Former CIA director John Brennan testifies before House Intelligence Committee

[1:35] Good morning. It is my habit and tradition to open hearings that I chair with a prayer, [1:40] so please join me with a quick prayer. [1:41] Dear Heavenly Father, we come to you this morning, humble, [1:43] understanding that we in desperate need of your wisdom and guidance and discernment. [1:48] Lord, in particular, we pray for the families and those affected by the bombing in Manchester last night, [1:53] a clear reminder of how dangerous this world is, [1:55] and we ask your comfort and healing for those involved in that horrific experience. [2:00] We ask for you to be with us this morning as we try to find the truth, [2:03] try to find answers that our American public wants, [2:05] and we ask for your guidance and wisdom. [2:07] These things in your son's name, Jesus. Amen. [2:11] Well, good morning. The committee will come to order. [2:13] I'd like to welcome our witness, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, John Brennan. [2:18] Thank you, Mr. Brennan, for agreeing to come visit with us this morning. [2:20] We appreciate that. [2:22] As you're aware, there's, like I mentioned by prayer, a horrific attack last night in Manchester Arena in the U.K. [2:29] We obviously offer up our prayers and sympathies to the families of the deceased and injured, [2:32] and while there are many unanswered questions, last night's unspeakable tragedy reminds us of the crucial role our intelligence agencies play in protecting our homeland. [2:41] I'm confident that our AC agencies are doing all they can to assist our U.K. partners at this time. [2:45] I'd now like to remind our members and the witnesses that this morning's portion is an open hearing. [2:51] There will be a closed session in the Intelligence Committee spaces immediately following today's open hearing [2:56] that will allow members and the witness to discuss classified information. [2:59] To our guests in the audience, welcome. [3:01] We appreciate the public and the media's interest in the committee's important work. [3:05] We expect a proper decorum will be observed at all times, [3:08] and disruptions during today's proceedings will not be tolerated. [3:10] At this time, I'd like our witness to stand and raise your right hand, please. [3:16] I do solemnly swear and affirm that the testimony you will give this committee will be the truth, [3:20] the whole truth, and but the truth. [3:21] So help you God. [3:24] Well, thank you, Mr. Brennan, again. [3:26] Appreciate it. [3:27] I now recognize myself for five minutes. [3:31] As you know, the committee has an incredible responsibility to the American public. [3:36] We are charged with getting to the bottom of the facts regarding Russians' involvement in the 2016 election [3:40] and what, if any, steps were taken by the United States government to prevent such interference in our election. [3:46] It's my hope that your testimony today will assist both ours and the American public's understanding [3:50] of the facts surrounding the Russian active measures during our last presidential campaign. [3:55] As a former director of the CIA, you have a vital knowledge of the events and activities of last year [4:00] and were a key player in the preparation of the intelligence community assessment [4:03] regarding Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections published in January 2017. [4:09] You are one of a handful of former U.S. government employees that can assist this committee [4:13] with understanding the events that took place [4:15] and the judgments rendered by the intelligence community regarding those matters. [4:19] In particular, I'm hopeful you will discuss your understanding of the ongoing Russia threat [4:23] and the actions that were taken by the Obama administration to counter it. [4:27] This committee was focused on the Russian aggression long before the 2016 election, [4:32] so it is disheartening to wonder why more action was not taken sooner. [4:35] I hope you will add some insight into this important matter. [4:39] Every day, the American public is bombarded with news about the Russian interference in our elections. [4:44] Many of these reports are false and or misleading. [4:46] Today is an opportunity to focus on the truth, [4:49] and the truth can be only found through a full and fair investigation of all the facts. [4:53] The committee has a vital duty to the American public [4:55] to conduct comprehensive bipartisan oversight of the intelligence community [4:58] and to follow the facts wherever they lead. [5:01] To that end, your testimony today will greatly help us meet this solemn obligation. [5:05] And with that, I recognize and rank you remember Mr. Schiff for five minutes [5:09] for any opening comments that he would like to make. [5:11] Adam. [5:12] Thank you, Chairman. [5:13] Good morning, Director Brennan, and welcome. [5:14] We thank you for coming before our committee and for your lifetime of service to the country. [5:20] We awoke today to the terrible news from Manchester [5:22] that a suicide bomber killed and wounded scores of young people, [5:26] including children enjoying music at a concert. [5:29] It's difficult to describe the depravity of that act, [5:32] let alone view of the images of the carnage which has now been claimed by ISIS. [5:37] We know that your colleagues in the intelligence community [5:39] are doing everything they can to share information with the British [5:42] and working day and night to prevent such attacks from again plaguing our own country. [5:47] We thank them and the brave servicemen and women fighting this scourge of terror [5:51] in places like Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. [5:55] Two months ago, our committee held its first open hearing [5:57] with then-FBI Director Comey and NSA Director Rogers. [6:01] Because Mr. Comey was responsible for investigating [6:04] whether U.S. persons were involved in the Russia hacking of our election, [6:09] many of our questions at that hearing went to the issue of collusion. [6:13] It was at that hearing that Director Comey first revealed [6:15] that the FBI had opened a foreign counterintelligence investigation [6:18] of people associated with the Trump campaign in July of last year [6:22] and that this investigation was ongoing. [6:25] Director Comey and Rogers also repudiated the president's contention [6:29] that he was the subject of an illegal wiretapping operation orchestrated by his predecessor. [6:35] Today, we'll hear the testimony of former CIA Director John Brennan, [6:39] who had the responsibility to determine Russia's plans and intentions [6:42] in the United States and around the world. [6:45] Those plans involved an unprecedented attack on our democratic institutions, [6:49] and those intentions included a desire to tear down our democracy, [6:54] and more than that, a wish to undermine the candidacy of Hillary Clinton [6:57] and advance the prospects that Donald Trump would become president of the United States. [7:02] The audacity of the Russian intervention in our election took most Americans by surprise. [7:07] And today, we will look to Director Brennan to inform us [7:10] when the CIA first learned that the Russians intended to do more than gather foreign intelligence [7:15] and were intent on weaponizing the data by publishing it at critical times during the campaign. [7:21] What accounts for the Russian willingness to interfere in such a brazen way? [7:24] What were they hoping to accomplish, and why were they willing to run the risk of getting caught? [7:30] Did the Russians believe that the U.S. government response would be so muted [7:33] that they could get away with it and pay little price? [7:37] Since the decision to intervene in our election came from the very top levels of the Kremlin, [7:42] was Putin himself encouraged by then-candidate Trump's call for the Russians [7:46] to hack Hillary Clinton's emails and his promise that they would be richly rewarded for doing so? [7:51] While the CIA's mission is to gather foreign intelligence, we will also want to explore [7:56] with Director Brennan what the agency may have learned about the issue of U.S. person involvement [8:00] in the Russian operation, and can share an open session, [8:04] about how the Russians may have identified or targeted U.S. persons to secure their assistance or co-opt them, [8:09] and what mechanism was established, if any, for the sharing of information [8:13] between elements of the intelligence community and the FBI. [8:16] Our agencies have concluded that the Russian attack on our democracy was not a one-off, [8:22] and they will do so again. [8:24] In fact, the Russians are already employing many of the same tactics in Europe. [8:28] We will want to know the Director's views of the broader Russian aims and what we can do to stop them. [8:34] Finally, the disruption of our democracy that the Russians sought to provoke [8:38] continues to reverberate throughout our government. [8:42] Over the course of the last two weeks, several matters have been alleged that are grave concern to our committee [8:46] and the public that have a direct bearing on our investigation [8:49] and the relationship between the President and the intelligence community. [8:53] It is alleged that the President shared sensitive and classified information with the Russians [8:57] that was provided by one of our intelligence partners. [9:01] It is alleged that the President urged Director Comey to lay off the investigation of Michael Flynn [9:05] and asked the Director to pledge his loyalty. [9:07] Most recently, it is alleged that the President weighed in with the Directors Rogers and Coats [9:13] and urged them to rebut the issue of collusion, and that his staff asked personnel at those agencies [9:18] to lobby Director Comey to drop the Flynn case. [9:22] And significantly, it was admitted by the President himself that the Russia probe was the primary motivation [9:27] behind his firing of Mr. Comey. [9:30] If accurate, these events would have taken place shortly after you left the CIA. [9:34] But as I imagine you must have maintained many relationships with the incredible workforce [9:40] at the CIA and elsewhere where you served for many decades, we will be interested to learn [9:44] whether members of the intelligence community have shared information with you that corroborates [9:49] any of these allegations, and how you assess the conduct of the administration may be impacting [9:54] the ability of our agencies to gather critical information from our partners and the ability [9:59] of the FBI to carry out its investigation free from interference. [10:04] And last, I want to say a word about the appointment of Mr. Mueller as special counsel. [10:08] Many of us have known Director Mueller for many years and have the utmost respect for him. [10:12] But I take sharp issue with those who have suggested that his important appointment, [10:17] as important as it was to ensure public confidence in the conduct of the DOJ investigation, [10:23] somehow obviates the need for our own congressional probe. [10:27] Our investigation and Mr. Mueller's have two very different but equally important objects. [10:32] His will ultimately determine whether any U.S. laws were broken, [10:35] and who should be brought to justice if they were. [10:38] And ours will be to determine the whole scope of Russian intervention in which U.S. person [10:43] involvement is but one part, whether our response was adequate, what steps need to be taken to [10:48] protect us in the future, and importantly, to make many of our public – our hearings and findings [10:53] public – since a well-informed electorate is our only sure defense. [10:57] I thank the chairman, and I yield back. [10:59] Mr. Chairman, do you have an opening statement? [11:02] Yes, sir, I do. [11:04] You're recognized. [11:06] Thank you. [11:07] Representative Conaway, Representative Schiff, and members of the committee, [11:10] I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. [11:14] As you know, I served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from March 2013 to January of this [11:19] year, as assistant to President Obama for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism from 2009 to 2013, [11:26] and as a CIA officer from 1980 to 2005. I am currently serving as a part-time senior advisor at Kissinger Associates. [11:35] I'd like to express my deepest condolences, like you, to the British people and to the families of [11:40] those killed and injured in yesterday's heinous attack against innocents in Manchester. I am confident [11:45] that intelligence, security, and law enforcement officers from the United Kingdom, United States, [11:50] and other countries are actively working to find those responsible and to prevent further attacks, [11:54] and I wish them Godspeed. Congress and the American people have already heard from former and current [12:00] U.S. officials intimately involved in uncovering Russian attempts to interfere in the 2016 presidential [12:05] election, notably from former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Director of the [12:10] FBI James Comey, former Acting Attorney General Sally Yates, and NSA Director Admiral Mike Rogers. [12:16] Rather than repeating details contained in their testimonies, I will use this opportunity to make three main [12:20] points before I take your questions. First, I'm exceptionally proud of the work done by the [12:26] women and men of the CIA who, along with their talented colleagues from the FBI, NSA, and the Office [12:31] of the DNI, tracked and exposed Russian active measures against our presidential election. [12:36] When it became clear to me last summer that Russia was engaged in a very aggressive and wide-ranging [12:42] effort to interfere in one of the key pillars of our democracy, we pulled together experts from CIA, [12:48] NSA, and FBI in late July to focus on the issue, drawing in multiple perspectives and subject matter [12:54] experts with broad expertise to assess Russian attempts to interfere in the U.S. presidential election. [13:01] The purpose was to ensure that experts from key agencies had access to information and intelligence [13:06] relevant to Russian actions so that we could have as full an appreciation as possible on the scope, [13:11] nature, and intentions of this Russian activity. The experts provided regular updates and assessments [13:17] through the summer and fall, which were used to inform senior U.S. officials, including President Obama. [13:24] The work also was leveraged for the intelligence community assessment that was completed in early [13:28] January under the aegis of the Director of National Intelligence. Second, it should be clear to everyone [13:34] that Russia brazenly interfered in our 2016 presidential election process and that they undertook these [13:40] activities despite our strong protests and explicit warning that they not do so. Along these lines, [13:46] on 4 August of last year, I spoke to Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Russia's Federal Security [13:52] Bureau, the FSB, Russia's internal security and intelligence service. The bulk of the scheduled [13:58] call focused on Syria, as Mr. Bortnikov was my principal Russian interlocutor on terrorism matters. [14:04] In consultation with the White House, I took the opportunity to raise two additional issues with him. [14:10] I first told Mr. Bortnikov, as I had several times previously, that the continued mistreatment and [14:15] harassment of U.S. diplomats in Moscow was irresponsible, reckless, intolerable, and needed [14:20] to stop. Over the years, it has been Mr. Bortnikov's FSB that has been most responsible for [14:26] this outrageous behavior. I next raised the published media reports of Russian attempts to interfere in [14:33] our upcoming presidential election. I told Mr. Bortnikov that if Russia had such a campaign underway, [14:39] it would be certain to backfire. I said that all Americans, regardless of political affiliation or whom they [14:45] might support in the election, cherish their ability to elect their own leaders without outside [14:50] interference or disruption. I said American voters would be outraged by any Russian attempt to [14:55] interfere in the election. Finally, I warned Mr. Bortnikov that if Russia pursued this course, [15:01] it would destroy any near-term prospect for improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow [15:06] and would undermine constructive engagement even on matters of mutual interest. As I expected, Mr. Bortnikov [15:13] denied that Russia was doing anything to influence our presidential election, claiming that Moscow [15:18] is a traditional target of blame by Washington for such activities. He said that Russia was prepared [15:23] to work with whichever candidate wins the election. When I repeated my warning, he again denied the charge, [15:28] but said that he would inform President Putin of my comments. I believe I was the first U.S. [15:33] official to brace the Russians on this matter. Third, through the so-called Gang of Eight process, [15:39] we kept Congress apprised of these issues as we identified them. Again, in consultation with the [15:44] White House, I personally briefed the full details of our understanding of Russian attempts to [15:49] interfere in the election to congressional leadership, specifically Senators Harry Reid, [15:53] Mitch McConnell, Dianne Feinstein, and Richard Burr, and to Representatives Paul Ryan, Nancy Pelosi, [15:58] Devin Nunes, and Adam Schiff between 11 August and 6 September. I provided the same briefing to each of [16:05] the Gang of Eight members. Given the highly sensitive nature of what was an active counterintelligence case [16:11] involving an ongoing Russian effort to interfere in our presidential election, the full details [16:16] of what we knew at the time were shared only with those members of Congress, each of whom was [16:22] accompanied by one senior staff member. The substance of those briefings was entirely consistent [16:28] with the main judgments contained in the January classified and unclassified assessments, [16:32] namely that Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process, [16:36] denigrate Secretary Clinton and harm her electability and potential presidency, and to help President [16:41] Trump's election chances. Let me conclude by saying that it was a very special privilege to serve [16:47] as a CIA officer for the first 25 years of my public service, and it was the highest honor of my [16:52] professional career, and always will be, to have served another four years as director of CIA. [16:57] CIA officers of all disciplines, past, present, and future, serve this country and their fellow citizens [17:03] with tremendous dedication, talent, and courage. They recognize that this country's national security [17:08] rests heavily on their continued outstanding work and on the sacrifices they and their families make [17:13] every day on behalf of their fellow citizens. We all owe a great debt of gratitude to all CIA officers [17:19] and their families for what they have done and continue to do to protect this country. And I will now be [17:25] pleased to take your questions. Well, again, Mr. Brennan, thank you very much for your long service, [17:31] distinguished, and for agreeing to come this morning. I'm joined on our task force by two able prosecutors. [17:37] I'd like to yield my five minutes to Tom Rooney. Tom? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [17:43] Mr. Director, if you could just take a quick minute before I start with my line of questioning [17:49] with regard to what happened last night in Manchester, to do whatever you can, the best you can, from your [17:54] expert opinion, to try to reassure the American people that what we do in this country and what [18:02] we're trying to do would help thwart and stop any kind of similar activity here in the future. If you [18:09] could help try to put American minds at ease briefly, I would appreciate any words that you might have of advice. [18:16] Well, I would say that ISIS and Al Qaeda and their terrorist terrorist affiliates continue to try to [18:23] carry out these outrageous attacks in Europe, as well as the United States. But I can say with great [18:29] confidence that this country has the absolute best counterterrorism community that knits together [18:35] the experts from intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, and does a great job of making sure that [18:42] our federal structure is interoperating as best it can with state and local officials and local law [18:50] enforcement. And so I have seen a tremendous, tremendous growth of capability as well as an enhanced [19:01] national architecture since 9-11 in terms of the ability to share counterterrorism information quickly, [19:09] terrorist threat information so that when it's collected overseas or wherever, it gets to those [19:14] individuals who have to take action on it. So I can assure the American people that I know today my former [19:20] colleagues are working even harder than they ever had before to prevent attacks. Thank you, sir. And to the [19:26] matter at hand, we heard the ranking member speak in his opening as well as we've heard in the press [19:32] numerous times with regard to and in your opening statement, the Russian investigation, what the [19:40] Russians were trying to do with regard to our election, the Russians interfering with our election, [19:45] whether it be through the RT or propaganda or whatever, we know that that has now unfortunately [19:51] become the new norm and something that we're all going to have to deal with. And our charge on this [19:56] committee isn't so much necessarily to try to seek out and root out criminal behavior, [20:02] especially now in light of the new special counsel, Robert Mueller, who would be looking into those [20:08] type of things. But for us on the intelligence committees, whether it be here or in the Senate, [20:13] to try to improve the intelligence community's ability to do our jobs and to make a report, [20:20] a recommendation to you and the new administration as to how we better defend ourselves against what [20:28] Russia and or others may be trying to do with regard to affecting our republic and our democracy. [20:34] And in doing so, if we do find any kind of criminal behavior, I think that the minority would agree [20:41] that those type of that type of information would be referred to the Justice Department, which is the [20:46] the proper jurisdiction. But with regard to the main question at hand and your experience with the [20:53] Russian trying to involve themselves in our election, did you ever find any evidence as the ranking [21:00] member spoke of collusion while you were the director? Did you find direct evidence of collusion [21:06] between the Trump campaign and Putin in Moscow while you were there? [21:11] Mr. Rooney, I never was an FBI agent. I never was a prosecutor. So I really don't do evidence. [21:18] I do intelligence throughout the course of my career. As an intelligence professional, [21:23] what we try to do is to make sure that we provide all relevant information to the bureau if there is [21:31] an investigation underway that they are looking into criminal activity. As I mentioned in my opening [21:36] statement, I was convinced in the summer that the Russians were trying to interfere in the election. [21:41] And they were very aggressive. They had it was a multifaceted effort. And I wanted to make sure that [21:46] we were able to expose as much of that as possible. But was there intelligence that said that the Trump [21:51] campaign was colluding with Moscow during their campaign? [21:56] It was intelligence that the Russian intelligence services were actively involved in this effort. [22:00] And having been involved in many counterintelligence cases in the past, [22:05] I know what the Russians try to do. They try to suborn individuals. And they try to get individuals, [22:09] including U.S. persons, to act on their behalf, either wittingly or unwittingly. And I was worried by a [22:17] number of the contacts that the Russians had with U.S. persons. And so, therefore, by the time I left [22:23] office on January 20th, I had unresolved questions in my mind as to whether or not the Russians had been [22:29] successful in getting U.S. persons involved in the campaign or not to work on their behalf, again, [22:37] either in a witting or unwitting fashion. And so, therefore, I felt as though the FBI investigation [22:43] was certainly well-founded and needed to look into those issues. [22:48] When you talk about, and I am running out of time, but hopefully I'll be able to circle back, [22:54] can you describe their capabilities beyond just propaganda and actual infiltrating whether or [23:01] not there was, you had intelligence to infiltrate the campaign with capabilities beyond just propaganda [23:08] and beyond just reaching out or trying to influence the news or the campaign? And how long have we [23:15] known about these type of capabilities? [23:17] MR. There's a lot of intelligence that's been built up over the years about Russia's M.O. [23:22] in terms of trying to gain influence in Western democracies, how they've been able to use individuals, [23:27] they've been able to use politicians, political parties, they've been able to use elements within [23:31] the media to try to make sure that their objectives are realized. And so, again, knowing what the Russian M.O. [23:38] is and has been, including in elections in Europe, I certainly was concerned that they were practicing [23:44] the same types of activities here in the United States. And that's why, as I said, we set up a group [23:49] in late July that included the FBI and NSA. I wanted to make sure that every information and bit of [23:56] intelligence that we had was shared with the Bureau so that they could take it. It was well beyond my mandate [24:01] as director of CIA to follow on any of those leads that involved U.S. persons. But I made sure that [24:08] anything that was involving U.S. persons, including anything involving the individuals involved in the [24:13] Trump campaign, was shared with the Bureau. [24:15] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [24:16] That was time expired. Mr. Schiff, five minutes. [24:18] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to fall upon a comment that I made in the opening statement, [24:26] and that is with respect to a number of the allegations that have been made recently [24:30] that the president or his aides may have sought to enlist the help of members of the IC or Director [24:37] Comey himself to drop the Flynn investigation. Have any members of the IC shared with you their [24:45] concerns that the president was attempting to enlist the help of people within the intelligence [24:49] community to drop the Flynn investigation? No, sir. [24:52] Are you aware of any efforts the president has made to enlist the support of [24:59] intelligence community personnel to push back on a narrative involving the collusion issue that [25:05] Mr. Rooney was asking about? I am unaware of it. [25:07] I want to ask you about the allegations concerning the president's meetings in the White House [25:14] in the Oval Office with the Russians. First, what concerns you might have if the allegations are [25:23] accurate about sharing information that we may have obtained from an intelligence partner? [25:28] What impact do you think that might have on not only that partner but other intelligence [25:33] partners' willingness to share intelligence with the United States? But more than that, [25:37] if you could also shed your insights on one other thing, and that is the Russians' reaction to that [25:44] meeting was at least two-fold. One was Vladimir Putin's offer to validate what happened in the Oval [25:51] Office, to provide his own transcript of that meeting, but also the Russian publication of photographs [25:57] from that meeting. The Russians had to understand that the publication of those photos would be [26:02] harmful to the president, or the president would have invited American press into that meeting. [26:08] What do you think motivated the Russians to publish those photos? What do you think motivated [26:12] Putin to make a claim he knew would never be accepted to provide their own transcript of that [26:17] meeting? Is this just further efforts to weaken the president, disrupt our political process? [26:25] How do you explain those events? A lot of questions there, Mr. Schiff. [26:30] The first point I'd like to make is that I shared classified information with the Russians [26:33] while I was director of CIA. CIA, on a routine basis, shares classified information with Russians on [26:39] terrorism matters. It doesn't mean that it becomes unclassified. It means that it retains the [26:44] classification, but is releasable then to Russia or to other partners. So that in itself is not [26:49] unprecedented. And I don't know what was shared or said in the Oval Office, but if the reports in the [26:55] press are true that Mr. Trump decided to spontaneously share some intelligence with the Russians, I think he would [27:02] have basically violated two protocols. And those two protocols are, one is that such intelligence, [27:09] classified intelligence, is not shared with visiting foreign ministers or local ambassadors. [27:12] It's shared through intelligence channels because it needs to be handled the right way and it needs [27:16] to make sure that it is not exposed. He didn't do that, again, if the press charges are accurate. Secondly, [27:23] before sharing any classified intelligence with foreign partners, it needs to go back to the originating [27:28] agency to make sure that the language in it is not even just providing a substance going to reveal [27:33] sources and methods and compromise the future collection capability. So it appears as though, at least [27:39] from the press reports, that neither did it go in the proper channels, nor did the originating agency [27:46] have the opportunity to clear language for it. So that is a problem. What I was very concerned about, [27:52] though, is the subsequent releases of what appears to be classified information purporting to [27:57] point to the originator of the information, liaison partners. These continue to be very, [28:02] very damaging leaks, and I find them appalling, and they need to be tracked down. [28:06] So that was where the damage came from, I think, that it was released in the press. [28:11] Now, the Russians are watching very carefully what's going on in Washington right now, [28:15] and they will try to exploit it for their own purposes and to see whether or not they can further, [28:20] I think, seed partisan animosity here in Washington and try to roil the waters, the political waters [28:29] here. And so even though the election is over, I think Mr. Putin and Russian intelligence services [28:36] are trying to actively exploit what is going on now in Washington to their benefit and to our detriment. [28:41] FALPA, again, on Mr. Rooney's questions. When you had these concerns raised about the Russian efforts [28:50] and their potential effort to suborn U.S. persons to their cause in the hacking operation, [28:57] did you take steps to set up an organizational structure to analyze the Russian campaign so that [29:07] members of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and other agencies would look at these allegations in a cohesive fashion? [29:16] Yes, and I also recognize that this was an exceptionally, exceptionally sensitive issue, [29:21] an active counterintelligence case trying to stop and uncover what the Russian intelligence activities [29:28] were in the midst of a hotly debated presidential campaign that included information that may have [29:35] involved U.S. persons contacts with Russia, whether they be nine or not. And so, therefore, [29:41] one of the key pieces of any type of counterintelligence effort is to compartment that effort so that [29:47] your operators, your investigators, your collectors can continue to uncover what the Russians were doing. [29:53] We set up a group within CIA. I spoke to Jim Comey. I spoke to Mike Rogers to make sure that they were [29:58] able to send over their experts so that they could share information among them, even the most sensitive [30:04] information that was not disseminated within the community. I wanted to make sure that learning [30:09] the lessons of 9-11, that there were not going to be any stovepipes and barriers to sharing information [30:16] from the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. [30:21] Mr. Gowdy, five minutes. [30:23] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director, thank you for your service to our country. Let's go back to where we were a [30:28] couple of minutes ago. You mentioned or you testified that you had a conversation in August of 2016 with your [30:33] Russian counterpart. You testified that you briefed at least eight members of Congress throughout the [30:40] dependency of your investigation when you learned of Russian efforts. And we'll get to that in a [30:46] minute because my understanding from your unclassed report is Russia has historically attempted to [30:52] interfere with our electoral process, and they did so without coordination, collusion, or conspiring [31:00] with any of the candidates. So they have a history of doing it. We'll lay that aside for a minute. [31:05] 2016 electoral process. When you learned of Russian efforts, did you have evidence of a connection [31:13] between the Trump campaign and Russian state actors? As I said, Mr. Gowdy, I don't do evidence. [31:21] And we were uncovering information and intelligence about interactions and contacts between U.S. [31:27] persons and the Russians. And as we came upon that, we would share it with the bureau. [31:33] I appreciate that you don't do evidence, Director Brennan. Unfortunately, that's what I do. That's [31:39] the word we use. You use the word assessment. You use the word tradecraft. I use the word evidence. [31:45] And the good news for me is lots of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle use the word evidence, [31:50] too. One of my colleagues said there is more than circumstantial evidence of collusion between the [31:55] Russians and the Trump campaign. Now, there are only two types of evidence. They're circumstantial [32:01] and direct. So if it's more than circumstantial, by necessity, it has to be direct. Those aren't my [32:06] words. Those are the words of one of my colleagues on the other side of this very committee. Another [32:11] Democrat colleague on the other side of this committee also used the word evidence, that he has [32:16] seen evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russians. And yet a third California [32:22] Democrat said she had seen no evidence of collusion. So that's three different members of Congress from [32:30] the same state using the same word, which is evidence. And that's the word that my fellow citizens [32:36] understand, evidence. Assessment is your vernacular. Tradecraft is your vernacular. You and I both know [32:45] what the word evidence means. And we're not getting into whether or not you corroborated, contradicted, [32:51] examine, cross-examine. We're not getting into how you tested and probed the reliability of that [32:58] evidence. It's a really simple question. Did evidence exist of collusion, coordination, conspiracy [33:05] between the Trump campaign and Russian state actors at the time you learned of 2016 efforts? [33:13] I encountered and I'm aware of information and intelligence that revealed contacts and interactions [33:22] between Russian officials and U.S. persons involved in the Trump campaign that I was concerned about [33:35] because of known Russian efforts to suborn such individuals. And it raised questions in my mind, again, [33:43] whether or not the Russians were able to gain the cooperation of those individuals. I don't know [33:48] whether or not such collusion, that's your term, such collusion existed. I don't know. But I know that [33:55] there was a sufficient basis of information and intelligence that required further investigation by the [34:03] Bureau to determine whether or not U.S. persons were actively conspiring, colluding with Russian officials. [34:09] Do you know the basis of that information that you shared with the Bureau? I mean, what was the nature [34:14] of the evidence? I think, Mr. Gowdy, this committee has now been provided information that relates to [34:22] that issue in terms of information that the agency shared with the Bureau. And that is something that [34:29] is appropriately classified. All right. And you learned that when? When in this chronology did you learn of [34:35] the contacts between these official members of the Trump campaign or because there's kind of a [34:43] tripartite hierarchy? There's Trump himself. They're official members of the campaign. And then there are [34:48] folks who represented themselves as being connected with him. I'm not going to try to identify individuals [34:55] nor try to parse it. I don't want you to parse it. I just want you to identify the individuals. I don't [35:00] want you. I'm not going to identify the individuals because this is information that, again, [35:03] is based on classified sources and intelligence. Were they official members of the campaign? [35:11] I'm going to defer to current agency officials to be able to further provide to you information [35:19] related to that. But my understanding is that this committee has access to the documents that [35:23] we would have provided to the Bureau. All right. Last question because I'm out of time. [35:29] We can use the word evidence. We both know what the other one's talking about. [35:32] How did you test, probe, examine, cross-examine, [35:35] otherwise test the reliability or believability, credibility of that evidence you uncovered? [35:41] I made sure that the components within CIA that have responsible for counterintelligence, cyber, [35:48] and Russia were actively working to understand as much as possible about the reliability, accuracy of [35:58] the information that they already collected and information that was available that needed further [36:04] corroboration. We'll come back to the next round. [36:07] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Director Brennan, for being here. It's good to see you again. [36:15] I want to use my five minutes to try to paint a more specific picture around the methods and mechanisms [36:21] that the Russians use to suborn, which is the word that you use and that we've used here today, [36:27] our democracy and our electrical process. And I want to start with a quote by a report I know you're [36:33] familiar with, CSIS's report, The Kremlin Playbook, in which they say that Russia, quote, [36:38] seeks to corrode democracy from within by deepening political divides, unquote. The Russians stir the pot, [36:45] heightened anxieties, and know that when they trigger chaos, even if it ends up negatively affecting [36:50] them, that they are serving the purpose of weakening us. I want to talk about people, [36:57] because you made reference to people. I don't want to do it specifically. I want to do it in the [37:01] abstract. The Kremlin playbook that I just referred to says further that Russia looks to corrode democracy by, [37:08] quote, investing in rising politicians, cultivating relationships with prominent businessmen, [37:14] or helping to ensure that its business affiliates become well positioned in government. [37:19] Mr. Brennan, assuming that you agree with that, how specifically has the Kremlin gone about [37:24] cultivating relationships with key Americans in an effort to influence our policy? [37:29] It is traditional intelligence collection tradecraft in terms of human, which is to identify [37:37] individuals that you think are either very influential or rising stars, and you will try to [37:43] develop a relationship with them. And the Russians frequently will do that through cutouts or through [37:49] false flag operations. They won't identify themselves as Russians or as members of the Russian government. [37:54] They will try to develop that personal relationship. And then over time, they will try to get individuals [37:58] to do things on their behalf. And that's why, again, having been involved in a lot of counterintelligence [38:04] operations over the years. And seeing this pattern over and over again, my radar goes up when I see [38:11] that the Russians are actively involved in a particular intelligence operational campaign, [38:17] and that U.S. persons are being contacted by Russian officials. [38:22] So is it is it fair to assume you the phrase you used previously was that you were worried by [38:28] contacts that there might have been efforts to suborn? Is it fair to say that those contacts that were [38:32] you might have been consistent with that age-old Russian recruitment methodology? [38:37] Sure. And these are contacts that might have been totally, totally innocent and benign, [38:41] as well as those that might have succumbed somehow to those Russian efforts. [38:48] Great. Let me shift focus from Americans to Russians. We hear a lot about Russian oligarchs. [38:53] And I'm not asking you a question about specific Russian oligarchs. We may do that in closed session. [38:57] But can you tell us a little bit about what the role of Russian oligarchs is in Putin's plan? What [39:05] levers of influence do they use? And why do some Americans fall for contacts with Russian oligarchs [39:12] and business people? Well, Mr. Putin's political standing in Russia is certainly well supported by key [39:20] oligarchs who control billion-dollar industries and parts of the Russian economy. And he is, [39:29] I think, reliant on them for support, and they are reliant on him for support. And so they obviously have [39:35] a lot of international connections, a lot of business connections that they will use to advance their [39:41] business interests. But also we see that Russian intelligence agencies do not hesitate at all to [39:48] use private companies and Russian persons who are unaffiliated with the Russian government to [39:56] support their objectives. And so we've talked about Americans and Russians now in these couple of [40:01] minutes. Do Americans who are suborned in such a way and Russian oligarchs that are recruited or suborned, [40:11] do they necessarily need to know that they are doing Russia's bidding? [40:15] No, many times they do not. They do not even know that the person that they're acting – interacting [40:20] with is a Russian. Many times they know that individuals may be Russian officials, [40:25] but they don't know that there's an intelligence connection or an intelligence motive behind it. [40:30] Thank you. Thank you. I'm running low on time, so I'll just close with this thought. There's hardly [40:36] anyone left today who doubts that Russia attacked us. But what we have to realize is that the true thrust of [40:42] the Russian attack is what they have triggered in us, the partisanship. Every time we refuse to face [40:48] facts, every time we attack the messenger rather than confront the actions that happen, every time we [40:54] undercut our allies and our alliances and our values, I think we're playing precisely into Russia's fondest [41:01] hopes. We're doing something that, in my opinion, the great Cold Warriors, be it Ronald Reagan or Harry [41:06] Truman would never have allowed. So I thank you for your testimony. I yield back the balance of my time. [41:12] Chairman, his office expired. Mr. King, five minutes. [41:14] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, before I yield to Mr. Gowdy, I have one question to ask you. [41:19] I realize we're in an open session, so I'm going to word it a certain way, but I think you'll [41:22] understand what I'm saying. In the preparation of the report on the 2016 election, which concluded [41:28] that Russia favored the election of Donald Trump, who would have made the decision to include or [41:33] exclude any evidence or indications of Russian intentions that were contrary to that conclusion? [41:39] Mr. Myself, Jim Comey, Mike Rogers, and Jim Clapper relied on the experts who pulled this [41:49] draft together in the intelligence community assessment, and it was a process where the [41:53] representatives from those entities wrestled with the language to make sure that they had as much [41:59] accuracy and precision and consensus as possible. So any adjustments that were made were made during [42:06] the process. I met with some of our my officers who were involved in it. I asked them questions. I [42:12] want to make sure that they were comfortable with sort of the language that was being used, [42:16] but it would have been that internal interagency process that then resulted in the intelligence [42:21] community assessment. That is the traditional way that these assessments are drafted, are coordinated, [42:27] and are published. And again, without even getting to the final conclusion, if there were other evidence, [42:34] though, that indicated contrary, should that have been listed or not? [42:37] Mr. You're dealing with a lot of information when you put together an intelligence assessment, [42:45] and it comes down to a distillation process. And as you know, there were two products that were produced, [42:52] a unclassified version and a highly classified version. And the attempt was to try to include in that [42:59] highly classified version all of the relevant and pertinent information that needed to be in there [43:05] in order to undergird the judgments contained. And so was 100 percent of all of the information [43:11] available put into that highly classified one? No, but it was taken into account. And so therefore, [43:17] again, some decisions have to be made about it. But I am unaware that anything was intentionally [43:23] excluded because of intelligence, that is, that was, for some reason, one of the agencies didn't want [43:33] in there for a reason that was not a very legitimate intelligence reason. [43:38] We can discuss that in the executive session. Mr. Gowdy, you'll balance my time to go. [43:43] Thank you, my friend, from New York. Director Brennan, last time we were talking about at the inception of [43:49] your investigation in 2016. I want the next question to include the inception, the pendency, [43:55] up until your very last day at the CIA. Did you see evidence of collusion, coordination, [44:05] conspiracy between Donald Trump and Russian state actors? [44:10] I saw information and intelligence that was worthy of investigation by the Bureau to determine whether or [44:17] not such cooperation or conclusion was taking place. That doesn't help us a lot. What was the [44:24] nature of the information? As I said, Mr. Gowdy, I think this committee now has access to the type [44:30] of information that I'm alluding to here. It's classified, and I'm happy to talk about it in [44:35] classified session. And that would have been directly between the candidate and Russian state actors? [44:40] That's not what I said. I'm not going to talk about any individuals. But that was my question. [44:44] And you answered it. You didn't answer it that way. No. Yeah, I responded to your query. I'm not [44:50] going to respond to particular elements of your question because I think it would be inappropriate [44:54] for me to do so here. So I can only repeat what I said, which is that I was aware of intelligence [44:59] and information about contacts between Russian officials and U.S. persons that raised concerns in [45:06] my mind about whether or not those individuals were cooperating with the Russians, either in a witting [45:12] or unwitting fashion. And that served as the basis for the FBI investigation to determine whether such [45:17] collusion cooperation occurred. All right. Well, there are a bunch of words that start with C floating [45:24] around. I ask you about collusion, coordination and conspiracy and use the word contact. And I think [45:30] in a previous answer, you did a really good job of establishing that contact could be benign or not [45:36] an open eye. So was it contact that you saw? Was it something more than contact? What is the nature of [45:44] what you saw? I saw interaction and aware of interaction that, again, raised questions in my mind [45:50] about what was the true nature of it. But I don't know. I don't have sufficient information to make a [45:57] determination whether or not such cooperation or complicity or collusion was taking place. But I know [46:04] that there was a basis to have individuals pull those threads. I don't want to put words in your mouth, [46:09] but you saw something that led you to refer it to law enforcement. And in your judgment, [46:16] it is up to law enforcement to test, probe, corroborate, contradict, otherwise investigate [46:24] the full nature of that information you passed on. Is that a fair way to put it? Yes, [46:29] it is, because it's not CIA's job to make a determination about whether a U.S. person [46:33] is cooperating, colluding or whatever in some type of criminal or illegal matter. It is our [46:38] responsibility to give the bureau everything that they need in order to follow that path and make [46:44] such a determination and recommendation if they want to press charges. All right, we'll pick it up next [46:48] on. Ms. Sewell, five minutes. Welcome, Director Brennan. Building on the questions that my colleague, [46:55] Mr. Himes, talked with you about, I'd like to ask you some more specifics about Russia attacking us and [47:02] how their attacks specifically cause us to doubt our own credibility as Americans. I'd like to talk [47:09] about truth and what it means to be truthful to your country if you are in a position of power. [47:16] Director Brennan, was Putin first within Russia and then against us, [47:23] working to undermine truth? And how exactly has he done that? [47:27] Mr. Putin and Russian intelligence services are determined to do what they can to influence in [47:36] a very inappropriate and illegal way activities within Western democracies to undermine the Western-led [47:44] liberal democratic order. They do that on a regular basis. They see that as Western democracies as a [47:49] threat to them. And so that's why the cyber domain right now is a growing playground for Russian activities. [47:59] And they will use that and exploit it whatever way they can. So they've been involved in elections for [48:04] many years, including try to influence the ones here in the United States with propaganda or whatever. [48:09] But this cyber environment now provides new opportunities to collect, to collect and release, [48:15] to influence. And they are increasingly adept at it. So you said that they're going to do it again. [48:24] We the IC unclassified assessment said that. And has there been any blowback or consequences to Russia [48:34] for their interference in our election? And most importantly, [48:39] what would you do to try to prevent that from happening in future elections? [48:43] MR. Well, first of all, I think exposure is very, very important to make sure that we're able to [48:49] confront the Russians and make sure that partners and allies in other countries around the globe [48:53] are aware of this type of Russian capability. And it also is important, I think, to have the Russians [48:59] incur costs, not just in terms of reputational damage, but also actions that I think this government [49:06] and other governments should take against the Russians when they're caught in those types of activities. [49:11] It is anathema to our democratic values. And it's something that I think we need to be able to, [49:17] again, push back hard against. [49:18] MS. Have you seen the Trump administration do anything to push back, as you said? [49:24] Have you seen – I know that you're no longer in the – you're no longer a director, but [49:30] have you seen any indication that we're trying to punish or stop the Russians from doing this again? [49:37] MR. I'm not in a position to evaluate, because there could be things going on behind the scenes. [49:41] We were doing things beyond the scenes to try to counter Russian activities. We took actions in [49:46] January in the last days of the administration in terms of PNG-ing a number of Russian officials here [49:52] and trying to clamp down on their intelligence activities. Maybe the current administration [49:58] is doing the same thing. I don't know. [50:00] MS. So, Director Brendan, can you talk about – more about Russia's disinformation campaign [50:06] and what tools the Russians use to do that? [50:08] MR. They use all sorts of tools. As I said, they have been able to control [50:16] various media outlets. Obviously, they use RT TV here in the United States, which has a fairly [50:22] significant audience. They use individuals who have – who are writers or publishers, editorialists. [50:30] MR. Again, some of this is very obvious to those who are involved, because they're on the payrolls. [50:39] I'm talking globally now. They're on the payrolls of Russian intelligence, and so they place [50:45] pieces that advance Russia's interests. [50:47] MS. So, I just wanted to really kind of go back to what I was trying to say before, [50:52] which is about truth, getting to the truth. And I can't emphasize enough how damaging this [50:56] disinformation campaign is. And it troubles me so much that there are those in this country that – who [51:03] are practicing similar tactics, I think – attacking truth, calling disagreeable facts fake news, [51:08] and attacking the messenger rather than confronting the message that the Russians are trying to get us [51:15] to believe. It's divert, it's dissemble, it's deny. And these are Putin's tactics that are – that we're seeing and embracing in America. [51:24] In other words, truth is being replaced by trust. People trust this person or this news source, [51:31] even if it isn't objectively true. So we can't all agree on a common set of facts. And that's a big [51:37] problem, I believe, that really is leading to the divide that we see in this country. Our national [51:43] security has never been as partisan as it is now. And I think that the – the truth is that they [51:52] interfered in our elections. And the truth is the American people want to get to the bottom of it. [51:56] And the truth is we as elected officials and on this committee should be doing all we can to make [52:03] sure that we find out how they did it, we make sure we know who helped them do it, and that we also [52:10] get to the bottom of making sure that it doesn't happen again. So my last question to you is, [52:16] do you believe that – one of the things you talked about was exploit. You said that [52:22] that even though the election is over, Putin is still – and Russians are still exploiting us. [52:26] What did you mean by that? [52:27] SECRETARY KERRYKER I mean that, again, this has been a pattern of Russian intelligence services [52:34] to try to take advantage of the openness of Western societies, free press and other things, [52:41] and political parties and systems to find opportunities and vulnerabilities that they [52:47] can use to advance their interests. They will continue to do this. I think they're probably [52:51] taking some lessons from this past experience. I don't believe that this is going to make them at [52:56] all recoil and not engage in these types of things in the past. I think that what they will do is to [53:01] further refine their tactics so that they can be as successful as possible in the future. [53:06] SECRETARY KERRYKER Thank you. [53:06] SECRETARY KERRYKER Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Brennan, [53:13] thank you for being here today. Thank you for your service. And I have a number of questions [53:17] I know in an open setting you won't be able to answer, so I'm looking forward to the closed setting. [53:23] But Ms. Sewell asked, to the extent you can answer in this setting, what the elements of Russian [53:29] active measures in the campaign of the election were. So are these – can you be any more specific [53:36] than your answer with her about what they were doing, what you saw? [53:39] SECRETARY KERRYKER I think they're all chronicled in [53:41] the Unclassified Intelligence Community Assessment in terms of it's very clear that the GRU was [53:45] responsible for hacking into the networks of the DNC, DCCC, and were responsible through a cutout, [53:53] releasing it through places like Lucifer 2.0, WikiLeaks, and others. And so they were taking advantage of [54:02] information that they had collected that they determined if it was publicly released was going [54:07] to advance their objectives that I had enumerated before. In addition, they amplified a lot of fake [54:13] news stories that tried to denigrate Secretary Clinton. So it was a mixture of propaganda. It was [54:22] cyber collection, and it was the release of information that was, again, seen as damaging to [54:30] one of the candidates that they were trying to harm. [54:34] SECRETARY KERRYKER So you said a moment ago that you don't believe they'll be deterred from engaging [54:39] in activity like this in the future. Do you think they would attempt to influence the 2018 midterm elections? [54:47] SECRETARY KERRYKER I have, unfortunately, grudging respect for Russian intelligence capabilities [54:55] and their aggressiveness, their pervasiveness, and their determination to do what they can to undermine [55:05] this country's democracy and democratic institutions, as well as those certainly in Europe and other areas. [55:12] So I believe that they will try to exploit elections, but they will not wait only until elections. We know that they, [55:20] again, are aggressively collecting and trying to evaluate individuals who may be influential, [55:25] who currently are in government or are not. The Russian intelligence threat is a serious one, [55:30] and this is just one manifestation of the nature of that threat. [55:34] SECRETARY KERRYKER During your tenure as CIA director, did you have the resources and authorities [55:39] necessary to conduct what you needed to with as it pertained to the Russians? [55:45] SECRETARY KERRYKER I had resources and authorities [55:55] that allowed us to do things, but I think this is something that maybe in a classified setting [56:02] we can talk more about. SECRETARY KERRYKER And if we need to go to classified setting, [56:06] I understand, but were there additional suggestions that you would give to this intelligence committee [56:13] of what we should be doing proactively to enable not just the CIA, but the FBI and the NSA for [56:21] to thwart the future meddling? SECRETARY KERRYKER Sure. [56:25] SECRETARY KERRYKER Okay. Based on what happened here, [56:34] do you think there are ways that we can assist our allies in thwarting what the Russians are doing? [56:41] Is it simply sharing information or are there additional measures that can be taken? Because [56:46] I think if one of us is successful, then more of us can be successful. SECRETARY KERRYKER I think it's a [56:52] combination of things, and I have to be careful here, again, in an open setting, but certainly [56:56] sharing information and making sure that they're aware of the techniques, the tactics, the procedures, [57:02] as well as the practitioners that the Russians use. That is something that's very important. [57:07] We also need to be able to work some joint operations together so that we can expose Russian actors in a [57:14] variety of places. And I know that my former colleagues, who currently are still in the intelligence [57:19] community, are working very closely with a lot of sister services to do exactly that and to catch [57:25] the Russians in their efforts to undermine democratic institutions. We need to continue to do that. [57:32] We need to continue to do even more of it. SECRETARY KERRYKER I'm not sure if you can answer in this [57:36] setting, but while we're focusing on Russia, do you have indications that there was any collusion [57:41] with the Russians, with other state actors, the Iranians, the North Koreans, to meddle against us? [57:47] SECRETARY KERRYKER I do not believe that [57:53] they were partnered with other countries in this most recent effort to undermine last year's election. [58:01] SECRETARY KERRYKER Do you believe that other [58:02] countries were involved in attempting to influence us? [58:04] SECRETARY KERRYKER I'd have to think about that, [58:12] and I want to talk to you about that in closed session. [58:14] SECRETARY KERRYKER Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [58:16] SECRETARY KERRYKER Chairman Chairman, time expired. Mr. Carson. [58:18] SECRETARY KERRYKER Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, [58:26] Director, for your service to our country. We've talked about Putin's desire to weaken our [58:30] democracy from the inside out. I want to turn to how our democracy has been undermined by attacks [58:36] on our military, diplomatic, and intelligence professionals. In our 240 years, America has [58:43] spent a lot of blood and treasure to make the world safe for democracy. We work to ensure this at home, [58:49] and we work to ensure it abroad. Our diplomatic, intelligence, and military professionals have been [58:55] at the forefront of that effort. They're the reason we've succeeded. They've worked tirelessly [59:00] to promote democratic values because we value democracy in itself, but also because it helps us [59:07] to prevent war. Now, those professionals have helped advance the cause of freedom, [59:11] and they've helped enable economic opportunities. Director Brennan, in your mind, [59:17] does Putin want us to be successful? And, secondly, does he want to see democracy thrive [59:21] around the world? I would imagine he doesn't. [59:24] SECRETARY KERRYKER No and no. [59:25] SECRETARY KERRYKER Director, Director, Director, [59:27] Director Brennan, how do our intelligence professionals in particular support America's [59:31] mission to protect the world from war and to maintain global stability? [59:34] SECRETARY KERRYKER We are this nation's forward deployed radar. [59:41] We are the ones that need to make sure that we understand what is going on, but also what is [59:48] underway in the future. We need to make sure that we're able to assess capabilities and intentions of [59:56] foreign actors if they try to do us harm, as well as to support our diplomatic efforts, [1:00:02] our warfighters, our homeland security specialists and others. The foreign intelligence IC community [1:00:10] has an enormous task to cover the globe, do it 24-7, frequently in places where they are in harm's way, [1:00:19] but also in other areas where the threat to U.S. national security is much less obvious, [1:00:25] much more insidious, and sometimes much more threatening. And so, therefore, our nation's [1:00:31] intelligence professionals really have a lot on their shoulders as far as keeping this country safe [1:00:36] and secure. SECRETARY KERRYKER Yes, sir. And lastly, [1:00:39] Director Brennan, do you believe, sir, that Putin and the Kremlin would like to see us hamper and shrink [1:00:44] our intelligence and diplomatic capabilities? SECRETARY KERRYKER Sure. They know that we are their [1:00:49] principal nemesis. We are the reasons why they have not been successful in so many areas, [1:00:53] and we've been able to undercut and undermine them. So, although they are capable, I wouldn't [1:00:58] suggest for one moment that the U.S. intelligence community has not been very successful in preventing [1:01:05] and thwarting Russian activities. SECRETARY KERRYKER That's so important, sir. You know, [1:01:08] Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, I think he knows that diplomats are the tip of the spear. He said [1:01:14] himself in 2013, and I quote, if you don't fully fund the State Department, then I need to buy more [1:01:21] ammunition, end quote. So, I am concerned, as we all are, sir, when we see proposed cuts of a third [1:01:27] to the State Department, a third to the entire budget, their entire budget, and the announcement [1:01:32] that we, the United States of America, are no longer champion human rights around the world. [1:01:38] We are concerned with efforts to undercut our intelligence professionals, comparing them at times [1:01:44] to Nazis, comments by our own leaders. We can't let Vladimir Putin continue to undermine us [1:01:51] by doing exactly what he wants us to do. Generations of intelligence, diplomatic, [1:01:56] and military professionals have fought for our independence and for the march of democracy [1:02:01] around the world. And I don't think, sir, and neither of the rest of us, that we can [1:02:05] we can't let their important work prove to be nothing. [1:02:08] I thank you for your commitment and service to our great nation. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. [1:02:12] Jim is back. I inadvertently skipped Mr. Rooney for his own five minutes, so Mr. Rooney, five minutes. [1:02:17] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Director, I want to say that I have been up to the agency to review [1:02:23] those documents that you had referred to before, and I look forward to talking about the information [1:02:29] therein in our closed session. I also want to mention something that we had talked with Admiral [1:02:35] Rogers and Mr. Comey for in our last or two open sessions ago from the intelligence House Intelligence [1:02:41] Committee. It's one that sort of got a lot of hoopla on TV with regard to our side of the aisle here [1:02:48] trying to make a diversionary tactic when we talk about the importance of what leaks do with our [1:02:55] intelligence community. And I just want to ask you if you agree with Admiral Rogers that [1:03:00] that kind of leaking with our ability to have to reauthorize things like 702 so we can gather intelligence [1:03:09] on bad guys, for political purposes, if you agree with Admiral Rogers that that kind of leaking, [1:03:15] with our ability to have to reauthorize things like 702 so we can gather intelligence on bad guys, [1:03:20] for political purposes, if you agree that that kind of activity actually hurts our national security? [1:03:35] Admiral Rogers I think the unauthorized disclosure of classified information at all times hurts our [1:03:39] national security, compromises our intelligence capabilities, and needs to be investigated, [1:03:46] needs to stop, absolutely. Thank you. With regard to more specific questions, with regard to hacking, [1:03:53] when did you learn of the Russian hacking in the last election cycle? In the summer. And did you at [1:04:02] that time notify the both campaigns that you, or did somebody at the agency, or are you aware that [1:04:10] both campaigns were notified at that time that there was an effort by the Russians to hack and try to [1:04:16] influence the uh the political campaign of uh of last year? I was aware that both campaigns were being [1:04:23] contacted and notified about it, yes. Um you said, I believe to Mr. Gowdy that you you believe that there [1:04:30] was information of contact between people in the Trump universe and Moscow, whether or not that was [1:04:36] collusion or not remains to be seen. You said you didn't know if it was actual collusion. I think that your [1:04:42] words were I don't know. Um can you tell us whether or not from the information that you've looked at, [1:04:49] it looks like the intelligence shows that Moscow was actually rooting for Donald Trump or were they [1:04:56] rooting against Hillary Clinton and why? I think my assessment is it was both. Um I think that they [1:05:09] at different times in the campaign they felt that the fortunes of one candidate or the other was going up or [1:05:14] down. Um and I think that they uh most of the time believed that Secretary Clinton was going to win [1:05:19] the election and so their efforts to denigrate her were not just to try to diminish her chances of [1:05:25] winning but also to uh hurt her um and for her eventual presidency. Uh but also it's my assessment that [1:05:35] uh they clearly had uh a more favorable view toward Mr. Trump and actions they were taking were trying to [1:05:41] increase his prospects even though I think that they probably felt as though they were um not all [1:05:46] that great. Why? Why did they why did they want her or why did they want him and not her? Uh I think [1:05:52] it's a variety of reasons. One is that there was a have been a traditional I think animus certainly between [1:05:57] Mr. Putin and Secretary Clinton uh as well as uh uh there has not been a good relationship between the [1:06:05] Putin's and between Putin and the Clintons over the years. Uh I felt that uh Secretary Clinton with [1:06:11] some of her actions while she was Secretary of State uh led to some of the domestic disturbances [1:06:15] inside of Russia and I think he was more concerned that she was going to be more rigid on certain [1:06:21] issues particularly on human rights and other issues. So what was Donald Trump going to do for them [1:06:26] then or was it just that they didn't like Hillary? No I think that they felt that's that uh Mr. Trump being [1:06:33] a a bit of an outsider uh and that they have in the past had had some good relations with businessmen [1:06:40] who happened to elevate into positions of of government authority and so felt as though from [1:06:45] a negotiating standpoint that he might be more so good relations uh uh what if that's true one of the [1:06:53] questions that I have and this might be more appropriate for closed session but if that's true [1:06:57] um was there in your in your uh review of the evidence was there more damaging evidence of Secretary [1:07:05] Clinton that was not revealed and if it wasn't revealed what does that say about their the Russian [1:07:11] ability to be actually rooting for her to win? Well yeah we can talk about it in close but as I said [1:07:18] I think that they anticipated that Secretary Clinton was going to win the election and so they I believe [1:07:24] that they tried to damage and bloody her before the election uh but also I would have uh anticipated [1:07:32] that had she been elected that their efforts to denigrate her and hurt her would have continued [1:07:39] during her presidency so if they did collect more information about her that they did not release [1:07:44] I think they were probably husbanding it for a another day. Chairman is back uh Ms. Speer five minutes. [1:07:51] Thank you Mr. Chairman thank you Director Brennan for your service um I'd like to spend some time [1:07:58] talking about the outsized role that the Russian oligarchy plays in terms of supporting the Russian [1:08:08] government it's been said that there when the Russians want to cultivate a U.S. person they will do it over [1:08:19] a long period of time is that your experience? I guess a lot depends on the U.S. person and their [1:08:25] willingness to uh work with the Russians. Were you aware that they were attempting to cultivate then [1:08:32] real estate developer Donald Trump for almost eight years? I'm not going to talk about any individuals [1:08:37] and um are Russian oligarchs encouraged to invest in the United States? By whom? By Putin? There are some [1:08:50] tremendous uh investment opportunities here in the United States and uh certainly I think that uh Mr. [1:08:56] Putin would like to see more Russian involvement and investment here in the United States so yes. And [1:09:02] with that Russian investment is there an expectation that they're going to provide information to [1:09:09] President Putin about what's going on in the United States? I would fully anticipate that uh some of the [1:09:14] key Russian oligarchs and their business interests are you know tapped on a regular basis by Russian [1:09:20] intelligence for information? So were any of the oligarchs investing in U.S. properties owned by [1:09:25] then real estate developer Trump? I don't know the answer to the question. Are you aware that in 2015 alone [1:09:32] there were 106 visas granted to Russians for investing in the United States in amounts of money of 500 [1:09:43] thousand dollars or more? They're called EB-5 visas? I'm unaware of that. So as a general rule within [1:09:50] the CIA you did not investigate those who were granted EB-5 visas? It may have come across our screen. We [1:09:57] may have intelligence on it. I'm just not personally aware of a lot of the information that the CIA had [1:10:03] collected. So in 2014 the United States, the European Union, and Canada imposed sanctions on Russia [1:10:11] in response to their invasion of Ukraine and Crimea. These sanctions greatly restricted the flow of private [1:10:20] money to the Russian government and business leaders. How much pain do you think those sanctions [1:10:25] have caused Russia? I think it has been increasingly painful and I believe that one of Mr. Putin's [1:10:32] priorities has been um especially over the last year to try to get those sanctions reduced and his strategy [1:10:40] is uh getting European countries to separate from the U.S.-led sanction effort and that's why I think as [1:10:48] part of this effort they were trying to drive a wedge between Europe and and Washington and some of the [1:10:54] unfavorable characterizations of Secretary Clinton indicated that she was uh an unreliable leader and [1:10:59] that there were going to be problems for Europe. So I think that's part of a a broader Russian strategy. [1:11:04] Again I think that he Mr. Putin wants sanctions removed sooner rather than later. So that's you would [1:11:09] say that's one of his top if not very top policy objectives in dealing with the United States? [1:11:13] It's certainly it's a it's a key one but it's it's more dealing with us indirectly by trying to [1:11:19] wean the uh the European nations off of the of the sanctions uh wagon. [1:11:24] So Igor Rosneft Igor Sechin who was the CEO of Rosneft and then Rex Tillerson the CEO of Exxon Mobil [1:11:36] were doing a deal in Russia that was about a billion dollars I believe. The sanctions that were imposed [1:11:43] in 2014 shut that down is that correct? I believe so I'm not sure. So again it would make the case that [1:11:56] the impacts on Russia are grave in terms of the sanctions. Let me ask you another question. [1:12:05] There have been reports in in newspapers that British and Dutch intelligence had provided information [1:12:14] about meetings in European cities between Russian officials associated with uh President Putin and [1:12:21] associates of the Trump campaign. Is that how you first found out about those meetings? [1:12:26] I am not going to talk about anything that uh any of our international partners might have shared with us. [1:12:32] All right thank you Mr. Chairman I yield back. [1:12:33] Chair Lady yields back. Ms. Reis-Layton five minutes. [1:12:36] Thank you so much Mr. Chairman. Thank you Mr. Brennan for being here. Because of your [1:12:40] long history with the with the agency I think that you're the the perfect uh uh expert to give us [1:12:46] some historical perspective on how long uh Russia has been at this this active measure uh campaign. [1:12:54] How long would you say that Russia and the Soviet Union uh sought to undermine the the process of our [1:13:00] our democratic framework here in the west? For many many decades. For decades. And did Russia attempt to [1:13:10] collect intelligence on specific U.S. presidential candidates or uh target political parties or [1:13:19] organizations in the U.S. before 2016? Or was it more of a a general uh campaign? [1:13:26] Yeah well I would defer to the bureau which would have the investigative lead in terms of what might be [1:13:31] happening here on U.S. soil. But uh I know uh that again the Russians try to cultivate relationships with [1:13:39] with individuals but again I would defer to the bureau. Thank you um can you provide any examples of past [1:13:47] Russian or Soviet uh active measures as they're called? Well it runs the gamut from uh targeted assassinations [1:13:58] of dissidents of members of the media of uh inside of Russia as well as outside of Russia uh to uh getting [1:14:09] people uh on their payroll in uh foreign governments and to carry out their their actions uh to um the their [1:14:17] efforts in Ukraine uh as not just the military takeover of Crimea but their uh basic intervention [1:14:26] into eastern Ukraine uh with their intelligence and paramilitary services uh to the active propagation [1:14:34] of propaganda of propaganda and disinformation uh as they try to besmirch and tarnish uh individuals [1:14:41] as well as the use of of blackmail compromat uh that they would be able to then leverage uh for their own [1:14:49] purposes so it it really does uh run the gamut uh from the the most heinous and and violent uh to that which [1:14:56] is much more subtle and insidious. Yes the the scope is is alarming uh how does uh the Kremlin's attempt to [1:15:04] influence the this previous election compared to Soviet active measures that during the cold war [1:15:11] what has changed in their stagecraft? Well I think when we talk about U.S. presidential elections and [1:15:16] we know that the Russians were trying to influence outcomes uh as well as perceptions uh uh back to [1:15:24] the 1960s I believe um but again the the cyber environment now really provides so much more opportunity [1:15:32] for a variety of trouble making uh and the Russians take advantage of it so the ability to go in and to [1:15:40] collect uh and to use different types of techniques spear phishing whatever else so that they can then [1:15:46] gain access to people people's emails computer systems networks uh it is uh something that the Russians [1:15:53] are quite adept at and what we've seen recently is uh the collaboration between Russian intelligence services [1:16:00] and organized criminals I think it was in March the Department of Justice uh indicted four individuals [1:16:06] two members of the FSB and two well-known uh organized criminals hackers because of the uh the pillaging [1:16:13] of the Yahoo servers uh and that collaboration between Russian intelligence and Russian organized crime I [1:16:20] think is more and more of a concern so that they can promote uh their respective interests uh so this is [1:16:26] something that I think the Russians are looking for new opportunities to partner with whomever they can [1:16:33] in order to do what they they want to do and as a young analyst you probably had a lot of dealings with [1:16:39] uh Andropov the head of the KGB in the early 80s and he was very focused on on this active measure campaign [1:16:48] well yes I as a young analyst I wouldn't have had direct interaction with Andropov but I [1:16:52] have studied uh Russian uh intelligence activities over the years and have seen it again manifest in [1:16:58] many different of our counterintelligence cases and and how they have been able to get people including [1:17:03] inside of CIA to become treasonous uh and frequently individuals who go along that treasonous path do not [1:17:10] even realize they're along that path until it gets to be a bit too late and that's why again my my radar goes [1:17:17] up early when I see certain things that I know what the Russians are trying to do and I don't know [1:17:22] whether or not uh the targets of their efforts uh are as uh mindful of the the Russian intentions as [1:17:30] they need to be thank you for your service thank you mr chairman your lady is back uh mr quigley five minutes [1:17:36] thank you mr chairman thank you director for your service so you said you became aware of [1:17:40] u.s persons interactions with the russians and you've mentioned your radar going up is a part of that [1:17:47] who the russians were that were meeting i'm sorry it was part of your concern not just the fact that [1:17:54] there were interactions but who the particular russians were yes it was uh on both sides um yeah [1:18:02] not just the the nature of the context and the and the communicants or the yeah and it's not just the [1:18:06] fact that they met right you said and i want to make sure i had your words correctly uh you knew that [1:18:14] meant there was a there was a basis to pull these threads can you elaborate on what that means generally [1:18:19] well frequently and even totally divorced from the presidential election issue if there are [1:18:28] russian known or suspected russian intelligence officers who seem to be cultivating contacts with [1:18:34] u.s persons and there are reasons for cia or others to be concerned about what's happening there [1:18:41] we would make sure the bureau is aware of it we wouldn't know what those follow-up investigative [1:18:46] steps were taken by the bureau because of appropriate privacy rights and civil liberties of [1:18:50] u.s persons but the bureau has the primary responsibility in u.s soil to follow its [1:18:56] counterintelligence leads wherever they may go cia has very unique counterintelligence authorities as [1:19:02] well and we have a unique collection of authorities that make us the i think the the closest partner [1:19:09] with the bureau in this in this matter because we have the intelligence liaison relationships with our [1:19:13] foreign service sister services we have covert action responsibilities we have clandestine collection [1:19:18] responsibilities and authorities we have all sorts analytic capabilities the best analysts in the u.s [1:19:23] government bar none and so that combination of talent and capabilities is able to give the bureau [1:19:29] what they need and that's why any type of suspicion that we have that something may be afoot here that [1:19:35] the russians are trying to get and it's not just the russians it's other foreign services as well [1:19:39] we make sure the bureau is fully apprised of that and that's why we have fbi agents who are [1:19:44] serving inside of cia's uh counterintelligence elements thank you switching topics here um the [1:19:51] spear mentioned the um sanctions and the how they're impacting the russians uh you talked about how [1:19:58] the russians are attempting to get uh avoid these sanctions and getting aid from others but they also use [1:20:05] money laundering correct yes they do and can you elaborate just how extensive that is and where they're [1:20:12] doing it primarily i would i would defer to some of the experts and uh cia as well as department of [1:20:19] treasury and others but money laundering is a a long practice effort on the part of russian businesses [1:20:27] russian government officials and others as well as russian intelligence services in order to cover [1:20:33] their tracks and be able to carry out uh their illegal illicit even immoral activities uh avoid taxes [1:20:41] sanctions i'm sorry avoiding taxes sanctions oh avoiding any number of problems uh for them and [1:20:47] they become very adept over the years at uh money laundering are you familiar with which particular [1:20:52] country or countries that they're principally involved with money laundering i'm aware of some but uh [1:20:58] again i would defer to the agency at this time to identify the priority ones cyprus they they use uh banking [1:21:07] institutions um in a number of countries uh a lot of times what they're doing with some of the financial [1:21:14] elements in countries is unbeknownst to the governments and so uh there are a number of uh financial centers [1:21:22] around the world that the the russians uh have become quite active in and i agree that the the home [1:21:28] country may not be aware and probably isn't aware of all that's taking place but you would certainly be [1:21:33] aware and concerned if there were u.s persons involved with those financial institutions correct [1:21:39] anything that we might uh uncover related to that we would make sure that the bureau department treasury [1:21:44] and others are aware of it they're the ones that need to follow up in terms of whether or not [1:21:48] there's any criminal activity and were there areas concerned in cyprus involving this with u.s [1:21:52] persons and financial institutions there well i think it's a well-known fact that uh there is a [1:21:58] large russian presence a large business interest a large financial interest a part of russia in cyprus [1:22:03] and so again any type of involvement of u.s persons or companies uh it would be the responsibility of [1:22:10] of the fbi and other u.s agencies not cia to follow up on that finally if a u.s president asked any intel [1:22:17] official not to pursue an investigation would you construe that as obstruction uh i do not have the [1:22:24] legal basis uh to determine what constitutes obstruction of justice how would you react if a [1:22:29] president asked you not to pursue an investigation i have never been asked that and if i was i certainly [1:22:35] would not uh i would not follow such uh a directive thank you i yield back jimiel's back mr turner five [1:22:42] minutes thank you mr chairman i'm mr brennan um and turning back to um the um exchange that you had with mr [1:22:50] gowdy uh you stated uh and by the way i i want to also uh thank you as others have for the specificity that [1:22:57] that you provide to us these are difficult issues and concepts different standards intelligence [1:23:02] assessments evidence we've got uh you know the fbi the cia each of you do different uh jobs and uh [1:23:08] your expertise is certainly helpful to us to unwind as we're dealing with elements of this what [1:23:13] what we're looking at and what this means as we try to move forward with an investigation [1:23:16] so you indicated um that you saw when asked about whether or not you'd seen evidence of collusion [1:23:23] or collaboration you said that you saw intelligence that indicated there had been contacts uh with [1:23:29] individuals uh with um with russians that were of a nature that bore investigation uh you said that [1:23:37] those contacts might have been benign might not have been but they rose to the level of um indicating that [1:23:44] they need to uh be reviewed for their nature and looking into an investigation did i characterize [1:23:49] that correctly yes but i don't want to take this out of context you know we see contacts and interactions [1:23:56] between russian officials and u.s persons all the time it is when it's in the context that there's [1:24:01] something else going on and so we knew at the time that the russians were involved in this effort to [1:24:07] try to interfere in our election so with that backdrop and increasing uh indications that they were [1:24:12] involved in that seeing these types of contacts and interactions during the same period of time [1:24:17] raised my my concern excellent i appreciate that that um that qualification but if someone left this [1:24:25] hearing today and said that you had indicated that those contacts were evidence of collusion or [1:24:32] collaboration they would be misrepresenting your statements correct they would have misheard my [1:24:38] response to the very good questions that were asked of me i'm trying to be as clear as possible in [1:24:42] terms of what i know what i assess and what i i can say so you would say that's a misrepresentation of [1:24:48] your statement yes i i would say that it was not an accurate portrayal of my statement absolutely it [1:24:54] was inconsistent with my so let me go to the next step if someone saw what you saw and only what you saw [1:25:00] with respect to those contacts if they looked at the intelligence that you saw where you said it might [1:25:06] have been benign might not have been benign and then they characterize what they saw has been as having [1:25:12] been evidence of collusion or collaboration they'd be misrepresenting the intelligence would they not [1:25:19] i don't know what else they have seen that could corroborate or core or is correlated what you saw [1:25:27] they would be misrepresenting the intelligence correct i i i presume they would be misrepresenting [1:25:37] what it is that i uh saw again i don't know thank you i appreciate that because i do believe that [1:25:43] there are members of this committee that deserve that counsel because your specificity gives us an [1:25:48] understanding of what we're reviewing and i do believe that there are those who review some of [1:25:52] the information that you have have seen and uh represent it to the public absolutely incorrectly [1:25:58] and misrepresent it i'd like to yield the remainder of my time to mr gowdy sorry i was uh colluding with my [1:26:10] friend from florida uh and i want to pick up where uh well i want to do this the last time you and i [1:26:17] talked you had referred information to the bureau am i right you would you what you had seen you [1:26:24] referred to the bureau okay what i don't know if that was the last thing that we talked about but [1:26:30] i'll grant you that one of them about that yes one of the last yes it wasn't a trick question one [1:26:34] of the last things you referred to the bureau what you saw is that fair yes did you also refer to director [1:26:40] clapper uh not everything that was shared with the bureau was shared with director clapper and why would [1:26:48] that be because uh on counterintelligence uh matters dealing with uh u.s person information of a very [1:26:58] uh sensitive nature uh the office of the dni and the dni does not have that type of operational [1:27:05] responsibility and what we try to do is to make sure that there is as little exposure of that [1:27:10] information as possible i would keep general clapper uh informed about the nature of my engagements but [1:27:18] the materials that were shared with the bureau would not have been shared with the uh the dni do you [1:27:23] know if the bureau opened a matter well first of all when was that with as much specificities as [1:27:27] as you can give us when did you refer that information to the bureau would you accept last year that's the [1:27:33] answer it was during the summer time and the okay and but even previously there are ongoing uh ongoing [1:27:41] sharing of information with the bureau and so it was over the course of the of the year all right and [1:27:48] conclusion because i'm out of time sometime in the summer you shared the information with director [1:27:54] comey at the bureau sometime of the summer there was information that the cia had that was shared with [1:28:01] the bureau but it wasn't the only period of time where such information was shared with the bureau good [1:28:06] enough thanks jimmy yes back to swalwell five minutes thank you chair thank you director since you [1:28:13] passed that information to the fbi director have you reviewed the fbi's development of that evidence [1:28:19] or any other evidence i am unaware of what the bureau has done with that information and i have no [1:28:25] knowledge of anything even that the agency has done since january 20th are you aware of what the bureau [1:28:31] has briefed this committee with respect to evidence of collusion i uh watched uh jim comey's uh hearing and his [1:28:40] comments and i've gone through his transcript so i'm aware of it yes have you are you aware of what [1:28:46] the fbi has briefed this committee in a classified setting with respect to evidence of collusion no i'm [1:28:51] not totally not director may 10th of this year produced an unsettling image inside the oval office [1:28:57] president trump standing and laughing with russia's ambassador kislyak and foreign minister lavrov [1:29:02] it's been further reported that president trump shared highly sensitive code word information with russia putting [1:29:08] at risk u.s lives and jeopardizing sources and methods director are the russians worthy of receiving such [1:29:15] information in the manner alleged i believe it's important for the u.s intelligence to provide to [1:29:24] any of our foreign partners any information related to terrorist threats to foreign countries or their [1:29:30] citizens and that's why i authorized the provision of classified information numerous times to the [1:29:35] russians that i believe saved russian lives as i mentioned there is an appropriate [1:29:40] manner and procedure for doing that they need to be followed scrupulously so that there's not going [1:29:46] to be a undermining of those collection capabilities and systems director you warned bortnikov that [1:29:53] there would be consequences if they meddled in our elections when you look at that picture [1:29:58] and the manner in which allegedly classified information was conveyed to the russians do you see [1:30:04] consequences for their actions again i don't know the totality of the actions that have been taken [1:30:13] against the russians i know that uh again the obama administration in january took actions against [1:30:19] them uh so i i i believe that uh depending on how this uh investigation uh proceeds uh by the [1:30:27] by the fbi and special counsel as well as by the work of the committees and i agree that the [1:30:32] appointment of a special counsel should not in any way uh stop these committees uh intel's committees [1:30:37] in the senate and the house from doing its work because you're supposed to be looking at [1:30:40] what are what do we need to do to strengthen our system so that we're better prepared uh to it [1:30:45] so i believe that consequences need to be uh levied on the russians for it but i would defer to [1:30:50] policy makers in congress to decide that director with respect to the contacts between russia and trump [1:30:56] campaign persons that you referenced earlier and whether they were innocent or benign contacts when [1:31:02] you see a multiplicity of contacts between one country and one campaign when does it in your mind when [1:31:09] you're deciding whether to refer to the fbi when does it move from mere coincidences to a pattern [1:31:17] and in this case when did it um i guess it's all sort of very generous as as far as the instances are [1:31:26] concerned but uh as i said there was a backdrop there of uh known russian efforts to interfere in [1:31:32] election and there were a variety of activities taking place that uh wondered whether or not they were [1:31:38] part of that campaign and strategy uh we don't have a totality of uh insight into all the things that [1:31:45] russians were doing uh and um i left it up to the professionals the counterintelligence and russian [1:31:52] experts to make sure that whatever information that they deemed appropriate to share with the bureau [1:31:59] because it could be relevant to their investigation they did that so i wasn't the one to make decisions [1:32:04] you know share this with bureau share this with it was based on long held uh practices on the part of [1:32:11] the cia to make sure that we're not holding back from our bureau colleagues director there is what is [1:32:17] referred to as consciousness of guilt evidence that's when somebody lies about a material fact and that [1:32:23] fact the fact of them lying can be used against uh that person because it would be in essence uh an [1:32:30] effort to cover up what happened meaning if you know you were telling the truth uh you wouldn't have [1:32:35] anything uh to cover up with respect to some of the contacts that you've referred to between [1:32:41] russia and trump campaign officials are you aware of any of those u.s persons who had contacts with [1:32:46] russia either making false statements about those contacts or failing to disclose those contacts i think [1:32:56] that's something that uh you can uh we can pursue in uh close session and director with respect to the [1:33:04] contacts that you have seen have you ever seen in your history working as an intelligence official [1:33:12] this number of contacts between a foreign adversary and a presidential campaign [1:33:17] i think our collection systems have increased over the years and so i don't know whether or not [1:33:26] it's a result of better collection or because there were more contacts this time than not i i just do not [1:33:34] have a basis to make a determination about that thank you yield back jimmy's back dr winstrom thank you mr [1:33:40] chairman thank you mr brun for being here today and uh your candor in this conversation have you ever [1:33:46] been uh asked to give your opinion to the fbi about whether intelligence you gathered should lead to an [1:33:52] investigation do they engage you in that way you said there's fbi engaged in the cia so i didn't know [1:33:59] if they have an opinion or ask your opinion on that well we would we would make a referral to the department of [1:34:07] justice on in many instances when we saw classified information appear in the public in an unauthorized [1:34:15] fashion and so that referral is made to the department of justice to determine whether or not there should [1:34:20] be a follow-up investigation and it's the fbi that then takes a look at the circumstances the and makes [1:34:26] the decision so that would be the referral we make okay and we've pretty much established that russian [1:34:32] soviet union they've tried to meddle with our elections for years now you came in as director [1:34:37] after the last election um and which which leads me to something mr hymes was talking about he says you [1:34:45] know the rules of the russian playbook or whatever they go they try to build relationships especially with [1:34:50] influential americans and you would agree with that that's one of the things that you're kind of looking [1:34:55] out for these relationships at least i believe that's what you've said so i'm just trying to understand [1:35:00] process here a little bit what sets up a red flag what type of conversation do you hear that says [1:35:07] maybe we need to take a little bit further look into this or refer it on and i can't help but think [1:35:12] back to the previous election when we see on videotape president obama says this is my last election after [1:35:20] my election i have more flexibility and president medvedev who he's speaking to says i understand i'll [1:35:26] transmit this information to vladimir and i stand with you now you talk about the playbook it sounds [1:35:32] like i stand with you that's a pretty strong relationship this is certainly an influential [1:35:36] american and we're talking openly about elections so again i'm just i'm not trying to launch another [1:35:41] investigation here but i am concerned about the process so you weren't sitting as a director at that [1:35:47] time but you know as mr swalwell used the term that's a pretty disturbing image i think to a lot of [1:35:53] americans is what kind of relationships so would you question this interaction uh where that type [1:35:59] of conversation is taking place and again i'm just trying to understand process of how it moves from cia [1:36:05] to fbi to doj that was a direct conversation between the the heads of government and state between two [1:36:13] countries i'm i'm not going to respond to you okay but i think that's what we're talking just again [1:36:17] trying to get some understanding of what sets off a red flag um you know and when do you refer to law [1:36:25] enforcement i know you weren't the director at that time um but boy that just hits all the things you [1:36:31] were talking about in the playbook elections influential american and building a relationship [1:36:36] i stand by you so just again trying to to get to the the substance there but i um that's interesting you [1:36:43] can't respond to a personal conversation but this is what we're talking about anyway with that i yield [1:36:49] back i try to get go ahead try to avoid getting involved in political issues partisan issues and so [1:36:54] with respect to mr winstrup i just will not uh recognize that question thank you and with that i [1:37:01] yield the remainder of my time to mr gowdy uh thank you dr winstrup um congressman rooney and you were [1:37:09] discussing uh generally uh the motive and i think it is let's just assume it's given um that the russians [1:37:17] did not like secretary clinton did not like president obama for that matter and uh desired uh negative [1:37:24] things for her um but they also thought she was going to win was it your testimony that all of the [1:37:32] information stolen um was not publicly disseminated no i said if they had collected additional information [1:37:41] as i think was implied that um the uh the effort to try to uh further hurt her uh if she became [1:37:49] president uh that information uh any type of derogatory information about her could have been husbanded [1:37:56] for uh post-election period all right but do you know if uh negative information was husband to use [1:38:04] your word and not disseminate and i i think that would be uh inappropriate to talk about in an open [1:38:10] session like this is it inappropriate to both i get not asking you about the nature of it is it [1:38:15] inappropriate to answer yes or no whether or not that information was husband but not disseminated [1:38:22] my my uh request would be that we could talk about that in closed session okay i'll honor your [1:38:27] request and we'll talk about it a little bit jimmy else right mr castro uh thank you chairman thank you [1:38:33] director brennan for your testimony here today uh over the course of the last several months the [1:38:38] intelligence agencies have been berated by the president for the possibility of leaks have you [1:38:44] are you aware of his tweets and other criticisms he's made about leaking in the intelligence agencies [1:38:49] i know that there have been a number of allegations made publicly about intelligence officials being [1:38:53] responsible for those leaks yes i'm aware are you aware of a story that came out yesterday [1:38:58] that said quote three white house staffers have been identified for leaking classified info [1:39:04] potus will fire quote multiple people when he returns to dc i'm unaware of that story or the facts [1:39:11] if any underneath it uh if the story is true and we don't know whether it is or not but if it's true [1:39:18] that there may have been people who leaked classified info at the white house first could you tell us [1:39:22] would it seems like an obvious question should be an obvious answer are there people at the white [1:39:27] house that would have classified information that they could leak to journalists white house officials if [1:39:33] they have the appropriate security clearances based on their position they would have access to [1:39:36] classified information yes okay and then the second part of that is if the white house has determined [1:39:43] that leaks are coming from within their operation could you tell us how they would go about determining [1:39:48] that how would they figure out that they have leakers in the white house if there is a uh sense that [1:39:57] there are unauthorized disclosures of classified information from within the white house uh i think it's [1:40:03] imperative that the uh the fbi be brought into the matter so that there can be an appropriate [1:40:09] investigation to determine whether or not that conduct was criminal or not and uh there shouldn't be [1:40:15] just uh a independent investigation that takes place they can they can do some uh efforts to try to [1:40:22] contain any hemorrhaging of information but it really is the responsibility of law enforcement and [1:40:27] the bureau to investigate criminal leaks of classified information oh thank you now i i have some [1:40:33] questions about the ic assessment itself and the declassified report because there has been a lot of [1:40:39] disinformation and confusion about the intelligence assessment and it's been attacked also so uh mr brennan [1:40:47] when did the ic start warning about the russian threat and how was the assessment produced do you [1:40:52] believe that the people working on it had the requisite skills and expertise to write such an important [1:40:57] assessment well the intelligence community assessment that was produced in early january was [1:41:05] initiated by president obama in early december uh to ensure that there was going to be a a full accounting [1:41:13] of russian activities and uh directed that there be a classified and unclassified version of that [1:41:21] the effort to uncover the russian activities took place prior to that and in both instances i believe that [1:41:29] the right people with the requisite array of skills were involved in the initial collection effort and [1:41:37] assessment effort about russian activities uh up to and even in the aftermath of the election in november and [1:41:44] then there were additional individuals who were added to that to a group that could draft that assessment so [1:41:51] that it could be produced in early january and let me ask you um how and why did all three agencies come to [1:41:57] such a high degree of confidence about their assessment i think that they rigorously um interrogated the [1:42:04] data uh it had very careful and uh deep uh discussions about uh what the data told them about their [1:42:14] assessments and so therefore there was a a unanimous consensus among the three agencies and the odni [1:42:20] about the judgments there was one variation as far as the nsa's confidence level in terms of the [1:42:26] russian advocacy for mr trump but uh with that lone exception uh it was uh a a consensus uh assessment [1:42:35] and the report also talked extensively about the role of wiki leaks in working with russia on this [1:42:40] covert action campaign can you talk a bit more about how they fit in well i think as the assessment says [1:42:46] that the russians used a cutout for uh the wiki leaks exposure and uh when you look at the wiki leaks [1:42:55] releases over time uh you can see that uh sometimes they are time to coincide with certain events and [1:43:03] they i think are always intended to undermine u.s national security and russian protests that they [1:43:09] are not working with wiki leaks and wiki leaks protests are not working with the russians i think [1:43:13] on both parts are disingenuous uh and then let me ask my final question because i'm running out of time [1:43:18] back to the leaking at the white house or potential leaking uh what surveillance methods [1:43:24] would the president or the white house have authorization to engage in on its own staffers [1:43:30] that would be legal and where might they cross the line i am not a lawyer and uh you would have to [1:43:36] go to the department of justice and the fbi uh in terms of what uh statutory uh authorities they might [1:43:42] have uh which i i just i'm not aware i don't know thank you director jama stuart mr stewart five minutes [1:43:50] thank you chairman and thank you mr rector for again your many years of service i'm going to go [1:43:54] very quickly because i want to reserve as much time as i can for our task force and the attorneys [1:43:59] i want to go through and make one point it's a point worth making but before i do i'm just going [1:44:03] to add that uh i've reviewed the raw intelligence of the cia regarding the analysis of whether they [1:44:09] preferred mr trump i don't agree with the conclusion particularly that it's such a high level of [1:44:14] confidence i i just think there should have been allowances made for some of the ambiguity in that and [1:44:20] especially for those who didn't also share in the conclusion that it was a high degree of [1:44:24] confidence but having said that i do think we can agree that russia wants a weakened u.s president [1:44:30] would you agree with that uh yes yes certainly and in regards to secretary clinton you've said that [1:44:36] their primary goals seem to be to work to weaken her candidacy so that she would be a weakened u.s [1:44:41] president my question to you is would the same thing be true now would russia want a weakened u.s [1:44:47] president president mr trump well i think they they want to be able to weaken u.s uh policies uh especially [1:44:58] on the international stage uh i i do think that there is an interest in the part of the russians [1:45:04] to improve relations with the united states and i do think it's important that relations between [1:45:09] washington and moscow be improved because but even if they want improved relationships they would want [1:45:14] that on their terms as much as able and that would be better accomplished by having a weakened u.s [1:45:20] president regardless of who it is wouldn't you say that's true one can argue the point or that a a [1:45:27] stronger president is able to make uh have have an accommodation with russia uh out of strength as [1:45:34] opposed to out of weakness okay i i would agree with you that there are some circumstances but i think in [1:45:40] general they a weakened u.s a weakened u.s western uh influence in the world and a weakened u.s president [1:45:47] is in their interest and i'll just conclude with this these active measures the propaganda the false [1:45:52] news reports etc they don't end with the u.s election and i think it's it's appropriate that [1:45:58] we would warn the american people that these active measures again propaganda fake news stories etc [1:46:04] would be applicable today as well and that they would be trying to weaken our u.s president [1:46:10] and trying to weaken foreign leaders as well as we look at upcoming elections would you agree with [1:46:15] that yes generally thank you and with that i yield the remainder of my time over to i believe mr gowdy [1:46:21] i think we're free from utah director brennan why is it important to protect the identity of u.s [1:46:26] persons as part of our surveillance programs because uh there is i think a right of all americans uh to [1:46:36] privacy and that uh sometimes information is collected about u.s persons who may or may not be [1:46:45] involved in any manner of criminal activity and therefore uh respecting that privacy of u.s citizens [1:46:53] uh the intelligence community goes to great lengths to uh cover the identities of u.s persons if they [1:47:00] happen to be included in an intelligence collection for all those reasons and others the and again we're [1:47:06] not talking about leaks we're talking about masking within the intelligence community right we're not [1:47:12] talking about reading it on the front page of newspapers we're talking about uh prohibitions that [1:47:18] you place on yourself with respect to identifying u.s persons as part of our surveillance programs right [1:47:24] that's correct all right yes and and you just cited some of the very important reasons uh that we do [1:47:31] that and i would assume that there is a process a protocol under which the intelligence community [1:47:38] goes through if they seek to unmask a u.s person's name that's correct have you ever requested that a [1:47:45] u.s person's name be unmasked yes i have have you also uh either approved or denied requests of others [1:47:54] that a u.s person's name be unmasked i don't recall in my tenure at cia any decision on unmasking for [1:48:02] someone else coming up to my level it would have been uh that decision would have been made at a [1:48:08] lower level within the agency are you aware of any requests within the community that were denied [1:48:14] i i do not i didn't have visibility into requests that were being made across the government so [1:48:23] uh i don't i don't recall one uh that uh i was denied do you recall any u.s ambassadors asking [1:48:31] that names be unmasked i don't i don't know maybe it's ringing a vague bell but i'm not [1:48:41] i could not answer with any confidence do you remember what your last day on the job was at the cia [1:48:46] was the date it was noon on january 20th when i gave up my responsibilities director of cia on that [1:48:53] on either january 19th or up till noon on january the 20th did you make any unmasking request i do not [1:49:01] believe i did so you did not make any request on the last day that you were employed no i was not [1:49:10] in the agency on the last day i was employed i definitely know that the last day i was employed [1:49:14] i definitely did not make such a request thank you director yeah this time has expired uh mr crawford [1:49:19] five minutes oh i'm sorry mr heck mr chairman i just want to make sure you're way down there [1:49:25] a second all over it mike thank you sir director brennan thanks for being here i i want to freely confess [1:49:31] to you that there's an element to this russian investigation with which i've struggled and it [1:49:36] is this how do i explain why this should matter and why people should care what words do i use to [1:49:44] explain this to folks who have a lot of other things on their mind things like their kids like keeping [1:49:49] their job like managing their debt like caring for an elderly parent why should people care that the [1:49:55] russians hacked into our computers and then selectively disclose that information with the express [1:50:02] purpose of swaying an election why should they care that the russians are doing this in other [1:50:07] western democracies and will continue to do so by the way at minimal investment that's the precise [1:50:14] question that i actually put to then director comey and admiral rogers when they were with us in march [1:50:20] i now pose it to you sir so not for my sake but for america's sake as someone who has devoted [1:50:27] your entire life to public service in your own words please tell my constituents my neighbors [1:50:34] why they should care not just here in washington dc but in washington state and texas and connecticut [1:50:41] and points in between why should they care why do you care sir because for the last 241 years this [1:50:49] this nation and its citizens have cherished the freedom and liberty that this country was founded upon [1:50:55] many many americans brave americans over the years have lost their lives to be able to protect [1:51:01] that freedom and liberty they've lost their lives also to protect the the freedom and liberties of [1:51:07] other countries and other peoples around the world uh our ability to choose our elected leaders as we see [1:51:15] fit is i believe an inalienable right that we must protect with all of our resources and all of our [1:51:21] authority and power and the fact that the russians tried to influence that election so that the will [1:51:28] of the american people was not going to be realized uh by that election i find outrageous and something [1:51:34] that we need to with every last ounce of devotion to this country resist and to try to act to prevent [1:51:41] further instances of that and so therefore i believe that this is something that's critically important [1:51:46] to every american it's certainly i it's very important to me for my children and grandchildren to [1:51:51] make sure that never again will a foreign country try to uh influence and interfere in uh the foundation [1:52:00] stone of this country which is uh electing our democratic leaders in other words sir because you [1:52:07] love your country that's the uh the cliff note version of it yes well i believe much is at stake here [1:52:14] including the following whether american will whether america will have elections that we can trust [1:52:20] that are continuing measures of self-determination free from foreign interference whether we will [1:52:25] smartly arm ourselves against any future such digital invasion whether we are strong enough to make [1:52:31] good on the promise to be a nation of rule by law whether we will hold those accountable who seek to [1:52:38] abrade our cherished institutions whether we will stand up for democracy or enable this insidious autocracy [1:52:46] and kleptocracy much is at stake no one should be misled however because this isn't just about russia [1:52:54] this is about us and our metal the famous american diplomat george kinnon said at the outset of the [1:53:02] cold war much depends on the health and vigor of our own society and indeed it does we're being tested we're [1:53:12] divided we've gone to our respective corners and claimed our own set of facts anger has become the currency of [1:53:20] our civic discourse reason has been replaced with decibel level but you know what people also yearn [1:53:31] for a reaffirmation of the value of narrative of america which is the very thing that makes us great [1:53:40] that's what i hear when i'm home whether i'm playing cards with my buddies or out to a movie with [1:53:45] my wife paula or having coffee in the narthex of church and do you know why do you know why americans [1:53:52] yearn for this it's because it's what makes us makes it possible for us to be for something bigger [1:54:01] than ourselves and that is precisely what america is hoping if not counting on us on this dais to do [1:54:10] to be for something bigger for ourselves and to put our country above party and i pray that that's what [1:54:18] we'll do thank you sir for your decades of service and for your presence here today [1:54:25] chamber time is expired mr crawford five minutes thank you mr chairman i will yield to the gentleman [1:54:29] from south carolina you may ask mr gowdy i'd thank my friend from arkansas director brennan do you know [1:54:35] who commissioned the steel dossier i don't uh do you know if the fbi paid for any portion of the steel [1:54:46] dossier i don't know i know that there are press reports related to that but i i don't know i have [1:54:53] no first-hand knowledge of that do you know whether any of the underlying allegations made in the steel [1:54:59] dossier were other ever tested probed examined cross-examined whether the sources were examined [1:55:06] for reliability credibility i know that there were efforts made by the bureau to try to understand [1:55:14] whether or not any of the information in that uh was uh valid but i i just i don't have any first-hand [1:55:22] knowledge of it do you know if the bureau ever relied on the steel dossier as any as part of any court [1:55:28] filings applications petitions pleadings i have no awareness did the cia rely on it no why not because we [1:55:42] we didn't it wasn't part of the corpus of intelligence uh information that we had it was not in any way [1:55:50] used as a basis for the intelligence community assessment that was done uh it was it was not [1:56:00] all right this is my last line of question i hope i have waited sufficiently long enough to ask you [1:56:05] about leaks to not inflame the anger of our friends in the media who think republicans are hyper focused [1:56:12] on it so we'll just do it last um some of your colleagues have testified that our surveillance programs [1:56:19] are critical vital indispensable to our national security do you agree with their assessment [1:56:25] speaking generally uh yes some of those programs are absolutely essential and vital to our national [1:56:29] security do you agree that there is at least a tacit agreement between the american people and their [1:56:35] government that they will allow us certain power certain freedoms in exchange for safeguarding the [1:56:40] privacy of the information collected i i think there is uh certainly an expectation that there would be [1:56:48] uh a protection of privacy as the government carries out its its responsibilities yes and you and i [1:56:54] discussed some of those privacy protections even within the intelligence community as it relates to [1:57:00] u.s persons and you've been very clear this morning in fact i've noted the times you've said u.s [1:57:06] persons you could have inserted a name but you did not you had the discipline to say u.s person [1:57:12] and that discipline is practiced throughout the intelligence community unless and until there is a request to [1:57:17] unmask that u.s person's name correct i would like to think that discipline is still exercised [1:57:23] even if a request to unmask a name is made all right so we protect u.s persons even within those like [1:57:32] yourself and director pompeo and admiral rogers and director comey and the people that we trust with awesome [1:57:40] powers we still impose some restrictions on them and that they have to request an unmasking there has to be [1:57:46] i assume a justification you can't just wake up in the morning and say hey i feel like [1:57:50] knowing who participated in x y and z there has to be justification right yes all right so how do we [1:57:57] get from that to names being on the front pages of certain major u.s newspapers it's an excellent [1:58:08] question what would be an equally excellent answer that somebody violated their um oath to protect [1:58:16] classified information and violated that oath and shared that information in an unauthorized fashion [1:58:22] with members of the media well my friend from washington and he is my friend um i i was um [1:58:29] impressed not only with this eloquence but the conviction with which he just spoke um but i've got [1:58:38] other colleagues not from washington uh that tend to minimize uh the nature of leaks as if there is [1:58:47] somehow a weighing and a balancing that needs to take place between how interesting we may find the [1:58:52] underlying information how interesting we may find the underlying names i have seen attempts uh [1:58:58] unfortunately by members of this very body uh to mitigate and explain away and minimize what it does [1:59:06] to the surveillance programs to have leaks of classified information so i i will finish with this i [1:59:15] i believe there's some some surveillance programs that are up for reauthorization what what would you [1:59:21] say to the american people as names are unmasked on the last day that people are in office and classified [1:59:29] information appears on the front pages of major u.s newspapers how would you tell your constituents [1:59:38] let's reauthorize this program again despite the fact that we have abuses how help us make that argument [1:59:44] when we go home mr gowdy you and your colleagues here are going to have to make that argument uh based [1:59:50] on the merits of the program and the importance of it to our national security as well as trying to [1:59:54] send a reassuring message to them that if there have been any abuses of the accesses uh to that [2:00:01] information either because of the number of people involved or those who were in fact uh violating [2:00:07] their oath of office that you and your colleagues will do everything possible to make sure you work with [2:00:11] the executive branch to uh minimize and mitigate uh that uh danger in that prospect [2:00:17] mr stefanik thank you mr chairman and thank you director brennan for your service my questions will [2:00:25] be focused on the process and development of the intelligence community assessment as you know the [2:00:30] previous administration directed the intelligence community to produce a comprehensive intelligence [2:00:35] report assessing russian activities and intentions on december 9th the unclassified version of that [2:00:40] report incorporated information as of december 29th in your experience as an analyst and as the director [2:00:47] what is the average time that it typically takes to produce an ic assessment it can range from days to [2:00:57] months to years in fact depending on the complexity of the matter as well as the urgency of getting [2:01:05] something out but it really does vary widely so you you noted that the complexity can have an impact [2:01:13] on the timeliness to produce a comprehensive report this report was produced in just 20 days in december [2:01:20] was there anything about this interagency process that differed the timeline the approval process the [2:01:26] editing or the staffing i think it followed the general model of how you want to do something like [2:01:32] this with some notable exceptions it only involved the fbi nsa and cia as well as the office of director of [2:01:39] national intelligence it wasn't a full interagency uh community assessment that was coordinated among [2:01:45] the 17 agencies and for good reason because of the nature and the sensitivity of the information [2:01:51] trying to once again keep that tightly compartmented uh but in terms of the the rigor and the the analytic [2:01:58] tradecraft as well as the sourcing uh and as you i think know from the classified version there it's [2:02:03] extensively sourced uh it tried to adhere uh to the uh the general standards so at no point uh there was [2:02:12] never an individual within the administration outside of the cia the fbi the nsa or the dni [2:02:18] that reviewed edited or was part of the staffing process uh not to my knowledge um but um i wasn't [2:02:29] overseeing the production process and the review process the dni was overseeing the production [2:02:34] process yes it was a dni produced assessment so it's unclear whether anyone else on the nsc or the [2:02:40] white house was part of the approval or review process from your uh from the knowledge that you have [2:02:45] they naturally would not have been part of a you know any type of review or editing process no [2:02:51] what happened between december 29th the date of the last information listed in the ica and january [2:02:57] six when the report was published were there any additional edits or approval process outside of [2:03:01] the norm uh i think it was those last few days uh were used to further refine people over the the [2:03:09] holiday period uh but uh again it was uh trying to make sure that the products could be provided to [2:03:17] the former president and the current president uh in that first week of january um as we know from [2:03:22] your testimony the russian rule and hacking in of u.s political entities was first reported in [2:03:27] july 2016 and was publicly acknowledged by the ic in october of 2016. why wasn't the intel community [2:03:34] wide assessment of these activities ordered until december there were ongoing um assessments that were [2:03:41] done and as i mentioned in my opening testimony it was used to brief the senior most uh government [2:03:45] officials as well as to ensure that the fbi and dhs could do what they needed to do to protect [2:03:51] the the government uh institutions that were affected uh and so again there were periodic [2:03:58] assessments as we were learning more through the process it was additional detail it also allowed [2:04:02] us to um uh note that we weren't seeing certain things that we were concerned about and so the [2:04:09] intel screen assessment that was done in december published in january was the culmination of the [2:04:15] the work the assessment the collection that had taken place in the months before for the record it's of [2:04:19] concern to me that um there was a two-month lag for the administration to um direct the dni to um produce [2:04:29] a comprehensive report when um this was publicly acknowledged as an issue uh months earlier during [2:04:36] the year i want to touch upon um the previous administration's actions on december 29th in response [2:04:44] to the russian government's harassment of u.s officials and and cyber operations uh which declared [2:04:50] persona non grata 35 russian intelligence operatives and the closure of two russian compounds in the u.s [2:04:55] did you recommend any action uh to the to the administration prior to december 29th or prior to the november [2:05:02] election i wasn't recommending um we had discussed what different options might be so let me ask did you um suggest [2:05:15] or present different options prior to the election or prior to december 29th to the administration that's [2:05:19] something that could be discussed in a closed setting thank you my time has expired i was about [2:05:24] to and i yield back mr hurd five minutes thank you mr chairman and director brennan i'd like to join [2:05:32] my colleagues in thanking you for your years of service um some of which we overlapped um in the cia and i hope [2:05:40] you are enjoying not getting late calls at night and you looked you looked you look fresh my my first [2:05:50] question and i apologize in advance for asking some questions about what did you know when at certain [2:05:58] times i have difficulty remembering um what happened this morning um but nonetheless i'm going to continue [2:06:05] in 2016 was collecting intelligence on foreign entities attempts to influence our our election [2:06:13] a collection priority and when was that um last year in 2016 it it was a collection priority yes it was [2:06:22] so does that fall under the broader counterintelligence collection priorities of the of the cia uh yes [2:06:30] counterintelligence as well as russia collection efforts what is ops intel it's operational intelligence [2:06:39] that is not um maybe formally disseminated as intelligence community but it is something of [2:06:45] operational value uh to for example an investigation so prior to the um the full accounting that happened [2:06:56] in december 2016 of we're going to do a complete intelligence assessment um was there any ops intel [2:07:05] that was used or um changed into intelligence actually disseminated to the broader community [2:07:13] during that assessment there was an effort to make sure that all relevant intelligence that needed to be [2:07:22] tapped for the drafting of this intelligence assessment was made available to the appropriate individuals yes [2:07:30] so is it your understanding that there was information that was in operational channels that wasn't [2:07:42] available to the entire analytical community and that was included in that december um ultimately the the [2:07:50] the report that was dated january 6th i think as the and again i would defer to the folks at the agency [2:07:58] that classified intelligence report is exceptionally well documented and sourced and just because [2:08:05] something is produced as an intelligence report it doesn't mean that it goes to everybody in the community [2:08:11] it is there are recipient lists for that and depending on the sensitivity of the information it is either broadly [2:08:17] disseminated or very narrowly disseminated one of the issues that this committee is focused on is [2:08:25] figuring out what was the u.s government's response to these russian active measures [2:08:30] and what do we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future and one of my concerns is [2:08:38] did we escalate soon enough quickly enough did we notify those that were being targeted soon [2:08:49] enough and did we recognize the intelligence or the information that we had access to [2:08:57] at the time that it was actually collected and so my question is [2:09:02] knowing what you know now would you have directed the cia to do things differently you know i've asked [2:09:10] myself that question i feel as though we tried to do everything that we could to fulfill our [2:09:15] responsibilities which was to learn as much as we could about the russian efforts uh because we didn't [2:09:20] know again the extent of it and so we had to be very careful about what we did so that we would protect [2:09:26] certain capabilities and the community as a whole uh as well as to try to uh assess um what was [2:09:33] happening uh kept the uh the executive branch seniors informed national security council informed the the gang [2:09:41] of eight informed and so um you know 20 20 hindsight is always you know i think a lot maybe clearer to [2:09:47] some folks that's what i think this committee and the other committee and the senate is going to take a look [2:09:52] at uh was it perfect i don't think anything in this world is perfect but i think we tried to do the [2:09:57] best job that we could so are we is the intelligence community prepared or ready to counter covert action [2:10:10] directed against us or direct measures as the russians like to call that how do we develop a strategy to [2:10:18] counter covert action against us and i only have seven seconds so i know that's difficult and that's why [2:10:24] it's easy for me to say it's referred to closed session as well as to current agency and other [2:10:28] officials good copy i yield back chairman i do want to take this opportunity to say that i misspoke [2:10:32] earlier in response to mr gowdy i was at cia headquarters on the morning of january 20th i went there to [2:10:38] collect some final uh personal uh materials as well as to pay my last respects to our memorial wall and uh but [2:10:46] i was there for a brief period of time and uh just to take care of some final final things that were [2:10:51] important to me yes sir thank you well mr burton and uh thank you very much this is uh we're at the [2:10:57] end of our open hearing um our committee is charged with answering some really important questions [2:11:02] uh as several of my colleagues have said our uh the success the ultimate success of the russians [2:11:08] disinformation campaign and or active measures lies with the american citizens uh and whether or not [2:11:13] they're successful or not is up to us and up to us as citizens to to uh to not let that happen [2:11:18] a part of that is how well we inform them of what happened and where when and what all those kind [2:11:22] of good things and so thank you for being a part of that exercise this morning uh we intend to have [2:11:27] a closed session that will start in about 30 minutes downstairs in the spaces we've got sandwiches [2:11:32] available for you if you'd like with that we are recessed until we get the closed sessions downstairs [2:11:37] thank you very much [2:12:40] thank you [2:12:50] and the only reason we've got the mark going to one versus two that's even though it's closer is it [2:16:23] allowed us to have the shotgun receiver closer to a human being oh yeah so you could uh which we needed to [2:16:30] uh [2:17:07] oh [2:18:08] One, one, two.