that decisive action is necessary. Can you just be clear? We have the new chancellor, John Healy, he's giving his first budget. Is decisive action necessary for the UK specifically? [00:29:49] Speaker 1: Okay. And we're going to go here on the front row. Do you have, I can get another question on the UK, but we are on a very strict time here. And you will have the European department press briefing later this week. Please go ahead. [00:30:05] Speaker 11: This is Noor Amashif from Asharki Bloomberg from the Middle East. So the regional outlook was prepared before the latest escalation around Bab al-Mandeb. And the renewed Houthis attack. Does that mean that the fund's outlook for the region may now be somewhat optimistic, particularly when it comes to the non-oil activity in the GCC and Saudi Arabia, given the exposure to regional trade and logistics? And looking across the region, which economies have the strongest fiscal buffers to absorb a prolonged disruption? And thinking here particularly of Egypt, because if tensions were to persist and shipping through the Red Sea were further disrupted, how concerned would the fund be about the impact of the Suez Canal revenues and the Egyptian economy? [00:30:49] Speaker 1: Okay, so we have two questions, UK and then we can go to the Middle East outlook. [00:30:55] Silvana Tenreiro: Okay. So on the UK, I mean, as we said before, the UK has already started a consolidation path, fiscal consolidation. It is on that trajectory and the message for the UK is just simply stay the course and continue on that trajectory. I will pass a question on the Middle East to my colleagues. Okay, thank you. [00:31:19] Speaker 12: Thank you. Thank you. [00:31:21] Speaker 1: Thank you. Get closer to the mic so we can. Okay. Perfect. Yes. You can hear me now? I think so. [00:31:29] Speaker 12: Okay. So the impact in the Middle East is, I would say, quite heterogeneous. And there's a significant difference between the outlook for oil exporters and oil importers. Just to be clear, we actually revised in the last minute almost our forecast to incorporate the higher oil prices. So that being said, of course, the risks in that area are still on the downside. And that's why we also developed some of the scenarios that Sylvana spoke about earlier. They tried to quantify what the impact would be if oil prices were even higher. So when it comes to, again, the oil exporters, especially in the Gulf region, we have a sharp contraction in the forecast for their production activity, for their exports, which is followed by, again, a strong rebound in 2027, subject, again, to the assumptions that we have made. We are seeing some slowdown in some countries also in the non-oil sectors for those oil exporters. But again, risks there are also on the downside. Now, for oil importers is a slightly different story. We actually have a small upgrade there. In many of these economies, there's still a robust domestic demand and remittances and tourism also holding up. Now, there was also a specific question on Egypt. And there we have an upgrade of the forecast, both for this year and for next. And this is driven by the rebound in the activity in the Suez Canal and also petroleum-related activity. But growth is expected to moderate due to the lagged impact of the conflict. And again, risks are very much on the downside as in the rest of the region. Thanks. [00:33:31] Speaker 1: Okay, we continue our traveling around the world. And now we're going to combine two regions, Africa and Western Hemisphere. So I'm going to go to the lady here and then the lady on the front row. And actually, if you want, if I call on you, stand up so it's easier to see you in the room. [00:33:50] Speaker 13: Thank you and good morning. My name is Duduzi Laramila from MoneyWeb. What should the monetary policy response be for oil importing economies more so that are outside of the technology value chain? [00:34:05] Speaker 1: Okay. And we're going to go to the lady. [00:34:10] Speaker ?: Thank you. [00:34:11] Speaker 14: Thank you very much. I'm Nancy from Nigeria. Earlier on, when you were talking, you said that fiscal policy is already restrained. So my question concerning Africa is how can African governments pursue fiscal consolidation and put public debt on a sustainable downward trajectory? Of course, given that there's still poverty, imposing more hardship on vulnerable populations, even like Nigeria. And how can fiscal and monetary policy be better positioned to ensure the burden of stabilization does not fall so much on ordinary citizens like we even see in Nigeria? While preserving price stability and investors confidence. Thank you. [00:34:52] Speaker 1: Okay. So we're going to answer these questions in Africa. Then we will move to the Western Hemisphere. Okay. [00:34:57] Silvana Tenreiro: So on the first question on monetary policy, how it should respond to an oil price shock when there is no demand impulse. I think, I mean, that's the situation, the classical situation of trade off from the perspective of monetary policy. Inflation is high, but activity is being constrained or reduced by the shock. And this is where the central bank needs to manage the trade off, make sure that inflation returns to target within the policy horizon. We typically think about two years, two to three years. And so clearly it's a different situation than economies that are experiencing a demand boom. And so in there, we're talking about central banks, again, focus on price stability and make sure that you keep a stance that is sufficiently restrictive for inflation to return to target. But obviously you're not, you know, going fully as you would go if this was a demand, a pure demand shock. So, so that's, there's a lot of discussion of these heterogeneity in the response of monetary policy, depending on different circumstances. And of course, other guideposts will be, okay, how tight is the labour market? What are the levels of inflation to start with? And again, exposure to AI or, or other commodities? So, so, yeah, I invite you to take a look at that. Yeah. [00:36:35] Speaker 1: And I think that maybe for Nigeria, we should pass the floor to Denise. Sure. [00:36:41] Speaker 15: So let me, sorry, the question was about fiscal policy in particular in Africa, right? And so the things to emphasize here is that what we are advocating for is for policymakers to balance the near-term needs of the population. And that involves food security, that involves energy security, given that the prices of food and energy is increasing disproportionately. And while also keeping in mind the medium-term stability and how to do that is, of course, a great question. And we do actually also in one of our analytical chapters, our chapter two is looking particularly into fiscal policy responses. That's most effective when dealing with what we're calling cost of living crisis, where the price of essentials are increasing faster than the rest of the consumption basket. What that means in practice, maybe Nigeria is a good example, right? While the growth held up in Nigeria, given it's an energy exporter, powered rates are still very high. And we are very mindful that the population is suffering when it comes, especially food security, with also risks from El Nino. So in that environment, what we're advocating for is cash transfers and income support, targeted temporary income support for the most vulnerable households. In Nigeria, that can be done by the cash transfers that alleviate high poverty and ensure food security. And that needs to be coupled with, you know, aligned with a medium-term fiscal framework. And there, what that involves is improving expenditure quality and improving revenue collection. Let me stop there. Okay. [00:38:32] Speaker 1: We have six minutes, 25 seconds, and we're going to the Western Hemisphere. Here we include Latin America, US, so if you have questions, raise your hand. And I'm going to go through a quick round. Please, the lady here in the front. And then I will go to the lady back there. [00:38:48] Speaker ?: Thank you. Thank you. [00:38:50] Speaker 16: Karen Vanessa Quintero from El Espectador Colombia. My question is, what is the outlook for Latin America and what factors could affect the region's economic growth? Thank you. [00:39:01] Speaker 1: And then we're going to go to the lady. Stand up so they can see you. [00:39:09] Speaker 17: Hi. [00:39:10] Speaker 1: Yeah, we can hear you. [00:39:12] Speaker 17: I was wondering why the IMF decided to cut the growth forecast for Argentina, mostly considering it's going to become an energy exporter in this context. And also, how do you assess the fiscal development of Argentina, considering the World Economic Outlook mentions the need for fiscal space? Thank you. [00:39:36] Speaker 1: Any questions on the US? No? No? So let's go with these two. And then if we have time, we might go to another one. But yeah, five minutes. [00:39:46] Silvana Tenreiro: Okay. So on the outlook for Latin America, we are forecasting growth in 2026 to be 2.3%, a small downgrade from what we had before, and 2.5% in 2027, also a small downgrade. Inflation is projected at 4.2% for the region in 2026 and 4.1% in 2027. Again, the outcomes in Latin America are fairly heterogeneous depending on the commodity exposure of the countries. AEI has not been a very strong driver in the region so far. So we have the commodity exporters doing fairly well and the importers not as well. So we have this heterogeneity in the region. And again, the advice from the fund is to keep the eye on inflation and make sure that we prevent any second-round effects from this energy and commodity shock, both for exporters and also for importers. And then we have a question on Argentina. [00:41:04] Speaker 1: We're going to pass that to Petia. Okay. [00:41:07] Speaker 12: Thank you. So in Argentina, we have a projected slowdown in growth from 4.5% last year to 2.1% this year and then a pickup to 3.5% in 2027. For this year, the number represents a downward revision of 1.4% and also we have a downward revision for 27% as well. Now, this downward revision that I was talking about is really due to the weaker activity that we've already observed through the third quarter of this year. And we've seen softer domestic demand amid still tight domestic financial conditions and the ongoing structural transformation of the Argentine economy. Now, that being said, we do expect growth to start recovering in the last quarter of this year and to strengthen further in 2027, 2028. And part of that is due to that recovery is due to the positive terms of trade that we're expecting, as well as the easing of financial conditions, as well as the pickup in investment, which is also expected in our forecast. Now, of course, the strength in exports in agricultural products as well as energy is part of the story in terms of that recovery. And then on the fiscal picture, you know, the fiscal adjustment has been an important part of the stabilization effort. And I think for more detailed assessment, I would refer you to the regional briefing that's coming up in the, I think, in the latter part of this week. Friday, yeah. Friday, yes. [00:43:01] Speaker 1: Thank you. Okay, we have two minutes. We have a new economic councillor. We're going to start a new tradition. So, it's your first press conference, Silvana. What are the main messages you want all these people to leave the room with? [00:43:13] Silvana Tenreiro: Okay, so let me stress the main message. The global economy has been resilient, but that resilience is reaching its limits. So, we need to move from just scoping to rebuilding. We need to restore fiscal space. We need to rebuild supply-side resilience. And that entails many steps, depending on where the weak links or critical inputs are, whether it's energy or other critical inputs. And so, that's the homework for everyone, to make sure that we're resilient and we replenish that resilience in the face of potentially new shocks. [00:43:56] Speaker 1: Okay, all good things come to an end. And I think that we're going to make it one minute. So, on behalf of Silvana, Petia, Denise, the communications department, the research department, and also, we want to thank to the Thai authorities for hosting us. We want to thank you for attending this press briefing. If you want to attend the global financial stability report release and press briefing, it's going to happen in this exact room at 10:15 a.m. I would recommend you also, tomorrow, fiscal issues. The press briefing is going to happen here. The managing director's global policy agenda is happening tomorrow here in this room, too. And later on in the week, all those regional press briefings that we've been talking about and where you will be able to ask about country programs and get more granularity, happening probably Thursday and Friday. Thank you very much. Have a great day. Have a great day. And if you have any questions, comments, IMF media@imf.org. Thank you very much. [00:44:52] Speaker ?: Thank you. Thank you.