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Markwayne Mullin and FBI Director testify at global threats hearing amid tech outages

The Hill November 19, 2026 2h 57m 28,303 words 1 views
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About this transcript: This is a full AI-generated transcript of Markwayne Mullin and FBI Director testify at global threats hearing amid tech outages from The Hill, published November 19, 2026. The transcript contains 28,303 words with timestamps and was generated using Whisper AI.

"of a colleague. The Chair will enforce these rules of decorum at all times and urges all members to be mindful of their remarks. The witnesses are here this morning voluntarily and I would encourage my colleagues to engage with them respectfully and productively on the topic of today's hearing. I..."

[0:00] of a colleague. The Chair will enforce these rules of decorum at all times and urges all [0:04] members to be mindful of their remarks. The witnesses are here this morning voluntarily [0:08] and I would encourage my colleagues to engage with them respectfully and productively on [0:12] the topic of today's hearing. I would also like to remind our guests that verbal outbursts are [0:17] a violation of House rules. Continued disruptions will result in law enforcement removing those [0:22] responsible from the room. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Good morning and welcome [0:29] to the Committee on Homeland Security's Annual Hearing on Worldwide Threats. This year marks the [0:34] 25th anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks. That tragic day forever changed our [0:39] understanding of the threats facing our country and continues to guide our work today. Earlier this [0:45] year I led a bipartisan delegation to Ground Zero to commemorate this anniversary. Meeting with the [0:51] families and first responders who gather each year is a powerful reminder of why we must never forget [0:55] and the importance of our work to secure the homeland. To the homeland security professionals who work [1:01] every day to keep us safe, we commend you and thank you for your service. Our witnesses today are [1:07] Department of Homeland Security Secretary Mark Wayne Mullen, Director of National Intelligence Jay [1:12] Clayton, and FBI Deputy Director Chris Varea. Thank you all for being here and for your service. [1:19] The committee has consistently held this annual hearing with the same panel of witnesses for over a [1:23] decade, the DHS Secretary, the FBI Director, and National Counterterrorism Center Director. Mr. Joseph Wierski, [1:31] who has been serving as Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, was scheduled to appear today, [1:36] but he was formally nominated to the Director role by the President only a few days ago. The committee has [1:41] made an exception and waived his participation this year given his confirmation hearing before the [1:46] Senate Intelligence Committee this afternoon. We look forward to continued collaboration with [1:50] Mr. Wierski following his confirmation. We are very pleased that Director Clayton was able to attend [1:55] today to ensure strong Intelligence Committee representation. We appreciate him offering his insights and [2:00] expertise on this important topic. I am disappointed that Director Patel chose not to appear before the [2:05] committee today. Today's hearing date was first provided to Director Patel in August. There was no [2:11] surprise or last-minute request, and despite repeated attempts over the span of several months [2:15] between then and now to find any date when he could testify, the Director made clear that he had no [2:20] intention of appearing. Director Patel's refusal to testify marks a significant departure from well-established [2:25] committee precedent. Both of Director Patel's immediate predecessors participate in this hearing [2:30] several times. Christopher Wray, for example, appeared before this committee for this annual hearing six times [2:36] during his tenure. Last year, an exception was made for the FBI Director to offer an alternative FBI witness [2:41] to participate in this annual hearing. Given the separate challenges, the committee experienced with [2:45] securing the availability for former Secretary Noem. However, the committee has been clear in its [2:51] direct communications to the FBI and through its historical record that this is a hearing where the [2:55] FBI Director is expected to participate on behalf of the Bureau. Our focus on world-right threats [3:01] transcends politics, and the Director should be here to brief Congress. I do want to thank Deputy Director [3:06] Rea for being here. It is very important that you're here, and I appreciate your testimony today. [3:11] Since becoming chairman, I have made congressional oversight a priority. Once it was clear that [3:17] Director Patel would not be attending, the committee decided to allow Deputy Director to participate, [3:22] so members could ask the Bureau some questions. To be clear, the committee's issues are not with [3:29] Deputy Director Rea, and I thank you for your years of service also to the FBI as well as the United States [3:35] Coast Guard. Transparency and accountability are essential to good government. Keeping Congress [3:41] and the American people informed is a responsibility of those entrusted with our national security. [3:45] Since becoming chairman, the committee has received testimony from well over a dozen administration [3:49] officials from across the department, including leadership at CBP, TSA, ICE, CISA, USCIS, the Coast Guard, [3:57] and more. Today's hearing gives Congress and the American people an opportunity to directly hear [4:01] from those responsible for our security about the threats we face and the resources needed to address them. [4:06] In the aftermath of 9-11, our mission and mandate was clear—prevent another terrorist attack on [4:12] American soil. Twenty-five years later, the threats to our homeland have grown more complex. [4:18] Cyber attacks, emerging technologies, foreign adversaries, and transnational criminal [4:22] organizations have fundamentally changed the security landscape. Border security has also [4:27] become a major national security priority. Over the last two years, the Trump administration has [4:31] established an incredible record of success in strengthening border security, dismantling [4:36] transnational criminal organizations, disrupting the trafficking of illicit drugs, and keeping the [4:41] American people safe, all of which was bolstered by generational investments made by Congressional [4:46] Republicans to reconciliation. Despite these successes, our work is far from over. We must continue adapting [4:53] to emerging threats and stay ahead of our adversaries. Foreign terrorist organizations continue to encourage [4:58] attacks against the United States, while China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea pose serious threats to our [5:03] government and critical infrastructure. As artificial intelligence advances, so do threats posed by [5:09] malicious actors. We must ensure our cyber defenders have the tools and capabilities to keep pace with [5:15] increasingly sophisticated attacks. Just last week, disruptions to critical infrastructure and [5:21] telecommunication systems affected everything from email to airline travel. While there is no indication that [5:27] these incidents were caused by cyber attacks, they underscore the importance of securing our networks [5:33] and strengthening their resilience. Ahead of this summer's FIFA World Cup, this committee worked with [5:38] Congress and the Trump administration to enact the Safer Skies Act, allowing trained and certified state [5:43] and local law enforcement to conduct counter drone operations for the first time. The World Cup and [5:50] America 250 celebrations presented significant security challenges, and I commend all of our witnesses for their [5:55] leadership in securing these events. Our committee's special task force, special events task force, [6:01] spearheaded by the former chairman of this committee, Congressman McCall, took the lead on those [6:05] important engagements and oversight work throughout this Congress. On that topic, I do want to take this [6:10] opportunity to recognize former Chairman McCall for his leadership and steadfast service on this committee [6:15] and his commitment to national security and public safety over his entire career. I know he'll be missed by this [6:19] body when he retires at the end of this Congress. As we look ahead to next Congress, I remain committed to [6:25] working with all my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to advance priorities that will ensure [6:29] that DHS has the resources, authorities, and personnel needed to carry out its no-fail mission. [6:34] To be clear, there will be policy disagreements as there always are. Committee Republicans will [6:40] continue to support DHS and all of our law enforcement partners. That said, this committee has proven over [6:45] the years that despite political differences, we can still work together when it comes to our shared [6:49] goal of protecting the American people. I look forward to continuing that partnership in the years ahead, [6:53] and I once again thank our witnesses for their participation here today and their dedication to [6:58] public safety. I now recognize the ranking member of the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, [7:02] for his opening statement. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I welcome our witnesses [7:09] and colleagues to the committee's annual hearing on worldwide threats to the homeland. Let me indicate that [7:17] that my Democratic colleagues at a caucus meeting, since we were not in charge, we couldn't postpone this [7:27] hearing like we did last week. I'm okay with postponing it. We understand. So we'll go forward. Elections are [7:37] going on as we as we speak. I appreciate the chairman holding the hearing for this committee. It marks the 25th [7:45] anniversary of the September 11th attack this year. So much has changed since 9-11 and the Department of [7:54] Homeland Security was established to prevent another large-scale terrorist attack on American soil. [8:02] Unfortunately, under President Trump, administration officials have weaponized DHS to carry out the [8:08] president's extreme political agenda and use their official positions to enrich themselves and their [8:16] friends. In doing so, they've taken DHS away from its original mission and made our country less safe. For [8:25] many years, these worldwide threats hearings provided Congress and the public with an opportunity to hear [8:32] directly from the Secretary of Homeland Security, FBI Director, and National Counterterrorism Center [8:39] Director about the threats facing our nation. I support the chairman's concern that the FBI Director is not [8:48] here at this hearing and is so unfortunate, notwithstanding the current FBI witness. However, only one of those [8:58] witnesses is here for this hearing today. I'm glad Secretary Mulling is here because we have many questions for [9:07] him about how the president has turned the department against the American people and used it as a personal [9:14] political cajole. I also want to thank and ask the secretary about the department's failure to respond to [9:24] the Democratic oversight inquiries. Dozens of our oversight letters have gone unanswered despite our [9:31] legitimate legislative need for this information. After the recent election, Secretary Mullins reached out to me [9:40] for the first time since his confirmation nearly eight months ago. While I appreciate your very belated [9:47] suggestion, Mr. Secretary, what I need you to do is please answer the letters that we've provided your office [9:56] with and I know you have a response and we'll talk about that. I hope you'll commit today to providing the [10:03] information and documents we requested without further delay. Our oversight is critical because even 25 years [10:12] after 9-11 threats to the homeland persist. Over the past week alone we've seen a major outage at Microsoft [10:21] and FAA outage that resulted in a nationwide ground stop and outages at major banks. Whatever the cause, [10:30] Americans are looking to the administration for answers and assurances that the critical infrastructure [10:37] they rely on every day is safe. They haven't forgotten it. Instead, the president responded to the ground [10:46] stop saying, I don't take any responsibility. Secretary Mullin, you went on TV to make statements and offer [10:55] hunches based on evidence or formal reviews, but on the conversations you've had with people you refuse to [11:05] name. Speaking about the administration's handling of the situation, you said, and I quote, this is what [11:12] the leadership of President Trump's looks like. Thank you. On that we agree, Mr. Secretary, the so-called [11:26] leadership of the Trump administration consists of refusing to take responsibility, shifting blame to the [11:33] others, and putting your own interests above the country. While Americans were stranded in airports across [11:41] the country, with many sleeping on the floor at their gates, the secretary boarded a luxury jet, [11:49] flew to a college football game, and visited the private suite of a company that DHS had awarded a [11:56] $2.2 billion contract. For the Secretary of Homeland Security to do that during a crisis was not only [12:05] irresponsible, Mr. Secretary, but also incredibly tone deaf. Meanwhile, President Trump's reckless war [12:14] on choice with Iran has been escalating. Reports of Iran developing plans to detonate a dirty bomb in [12:22] the nation's capital are alarming, and the public needs to be able to trust that their government is [12:30] focused on keeping them safe instead of living large on the taxpayers' dime. These are serious issues, [12:39] and American people deserve to have serious people solve them. Frankly, I do not believe that person is [12:46] you, Mr. Secretary, but in just a few short months, the committee is going to make sure that you do the [12:53] job you've been hired to do. If not, you'll need to go away of your predecessors. But at least you showed up, [13:01] which is more than I can say for FBI Director Cash Patel, who has again declined to testify at this [13:09] hearing. For over a decade, FBI directors and administrations of both parties appeared before this [13:16] committee to give their assessment of threats to the homeland. While I appreciate the Director of National [13:23] Intelligence was added to the panel late yesterday, Director Patel's absence for a second consecutive [13:32] year limits the committee's ability to conduct effective oversight at this hearing. Director Patel [13:41] is shirking his responsibility to appear before this committee, just as he has shirked his responsibilities [13:48] leading the nation's premier federal law enforcement agency, allegedly drinking so much that he's been [13:56] unable or difficult for staff to wake him up even during high-profile terrorist incidents and investigation. [14:06] Mr. Chairman, you should take it as an affront that the Director finds time to spend taxpayer dollars [14:14] flying to his girlfriend's concert, go VIP snorkeling at a Pearl Harbor Memorial site, celebrate with [14:23] hockey teams, and intimidate journalists for reporting what he doesn't like, but has no time to testify before this [14:34] committee. He also hasn't answered our oversight letters. Committee Democrats have sent six letters [14:45] to the Director over the last year and a half with no substantive replies. Those letters include questions [14:55] about the scaling back of FBI counterintelligence activities and investigations into government corruption [15:04] and domestic terrorism. Also, nearly a year ago, we requested a briefing from FBI and DOJ on their [15:13] implementation of President Trump's National Security Presidential Memorandum Seven, countering domestic [15:21] terrorism and organized political violence. This memorandum drastically redefines what domestic terrorism [15:29] is in order to justify the Trump administration's effort to stifle dissent and investigate anyone or [15:38] any group they don't like. In July, at a classified briefing, an FBI counterterrorism official told members that [15:47] they would be briefing the committee, quote, soon. My staff has followed up on more than a dozen occasions, [15:55] and last month I sent a letter to Attorney General Todd Blanch and Director Patel demanding the promised briefing. [16:04] Still, not a peep from either agency in response. If there is nothing illegal or improper about what the agencies are doing, [16:14] then there should be no problem being forthcoming with the committee and the public. Their silence speaks volumes, [16:23] but it's no surprise. The Trump administration's agenda for the last two years has been weaponize the government, [16:31] politicize DHS, shift the blame, line their own pockets, ignore oversight. Congressional Republicans have [16:41] let this outrageous behavior go on unchecked, but the administration's free pass is about to come to an end. [16:50] Earlier this month, the American people overwhelmingly voted for accountability for an end to the Trump administration's chaos, [17:00] violence, and vitriol for a government that works for the American people rather than for special interests, [17:07] for Congress to use its authority to conduct oversight of an administration that has rejected the rule of law. [17:16] Come January, this is what Democrats intend to deliver for our constituents and for the country, accountability. [17:25] Mr. Secretary, we look forward to receiving the responses you owe this committee so that we can do our legislative work [17:34] and to having you before us early next year. Accountability is coming. [17:41] Mr. Chairman, in closing, I want to thank members who will not be returning next Congress for their service. [17:48] To Representative Thanahar, Goldman, Johnson, and Green, your work on this committee [17:56] has helped secure the homeland, uphold our values, and hold this administration accountable. We look forward [18:04] to following your contributions to this great country going forward. I'd also like to indicate that [18:12] Mr. Correa has a health situation he's dealing with, and that's why he's not with us today. So, [18:20] Mr. Chair, thank you, and I yield back. Thank you, and we all wish Mr. Correa a speedy recovery. [18:27] He's a great asset to this committee. Other members of the committee are reminded that an opening [18:34] statements may be submitted for the record. I would like to now formally introduce our witnesses. [18:39] First is the Honorable Mark Wayne Mullen. He serves as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. [18:44] Prior to his appointment, Secretary Mullen served in both the United States [18:48] Senate and House of Representatives representing the state of Oklahoma. [18:52] Second is the Honorable Jay Clayton. He's the Director of National Intelligence. Prior to his [18:56] appointment, Director Clayton served as United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, [19:00] as well as the former Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. [19:04] Third is Mr. Christopher Rea. He's the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [19:09] Mr. Rea previously served as Assistant Director of the FBI's New York Field Office. [19:14] Thank all the witnesses for being here today. Pursuant to Committee Rule 8C, I ask that the [19:19] witnesses please rise and raise their right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will [19:28] give before the Committee on Homeland Security of the United States House of Representatives will be [19:32] the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God. Let the record reflect that [19:38] the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Please be seated. [19:40] I now recognize Secretary Mullen for five minutes to summarize his opening statement. [19:48] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson for this hearing today. I will address some of the [19:56] stuff that Ranking Member Thompson threw out. I want to say this right off the top. I have the [20:01] utmost respect for the 270,000 employees that work inside DHS. Our mission is awesome. We get to protect the [20:08] homeland. And as Mr. Thompson had alluded to earlier, our creation was to keep mass terrorist attacks from [20:16] taking place in the United States. We've done that for 26 years successfully. Even though I've only been [20:22] part of it for 239 days, it is something that I take as a great honor to be part of. I also like to deal [20:30] in facts. I believe that this committee has an oversight job, and I believe in that with all my [20:37] heart. I served in the House. I served in the Senate. And I believe Congress does have a role, [20:42] and I want you guys to have a role. But we need to deal with facts and not make political points. [20:48] Unfortunately, Ranking Member Thompson, I did reach out to you in good faith, wanted to have a good [20:53] conversation with you. And in 15 seconds, unfortunately, you came after me. And I said, [20:58] Sir, I was just reaching out to make contact with you. You said, I've reached out to you multiple times, [21:03] and you haven't responded once. And we went back and looked. And as of today, Congress, the House, [21:11] has been in 61 days. Out of 61 days that you've been in session, 36 letters have been signed and sent to [21:19] me by your office. We responded to 21 of those letters. That's more than every other day. [21:27] We're trying to do our job. We're trying to respond. And we want to be respectful to that. [21:32] But when you come in here and you start making political points by holding up posters that are [21:37] completely inaccurate, one being the statement that I made about President Trump's leadership team. [21:45] As you know, if you listened to the hearing, you would have saw, or the interview, you would have [21:49] saw that I was referring to the fact that we had a complete ground stoppage. And within a matter of [21:54] hours, we had the airspace back open. We had an issue with old technology and FAA. President assembled [22:02] the team. The whole of government went to work, every aspect of it. There wasn't one cabinet member [22:07] that had jurisdiction or had direct contact with this that wasn't involved. And we were able to put [22:12] the planes back in the air safely. We landed over 4,000 planes when the ground stoppage went out, [22:18] because of the communication, and didn't have one single incident. That in itself is a great success. [22:27] And then you want to bring up the fact that I took my family and my great nieces to an LSU game that [22:32] was scheduled for weeks prior to that, because I wanted to be a good uncle and take my little niece, [22:37] who has never been to an LSU game, and she's a huge LSU fan, to a game. We had discussions at 10 o'clock [22:44] Saturday morning. Should we cancel it? We had deep conversations about it. And it came in that if we [22:51] canceled something with the airspace that was completely open, it could bring confusion. [22:56] Because I was meeting the governor there, I was meeting other people there, that would show maybe [22:59] distrust that we're not even willing to fly. There was a lot of stuff going on in the news saying, [23:05] is it safe to fly? We were saying our skies were completely open. On Saturday alone, [23:09] 36,000 planes flew and flew safely. Before I took off, the airspace had been open for almost 24 hours. [23:18] I paid because when I travel on a personal business, not official business, even though I'm required, [23:26] and you know that, Mr. Thompson, to take the government-supplied plane because of the continuity [23:32] requirement I have and be in communication 24-7, 365 days. It's been 239 days, and there hasn't been a [23:39] single day off. I'm required to take the plane. I'm also required to reimburse the government for [23:44] that, which I did. I'm also required to pay for the tickets, to which I did. But the hypocrisy [23:52] from you and from the members that want to make a big deal out of it, I go, wait a second. I know this [23:56] game. I said over there, you guys would have done the same thing, but you would have called it a [24:02] campaign event. You would have paid for it with your campaign funds, or you would have reached out to [24:07] the state university and got the tickets for free. You know that. Your colleagues know that. [24:14] And you guys would have went to the same suite, and this person would have donated to your campaign, [24:20] and you would have said, it's a campaign event, yet you have oversight of them. The gentleman and I [24:25] went into a suite. I didn't reach out to him for the tickets. I reached out to the state for the [24:29] tickets, telling them we were going to reimburse. They put us in the suite. I'd never met the company. [24:33] I'd never met the team or the gentleman. I'd never had a conversation with them. They'd been doing [24:37] business with the United States Coast Guard for 40 years, well before DHS was even stood up. And yet, [24:45] there's some type of funny business going on here. But you guys call it campaign related. [24:52] I paid for it personally. This hypocrisy has got to stop if you actually want to look at oversight. [24:58] I'm willing to work with everybody. I have nothing to keep from you. I want you to do your job, [25:05] but I'm not playing games. Thank you, Secretary Mullen. I now recognize [25:11] Director Clayton for five minutes to summarize his opening statement. [25:14] Good morning. Chairman, ranking member, members of the committee, [25:20] thank you for having me here today. Like this committee, the agency I lead, [25:25] the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, was established after September 11th. [25:31] Congress created the ODNI out of the lessons learned from that tragedy to strengthen our nation's [25:37] security by improving integration across the intelligence community. The dedicated women and [25:46] men of ODNI remain committed to that mission today, and I am proud to work with them. [25:53] Twenty-five years after 9-11, the United States continues to face a heightened threat environment, [25:59] both in the homeland and to our interests abroad. While I cannot get into any classified details of the [26:07] threats here today, those threats have been fully briefed to the Gang of Eight and the intelligence [26:12] committees. I may pause in my responses to your questions because I want to be able to give you [26:18] as much information as possible, but you must understand that some of the information I have [26:23] is not appropriate for this setting. I'm going to address a few key threats we are seeing around the [26:29] world that are relevant to this committee. Terrorism, Iranian lethal plotting, and cyber attacks. [26:37] I'll start with terrorism. Our NCTC Director Wierski, as the Chairman mentioned, typically testifies at [26:45] these hearings. He has been nominated for Senate confirmation for that position. I'm proud of the [26:53] women and men that he leads who work 24-7, watching out for the homeland, watching around the world, [27:00] to prevent another 9-11. Post-9-11, the work of NCTC and the rest of the Intelligence Committee, [27:09] along with the agencies we interact with, has degraded the capabilities of global terrorist [27:14] organizations. We've improved our ability to detect and disrupt terrorist plots, and we have implemented [27:21] defensive measures that deter terrorist aspirations. Nevertheless, a diverse range of terrorist actors, [27:31] from individuals inspired by ISIS and al-Qaeda to networks enabled or exploited by adversarial states, [27:40] pose a persistent and evolving threat to American lives. Next, I want to briefly discuss the threat from Iran. [27:49] We remain committed to detecting, deterring, and combating the Iranian lethal plotting outside the United States [28:03] and inside the United States. These threats have substantially increased. Our women and men abroad, [28:10] our women and men here in the United States, are under greater threat. Next, I want to briefly address cyber threats. [28:18] But before I do that, I want to address the several unrelated issues that have recently caused service [28:25] disruptions. I understand the timing of these incidents can raise questions, and it should. [28:32] The American people should ask us these questions. But based on what we know today, after a great deal [28:38] of diligence, these are separate service outages associated with maintenance and technical changes. [28:45] They are not a coordinated or state-sponsored attack. The intelligence community continues [28:52] to monitor and stay alert to any possibility of malicious cyber activity threatening the U.S. networks [28:58] and our law enforcement partners. Let me note that superintelligence is reshaping the cyber security [29:08] landscape. It is sharply increasing speed, scale, and sophistication of offensive and defensive cyber [29:16] operations. And it's not just cyber. This goes to national security, it goes to the battlefield, [29:23] and it goes to commerce. Superintelligence is changing the way we do business, the way we fight wars, [29:31] and the way we combat terrorism every day. In closing, I want to say that the threats I just discussed [29:39] represent a small sliver of the threats facing our nation. But it is clear that our foreign adversaries [29:46] are more sophisticated and more determined than ever to bring harm to the American people and our way [29:51] of life. I want to mention FISA-702. It should not expire. It is the single most indispensable tool [30:02] we have to protect both Americans in the homeland and our troops abroad. This is the same authority that [30:08] we rely on to provide early warnings to this body of foreign threats, members of the administration, [30:15] and members of Congress. No other program can replicate the speed and effectiveness of FISA-702. [30:24] Letting it expire would simply be a mistake. Thank you for having me here today. Thank you, [30:31] Director Clayton. I now recognize Deputy Director Rea for five minutes to summarize his opening statement. [30:35] Chairman Gabarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and members of the community, first of all, thank you for [30:40] allowing me the opportunity to appear before you today. But probably more importantly, let me take this [30:45] opportunity to thank you for just your service in general to our country, not only as a member of [30:50] Congress, but as a member of this committee. Obviously, it's no secret the threats facing our [30:55] nation are more complex, they're more interconnected, and they're more global than ever before. From [31:02] foreign terrorist organizations and hostile intelligence services to transnational criminal networks [31:08] and cyber criminals operating across borders and adversaries that are constantly adapting. But the FBI [31:17] is meeting those threats head on. We are delivering historical operational results and remain focused on [31:24] our most important mission, protecting the United States of American citizens. Counterterrorism remains [31:33] one of our highest priorities. The threat from foreign terrorist organizations, homegrown violent extremists, [31:39] and individuals inspired by the extremist ideologies continues to evolve. In the past 21 months, [31:45] the FBI has arrested nearly 1,300 terrorists, conducted over 1,300 counterterrorism disruptions, [31:52] and seized 430 illegal firearms in counterterrorism investigations. Just last week, a joint investigation [32:01] by FBI New York and Washington field offices resulted in the indictment against three Iranian-backed operatives [32:09] for their alleged involvement in nearly 20 terrorist attacks and attempted attacks across Europe and the [32:15] United States. That includes an alleged plot targeting a base housing our American military personnel. [32:24] Unfortunately, these threats do not stop at our borders. Neither does our mission to identify, disrupt, and [32:30] dismantle the networks behind them. We're also aggressively confronting foreign intelligence threats. [32:37] Our counterintelligence efforts have resulted in 167 arrests, that's a 53 percent increase in the previous [32:46] 21 months, and 499 disruptions targeting espionage and other foreign hostile activities. In cyberspace, [32:56] our adversaries are exploiting emerging technologies, cryptocurrency, and international networks to [33:02] target American businesses, critical infrastructure, and hard-working American families. [33:08] Our cyber division has delivered 557 disruptions, 368 arrests, and 544 indictments, while seizing more [33:16] than 278 million in cyber criminal funds. Perhaps most importantly and impressively, we're seeing [33:26] extraordinary results through Operation Blackout. This is the FBI's global mission to disrupt, [33:32] dismantle, and demolish cyberscan compounds around the world. This operation has led to more than [33:39] 17 billion, billion with a B, in seizures, hundreds of arrests, and thousands of trafficked workers freed. [33:48] We've also prevented more than 11,000 Americans from losing 625 million in cyber-enabled fraud schemes. [33:56] These aren't just numbers. These are Americans whose savings, livelihoods, and futures we protected. [34:01] And we're not slowing down anytime soon. We're expanding our international partnerships and taking [34:06] to the fight directly to the criminal organizations responsible. Our national security mission goes [34:12] hand-in-hand with our responsibility to keep American communities safe. Nationwide, as you all are familiar, [34:18] the murder rate has decreased nearly 30 points in the last 21 months. And the FBI, along with our state, [34:25] local and federal partners, has contributed to that progress. We've made more than 71,600 violent crime arrests, [34:32] seized more than 4,600 kilograms of fentanyl, and that's enough lethal doses to kill 350 million Americans. [34:41] And just last week, I joined our Justice Department international partners to announce the results of Operation Tornado, [34:47] the largest coordinated enforcement action ever conducted under our Joint Criminal Opioid and Dark Net Enforcement Initiative. [34:56] That operation resulted in 354 arrests, 5.7 metric tons of drug seized, 209 legal firearms seized, [35:05] and 230 million in cryptocurrency and illegal proceeds. I'll close with FISA 702 like D&I Clayton did. [35:14] This remains one of our most important national security tools, allowing us, under statutory safeguards [35:21] and recent reforms that we have made, to collect critical foreign intelligence targeting non-U.S. persons [35:27] located overseas. That's why the FBI fully supports President Trump's request for reauthorization of FISA [35:34] Section 702. Members of the Committee, the threats facing our country are real and our adversaries are [35:40] relentless, but so are the men and women of the FBI. Thank you. [35:47] Thank you, Deputy Director Rea. Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their five [35:52] minutes of questioning. As a reminder, I will be strictly keeping to the five-minute rule to ensure [35:57] all members have the adequate time to ask questions of today's panel. I now recognize myself for five [36:03] minutes of questions. Secretary Mullen, thank you for being here, and I want to thank you. Your work as head of the [36:11] Homeland Department since you took over, and I've only been chair for over a year now, [36:16] it's night and day compared to how this committee was treated previously, and I want to thank you. [36:21] Your department, you oversee a lot of different things, and it's a very vast department, [36:26] and you have a very important job, and I believe our partnership, I see it as a partnership. We've [36:32] worked together on a lot of things, so I want to thank you for that. I'll start talking about my favorite [36:38] subject, which is CISA, and when you were back when you were here in June, you testified that CISA needed [36:44] roughly 600 new hires. In September, CISA's acting director stated about 250 selected candidates were [36:51] still waiting on security clearances before they could start work. Can you provide us an update on [36:56] how many employees have actually started at CISA since June, and how many remain in the clearance [37:01] process, and when the agency will be at the level that you have said it needs to be at to fulfill [37:09] its mission? Thank you, Chairman. I don't have those numbers with me right now. I'll have to get back to [37:15] you on those, which we'll be happy to do that. I will tell you that we're able to meet our mission [37:19] right now because of new technology that has come in. Our CISA director, we hope, will be confirmed, [37:26] our incoming CISA director hopefully will be confirmed before the Senate leaves. I believe it's on track to [37:32] do that. Our mission is broad, and we constantly meet threats and work with threats, work with [37:39] industries. Anytime they ask for our assistance, we're able to respond. During FIFA, you saw CISA was [37:45] able to stand up information centers, Knox, all across the United States, worked with 11 cities, [37:51] worked with municipalities, federal, state, and local. We were able to coordinate, and it all came through [37:57] CISA. We had one incident in Miami that happened about four o'clock in the morning. Because of CISA's [38:06] coordination with the local municipality in Miami, we were able to locate the threat, and I don't want [38:15] to say eliminate because that sounds like we took somebody out. We were able to neutralize what the [38:19] threat was. It wouldn't have been possible without CISA recognizing the traffic online to be able to see [38:27] it. I need to go back to FISA 702. That played a critical role at that time. When we deal with real [38:35] threats, which we deal with every single day in CISA and all throughout our other 21 components, [38:42] every minute counts. And we have a partnership. If we work closely with DNI, where we have INA [38:49] that is embedded with them every day, FBI, we work with them every single day. And without FISA 702, [38:58] we go from being able to do things in minutes or hours into days or weeks. That is a danger to the [39:06] American people. They're real threats. There's real bad actors. And they move at the speed of light [39:13] today. And I can't say this enough. CISA plays a critical role in everything we do because almost [39:22] all communications, all traffic we see goes through a device. And without CISA being able to be there to [39:30] meet the need, we'd be dark. And I'll say this one more time too, Chairman. We're able to meet those [39:38] needs today, but we want to grow our capacity and be able to do that. It does take time. But it also [39:45] takes a long time to get people cleared to have a TSSCI and above level. Not everybody can pass those [39:51] background checks. No, absolutely. And we have to work with industry because our pay scale is much lower [39:56] than what the industry is paying. Thank you very much. And if you can have your team get back [40:00] to us on those numbers and where they are. We will, Chairman. As well as I hope, and I'm sure they're [40:05] already looking at it with the rise in AI developed attacks, hiring those personnel that had that [40:11] expertise and not being stuck in the positions that existed as they were before. In my 45 seconds left, [40:18] Director Clayton, you ended your statement by talking about why FISA 702 cannot fully expire. Can you please, [40:25] just in 40 seconds, I'm going to cut myself off, talk about that. What we do every [40:32] day is protect the American people from foreign threats. FISA 702 allows us to collect on foreign [40:40] actors outside the United States who are looking to do us harm here at home. That collection is done [40:49] in a way that is extremely protective of the rights and interests of US citizens. It is a collection that [40:58] we are very proud of, and I'll just give you one stat. Over 60 percent of the critical information in [41:04] the President's daily brief comes from FISA 702 collection. Thank you very much. I now recognize [41:11] the ranking member for five minutes of questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Deputy Director Rea, [41:20] Can you, for the committee, name the FBI's listing of the most dangerous domestic terrorist organizations? [41:35] I think, ranking member, I think that is a very nuanced question. I think all terrorist organizations [41:42] are dangerous. I think that ebbs and flows as well as current events pass. I will tell you on my end, [41:50] probably the single most thing that keeps me up not as the deputy director is a threat from homeland, [41:55] homegrown violent extremism. That is something as we've seen some of these attacks land in the last [42:02] several years, they have been, they have been from the homegrown violent extremists. These are the [42:06] lone offenders that get radicalized on largely online. They don't even meet a terrorist face to face, [42:13] makes it very difficult to infiltrate them, whether it's so your testimony is that lone wolves [42:18] are part of that domestic terrorist threat? Yes, sir, the homegrown violent extremism. [42:24] So are there any organized organizations, to your knowledge, that would fit that domestic terrorist [42:31] threat? Oh, for domestic terrorism. So we look at domestic terrorism under three prongs in the FBI in [42:37] order to predicate a case. There's three things that have to be present. One, there has to be an alleged [42:43] violation of a federal criminal law, there has to be some sort of use of violence or threat of use [42:48] of violence, and there has to be an ideology. When those three things exist, and that ideology, [42:53] no matter how grotesque or no matter how heinous, for example, think 764, nihilistic violent extremists, [43:00] when those three things are in place, then we properly predicate a domestic terrorist. [43:04] So can you give me three of those organizations that meet that test right now? [43:09] I would say 764. I would also say Antifa off the top of the top of my head, those two organizations. [43:19] But again, we don't deal in the organizations when we're predicating those cases. We use those three [43:24] prongs to predicate domestic terrorism. Well, help me out. Are any right-wing organizations [43:31] in this country that meet that test? Yes, sir. Please name one. Yes, sir. Again, [43:37] the organization itself, I don't want to paint a broad brush here. There are right-wing organizations, [43:47] right-wing first protected organizations, just like there's left-wing first protected organizations, [43:52] that have people seeded into those organizations that meet those three prongs. Just name it one. [43:57] What's that? Just name it one. As a domestic terrorism organization? Right. [44:04] There's no right-wing organization to your knowledge in this country that meet the domestic terrorist [44:12] threat. There are people inside of right-wing organizations, just like there are people [44:18] inside of left-wing organizations that meet those three prongs to predicate a lawfully- I'm just [44:24] trying to come up with the name of an organization. If you're saying that organization doesn't exist, [44:29] then just please say that. Again, we don't deal in the organizations. We deal in the people in those [44:37] organizations. But you said Antifa. That is an organization that has been designated by the [44:43] President of the United States as a domestic terrorist. No, I'm asking for the FBI's designation, [44:48] not the President. We don't designate terrorist organizations. We open domestic terrorism cases based [44:55] on those three prongs. Thank you. Thank you so much. Are you aware of any instance where the [45:01] President has directed the FBI to investigate or not investigate anyone? Absolutely not. So when it [45:08] comes to the investigation into Tom Holman taking a $50,000 bribe, was the FBI directed by the President [45:17] or anyone else to drop the investigation? Our job as an investigative agency is to gather facts, [45:25] whether it's Tom Holman or any other subject. We gather facts. We put together investigative [45:30] reports. Did you do it? Did you do it? Did you do it? I'm not going to comment on the existence of an [45:36] investigation or non-existent of the investigation. It would be inappropriate. Mr. Chairman, I ask [45:40] unanimous consent to enter into the record a whistleblower disclosure that alleges that the President and [45:47] DOJ directed the FBI Los Angeles field office to open an investigation into ICE and CBP. [45:55] protesters demonstrating at federal buildings in Los Angeles. [46:00] That objection. I yield back. [46:04] Frank, the member yields back. I now recognize the former chairman of this committee, the gentleman from [46:10] Texas, Mr. McCall for five minutes of questions. [46:13] Thanks, Chairman. And this will be my final hearing after 22 years of service [46:19] in Congress and on this committee and as chairman of this committee. Prior to that time, after 9-11, [46:25] I was a Department of Justice federal prosecutor, chief of counterterrorism, national security. [46:31] I want to thank all three of you for your service. And over the years, having Homeland, the intelligence [46:38] community and the FBI working together has stopped so many threats from hitting this country. And when I [46:47] first became chairman, the Boston bombing occurred, the rise of ISIS and the caliphate, and all three of your [46:55] organizations stopped 95% of the threats, the 5% we know about publicly. But I just want to commend you [47:03] for that. And I agree with you on 702. I'm probably the only member that in Congress that actually applied [47:10] for FISA warrants. I know how critical they are. I know you can't get into the details in the open [47:15] hearing space. I would encourage members to go into the classified space with House Intelligence [47:22] Committee to learn. Because to me, it's political malpractice for Congress not to reauthorize FISA. [47:32] I want to start with you, Mr. Secretary. First of all, let me commend you. 36,000 planes being grounded. [47:39] Yes, it was chaotic. But you know what? Nobody died. And I want to thank you for that. The chairman [47:47] talked about CISA. We've seen a lot happen in a couple of days, whether it be the FAA [47:54] computer glitch to the NSA communications being shut down. That concerns me greatly. [48:02] It sounds like these are more technical glitches, but I worry about a foreign adversary, Director [48:07] Clayton, as you talk about, because we're under threat every day from them. Iran, China, Russia, [48:14] North Korea. And I think you've answered the question about CISA. But I would encourage you, [48:20] as the guy who actually created and authorized CISA into law, how important it was. We were going to [48:25] put it under the NSA. We decided to put it under a civilian agency. You have 600 people we need to [48:32] hire. I would urge you to get CISA at full steam, because the threats haven't gone away. And CISA needs [48:39] to be in full force. I want to ask Director Clayton about this latest threat from Iran. I happen to be [48:49] under indictment in Iran after the Soleimani targeting. I was a part of that with the White [48:54] House. And I'm on that top 10 list. And I hear sleeper cells and assassination teams. But there was [49:02] a report recently about an Iran dirty bomb. I know how vulnerable the southwest border is smuggling a dirty [49:10] bomb would be a relatively easy thing to do. Can you comment on this particular threat? And where [49:18] are we with that? Thank you. And thank you for recognizing that we do face a heightened threat [49:27] from the Iranians, lethal plotting against our citizens at home and abroad. I'm not going to talk [49:33] about specifics of intelligence. But Director Rea in his opening remarks noted about, I would say, [49:41] and this is an indictment, so I feel free to comfortably talk about it, a gentleman indicted [49:47] in New York for an Iranian-sponsored plots inside the United States. And not only did they seek to [49:56] plot against U.S. citizens while in custody, correct, sir, continued to seek to plot against interests of [50:05] the United States abroad. That demonstrates a network capability that is very sophisticated, [50:11] global and one that we need to combat seriously and with all the tools we have available. [50:17] And so it sounds aspirational, the motive and intent to do this. I don't know if the capability [50:24] is there, but perhaps we can talk in another space on that. Lastly, NCTC Director Joe Kent testified [50:33] 18,000 known or suspected terrorists entered the country under the Biden administration. To me, [50:39] those are all ticking time bombs. That frightens me. That keeps me up at night. Secretary Mullen, [50:46] can you address that issue? And I know there have been a lot of deportations, but it seems to me [50:52] when you're prioritizing deportations, that's got to be your top priority. It absolutely is. That and [51:01] locating the missing children that was led into the country with fake sponsors. So as of to date, [51:08] underneath the Trump administration, we've removed 2,705 terrorists or suspected terrorists that were [51:15] let in underneath the current or the previous administration, President Biden's administration, [51:21] and most of them gave, actually all of them gave false names. We ran into them actually while we're [51:26] serving other warrants. But I just want to put that in your head. Since President Trump has been [51:30] in office, January 20th of 2025, 2,705 terrorists were moved out of this country that were inside [51:37] wanting to do harm. They did just move votes to 1215, so we're definitely going to keep people [51:45] on to the five minutes, everybody. I'm okay with that, too. Now that votes have been moved, [51:49] we need to keep everybody on schedule. I apologize. And with that, I recognize the gentleman from Rhode [51:55] Island, Mr. Magaziner for five minutes of questions. Thank you. Secretary Mullen, how many ICE agents are [52:00] on the streets today who have not had full completed background checks? Our ICE agents have all been [52:06] back through training. We have moved our training as we... I'm not asking about training yet. I'm [52:11] asking about background checks. That's including the training. Full completed background checks. That's [52:15] including the background check. Every ICE agent we have in service right now have had full background [52:23] checks. That's in service. Now some of them are administrative leave until they get the final [52:28] background check. The reason I ask is that on July 13th in Biddleford, Maine, a man named Johan Guerrero [52:34] was shot and killed by an ICE agent in front of his wife and his three-year-old daughter. And Mr. Guerrero [52:40] had just pulled out of his driveway to go to work and was not the person that ICE had been looking for. And [52:45] the ICE agent who killed Mr. Guerrero, David Brouillette, had been hired and put on the street before his full [52:52] background check was completed. And in fact, his background check was still not complete when he [52:57] killed Mr. Guerrero on July 13th. If that background check had been completed, it would have shown that [53:03] Mr. Brouillette had severe mental illness, had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and hospitalized for [53:09] multiple times, that both of his ex-wives, his mother and multiple former employers found him to be [53:15] violent and unstable. But the Trump administration made him an ICE agent, put him on the street with a [53:20] mask and a gun before the full background check had been completed. So I just want to be clear [53:25] about this. It's your testimony that today, just a few months later, every ICE agent that is out there [53:30] on the street today has had a full completed background check. That is correct. And the ones that [53:35] aren't have been put on administrative leave until that happens. And I want to throw this out there too. [53:39] Let's talk about training then, which you brought up. Can I make a can I make a statement here? And I don't [53:43] mean to occupy time. We just recently arrested an individual from a state that was a state trooper [53:49] that was also had supposedly went through the background check and was a state trooper in a [53:54] state that was arrested because they were illegal. Yeah. So listen, I don't occasionally that happens. [53:59] So let's talk about training every single person. Mr. Brouillette was also put on the street and [54:04] authorized to use lethal force without completing the standardized training. In fact, he was put on the [54:09] street after completing just an online course. He didn't even do any of the in-person training [54:14] in Georgia. Now, I understand that you have changed policies. You've restored the full 13-week [54:20] in-person training. Has everyone who is out there on the street today completed the full 13-week [54:25] in-person training? Yes. And those that haven't have been put on administrative leave. Plus, [54:30] we added additional training. And so the 13 weeks doesn't just stop. We continuously do continuing [54:37] education. How many people had been put on the street who hadn't had the full training? [54:42] That had been? That had not. I would have to get back to you on that number. Right. Because there [54:47] were there were some people like Mr. Brouillette who just did online only. There were others who did [54:51] just the eight weeks. Unfortunately, Congressman, there were some decisions that were made before [54:55] I was secretary that we were having to undo. And we we are we're bringing the full faith, [55:00] just like I said, when I appreciate that. But I just how have you had time in just the less than a [55:05] year that you've been in office to retrain all of these thousands of people who didn't receive [55:10] adequate training before. So we are we're in charge of FLETC, too. Currently, right now, [55:14] we have five hundred and seventeen classes going. We had a lot of work to do. I've been in office, [55:19] as I said, 280 plus days. And we the the agency was eager to get back to the way they used to do [55:27] business. We stood up stood up extra classes with FLETC. We also have taken classes and put them in the [55:34] state to where the ERO offices are. We had a full push and we're able to do it and do it in a very [55:40] effective way. Let me ask you on a different topic. Then you oversee CISA, the nation's premier [55:46] cybersecurity agency. When did you learn that NVIDIA CEO Jensen Wang may have been compromised by a [55:53] Chinese spy agency? We weren't privileged to that privilege to that information at all until it was [55:59] broke. So that's surprising to me. I mean, because it's been reported that, you know, Secretary Rubio [56:05] knew months ago, Lutnik, that the president knew apparently over a year ago. But you're the Homeland [56:11] Security Secretary. You oversee the nation's premier cybersecurity agency. Why weren't you read in on [56:17] this? You should have been. The way that I understand it is because this is a spy outside of [56:21] just our network and they were handling it in different agencies. If it was a direct threat to the [56:26] homeland, I would have been right in on it. I would just suggest respectfully that China, one of our [56:34] greatest cybersecurity adversaries, having access to these advanced AI chips is a direct threat to [56:39] our homeland. It's a direct threat to our cybersecurity. Does it concern you that Secretary [56:45] Lutnik apparently resisted efforts for so long to rein in these export control of these exports of chips [56:52] to China? Because I know Secretary Rubio, others, Mr. Clayton, have said that it was something that [56:58] they had disagreed with. Do you disagree with it as well? This wasn't something I'm dealing with. [57:03] It's outside of my lane. Those that are dealing with it, I, but I'm not, I'm not read in on this case. [57:07] I say it should be something to deal with. The gentleman's, the gentleman's time has expired. [57:10] I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Gesser, five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [57:15] In less than a week, we have seen Microsoft services go offline, a nationwide ground stop, [57:20] disruption within our major banking institutions, disruption of U.S. national security communication [57:26] infrastructure. And earlier this week, United Airlines had a nationwide system outage. [57:32] So the people that I serve back in the great state of Mississippi, some of those individuals are [57:38] concerned about the fact that we have had these numerous outages that have occurred in such short [57:45] proximity to one another. I was texting this morning with Max Luter from Tylertown, Mississippi, [57:51] a Navy veteran, small business owner. And he asked me a question about, are these outages related in [57:59] nature? And I told him that that is a great, great question and that I was going to have a panel of [58:04] experts in front of me today. And I would ask you that question, starting with you, Secretary Mullen, [58:12] are the outages that we've seen within the last week. Do you have information that they are related? [58:19] And then also a second follow-up question, do you believe that they pose any threat to national security? [58:25] We have seen nothing that would indicate that they are related. We have reached out to industry [58:32] and there's been no online traffic that SISA has seen. I will pass this to Jay because Jay is working [58:38] with the agency too, and he's leading this because of INA, which is our intelligent analyst, is embedded [58:44] with DNI. Director Clayton. Thank you. Your constituents are right to ask those questions. [58:53] As the secretary said, after doing a great deal of due diligence inside the government with the private [58:59] sector, with people in the private sector whose job is cyber security, we have no indication that these [59:06] incidents are related, that they're coordinated. We also have no indication that they're a result of [59:11] a state-sponsored malign actor. Mr. Rea. Thank you, Congressman. And let me footstop exactly what my [59:19] colleagues here on the table said. We have our cyber action teams, our cyber experts have been engaged [59:25] from day one on all of these incidents very heavily. And I want to be very clear on this. At this point, [59:33] there is no indication whatsoever that there is any cyber malicious activity related to any of those [59:41] incidents. Now, obviously, we're going to keep working with our private sector partners in an [59:45] abundance of caution. But at this point, there is no indication of any cyber malicious activity. [59:52] I want to revert back to a question Mr. McCall brought up about the media reports about possible [59:57] Iranian actors, that they are developing plans to target senior Trump administrative officials, [1:00:03] by the use of a dirty bomb, or by chemical weapons. These reports, of course, raise serious national [1:00:11] security concerns. We know that under the previous administration, that there were millions of [1:00:17] individuals who entered the country illegally. Mr. McCall brought up that there were over 18,000 known [1:00:24] or suspected individuals on the terrorist watch list. We know that there were 1,500 Iranian nationals [1:00:31] who were apprehended that 700 of those Iranian nationals have been released into the interior. [1:00:39] And so my question, as my time runs short, is, are you individuals, are you concerned about the [1:00:50] possibilities of sleeper cells operating within our borders? And if so, are we taking the necessary steps [1:00:58] to identify, monitor and disrupt those potential threats? And I know you've got to do a very broad [1:01:06] overview that we can't go into the details in this setting. But starting with you, Secretary Mullen, [1:01:11] are we concerned about the possibility of sleeper cells? And if so, are we taking the necessary action [1:01:18] to make sure that those individuals are unable to carry out their mission? [1:01:22] Secretary Mullen So this is what the Department of Homeland Security was stood up for. Is it a concern? [1:01:26] Of course. Are we fighting it and stomping it down every single day? Absolutely. Our men and women [1:01:31] are completely dedicated to it. They showed it even when they were shut down for over 120 days last year. [1:01:35] They still showed up for work and still carried out the mission. We have great partners with D&I, [1:01:39] great partners with DOJ, and we work in a cohesive manner to go after every one of these threats. [1:01:46] Secretary Mullen I'll go quickly and echo something that Deputy Director Wray mentioned, [1:01:55] which is the evolving technique of using online forms to radicalize people that are here in the [1:02:02] homeland. That's not theoretical. It's real. We saw it in New York. We've seen it in other cases. [1:02:08] It demonstrates why we need to be vigilant. Secretary Mullen I'll be real quick. Obviously, [1:02:15] it's a concern for us, having read that reporting now every day for a decade. I will tell you, [1:02:20] a lot of the reporting is largely aspirational, but that does not mean we do not take it seriously. [1:02:26] We have revamped our Iranian threat mission center to help combat that threat, and we've had a lot [1:02:33] of wins that are in the public ether on lethal plotting as it relates to lethal plotting against [1:02:38] dissidents. The gentleman's time has expired. I'm sorry. I now recognize the gentleman from New York, [1:02:43] Mr. Goldman, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is also my last hearing, and I've been [1:02:48] grateful for your leadership and Ranking Member Thompson. Excited to see what he will do taking [1:02:54] over the majority because there are a lot of questions that we have asked over the last two [1:03:00] years that have not been answered. We're in a crisis moment right now, and Mr. Clayton, I want to focus on [1:03:09] the NSA outage from a couple of days ago. Is it your testimony today that the technological problems [1:03:16] that the NSA faced on Monday were from internal software and technological upgrades? We have no [1:03:27] indication that they have come from external threat actors or state-sponsored actors. So it's a pretty [1:03:35] binary. It's either external or internal, right? So if you have no indication that it's external, [1:03:39] is it your testimony that it is from internal upgrades? My understanding, and look, I want to be [1:03:48] as responsive as possible, but we also need to protect that agency. Anytime you're talking about [1:03:54] patching, upgrading, you want to speak- Are you talking about patching or upgrading is really [1:03:59] the question. I am talking about the suite of things that you do as a routine matter to upgrade your [1:04:07] systems, patching, upgrading, replacing hardware, doing those things. Anytime you are going to do [1:04:14] those things, you take systems down, you bring them back up. In that context, we have no indication [1:04:21] of any foreign threat actor or any coordinated cyber- That's fine, but is that why the system failed? [1:04:28] Because of those internal patches and upgrades? The issue we are dealing with, as far as we can tell, [1:04:36] and we've done a lot of due diligence, is exactly that. That type of routine. [1:04:40] All right. You and I have known each other a long time. You're a very smart person, [1:04:45] and you're clearly not answering my direct question. No, I'm actually answering the question [1:04:48] But let me ask a different way. In the most appropriate way I can. During those issues, [1:04:54] And I don't think there's any ambiguity in what I'm saying. Was there any vulnerability of our [1:04:59] classified systems to, while those systems were down, to malign actors who may or may not want to, [1:05:07] to get on our system? No, that is a terrific question. Because [1:05:10] as you make adjustments and upgrades, one of the things that you ask yourself is, [1:05:15] when I'm doing this, is the threat- All right, all right. I don't have time for the long answer. [1:05:21] I'm sorry. I appreciate it. I know you're trying, you're doing this in good faith. But it's [1:05:25] a little bewildering to me that the Secretary of the Department of Transportation is doing a [1:05:30] hill tour asking for more money to upgrade the FAA systems, uh, after, when he has billions of [1:05:38] dollars to do that, that he hasn't used, after a nationwide ground stop. And for some reason, [1:05:45] we are supposed to be grateful to the incredible team that President Trump put together to get back [1:05:52] online, uh, all of our flights, even though 18,000 flights were canceled and there's been no clear [1:05:59] explanation for why that ground stopped. Our constituents, the American people, are looking [1:06:05] at a series of dramatic and systematic failures in the government, in the private sector. Mr. Clayton, [1:06:13] you're right. Yes, they should be asking these questions, but is it your testimony today that [1:06:18] the American people should believe that the series and sequence of events over the last week is purely [1:06:25] coincidental? We, we, I'll go as quickly as I can. I know your time. We have no indication that these [1:06:32] events are related, but let me, let me answer something that the American people should know, [1:06:37] which is the speed of compute and the level of capability of applications that use that compute [1:06:45] is increasing substantially, which means legacy systems that were old six months ago in a year [1:06:51] are a lot older than they were then. Yep, which is why the FAA and the Department of Transportation [1:06:56] should have put a little bit more of their money into the underlying infrastructure so that these [1:07:02] additional AI and technological, uh, upgrades would have a foundation. I, I don't have much time. I did [1:07:09] want to get to one thing, which is, let's be real, all three of your agencies, perhaps not Mr. [1:07:15] Clayton, have decimated the cybersecurity personnel that this administration entered office with. [1:07:21] CISA is way down because the president didn't want election fraud to be uncovered. The FBI has [1:07:27] fired numerous cybersecurity agents because they may or may not have served a subpoena in the Mar-a-Lago [1:07:33] case. You all have an obligation to restore that. And Secretary Mullen, I didn't have time to get to [1:07:39] your, uh, demonstrate your declaration that you believe in oversight. I have sent six letters to [1:07:45] you. I have asked for meetings. You haven't responded to a single one of them. It can't just be that [1:07:49] oversight exists for the party in the administration. And I do hope you don't force the majority to go to [1:07:55] subpoenas. And if you do that, you comply with those subpoenas in the next term. I yield back. [1:07:59] Thank you. Can I respond to that? No, I'm sorry. Unfortunately, maybe in somebody else's timing, [1:08:06] they'll give you a second to, but I got to stay on on schedule here because everybody wants to ask [1:08:10] questions. I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Jimenez, for five minutes. Thank [1:08:16] you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary Mullins, thank you for being here. And I know that some of my [1:08:23] colleagues on the other side of the aisle are upset that somehow you haven't responded. I'm a little bit [1:08:28] more upset that your Democratic predecessor actually sat in that chair and told us for years that the [1:08:34] border was secure. So, you know, thank you for that. At least you're sitting there. Um, the, um, [1:08:42] Mr. Clayton, uh, director Clayton on, on the issue of the dirty bombs, is that a new issue? Um, [1:08:51] I mean, I'm not going to talk about a specific matter of, I'm not talking about that. I'm talking [1:08:57] about is the threat of a dirty bomb. Is that something new, something that just came up like, [1:09:01] you know, two weeks ago? There are a suite of threats that are, that we refer to as, [1:09:08] you know, civilian mass destruction threats or whatever you want. And they have been around [1:09:14] for a long time. This actually, they have been because, you know, when I was mayor of Miami-Dade [1:09:18] County, um, one of my biggest concerns was that a dirty bomb would be floated up the Miami river and [1:09:25] exploded in the middle of my city. That was 10 years ago. All right. And so who was I concerned about? [1:09:31] Iran. Isn't that, isn't that amazing? Okay. 10 years ago, I was, I was worried about Iran, [1:09:37] not because we started a war with them, because they've been at war with us for about 47 years. [1:09:43] And so I, this threat from Iran is not something new. They've always been threatening us and they've [1:09:48] always been trying to find a way to, uh, to harm us. And so I think that this revelation, if true, [1:09:55] is just indicates why Iran should never have a nuclear weapon. If they can do that with a dirty bomb, [1:10:01] which is pretty simple to make, et cetera, and, and detonate, you know, could you imagine if they [1:10:06] got their hands on a real nuclear weapon, what they would do? Uh, and so, you know, I, um, you know, [1:10:12] I find that very interesting. Everybody's real. Oh my God, it's because the Iran war. It's not because [1:10:16] the Iran war, they want to destroy us. They've said death to America for 47 years. I think it's time we [1:10:23] take them, you know, seriously. Um, so Mr. Mr. Raya, um, if there are a, an employee of General Motors [1:10:37] that fit your three definitions for domestic terrorists, and you would label that individual [1:10:42] a domestic terrorist, would you label General Motors a domestic organization? Okay. And so, [1:10:49] you know, I think that the fact that, you know, what the ranking member is trying to get to you, [1:10:53] and I understand you very, very well that you, you designate people unless the president designates [1:11:01] an organization. And that's why you couldn't name a right wing organization, because there are people [1:11:07] inside right wing organizations that are domestic terrorists, correct? That is correct. Yes. But not [1:11:12] the organization itself. Just like I'm sure there may be somebody working for General Motors that may [1:11:17] be a domestic terrorist, but General Motors is not a domestic organization. That's it. Mr. Mullins, [1:11:23] uh, uh, one thing, um, the one thing I do disagree with the, with the administration on, um, is immigration [1:11:30] enforcement. And I haven't been quiet about it. I've been telling people for a long time. I have no [1:11:35] problem with, uh, closing the border. I have no problem with, uh, deporting criminals. I have no problem [1:11:42] gang members, terrorists, et cetera, or people with active deportation orders. I just think you've gone a [1:11:46] little bit too far. So is that your policy or some, somebody else's policy that you're implementing? [1:11:53] Our policies that we implement are based on statute of laws that Congress passed. I've said this [1:11:58] multiple times. Um, our job is to enforce laws, not make laws. If Congress wants to change that, [1:12:04] they can. Uh, our policy right now is to go after the worst, the worst. But every time you go after [1:12:09] the worst, the worst, you also, uh, have what we call collateral criminals. So when we arrest someone [1:12:16] that's on a warrant, um, most of the time they're not by themselves, there'll be two or three [1:12:21] individuals with them. The 2,700 terrorists that we have found, all of them weren't known. [1:12:28] We were serving a warrant on someone else when we found them and they were giving us the wrong name. [1:12:33] When we did biometrics on them or we did more in depth, uh, look into their travel, [1:12:38] we were able to find out that, oh, wait a second, these guys should never be in this country. [1:12:42] So our enforcement every day is worst of the worst. But we, when we encounter someone here illegally, [1:12:50] I am required to find out who they are because we cannot have national security if we don't know [1:12:56] who's in here. And I would encourage Congress, if you want to change my laws that I have to enforce, [1:13:01] the statutes that I go through, do it and I'll enforce those too. I'm not picking and choosing which [1:13:06] law I enforce. [1:13:07] Fair enough. But one of the things that I do have concern about is that there are some people who [1:13:11] are here legally under, uh, temporary protective status that the administration later took that [1:13:16] away. Okay. And that's, that's the problems that I have. And so, you know, my time is up and I'll [1:13:21] you back. Thank you very much. [1:13:23] The gentleman is back. I now recognize the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Ramirez for five minutes of questions. [1:13:28] Thank you, chairman. Well, hi secretary. I want to ask you a pretty direct question. Are you comfortable in [1:13:36] your seat right now? Yes or no? I absolutely love my mission. That's great. Well, secretary Mullen, [1:13:43] I have sent 10 separate oversight inquiries to the Department of Homeland Security that have gone [1:13:47] and answered. You were just mentioning that you respect and understand oversight, but I have them [1:13:51] here. Five of them have been actually under your tenure about conditions at Campbell County and El Valle [1:13:57] detention facilities, data sharing agreements with TSA, your department's use of shot gloves and less [1:14:04] lethal weaponry. And even though the department seems to not have time to respond to Congress's [1:14:10] congressional inquiries, you seem to have time to respond to me on X. Your most recent post suggests [1:14:18] that the Department of Homeland Security and its agents are keeping Americans safe. So I want to talk [1:14:22] about that. When Martin Lagunas pointed his firearm in Carolina Molina's face, a licensed mental health [1:14:31] professional and U.S. citizen, was he keeping Americans safe? Or when Charles Exum crashed into the vehicle [1:14:38] of Marimar Martinez, a United States citizen, a teaching assistant, and shot her five times, was he keeping [1:14:47] her safe? American safe? When Border Patrol agents Matthew Zulek, Michael Turner, Oscar Mesa, Andrew Terrapour, [1:14:55] Joseph Brennan, Martin Davalos, and Alexander Mills crashed into the vehicle of Diane Figueroa, a United [1:15:02] States citizen and a paralegal, pointed the weapon at her, pulled her out of her vehicle by her feet, [1:15:10] pinned her face down, and utilized excessive force as they detained her. Were they keeping Americans safe? [1:15:18] Now, when Border Patrol agents Enrique Camacho, Angel Nieves, Ricardo Moreno deployed tear gas on a public road [1:15:27] near an elementary school while children were playing nearby, were they keeping Americans safe? [1:15:34] You know, there's a lot of examples how this government is not keeping people safe, and many of those threats [1:15:41] are coming among your rings. They don't respect the civil rights of our neighbors and the rule of law. [1:15:46] They're terrorizing our communities and they're acting with impunity. According to ISIS enforcement and removal [1:15:52] operations, your own numbers to this committee in July, while they've opened 53, now let me say it again, [1:15:58] 53 internal investigations, only one agent has been held accountable through temporary suspension. [1:16:06] So, Secretary, do you have an update on since that last report how many agents that have violated the rights [1:16:13] of or harmed our neighbors have been, in fact, accountable? [1:16:18] All cases that are supposed to be under investigation are still under investigation? [1:16:22] You talk about not keeping our country safe? So any cases, anyone accountable? Anyone else suspended? [1:16:27] Anyone removed? Why they're under investigation? They're investigated outside of ICE when they're [1:16:32] under investigation. I'm not able to comment, but when they come up and we get recommended actions. [1:16:36] Let me reclaim my time. Let me reclaim my time, because it was about specific numbers and you can't [1:16:40] report. I would love to talk to you about numbers. Let me reclaim my time. It's my time. [1:16:44] Last time I told you when you came not to get comfortable in the seat, because we do need [1:16:49] accountability. Well, I want to take it back. I do think you should get comfortable because there are [1:16:55] so many unanswered questions and next Congress, things will look a little different. And I hope to [1:17:02] chair the oversight subcommittee here, a committee that I've spent now four years doing oversight on. [1:17:07] And when I do, you are going to spend a lot of time in that seat. I will be bringing to you and your [1:17:13] staff questions for you to answer in this committee on the use of federal funding to reward campaign [1:17:19] donors like GEO Group and CoreCivic, the grant contracts to friends and family members, the illegal [1:17:25] and unconstitutional surveillance of the American people by DHS and its contractors, the illegal neglect, [1:17:32] the medical neglect, the miscarriages and abuses in detention centers, Stephen Miller's calls to [1:17:37] ignore habeas corpus, DHS agents due process violations with impunity, the rapid spread of [1:17:44] 287G agreements threatening the safety and stability of our communities, the defunding of FEMA, of CISA, [1:17:51] of Coast Guard and TSA just to support this president's mass deportation campaign, [1:17:57] the politicization of FEMA's mission, the incompetence of you and your department to protect us from cyber [1:18:03] attacks and so much more. We have to uncover the corruption. And you are absolutely right. It is [1:18:09] the responsibility of this committee to do oversight. And we will do just that in the next Congress. [1:18:17] And I cannot wait to see you again. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. [1:18:21] General Lady yields back. I now recognize a gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pflueger, for five minutes of questions. [1:18:26] Thank you. I've got a lot of questions. Secretary Mullen, did you have maybe 30 seconds of response on any of the oversight letters? [1:18:32] Yeah. Listen, if we didn't respond, I apologize. That's not a reflection on us. I said that we'd be [1:18:41] very forward leaning as much as we can on public affairs. Sometimes the letters aren't directly, [1:18:47] we may not have direct oversight of it. So if it's something that DOJ is investigating, [1:18:50] we have to refer it to DOJ. If it's something that the IG is investigating, we give it to the IG. [1:18:57] Because I can't respond to all of them. But we'll try. And I apologize greatly for that. Mr. Goldman, [1:19:04] I have tried to reach out to you. In fact, just recently on Veterans Day, because the number I [1:19:10] have for you, I apologize. It's not right. But I just wanted to thank you for your service. I reach out to [1:19:15] all veterans that serve in Congress, regardless of what side of the aisle you're on, because I still [1:19:19] respect it. So I will apologize for that. That's our reflection of what we do. [1:19:24] I'll ask a couple of questions about, are these threats still threats to the United States of [1:19:32] America? AQ, ISIS, Iran, IRGC, their proxies, cartels, the CCP. Just, are these threats still viable [1:19:43] threats? And I've got questions to follow on on that. I'll start with. [1:19:45] They are absolutely a real threat. We combat every single day. I just want to throw out one statistic, [1:19:51] just by the cartels. Cartels are into human trafficking. They're the ones that trafficked [1:19:55] the 400 – it was 478,000 kids that were lost underneath the Biden administration. We've only [1:20:01] found roughly 160,000 kids, which you can imagine the other 300,000 what conditions they might be in. [1:20:07] Just underneath the Biden – or just underneath the Trump administration, we've [1:20:12] apprehended 8 billion lethal doses off the streets that were shipped in by here by the cartels. That's [1:20:22] equivalent to kill the entire population of the United States 21 times or 90 percent of the entire [1:20:31] world population. That is a major, major threat. Because of President Trump's push on this, we have [1:20:38] brought overdoses down by 46 percent. Because he has authorized us to do what? Do our job. And we're [1:20:46] able to do it. [1:20:47] You've done a tremendous job of upholding the laws. And despite what we're hearing over here, [1:20:51] sanctuary cities continue to be a problem. These threats continue to persist in our country. [1:20:56] They use an open border as the most open avenue to threaten our country. Director Rea, [1:21:04] is it clear how many illegal immigrants are still in the United States? And of that number, [1:21:09] do we have any idea – and for anybody on the panel – how many of those are affiliated with [1:21:14] al-Qaeda, ISIS, Iranian threats, or their proxies, cartels, the CCP, and any other threat that may be [1:21:19] out there? Congressman, I would refer those numbers to immigration on DHS. Obviously, we're DOJ. But what I [1:21:27] can say is due to the border being shut and the job that DHS has done as it relates to enforcement, [1:21:35] a lot of our counterterrorism cases in the past that had folks that were illegal into the country [1:21:42] and we couldn't get to a 2339 charge or a substantive terrorism charge before we weren't able to do [1:21:48] anything except continue to watch them, continue to make cases on them because they would never get [1:21:53] kicked out of the country. Now, under Secretary Mullen and DHS, we're able to enact – we're able to use [1:21:59] DHS to enact those immigration authorities. And when we know we have a bad actor, a bad terrorist in [1:22:04] the country, and we can't get to a substantive charge, we're able to immigrate, we're able to use [1:22:08] those authorities and create a disruption and ultimately – How many elected officials do you have [1:22:13] in sanctuary cities throughout the country that directly oppose the enforcement of federal statute? [1:22:19] Elected officials? Yeah, that are direct – that are out there lamenting and talking about opposing [1:22:25] it and not following federal statute. I don't know. I know there are outspoken politicians [1:22:32] regarding that. Again, my job is to oversee an agency to keep America safe through investigation. [1:22:38] Secretary Mullen, when it comes to some of the campaign promises that were made by Democrats, [1:22:45] especially DSA-associated people that want to defund ICE, people in this room, in fact, [1:22:51] that want to defund ICE. Tell me about the effect that has on the morale of the 27,000 employees at DHS. [1:22:57] Well, it's actually moved from defunding ICE to defunding Department of Homeland Security, [1:23:01] which is absolutely crazy to me, because we protect the homeland. All 22 components enforce [1:23:06] the laws that Congress passed. And as I've said multiple times, Congress can change those laws. [1:23:12] And if they can change the laws and get the president to sign it, we'll enforce those laws. [1:23:16] But to be mad at us for simply doing our job, I don't understand it. Our job is to protect the [1:23:22] homeland. That means we're going to protect your backyard just like I protect my backyard, [1:23:26] and we do a good job at it every single day. Thank you. Yields back. [1:23:32] The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Tanidar, [1:23:35] for five minutes of questions. Good morning, Secretary Malone. [1:23:39] To fulfill President Trump's mass deportation agenda, DHS carried out a hiring campaign to more than [1:23:50] double the number of ICE officers and agents. To get as many new officers into the field as quickly as [1:24:00] possible, DHS took shortcuts, slashing training time in half and eliminating much of the required [1:24:11] testing for officers. These shortcuts put public at risk and had serious and even deadly consequences. [1:24:21] For the record, Mr. Secretary, I'll appreciate if you'll answer these yes or no questions. Yes or no, [1:24:33] during the hiring surge, did ICE remove or reduce firearms training for new recruits? [1:24:40] I wasn't here during that time, sir. I've only been in office since March. All these decisions were made [1:25:10] prior to me coming into office. I'm sure you reviewed those decisions when you took the job. [1:25:15] Sir, we changed a lot of things when we came in. I would, I mean, I can't answer for previous [1:25:20] administration. You want to ask questions with my tenure there? I'd be happy to answer all those. [1:25:24] Yes or no, at any point during the hiring surge, did ICE reduce on-the-job training for ICE officers? [1:25:33] Once again, that was before my time, sir. I would love to answer questions about my tenure. [1:25:37] I think you know when I came in office. So we can answer all those questions moving forward. I can't [1:25:42] answer for a previous administration or a previous secretary. When you took the job, [1:25:47] did you speak with any of the previous administration? As I said, we restored our [1:25:52] training back to what it was going to be. And I made that very clear when I came in front of your [1:25:55] committee the first time. Well, sir, I proudly represent Detroit, Michigan, and we have some of the [1:26:02] finest barbers in the United States. And our barbers go through more training than your ICE officers. [1:26:11] Do you know that? I've never been a barber, but I know the service industry and apprentice license for [1:26:21] electricians, plumbers, and heating and air is roughly three to four years. I can talk about that. [1:26:27] Let me switch to another topic that has been on the minds of my constituents this past week. Secretary [1:26:34] Mullen, can you give me your best guess as to why systems across the country keep breaking? And now [1:26:41] this is happening on your watch. You can't punt this or blame this on the last administration. First, [1:26:49] outlook went down and work grinded to a halt. Then the FAA implemented a ground stop nationwide. [1:26:58] The second time since 9-11 attacks, they have done that. Major banks across [1:27:04] the country experienced widespread disruption. And recently, the NSA's classified network went down. [1:27:12] Secretary Mullen, what the hell is going on? What is your department doing to look into these recent [1:27:19] failures? And do the American people have a reason to be suspicious of the administration's answers that [1:27:28] everything is fine? It's unfortunate that you just got here because we've answered this question [1:27:34] multiple times. I don't think your staff is doing you any justice because they would change your [1:27:37] questions. But I'll let Jay answer that question. We are in an environment where the rate of patching, [1:27:51] the rate of upgrading of systems is increasing. That is the result of advancements in compute and in [1:28:00] applications. We should expect that as people are patching and as people are upgrading systems, I say it this [1:28:08] way. Any one of us who's worked in a large organization has heard the system is going to go down at 5 o'clock on [1:28:16] Friday. It's scheduled to come back up at 2 o'clock in the morning on Saturday. I only have 20 seconds left. [1:28:24] Okay. So I have another question for the Secretary. Secretary, is your commitment that all ICE officers [1:28:32] hired during the hiring surge will grow through the full 13-week in-person training? Would you commit [1:28:40] to that? Yes. Thank you. Well, the part of the training they haven't already completed. There were [1:28:46] some of it they completed. The parts that we added to it, they will go through all the training and [1:28:50] continuing training throughout the year as long as I'm in office. Thank you. I yield back. The gentleman [1:28:55] yells back, and I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Luttrell, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:28:59] Mr. Secretary. Gentlemen, good to see you. Mr. Secretary, Houston, Harris County is, and I hate to [1:29:07] say this out loud, but it's the worst, it's considered the worst city in America when it [1:29:10] comes to trafficking. We sit on the I-10, I-45 corridor and 35 runs through there too. We're [1:29:15] missing, you threw some numbers, 100,000, 300,000 still missing. What is the department by, with, and [1:29:22] through the other organizations that you're partnered with doing to not only currently combat human [1:29:27] trafficking, but to rescue those babies that are still missing? This is something I take extremely [1:29:36] personal because with six kids, I just can't imagine the horrific conditions that some of these [1:29:44] kids are dealing with. We've already, out of the 160 plus thousand that we've recovered, 7,500 of them [1:29:52] were in direct trafficking. We just recently found one in Oklahoma that was in a vehicle. She was 17, [1:30:00] and when I say recently, this is two weeks ago. We had been looking for her. She was trafficked from [1:30:08] Arizona. She was in a vehicle with six adults that were all legal, male adults, and we found her in [1:30:15] Oklahoma driving down Interstate 40. You can imagine the horrific things she had to go through. And it [1:30:23] frustrates me because we're even seeing sanctuary cities and states that are refusing to work with us [1:30:31] to find these kids, refusing to work with us. If we can agree on one thing, it would say, hey, let's go [1:30:41] find these other 300,000. Because you can imagine the harder they are to find, there's probably a reason [1:30:49] for it. And it breaks your heart. What's even worse as an alarming rate, they're aging out. Meaning once they get 18, [1:31:01] they fall underneath a complete different jurisdiction. And it's much harder for us to find. [1:31:07] We need to have every law enforcement agency working on trying to find these kids that were lost [1:31:15] underneath the Biden administration. They were given to sponsors. It's not even an argument. You can't even [1:31:19] argue this anymore. It's a fact. They were given to sponsors that were unvetted. Some sponsors had taken as [1:31:24] many as 40 kids. 40 kids. I don't know. I have six. Six is a lot to raise. 40 that you're a sponsor of in four years? [1:31:37] Who was the oversight? People should go to jail over what happened here. But our first responsibility is to locate [1:31:45] these kids. And it is our mission every day. We have partnered with outside organizations to go around what sanctuary cities [1:31:53] want to allow us to do. So they'll allow these outside organizations to do it. We're having to pay [1:31:59] them to go do it. But it's worth every dollar we spend for every single kid. And we're finding roughly [1:32:05] at this rate, it slowed down some because of cooperation, the harder they are to find. But we're [1:32:11] finding roughly 4,000 kids to roughly a month. I can think some other places I'd rather send those [1:32:19] people in jail. But I digress. Or you and I would probably agree on that. Mr. Ray and Mr. Clayton, [1:32:26] this might land on top of one of y'all. And this goes to Mr. Thompson's point about domestic terrorism. [1:32:33] Give me some rope on this one, okay? And domestic terrorism could be an individual, [1:32:39] not less an organization. My question, which most likely may not be able to answer in here, [1:32:46] you guys both familiar with hugging face attack, correct? An individual's capability to create an army [1:32:57] of AI agents and an attack profile creates an organization. And if you have tens of thousands [1:33:08] of generated, and I'm a fan of artificial intelligence and super intelligence, whatever [1:33:13] you want to call it, but it's the good and the bad here. How, looking downstream, how do we protect [1:33:21] ourselves from an AI-generated army that can be programmed to be a terrorist when we move at the [1:33:34] speed of government? And they do not. Let me, let me say multi-pronged effort. But one of the most [1:33:45] important prongs is to have the best technology. Because this is not geographically bound within [1:33:51] the United States. There are people developing super intelligence technologies and developing [1:33:57] applications. I say that just so everyone knows, it's not just China, Iran, North Korea, [1:34:00] and everybody that's attacking us. There's somebody living out, there's probably somebody across the [1:34:03] street right now listening to what I'm saying. Yep. And ready to rock and roll. Just like we have to [1:34:07] lead in aerospace for defense, we have to lead in computing technology and applications technology for [1:34:13] defense in the cyber arena. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Thank you. Um, and I'll just [1:34:19] schedule you. So with votes being called at 1215, we will keep the hearing going. So if you have not [1:34:24] questioned yet, uh, or if you have, if you're not having questions by the time it's coming, I would suggest [1:34:29] you get there for votes right at 1215 and come back because we are going to keep this, uh, this hearing [1:34:34] going. Ms. MacGyver, can I borrow one second of your time? No, well, she's not at the time. Is there [1:34:39] an official question? Yes. What is it? I would just, can I get those answers on the, from those guys on [1:34:44] the record? No. Okay. Thank you. There you go. Unless Ms. MacGyver would let them, but I now recognize [1:34:51] the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. MacGyver, for, uh, five minutes. Thank you, uh, Chairman, and thank [1:34:57] you, ranking member Thompson for holding this hearing today. Secretary Mullen, we have a lot to [1:35:02] discuss. Last Friday, due to extraordinary circumstances, a communication out outage [1:35:08] resulted in only the second national ground stop since 9-11. Truly ridiculous. You and Secretary [1:35:14] Duffy criticized Congress for failing to prioritize investments in our nation's aging air traffic [1:35:19] control infrastructure. But in 2021, Congress passed the bipartisan infrastructure law providing [1:35:25] $25 billion for aviation infrastructure, including $5 billion specifically for FAA facilities and [1:35:32] equipments. Mr. Secretary, if I'm not mistaken, you were a congressman, um, during that time when that [1:35:38] bill was considered. How did you vote on that legislation? Oh, you know what? I remember. I'll, [1:35:45] I'll tell you how you voted. You voted against it. Last year, the One Big Beautiful Bill gave another [1:35:50] $12.5 billion to the FAA. The administration now says it needs another $50 billion on top of that. [1:35:57] An infrastructure failure like the one we saw last week, grounding all U.S. flights and having [1:36:02] the administration say they don't know what the issue is, exposes how vulnerable our country is to [1:36:09] sabotage. Under your leadership, we look like a weak target. Secretary Mullen, would you support fixing [1:36:16] our air traffic control system by redirecting some of the funds from ICE? Well, uh, by statute, [1:36:26] I'm limited on what I can spend those funds on. So I guess that's a no. You know what is happening [1:36:31] under your leadership. Historically high deaths in ICE custody. To date, 65 people have died in ICE [1:36:38] custody underneath this administration. Mr. Secretary, the last time you were before this committee, I [1:36:44] asked you, had you ever visited Delaney Hall in my district? You said no. Since then, two more people [1:36:51] have died at Delaney Hall. So I'll ask you again, have you taken the time to visit Delaney Hall, a [1:36:58] detention center that is under your, your, uh, your umbrella? Yes or no? Absolutely, I have. And the [1:37:06] facility, as you know, because you've been there, is in way better condition than your state penitentiary. [1:37:11] No, it's, it's, no, it's not. Reclaiming my time. I'm currently, I'm, I'm, I'm reclaiming my time, [1:37:17] Mr. Secretary, please. As you know, I am facing 17 years in prison from this Trump administration [1:37:24] for my work at Delaney. Do you even understand why I've been sounding the alarm about Delaney Hall [1:37:30] for so long? Do you understand that? No, I went there and visited the facility. It was in very good [1:37:35] condition. We provide twice as much medical attention. Reclaiming my time. Reclaiming my time, [1:37:40] Mr. Secretary. It's interesting. Isis. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman. Reclaiming my time. Isis own [1:37:48] investigation. Mr. Secretary found that nearly 80% of people who died in custody in the first year [1:37:55] of Trump 2.0 died after receiving poor medical care. That is Isis own investigation. This includes [1:38:03] failure to provide emergency care and adequate treatment of chronic conditions and failure to [1:38:08] respond to suicide risks. Someday, extremely soon, history is going to judge you for what you are [1:38:16] doing. Your collaboration with Stephen Miller, all of these deaths. Do you have any regrets or [1:38:23] reservations for the leading role you are playing in this administration's immigration agenda? [1:38:28] I'll never apologize about enforcing our nation's laws. Not about even killing people. No apologies for [1:38:34] that. We're not killing it. You are killing people. You are killing people. That's your opinion. No, no, [1:38:38] you are killing people. The whole entire country watches you kill people. I got the numbers right [1:38:43] here. I'm reclaiming my time. This is my time. I'm reclaiming it. With that, Chairman, I yield back. [1:38:51] General Levy yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong, for five minutes of questions. [1:38:56] Thank you, Chairman Gorbarino and Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman McCall. And I thank all of our [1:39:02] witnesses for being here today and your service to our country. What I have noticed is much of this [1:39:08] debate would never have occurred if President Joe Biden would not have allowed the invasion of 25 [1:39:15] million illegal aliens at the southern border to come into America. Secretary Mullen, before I get into [1:39:21] my questions, I want to commend you and President Trump for your leadership and commitment to securing [1:39:27] our southern border and strengthening our nation's homeland security. For reducing illegal border [1:39:33] crossings to combating drug trafficking, human trafficking and criminal cartels, your efforts are [1:39:39] making a real difference in keeping America safe. First off, I want to talk about a place that's very [1:39:46] important to my that's very important to my community and the people that I represent in North Alabama. [1:39:52] Redstone Arsenal and the greater Huntsville community are home to a remarkable concentration of military [1:39:59] intelligence and federal law enforcement capabilities supported by a robust defense industrial base [1:40:05] and a strong network of industry and academic partners. As outlined in the administration's 2026 [1:40:11] national defense strategy, the threats facing our homeland are becoming increasingly complex [1:40:17] from foreign adversaries to developing advanced technologies to persist threats of terrorism. [1:40:24] Addressing these challenges require strong coordination across our nation's security agencies [1:40:29] and continued investment in American innovation. The Department of Homeland Security [1:40:35] has not been turned against the American people as previously stated. Secretary Mullins, the day you were [1:40:41] confirmed secretary, you immediately authorized the latest technology be deployed to defend against counter UAS for every state hosting a FIFA event. [1:40:55] You deployed counter UAS for America 250 events in record time. Secretary Mullins, I'm proud you have engaged in college football games. [1:41:06] Secretary Mullins, I chaired an emergency management technology committee meeting right here where you sit. [1:41:12] And on any given weekend in the Southeastern Conference, nine to seven stadiums have more than 90,000 fans in attendance with even more thousands around the stadium. [1:41:24] And we need to be defending these large gathering operations. You think about it. I will continue to advocate that counter [1:41:31] counter UAS be deployed to large venues throughout America. As each of you know, we have the technology to intercept, [1:41:40] drop, block, do forensics on drones. Much of this technology is from my district in Huntsville, Alabama. [1:41:48] Deputy Director Rea, I was with you, Dan Bongino, at another America 250 event where the FBI foiled an effort to assassinate members [1:41:59] and others in attendance. Please tell your agents thank you for what they're doing for the American people. [1:42:06] Deputy Director Rea, can you speak to the importance of Redstone Arsenal and the broader [1:42:11] Huntsville community to the FBI's mission and the opportunities you see for continued growth and [1:42:16] collaboration there? Well, first of all, Congressman Strong, I would be remiss if I didn't thank you [1:42:23] personally for your support, not only Redstone Arsenal, but in the FBI and and really federal law [1:42:28] enforcement intelligence in general. So appreciate that. You mentioned it earlier. I think one of the [1:42:34] biggest strides that we made in the last 21 months, not only with the FBI, but with with Department of [1:42:39] Homeland Security and our federal partners is in that fight against counter UAS. All you have to do [1:42:45] is look at look at a YouTube video, excuse me, and see what's going on overseas with explosive payloads [1:42:52] put on these put on these UAS. 21 months ago, I was not I was very concerned about that technology [1:43:00] coming over here to the United States. And I am still concerned about that threat coming here to [1:43:04] the United States. However, in the last 21 months, based on a multitude of things to include the standing [1:43:10] up the National Counter UAS Training Center, where we are deputizing state, local and other federal [1:43:16] authorities to give them the same the same technology to not only mitigate to not only detect, [1:43:21] but mitigate all across the country and increase that throughput. We are much better postured against [1:43:26] that threat than we were 21 months ago. And I appreciate your support. And I appreciate everything [1:43:31] you've done to help us in that effort, Congressman. Thank you. Secretary Mullins from DHS perspective, [1:43:36] how important is collaboration with national security community in North Alabama to identifying and [1:43:43] addressing emerging threats to the homeland? We couldn't do it without the without the cooperation. [1:43:49] It is is vital for state, local, federal cooperation. It's the only way we're going to effectively combat it. [1:43:58] Thank you. And again, I want to thank you for what you did to immediately from the first day you took [1:44:03] office, you deployed counter UAS to FIFA, which was equivalent to what seven Super Bowls going at the same [1:44:10] time at 11 different locations. America 250 and the Olympics is on the horizon. Never quit. We'll never relent. [1:44:18] Mr. Chairman, I yield back. [1:44:19] The gentleman's time is expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Puerto Rico, Mr. Hernandez for five minutes. [1:44:24] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 25 years ago, after 1911, this country created the Department of Homeland Security [1:44:30] to keep Americans safe. Now, let me be clear. I believe in enforcing the law. We all want those who break it to face [1:44:40] consequences. But immigration law can and must be enforced without violence. Let's take a cold look at [1:44:47] the facts. In Chicago, masked agents raided an entire apartment building. In the middle of the night, [1:44:55] U.S. citizens and children were pulled out of their beds and zip tied for hours. Since these enforcement [1:45:02] operations began, immigration officers have fired at people in at least 29 incidents. At least seven [1:45:08] people are dead. Renee Nicole Goode, Alex Preddy, Silberio Villegas Gonzalez, among others. Agents [1:45:17] have tear gassed police officers, protesters, children, and clergy. Officers have been told to identify and [1:45:27] run checks on people whose only act was filming them. So let me say it plainly. We are here to talk about [1:45:34] threats to the homeland. When the government enters an apartment and zip ties children and citizens, [1:45:41] the government is the threat. When the government opens fires on our streets and families have to [1:45:49] bury their dead, the government is the threat. When the government tear gases children and clergy, [1:45:58] the government is the threat. When the government puts a citizen in a database simply for holding up a [1:46:05] phone, the government is the threat. When the government shoves a pregnant woman as they did in Puerto [1:46:12] Rico, the government is the threat. Meanwhile, the threats that this department was built to stop [1:46:21] have not waited. The department's own cybersecurity agency has reported a vacancy rate of about 40 percent [1:46:27] across key mission areas. Every hour and every dollar spent on raids like the ones in Chicago, [1:46:34] Minneapolis, San Juan, Caguas, is an hour and a dollar not spent on those threats. I represent more [1:46:43] than three million American citizens in Puerto Rico. Many of us speak Spanish at home, on the streets, [1:46:50] at work. Our citizenship does not depend on our accent, our last name, or the color of our skin. [1:46:57] When ICE operations came to Puerto Rico, I asked for one thing. That the law be enforced without violence, [1:47:04] with compassion, and with respect for human rights. That is not too much to ask. That is the minimum. [1:47:13] Mr. Secretary, the American people deserve a department that protects them, not one they need [1:47:18] protection from. Mr. Secretary, these incidents raise serious questions about accountability within [1:47:25] your department, and the American people deserve answers about what happened, who was responsible, [1:47:32] and what action DHS has taken. Mr. Secretary, what is the status of DHS's investigation into the [1:47:40] killings of Americans, Rene Nicole Good, Alex Bretty, and Ruben Rey Martinez? [1:47:45] I cannot talk about ongoing investigations, but I can talk about the angel families that's been lost by [1:47:52] by the hundreds at the hands of illegals that were led underneath this administration, [1:47:56] or the previous administration. Does that justify the killing of innocent people? [1:47:59] It never justifies anybody. And why do you have to bring up the comparison? [1:48:02] That is very disrespectful to those victims. I'm just saying in your mouth, [1:48:04] you should probably talk about the angel families that the illegals that were led underneath [1:48:07] there and the Biden administration have killed. You don't talk about the angel, you should talk [1:48:11] about them. We are against the killing of any person in the United States. [1:48:13] No one should pass away. We are against the killings of every person. We are for peace. [1:48:16] We are for justice. We are cleaning up the mess because of the Biden administration. [1:48:18] What is the status of DHS's? I claim back my time. What is the status of DHS's investigations [1:48:24] into the killings of Lorenzo Salgado and Johann Sebastian Duran Guerrero? [1:48:28] The answer is still the same. What is the status of the shooters in those cases? [1:48:32] Are they still working? Still in the investigation, and anyone that was involved in a shooting [1:48:36] is no longer- How long will this investigation take? [1:48:38] I'm not doing the investigation. A lot of it is being done by- [1:48:41] You don't know how long the investigations your agencies conduct- [1:48:43] Once it goes into investigation, that's- [1:48:45] Are you pressuring the relevant agencies to conduct the investigations faster? Because we [1:48:49] don't want people who are potentially guilty of murder conducting- [1:48:52] I'm not involved in the investigation at all. I've already said that. So don't put words in my mouth. [1:48:56] I never put any words in your mouth. [1:48:58] By saying in my pressuring, when I already said I'm not involved in the- [1:49:03] Are you indifferent towards the investigations- [1:49:05] Am I what? [1:49:06] ...being solved indifferent towards the investigation being solved properly? [1:49:08] I'm not involved in it at all. [1:49:09] You're not involved in it, so you don't care about the- [1:49:11] I know. It's not my- [1:49:12] The investigation- [1:49:12] Will you commit to providing the committee with the investigator- [1:49:16] investigative files of those cases within the next two weeks so we can carry out [1:49:20] our constitutional right of- [1:49:21] I'm not in charge of the investigation. [1:49:23] Do you have any files related to the investigation? [1:49:25] I'm not in charge. I have nothing to do with it. [1:49:26] I don't know how many times- [1:49:27] Nothing to do with the investigations. [1:49:28] You do not provide any information for the investigation. [1:49:31] I don't know how many times I can repeat myself. [1:49:33] I don't know if you're having a hard hearing, but I've said this multiple times. [1:49:35] Gentlemen's time has expired. [1:49:37] Gentlemen's time has expired. [1:49:40] I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for five minutes of questions. [1:49:44] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:49:45] Thank you, gentlemen, for showing up today. [1:49:47] I want to say thank you, Mr. Secretary, for bringing up these angel families. [1:49:51] You know, it's interesting. [1:49:53] They never bring them up. [1:49:54] They don't care about them. [1:49:55] They don't care about the hundreds of thousands of kids. [1:49:58] You know that. [1:49:59] You've sat through enough of these hearings. [1:50:00] It's just so interesting how they don't care about American citizens that have lost their [1:50:05] lives to the millions that the Biden administration let in. [1:50:11] Mr. Secretary, we've obviously had a pretty tough week of technology outages within federal [1:50:17] agencies and the private sector. [1:50:19] Microsoft, FAA, Workday, Chase Wells Fargo, United Airlines, NSA, Apple, and the National Weather Service. [1:50:27] I know the administration has said repeatedly there is no evidence that these were cyber attacks. [1:50:33] Secretary Mullen, I know you've been in D.C. for a long time as a former member of Congress, [1:50:37] Senator, and now in your current role. [1:50:39] I want to ask you, have you ever in all of your years in D.C. seen this many technology [1:50:43] outages during this short of a period of time? [1:50:45] Absolutely not. [1:50:48] And we're actually convening a phone call with industry because my personal opinion here is [1:50:56] it'd be helpful as we're moving forward that maybe the industry that's doing the upgrade [1:51:03] could inform their customers that it's going to take place. [1:51:05] I mean, when we upgrade our phones, right, it gives us a warning and says, hey, [1:51:08] you're due for an upgrade. [1:51:09] And when you upgrade it, you know your phone's going to go offline for possibly two minutes. [1:51:12] With the amount of patching work because of the aging infrastructure we have, [1:51:18] it's probably time for the industry – and it's the industry. [1:51:21] We're not pressuring the industry to do it. [1:51:23] We just want to have a conversation and say maybe we should start communicating. [1:51:26] Because what happens online is a tremendous amount of fear. [1:51:29] And we can understand it. [1:51:31] I think all of us can understand it. [1:51:32] But there's no cause for it. [1:51:34] It's – and – Jay, I'm sorry. [1:51:39] I keep calling you by your first name. [1:51:40] I – the director – [1:51:42] Everybody does. [1:51:43] I know. [1:51:43] But, you know, we – we're – I consider you a friend. [1:51:46] But the director has mentioned about this and about what's going on in the technology world. [1:51:50] And I think it's helpful for him to say it again. [1:51:54] Well, I appreciate that. [1:51:56] But I'm getting – as you guys are, I'm getting a lot of text messages, [1:52:00] phone calls about these issues. [1:52:01] And I think one of the concerns is how quickly and how many of these outages we've seen [1:52:07] from the 12th to the – I believe the 17th. [1:52:09] So in a span of five days when we've never seen that. [1:52:13] That coupled with Mr. Clayton, your testimony about the rise of super intelligence and how just [1:52:20] a lone hacker himself with some of these advanced tools can now become that much more of a threat. [1:52:26] It just seems, you know, really frightening to a lot of people that there might be some there. [1:52:33] So how can you guys with confidence sit here and tell us that, hey, there's nothing to – you know, [1:52:40] these aren't cyber attacks. [1:52:42] These are actually just a bunch of patches and, you know, old networks. [1:52:47] Now, I think – I think you're correctly outlining two different things. [1:52:52] What we're seeing – and the American people are right to say, hey, you know, you in government, [1:52:58] you in industry, what's going on? [1:53:00] We have gone out to each one of those individuals. [1:53:02] We've used our tools and we have no evidence that this is a coordinated cyber attack or state-sponsored [1:53:09] activity. [1:53:09] Thank you. [1:53:10] Thank you, sir. [1:53:11] That said, you make a very good point. [1:53:13] The pace of technological advancement is increasing. [1:53:16] It's increasing where we have access to it at the government. [1:53:19] It's increasing in the private sector. [1:53:21] And it's increasing outside the United States. [1:53:23] Thank you. [1:53:24] We need to be prepared for that. [1:53:26] I appreciate that. [1:53:27] Secretary Mullen, why has the no-taking-off shoe policy still been in place at the TSA? [1:53:35] We're evaluating technology every single day. [1:53:41] And we feel like what we're doing right now is keeping the American flyers very safe. [1:53:47] We have never put anyone at risk at all. [1:53:50] That's our number one job at the Department of Homeland Security is to protect the homeland. [1:53:54] There's been multiple reports that's come out on this. [1:53:56] I understand it. [1:53:57] I've talked to the IG personally in the SCIF, addressed his concerns. [1:54:01] In fact, we addressed three of the four concerns. [1:54:03] The fourth concern has nothing to do, in my opinion, with the security of it. [1:54:08] But I will tell you, Congressman, we would never put anybody at risk if we were in any doubt. [1:54:14] Thank you, sir. [1:54:15] And to follow up on that, I've been briefed. [1:54:17] I got the classified briefing from the IG on that. [1:54:20] It was very concerning. [1:54:21] I'd like to talk with you sometime off the record about that. [1:54:24] My following question, Secretary Mullen. [1:54:26] I find it interesting that Democrats are coming after you for these outages, [1:54:30] and also your own voting record when they voted against DHS funding on January 22nd, [1:54:36] March 5th, March 26th, and June 9th. [1:54:38] I'd like to hear your comments on that. [1:54:39] Thank you. [1:54:41] Unfortunately, every time we go dark, which we did for 120 days, [1:54:45] it damages our ability to do our job and protect the homeland. [1:54:49] I don't know why the Department of Homeland Security is even controversial. [1:54:51] We should all agree with protecting our communities. [1:54:54] And that's what we do, and we do a good job at it. [1:54:57] Thank you. [1:54:58] The gentleman's time has expired. [1:54:58] I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy, for five minutes of questions. [1:55:03] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:55:04] There's no question that our constituents feel less safe today. [1:55:07] And troublingly, it's the Trump administration that bears responsibility for that. [1:55:12] Through DHS's misguided, deeply flawed priorities, you've built out a mass detention system, [1:55:19] unleashed rogue immigration agents in our communities, and left families and neighborhoods [1:55:22] living in fear. [1:55:24] And yet, despite widespread public opposition and Donald Trump acknowledging himself, [1:55:29] his policies were, in his own words, too tough. [1:55:33] This administration has shown no signs of slowing down. [1:55:38] Secretary Mullen, do you agree with President Trump that this administration's policies were [1:55:44] too tough? [1:55:44] Yes or no? [1:55:45] Thank you. [1:55:48] Every single day, we go after the worst of the worst. [1:55:50] And underneath of President Trump's leadership, we've been able to take 2,705 terrorists off [1:55:56] our streets that was led underneath the Biden administration. [1:55:57] We've been able to remove 20,690 gang members off of our streets. [1:56:02] And countless murderers and child predators. [1:56:04] We were able to find 166,000 kids that were lost during the Biden administration. [1:56:09] So do you agree? [1:56:10] You're able to take record numbers of drugs off the streets and bring down overdoses by 46%. [1:56:15] So my point is that we're going after the worst of the worst every single day, and we're doing [1:56:20] a good job at it. [1:56:21] Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman. [1:56:22] Put that up in four minutes, please. [1:56:24] Reclaiming my time. [1:56:25] Yes or no? [1:56:26] Do you agree with the President that his own policies are too tough? [1:56:30] Underneath my tenure, the President and I had a conversation right off the bat, [1:56:36] and he said, let's go after the worst of the worst. [1:56:38] And that's exactly what we're doing. [1:56:39] Okay. [1:56:40] So the worst of the worst include more than 70% in a recent letter to me from you. [1:56:46] Thank you for finally responding after three months. [1:56:48] But over 70% of the detainees at the Batavia Federal Detention Facility have never been convicted [1:56:57] of a crime. [1:56:58] Yet they're detained. [1:57:00] Are they the worst of the worst? [1:57:03] As I stated earlier, which I know you had other things to do and you wasn't in the committee, [1:57:07] I said that every time we serve a warrant, we have what we call collateral criminals, [1:57:15] which are illegals that are with the person we're serving the warrant on. [1:57:17] It is our due diligence to find out who they are, [1:57:20] which is why we've been able to find the 2,705 terrorists. [1:57:24] And nationwide… [1:57:25] Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman. [1:57:26] …we deport 50% of the people we deport have criminal records. [1:57:29] Mr. Secretary, I'm reclaiming my time. [1:57:31] And I was voting for a new Speaker of the House because the American people have spoken against [1:57:35] these failed policies of DHS and this administration. [1:57:40] That's where I was. [1:57:41] And I'm here. [1:57:42] I'm asking you simple questions. [1:57:43] Yes or no. [1:57:43] You seem like you can't answer that. [1:57:46] Well, here's what I know. [1:57:47] You're expanding an ICE detention facility just south of my district in Batavia, New York, [1:57:55] at $17 million of taxpayer funds. [1:57:58] And at the same time, I find this single award construction contract that has been put forward [1:58:09] for a billion and a half dollars, one and a half billion dollars to detain people that no one in [1:58:18] good faith would consider the worst of the worst. [1:58:22] You know, a billion and a half dollars this contract is for. [1:58:27] I was just at the Batavia ICE detention facility last month. [1:58:32] Have you been there, Secretary Mullen? [1:58:35] No, I have not. [1:58:35] Okay. [1:58:36] Well, what I can tell you is that this is not a facility in need of a billion and a half dollar [1:58:42] facelift. [1:58:43] When people are starving in our country, when gas prices are skyrocketing, when people can't afford [1:58:49] the daily cost of living, and we're going to spend a billion and a half dollars on a facility [1:58:54] in Batavia, New York that no one wants or we don't need. [1:58:59] And the only reason that you're even considering an expansion is because 70% of the people that are [1:59:05] there, again, in your own words, have never committed a crime. [1:59:08] These are not the worst of the worst. [1:59:11] This is a failed policy of this administration. [1:59:13] And the American people have had enough, quite frankly. [1:59:16] And so with that, Mr. Secretary, I'm very concerned about the direction of your policies, [1:59:26] of DHS in general. [1:59:28] And that's just the tip of the iceberg. [1:59:31] How, in good faith, can you spend a billion and a half dollars on an ICE detention facility [1:59:38] in western New York? [1:59:40] Congressman, I agree. [1:59:41] We probably shouldn't have to spend the money, but because of sanctuary policies over your governor, [1:59:45] they're not allowed to cooperate with us, and we have to detain them. [1:59:47] We'd love to work with you guys in your state prisons or your state jails. [1:59:51] We could save all that money. [1:59:53] But because of your sanctuary policies, you're not allowed to work with us. [1:59:56] In fact, right now, inside your state penitentiaries, you have 18,746 [2:00:01] detainers that we're asking you to hand over that are murderers, child predators, rapists, [2:00:06] drug dealers, and yet you guys will not work with us on it. [2:00:10] So if you want to help, and you want to save the taxpayer dollars, let's do it. [2:00:14] Have your governor in the sanctuary policies. [2:00:16] Seventy-two percent of the detainees have never committed a crime. [2:00:20] That's not the worst of the worst. [2:00:21] They did. They entered the country illegally. [2:00:23] That's not the worst of the – that's not what the President of the United States [2:00:26] promised when he was campaigning years ago. [2:00:29] He said, we're going to deport the worst of the worst, is what he said. [2:00:33] And that was a lie. That was an aberration. [2:00:35] And that was a lie to the American people. [2:00:37] And you know it, and the people know it. [2:00:39] And that's why we have a new Congress coming in. [2:00:41] I yield back. [2:00:42] The gentleman yields back. [2:00:44] I now recognize the gentleman from New York. [2:00:45] Secretary Mullen, where are the worst of the worst right now? [2:00:50] We're catching them, or they're being shipped back. [2:00:52] Are they in our state prisons? [2:00:54] Most of them, yes. [2:00:55] Why can't you get to them in the state prisons and jurisdictions like New York? [2:00:58] Because they won't honor the detainers, [2:01:00] and they're going to release them back on the streets. [2:01:01] And that's what's happened. [2:01:02] Is that a choice that's being made? [2:01:03] A thousand percent choice by the sanctuary policies. [2:01:07] Who's making that choice, Mr. Secretary? [2:01:09] Elected officials that have chosen to choose criminals over law-abiding citizens. [2:01:14] Thank you, Mr. Secretary. [2:01:15] Switching gears a little bit. [2:01:16] Director Clayton, good to see you. [2:01:18] You're the Director of National Intelligence? [2:01:22] The nation's top intelligence officials? [2:01:24] One of them. [2:01:25] The 18 or so entities report to you? [2:01:28] Yes, they do. [2:01:29] Do you believe in coincidences, Mr. Director? [2:01:33] I believe in exploring coincidences. [2:01:36] That's a good answer. [2:01:37] My constituents and I, we believe sometimes in coincidences, but maybe sometimes not. [2:01:42] And I'm a little worried that what's happened this last week are a little beyond coincidences. [2:01:48] Thursday, Microsoft 365 went down. [2:01:51] Friday, a nationwide ground stop. [2:01:53] Monday, United Airlines grounded flights. [2:01:55] Also Monday, Chase and Wells Fargo experienced banking disruptions. [2:01:59] And yesterday, we learned of a network disruption at the NSA. [2:02:04] Five major disruptions in less than a week. [2:02:06] Five different explanations. [2:02:09] All while America is engaged in conflict with Iran. [2:02:12] Russia is illegally, unfairly fighting Ukraine. [2:02:16] And China is growing increasingly aggressive. [2:02:19] You've said before, Mr. Director, that there's no indication of a coordinated cyber attack. [2:02:25] But have our intelligence agencies affirmatively ruled out a connection? [2:02:30] Or have you simply not yet found one? [2:02:32] Like I said, very right to ask. [2:02:36] It's your constituents are right to ask. [2:02:39] The questions that we have asked that give me a very high level of confidence, [2:02:43] that there's no coordination and no state sponsorship around these are. [2:02:47] They are different causes, first of all, in those. [2:02:50] We have then looked inside the government, inside the private sector. [2:02:56] You know, what are the TTPs? [2:02:57] What are the techniques, tactics and procedures that have been used [2:03:02] in the past for that type of activity? [2:03:04] Do we see any of them here? [2:03:06] We do not see them. [2:03:07] Director, when you and your folks are analyzing these five and more instances, [2:03:10] are you analyzing them independently? [2:03:12] Or are you comparing the TTPs on one to the other? [2:03:16] Both. [2:03:17] Great. [2:03:17] Secretary Mullen, we've heard explanations involving faulty routers, [2:03:22] software defects, and routine maintenance. [2:03:25] The Director says he's confident. [2:03:27] But on a scale of 1 to 10, how confident are you that these five incidents are a result of [2:03:32] technical failures and not a sophisticated adversary exploiting vulnerabilities [2:03:40] that may resemble ordinary failures? [2:03:42] I've said this publicly. [2:03:43] I'm 98 percent confident that this has nothing to do with our adversaries [2:03:49] hacking or going after our systems. [2:03:51] I saw the FBI Deputy Director nodding his head earlier. [2:03:54] I think he might have something to say. [2:03:55] I would make that same assumption. [2:03:57] I mean, we have people, our cyber experts are out on scene with a lot of these companies [2:04:03] in an abundance of caution. [2:04:05] And again, to foot-stomp it, we have seen no malicious activity as of today. [2:04:10] We are going to continue. [2:04:12] We are going to continue working with DHS, working with the DNI to be 120 percent sure. [2:04:18] But as of right now, again, no malicious cyber activity. [2:04:21] Jump back in quick because I don't need to ask another question. [2:04:23] You've got 10 seconds. [2:04:24] Let's be clear. [2:04:24] You are also right. [2:04:25] There are far and malign actors who would seek to do us harm. [2:04:29] That's one of the threats. [2:04:30] So broadly speaking, you've done the diligence. [2:04:33] You've done the investigations. [2:04:34] You've gone through the protocols. [2:04:35] You haven't found anything. [2:04:36] What's your gut say? [2:04:37] Just a coincidence? [2:04:39] Five in one week while we're fighting Iran, while China's getting aggressive, [2:04:42] Russia and Ukraine. [2:04:44] Does your gut say just a coincidence? [2:04:47] It does. [2:04:48] And let me tell you why. [2:04:48] It's an informed opinion. [2:04:51] And the reason it's informed is we are engaged in a substantial increase in upgrades. [2:04:58] The number of patches, the number of upgrades that we're undertaking in the public and private [2:05:02] Thank you. [2:05:02] Let me get back to my last question before my time expires and the chairman gavels me out. [2:05:08] 25 years ago, we had horrific attacks on this nation. [2:05:12] Nearly 3,000 Americans were murdered that day. [2:05:15] And for the years afterwards, the nation contemplated, how the hell did that happen? [2:05:21] And one of the four key takeaways was a lack of imagination, that there was other things about [2:05:28] lack of communication and coordination, some duplicative services that were stovepiped. [2:05:32] But one of the key four takeaways was a lack of imagination. [2:05:35] Folks didn't figure out that 19 civilians could hijack planes, use them as cruise missiles to attack [2:05:41] innocent people here. [2:05:43] I would ask you this. [2:05:45] Can you have, make sure that you and your folks are having the largest imagination possible [2:05:50] to ensure that this isn't just a coincidence, that this is a coincidence? [2:05:54] Can you ensure that you are imaginative, you're using opposition research and everything else [2:06:00] to ensure that this is not nefarious? [2:06:03] Let me give you one example of the types of things we do and I expect we will do here. [2:06:07] We call it red teaming. [2:06:08] We say, okay, let's say we wanted to do this and not be detected and make it look like it [2:06:14] wasn't coordinated and try to establish all of that. [2:06:17] That's the kind of exercise that our experts at the FBI and the like will go on. [2:06:22] And I think we should be doing more of that. [2:06:23] Thank you, gentlemen. [2:06:24] Appreciate it. [2:06:24] The gentleman's time has expired. [2:06:27] Votes have been called. [2:06:29] Just to let you all know, one vote, I believe. [2:06:32] I now recognize a gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw, for five minutes of questions. [2:06:36] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:06:37] And one of the most serious threats we face is cyber attacks targeting the technology [2:06:42] systems and the critical infrastructure that Americans rely on every day, our water systems, [2:06:47] our hospitals, our banking networks. [2:06:50] And those threats, those attacks are exploding. [2:06:54] They're not growing, they're exploding. [2:06:57] And the recent tech outages are not coincidences. [2:07:00] And they are connected to cybersecurity because organizations, businesses, government agencies [2:07:07] are frantically patching systems to close vulnerabilities that advanced AI can exploit [2:07:13] at a speed and scale unlike anything we've ever seen. [2:07:16] This week, the FBI warned that hackers are using autonomous AI tools to target governments [2:07:22] and businesses in the United States. [2:07:24] Is that true, Mr. Deputy Director? [2:07:26] We put out a flash message on that. [2:07:31] Yeah, thank you. [2:07:32] We are under attack. [2:07:33] We're under attack. [2:07:34] But at precisely the moment that these threats were growing, the Trump administration gutted [2:07:42] CISA, the agency responsible for helping protect us against those attacks. [2:07:46] And Mr. Secretary, respectfully, it is not true [2:07:51] that the gutting of CISA had no impact on its ability to accomplish its mission. [2:07:55] Don't ask me, ask its former director, its former director in this administration. [2:08:00] He said, quote, the reduction in personnel has limited CISA's ability to fully support [2:08:06] national security imperatives and administration, Trump administration priorities. [2:08:11] Mr. Secretary, at the beginning of this Trump administration, approximately 3,400 people worked [2:08:19] at CISA. [2:08:20] In June, you testified before this committee that CISA had approximately 2,200 employees, [2:08:28] but needed 2,800. [2:08:31] Is that correct? [2:08:32] Is that consistent with your previous testimony? [2:08:34] Some of those, I believe that is. [2:08:36] I don't see the testimony in front of me. [2:08:37] Some of those numbers have changed because- [2:08:39] I understand. [2:08:40] And the chairman asked you this question earlier. [2:08:42] You didn't have it. [2:08:43] Maybe you have it now. [2:08:44] How many fully onboarded employees does CISA have today as we sit here? [2:08:52] As I told the chairman, I'll get- [2:08:53] All right. [2:08:54] Mr. Secretary, you've been here for hours. [2:08:56] And earlier, you said a member's staff wasn't serving him well. [2:09:00] If you wanted to tell us that number today, any number of those people behind you could have [2:09:05] given you that number. [2:09:06] Either they're not serving you well, or you don't want to tell us how many onboarded employees. [2:09:11] Reclaiming my time. [2:09:12] A lot of members saying we're going to get back to you on the answer. [2:09:14] Reclaiming my time. [2:09:16] Mr. Secretary, let's be clear about what happened. [2:09:18] The Trump administration inherited a CISA workforce of 3,400 people. [2:09:25] They fired and pushed out more than a thousand cyber defenders [2:09:30] at precisely the moment the cyber threat was exploding. [2:09:34] You came before us and said correctly that you needed hundreds of those employees back. [2:09:43] So I have a simple question for you. [2:09:46] Was it a mistake in 2025 for those employees, [2:09:51] the thousand-plus CISA employees that you now need back, [2:09:54] was it a mistake for them to have been fired and pushed out, yes or no? [2:10:00] I wasn't there when that was made. [2:10:03] I don't know the reasoning behind it. [2:10:05] So I'm not going to talk about why someone was let go when I wasn't involved in it. [2:10:09] Well, none of them were let go for cause. [2:10:11] They made a decision to push out a thousand people at CISA. [2:10:16] Well, actually we do. [2:10:17] They made no claims. [2:10:18] You now say you need them back. [2:10:20] You saw that file? [2:10:21] If it wasn't a mistake, why did you tell Congress you needed hundreds of them back? [2:10:27] Not them back. [2:10:29] I didn't say those employees back. [2:10:30] I said we're hiring new people. [2:10:32] We need to bring experts in. [2:10:33] The new employees that have been onboarded at CISA recently, [2:10:38] are any of them among the thousand-plus who were pushed out and fired? [2:10:42] I don't know. [2:10:42] You have that information? [2:10:43] I don't know. [2:10:43] You have no information about CISA's workforce when you come before this committee today. [2:10:49] Sir, we have 270,000. [2:10:49] As our cyber threat facing the American people is exploding, you don't have basic information. [2:10:56] If you need 2,800, and you have today somewhere between 2,200 and 2,800, you don't know. [2:11:03] If you need 2,800, you don't have them all today, what work, what critical work that you seem to [2:11:10] believe, correctly, I agree, needs to be done, is not getting done while those positions are vacant? [2:11:17] What work is not getting done that you would like to see done at CISA? [2:11:20] I think, I don't know if you were here earlier because I wasn't- [2:11:22] I was. [2:11:23] Then you heard me say we have not missed a mission. [2:11:26] We're very mission- [2:11:27] Then why do you need them? [2:11:28] We need to address the emerging threats. [2:11:31] The threats don't exist today. [2:11:34] The threats are always involving. [2:11:35] They're always moving, and we're always trying to catch them. [2:11:38] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:11:40] I yield back. [2:11:41] The gentleman yields back, and I recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ogles. [2:11:44] Ogles for five minutes. [2:11:46] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses. [2:11:49] I have the privilege of serving as the chairman of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure [2:11:53] Protection Subcommittee, and I thank the chairman. [2:11:56] You know, obviously, the last few days have been very trying for you gentlemen and your [2:12:01] respective agencies, and quite frankly, stressful for the American people. [2:12:04] And so let's jump the pond for a moment. [2:12:06] Look at the last three weeks. [2:12:08] You look at India, where you have the Crafty Falcon. [2:12:11] The crypto wallets were raided. [2:12:13] North Korea hit Binance, $6.3 billion over a 20-minute operation. [2:12:18] November 16th, you have the JavaScript code through Optimizely hit, again, roughly 178 organizations. [2:12:26] And now you look at headlines from Polymarket, and specifically Yahoo Finance, saying that AI will [2:12:32] make the next 12 months a slaughterhouse for crypto security. [2:12:36] So as the American people hear those headlines, see those headlines, obviously they're concerned [2:12:40] in the context of the last few days. [2:12:42] So I'll start with you, Director Clayton. [2:12:45] Talk to the American people. [2:12:47] Reassure them that what we're seeing today isn't orchestrated, per se. [2:12:53] Then also that we're watching overseas what's happening, what's occurring. [2:12:57] So we see the resources being deployed by North Korea, by China, by Iran, et cetera, [2:13:03] against our allies and what may be coming if we're not ready. [2:13:05] Thank you. [2:13:06] Thank you for the opportunity to do that. [2:13:10] As we've all talked about, and with the processes that we put in place, [2:13:15] what we have seen over the last 10 days is not an orchestrated attack by a far and malign actor. [2:13:20] We do not have any indication that it would be. [2:13:23] But your question about what's going on in cyberspace globally is an excellent one, [2:13:29] and one that we are keenly focused on. [2:13:31] Computing capabilities, the overall processing, [2:13:36] is increasing exponentially. [2:13:39] The applications that then run on that computing technology, [2:13:43] they are increasing in terms of their sophistication. [2:13:46] In that environment, our digital infrastructure [2:13:49] is becoming increasingly outdated and needs to be upgraded. [2:13:53] The better we do that, the better America will lead in commerce, [2:13:59] in defense, in national security, and all the things that matter. [2:14:03] This is a dramatic change that's going through [2:14:06] the technology infrastructure around the globe, and we need to lead it. [2:14:09] Mr. Secretary? [2:14:11] Sir, I would agree with what Jay is saying in this. [2:14:19] He has definitely stepped up to meet the moment, and he's leading the charge here. [2:14:25] Sir, thank you for the opportunity. [2:14:28] I couldn't agree more on the breadth, depth, and scale of our cyber taxes increasing in general, [2:14:37] from state actors and from criminal actors. [2:14:38] In fact, one of the things we've done recently under Director Patel's leadership, [2:14:42] probably one of the biggest reorganizations at headquarters that we have done, [2:14:46] is we've completely reorganized our cyber branch. [2:14:50] We have made that a branch before it had fallen under another branch. [2:14:54] We've taken the entire cyber mission, intelligence, investigation, our capabilities, [2:15:00] and our cyber security of our own systems. [2:15:02] We've put those under one accountable executive in order to streamline, enhance our investigations, [2:15:09] and stay ahead of this emerging threat. [2:15:11] The other thing we've done is we've also done a lot of operations and initiatives, [2:15:17] not only offensively, we did Operation Riptide earlier this year. [2:15:21] That resulted in over 200 arrests, the freezing season over 23 million, [2:15:25] so we did that offensive capability in order to stay ahead of the threat. [2:15:28] We also launched Operation Winter Shield, which was a defensive initiative, again, [2:15:33] that we worked with the private sector, where we reached out to something like 600 [2:15:37] different private sector companies in the critical infrastructure space in the matter of about 60 days, [2:15:43] and we worked with our partners at CISA and the DNI to increase their cyber hydrant, [2:15:50] work with them to harden their networks, and so we are dumping a ... Director Patel has been very, [2:15:54] very aggressive in staying ahead of this cyber threat based on the American public's concern, [2:16:04] and based on what the DNI and the Secretary have said. [2:16:06] Thank you, gentlemen. [2:16:07] You know, Mr. Chairman, you've got 30 seconds or so left. [2:16:10] I mean, I think it's important for the American people to understand, [2:16:13] is that under this president, these agencies inherited a mess. [2:16:17] They've spent the last each of their tenure fixing what was broken. [2:16:23] Meanwhile, we are under global threats day in and day out, and yet America is safe. [2:16:29] The bad actors don't have to be right every time. [2:16:32] They have to be right once, right? [2:16:35] These guys have to be right every single time. [2:16:37] So thank you all for your service. [2:16:39] God bless America. [2:16:40] I yield back. [2:16:41] I thank the gentleman. [2:16:43] The chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Ms. Mahea. [2:16:46] Thank you. [2:16:48] Mr. Secretary, while DHS initially abandoned plans to convert a Roxbury warehouse into a detention camp [2:16:57] in Roxbury, New Jersey, it has since reversed course. [2:17:02] Can you please share a timeline for this conversion and a timeline for its anticipated opening? [2:17:10] We were wanting to not have to do that. [2:17:12] We're trying to work with your governor. [2:17:14] Timeline only, sir. [2:17:15] I'm just saying, explain to you, we're trying not to have to do that. [2:17:19] Because of the circumstances, working with your governor, it forced us to. [2:17:23] We're still putting it out for bid. [2:17:25] Once we get the bid complete, we'll let you know. [2:17:27] Got it. [2:17:28] So you don't have a timeline. [2:17:31] Has any work, any conversion work begun at the facility? [2:17:36] Right now, we're still looking out and trying to figure out what is the best approach forward. [2:17:41] So should I take that as a no? [2:17:44] We haven't started full construction, no. [2:17:45] We're looking at what we need to do for the bidding. [2:17:48] So full construction means partial construction has begun? [2:17:51] No, full construction means that all we're doing is putting it out for bid right now. [2:17:55] Let me ask this again very clearly. [2:17:57] Has any work to convert the Roxbury warehouse into a detention camp? [2:18:05] Has any work begun? [2:18:08] Ma'am, don't call it a detention camp. [2:18:11] Those are ridiculous words that you're using. [2:18:13] Okay, reclaiming my time. [2:18:15] May I ask, according to a court order, [2:18:19] any conversion work is restricted pending an environmental review. [2:18:24] Has that review been conducted? [2:18:26] As I said, this is part of the bid process. [2:18:28] So we're still putting it up for bid and that's part of it. [2:18:32] Sir, it is such a clear question. [2:18:35] Has there been an environmental review conducted? [2:18:39] We're still going through all the all the requirements right now. [2:18:41] Okay, so that's a no. [2:18:42] I don't know if it's been completed. [2:18:44] Okay, that's I don't know. [2:18:46] That's a fair answer. [2:18:47] Okay, so let me ask. [2:18:51] Again, ICE had admitted that they had detained 14 individuals at Roxbury on September 4th and [2:18:59] September 8th for processing. [2:19:01] Can you share, have any detainees ever been brought inside of the warehouse? [2:19:08] Ma'am, I'm not familiar with it as they have. [2:19:10] I don't know. [2:19:10] Okay, so you don't know. [2:19:12] Do you know if your officers, ICE agents, anyone under your jurisdiction, [2:19:20] are they informed about any court decisions about a facility like Roxbury, i.e., [2:19:26] would they know that there is a court order saying this facility is not to be used? [2:19:31] That communication would be with acting director, [2:19:33] and I don't know if he's informed all his employees. [2:19:36] Okay, may I ask, since September 8th, have any detainees been brought to the site either [2:19:42] inside or outside during any moment of your tenure? [2:19:46] Ma'am, if you'd like, I can take that and get it back to you. [2:19:48] Oh, I would love that. [2:19:50] I would love that, actually. [2:19:52] Can you, may I make a request? [2:19:54] Will you commit to submitting to this committee to my office and to the state of New Jersey [2:20:01] your timeline for the conversion, your timeline for the environmental review, [2:20:07] and your timeline, anticipated timeline for an opening of this facility? [2:20:11] What is statutory required of us? [2:20:12] We will do. [2:20:12] Okay, you just said that you would share information, [2:20:15] and now I'm asking for three pieces of information. [2:20:18] You just, you said that you would share the information on the environment. [2:20:21] You asked me questions about operations. [2:20:23] I said that I can, I'll take that and get back to you. [2:20:26] The questions you're asking me now, [2:20:28] I said that I will take those that the statutory required of me to report those to you. [2:20:31] I will. [2:20:32] Okay, so what I have, what I am requesting for this committee, the state of New Jersey, [2:20:37] and my office is for you to inform us on when that environmental review will take place. [2:20:44] Are you able to share that information, yes or no, at this point or at a future date? [2:20:49] Let me get back to you on that. [2:20:51] Okay. [2:20:52] I'd be happy to. [2:20:52] Let me, now let me shift a little bit. [2:20:56] So you said that you do not cherry pick laws. [2:20:59] May I ask, do you believe that citizens and non-citizens alike have due process and equal [2:21:04] protection rights according to our constitution? [2:21:08] Ma'am, our immigration policy is policy that Congress set. [2:21:10] That's not what I'm asking. [2:21:11] I'm asking. [2:21:11] And I follow that policy. [2:21:12] I'm trying to understand your understanding of our constitution. [2:21:15] They're not one and the same. [2:21:17] Are you aware, do you believe that citizens and non-citizens alike have due process and [2:21:25] equal protection laws afforded to them according to the 14th amendment of our constitution? [2:21:31] Yes or no? [2:21:32] American citizens have unique rights that are given to them. [2:21:35] That's not what I'm asking. [2:21:37] But it's okay if you don't understand, if you do not have awareness of our constitution. [2:21:42] That's totally okay. [2:21:43] It's shocking, but I'll let that pass. [2:21:47] Let me ask. [2:21:48] New Jersey passed a law barring ICE agents from being masked when they're carrying out [2:21:55] operations and yet officers, agents persist. [2:21:59] Is that cherry picking laws? [2:22:01] Adherence to laws? [2:22:02] As I said, ma'am, I enforce the immigration policies that Congress sets. [2:22:08] If you want to change your policies, you want to change your laws. [2:22:10] So you ignore state law? [2:22:12] Ma'am, I enforce the laws by immigration policies. [2:22:14] I do ignore state law. [2:22:15] Thank you. [2:22:16] The gentlewoman, Ms. Biggs, is recognized. [2:22:21] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to each of you gentlemen, the service, [2:22:28] what you do for our country. [2:22:31] I've just been sitting here listening, and it's really appalling to me at how members on the other [2:22:37] side want to put illegals over our American citizens, and I find it kind of disgusting. [2:22:47] But thank you for the service that you do. [2:22:52] Anti-American radicals are converging on our campuses and in our streets. [2:22:58] In the 25 years since 9-11, the United States has faced violence from radical leftists and [2:23:05] Islamist extremists, raising concerns about cooperation between these movements. [2:23:12] Their sources of funding and support also deserve scrutiny, including potential links to foreign [2:23:18] governments, such as Iran and China, and organizations funded by George Soros and Naveel Roy Singham. [2:23:27] The alliance elements of the radical left and the Islamist extremists, it's not new. [2:23:33] A decade ago, the Soros-funded Open Society Foundations were already funding organizations [2:23:41] affiliated with Linda Sorosauer, who has connections to the Council on American Islamic Relations [2:23:49] and Extremist Figures. [2:23:51] Likewise, Naveel Roy Singham's network fuels both groups of radicals as well. [2:23:56] The House Ways and Means Committee is investigating foreign link funding involving organizations [2:24:03] connected to Naveel Roy Singham. [2:24:06] And in July, the committee announced subpoenas to Breakthrough News, Tri-Continental, [2:24:12] and the People's Forum as part of that investigation. [2:24:17] These cases show how layers of grants and intermediary organizations obscure who is paying [2:24:25] for political messaging and organizing. [2:24:29] Secretary Mullen or Director Clayton or Director Rahu, I would love to have your input on these. [2:24:38] My question is, what is DHS doing to uncover these networks and identify foreign influence aimed at [2:24:47] destabilizing American society? [2:24:49] Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. This is what our 80,000 badge officers throughout DHS does [2:24:56] every day. And we couldn't do it without direct coordination with our state and local partners. [2:25:02] This is why sanctuary cities and sanctuary states are so dangerous, because it creates a melting pot [2:25:08] and a safe haven for this type of activity, because they realize that we're getting no cooperation from [2:25:15] the people that are patrolling the neighborhood daily. And yet we're still able to do our job. [2:25:21] It's frustrating, though, because we're tasked to do the job and just protect the homeland. [2:25:26] But yet we fight the very people that written or that wrote the law to do that. It's frustrating when [2:25:34] sanctuary politicians are able to just ignore federal law, ignore what law-abiding citizens actually [2:25:45] do want and protect their constituents. And it puts the American people at risk. [2:25:51] Thank you. [2:25:54] Ma'am, thank you for that question. I believe what you're also referring to is the President's NSPM [2:26:01] 7 Memorandum on anti-authoritism and anti-government rhetoric, violence and the like. And I can tell you, [2:26:10] we have moved a lot of that space under Director Patel's leadership. We have stood up what we are [2:26:15] calling the Joint Mission Center that's housed out of FBI headquarters. It's us and about 10 different [2:26:21] agencies to include DHS. And we have taken different pieces of our organization because that thread [2:26:30] encompasses our criminal, our criminal folks, our CT folks, as you mentioned, influence, our CI folks, [2:26:36] as well as our cyber folks. And we put them all under the same roof to act as a clearinghouse. And we [2:26:43] process leads. We put leads out. We connect the dots, particularly when it comes to the funding, [2:26:49] because we know there's funding behind some of these violent protests, some of these violent acts [2:26:53] that you're seeing out in the media right now that we're seeing in some of these cities. And we're [2:26:58] pushing those things out to our JTTFs who are the actuating arm of that particular mission center. [2:27:04] I just want to throw out, I can't talk specifics about cases and confirm or deny cases on those [2:27:10] individuals you mentioned. But I do want to talk about some stats that we have done in a very short [2:27:17] time under the JMC. Right now, roughly, we've got about 2,766 anti-government slash anti-authority cases. [2:27:26] That's up about 22%. We've actually issued, in conjunction with our partners at Department of [2:27:31] Justice, 220 indictments. That's up about 70%. 155 judicial complaints with DOJ. That's up 66%. [2:27:40] And so, all that to say, we are taking that threat very seriously. We're getting some massive wins [2:27:45] in that space. And we're going to continue to work that aggressively to keep our country safe. [2:27:49] Thank you. The gentlewoman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, [2:27:55] Mr. Evans, for five minutes of questioning. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member. And thank you, [2:28:00] of course, to all of the witnesses for coming out today. My first question is going to be to the [2:28:04] Secretary. Good to see you again. Border security. We've talked about what a disaster it was under the [2:28:12] four years of the previous administration. We've talked about how we've secured the border, which was [2:28:16] the number one thing I heard from my constituents two years ago. We've secured the border the last two [2:28:20] years. But unfortunately, now we're starting to see reporting coming out about caravans and cartels [2:28:29] anxiously awaiting the new Congress to be seated so that they can hopefully go back to business as [2:28:34] usual. In fact, we saw reporting of a caravan leaving from the southern Mexico area, November 10th and 11th, [2:28:41] coming north to the United States, hoping to take advantage of the new Congress. And what they hope is [2:28:47] a relaxing of the border security measures that I think everybody in America wants to see. And so the [2:28:53] first question to you is, can you comment on any intel or other reporting about how cartels and caravans [2:29:01] are hoping to exploit potentially relaxed border security procedures in the next Congress? [2:29:08] Under the previous Biden administration, the cartels turned human trafficking into a multi-billion [2:29:15] dollar industry. And they're selling, unfortunately, very vulnerable people a bill of goods that they [2:29:21] can't deliver. They will not be allowed to enter the United States underneath President Trump's watch. [2:29:27] Our border is secure and it will remain secure. Fortunately, we have pretty good cooperation [2:29:32] with Mexico right now. And Mexico has assured us that they will not make it to our southern border, [2:29:38] their northern border. They also realize that if they do, they'll have an immigration issue on their [2:29:43] hands because we're not letting them in. It's completely closed. So for anyone that's thinking [2:29:47] about joining one of these caravans and allowing the cartels to extort dollars from you, [2:29:52] you're wasting your money. It's not going to happen. You're not coming into the United States [2:29:58] unless you do it the proper way. And that's following our immigration policy that Congress set. [2:30:03] Thank you, Secretary. Deputy Director Rhea, thank you for coming today. And thank you for the work [2:30:09] that you and everyone else in the FBI does. My background, I was a cop for 10 years and so worked [2:30:14] work with you guys on some bigger cases. Question to you is around overdoses and violent crime, [2:30:21] specifically as it regards sanctuary jurisdictions. I hail from Colorado, where unfortunately we are [2:30:27] both a sanctuary state with sanctuary municipalities within the state. And we can see the data around [2:30:32] the impact that's having on public safety nationally. In your comments, you talk about how violent crime [2:30:37] down, overdose down nationally. But in Colorado, the Common Sense Institute, which is a bipartisan [2:30:44] think tank that actually has the former Democrat district attorney for the city and county of [2:30:48] Denver on their public safety portion of the think tank. Common Sense Institute says 1600 Coloradans [2:30:57] are dead today that should have still been alive had Colorado merely followed the national declining [2:31:03] trend in overdose deaths. But overdose deaths continue to go up in Colorado. Same thing with violent crime, [2:31:09] nationally violent crime down in Colorado, Denver specifically, murders are up 30 percent compared [2:31:15] to just this time last year. And so the question to you is, do sanctuary jurisdictions contribute to [2:31:20] higher crime rates and higher overdose death rates? I think to your to your point, Congressman, [2:31:27] we have seen little pockets of areas where the violent crime rate has actually gone up. I think [2:31:32] nationally, as I referenced before, we're largely down about 10 percent violent crime. The murder rate [2:31:39] the last 21 months has been down 30 percent. A lot of our wins in that space, in addition to our renewed [2:31:46] focus in the in the FBI on violent crime, a lot of our wins in that space comes from our relationships we [2:31:52] have with our state, local and other federal governments. And so if there's not a lot of support in a [2:31:57] specific city for their state, local and federal governments, then that makes it that makes it very [2:32:03] difficult for us, obviously, as a task force or those agencies in general to continue with the national [2:32:09] decline of violent crime. Thank you for that. Director Clayton, last question to you. Again, I was a cop [2:32:16] for 10 years, so I know to get a warrant, you need probable cause, which means you have to have enough [2:32:21] information to be able to articulate probable cause. So speaking to FISA, that's how we get that original [2:32:28] information that starts off a FISA request. We know the statutory authority for FISA 702 lapsed in June [2:32:35] 2026, and so even though the program is operational through 2027, through a one-year extension, have your [2:32:42] agencies experienced any significant or notable disruptions in collection? To date, in terms of [2:32:51] collection, we have not seen a material decline, but there is a subset. If those authorities lapse, [2:32:59] the providers, and let's be clear, they provide us with information about foreign persons outside the [2:33:06] United States, the providers are unlikely to feel comfortable continuing to provide that information. [2:33:13] Thank you, Annette. I'm out of time. Yield back. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. I now [2:33:17] recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green. Mr. Green, you're recognized for five minutes of questioning. [2:33:23] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for appearing today, and I have been monitoring [2:33:30] this hearing for the edification of persons who have commentary about those who do not know what has [2:33:37] been said. Secretary Rubio, who is also the director of national security, I believe, [2:33:48] has indicated that there is zero evidence that the outages are connected. You know what I speak when I say [2:33:57] outages? I think zero is a pretty strong statement. So I'd just like to get your commentary. Do you agree [2:34:05] with Secretary Rubio? And I'll start with you, Mr. Ray? Zero? Thank you, Congressman. As I've stated [2:34:13] of a formative... If you don't mind, a yes or no would suffice. And if you say anything other than [2:34:17] yes or no, I'll just take a yes. We... Okay, I've taken your answers yes. We are. Okay. Let's go on to [2:34:24] Mr. Clayton. Based on all the work we've done, we have seen no evidence to that effect. Thank you, [2:34:31] sir. Appreciate your answer. Mr. Secretary? Appreciate you showing up two hours and 40 minutes late. [2:34:36] If you monitor... Excuse me, would you ask him to hold for a moment, please? I'm not late. I've been monitoring this [2:34:46] hearing. I don't have to sit here... And you would know... I don't have to sit here... Excuse me, [2:34:51] Mr. Chairman. It's my time. I don't have to sit here and watch you perform. I don't have to do that. [2:34:58] I can look at you on television. And that's what I've been doing. Now that you've been properly [2:35:05] chastised, let me go on. Do you agree with the Secretary? Like I said, if you've been watching it, [2:35:14] you would... I was watching. I'm asking you, do you agree? Do you know the question? I take it then you're [2:35:18] saying we're 98% confident that there is no affairs... Is your answer yes? I take it as yes. [2:35:24] Okay. Very good. Now let's go on to the next question. He's also said there is no imminent [2:35:29] threat of a possible Iran dirty bomb plot. No imminent threat. Do you agree with that assessment [2:35:37] as well? That's a question that hasn't been asked. Well, I don't have to... Mr. Chairman, [2:35:44] since it's my time, would you kindly restore some of my time given that I've had to have this... [2:35:49] Well, we'll just do that. I feel like I've talked to you guys before about this. What we'll do is, [2:35:56] you ask the questions. You can't tell him how to answer it. And if you want to reclaim your time, [2:36:02] please do suspend the clock right now. Okay. Please, please. That's how we're going to... [2:36:07] Do you agree that he can't tell me how to attend meetings? You do agree with that, don't you? [2:36:15] Let's ask... We can ask the questions. Okay. All right. And then he'll answer them. But again, [2:36:20] you ask, he'll answer. Okay. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me just say this. For the record, [2:36:23] let's let the record reflect that I've been viewing this meeting, this hearing, and that I don't have [2:36:29] to be here in his company. Quite frankly, I don't enjoy being in his company, but I can come. Okay. [2:36:36] Well, I'm going to tolerate him as long as I have to. There's some agreement. Okay. I'm going to [2:36:40] tolerate him as long as I have to. Yes. Okay. Okay. Let's... Okay. Okay. We have two minutes and 20 seconds left here. [2:36:46] Let's get questions, please. Secretary, if he reclaims his time, please. Again, but no directing [2:36:52] on how he... You asked the question, no directing the witness on how to answer. Let's get through this. [2:36:58] We're almost done with this today, and I appreciate you both being here. This is a very important [2:37:04] hearing, and I'm glad that you all made the time to be here. Thank you. All right. Now, let's try it [2:37:10] again. Do you agree with the assessment that Iran is not an imminent threat in terms of a dirty bomb [2:37:20] plot? Yes. Okay. I appreciate you saying that, because my suspicion is that the president is [2:37:28] looking for a reason to take kinetic action against Iran, and if he can conclude in his mind, as he's [2:37:36] concluded, by the way, that he won the election, that he lost, that DEI was the cause of an accident out [2:37:44] at the airport, if he can conclude in his mind, then he'll take us back into Iran with kinetic activity, [2:37:50] which is another way of saying war. The president has not come to Congress to get congressional [2:37:58] authorization for his wars. The president has to be impeached for that. He has to be. He must... If we [2:38:06] don't impeach him, every president after him will assume that you can take this country to war without [2:38:13] consulting Congress. I believe that notwithstanding his behavior sense, if he goes on to become a saint, [2:38:23] he still has to be impeached, because if a person robs a bank and he decides that he's going to return [2:38:29] the money, he still has to be prosecuted. So the president must be impeached, and any members who [2:38:37] contend that he shouldn't be impeached, they are aiding and abetting the president's behavior, [2:38:43] and it's sinful. Now, quickly, for you, Mr. Secretary, Alex Preddy, no information about a verdict in [2:38:55] that case. Is there going to be... Are there any charges being filed? Once again, if you're monitoring, [2:39:00] you would have known that I said this was still in your investigation. Well, you don't have to tell me [2:39:03] about if I'd monitored. I heard you. I want you to answer me. Now, you did what I asked. I'm going to ask you again. [2:39:11] Another question. You do know that Mr. Perez was arrested within 10 days after he was accused of [2:39:18] assaulting an officer in Austin, Texas. Do you know that? I'm not commenting about an ongoing [2:39:24] investigation. Well, you don't comment on very much to hide yourself, but let me just say this. [2:39:29] You want to disguise your commentary, but Mr. Chairman, let me close with this. We have not heard [2:39:38] anything in terms of what's happening with Alex Preddy. Mr. Perez was charged in nine days after [2:39:45] being accused of assaulting an officer. It's been more than nine months with Alex Preddy. [2:39:50] Secretary has talked about how somebody ought to be arrested. [2:39:53] Mr. Secretary, you ought to be arrested. [2:39:55] The gentleman's time is expired. [2:40:01] I hope you enjoy your forced retirement. I'm enjoying it more than you know. [2:40:06] And you will know. [2:40:07] The gentleman's time is expired. Now recognize the gentleman from California, [2:40:11] Mr. Fong, for five minutes of questions. [2:40:13] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. [2:40:17] Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your leadership. Cybersecurity [2:40:20] and our cybersecurity needs and challenges are now front and center. I appreciate and I'm grateful [2:40:27] that you highlighted in your comments the need to grow CISA's capabilities. I want to thank you [2:40:33] as well and your team for working with me on my bipartisan bill that I've introduced, the Bridge AI [2:40:38] Act. This bill would authorize CISA to create a pipeline and bring private sector AI professionals [2:40:45] into the agency to advance its mission of safeguarding U.S. critical infrastructure. [2:40:50] As you know, the private sector has a lot of talent and expertise that we love to bring into [2:40:55] CISA to enhance America's security. I wanted to get your perspective on this type of legislation [2:41:02] and how we can make it easier to bring the best talent into public service. [2:41:06] Congressman, I spoke with Congressman Gondheimer on this. I think this is a very forward-leaning [2:41:11] bipartisan bill that we need more of. This gives us exactly the flexibility we need to compete with [2:41:17] industry and bring in the best that we can into CISA and pay them competitively. [2:41:23] I appreciate Congressman Gondheimer's partnership on this. It is bipartisan legislation and so [2:41:30] certainly look forward to working with you on trying to get this implemented. Earlier this year, [2:41:36] I held a roundtable by Mr. Secretary with Chairman Garbarino and brought him into my district, brought him to [2:41:41] California. We gathered representatives from CISA, hospitals, military bases, utility companies, [2:41:50] local government. Certainly all the infrastructure, when we talk about rural communities, [2:41:56] are all targets to cyber attacks and certainly the increase in cyber attacks over the years have grown [2:42:03] exponentially. I wanted to get your sense of how we can work with you, what Congress can do to assist [2:42:10] these rural entities and modernizing their cybersecurity networks. Are there additional [2:42:14] authorities that you need, additional resources so that we can enhance rural communities as well as urban [2:42:21] communities as well? Our rural communities, because a lot of times a lack of funding, especially in [2:42:27] very rural areas like where I live, they lack a tremendous amount of funding. It's going to take [2:42:32] a partnership to do that. But there is some authority that we're going to need, but we're probably going [2:42:40] to talk about that in a different setting. And they're asking for it. I recently met with a fraternal [2:42:50] order of police and they were asking for specific authorities. I met with the sheriff's associations. [2:42:58] They were asking for it too, but we're going to have to, it's going to take legislation and hopefully [2:43:02] we can do it in a bipartisan way. Great. As any way we can help to bring AI tools to give it to the [2:43:09] good guys and to protect us from the bad guys. We certainly look forward to that work. The biggest [2:43:14] problem that we have on this too is some of the stuff we need to send them requires a clearance and [2:43:20] it requires a system for them to be able to access it. Very few municipalities and counties have that [2:43:30] type of facility to access it. And most of them don't have the clearances. Even we have sheriffs that [2:43:37] don't have the clearances that they need to be able to get to access that. That's an important [2:43:45] piece. And we want to work with you on that. The question to the secretary as well as [2:43:51] Dr. Clayton. In April, the White House warned that the PRC, their entities are conducting industrial [2:43:59] scale distillation in American frontier AI bottles, copying our capabilities without permission. [2:44:07] Every advance American lab that's making, that make AI capabilities are now being reproduced [2:44:15] in these models and then released and used openly in the world, including criminals, terrorists, [2:44:21] hostile governments, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, to name a few. How quickly are you both [2:44:26] seeing frontier cyber capabilities reach PRC models and the actors who use them? And what does that mean [2:44:32] for the time American defenders have to fix vulnerabilities before they're exploited? [2:44:40] Let me put it this way. America is still in the lead. We need to remain in the lead. You bring up an [2:44:46] important point that Americans should recognize, and that is that industrial espionage, whether it's [2:44:52] state-sponsored or private-sponsored, is a threat. There are people who are seeking to steal our trade [2:44:59] secrets, seeks to steal our exquisite compute. It's something that we work very closely with the FBI [2:45:05] to combat. But it is a reality, and this is about worldwide threats. One of the worldwide [2:45:11] threats to America is industrial espionage. I've read out of time. The threats are real, [2:45:16] and we appreciate the work that you guys do. Thank you. [2:45:20] Thank you. And I recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps, for five minutes of questions. [2:45:26] Thank you, Chairman Garbarino, for continuing to hold these hearings on worldwide threats to the [2:45:30] homeland. And thank you, Secretary Mullen, Director Clayton, and Deputy Director Raya, [2:45:34] for joining us today. I'm deeply grateful for the services you all provide to this country. [2:45:38] It's an honor to serve on this committee dedicated to stewarding our country's security. [2:45:43] We know that the threats facing us today are more varied and complex than ever before. [2:45:46] The cyber domain grows increasingly competitive and difficult to defend. Our critical infrastructure [2:45:51] is vulnerable to attacks from the other side of the planet. Our young people are being [2:45:55] radicalized online. Biological, technological, and ideological threats evolve faster every day. [2:46:01] During last year's worldwide threats hearing, I discussed emerging AI threats. [2:46:06] Today, that threat is still a priority. Foreign cyber actors continue to use AI tools to threaten [2:46:10] our cyber infrastructure. Part of our responsibility is to ensure the federal government safeguards [2:46:16] our critical systems from these threats, while also clearly delineating how AI can be used across [2:46:22] our systems to make them stronger and more efficient. Director Clayton, leading American AI developers have [2:46:30] activated heightened safeguards on their most capable models because they cannot rule out that those [2:46:35] models could meaningfully help a novice build a biological weapon. In September, Anthropic disclosed [2:46:41] five cases since December in which users tried to get around its safeguards on dual-use biology [2:46:47] involving highly pathogenic, avian influenza, orthopox viruses, and toxins. Open weight models offer no [2:46:55] such protections once downloaded. Does ODNI assess that terrorist groups or other non-traditional actors [2:47:01] are actively seeking to use AI to acquire chemical or biological weapons capabilities, and how has the [2:47:07] intelligence community adjusted its collection to detect it? Thank you, and I commend you for the context [2:47:13] in which you place that question. American frontier model developers are at the forefront. That capability [2:47:25] is very important to national security for many of the reasons that you just mentioned. That is not [2:47:32] isolated work. They are ahead. They are working with us, seeking to develop this capability in what I [2:47:40] would say is a responsible and controlled environment. That does not mean that people around the world are [2:47:46] following those same rules. It's one of those reasons why we need to be out in front so that we can be [2:47:52] out in front of those who would seek to develop similar technology, seek to have similar compute, [2:47:58] and not use it for good. The United States has demonstrated through every technological development [2:48:04] that our leadership is good for the world, and we need to keep doing that. Thank you, sir. [2:48:10] Director Raya, the terror threat landscape in the U.S. is increasingly shaped by emerging [2:48:14] nihilistic violent extremism, or NVE. These decentralized online groups are primarily run [2:48:19] by youth and minors who promote cycles of victimization and coercion, including self-harm [2:48:24] extortion and mass attacks. I'm very concerned about what this is doing to our youth. At the federal level, [2:48:30] how has the FBI approached investigations and prosecutions tied to NVE groups, since most are [2:48:36] minors with prosecutorial limitations? Thank you for that question, Congressman. I, as yourself, [2:48:43] is very concerned about that threat, and the FBI is concerned about that threat. That is a threat that [2:48:48] we have pushed a lot of resources into. It encompasses, obviously, for us, it is considered [2:48:53] a domestic terrorism threat. Groups like 764, the COM, which I know you're familiar with, [2:48:59] but it also has a crimes against children aspect to it, because it's targeting one of our most vulnerable [2:49:04] populations, our children. So what we have done at the FBI is we've created the NVE fusion cell, and we've [2:49:11] taken experts from our domestic terrorism folks and experts from our crimes against children folks, [2:49:18] and we've put them in one room in order to create that synergy to investigate those cases. So we've [2:49:23] seen a lot of wins in that space recently, but as you said, a lot of these are minors, and as you know, [2:49:29] the federal system is not set up for minors. So we rely a lot on our state and local partners in not only [2:49:36] disrupting those individuals, but also in getting some type of jail time and making sure they're [2:49:43] held accountable. In extreme circumstances with some of our older children, we can go to the attorney [2:49:51] general and prosecute on a federal law, but that is something that is, you know, doesn't happen that [2:49:58] often. That's something we continue to work on. We're going to continue to push a lot of energy into, [2:50:02] and we're going to continue to keep our children safe because that is a priority of this administration [2:50:06] and of our director. In the final 15 seconds, any comments on counter-UAS? I know you've made [2:50:13] comments on that. I have a long question, but anything you'd like to add? Yeah, earlier I was [2:50:17] explaining to Representative Strong here, we have made a lot of space in this last 21 months, and we are [2:50:23] much better postured now combating, as a country, state, local, and federal, we are much better [2:50:29] posture now combating that threat than when we were just 21 months ago. Thank you, gentlemen. Chairman, [2:50:34] I yield back. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. [2:50:39] McKenzie, for five minutes. I just want to say it was a real pleasure having you on the committee. [2:50:44] We're going to miss you. You were a great asset to this committee, so thank you for all your hard work. [2:50:48] Thank you. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a pleasure to be a member of this committee and [2:50:53] appreciate your leadership and mentorship during my time here on the Homeland Security Committee. [2:51:00] To our panelists, we talked at length about the challenges that the government through the FAA, [2:51:07] the NSA, and other entities in the private sector have been facing with these outages over the past [2:51:14] week or so. You've given pretty detailed answers about the things that we can rule out, that they are [2:51:20] at this time not believed to be related, that they are not a state sponsor of terror, that there was no [2:51:25] malicious activity. I do have some follow-on questions, though, that Director Clayton, you talked about [2:51:33] the challenges that we face in upgrading our systems, doing patches, upgrades, etc. Is it possible that AI [2:51:42] or SI is exploiting those opportunities that it sees when an upgrade or a patch is being added to a system [2:51:52] to go in and attack at that point? We've talked today, and I think it's very important, very important [2:51:59] question that we've talked about computing capabilities, applications capabilities. Think about [2:52:06] people using scanning to identify vulnerabilities in systems. This is some of the things that [2:52:11] cyber malign actors do. Their ability to scan is increasing. We need to use the increased compute [2:52:21] and the increased capabilities to combat that scanning. That is going on. That has been going on [2:52:29] inside a number of our sophisticated financial institutions and others. So we are meeting this [2:52:37] threat, but it's something that we need to continue to do. And I certainly agree with you. We need those [2:52:43] defensive capabilities against those malicious activities. But I guess my question is this. Do we [2:52:50] think that the outages are a result of the patch being done or the upgrade being done internally, [2:52:58] or is it somebody taking advantage of the change being made? I see the question you're asking. It's probably [2:53:03] a question the American people are asking. It's a very good question. We have no indication that a [2:53:09] nefarious actor is saying, oh, they're in the process of patching. Therefore, we're going to take [2:53:15] advantage of that. We have scanned for that. We've looked for that with the FBI, with the private sector. [2:53:20] But you are right. One of the things about patching is you have to anticipate that during that process, [2:53:27] you know, people will scan and the like. These are things that we've been dealing with. We're going to [2:53:32] be dealing with going forward. And the American people should understand that we are in the [2:53:36] process of upgrading our systems. I'm looking around this room and I'm seeing different systems [2:53:43] from many different decades, some of them actually a combination of decades. When you have combinations [2:53:50] of old and new equipment on a particular network, that makes upgrades and things like this challenging. [2:53:56] We're going to go through this challenge, but I think we're going to come out the other side [2:54:00] stronger than any country in the world. OK, more just at a high level, not any related to any of [2:54:07] the specific outages that we've seen. Are we seeing increased usage of state sponsors of terror [2:54:15] or our adversaries utilizing AI to try to attack or exploit our systems? I think I think that's something [2:54:26] we we we we have seen instances of that. We are concerned about that. I would classify more. We're [2:54:33] more concerned about that. I think you're familiar. We issued a flash related to that here on Friday. [2:54:38] And that's something we are going to work very, very expeditiously and very aggressively when it comes [2:54:44] to when it comes to that particular threat vector. In fact, I think you may have been here, but I'll repeat [2:54:48] it again because it bears repeating. We did a complete reorg of our cyber branch and we've taken our [2:54:54] investigative parts of our cyber capabilities. We've taken our cyber capabilities. We've taken [2:54:59] our cyber intelligence and taken our OCIO and our cyber security. We all house them together under [2:55:06] one accountable executive. So SI attacks from SI, it will continue to be something that we focus on in [2:55:13] the future and try to stay ahead of that threat. All right. Thank you. In my final 30 seconds, I would [2:55:18] just like to say thank you to the secretary for your leadership of the department, the changes you've made [2:55:23] around training, which you've talked about at length here, your continued work to track down those [2:55:28] children that were lost or not being tracked properly starting from the last administration. [2:55:34] So I want to commend your efforts there and would just encourage continued efforts to improve TSA. [2:55:40] I've introduced a number of pieces of legislation here to improve our TSA operations for all travelers, [2:55:46] but also specifically for families. And so just want to, again, thank you for all your work and look forward to [2:55:52] seeing even more great work coming out of the department going forward. Thank you, Congressman. [2:55:56] You're not going to miss the political theater, but you're going to miss the friendship around [2:56:00] this place and you're going to be missed as well. Thank you. With that, I yield back. [2:56:04] Gentleman yields back. Ranking member has a UC. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I [2:56:12] act unanimous consent to enter into the record testimonies, letters, and statements from Democratic forums held in New [2:56:20] Orleans, Houston, Austin, Newark, Bidford, Maine, and Washington, D.C. this conference. Mr. Chairman, [2:56:28] I also act unanimous consent to enter into the record letters we've sent to the secretary and the FBI [2:56:36] director of which we have not received answers. Without objection. Gentlemen, the members of the [2:56:44] committee may have some additional questions for you all, and we would ask that you all respond to these in [2:56:48] writing. Presumed to committee rule 7E, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days, and I want [2:56:53] to thank you all for being here today. This is a very important hearing, and your attendance shows [2:56:57] that it's that important. Without objection, this committee stands adjourned.

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