The State of UK Environmental Policy 2018: The government’s 25 year environment plan

[00:00:00] Speaker 1: Welcome back to those of you who are living in the program. It's really nice to see you again. Welcome to those of you who are prospective students. And welcome to those of you who are prospective students. So, this evening we're going to go through a pretty simple agenda. Paul is going to talk in his annual State of UK Environmental Policy Lecture. This year we're going to talk about long-term environmental policy. Off the back of the UK's new 25-year environment plan. And then we'll have a bit of Q&A. And then we're going to have a panel to shut down. And our panelists for the evening are three of our alumni. [00:01:17] Speaker ?: So, we have Jesse Glicker from the International Energy Institute. [00:01:21] Speaker 1: He's going to say a bit about what he does there and a bit about the nature of long-term policy and global policy perspectives. So, the only other thing I wanted to say. was that this evening we've been doing it now for a third year's pandemic coming in today. It's a really nice moment for us as the whole team. to get to reflect on all the interesting places that our alumni are now working. This slide could be a lot bigger. But I just load earlier. [00:01:55] Speaker ?: And it's exciting work. [00:01:55] Speaker 1: I think it's going to be a lot bigger. It's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's exciting work. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. [00:02:03] Speaker ?: And it's going to be a lot bigger. [00:02:03] Speaker 1: And it's exciting work. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. It's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. [00:03:12] Speaker ?: And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. [00:03:14] Speaker 1: And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. [00:03:25] Speaker ?: And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. And it's going to be a lot bigger. [00:03:31] Speaker 2: Thank you. Well, thanks all. And it's lovely to see you all again. I have to say this is probably, I don't know whether it's true for you, but it's probably my favorite evening of the year. Because I get to see how you're doing. And although, you know, Will said and gave all those logos of different companies, you may have thought that the purpose of this course was to kind of educate you. And yeah, that's a marginal thing. But actually, the purpose of this course is that in this time, you guys are going to rule the world. And you will be out there in those organizations putting this knowledge to work. And by God, it's needed. So congratulations to all of you who are already doing that and out there. And I've talked to two or three of you already. And hopefully these few ideas I'm going to share with you tonight will help. They're quite different to anything that you've got on the course. And I'm going to talk about policy stickiness, super wicked problems, and long grass. And this is indeed, as Will said, about long-term environmental policy. Draws on some ideas that I picked up at a conference in Canada a couple of weeks ago. So I try to keep in touch. And for those of you who are not English, I will just explain that wicked in this context does not mean evil. It means really, really difficult. And long grass is where you put something that you want to forget about for a very long time. And so that's what that's about. I'm not going to go through those in any detail. This is the academic background to the idea of a wicked problem. It goes back to 1973, this paper by Rittle and Weber. And you can see that as you read down that list of bullet points, you can see that the kind of environmental problems that we wrestle with are very much wicked problems. Unique, symptom of another problem. There's no true or false, but better or worse. They don't stop. They're not things that you solve. There's never going to be a moment when we can get up and say, yeah, we've done it. Climate change is solved. It's going to stay there and we'll have to manage it, etc. As you would expect from academics, 1973 was not the final word. So we got a second bite at this from a chap called Conklin. The problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution. A particularly difficult kind of problem. No stopping rule again. Not right or wrong. Novel. Unique. One shot operation. Really, really interesting. They're problems that you can't kind of experiment, learn and go back again. You will have done a lot of stuff with Will, I'm sure, on path dependency. And once you do a major policy intervention in the climate change or other major environmental space, you've changed the context. You don't go back to the status quo ante and have the opportunity to start again. You've got to take it from where you then have got to. So if we were to do geoengineering with regard to climate change and put zillions of tons of iron filings in the ocean or put large quantities of sulphur dioxide in the air in order to control global warming. If it doesn't work, there's no way of going back. We've then got to take it on from there. I rather hope we don't do either of those things incidentally, but you never know. No. And the big environmental issues are examples of those. They're by no means the only examples. And I've put up there obesity, drug abuse. Those of you who are aware of what's going on in the United States at the moment about the overuse of opioids. Well, that's another very much big wicked problem. Really tricky. This is the paper that I came across at a conference in Ottawa last week. This is a super wicked problems. I came across this guy, Ben Cashaw, who is a professor at Yale and a very, very interesting political scientist. And he's introduced the time element to that. Time is running out. Irreversibility. Normally these wicked problems are kind of long term. There's no central authority. There's no one who you can say it's absolutely your job to sort this out. One of these characteristics that those seeking to cure the problem are also the cause of it. And there are lots of examples of that. We all buy stuff. We drive. We fly. We eat meat. Most of us. Lots of us. We all do some of those things. And yet we know that they're problematic. Consumerism more generally. These wicked problems often have the characteristics of addiction. And one of the things that you find in our society with regard to these environmental things is that many of them seem to be kind of addictive. And they discount the future irrationally. And we've talked a lot in the course obviously about discount rates. There's a nice little picture which I guess if you guys don't succeed in ruling the world in ten years time we will end up in the Maldives climate conference in whatever year it may be. Not solving the climate issue or not managing the climate issue. So we collectively recognize the need to do something about this stuff but the behavior change implications kind of overwhelm the politics. And we tend to focus on short term interests instead. I've put a reference there to Saint Augustine and you might wonder what on earth that is doing. So the battle we are waging is against ourselves. Some of you will know this story may be completely untrue. But it's a nice story. It is said that Saint Augustine who obviously turned into a very holy man at some point in his life. Early on in his life he was very fond of women and he realized that that was wrong. And he said to God, with whom he had a hotline, God please make me chaste, but not yet. And I feel the kind of environmental issue is not entirely unlike that in many kinds of ways, this kind of battle that we wage against ourselves. So, and this is what this paper was all about. What might we do about problems of this kind? Well, progressive incrementalism, and I'll show a little diagram that says what I mean by that in a minute. Recognizing that this path dependency is not only a bad thing. We're all aware that we're locked into a high carbon society at the moment. But we need to be aware that every step we take towards a more low carbon society, we're beginning to lock in that trajectory as well. And that's going to be an absolutely critical part of getting there. And we need to have some sense of where we're going. And many of you will remember the lecture given to you by Dimitri Zengelis, who's a fantastic guy. I mean, he, it's very rare for an economist to say that economists are absolutely useless at forecasting. But what we ought to be able to do if we understand processes by which economies develop and change and societies develop and change, we ought to be able to create scenarios, we ought to be able to make commitments, we ought to be able to set directions, and then allow those to work out. And for that we need policies that are difficult to reverse, and that's what Ben Cashaw was calling stickiness, because we know that these things are not going to be solved in one parliamentary term. They're going to have to roll out over a much longer period. They have a long-term perspective. They give long-term assurance and incentives to investors, because inevitably they require investments, infrastructure, etc. And they kickstart these progressive incremental processes, which lead to those three phenomena. They become increasingly entrenched. They appeal to an expanding population so that you're building your constituency, and they start to have greater effects on behavior. So, the question, once we recognize that this is the nature of the problem, is how can the overarching direction of low-carbon change be stabilized, avoiding the reversal or erosion of the low-carbon course of development? And as we look around different countries, we can see where that reversal happens, and how it happens. I mean, Australia is probably the best example, where three prime ministers have lost office due to the climate change issue. They had a carbon tax that was going to turn into an emission trading scheme, then they didn't have a carbon tax, and another prime minister came in and said they were going to put a carbon tax in place, and the whole thing is utterly chaotic, because that carbon tax that they implemented was not sticky. And, and I'll explain a bit more, and through which specific mechanisms might this policy orientation be instilled with greater stability. And the mechanisms that Ben Cashaw recommends are that you increase the cost of reversal or erosion, the political costs, these are political issues. You encourage the emergence and develop of supportive policy constituencies, i.e. lobbyists. You embed the low-carbon transition within a supportive ecosystem of institutions, so that you have people working in organisations that regard this as their mission. And obviously you've got to build societal legitimacy for this, otherwise it's going to be overturned. So, I'm going to quickly get this, because I want to get to the kind of case study examples of this. Stickiness, path-dependent processes, I'm sure Will will have given you lots of stuff on this. The whole notion of lock-in is another way of expressing stickiness, that once you're on a path it's difficult to get out. It's self-reinforcing, because the costs of reversing it rise over time. People have already made investments, there are sunk costs. There are increasing returns, so that the benefits increase over time. Learning by doing all this stuff that you've heard about: innovation, learning curves, the fact that renewables are now in many parts of the world as cheap as fossil fuel is obviously absolutely critical for stickiness, because it does all this self-reinforcing thing, the increasing returns, and there are positive feedbacks. So, if we look at a little graph there with durability and the number and size of steps, the classic paradigm is if they're both durable and few steps, that would be marvellous. Very few wicked problems can be solved like that. Very often non-durable change happens and you seem to be making progress and you go backwards, as in the Australian example I gave you, so that's no good. The incremental is making progress that is then undone rather quickly and doesn't really get anywhere. So, what we've got to try to get is this what they call progressive incremental, whereby a series of steps, each one is there. It may fall back a bit, but the overall direction of travel is as we would like it. And I now want to apply those ideas and that framework to the UK so that you can see what it is I'm talking about. And I will then come to talk a bit about the 25-year environment plan because you can see where we're going with that. How sticky is the 25-year environment plan which was launched by the Prime Minister in January this year. Well, just some examples and these are going to be some slides that some of you may remember because you have seen them and I've not presented them in the context of stickiness before, but you may recognise them. I'm going to talk a bit about the Climate Change Act and the EU Renewables Directive, both of which you will now know lots about because they both have very important examples of stickiness. So, the long-term commitments in the Climate Change Act, 2050 targets and 34% reduction by 2020, by themselves that probably would not have been terribly effective. No politician in 2008 gave tuppence about 2020, let alone 2050. So, the second element there, the binding carbon budgets was absolutely critical to fit that long-term perspective within the parliamentary timeframe because each of these carbon budgets is five years and we now have statutory commitments to carbon budgets stretching all the way out to 2032. Do come and sit down at the front here, don't feel embarrassed that you've arrived a bit late, there's no point standing through that. So, you will remember that, but absolutely classic example of stickiness, the political cost of reversal, of actually saying, ah, we're going to give up, we're not going to do this. Well, firstly, it's statutory, it's in legislation, so you'll have to repeal the Climate Change Act and there's absolutely no appetite to do that. And as long as it stays on the statute book and you've got this binding carbon budgets, but then you've got the third element, which is just as important. It's no good the government saying, well, we've got these carbon budgets, guys, but we can't do it. It has a statutory requirement to introduce policies and there is a very important independent committee, the Committee on Climate Change, which suggests what those policies might be. So, the Committee on Climate Change doesn't just say to the government, you know, here you are, these targets, you've got to meet this, it's your problem. It says, this is how you can meet these targets and this is how we suggest you do it. It doesn't obviously pass the legislation because that's the job of government. But if government doesn't adopt the budgets and put the policies in place, then it has to explain in Parliament why it's not doing that. And it's not able to say, and this is all in the legislation, it's not able to say, look, we're not, you know, we don't feel like doing it this time, it's a bit tricky, it's rather difficult, you know. It has actually to give good scientific reasons why it's not doing it. It has to say why the Climate Change Committee is wrong in the policies that the Climate Change Committee is recommending. And obviously, that's quite a task because the Climate Change Committee is very expert and it does a lot of analysis. And it knows much more about the issue than most people in, certainly the politicians and most civil servants in the department. So, you can see that this is an absolutely wonderful example of stickiness, a very, very sticky policy. And you can see that the first three budgets have been met quite easily. At the moment, the fourth and fifth budgets stretching out into the twenties and early thirties are not being met. And it's going to be fascinating to see how that tug of war plays out between the legislation and the government. The EU Renewables Directive, well, that's much less sticky. And here's 2008, which is where we were when Tony Blair came back from Brussels. And against all the advice of his civil servants, he said, I've committed the UK to sign the Renewables Directive. The civil servants were absolutely appalled because we were here. We needed to get to there by 2020. And this again is a statutory commitment. And you can imagine, they thought this guy had taken leave of his senses. But you can see that that commitment and the fact that it was a statutory obligation has meant a level of progress towards the targets that would never have been achieved in the absence of that commitment. We're not there. We're not going to make it. You can see that heat is still way off and transport is still way off the levels that will need to be reached for the Renewables Directive to be met. But what's happened in renewables and electricity is truly remarkable in just 10 years. The entire electricity system is on the way to being transformed in a very short space of time. OK. So, to the 25-year environment plan. The government could have enacted an Environment Act. In fact, it did enact an Environment Act back in 2011, which it said was going to be very important documents. Turned out to be completely unimportant. But it chose not to do that. It's introduced this plan. And these slides come from a civil servant who's given me permission to use them. And I'm going to make my own rather irreverent commentary on these slides. And you're then going to tell me whether I've been terribly unfair or not. I'm looking for stickiness. Because I know politicians who commit to something 25 years in advance. It's not worth the paper it's written on unless it's sticky. Because there will be tough times ahead. And if they can, they'll get out of it. Well, we of course are going to start with some nice warm sort of words. And there we are, nice pictures of the UK, which looks nice. Try to leave the Earth a better place. Yeah, well, we can all sign up to that and move on. And here we have our Prime Minister saying something which has always struck me that Conservatives ought to be environmentalists. I mean, it's so conservative, that kind of thing. Mrs Thatcher used to say that sort of thing periodically as well back in the 1980s. But of course, as we know, not a lot happened that made things better. So then we've got all these publications that have led up to this 25 year environment plan. It's fascinating. Something that I'm going to have to look up and I didn't have time to do it before this talk. This guy Johnson back in 1909. I've no idea what this guy Johnson had to say about natural capital. Perhaps Michael is going to tell me that. But then there's little things here, most of which I actually do remember. UK National Ecosystem Assessment. You'll remember we did a seminar on that. Then this is the white paper for the National, the Environment Act in 2011. This is the report of the Natural Capital Committee, the Conservative Manifesto. And then we arrive at this 25 year environment plan. So the one thing you know governments are good at is publishing documents. Here we are, the key plan strengths. It's a long term 25 year plan. As soon as I hear that I begin to smell long grass. And I was hoping I was going to be wrong about long grass. But we'll see. We'll go through it. It's underpinned by natural capital. Well that's an idea that you all fully understand. And then there's this fascinating remark about Brexit. I mean in 25 years hopefully no one's going to be worried about these things. We'll probably be back in the European Union by then. But in any case. In any case. I mean who said we were engaging in a race to the bottom. So you can see that there's a shoring up of political positions here. And then this statement from me. I was fascinated that these slides were part of DEFRA's slide set for this particular thing. Then we come on to the framework which is great. I mean obviously who doesn't want any of these things. Clean air, clean and plentiful water etc. When you read clean air you wonder that the government's lost three court cases on clean air. And has been in default of its statutory commitments under the European Union's clean air legislation since 2010. So you wonder why they need a 25 year environment plan to meet legislative commitments that they engaged in 2010. But nevertheless this is all good stuff. Policies will focus on this and we can like that and move on. The whole question of agriculture is going to be again really interesting. Because we don't really do agriculture in this course. Which is a bit of a pity. Because we can't do everything. But it's obviously terribly important. And we're going to plant some trees. Well that's obviously a good thing. This is fascinating. Embed an environmental net gain principle for development. Because at the moment we have no idea how we would calculate that. And you know we spend a whole module on measurement and indicators and all that kind of stuff. There is absolutely no way government would be able to implement this at the moment. We'll come to that in a minute. And calling farmers true friends of the earth I think is absolutely classic. I mean these are the guys who've ripped out practically every hedge in the UK in order to make bigger farms. And have put very large quantities of chemicals of all kinds onto the land which gets into our streams. That may be necessary. I've got no problem with that. But as an environmentalist myself I think that's a pretty classic statement. Then we've got some other nice things with some nice pictures of birds and animals that we all like. With a nature recovery network. And the fascinating thing about this is that all this stuff speaks to things that we ought to be doing already. We have national biodiversity plans. Which are supposed to be as you will know which are supposed to be safeguarding biodiversity. But are not doing a very good job of it at the moment. And so the key question is well what is going to come out of this that is not in the national biodiversity plans. And why do we need to wait 25 years for it. The obligatory picture of a child sniffing a plant. And this is always very important. And they're going to spend 10 million pounds encouraging children to be close to nature. Which is fascinating. If you divide 10 million by the many thousands of schools that there are in the UK. primary schools in the UK. There's not going to buy a lot of more pupil contact with nature. And then we come to this fascinating thing with plastic. Which of course is fascinating how these environmental issues suddenly emerge. I mean anyone who's been having any awareness of the seas and the oceans for the last 15 to 20 years knows that there are these massive mountains of plastic floating about. And yet suddenly it's the issue of the year. This is going to be a really interesting resources and waste strategy when it comes out. Perhaps that will be the topic of my little talk next year. See how that goes. And that marvellous phrase zero avoidable waste by 2050. The quantity of wriggle room in that word avoidable is almost infinite. I mean like avoidable to whom by whom. This consultation launched by Philip Hammond the Chancellor just the other day. How the tax system or charges could reduce single use plastic waste. That's a topic as you know that I've spent a lot of time on. And it's interesting that we need more seeking of views about it. And then this clean air strategy for consultation for consultation in 2018. And as I say we've had three court cases for why the government hasn't already meeting the clean air commitments that were supposed to have been met by 2010. Oceans and fish there and these marine protected areas. So set the direction of future sea use policy. As we leave the common fisheries policy okay. Protecting and improving the global environment. I mean again really interesting pursuing a ban on sales of ivory. This is something that I'm entirely in favour of. I think that's potentially a very important message. It's not yet clear whether it's going to be implemented. But we'll have to see. And then you can tell that this obviously this presentation is coming to an end. Monitoring progress and refreshing the plan. I was fascinated that thing about refreshing. But we haven't got it yet. I mean it's not doing anything. So how on earth can it possibly be needing to be refreshed. And you can see that DEFRA is going to work with experts to identify metrics. So there's a job opportunity for all you stars of BENV GC5. And again we've been publishing sustainable development indicators at least since 1999. And you just wonder why we're still thrashing about around the indicator stuff. And then this is the clearer statement of what they're actually going to do. And this is where I was really hoping I was going to see some stickiness here. Consulting, consulting, consulting, working with local stakeholders, engaging the design and implementation. There's nothing that's remotely sticky there. I mean there's no actual commitment to do anything that I can see. And then of course the obligatory governments say well it's not actually us, our job gov. It's over to you really to do this. We all eat, drink, consume and travel. Well we know that. We can all do more to protect and enhance the environment. Of course we can do that too. Most land is privately owned and therefore it's up to the guys who own it. Perish the thought that the government might like to regulate any of that privately owned land. And they like this momentum on plastic which of course we all like. It's a very good thing. A wonderful quote from Deuteronomy. I mean who puts, who puts, how many of you know what book Deuteronomy comes from? Yes indeed. Indeed it comes from the Bible. It's an Old Testament book. It was saying you shouldn't chop down trees. I'm not entirely sure what its relevant is but it wants lots of people to be involved in this. And it's then saying business has a role to play which is of course true. Says it's going to set up a green business council. And it's fascinating because the last government also set up a green business council. And after four meetings, it was supposed to be chaired by two ministers. And after four meetings the business leaders who used to turn up, they decided they weren't going to turn up anymore because it was clear it wasn't doing anything. It was simply a waste of time. So hopefully this is going to be a little more effective. Where should the focus be? Well, there's rather a lot of possibilities there obviously. And someone's going to have to choose where that focus would be. I kind of thought that's what governments did. They would have decided where the focus needed to be. Asking for some thoughts. What needs to be done to get business on board? What sectors? Greatest opportunity, etc. Someone I've not heard of there saying some more wise words. So these are my conclusions. By the time I got to the end of this, I was suffocated by the smell of long grass, I have to say. I didn't find any stickiness at all. You know my views on Brexit so I don't need to hide them anymore. But I found that the whole thing was kind of laced with this Brexit opportunism. And I give it a stickiness score of zero. There's absolutely nothing in there that would stop a future government simply ignoring this document. And that to me is the hallmark of very bad policy. So am I being unfair? I was hoping to be someone, one of our alumni who was employed by Bayes. And they would be able to stand up and say I am being unfair. [00:34:30] Speaker 1: Well, thank you, Paul. We're going to have some questions. Indeed. We do have somebody, an alumnus who is employed at DEFRA, who I think was going to come. [00:34:39] Speaker 2: Oh, your Bayes. Of course, and I've got the department wrong and I'm terribly sorry. I don't expect anyone from Bayes to say anything about this. [00:34:46] Speaker 1: I mean, if we get away from the environment plan, do people think this idea of stickiness is a useful one? [00:35:02] Speaker 2: I mean, when you come to your, you know, the work that you're going to do. I hadn't heard of it expressed like that. I mean, I'd obviously thought about the Climate Change Act in these sorts of terms. But actually identifying this as a characteristic of long term policy that you particularly want to design in. Just, you know, in order to create path dependence and all that kind of stuff. Like, would you think that was a kind of useful way to go? [00:35:57] Speaker 3: Yep. I'm glad you're everyone to continue thinking about it, and I totally agree with you about it. [00:36:38] Speaker 2: Yeah. [00:36:39] Speaker 4: I think you've all agreed to thinking it's a good thing. I think the hard thing is about, in terms of policy practicality, how do you maintain that? So I think with the kind of thing that we had strong cross-party support, and the government had a large majority, and it may not be a cross-party support or detect nothing, and the government has a lot of time, so realistically, how do we get these kind of sticky policies, whatever they might be in the environment or anything, how do we get those tasks? [00:37:04] Speaker 2: Do you not think that a 25-Year Environment Act could command cross-party support? [00:37:12] Speaker 4: I do, but I don't think there was... I don't think there was sufficient consultation across parties to get that support, support as part of the government. [00:37:20] Speaker 2: No, I think that's absolutely right. I mean, I was not involved in the process that led up to the passing of the Climate Change Act, but I'm aware that there was... because I'm not particularly close to the Labour Party, and that we had a Labour government at the time. But I'm aware that there were lots and lots of processes going on, and it's those processes which need to be undertaken, rather than these formal consultations. I think it would be quite difficult, especially with the current Secretary of State, I think it would be quite difficult for parliamentarians to vote against a 25-Year Environment Act. But I can imagine that, I mean, when the Climate Change Act was passed, you probably know there's about 650 MPs, five voted against it, just five. I mean, it's unprecedented in that. And I kind of feel that if Michael Gove were to bring forward a 25-Year Environment Act, I think it would be quite tricky for people to... But there's an enormous amount of thinking to be done, obviously, about whether the committee is going to be like the Climate Change Committee, what its powers are going to be, etc., etc., all those kinds of things. And as you quite rightly say, that work hasn't been done. But, I mean, the Climate Change Act was six, nine months late. The environment plan was six, nine months late. They might have done some of that. But that's a very good point. Yeah, any other thoughts about this? Yeah? [00:38:47] Speaker 5: So I guess, two questions. The first one is, kind of, what's the background for releasing this environmental plan? Is it that this is, you know, legally binding? And then, I guess, I feel like, more given that, you know, the government kind of, it's kind of, it's kind of, it's kind of, it's kind of, it's kind of, isn't it kind of good that it really, it's kind of, you know, kind of, you know, you can actually come up with some reactions, but looking in the UK to a suboptimal policy target, or policy path, just, you know, kind of... [00:39:16] Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, it, the government has a very small, it doesn't have a majority on many, many things. As I say, I'm not sure that it couldn't have built cross-party consensus on this. There's then your main question, which is, is this better than nothing? And that's a very important question. Is it better than nothing? I mean, the thing is, if it's nothing, then you know where you are. You know that the government's not interested in this. It's got other fish to fry, and if you want environmental action, you'd better get out there and campaign for it, because the government's not interested. There may be people who take this stuff really seriously, and you say, oh, well, done and dusted, you know. I mean, Theresa May comes up and says that the environment's going to be better 25 years from now than it is now, and so we don't need to do anything. And then if nothing happens, of course, you're not, in that sense, it's kind of worse than nothing. So I'm genuinely, I mean, obviously I hope that as we move forwards and the government gets a bit more space in its agenda to start thinking about things like that, I hope that elements of stickiness will be put into this plan. Well, we don't need elements of stickiness. There's actually not a single commitment in there beyond consulting. And obviously consultations, all sorts of things can happen. So I'm in two minds as to whether this is better than nothing. And I think, and this is my conspiracy theory, and you're welcome to reject it, I actually think that the environment has been identified as potentially an Achilles heel of the Brexit process. All sorts of green types think that the European Union has been good for the environment, certainly things like air quality, as absolutely is the case, and that an important part of the whole Brexit plan was to loosen the environmental regulation and enable us to engage in free trade deals that wouldn't require some of the regulations that we currently have on environment and farming, et cetera, et cetera. But that there are people suspicious of that, and therefore you see these pro-Brexit statements here trying to reassure the people that that is not going to happen. But without stickiness, there's absolutely no guarantee that that's going to be followed through at all. So, you know, there's a lot of politics going on there, which makes me very suspicious. [00:41:56] Speaker 1: Great. Thank you, Paul. I think we'll move on now to our panel of alumni speakers who will say a little bit about what they're doing now and who they are, and then provide some reflections on this kind of business of long-term policy and stickiness in the context of the International Energy Agency, Aurora Energy Research, and the Ellen MacArthur Foundation. So, Jesse, Oliver, do you want to come up and take a seat along here? And then, in turn, I think we'll go with Jesse first, then Oliver, then Gere. Say a few words, and then Michael will share the discussion. If you're coming in late, there's some seats along at the front. So, Jesse, if you want to introduce yourself and say a few words. [00:43:04] Speaker 6: Hi, I'm Jesse. Pleasure. I graduated last year, finished last year. Graduation was this fall. But I work at the International Energy Agency now in the Energy Efficiency Division, and I'm very happy to be back. I was basically all Will needed to say was probably going to talk. So, a bit about the IEA, real quick, because I'm sure a lot of you have read a lot of IEA reports or, you know, seeing the graphs up and presentations before. So, I think we're going to talk a little bit more about our clients, if you will, our governments. We are an international organization. We're based in Paris. And I work on the Energy Efficiency Team. So, I don't do any of the modeling. So, if you're aware of the WIO scenarios, they're not forecast, they're scenarios. I unfortunately can answer principle, but not for you. But I do, well, unfortunately. But I do analysis for energy efficiency policy. And Paul mentioned several times metrics and indicators. And my first day at the IEA, I was in a meeting about what kind of indicators we were going to use, and it felt, the day before, I had literally been in Paul's lecture, and it felt very bizarre and surreal to be in a business environment, kind of the same exact conversation. So, that was very exciting. And I think that's why I've been there almost exactly a year now. I was warm, but I decided to start the internship the same week as my first exam. And then, do the internship for the duration of my dissertation, and then became full-time right at the end of my dissertation, the week my dissertation this year. So, yeah, go back, go back, go back, go back, go back, go back, go back, go back, go back. So, yeah, I absolutely, I mean, I think the idea of stickiness is incredibly valuable. I'll definitely take that one back to the IEA. But I agree that the 25-year plan is definitely sort of getting lost in the meat a little bit. And I think an important consideration is what kind of audience you're looking at. I wasn't in the UK in January when this came out, but who decides, you know, the people and the specialists in this room are going to even read it, and who even notices what kind of headline it's making. So, I think in terms of who it's directed at and what these sort of fluffy, feel-good statements are trying to achieve is an important thing to consider. Although, to be fair, if something like this came out in the United States, it would be absolutely huge. So, when you're looking at your audience, it's here, I don't know if it made a lot of ripples. It doesn't really seem like it did. I was doing news articles. In the United States, I think this would just completely, you know, I don't know, it would do a lot. But in terms of planning, I think a 25-year environmental act would be incredibly valuable. If you're looking at an international scope, you have to think about the targets that are being implemented. This is something at the IEA we focus on a lot, what kind of targets, what kind of metrics, and how this can be measured. I don't know how something like this, a year from now in January, you can sit in this room and say what's actually happened. But maybe some cool reports that we could quote. But, you know, I think that's important. [00:46:41] Speaker ?: Okay. [00:46:43] Speaker 7: Okay. [00:46:48] Speaker 8: So, my name's Oliver Kerr, I was on the UCL program two years ago. A bit about my background, I guess, I have a totally unconventional path for any professor. My undergraduate degree was in Chinese, by the way. I got math, I think, and all forms of science, to course at UCFD. And then ended up somehow doing a master's in energy policy and Chinese studies in the U.S. at Harvard. From now on to the World Bank of the years where I worked on urban energy systems in the background of the policy. I realized that to really make an impact in the energy sector, you kind of need to be not terrible at numbers. So I came back to do the UCL program and after, you know, filling myself with my knowledge, then I ended up with Aurora Energy Research, which is where I'm now a senior associate in the consulting team. Aurora, probably not many of you have heard of it before, it's kind of small. Well, I used to say it was small, but now we've just outgrown our office. So I think when I joined, you know, 30 people in the last few years, we used to count for 70 to 80 people, so quite a big outfit growing very quickly. Modeling is really a deplorable view. So we have our own in-house energy economic model, both the quantity and the power sector. And based on the insights that we generate from those models, we have research and publications, which most of the main players in the UK are not to subscribe. And then a consulting team, which I did on, which invite you, you know, multiple stakeholders. So I'm mostly private sector on the transactions that you do, and my particular focus is on incentivizing the government, on how to adapt to a rapidly changing energy landscape. So that's kind of my background. I did prepare a few slides on the train on the way over. Oh, great. So perhaps we could, without knowing in advance exactly what Paul was going to talk about. But I hope they can shed some light on how, I guess, we at Aurora think about long-term planning. And I apologize in advance for the slides. They are actually very sticky. So I guess we can all agree, and I think Paul made a very convincing case about the importance of stickiness in long-term environmental planning. Particularly when it comes to kind of setting the overall policy's direction, and the framework and institutions that you need to prevent backsliding. I guess what I would like to talk about is slightly, perhaps slightly provocatively, the flip side of the stickiness coin. So what happens when you're making decisions under uncertainty, and what happens when you get that sort of technology lock-in, which might not be so helpful for long-term time. So I think, an obvious point I think many of us will know, is that we're actually very bad at forecasting disruptive change, especially in the energy market, which is what we at Aurora focus on. And there are a couple of ways we're bad at this. First of all, we anchor to the past. And sorry to Jesse. I mean, back in 2011, the IEA couldn't possibly have predicted the changes in the economy in developing countries, mainly China, so it really changed the coal outlook over the long-term. So you've seen, over time, a continual revision down of the coal forecast. Same with base, sorry, again, I mean, it's not sorry, because none of us are very good at predicting changes which are hard to forecast in the first place. So we tend to anchor to the past things that, we tend to think the future will be very similar to the past, but it turns out it's often not the case. So we anchor to the past, we like to extrapolate. The other way we get things wrong is we underestimate the speed of change. I think the classic example of this is renewables. If you look at IEA forecast for solar deployment in the last five years, they've been increased about five times, a factor of five, which is huge. And nobody, I think some people would say that we're still below where we're going to. Same with National Grid. They've published their future energy scenarios, and over the last few years, they've been consistently revising out how many batteries they think will be on the system as market developments to date have proved that we're moving in that direction. So we're not very good at forecasting disruptive change, but there are different types of uncertainty in the market. And I'm going to borrow from a very unpopular Secretary of Defense in the US. First of all, we have the known knowns. So I guess I would define this here as technology which is very established. We know it exists. It's probably been around for a while. But perhaps underlying market conditions change, which makes things become very different very quickly. A classic example of that is gas resistance and reciprocating engines. I mean, probably five to ten years ago, nobody really knew what a gas resistance engine was, even though we've had them for decades. Everyone thought the future was big gas CCGTs. In fact, there was an article that came out in 2012 in the Telegraph which said the dash for gas means that in the next 20 years we're going to have 30 new CCGTs on the system. That article has really not aged very well. I think we'll be lucky to see one or two gigawatts in the next ten years or so. And what we have seen instead, especially after the introduction of the Class C market, is a lot of these very small gas and previous diesel engines. Then we have the known unknowns. So I guess this is technologies that we know about but that may improve rapidly. So batteries would be a very good example of this. We know they exist. We know that they're improving rapidly. But how much cost can come down and over what time frame is still quite a big answer. Which makes it a sense of planning and policy perspective. And the third, and probably the hardest to plan for policy-wise, is the unknown unknown. Kind of by definition things that we just really haven't thought about. Maybe a good example of that was the shale boom in the US, which completely changed the energy landscape, not just in the US but globally. Something that was very hard to predict. I can't, I don't know what else would be in there. Maybe something like fusion or blockchain or whatever. Because we do know about those already. So all of these things, I think, make it very hard to plan. And if you put in, if one thing to put in place, kind of an overall, overarching policy framework, which gets you, sets the goal and sets the, where you want to get to. It makes it very difficult when we come to the kind of nitty gritty of policy implementation. I'd just like to do a quick poll, which may kind of bring some of this to life. So in the future, who here thinks that a generally decentralized energy system. So I'm thinking things like small microgrids, people develop, you know, solar panels on their roofs. Everyone generating electricity, maybe trading like peer-to-peer software. Versus a system more akin to something we have now, central operator, dispatching, making dispatch decisions. So who thinks that a genuinely decentralized electricity system is licensed? Show of hands. It's very vague. So next, next 30 years. That's quite a good number of people. And who thinks it's unlicensed? Wow. [00:55:01] Speaker ?: Okay. [00:55:02] Speaker 8: So I'd say it's about two-thirds to one-third. And so I guess the point here... It's not a hybrid. Yes, a hybrid. Which perhaps makes it even harder to plan for. So I guess the point here is, if we are all policy makers today, and we do have a lot of policy makers in the room, how do you set the direction when we don't really have a consensus about what the future might or even should look like? Another example would be heat and transport. So again, hybrid is probably most likely, but by 2050, do you think electrification of heat and transport is likely or unlikely? Who thinks likely? And unlikely? Interesting. I mean, just from a project we've been doing with... We've been advising the National Infrastructure Commission on what are the UK's energy infrastructure needs over the next five years, specifically whether these are assets that have very long lifetimes. We don't know how the future will develop. They're very interested to think through, do we want a hydrogen-based economy or do we want an electricity-based economy? What do we need to do as the NIC to encourage those things in the long term? And if we get it wrong, what are the implications for that energy sector? So I guess the conclusion is that stickiness in some ways is very good, but other ways, we do want to think about avoiding this walking. [00:56:28] Speaker ?: So yeah. Thank you. [00:56:30] Speaker 2: Great. [00:56:31] Speaker ?: And then our final panel speaker is Jie. [00:56:31] Speaker 2: So go ahead. Okay. [00:56:33] Speaker ?: So I think it's better to stand and make sure everyone could see me and could hear me. So hi, everyone. I'm Jie. [00:56:37] Speaker 1: And I graduated a couple of years ago, as soon as we were all together. [00:56:42] Speaker 9: Yeah, so it's really, really, really, really happy to be back here. 'Cause since I joined Elmer Carcer Foundation, I moved out of London. [00:56:50] Speaker ?: And now I'm living in I Love White. [00:56:50] Speaker 9: So some of you might have heard of I Love White, some of you might not. It's like, yes, it's another isolated island from the mainland. So it's quite like a rural area, but we've got sea, we've got seagulls, we've got yachts. So it's quite relaxing and yeah. I feel like it's quite cool. And I'm really, really happy to be back to London and also to UCL. Yeah. So I've been, I've been, I've been doing a long time, and I've been doing a long time. I've been doing a long time, and I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. I've been doing a long time. I've been doing a long time. I've been doing a long time. I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. And I've been doing a long time. [00:58:59] Speaker ?: Yeah, so I really want to say you guys are so lucky. Because you're here. [00:59:02] Speaker 9: And we have Paul Atkins. And we have wheels. To help you write a good reference letter. Yeah. So, yeah. So my job actually is, yeah. We can start from this one. It's partially my job. Plastics. Single-use plastics. Single-use plastics. So, actually, Elmer Curse has been doing business around circular economy. But we are not a consulting firm. We are not a think tank. We are a charity. So, all the projects are funded from our philanthropic. And so, why the plastics? So, what we'd like to do is help, you know. So, let's start from the circular economy. So, I think a better way to expand circular economy is to compare with the linear economy. So, which is like currently predominant economy mode. We, you know, we extract the resource from nature. And then we make something out of it. And then we use it for a while. And then we throw it away. Like this one. I think most of the plastic waste are going to be threw away tonight. So, that is the linear way. And then all those waste either ended up at landfill or some of them recycled or some of them just burned. And there's the data like now only 9% of the waste got recycled. So, it's quite, quite low. So, what we've been doing is how to like design the circular economy which could design out waste. And then make sure, because everything, all the products is designed. And then all the materials within could eventually valorize. And then could be kept at the highest utility through their whole life. Yeah. So, that is basically the idea. And then I joined the Anematous Foundation because there is a new China project. So, when everyone talk about China. Ah, China. Fascinating. A lot of things going on there. So, that's why they also kind of like want to enter into Chinese market. And obviously, I'm a Chinese. I speak Chinese. I communicate with local governments and various stakeholders. So, I just luckily got into the project. So, the project is started from a year and a half ago. It's funded by MAVA. Some of you might have heard of this MAVA Foundation. So, the first project is a research project. So, basically, we deep dive into five focus areas in China. Which includes the environment, mobility, textile, electronics, and the food. And we'd like to know the circular economy opportunities in those five areas. So, we've also done some modeling, some CGE modeling around those five areas. And to quantify the economic benefits as well as the environmental benefits. So, that is the first report. And we're going to launch the report this year in World Economy Forum in China. The summer. In Star Wars, every winter, they have the winter Star Wars. And also, they have the summer web meeting, which will be held in Dalian in China this year. So, we're going to launch our report there. And after this research, we realized, yes, there is a lot of opportunities in China. So, we'd like to do something, not only stop at paperwork. And then, we got another five years of funding also from Maba, which is like to allow us to do some concrete and tangible projects in China. And it's going to have like four different areas. So, first, we'd like to build up a case study library, which is kind of like an open, a mutual dialogue platform. We'd like to bring in some good practice in Europe into China, but also bring some good practice in China to here. Sorry, from China to here. Like, lots of sharing economy has been happening in China. And also, lots of innovative business models. And the second one is we focus on different material flow. It's kind of in line with our research. So, we're going to focus on food waste first. And second, it's going to be textile. And third, it will be e-waste. So, those three material flow. And also, we're going to focus on education. Because we think education has always been the focus on MROCAS funding. We'd like to work with local universities to bring social economy into their curriculum. And the fourth area, basically, is with business. Because sometimes, when we think about, like, who would be the most important people, to change the economy. So, we would say mostly driven by business. And so, for consumers, how much do they understand social economy? It's kind of irrelevant. But consumers need to be offered opportunities to allow them to shift from the linear economy to the social economy. So, basically, it's more like, so what we want is, it's shifted from ownership to access. Which means, before, everyone owns something. We buy something. We own it. But we just put it somewhere. And we use it once in a while. But now we'd like to promote those kind of, like, performance-based, or access-based products. Which means, you can rent your stuff. Now, there is an answer in China. It's called the Y-closet. So, what they're doing is they set up the renting, the garment renting platform. So, every, you basically subscribe membership, and then you got your clothes from that platform. And they provide very, very decent clothes for young professionals. And you don't have to worry about to clean them, wash them. You got everything delivered. And then, if you want something new, you call them again. And then, stop them, stop them, come to your door, pick it up. And they have professional cleaning system to clean it. So, instead of owning, like, ten different styles of clothes, what you need to do is decide what you want to rent, say. So, and this is very in line with, like, Chinese living, or maybe Asian living philosophy, which is less is more. So, you own less, but you have more access to more things. So, think about the young professionals. They really don't have time to afford ten decent, like, leather or nice dress. But they can easily rent one for themselves. Yeah, so, that is what we're going to do, like a business. Because there are a lot of small business happening in China. But, think about China is massively big. Population is also massively big. How could we rule out those good practices? So, this is what we want to do in the next four years. Yeah, and we're hiring people. I think it must be good news, yeah. So, we're still looking for senior research analysts, and also head of town team. Yeah, more information, guys. You can go to Elmar Castle Foundation website. Yeah, so, that's basically what I've been doing now. And, yeah, it's fascinating to hear professor for this lecture again. And it makes me think about climate change policy in China. And if I would be allowed to score that policy in China, I'd probably be minus five. Sorry, I've been very, very mean. Sorry. Yeah, there's something good. But the thing is, for example, the climate change policy. It was first led by Ministry of Environmental Protection around 15 years ago. And then, it's shipped to National Development and Reform Ministry. And then, this year, it's just reshuffled again. Because this year, Chinese government, they have a massive reshuffle among all the ministries. So, now they've established a new one, which is called Ministry of Ecological Environment. So, basically, climate change, air pollution, and ocean plastics, all the issues go into that Ministry of Ecological Environment. So, that just makes me think, because in China, doing business is quite different. There is really no sickness at all. It all depends on the minister. So, normally, we only start, like, that's why we only have five years' plan. We always do five years' plan, and then another five years' plan. And it's because the minister could stay in place for maximum five years. So, that is what I feel like is quite tricky for the climate change policy. And not only that one, also for circular economy policy. It starts from the Environment Ministry, and then to National Reform and Development Ministry. And hopefully, it will stay there for a bit. Yeah. But another change for the Chinese government, it's probably some of you might get news. Our president, Xi Jinping, we just changed the Constitution. So, he could stay, yeah, at the president as long as he wants. So, it's kind of like back to Chairman Mao's time. But hopefully, his stay could provide some sickness. Hopefully. That is my, yeah, that is my personal reflection upon that. Yeah, that's it. Thank you, everyone. [01:10:08] Speaker ?: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. [01:10:10] Speaker 2: Thank you. Thank you. [01:10:12] Speaker ?: Thank you. [01:10:12] Speaker 2: Thank you. [01:10:13] Speaker ?: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Okay. Well, about five minutes. [01:10:19] Speaker 10: I thought we were going to say, I thought we were going to say 5 or 7:30. Sure. No? I'm not sure. I can see, you know, many people have come in for the drinks. You need to wait a few minutes longer. There's a couple of chairs that are working with. We had a great lecture from Paul, a challenging one as well. And I think there's a superb diversity of experiences there in relatively new graduates of the of Paul. Very interesting. So, Jesse, Jay, and Oliver, thank you very much for that. I was asked to chair a discussion. I haven't actually had anything yet to debate, but let's see if there's some questions and comments that come up on anything you've heard. [01:11:19] Speaker ?: Is everyone going for the drinks? [01:11:23] Speaker 10: Well, if everyone is so shy, let me pick something up, which is very much on the theme of Paul's talk and frustration and comparison with the climate change act. Because it's worth thinking, well, how and why could we be thinking about climate change and not the character of the environment and what are characteristics of that? And it is interesting to reflect that climate change act for 10 years, very few countries yet have done in the consumer, although the new German government has, as part of its cultural agreement, a commitment to the climate change act. Precisely because the German targets for 2010 and 2020 are going to be missed. And so it's a kind of really easy target for a political campaign for any of the people who are going to want to do it. And so it's kind of a really easy target for a political campaign for any of the people who are going to be able to do it. And so it's kind of a really easy target for a political campaign for any of the people who are going to do it. And so it's kind of a really easy target for a political campaign, for any of the people who are going to do it. And so it's a really easy target for a political campaign, for any of the people who are going to do it. And so it's a really easy target for a political campaign, for any of the people who are going to do it. And so it's a really easy target for a political campaign, for NGOs focused on that, clear narrative, clear number of the politics around what will the number be and how it will be submitted. And so the list on the environment and the environment plan, it's like, wow, just how many conversations do you need to have and how many things do you need to define, and it's the sheer complexity of pulling it down to a simple thing you can angle it into. But there's a lot of both. One other brief comment on that structure that they don't have to say committed is it's not quite a climate change committee that can recommend policy. In fact, in some ways it's even smarter than that. And I know that Whitehall was quite nervous about that. It's actually the climate change committee is not supposed to recommend policies because that's the job of government. If this committee was spouting this, that, and everything else, then all right. What it says is if the committee assesses the government is not on track to deliver what are legally defined in commitments, then it can recommend what needs to be done to get back on track. And frankly, the last thing the Whitehall wants is to have a bloody independent committee telling the government what it should do. So they have a very strong incentive to try to keep on track. And it's quite an interesting thought, structure and intent. Anyway, that was me to fill in because nobody put their hands up on my ass. So now we've got like, great. [01:14:25] Speaker 7: Yeah, no, I mean, I was definitely not making a mistake. Yeah, no, I mean, I was definitely not making a mistake. [01:14:48] Speaker 8: Nihilistic arguments and not doing anything. And I think, maybe to clarify, I would draw some of the distinction between macro-stickiness and micro-stickiness. So like, it's good to set a goal, like the 80% reduction by 2050, and then put in place the mechanism to make it very hard to kind of backtrack on that goal. A good example might be the government's target to say, we want 20, by 20, 40, we want all vehicle sales to be elected. I guess what I'm trying to make is when you're trying to implement those policies, it becomes very difficult. So, I don't know, if you're Sadiq Khan and you've got positions for planning the mission for some two different electric car companies for that individual types of chargers, which ones you go for? You have to make that decision. What if you have five companies? Or what if, in fact, it's not even a charging point, it's even too big up the road, there's another technology where you can charge a trucker price while you're waiting. Or what if then hydrogen becomes the right thing to do? I'm just saying that when the devil is in the detail and it becomes very tricky to navigate that well. Modeling can help, but it's the one that you want to do that and you have to make decisions in the back. Yes? [01:16:10] Speaker 4: I was just trying to put forward on to the panel, but what would your thinking assessment be for the clean growth strategy? You do that as a sticky document and kind of give them that space on the foundation of the Climate Change Act and kind of going out and talking about what happens if we don't support the big part budget, we don't have a legal action. How sick do you think that is taken from the Climate Change Act? [01:16:37] Speaker 7: Yeah, it's a very different thing because it's not a green field document. [01:16:54] Speaker 2: The most remarkable thing about it is, and we did cover this in the course, but it was extraordinary how clear it is in the document, is that decarbonisation, clean growth, mainly decarbonisation, but not exclusively, there's a bit there about resource efficiency, resource productivity, circular economy stuff, is an economic opportunity. That's a revolution. That's a revolution, and if the base civil servants and the politicians who instruct them to really believe that, and it's not just a rhetorical flourish, then it could be very sticky indeed, because the one thing we know they're committed to is growth and jobs. Everyone's committed to growth and jobs. If they think they can get that through the low carbon route, and the clean growth strategy is full of that, then that's going to happen, and that's going to be very exciting indeed. So you'll have gathered I have a quite different view of the clean growth strategy than I do with the 25-year environment plan. [01:17:59] Speaker ?: Yeah. [01:18:00] Speaker 10: But the industrial strategy has got one of those, one of those things, a lot of it's going to be very interesting. So you're not going to be very interesting, but it's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. I think it's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. It's going to be very interesting. [01:18:22] Speaker 2: It's going to be very interesting. [01:18:23] Speaker ?: It's going to be very interesting. [01:18:24] Speaker 2: It's going to be very interesting. But the industrial strategy has got one of those, one of those things. And it's really important that Bayes came out and said the clean growth strategy. I mean, again, thinking back to Dimitri Zengelis' lecture, so much of the future is waiting to be invented. And it's, you know, not at all certain where we're going to go. But for Bayes to say, that's where we're going, because that's where we think jobs and growth are to be. And everyone knows they want jobs and growth. Then, I mean, that is really important. That is part of the future creating process that is just terribly exciting. Yeah. Okay. [01:18:59] Speaker ?: Yes. I'm all about that. [01:19:01] Speaker 11: I suppose, combining both what Paul said, the policy side and the corporate side. So, on one hand, we have policy and it's the policy speaking up for us to act. And on the other hand, we have the changing and evolving dynamic of the energy sector and power. How are we going to ensure policy is speaking enough for people to invest in the infrastructure [01:19:43] Speaker ?: that we could have been made? [01:19:45] Speaker 7: Thank you so much for all our energy. [01:19:47] Speaker 8: Yeah. No, I mean, I think that's a very good point. I think we've had a lot of angry clients from the last couple of years trying to grapple with the latest policy changes that have been thrown in the way. I guess the classic example was triax and taking away that or keeping time, although people knew that that was coming. Changes to the classic market. It seems a lot of integrators came through this time. A lot of people are not particularly happy about that. And I expect over the next couple of years we'll see some lobbying efforts to downplay the role of integrators. In fact, we've seen the same with factories. De-rating has gone down from 96% to less. So, yeah, it is very challenging to create kind of a stable policy framework in which investors are confident and then will invest on the back of it. Maybe it's a question to go back to you, your investor. How are you guys thinking about this? [01:20:47] Speaker 11: No, it's difficult. I was in the same class as Oliver. So, yeah, Aurora, we are one of Aurora's clients. Not unhappy so far. I think it's hard when you then try and actually monetize the policy and the change in the evolving sector. I think for someone like me, well, it's two sides where it's either XT, radio, or XT, it's higher risk, you need to create returns. But then I actually work in debt where we want to lend people who let them connect into it. Back to you. Back to you and stuff. But in terms of the policy changes and the evolving dynamics, we can't lend money to people because we don't think we're going to get it back. And I think that's why I wonder about this. How do we know that the policy has been sticking up and then not suddenly we can change it in long term and then we get cultural? [01:22:05] Speaker 8: We did a conference yesterday on subsidy-free renewables. And I guess one of the things that this, one of the reasons people are so excited about this is because you can kind of reduce some of that regulatory risk if renewals no longer have to depend on government subsidies. But then you can choose a whole bunch of new problems around, you know, when the solar plant can be exposed to merchant risk if you don't have long term kind of price involvement guarantee. And then there's a further regulatory risk of, okay, so renewables also impose integration costs on the system. And what if in 20 years, when we don't have as much flexible based on the system, government decides to step in and address some of those risks and make reasonable fair some of the costs that should come and socialize. So it's tricky, it's tricky. [01:22:56] Speaker 6: I think sort of one thing based on that is looking at what other countries have done. And I think sometimes the EU and the UK can get sort of a very insular look about what's happening in other governments and what other people have implemented. I think also it comes down to when policy is lacking. What we're seeing a lot of recently is private sector upping its game a little bit in terms of energy efficiency. investment and that energy efficiency has tended to be very, or perceived as a very risky investment. Private sector banks or banks are starting to fill the gap with their own standards that energy efficiency mortgages and things that, you know, they're stepping up and sort of adapting international standards. Something like climate bonds, and we're a little bit off topic here, but those are international standards that are now being adopted. And a lot of times when we're talking with governments, so the number one thing they want to know is what another country is doing. And you look at the industry leaders of Denmark, a lot of people want to know what Denmark's doing. People are really interested in the Chinese five year plan and what's happening with that. Even in the US, they're looking at like the metrics that are happening that are coming out of all the data gathering. And still that's the number one country that, you know, a lot of people look at for how they're collecting data. So I think a lot of it comes down to when the government does start to, when the government policy is lacking, where it gets picked up and looking at other countries' examples. [01:24:32] Speaker 10: So I think it's a lot of it. [01:24:33] Speaker ?: So I think it's a lot of it. [01:24:33] Speaker 10: So I think it's a lot of it. So I think it's a lot of it. So I think it's a lot of it. So I think it's a lot of it. So I think it's a lot of it. So I think it's a lot of it. [01:24:39] Speaker ?: So I think it's a lot of it. So I think it's a lot of it. So I think it's a lot of it. So I think it's a lot of it. I think it's a lot of it. [01:24:44] Speaker 10: And then maybe come back. Yeah. Yeah. I think it's a lot of it. I think it's a lot of it. I think it's a lot of it. I think it's a lot of it. I think it's a lot of it. It's a lot of it. It's a lot of it. It's a lot of it. People really need to think, what kind of changes are simply solving. And what kind of changes are basically shifting the direction where governments go. So things like change the storage. Well, it's like you've been paid with a lot and kind of backing up, you know. Yeah. There's quite a few of those. There's a lot of it. There's a lot of it. There's a lot of it. There's a lot of it. There's a lot of it. There's a lot of it. There's a lot of it. There's a lot of it. But just any further back to any of you on the panel, we've had a fairly depressing assessment of various aspects of the UK. I think the UK is still looked at as a leader within the EU in terms of environmental policy. [01:25:55] Speaker ?: I don't think, I mean, I think everyone's waiting for Brexit. [01:26:00] Speaker 7: We're talking about uncertainty. [01:26:01] Speaker 6: That just leaves so much uncertainty in something like this, just like a bit of a band-aid. And it's really just a matter of time, just still waiting. I think it's just what we're almost reaching two years of not really knowing what's going to happen. And I think people are still stuck in this waiting pattern. But, you know, I don't think it's -- no one sort of laughs at the UK like they do at the US. But -- Any others? Any others? Well, I think for -- I would say -- I would say -- I would have lost myself. Well, the interesting thing is, like, for example, I think there's some politics. [01:26:43] Speaker ?: I think there's some politics. [01:26:43] Speaker 6: But I think there's some politics. You know, there's some politics. There's some politics. [01:26:46] Speaker ?: There's some politics. [01:26:46] Speaker 6: There's some politics. I think there's some politics. There's some politics. And I think there's some politics. [01:26:50] Speaker ?: And I think there's some politics. [01:26:51] Speaker 7: There's some politics. I've been doing it for quite a long time. So the thing is, like, for China, while we're talking about social economy, actually, it's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. [01:26:57] Speaker 10: It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. [01:26:59] Speaker 9: It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not a brand new policy. It's not only international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. [01:30:01] Speaker 10: It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. It's international. I think we should just thank you very much for a great evening. And Will for helping put it all together, along with the aid of several other people behind us at Iowa. [01:30:21] Speaker ?: Good. Any thanks? [01:30:32] Speaker 7: So we've got drinks through there, but... [01:30:41] Speaker ?: Thank you.