Multipolarity, US Decline & Mass Politics - Interview with Nel Bonilla

[0:01] Welcome along, everybody. It's an interview special today for Liberation News Network. [0:06] And the subject of our discussion today will be, of course, the differing concepts of [0:12] multipolarity. It's a word that has been on everybody's lips over the past four years or so, [0:19] especially since the beginning of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine. And it's [0:24] a word that has come to mean, well, so many different things. But what those different [0:31] things are is seldom really explored. For instance, Marco Rubio confirmed himself as something of a [0:38] multipolarist in his confirmation hearings when he essentially admitted that the days of US primacy [0:45] were coming to a close. But again, what did that admission mean? Some took it to mean [0:50] that the US was preparing to accommodate itself to a new multipolar order in which it would play [0:55] an equal role with other major powers. The subsequent behavior of the Trump administration [1:01] has confirmed that not to be the case. So today, I'm very pleased to be joined by Nell Bonilla, [1:07] who's an academic and writes the Worldline Substack and has written several very interesting essays on [1:15] the differing concepts of multipolarity and the decline of the US imperial bloc, so to speak. So [1:21] Nell, welcome along to Liberation News Network, and thank you for joining me today. [1:25] Yeah. Yeah. Well, thank you for inviting me. I'm really honored to be here. So yeah, my substick is [1:32] Worldlines, and I'm a geographer and a sociologist, almost a PhD, but yeah. So, and I also write [1:42] articles on the German news site, Nachdink site, if anybody speaks German. [1:47] Okay. Well, we'll put links in the description box to all of those, and I really recommend that [1:54] you good viewers and listeners go and read Nell Substack, because there's, again, very interesting [1:59] discussions of the differing conceptions of multipolarity there, and that's what we're going [2:04] to be spending the hour talking about today. So first point I wanted to raise with you was the [2:10] recent Trump-Xi summit, which was, of course, subject to an awful lot of what I would describe as [2:18] fevered speculation on the part of various people who advocate for multipolarity of some kind or [2:27] another. So this was hailed in some quarters as a great diplomatic triumph for Beijing, more evidence [2:35] of a shifting balance of power. And yet your work through the essays that have explored what you [2:42] call the bunker state strategy suggests we should read these summits differently. Isn't the deeper [2:49] reality that beneath the hostile rhetoric, there is a profound structural dependency between the U.S. [2:54] and China that neither side can easily shed? You wrote recently about how Washington's approach to [3:00] Iran represents not retreat, but a transition to a more sustainable and ruthless model of hybrid [3:06] warfare, economic strangulation, covert sabotage, and targeted pressure rather than direct invasion. [3:13] And I would say, just in addition to that, that the way that the Iran-U.S. talks have played out [3:18] confirmed that. So should we then read the summit through the same lens, not a detente, [3:26] movement, but a move to a more efficient mechanism of containment? [3:31] Yes, that's a very good question. So first of all, yeah, I totally see how people are reading the [3:43] Xi and Trump summit, the Putin and Xi summit as being about China wins or the U.S. is losing and [3:50] so let's just redo the work. It will all be fine. And I don't see it. It's not that I don't see it. [4:00] It's rather that we are indeed rather in a multipolar order already. There is a shift in balance of power, [4:07] but what does that even mean? But we can talk about this later. However, to your question about, [4:18] yeah, can we read the summit like a detente or more like a mechanism of containment? Well, [4:27] I would first of all say that China and the U.S. are very interdependent, but not only China and the U.S., [4:36] also China in itself with the world, with the global capitalist system. So in this sense, [4:46] and here's another point, the global capitalist system is of course part of and very much influenced, [4:53] if not partly also controlled, I mean, not in a conspirational way, but in a structural way, [5:00] through this U.S.-led imperial bloc. So if we keep all of these things in mind, then what the summit [5:09] actually showed us was a sign of how the U.S. and China are locked into this structural dependency, [5:17] where they both need certain parts of the other, otherwise they are put into a systemic risk. [5:25] And they both thus have different kinds of assets, resources, and so on that act as stabilizers for the [5:34] other, for example, financial architectures, technology, supply chains, and all of that. So in [5:43] that sense, it's not even about, or we cannot expect to see or to think that this summit means that [5:52] China has won, will simply then initiate the process of decoupling from the U.S.-led system, [6:00] capitalist system and market system. And so then the U.S. will just decline, fall, and we will have a [6:08] peaceful world or something like that. So that's not what is happening. Instead, not only has China, [6:18] well, let's say both China and the U.S. understand this or the elites, the ruling strata, [6:25] understand this. They understand this mutual interdependence and [6:31] understand also tacitly the warfare-related patterns that underlie these interdependencies. [6:44] So in other words, I found a Brookings paper, not to say that Brookings papers are like exact [6:52] blueprints or anything like that, but it's very interesting. It's called Feeling a New Disorder, [6:59] and it's from 2015. And there I found a concept they talk about, which they call Mutually Assured [7:07] Denial, where they basically say neither side, whether not the U.S., not China can push the other [7:15] out of critical strategic domains for either for one or the other, and without themselves hurting, [7:26] having catastrophic costs set upon them. So this means that the U.S. accepts this, that China will [7:36] keep developing their technology, will build militarily their naval capacity to prevent blockades, while China [7:48] accepts that the U.S. will not just withdraw from the South China Sea or anything like that. They tacitly [7:58] accept this. So then the goal of this Mutually Assured Denial is about basically constantly renegotiating [8:09] this configuration, an equilibrium, a stable configuration of this mutual constraint, because [8:18] they both know that the other side has a capability that can hurt and damage and weaken in very, well, [8:29] catastrophic ways, one of the parties. So in that sense, this summit is a reflection of this also, [8:37] because this is actually a quite qualitative shift. I mean, because we maybe are thinking about [8:47] Trump, the U.S. ruling strata, foreign policy establishment, and all of them can just, like in [8:56] old days, sanction and invade and what have you. I mean, they still do these things, but [9:05] and then now we see the summit and say, it didn't even go, apparently didn't even go that great for [9:12] the Trump administration. But instead of seeing it like this, like a win or lose situation, we should [9:20] see or understand that the U.S. ruling elites have already accepted that a multipolar order is here, [9:30] it exists, and that they are not trying to see, okay, how can we adapt to it and influence it so that it [9:40] doesn't shift into a manner that would actually cut the resources, the roots of the, let's say, [9:48] structural power from under their feet. So that's what they are trying to do, or that's what they [9:55] have accepted, and now try to live with this reality. So, and what I then say, here comes this [10:04] idea about the variance of multipolarity, is that this variant of multipolarity we are right in, [10:13] I mean, right now in, I call it a little competitive multipolarity. I mean, maybe there are other ways [10:20] to describe this, but I call it in this way because it means that there are several great powers or [10:27] several powers in countries that have some kind of bargaining power or chips over the shares, the rules [10:35] and the spheres within this capitalist world system. And it's not like a system or multipolar order where [10:45] we can say, oh, this is actually about having multiple countries, they are all sovereign, autonomous and [10:52] trade or interact with each other on an equal basis and so on, or that this is even the goal and this [11:00] would, this will happen and so on. So this is not what I'm seeing right now. We actually have this type of [11:08] rather elite competitive multipolarity. And the US, well, it accepted it and not in a way of saying, [11:15] and not in a normative way, not like saying, oh, multipolarity is good. And it means we now will share [11:25] our resources and how we make laws and all of that. No, it just means the US understands that they [11:34] don't anymore have this overwhelming superiority in military and technological domain in science or [11:43] anything, many of these spheres, but rather that there are other countries that do have more of this [11:50] superiority and that they won't or they can't also not restore it just by force alone without actually [11:59] really hurting themselves and then decline. And well, I'm not sure if they would actually totally [12:07] collapse. And then the other thing is why I say that this isn't like an anti-imperialist multipolarity [12:17] or one that will lead us to a more peaceful or stable world is that both Russia and China don't seek, [12:26] I mean in other countries too, not to single them out, are seeking autonomy, are seeking maybe spheres of [12:33] influence, maneuvering, and they are not trying to export their kind of thinking and systems of how [12:42] to organize society into the world. So, and in that sense, the US can accept such a state of things [12:52] at the moment. So, and the other thing about this bunker state logic that now the US is basically [13:02] engaging in a more low-cost way of warfare, hybrid warfare above all, and in all domains, and all [13:13] domains of that we can actually think of and continuously is also such a reflection of this [13:20] acceptance that there is no multipolarity and this acceptance that they don't have any more this [13:26] overwhelming superiority in these areas. It means they then say, okay, what can we cut back? And of [13:34] course they will cut back social welfare, the contract, social contract, what else? The so-called [13:44] commitments, security commitments with other countries and all of that. And instead concentrate [13:50] on all the coercive and violence-related tools they have, which includes the dollar system, monetary and [13:58] financial architecture, which also includes the military in certain ways, specifically the command [14:04] structure, surveillance, and which also includes, yes, proxies and arming them, lawfare, quite some, [14:15] it's quite a palette of things that this includes, but it's all about coercion and violence. [14:21] So at the end of the day, I would say, well, it's a, it's kind of rather than let's say, oh, [14:29] this is a detourned or anything like that or containment. It's more like the, it's an attempt maybe, [14:39] but the thing is that the target of this type of warfare of the attempted containment and all of this [14:46] is structurally indispensable for the US-led block. So it's just the recalibration [14:54] into the talent on the surface, seeking stability, but only on the surface, while at the base of all, [15:03] they are still developing and trying and engaging in hybrid warfare, basically. So this is what I would [15:11] say about this. Well, I mean, there's more to say, but that's what I would say right now about this [15:18] question. [15:19] Yeah, that's a really interesting couple of things I want to just go a little bit further [15:25] with there, because on the one hand, as you say, you get all this over the top rhetoric from US [15:34] politicians about China, and you are from various different like think tanks, screaming about China's [15:42] stealing our technology. The Chinese are advancing everywhere. I mean, as Trump said when he ran in [15:49] 2016, we're losing, China's eating our lunch, et cetera, and a promise being made of a great American [15:57] industrial renewal on top of that. And that's the public level. On the private level of these discussions, [16:06] as you say, there is a recognition from the American side that, well, actually, we can't [16:13] really change these things. So there will be no great American industrial revival, for instance. [16:22] The economic state and political state of late-stage US imperialism precludes that. And on the same side of [16:31] things, you also have, as you say, Aaron, your answer, the fact that the US can't just cut China off [16:39] in terms of trade. They struggled for, I think it was over a decade, just to reshore American military [16:50] production in terms of the various different industrial components that go into American tanks, [16:56] for instance. So many of those were made in China. It took them years and years just to try and get [17:02] the manufacturing of that back onto American soil. So to actually decouple from China would be [17:09] devastating for the stability of the United States itself. And on the other side of things, you have [17:19] China where the rhetoric is less over the top, I would say, but there is more of an acknowledgement [17:30] that the Chinese are locked into a system of global capitalism, which is still principally organized [17:41] from the US and slightly less so from the European and British side. And that they're not playing just [17:50] to exit from that anytime soon, nor could they without suffering, again, severe internal disturbances. [17:58] So what you have in reality is something which is a lot less romantic, shall we say, [18:05] than some of the people who advocate for multipolarity, which is an emergent system where [18:11] you have the two largest economies in the world interlocked and interdependent, [18:19] but at the same time where you get constant aggressive efforts coming from the US side to try [18:25] to destabilize China, trying to push China out from various different countries. But again, the US's [18:33] scope for maneuver is limited. So this looks to be, according to my reading of it, something that will [18:39] continue unless there's some kind of massive structural change for the next generation, at least. [18:46] And neither side will be able to get rid of their dependency on the other anytime soon. [18:52] Is that how you would read it? [18:54] Yes, yes, exactly. That's exactly how I would read it in the sense that the US has been in, [19:02] not only the US, Europe, of course, too, in a decline for some time now. And on the other hand, [19:09] they need China. And China is simply totally very much integrated into the global world economy in [19:17] many ways. And as they also need some of these tools and architectures that the US-led block [19:25] provides. And in this sense, I don't see exactly, I don't see how this could just implode, collapse, [19:33] or any of it, just by doing nothing. That's exactly what will not happen. It will continue like this. [19:41] If nothing, dramatic changes. So yes, I agree. [19:45] Well, and to go further with this, so we've been talking about different concepts of multipolarity. [19:51] There's a key difference between what the Chinese are doing now and what the original generation of [20:02] communist revolutionaries were doing in the early to middle 20th century, which is the Chinese very [20:10] deliberately aren't engaging in the kind of political operations that the communist international did. [20:18] And they're also not recreating stuff like Comic-Con or the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. [20:28] They have a philosophy where they will literally deal with anybody, any type of governmental system, [20:36] but the Chinese will make economic arrangements with them. And whereas that can lead to some [20:43] liberatory potential. So for instance, the Chinese will do business with the Sahel states, for instance, [20:51] and other states that are incurring the displeasure of the imperialist bloc. Again, that's not as part of [20:59] any kind of global revolutionary movement. It's a matter of trade and business as usual, essentially. [21:06] So that is a fundamentally different thing, is it not, than from the earlier generation of Chinese leaders who [21:16] proclaim themselves to be fully backing like the anti-colonial revolution in the 60s and the early 1970s? [21:25] Yes. It is a very large difference in what we can see, the behavior of, let's say the Chinese ruling [21:36] strata and parts of it were in the 1970s and in comparison with now, with at least in the 1990s, [21:45] and more so now what is happening. It's very different. So on the one hand, [21:50] what happened is that the Chinese leadership, as the Soviet Union collapsed, found or were trying to [22:05] study why did it collapse. And according to their analysis, their studies, they were concluding that [22:15] it was indeed this idea of global revolution, of having this posture of exporting revolutionary [22:22] potential and all of that, that led to or was one of the leading factors in the collapse of the [22:32] Soviet Union. Plus, of course, also like a kind of loss of confidence in the ideology of communism, [22:42] Marxism, socialism, and these kinds of things. So as they tried to understand what happened, [22:51] they then came to the conclusion that, well, they cannot, of course, make the same mistakes. [22:59] And in their reading then, for example, there is the former executive vice president of the [23:09] Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that said in 2006, [23:18] he said, oh, and he's called Jiang Weijin. I'm sorry if I mispronounce. He said, [23:24] in strengthening comprehensive national power, the Chinese people will not pursue the Soviet dream. [23:32] Back then, the Soviet Union engaged in an all-out arms race and large-scale export of a revolution [23:38] abroad. Whereas China simply focuses on developing itself. We only export computers, not revolution. [23:45] And then he repeated the same in another speech at the school in 2011. But there he even said the [23:52] American dream is high energy consumption and the European dream is colonization. And we also don't [23:58] want that. We are about exporting goods, capital markets, not revolution, colonization or incredible [24:07] consumption. And he was one of the, let's say, people who influenced this doctrine or this idea of the [24:18] Chinese peaceful rise, the Chinese peaceful development, which was about trying to industrialize [24:25] China and elevate living standards, quality of life, gradually integrate into the capitalist market more [24:33] and more. But without exporting their ideas, ideologies and ways of organizing society and economy into [24:44] other parts of the world. And I have a small anecdote, which I found very interesting. I last year, [24:52] last year took a course, which was in cooperation with the Mexican Autonomous National University and [24:59] the Renmin University in China. I mean, I didn't take it in China, but... And the course was, or this [25:08] class was about global implications of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era. And I [25:15] thought, oh, maybe they will talk about socialism, communism. I mean, they did. But it was more about [25:23] saying, okay, this is our ideology. This is our path. And I mean, and it's good. Look, it has very good [25:31] features. It's not at all aggressive. And this is it. So don't, almost like saying, don't be afraid of us. [25:40] This is what we are doing. This is what we are doing. And we also want to cooperate with everybody, [25:45] with win-win situations. And we all want the development of other countries and all of that. [25:52] So it was not at all a course that one would say was about trying to win over the pupils of students [26:02] there and say, socialism or Marxism, you should try it. You should build a revolutionary structure. [26:11] No, that was not the goal of this course. And this is also one thing which we then see. The outreach [26:19] that the Chinese government is doing in the world is not at all about reaching masses of people in other [26:28] countries, but it is rather very, very self-cautious, very state-centered and elite oriented in the sense [26:36] that it's an outreach through embassies, through universities in the academic realm, corporations [26:47] maybe through the infrastructure projects, of course, totally. But all of this doesn't at all need [26:53] in any way the mass institutions or the organizations of any way that are less elite and more geared towards [27:06] the working classes, the working classes of other countries where they want to trade with or build [27:15] projects with. So what I then found very interesting is that they themselves or some of their analysts, [27:24] some of the economists, Marxist economists, of course, then say, well, what is happening currently in [27:31] China is that it is a socialist market economy and not simply state capitalism. Yes, it has contradictions, [27:42] but these contradictions are existing within the socialist project. They are tools to increasingly [27:52] come near to this goal of having socialism and, how do you say, lift up the working masters of China, [28:02] their living standards, the technology and all of that. So in that sense, they also view, or [28:10] Cheng Enfu says in his books that China and its communist party is there then the central subject of the [28:20] socialist transition, managing it, steering it, the economy specifically, over this very, very long horizon [28:28] towards socialism in China, not exporting revolution in any way. So in that sense, they basically accept the [28:40] Chinese ruling structure that China has socialist tendencies in its domestic economy, but must [28:48] integrate and must adapt and trade with the capitalist system and act within these capitalist imperatives of [28:59] this global system. And even the other questions of why, and if we turn back to the 1970s topic and 1990s, [29:10] 80s about the Soviet collapse, because they see this as the only way to not collapse, to not be weak, to [29:18] survive, to be stable and not run the fate of the Soviet Union. And this is basically it. So it's not [29:29] trying to be anti-imperialist. I mean, some things they do have this quality, but rather anti-hegemonic, [29:38] trying to carve out their space to have China stable and safe. So I would say that this is like [29:48] what I would answer about, okay, what, what was the difference and why is it even like that today? [29:54] Like they seek additional stability and yeah, through gradual diversification of their trade [30:02] partners and all of this, and through integration in the capitalist market. But it's all about seeking [30:07] stability and safety, um, while saying, okay, this is the dialectic, we are socialists and we can work with it. [30:14] Yeah. And that, that's, that's confirmed in all of the statements that you read from Xi Jinping, [30:23] especially, um, if you go through like his, uh, the collected works of his that are issued by the [30:30] Chinese government, you get a consistent message there, which is that, um, China is not a hostile [30:36] power. China will work with anybody. Um, China does not see the, um, the US, uh, relationship as [30:45] necessarily hostile, um, that it doesn't have to be hostile, that we can, uh, do business with each [30:52] other and respect each other's sovereignty and systems essentially. And that's been the consistent [30:58] message for really since the Deng Xiaoping era. Um, and they, the current balance of forces within the, [31:07] uh, the communist party of China, um, dictates that. Um, because again, I think there's a big [31:14] misunderstanding often amongst how amongst even people who advocate for multi-polarity that China [31:20] is like the realm of just Xi Jinping. Like any leader, he expresses the collective will of the [31:27] ruling group. And in this case, that's the CPC itself, which has multiple tendencies within it. [31:33] Some of which are very much pro-capitalist, some of which are not. And he has to navigate [31:39] in between all of those to kind of, to express like a, a unified line, so to speak. Now this, [31:47] I think is, it gives us an interesting pivot point to turn to the discussion of like what the futures of [31:53] multi-polarity here, because the, the Chinese do have one specific vision of this. The US has been [32:00] forced to acknowledge that multi-polarity is already a factor, but, um, I wanted to explore your writing on [32:08] this. So you wrote recently on your substack that, uh, quote, uh, multi-polarity itself has several [32:14] different possibilities in terms of what it could look like. And you distinguish between what you [32:19] call anti-imperialist multi-polarity and other potential trajectories. So could you elaborate on [32:25] that, um, in terms of your thinking on that and like, what do you see as these, uh, these, the [32:31] differences between these different, um, multi-polar, multi-polar futures? [32:38] Yes. Yeah. So yeah, I have been thinking, thinking about this, uh, um, idea about multi-polarities [32:45] and mostly because, um, I see the discourse in media alternative, but also not alternative media, [32:52] let's call it it, uh, about this, uh, constantly about the US is collapsing, um, China era, Iran, Russia, [32:59] they win and so on. And, uh, then I'm, I was thinking, okay, but what does, what does it even [33:05] mean? Multi-polarity win-lose and so on. So I would say that there is like a slight misunderstanding [33:14] and, uh, and I will come to this, uh, and this will lead us then to this different [33:18] multi-polarity. So there's some misunderstanding and saying, okay, just because the US, uh, unipolar [33:23] moment is, uh, over just because US hedging money is eroding, uh, this means that the US empire is, [33:32] uh, US led empire is dying and empire in the sense of, uh, rather a class structure with a class [33:39] project, with shared interest that has been historically grown since, uh, well, the advent [33:44] of capitalism with colonization and so on. So it's still with us. In fact, every formal empire that we [33:53] know of, yes, has fallen, collapsed, but it didn't, uh, let's say these parts of these classes didn't [34:00] just, uh, die out. Instead they transformed, they adapted and they, uh, went on to live within the [34:07] next empire, formal empire. So, and we are now in what I would say is the US led empire. Now, [34:16] in that sense, yeah, we see the US as a country is becoming increasingly weak, [34:21] the industrialized, poor, uh, impoverished, um, all of it, polarized, uh, you know, political corruption, [34:29] et cetera. Uh, and then assume, uh, this is the end, a new world will, uh, come that is much better. [34:36] Yeah. So, um, but no, if we understand this, what we just talked about, about China and it's, [34:43] China is just an example, but it's actually the example of a country that is a socialist or that, um, [34:51] tries to work in communist, um, with the communist ideology has a long horizon and so on. This is, [34:58] and it's, uh, really a country that is, um, really, yeah, let's say powerful in a way in many domains. [35:06] And if this country says, no, we actually just want to develop ourselves, be stable, survive, [35:14] and all of this, then this means that the current multipolarity we are in, because this kind of [35:20] thinking also applies to many, many other countries in this, uh, multipolar order in this, [35:26] um, let's call it anti-hegemonic block, um, this kind of thinking. If this is the case, [35:32] then what we actually in is not, uh, um, a peaceful, will not be a peaceful multipolarity, [35:39] but instead rather, uh, this, what I call, uh, the elite competitive form of multipolarity, [35:44] and not at all even anti-imperialist multipolarity. Why? Or what are the, um, distinctions? Well, [35:52] on the one hand, an anti-imperialist multipolarity would maybe be about, uh, having genuine sovereignty, [36:01] equality, incorporation, um, and erosion of this, uh, corporate periphery extraction mechanisms and [36:10] patterns we've seen nowadays. Um, I, and I mean, not only nowadays, but, um, and, uh, there would be [36:17] more power to, yeah, subalterns to the working classes and all of this in elite competitive [36:24] multipolarity, what we have right now. It's rather more like this idea of a concept of great powers, [36:29] where they try to find a balance of power among the ruling strata only. It's not so much, I mean, [36:36] it's, it is maybe about people in the sense that it's about trying to survive, uh, the country's [36:42] trying to survive, but not in the sense of, um, uh, trying to turn over the system and find another [36:50] way to, um, live with what is happening right now. The other thing is, um, it wouldn't, I mean, [36:58] an anti-imperial multipolarity would be a real, um, real threat towards the US-led empire or block or [37:07] whatever. Um, but it isn't right now because it doesn't try to displace the global system of the [37:16] economy. It doesn't try at all. Instead, we see just with this example of China that they are trying [37:24] to survive, uh, simply in this, um, market economy as a world of competing cause of, uh, they try to [37:32] carve out their own spheres of influence. The other thing which I found in, uh, which we need to, uh, [37:39] keep in mind is that this also means that if we have such a world of competing cause in specifically [37:47] a world where this, uh, US ruling strata still reigns with this imperial system, this means there's [37:53] violence becomes organized violence becomes normalized through this proxy wars, uh, [37:59] grazing warfare and, um, all these things because they, they want, I mean, they accept a multipolarity, [38:06] but it doesn't mean they accept it to see how they can, um, work with it and survive, but they [38:13] don't accept it in the sense that they will just sit and say, let, um, all the others take over the [38:19] different parts of the world. Um, they will of course, uh, steadily continuously and perversively [38:25] inject violence and coercion, uh, through all kinds of ways, uh, into the world and into these more [38:32] anti-hegemonic countries. And lastly, um, we can say that, uh, what the difference is, is also that this [38:39] is about the, this multipolarity now is more about ruling classes or trying to arbitrate between [38:46] themselves, shifting alliances and allegiances, sorry, um, and remaining entrenched in the system. [38:55] Whereas in anti-imperial one, wouldn't be so much about, um, these ruling classes, uh, well, [39:04] managing themselves, but rather, rather about socializing somehow, um, property and infrastructures [39:13] on a global scale. Um, so this is not happening. And, um, what I would like to add here is that [39:21] it's not happening, um, because these, uh, all of these types of, uh, anti-hegemonic countries actually [39:28] don't, uh, have, um, a common project in common and shared ideological project or a shared horizon. [39:38] They don't have a vision that is better for the world, which they're working towards and that they [39:45] share. They talk about civilization, but civilization, again, is for me also like more of an elite concept. [39:55] If you have civilization, this means that you are basically fragmenting the, uh, different countries. [40:02] You're not, sorry, you are not trying to, uh, build a shared and common understanding that would, uh, [40:10] mobilize people to, uh, interact more, to even sacrifice for the long-term goal of somehow bettering [40:18] this type of world. And, um, in, in that way, I would say, yeah, well, we don't have, um, a unified [40:27] anti-demonic block, but instead one that is actually rather fragmented, even competitive in the sense that [40:34] in different domains of the market, um, that we have energy, um, food, what else, armaments, [40:43] and, um, medicine, whatever, they are competing and, um, interacting even with the US. So, and [40:52] this is why we see, like, um, acts where we say, okay, why, why did this happen? Why is China, for [40:57] example, selling drones to, I know, uh, I don't know, Armenia or so, because they are simply working [41:05] in the system and competing with each other. Inter-civilizational language, which seems like [41:11] a common project, is actually more like masking also this, uh, national interest, this fragmentation, [41:17] and it's more about, well, bargaining with, uh, each other. So this is what I would, um, say. I mean, [41:24] there's much more to say, but yeah. Well, yes, I mean, this is a very interesting, like, uh, topic [41:32] of discussion that, um, could, you know, we could go on for, with this for quite some time. I mean, [41:37] I would just add to what you're saying there with the, uh, the, the, the rea, the reality is that, [41:44] um, as we've been discussing, uh, from, throughout this program so far, that what you've, what's [41:51] developed over the last, I would say, at least 30 years since the end of the, or 35 years since the [41:57] end of, like, the Soviet Union and the collapse of the, what was called the socialist bloc, [42:05] is that the U.S. has very successfully created a system of global institutions, which, such as, [42:12] or should we say, repurposed existing global institutions, such as the International Monetary [42:17] Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, amongst others, that codify a [42:23] set of rules, um, as to how trade should be conducted, and as to how economy should be structured. [42:31] And, uh, this has been very successfully, um, imposed by the, the hybrid means you talk about [42:38] across the entire world. Meaning that the, the U.S.'s, uh, imperial presence [42:45] is felt everywhere, whilst the U.S.'s actual military bootprint, so to speak, doesn't have to be [42:53] as, anything like as extensive as previous iterations of empire were. Even though the U.S. does have a lot [43:00] of bases around the world, if you look at the, the actual troop numbers in a lot of those bases, [43:05] it's actually quite small in terms of the amount of force they could possibly project. [43:10] So, you've got this, um, distinction between the, um, U.S.'s, um, ability to project force, [43:19] which is diminishing, but their ability to enforce their rules on, uh, particularly like, um, the global [43:27] South nations has, is remains consistently high, uh, to even to this point when they, they, they [43:34] themselves acknowledge the road decline. Now, this, um, leads us to, uh, another interesting [43:41] point that you've made, which is that the U.S. itself might decline, but the system that it put in [43:48] place could survive it, uh, by quite some time. Now, I found this very interesting because this recalls [43:54] the, um, how people, I would argue, misinterpret the British empire and British imperialism. [44:02] A lot of the time people say, oh, Britain, Britain is like some useless backwater now, [44:08] um, its empire went a long time ago. Unfortunately, that's, that's not true. Uh, British imperialism [44:15] morphed. It's the ruling class changed their tactics by needing to be in an imperialist block [44:21] to survive, but their ability to, um, uh, export capital and bring capital back into this, particularly [44:30] the city of London survive far beyond like the physical infrastructure of the British empire. [44:36] So you've got another version of this. You, you, you seem to argue that another version of this is [44:42] potentially going to happen with the U.S., which is that it, the U.S. itself as, as a, as a unipolar [44:49] power might diminish, might even, the U.S. itself might even implode, but the system that it built has [44:56] survived, it will survive. So I wondered if you could just go further into that, because I think it's a [45:01] very interesting concept. Hmm. Yes. Yeah, it is an interesting concept. Well, it's a spring, well, it, um, [45:09] was born out of this, uh, idea of, of these empires that shift and, uh, don't really die. I mean, [45:15] their particular, their ruling strata, the, the, the power they have. And it's also, um, tied to this [45:23] observation that I think this, um, U.S. led block, this U.S. led empire is, it tries to adapt to this, [45:31] now, multipolar world and, um, is concentrating on developing its coercive tools. It is also, uh, [45:39] seeing the different countries that they use. Well, they see it more as, um, not, not to say [45:44] that they don't have any connections at all to the, uh, national histories of their countries, [45:50] but rather that they are kind of using the different countries as nodes with their different [45:56] roles. And in this sense, the U.S. as a country, as a territory with all its resources could, um, [46:04] collapse in a way, implode or what have you. But this wouldn't then necessarily mean that, [46:12] well, the U.S. empire will fall because, as you said, the, the structures such as the finance [46:19] structures, um, but also those of global trade, um, and so on, uh, and legal frameworks, international [46:26] ones too, well, they are embedded in the whole world. And there are people, uh, behind it, which are [46:33] part of this, what we could call an empire. And they are not bound to the U.S. as a country. So, [46:40] if the U.S. as a nation state, um, implodes, this would somehow, um, keep on surviving. Now, [46:48] I'm not, of course, I don't have a crystal ball. It could be that this survival would be then through, [46:56] like a transnational system of justice, uh, infrastructures, which again is still a ruling [47:03] strata, um, um, even if we call it infrastructures and what have you. And, um, it's also based, um, [47:13] well, what I already said on this, uh, transitions of empires. And the thing is, we know that the [47:20] dominant state of each empire always declines, but it just mutates, as you also mentioned for, uh, [47:28] Britain. So in this sense, I would say, yeah, it will most likely survive, whether it is through [47:36] a different country or just through this types of transnational financial infrastructure through, [47:44] these events through, uh, militaries and, uh, security architectures. So for example, um, what I [47:51] said, uh, when I talk about the U.S., or we, uh, have observed that the U.S., well, has all these [47:57] military bases and they, they talk about, oh, we will, um, draw down troops from Germany, for example. And [48:05] everybody is saying, oh, look, they are leaving NATO and stuff like that. Well, it is just that they will [48:11] different means of, um, of, uh, keeping that type of control to survive. And that, in the case of [48:18] Germany, for example, there is now a U.S. colonel that is the deputy head of the German army commands [48:25] operation division. A U.S. army command person has now a command position in the German army in the [48:33] Bundeswehr. Um, how, why? I mean, this, um, is, uh, incredible in, in my eyes, but I mean, we know, [48:42] we already know that, um, Europe, many European countries have, um, not that much of a so sovereign, [48:50] um, way, but at the same time, they are also part of these ruling strata. So, um, now the other thing is, [48:59] there's also, of course, in the corporate, corporate world, like the, uh, credit system, [49:05] financing systems of the world. And another point, which I found very important to understand that [49:12] it will not just implode, is that it lies, but also there is the, this, what we can call the [49:19] comprehensive elites of the world. They are, which are in every country. And again, they are like this [49:25] part of the ruling strata of every country that is trying to integrate itself or integrate [49:30] itself more, um, market economy instead of into the capitalist system, instead of trying to, um, [49:40] develop their countries, uh, make them more survival. Well, they could survive better and [49:47] be more autonomous, but instead, uh, the opposite. So all of these different, um, oh, and the most, [49:55] maybe the most important, almost, um, part is that there's also a lack of a counter system. [50:02] And I mean, in a large scale. So because if, uh, if any kind of, uh, world system implodes or needs [50:10] to fall or empire or what issue, it needs to have another system that works differently already at some [50:20] type of scale in place to be absorbed. Because, uh, I mean, I'm not saying like fully, fully formed and [50:27] wow, it's already there, but at least an attempt at, uh, having a different system. And this is at the [50:34] moment, not, uh, the case. We just have capitalism. I mean, there are some countries that try, but it's [50:40] not like a large scale where we could say this is already something different in capitalism. And if the [50:48] US implodes, they surely will then, um, adapt to this new system. Yeah. I only said that, well, [50:58] I'm not sure that if we don't have in a different kind of system, an alternative that organizes society, [51:07] economy, et cetera, differently in place, even if it's embryonic, even if it's just an attempt at [51:12] least, it scales. Then if an empire or whatever implodes, there's nothing that will catch it, uh, [51:19] so that it can adapt and transform for real, which I think is quite one of the most important factors [51:25] why this type of imperial structure will survive. Even if the US as a country, as a nation state, [51:33] implodes or collapses because the ruling strata, they are still there. They are transnational [51:39] and they are in this different architectures and all the other countries in the world, still a part of [51:45] their ruling structure are trying to be part of this more integration. And, um, there's also no, [51:52] no alternative at scale. So, yeah, I, I see, I see this quite clearly with like even nations that are [52:01] in, for instance, BRICS. So if you look at like, um, the Indian ruling class, you can see that, um, what a [52:09] large element of the Indian ruling class actually want is to be integrated into the US-led system. To a large [52:16] extent they already are. And to essentially profit from the divisions that exist in the current world [52:24] by providing certain services for the US. So there is a, and the rest of the US-led bloc. So there is [52:30] this plan floating around a while ago that the, well, uh, that in, in Britain that, well, maybe Britain [52:37] can't re-industrialize, but we can get defense, um, uh, manufacturing outsourced to India. And the Indians [52:45] can make it and send it to us, which seems rather impractical if you're planning on some kind of [52:50] giant war, but, uh, perhaps they're not. Um, but the other point that you were making now, [52:56] which is that there is this integration of the ruling classes of the, of the world into the US-led [53:01] system. And also that's an ideological integration, um, following from the material integration, you [53:06] have whole generations of politicians across the world who are trained in US think tanks, who are [53:15] educated in the, what would be called like the methods of neoliberal governance, so to speak, [53:23] who don't know how to operate in any other way. And also I would argue you have a truly global fear of [53:32] the, amongst the ruling classes, of the power of the organized working class. Um, that, that's something [53:39] that unites many different, um, uh, different countries, ruling classes, some of whom apparently [53:45] hate each other, but none of them want to see the re-emergence of like a powerful workers movement. [53:51] Now this, um, leads us, uh, I think to a very interesting exploration of another point of conflict, [53:59] which is of course the Russia question. And we see the, uh, back and forth in like the US-Russian [54:06] negotiations, which seem to be going nowhere. You have Vitkov and Kushner traveling to Moscow [54:12] repeatedly. Putin keeps referencing an Anchorage understanding, which may or may not exist, [54:18] or it may have existed when he said it to Trump, and then Trump may have forgotten about it three [54:22] minutes later. Um, so the Russian side persists with these talks. At the same time, there's continual [54:30] drone attacks from the, what's called the Ukrainian side, whether it is Ukrainians actually doing this [54:36] is another question. And then you also have Russian retaliation directed at, uh, military and strategic [54:43] positions in Kyiv itself. So these continual talks between the US and you and Russia, right? Ukraine, [54:52] are these in your view, diplomatic fear there or are there, is there a deeper strategic function [54:58] for both sides going on here? Hmm. Yes. Well, I would say, well, first of all, well, just like with China [55:06] and I'm also not a, uh, Russia expert, however, just from the observations of these, uh, talks that are [55:14] going on from this hybrid warfare against, uh, Russia. And so if we think, well, this is, uh, obviously not [55:22] about peace negotiations, I would say it's like rather about managing there for Russia. [55:30] It's about managing their constraints. For the US on the other hand, I would say it's maybe about [55:36] seeing where they can get some benefit. I mean, from, for the US ruling strata. And again, for Russia, [55:45] how is this about managing constraints? Well, first of all, Russia is not, um, it's not as, uh, let's say [55:53] powerful or rising, for example, as China. And that's what it seeks or what its ruling strata then seeks is to [56:00] damage the, uh, I mean, limit the damage that is being done through, uh, NATO through, uh, well, [56:07] through Ukraine or what have you. And if this is their goal and they, they probably see that they [56:15] can't do this just by warfare, well, by defense alone, then, um, I would say they are trying to keep [56:24] the door open to a potential lessening of the damage in the future. And, uh, the other thing [56:30] that I would even argue that these talks are about in the case of Russia are also about their own [56:36] different factions of elites or of ruling strata. Um, we have, I would say on the one hand, maybe the [56:43] Russian security establishment. Then we also have its, uh, political section. And then the, [56:49] of course, the corporate, uh, uh, finance and so on section. And they, well, probably, I mean, [56:58] most of all the latter, the finance, the corporate section of these ruling strata, they are more about [57:04] trying and wanting to reintegrate into the, uh, this, uh, world market, into the US-led, um, system [57:12] after all these sanctions and they want to reintegrate. But this is at the moment, of course, [57:16] not just as easily possible. And in this way, I would say that these talks with the US kind of are [57:22] about signaling to these types of elites. Well, there could be a way and we are trying and thus, [57:30] they try not to lose them at all. Because if you lose any kind of, uh, faction of ruling strata, [57:36] they can then, um, maybe act as, uh, collaborators or whatever, in a more overt way. So in that sense, [57:44] I think they are trying to manage, uh, the different, um, factions of ruling strata within Russia. [57:52] And, um, on the other hand, there are even some, which I have recently seen, analysts, [57:58] like geopolitical analysts in Russia that are currently saying, well, what is happening is, [58:03] I actually believe that Russia cannot at this moment, um, win this, uh, thing. They cannot [58:10] just liquidate the Kyiv regime, so, so to speak. And they can't even also fully occupy Ukraine, [58:18] which would be like the, um, thing they would need to do to have more control and, uh, have as little [58:25] damage as possible. So if that is technically, or because of materials and so on, not, uh, fully [58:32] possible, then what is needed is rather, um, something else. And some then talk about, okay, [58:40] we need to look at our geographic neighbors and, uh, win them over as partners, but with the benefits, [58:48] of course, for Russia. And we need to modernize our industry, technology, et cetera, to create this [58:54] kind of development that China has had and then, well, not be, um, so, so vulnerable in this, um, [59:03] hybrid warfare. So in this sense, these, uh, negotiations, I would say are trying to kind of, [59:11] prepare the different types of elites for different, uh, scenarios. May this be like, [59:16] oh, here's an opening. Maybe we will trade with the US and all of that, or for the other, uh, [59:23] faction saying, well, we won't be able to, or we won't, um, be able to find these or reach these [59:31] maximalist war aims, a certain victory. And thus we need to consolidate rather some limited gains and [59:39] reach some kind of compromise, um, with Ukraine through the US, but have you. So, and it's, [59:46] in this sense, I think, uh, it's, uh, it's really about kind of managing the elites, but again, I'm [59:51] not, uh, like, uh, well, this is one point. I mean, I'm not a super expert in, uh, Russian politics. [59:57] The other thing is, yeah, it may be also about a bit about trying to, uh, drive a wedge, um, between the [1:00:06] European, uh, ruling strata and the US by saying, look, we are, uh, the US is actually, um, talking [1:00:13] to us over your heads. And what does this, this would then, um, slow down, maybe slow down and [1:00:21] bring a bit of confusion and mistrust and all of this in the European ruling strata, which are the [1:00:27] ones that are like this, what is called a forward base or however, um, of this hybrid warfare, that [1:00:35] they could potentially be that. And thus, uh, they are trying to create this mistrust also. I mean, this [1:00:41] would be another, um, point at, um, why Russia keeps engaging in these talks. And the other, um, is to just, [1:00:50] to buy some time to say, well, this is going to be a long conflict, but, uh, we are trying our best to [1:00:57] enter it also. And so, but at the end of the day, I think for both, it is still also about these [1:01:06] kind of mutual denial and mutual denial equilibrium to say, okay, I know you as the US-led empire or the [1:01:14] US or NATO or what, um, with Ukraine are doing this, are, um, engaging in hybrid warfare with us, [1:01:22] but we also won't just, uh, sit there and do nothing. And that these talks maybe, uh, are there to [1:01:31] have these open lines so that it doesn't escalate. So I would say that these are like, um, some of the [1:01:40] functions of these talks, not peace at least, that I don't think. [1:01:45] Yes. I think, uh, yes. Right. Which is that the, um, the, the, the, the Russian system very much [1:01:54] is about balancing a lot of, uh, elite interests in the country, which include, um, [1:02:01] Comprador bourgeoisie who are desperate to reestablish relations with the West. And the, [1:02:09] also the, um, the, the Putin-led system, um, has an inherent fear of the kind of mass mobilizations [1:02:19] that you would, that it would need to do in order to actually do something like, um, occupy the bulk [1:02:26] of Ukraine. Um, that's something which they're very, they're very keen to avoid, uh, because that [1:02:33] is very much the antithesis of what the, a lot of the, the Putin era is about, which is managing [1:02:40] Russian capitalism and trying to stabilize Russian capitalism, given that Putin emerges as a political [1:02:48] figure because he can negotiate between these different factions within the post-Soviet reality [1:02:54] in the, within the ruling class and the state Stratum, um, which were at the point of, of turning on [1:03:03] each other in a very violent sense in the, in the 1990s. And move, moving beyond that to the kind of [1:03:11] like mass mobilization, um, and the politics that would be needed for that is not something which [1:03:17] the Putin system is set up to do. And I'd argue that the more clever people in the US ruling, ruling [1:03:26] structures understand that. Not the politicians, not the, certainly not the spokespeople for the [1:03:32] European Union. I don't think they understand it, but a lot of the intelligence people do, [1:03:36] which is, I think why they persist with the war, thinking that maybe, uh, they can at least stop [1:03:44] the Russians from achieving certain of their aims. Um, and that, I think that is something which is in [1:03:50] play here. So it's that, that's something which I think we, we will need to return to on a new, a [1:03:56] number of, number of occasions in the future, uh, because it's very much not concluded yet. But I wanted to [1:04:01] to close out this discussion by talking about, you know, bringing a lot of themes together, [1:04:06] uh, now, which is that we, you've been talking about, um, the difference in like, uh, [1:04:12] multi, different multipolar possibilities. And like a lot of this is about, um, elite competition or elite [1:04:20] management of multipolarity. But there is, as we've discussed, um, briefly, the, the potential for a different [1:04:28] kind of multipolarity, which depends upon, does it not, the emerge, the reemergence of mass politics [1:04:34] and the reemergence of a working class movement, which is international in its perspective as well, [1:04:41] uh, though it must start of course on the national level. So I think, I think a good way to conclude is [1:04:47] like, uh, asking the question of, uh, can a genuinely anti-imperialist multipolarity actually [1:04:54] be constructed without the, the resurgence of a working class movement and with an internationalist [1:05:00] perspective? Hmm. Yes. That's a very good, uh, question because it, at least it seems like many [1:05:08] countries, um, even the anti-hegemonic ones do not want, um, such a change of, uh, well, radical change [1:05:15] in the way that things are working. So I would say that, uh, I mean, the short answer is I don't [1:05:20] think it would be possible to, um, uh, create or have this, uh, more anti-imperial multipolarity [1:05:28] without trying to, uh, find the support without, uh, the, the, the power, so to speak of the masses [1:05:36] or of the working classes. And, um, yeah, this is so, or I would argue that this is so because yes, [1:05:45] on the national level, okay, there we can, I mean, countries do mobilize their, uh, consider their [1:05:52] citizens on a mass level, even sometimes particularly if their policies are, um, well, [1:05:59] better and, um, uh, qualitatively better for the, for the lives of these, uh, citizens. And [1:06:07] also if they have a discourse that, um, is about, for example, sovereignty or, but also developing the [1:06:14] country to, to watch a better product. Um, so this is something that is possible, but the other, [1:06:21] um, let's say problem or challenge is, well, how, but how do we get this to a transnational [1:06:28] level, like these, uh, mass mobilizations, organizations, even we could say like the [1:06:34] institutional architecture, but built on, um, yes, working classes and not so much, or not only [1:06:40] on, uh, these, uh, ruling strata and elite things, which is what we have today. So in that sense, [1:06:47] I think one of the problems, uh, of why this is at the moment, not the, the, the status quo is [1:06:55] because in the 1970s, 1980s, and, uh, before that, of course, let's say in the, uh, the cold war, [1:07:01] during the cold war, we, we did have, uh, mass institutions, mass organizations that were [1:07:07] transnational and global, and that were, um, materially supported by the different countries [1:07:12] that had, uh, the ability to do so, such as Russia, well, let's say at Union and, uh, China. [1:07:18] And, um, they did really cooperate and did really support, I mean, with material even, [1:07:24] but not only that, also in, uh, in the way of trying to educate each other, trying to support each [1:07:31] other in, um, different spheres of, um, of life, such as health, such as how to organize society, [1:07:38] and all of this, but on the mass level. So this is what was there then, and which was supported [1:07:45] with, uh, resources, real resources. Nowadays, we don't have that anymore. We need to have, um, the [1:07:52] desire, the wish of any country, or maybe there are countries, but, uh, they, well, for most of the, [1:07:59] uh, ruling strata for the countries in the world, they don't have that desire to create such mass [1:08:06] organizations, institutions that are transnational and built toward a different project for the future [1:08:12] in the world. And, um, we don't also, we don't have, um, any material support for them to be established [1:08:21] and to be continuous and all of that. So these are some of the problems why there isn't. The other [1:08:28] thing is, uh, this, what we have talked about all this time about this years, that empire being, [1:08:33] um, almost like this, uh, infrastructure, architecture of finance, of, uh, the monetary [1:08:39] sphere of, uh, global markets, and which is almost like invisible. And then how do, how do you mobilize [1:08:46] people against something invisible? Well, then we would need like a system, a framework, [1:08:52] a narrative, an ideology, a political economy that would make clear what is actually happening [1:08:59] and why, and why there isn't, for example, a new world or why there won't be a new world with [1:09:04] more peace and prosperity and equality. So this is also another point. And, um, what I like to, [1:09:12] um, always say is that, for example, which is, uh, an example I know more or less is Latin America. [1:09:18] They are very much, uh, much cross-border work and, um, in attempted building really mass [1:09:27] kind of at least education, mass education, popular education through, um, TV, but also really [1:09:36] networks, real life networks where people in, uh, towns and communities get together and say, [1:09:42] oh, we will now, um, watch, um, this TV station, for example, Telesu, or we would, [1:09:48] we'll watch, uh, this, uh, class course on anti-imperialism in, uh, on YouTube because they [1:09:55] actually do exist such, um, infrastructures in Latin America. But they are, or they, in the case of [1:10:04] Latin America, for example, there is just too much destabilization that any more institutional [1:10:10] cooperation, um, would or is constantly being, um, uh, shrunken, cut out, destroyed through, [1:10:18] uh, of course the coups, the sanctions, lawfare, all of that, which we just see now with Venezuela, [1:10:23] within the threatening of Cuba. And of course they are also threatening other countries in Latin America. [1:10:29] And we know all of that. So all of these kinds of, um, dynamics then make it very difficult for [1:10:36] these kinds of, uh, mass institutions to actually consolidate in a more, um, stable basis and then [1:10:43] also be supported financially and materially. So this is another point where I think, okay, this is [1:10:50] something that is, um, uh, getting in the way of such an anti-imperial multipolarity, because at least I [1:10:57] can tell you for Latin America, there is really, um, in the, uh, most popular education attempts that are [1:11:05] being done there. Um, um, how do you say it? An effort to talk about anti-imperialism as such, [1:11:13] world system theory, dependency theory, all of that, even Marxist economy, um, in a very explicit way. And [1:11:20] it's just that, um, there is too much destabilization right now in every country in this, um, world. And [1:11:30] I mean, in Latin America, in this example, whereas for example, um, we have then, uh, the, um, example of [1:11:37] West Asia, of Iran and the resistance zone, they, for example, have more like this defensive, uh, [1:11:44] security architecture that they have tried to build and, but this is also under attack. So, uh, this is [1:11:51] another point where, where I think that, uh, there are many, many factors that, that are like undermining [1:11:58] such efforts that do exist. And the other final thing, I, I think it's the final thing I would say about [1:12:04] is almost, is that there's also right now, because if we think about it, well, why isn't there such, why [1:12:12] aren't there such type of movements or attempts in, let's call them Western countries? In part, [1:12:20] I'm not saying it's absolutely this, in part, this is exactly because there's, um, in many, many, many [1:12:26] alternative media spaces, uh, which are the ones I would say that have this potential, this idea that, [1:12:32] well, the, the, we are already winning. The multipolar world is already here. US hegemony is already [1:12:39] inclined. And these kinds of narratives, I think would rather, will really, could lead to passivity [1:12:45] and not trying to think about, well, what does this mean to be, there's no attempt to have conceptual [1:12:53] clarity, which is needed to then actually organize and, uh, seek, uh, alternative organization forms, [1:13:01] institutions, um, and all of that. And as, uh, finally, as Gramsci said, um, uh, with hegemony and [1:13:08] counter hegemony, hegemony is not only the narrative, it's not only the equation, which is a huge part, [1:13:16] but it's also the material, uh, structures that are, for example, used for them, the thing that it's [1:13:23] called coercion, yes. So, and if there is neither a country that tries to support the material [1:13:31] infrastructure, or they're not enough anti-hegemonic, well, the content structures, [1:13:38] then there is not enough to build such mass organizations, mass institutions that would be [1:13:44] the ones that have the power then to, for example, uh, reign in these, uh, ruling strata, [1:13:50] these factions that try to always incorporate themselves into this global capitalist system. [1:13:56] And thus they are, well, not, not, they're not the only reason, but they are part of the reason why [1:14:02] this US-led empire, whether with the US or not, will still keep, be, uh, be, um, well, surviving [1:14:10] and injecting coercion and violence until the, some type of other empire is then the, uh, supreme, um, [1:14:18] world or empire again, or something. So, yeah, I would say that like, uh, these are the points I [1:14:25] would say concluding why on the one hand, we would need mass mobilization, mass institutions, [1:14:31] organization, education, and the other hand, why they are currently not being built [1:14:38] so successfully and so transnationally. Yeah. [1:14:41] I think that's the, this is a very interesting point to end, uh, end the discussion on because the, [1:14:47] the, what the is referred to in some literature as the imperial core nations suffer exactly from [1:14:55] what you've just been describing, which is the essentially politics as a spectator sport, [1:15:00] which is you get a lot of people just basically like producing videos or memes, uh, with, uh, [1:15:06] yeah, featuring Xi Jinping saying, do nothing and win. But that's the attitude of an awful lot of people, [1:15:13] which is that they just need to sit there and wait for this new multipolar world to be managed into [1:15:18] existence. And ultimately that's not how things really change, um, without the intervention of, [1:15:25] um, the, the, on a mass level of the working class, there will be no change in the, in, [1:15:30] in the imperial coordination that is positive. Um, and that needs to be recaptured somehow, um, or in, [1:15:38] in the near future, otherwise we will be facing a, in, in a rather typical piece of English [1:15:43] understatement called an extremely negative situation. Um, but this has been a very interesting [1:15:50] discussion of the, uh, futures, uh, or the presence and futures of multipolarity. Uh, I'd like to thank [1:15:57] you, Nell, for coming on the program today. I would urge everybody to check out the worldline [1:16:03] Substack, which contains some very interesting articles that which you can read and you will [1:16:07] get a much better insight into, uh, the emergent multipolar reality by reading that. Uh, and to be [1:16:14] able to actually identify, um, a way forward, we have first have to clearly understand the system [1:16:20] that we're in. And I think the one part of the problem for the, the left and the imperial core is [1:16:25] that a lot of the time they're not really fighting the enemy. They're fighting a past version of the [1:16:33] enemy or a fat or a fantasy version of the enemy. And that can, that fantasy occupies an awful lot of [1:16:39] time. So to defeat something, one first has to understand it. And I would argue that work such [1:16:45] as yours and other, uh, writers on, on this subject to multipolarity are a good way to actually [1:16:51] understanding the enemy more clearly. So now thank you for your time today. And, uh, I'd like to, uh, [1:16:56] say that, um, you welcome back anytime you want to come on and we can take this discussion further. [1:17:02] Thank you for inviting me. Thank you. And yes. [1:17:06] Okay.