Gabbard Testifies Before Senate After Staffer Resigns Over Iran War

[0:00] and the DIE Director, Lieutenant General James Adams. [0:04] Thank you all for your appearance today and for your service. [0:07] I also want to offer a special thanks to General Hartman, [0:10] who is about to enter a well-earned and well-deserved retirement. [0:14] General, on behalf of the committee, thank you for your lifetime of service to our nation. [0:18] I'd first like to take this opportunity to commend the thousands of men and women [0:24] in our intelligence agencies whom our witnesses represent. [0:28] Our intelligence professionals are second to none. [0:31] Because of their service, their dedication, and their sacrifice, [0:33] Americans are safer at home and around the world. [0:36] But because of the nature of their work, [0:38] grateful Americans don't buy their lunch at restaurants or even have a chance to say thank you. [0:43] So on their behalf, let me simply say thank you. [0:46] I want to make two basic points this morning. [0:50] First, the world is always a dangerous place, especially for America. [0:55] But thanks to your agencies and President Trump's leadership, [0:58] the world isn't quite as dangerous for Americans as it was a year ago. [1:03] Thanks to the efforts of our military, [1:04] and the efforts of our intelligence agencies, [1:04] and the efforts of our intelligence personnel, [1:06] including my fellow Arkansans who are now serving in the Middle East, [1:09] the Iranian revolutionary regime that terrorized the world for 47 years [1:14] is finally knocked on its back foot. [1:18] Last summer, we devastated Iran's nuclear facilities. [1:20] In recent weeks, we've eliminated Iran's top leadership, [1:24] pummeled its military, sunk its navy, destroyed its missiles, [1:27] neutered its proxies, and left its economy reeling. [1:31] After 47 years of indecision and timidity, [1:34] America has finally put our foot down. [1:37] I'm also pleased to report that things have improved a lot in our own backyard [1:42] now that Venezuela's illegitimate communist dictator, [1:44] Nicolas Maduro, is rotting in a New York prison. [1:47] Only the United States could execute a military and intelligence operation [1:52] of this difficulty without a single American life lost. [1:57] Our military is awesome, but these operations wouldn't have succeeded, [2:01] and they probably wouldn't have even been tried without timely, accurate, and fact-based, [2:06] intelligence from your agencies. [2:08] These successful operations are a testament to our intelligence professionals' ability [2:14] to expose and uncover critical details about America's enemies. [2:18] So let this be a warning to those who wish America harm. [2:22] We leave no stone unturned. [2:24] And there's no one or no thing close to you that might not betray you. [2:30] Today's hearing is an opportunity for the American people to hear an unvarnished [2:35] and unbiased account of the remaining threats we face. [2:38] Remember, we're here for you. We're here for you. We're here for you. We're here for you. We're here for you. We're here for you. We're here for you. We're here for you. We're here for you. We're here for you. [2:38] From communist China, North Korea, and Russia to the east, to narco-terrorist cartels here at home, [2:44] these threats truly do span the globe. [2:47] And for my second point, your agencies have improved over the last year [2:52] thanks to reforms that has gotten them back to basics. [2:56] Of course, my two points are related. [2:59] When our intelligence agencies return to their core mission, [3:02] stealing the secrets of our adversaries to deliver timely and needful intelligence, [3:07] America is safer for it. [3:09] These efforts are already bearing [3:10] fruit. For example, last year, the CIA increased its foreign intelligence reporting by 25%. [3:18] This year, the CIA is on track to hire and deploy more officers than at any point in the last [3:23] quarter century. While I'm greatly encouraged by the progress, more remains to be done. [3:28] We must always equip our intelligence personnel with the tools they need [3:33] to do their jobs well and execute their missions. [3:36] That's why I fully support President Trump's request for a clean reauthorization of FISA [3:40] Section 702. And it's why I'm here to support the efforts of the CIA. [3:42] That's why I expect a healthy intelligence budget request in the administration's supplemental [3:48] appropriations request to fund operations against Iran and narcoterrorists. [3:53] No doubt our military needs supplemental funding, but our intelligence agencies need [3:58] it just as badly. [4:00] Moreover, I urge each of you to continue to make personnel and institutional reforms that [4:04] will cement these changes and foreclose a return in the future to bureaucratic bloat, [4:11] political bias, and excessive caution within our government. [4:13] Thanks. [4:13] within your services. [4:15] When I became chairman, I promised real reform across the entire intelligence community. [4:20] Our first Intelligence Authorization Act set the foundation for a more efficient intelligence [4:24] community by, for example, reorganizing the ODNI, improving the security of CIA installations, [4:32] and directing resources towards foreign intelligence collection and covert action. [4:37] This year, I look forward to going further, namely by growing our cadre of collectors, [4:42] making generational investments in core capabilities, providing new capabilities to defend our space [4:47] assets, and further codifying reforms to guard against any future return of bloated and biased [4:53] bureaucracy. [4:54] I look forward to working with you towards these ends. [4:58] I now recognize the Vice Chairman. [5:01] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me also offer a good morning to our witnesses. [5:06] Let me also join you, Mr. Chairman, and begin by thanking literally the tens of thousands [5:12] of men and women. [5:14] I'm a member of the U.S. intelligence community who work every day to keep our country safe. [5:19] Their work is by necessity secret. [5:22] That is the nature of intelligence. [5:24] But that is also why hearings like this one matter so much. [5:29] Over the past year, we have seen a series of developments that raise serious concerns [5:36] about the erosion of safeguards that protect both our democracy and our security. [5:43] And nowhere is that more worrying than when it comes to the integrity of our elections. [5:50] For decades now, our intelligence community has warned that foreign adversaries, including [5:56] Russia, China, and Iran, are actively seeking to shape the outcome of American elections. [6:04] These efforts have included cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns, and covert influence [6:10] operations designed to divide Americans and undermine our confidence in our democratic [6:15] institutions. [6:17] Protecting our elections from these threats should be one of the intelligence community's [6:22] highest priorities. [6:24] The DNI is supposed to be coordinating intelligence on foreign election interference, warning [6:32] the American people about adversaries seeking to undermine our democracy, ensuring that [6:38] federal, state, and local officials have the information they need. [6:43] Congress even required the creation of a foreign malign influence center inside the office [6:50] of the DNI to coordinate the intelligence community's response to foreign election interference, [6:57] and ensure that these threats are properly shared across the government. [7:02] That is the mission Congress assigned to the DNI. [7:07] But while foreign adversaries are actively probing our democratic institutions, the DNI [7:13] has eliminated the foreign malign influence center and does not have a designated official [7:19] coordinating the response to election threats. [7:23] And for months, the committee has reportedly, has repeatedly, requested briefings from the [7:29] IC. [7:30] Briefings that are required by the DNI. [7:32] By law, on legitimate foreign threats to the midterms. [7:37] We have received no response. [7:41] Now that silence, I believe, should concern every member of the committee because it clearly [7:46] demonstrates the DNI is not interested in protecting American democracy by combating [7:52] foreign influence. [7:54] Instead, unfortunately, we have seen the DNI involve herself in purely domestic matters. [8:02] Last month, we saw Director Gabbard personally participate in a law enforcement [8:07] raid to seize election ballots and voting machine records in Fulton County, Georgia. [8:14] A raid tied to an election that the president lost six years ago. [8:20] When the warrant supporting the raid was unsealed, it showed something deeply troubling. [8:26] There was no foreign connection to justify the involvement of our nation's top spy. [8:33] Instead, the predicate for the warrant was a slop of debunked conspiracy theories that [8:40] had already been rejected repeatedly. [8:43] By courts, by independent investigators, and even by Georgia's own Republican Secretary [8:48] of State. [8:50] Yet the nation's top intelligence official was personally involved in this operation. [8:56] This raises one very serious question. [8:59] If the intelligence community is not being mobilized against foreign threats, why is [9:09] it being deployed at all on a domestic issue? [9:13] The DNI's appearance at this raid, as well as their involvement in seizing voting machine [9:17] records, suggests something that should also alarm every American. [9:24] I believe an organized effort to misuse her national security powers to interfere in domestic [9:30] politics and potentially provide a pretext for the president's unconstitutional efforts [9:37] to seize control of the upcoming elections. [9:42] Don't take my word for it. [9:43] The president has repeatedly pushed for the nationalization of our elections, calling [9:49] for federal government to override the state election laws. [9:50] The president has repeatedly pushed for the nationalization of our elections, calling [9:51] for federal government to override the state election laws. [9:51] The president has repeatedly pushed for the nationalization of our elections, calling for [9:52] the nationalization of our elections, calling for federal government to override the state [9:52] election laws and quote, take over voting while continuing to make false statements [9:57] about election fraud while continuing to make false statements about election fraud. [10:00] And we've heard troubling rhetoric from senior officials that reinforce these concerns. [10:05] As former Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem said publicly, we've been, and this [10:10] is a quote, we've been proactive, trying to make sure we have the right people voting, [10:17] electing the right leaders to lead this country. [10:23] At the same time the administration has brought into government individual individuals that [10:26] need doing. [10:27] promoting conspiracy theories about our elections the so-called white house director of election [10:33] security and integrity kurt olsen played a key role in efforts to overturn the results of the [10:40] 2020 election now mr olsen holds a position inside the federal government with the authority to refer [10:48] criminal investigations and access our most sensitive security information all supposedly [10:57] doing his witch hunts around elections matter of fact according to the court filings he helped [11:02] trigger the fbi seizure of the ballots in fulton county so it's worth asking why is someone whose [11:09] career has been devoted to undermining the legitimate results of a democratic election [11:16] now operating from inside the federal government with access to law enforcement and intelligence [11:23] authorities what exactly has he been empowered to do as members of our committee know this create [11:30] as members know this committee was [11:32] created in the aftermath of the unconstitutional abuses exposed after watergate the guard rails [11:39] have been built around our intelligence and law enforcement agencies over the past several [11:45] decades exist for a reason without them america begins to look more like adversaries emphasizing [11:52] this year's annual threat assessment china russia iran north korea and less like a democracy [12:02] confronting these very clear and present threats to [12:06] security requires experienced professionals and intelligence [12:11] agencies that are focused squarely on their mission. Instead, over the past year [12:16] we've seen actions that only serve to weaken them. Politically motivated purges [12:22] at the FBI has resulted in the exodus of hundreds of agents and the reassignments [12:29] of hundreds more from key national security areas like counterintelligence, [12:34] counterterrorism, and cyber and where they've been redeployed to immigration [12:39] enforcement. In one troubling case, agents working on a task force focused on [12:47] threats from Iran, clearly something that's pretty damn important right now, [12:51] were dismissed because they had previously participated in the [12:56] investigation of the president's mishandling of classified information. [13:00] Elsewhere, the bureau's budget is being slashed. Last year it cut over five [13:06] hundred million dollars with the largest decrease [13:09] from cyber, counterterrorism, and counterespionage. And the remaining [13:16] scarce resources are being squandered on things like a 60 million dollar jet for [13:21] the director's personal travel so we can go golfing in Scotland or partying with [13:25] athletes in Milan. In fact, according to a whistleblower account, those flights [13:30] became so frequent they even delayed the bureau's response to major incidents [13:34] like the Charlie Kirk assassination or shooting at Brown University. Credible [13:39] reports also indicate that highly trained FBI agents from [13:43] elite SWAT units have been reassigned to chauffeur his girlfriend and [13:48] unprecedented use of personnel whose training intended, or actually intended, [13:54] for hunting violent criminals and neutralizing terrorists. Unfortunately [13:59] this dysfunction has not been limited to the FBI. Both the National Security [14:04] Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and this is no reflection on the [14:08] two gentlemen sitting in front of us, were both left leaderless for months [14:13] after the president fired their directors. [14:17] One at the behest of a 9-11 conspiracy theorist and the other for providing a [14:23] fact-based assessment that contradicted the president's claims about [14:28] obliterating Iran's nuclear program. Clearly if the program had been truly [14:35] obliterated the president wouldn't be bombing again right now. And again, more [14:41] than one-third of the personnel at CISA created by Congress to protect critical [14:46] infrastructure like power, water, and election systems have been forced out. [14:49] That seems like a real mistake. [14:52] As we still grapple with the intrusion called Sight Typhoon and the recent [14:58] Iranian cyber attack on Stryker. And we are now seeing in real time the cost to [15:05] the State Department. Thousands of American citizens were trapped in a [15:09] literal war zone with little assistance from their own government. For a time [15:14] those calling the State Department hotline for assistance were greeted with [15:18] a pre-recorded message that said, quote, please do not require, rely on the US [15:24] government. [15:24] For assisted departure or evacuation. This was a foreseeable security crisis. [15:30] When you start a war of choice, when there was no imminent threat, you should [15:37] be able to prepare to make sure you get Americans out of the war zone. That same [15:45] attitude, pushing some of our closest friends into the arms of our most [15:50] capable foes, has profound consequences. Two of our most significant allies, Canada [15:55] and the UK, are currently working to sign trade deals with China because [16:01] they no longer believe the United States is a dependable partner. That's a [16:06] remarkable statement in 2026. [16:08] And in the President's war of choice with Iran, a war that has already killed 13 [16:15] service members, cost American taxpayers billions of dollars. And scrambled [16:22] supply chains from oil to fertilizer to aluminum, nobody answered the call when [16:28] the President asked our allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. As the [16:33] President's own counterterrorism chief acknowledged in his resignation song, [16:34] We特 Building Off Strait of Hormuz, Washington. For the tidal spiciness of wind, [16:35] these�� this, is about to bring home our Japan's most vibrant timer. this We [16:36] matter the most for us all. This is what we believe, our real risk budget is to make [16:37] us here. This is why the White House is different from the rest of America and the [16:37] yesterday Iran posed no imminent threat the United States unfortunately our [16:45] allies have been alienated and distracted by the administration's [16:50] unilateral threats like invading Greenland and the result is clear [16:54] Americans have been left more exposed in an already dangerous conflict now what I [17:02] say what I just outlined is quite a list and it's a partial one at that matter of [17:06] fact we've got a full list we'd like to share with all the press so what does [17:10] this all mean it matters because I believe the warnings contained in this [17:15] year's annual threat assessment I believe our I see when they say the [17:21] global security environment is becoming more complex and that armed conflict is [17:27] becoming more global and I also agree with the assessment when it says that [17:32] succeed we must think prudently and prioritize our efforts on the topic of [17:38] the annual threat assessment I want to close where I began by noting that since [17:44] the first [17:44] time since 2017 in the aftermath of Russia's intervention in our 2016 [17:51] elections the annual threat assessment includes nothing nothing about adversary [18:00] attempts to influence American elections now I don't believe this omission means [18:06] that the threat has disappeared it means that the intelligence community is no [18:11] longer being allowed to speak honestly about it and it raises serious questions [18:17] and I will be asking about these your priorities director Gabbard [18:21] in terms of what you're choosing to prioritize instead thank you Mr Chairman [18:25] I yield back before we go to the witnesses now that we have a critical [18:28] mass of members I would simply like to remind members that we will handle [18:31] questions as we did last year seniority at the time of the gavel and alternating [18:38] between Democrats and Republicans we'll have one round of questions seven [18:41] minutes per round I will not entertain questions after seven minute time has [18:45] expired furthermore I expect to convene the closed session in our usual location [18:51] approximately 30 minutes after the open session begins director Gabbard the floor is yours thank [18:59] you Chairman cotton by sure Warner members of the committee good morning I'm here today to present [19:05] the 2026 annual threat assessment joined by the directors of the CIA FBI DIA and NSA before I [19:14] continue on behalf of the intelligence community want to extend our thanks to General Hartman for [19:19] his 37 years of service in uniform and closing out [19:25] 37 years with tremendous leadership of the NSA this briefing is being provided in accordance [19:31] with odni statutory responsibility I'd like to remind those who are watching what I am [19:36] briefing here today conveys the intelligence communities assessment of the threats facing [19:41] U.S citizens our homeland and our interests not my personal views or opinions in this assessment [19:49] we're following the structure of priorities that were laid out in the president's National [19:53] Security strategy starting with threats to our homeland and then shifting [19:57] to global risks the defense of our homeland is of the utmost importance to the American people and [20:04] efforts by this administration have shown over the last year the results of bolstering Homeland [20:10] defense in the security of the American people for example the strict enforcement of U.S policies at [20:16] the U.S Mexico border and regionally have served as a deterrent drastically reducing illegal [20:22] immigration based on customs and Border Patrol data January 2026's monthly encounters are down [20:29] 3.8 percent compared to January 2025 encounters declined 79 compared to 2024. the drivers of [20:40] migration are likely to continue potential worsening instability in countries like Cuba [20:44] and Haiti risk triggering migration surges and smugglers who have long operated as transnational [20:50] criminal organizations continue to view chaos as an opportunity for profit and will continue to look [20:57] to profit from illegal immigration flows [21:00] these transnational criminal organizations continue to pose a daily and direct threat to the health [21:06] and safety of millions of U.S citizens primarily indirectly by producing and trafficking in illegal [21:12] drugs under President Trump's leadership fentanyl overdose deaths have seen a 30 percent decrease [21:18] from September 2024 to September 2025. President Trump's aggressive efforts to more directly and [21:26] actively target these transnational criminal organizations and reduce the inflow of fentanyl [21:30] precursors [21:32] has already had a significant impact which is likely to continue we've seen fentanyl potency [21:38] also decrease likely due to disruptions to the production supply chain U.S efforts to work with [21:45] China and India to halt the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals to North America are [21:50] demonstrating some improvement but there is more work to be done as sadly there are still tens of [21:56] thousands of fentanyl related deaths in America every year Mexico-based TCOs like the Sinaloa [22:03] cartel and Jalisco [22:04] generation cartel dominate the production and smuggling of fentanyl heroin meth and cocaine into [22:10] the United States Columbia-based DCOs and illegal arm groups like the Revolutionary armed forces of [22:17] Columbia and the National Liberation Army are responsible for producing and trafficking large [22:23] volumes of cocaine to the U.S and European markets with now some indicators of attempts to expand [22:29] their market to the Asia-Pacific region Columbia remains the world's largest producer of cocaine and [22:36] criminal groups have expanded their trafficking relationships with the neighboring Ecuadorian and [22:41] Brazilian gangs as you know MS-13 is well established in cells within the United States and [22:48] uses violence to intimidate the Salvadoran Diaspora engaging in murder extortion retail drug trafficking [22:56] firearms offenses and prostitution fueling increased violence and instability these and [23:01] other TCOs continue to present a very tangible and individualized risk of violent crime to everyday [23:08] Americans and contribute to regional instability as the president increases his focus on counter [23:13] drug and counter cartel pressures they're likely to seek ways to try to adapt their operations [23:19] including shifting production locations and trafficking routes and methods the United States [23:26] continues to face a complex and evolving threat landscape with the geographical geographically [23:30] diverse set of Islamist terrorist actors seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm [23:39] the world's most vulnerable communities the spread of Islamist ideology in some cases led by [23:46] individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood poses a fundamental threat to [23:52] freedom and the foundational principles that under underpin Western civilization Islamist [23:58] groups and individuals use this ideology for recruiting and financial support for terrorist [24:03] groups and individuals around the world and to advance their political objectives of establishing [24:08] is an Islamist caliphate [24:10] which governs based on Sharia they're increasing examples of this in various European countries and [24:16] President Trump's designation of certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist [24:20] organizations is a mechanism to secure Americans against this threat in response to setbacks to [24:27] their capabilities of conducting large-scale complex attacks Islamist terrorist groups have [24:32] shifted toward focusing on executing information operations to spread propaganda and inspire or [24:38] enable individuals located in or with access to the West [24:42] U.S counterterrorism efforts primarily in Iraq Somalia Yemen and Syria in 2025 were instrumental [24:51] in removing key terrorist leaders and operatives degrading the ability of Al Qaeda and Isis to [24:57] quickly reconstitute its leadership and plan large-scale attacks against the homeland and [25:03] U.S interests abroad strict U.S border enforcement measures and increased deportations of individuals [25:09] with suspected links to Islamist terrorists have reduced access to the homeland and removed some [25:15] of future terrorist attacks since January U.S officials have only had a handful of encounters [25:21] at our borders with individuals associated with terrorist groups this is a positive trend however [25:27] our interagency coordinated efforts to continue to identify locate and remove known or suspected [25:33] terrorists who may already be in the United States continues with vigilance in 2025 there [25:40] were at least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the United States law enforcement disrupted at [25:46] least 15 U.S [25:47] based Islamist terrorist plotters roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some online [25:53] contact with Islamist terrorists inspired by Islamist foreign terrorist organizations abroad [25:58] for example in the recent attempt to attack a synagogue in Michigan the shooter had familial [26:04] ties to a Hezbollah leader Al Qaeda and Isis posed the biggest threat to U.S interests overseas in [26:11] parts of Africa the Middle East and South Asia where these groups operate in the Middle East [26:16] AQAP in Yemen ISIS K [26:20] in South Asia and Isis in Syria are among the most likely groups conducting external plotting [26:25] Isis in Syria is likely seeking to rebuild its ranks expand support networks and solicit funds [26:32] by re-engaging with and recruiting from the likely hundreds of Isis detainees and thousands of Isis [26:38] linked women and children who were either released or escaped from prisons and displaced person camps [26:43] that were previously run by the Syrian Democratic forces in Northeast Syria meanwhile state actors [26:50] present [26:51] risk broader in scope by seeking new capabilities in kinetic and cyber warfare the United States [26:58] secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure safety in the homeland against strategic threats [27:04] however the intelligence community assesses that Russia China North Korea Iran and Pakistan have [27:10] been researching and developing an array of novel advanced or traditional missile delivery systems [27:16] with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland within range the IC assesses that [27:22] threats to the homeland [27:24] stand collectively to more than 16 000 missiles by 2035 from the current assessed figure of more [27:30] than 3 000 missiles the IC assesses that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems [27:37] meant to be capable of penetrating or bypassing U.S missile defenses North Korea's icbms can already [27:43] reach U.S soil and the IC assesses that it is committed to expanding its nuclear Arsenal [27:49] Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include icbms with the range [27:56] capable of striking the homeland the IC assesses that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch [28:02] and other technology it could use to begin to develop a militarily viable icbm before 2035 [28:09] should Tehran attempt to pursue that capability however these assessments will clearly be updated [28:16] as the full impact of Operation epic Fury's devastating strikes on Iran's missile production [28:21] facilities stockpiles and launch capabilities is determined these nations collectively will likely [28:28] seek to understand U.S. [28:29] plans for advanced missile defense for the homeland probably for the purpose of shaping their own [28:34] missile development programs and assessing U.S intentions regarding deterrence shifting to the [28:40] cyber domain the ic assesses that China Russia Iran North Korea and non-state ransomware groups [28:45] will continue to seek to compromise U.S government and private sector networks as well as critical [28:51] infrastructure to collect intelligence create options for future disruption and for financial [28:57] gain the ic assesses that China and Russia [29:01] are the most persistent and active threats and are continuing their r d efforts North Korea's cyber [29:07] program is sophisticated and agile in 2025 alone North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole [29:13] two billion dollars which the ic assesses is helping to fund the regime and include further [29:18] development of its strategic weapons programs financially or ideologically motivated non-state [29:25] actors are becoming more bold with ransomware groups shifting to faster high volume attacks [29:30] that are harder to identify [29:32] and mitigate innovation in the field of artificial intelligence will likely accelerate these threats [29:38] in the cyber domain the ic assesses that it will increasingly shape cyber operations with both [29:44] cyber operators and Defenders using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness for example [29:50] in August of 2025 cyber actors used an AI tool to conduct a data extortion operation against [29:56] International government health care and public health emergency service sectors as well as [30:01] religious institutions moving to the Arctic [30:05] the ic assesses that Russia and to a lesser extent China aimed to strengthen their presence in the [30:10] region through increased Maritime trade natural resource extraction and military activity [30:16] Russia which has the longest coastline in the Arctic has long sought recognition of its polar [30:22] great power status and is deploying more military forces and building new permanent infrastructure [30:27] China though not an Arctic country is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its [30:33] own strategic and economic interests the ic assesses [30:40] that China is the most capable competitor in the field of artificial intelligence the ic assesses [30:46] that AI capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing the threat landscape as this is a [30:51] defining technology that enables computers and machines to simulate human learning comprehension [30:56] problem solving creativity and autonomy it will be critical to ensure that humans remain in control [31:02] of how AI is used and of the machines that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests [31:07] of the American people across all domains [31:11] AI adoption at scale across the spectrum of usage poses serious risks AI has the potential to aid in [31:18] weapons and systems design has been used in recent conflicts to influence targeting and streamlined [31:24] decision making underscoring the risk and likely threats that could manifest on the battlefield early [31:31] developers in the quantum in quantum computers will give countries an extraordinary technological [31:37] advantage over others to quickly process National security information and break current encryption [31:43] technology used to protect sensitive Finance health care and government information the global security [31:51] landscape is volatile and complex with armed conflict growing more common and posing potential [31:57] threats against U.S interests strategic competition and regional and smaller powers are becoming more [32:03] willing to use force to pursue their interests heightening the risk of conflict the ic assesses [32:09] the space domain is becoming increasingly contested with China and Russia developing [32:14] counter space capabilities to [32:16] change U.S space efforts the threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological [32:22] Warfare capabilities continues to grow I'll turn now to our neighborhood in the Western Hemisphere [32:28] where flagging economies high crime rates pervasive organized crime migration flows corruption narcotics [32:34] trafficking all of these present a spectrum of risks to U.S interests and where strategic [32:39] competitors seek to gain greater influence in the region the ic assesses that Latin America and the [32:46] Caribbean almost certainly [32:47] will see hot spots of volatility in the coming year since Maduro's arrests the ic assesses a shift [32:55] in Venezuela's leadership towards cooperating with the U.S to open its economy to develop the [33:01] country's oil and gas extraction capability and we've seen their movement in releasing political [33:06] prisoners the U.S Mexico Canada agreement review in 2026 will likely increase uncertainty in many [33:14] Latin American countries especially those that rely on Mexico as an export destination [33:19] for intermediate goods for manufacture and onward export to the U.S China Russia and Iran are likely [33:26] seeking to sustain economic political and military engagement with Latin America the ic assesses that [33:33] China's demand for raw materials is likely to continue to drive its economic outreach while [33:38] Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua the ic [33:45] assesses that China aims to elevate its own political economic military and technological power to increase its own [33:51] regional positioning global influence to fend off threats to their interests while there are [33:58] challenging areas where interests diverge President Trump's diplomatic engagements with President Xi to [34:04] work towards U.S interests have enabled progress where those interests align the ic assesses that [34:10] China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces across all domains in pursuit of its goal [34:15] to achieve world-class status by mid-century this includes building a force with the aim of being [34:22] capable of deterring U.S and allied forces [34:24] in the region and to achieve their stated objective of developing the ability to seize Taiwan by force [34:30] if necessary however the ic assesses that China likely prefers to set the conditions for an [34:36] eventual peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict the ic assesses that an increasingly [34:42] confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern regionally and globally its weapons of mass [34:48] destruction its conventional military capabilities illicit cyber activities and demonstrated [34:53] willingness to use asymmetric capabilities [34:55] poses a threat to U.S and its allies particularly South Korea and Japan North Korea's partnership [35:02] with Russia is growing and in 2025 Kim took steps to improve ties with China still North Korea's most [35:10] important trading partner and economic benefactor the ic assesses that North Korea's support for [35:16] Russia and the war against Ukraine has increased North Korea's capabilities as their forces have [35:21] gained combat experience in 21st century Warfare along with equipment in 2024 [35:27] North Korea deployed more than 11 000 troops to Russia to support combat operations in Kursk Pyongyang [35:34] continues to develop and expand its strategic weapons programs including missiles that can [35:38] evade U.S and regional missile defenses it is continuing to work to increase its nuclear warhead [35:45] stockpile and maintains biological and chemical weapons capabilities Russia retains the capability [35:52] to selectively challenge U.S interests globally by military and non-military means the ic assesses [35:59] the dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S is the potential of an escalatory spiral in an [36:04] ongoing conflict such as Ukraine or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities including the [36:11] potential deployment of nuclear weapons the ic assesses that Putin continues to invest in Russia's [36:17] defense industrial base as well as novel capabilities that may pose a greater threat to the [36:21] U.S homeland and forces abroad than conventional weapons Russia has advanced systems hypersonic [36:28] missiles and undersea capabilities [36:30] trying to negate U.S military advantage Moscow also relies on other tools to exert pressure using [36:37] gray zone tactics to further its goals and compete below the level of armed conflict Russia is also [36:44] building an extensive counter space capabilities to contest U.S space dominance its development of [36:51] a nuclear counter space weapon poses the greatest single threat to the world's space architecture [36:56] during the past year the ic assesses that Russia has maintained the upper hand in the war against [37:03] U.S-led negotiations between Moscow and Kiev are ongoing until such an agreement is met Moscow is [37:09] likely to continue fighting a slow war of attrition until they view their objectives have been achieved [37:14] in the Middle East conflict and instability will shape security political and economic dynamics in [37:20] a variety of ways the ic assesses that operation epic Fury is advancing fundamental change in the [37:26] region that began with Hamas's attack on Israel in on October 7 2023 and continued with the 12-day [37:34] war last year resulting in weakening Iran and its proxies the ic assesses the regime in Iran appears [37:41] to be intact but largely degraded due to attacks on its leadership and military capabilities its [37:48] conventional military power projection capabilities have largely been destroyed leaving limited options [37:54] Iran's strategic position has been significantly degraded the U.S led maximum pressure campaign and [38:02] snap back of European sanctions added additional pressure to an already bleak Iranian economy [38:07] resulting in mass protests earlier this year that Tehran suppressed by killing thousands of [38:12] protesters even if the regime remains intact the ic assesses that internal tensions are likely to [38:19] increase as econ as Iran's economy worsens even so Iran and its proxies continue to attack U.S [38:28] and allied interests in the Middle East the ic assesses that if a hostile regime survives it [38:34] will likely seek to begin a year's long effort to rebuild its military missiles and UAV forces [38:40] prior to Operation epic Fury the ic assesses Iran was trying to recover from the severe damage to [38:47] its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-day war and continued to refuse to comply with [38:52] its nuclear obligations with the iaea refusing them access to key facilities the ic assesses [39:00] that China Russia and North Korea see the United States as a strategic competitor and potential [39:05] adversary Iran has long viewed the U.S as an adversary and is engaged in active conflict with [39:10] the U.S as of today [39:13] these four countries the ic assesses are likely to continue their selective cooperation with each [39:18] other which could bolster their individual capabilities and threats to U.S interests more [39:22] broadly however currently these relationships are primarily bilateral on selective issues and [39:29] depend on broader circumstances Divergent Sovereign interests and in some cases concerns over directly [39:36] confronting the United States these factors the ic assesses are likely to constrain their [39:41] relationships finally [39:45] on the continent of Africa are likely to persist through 2026 due to poor governance economic [39:50] demands and external support tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea which could rapidly [39:56] accelerate to conflict contentious National elections in Somalia could distract the federal [40:02] government away from counterterrorism actions against al-Shabaab which continues to conduct [40:07] terror attacks while providing funding and propaganda support to other elements of al-Qaeda [40:12] in Yemen the civil war in Sudan continues even as [40:16] external negotiations occur Isis in West Africa and the Sahel have increased the intensity of [40:23] their attacks against local security forces expanding their areas of operation and moving [40:28] closer to cities with the U.S presence the ic assesses that African governments will likely [40:34] use their wealth in critical minerals to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefit [40:38] concurrent conflicts and crises across the continent will continue to put U.S citizens [40:43] at risk and cause further instability in closing as leaders [40:49] intelligence community, we remain committed to providing the president [40:53] and policymakers with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to inform [40:58] decision making and to ensure the safety, security and freedom of the [41:01] American people. Thank you. Thank you, Director Gabbard. General Adams Camden [41:07] Arkansas is the home of brand new production lines for the Israeli missile [41:11] defense interceptors. Could you please explain how critical arrow and Iron [41:15] Dome systems being built in Camden, um, are for not only Israel's defenses, [41:22] but the defense of hundreds of thousands of American citizens and [41:25] troops in the region. Chairman Cotton. Thank you for that question. And I have [41:31] to say that the arrow system in the Iron Dome system are critical defensive [41:36] systems that prevent adversary power projection from impacting the targets [41:44] and the friendly areas in Israel. [41:46] The [41:46] arrow system itself is, uh, the high altitude, primarily against, uh, MRB M's [41:53] and it's proven to be very, very effective against those systems. The [41:58] Iron Dome is more of a closer in system protecting against rockets and things [42:03] of that nature. But the combination of those two with U. S. Systems creates a [42:09] shield to prevent those attacks from the Iranians impacting key areas in in [42:16] in [42:16] in [42:16] - in areas where they're protecting. Thank you, General Adams. I was recently in [42:20] Camden with Secretary Hegsath as part of his Arsenal Freedom Tour, and they are [42:25] greater Kansan to do great work to keep our nation safe. General Hartman. We've [42:29] often spoken about our pressing need for more cyber security manpower and part [42:34] time formation such as the Arkansas Air National guards. 223rd cyber space [42:39] operation squadron or great, great way to grow the force. What recommendations [42:44] do you have to grow the cyber protection teams and development? [42:47] develop more capacity for local and national missions chairman cotton thank thanks for the [42:53] question um i did hear a little bit about the great team in arkansas there and i know 855 cpt [43:00] operates from that formation and so for us certainly looking at a number of different [43:05] initiatives one ensure that we can share all of the relevant top secret classified information [43:11] and other sort of indications and warning that the organizations need but i will tell you i'm [43:16] an advocate for an ability to establish some sort of joint reserve cyber organization and so that [43:24] at cybercom we can ensure that those organizations have all of the advanced training that they need [43:30] to ensure that those organizations have access to all of the intelligence that they need [43:35] and to ensure that we control some level of funding at both cybercom and nsa [43:40] that can be used to mobilize those personnel to handle the most difficult problems that we're [43:45] faced with [43:46] it [43:46] and we have been working with congress on some of that language and the department and we appreciate [43:50] it sir thank you general hartman as i said in my opening um we only have this one public hearing [43:56] a year even though the committee hears from each of you several times throughout the year [44:00] in classified settings so we don't often have a chance to tell the american people what great [44:07] work their intelligence professionals are doing for them so director ratcliffe could could you [44:12] take the opportunity to maybe join in the excellent briefings that secretary hegseth [44:16] and general kane have provided on a regular basis um over the last couple months um on the military [44:23] aspects of both the maduro raid and operation epic fury to explain the cia's contributions to those [44:29] operations thank you senator um you know last year when i was here uh in in my confirmation [44:37] i promised you all and you got all asked for a more aggressive cia one that was focused on core [44:44] mission getting back to the business of [44:46] stealing secrets to be able to provide our policy makers with a decisive strategic advantage that [44:54] would allow and advance and contribute to foreign policy and national security successes to the [45:02] credit of the cia workforce the cia has delivered some of those successes have been very public [45:11] as you mentioned senator operation midnight hammer operation absolute resolve [45:17] and the cia as you know from classified briefings contributed in myriad ways to the success of that [45:31] but what i would say to you is those successes are just emblematic of the phenomenal progress [45:36] and success really by every measure every metric every standard across every national security space [45:44] with regard to the work of the cia [45:47] senator you mentioned some of it in your opening um the increase of our assets stable um and our [45:53] human sources up by 25 percent our fi collection across the board our foreign intelligence [45:59] collection uh up by 25 overall and in important categories like china for instance up 100 percent [46:07] uh in areas like tech and ai up 45 percent on the counter narcotics front our operations up by [46:14] 70 percent and with regard to counterterrorism [46:18] uh those are classified numbers that i'll share with you in the classified portion of this hearing [46:23] but they're off the charts good um the best way i can summarize it um senator is i had a 32-year [46:29] veteran of the agency retire this year and he said to me i hate to go uh i don't know if this [46:36] is the best year that the cia has ever had but it's the best year i can ever remember and i think [46:41] that reflects the current morale of the of the cia it's a workforce that knows it's doing a great job [46:48] that it's being allowed to do what they signed up to do, which is provide that decisive strategic [46:54] advantage to our country for great successes that everyone can see. [46:59] So I thank you for the opportunity to let me recognize the CIA workforce. [47:03] Thank you. [47:04] Director Ratcliffe, I want to address one specific threat from Iran, the threat of an [47:08] intercontinental missile, which is really just the combination of two technologies, [47:13] one thrust to get something into space and a reentry vehicle to get it back to Earth. [47:18] Iran has always had a space launch program, which is flimsy cover for the first part of [47:23] that intercontinental missile program. [47:25] I haven't seen any Iranian astronauts in space lately. [47:28] And second, they have medium range ballistic missiles, which already have a reentry vehicle. [47:32] So if you crudely married those two technologies together, I've heard some analysts say that [47:38] Iran could have had a functioning intercontinental missile to threaten the United States. [47:43] And as few as six months. [47:45] Would you agree with that assessment? [47:46] Well, you're right to be concerned about Iran's development of longer range ballistic [47:51] missiles, Senator. [47:52] If Iran were allowed to develop at the IRBM ranges, which is 3,000 kilometers, it would [48:01] threaten most of Europe. [48:03] And yes, as you mentioned, we know that Iran is gaining experience in these larger, more [48:09] powerful booster technologies through its... [48:13] So-called space launch vehicle program. [48:17] If left unimpeded, yes, Senator, they would have the ability to range missiles to the [48:23] continental US. [48:26] It's one of the reasons why degrading Iran's missile production capabilities that is taking [48:32] place right now in Operation Epic Fury is so important to our national security. [48:38] Thank you. [48:40] Vice Chairman. [48:41] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [48:43] Director Gabbard, the whole country knows. [48:44] Thank you. [48:45] The president knows that you were recently involved in an FBI operation to seize ballots [48:50] in Fulton County, Georgia. [48:53] Yet this was despite the fact that the warrant showed no foreign interference or nexus. [49:00] Matter of fact, the warrant was based entirely on conspiracy theories that have already been [49:06] examined and rejected repeatedly. [49:09] Now, where is the authority for you to involve yourself in a domestic law enforcement activity? [49:18] Thank you, Vice Chairman. [49:19] I appreciate the question. [49:20] As you know, I've addressed everything. [49:21] Thank you. [49:22] every issue you've raised in detail in a letter, but I'm grateful for the opportunity to do [49:26] it in this forum. As you stated, Congress provided by statute, ODNI, with the responsibility [49:34] of election security and counterintelligence in 2021. As you also know, ODNI has purview [49:41] and oversight- [49:42] I know the history very well, but could you just address the question? [49:46] ODNI also has purview and overview over two domestic related agencies, the Department [49:53] of Homeland Security and the FBI, both of which have purview over election security [49:59] responsibilities to ensure the integrity of our elections. I want to correct one of your [50:04] statements that you've made multiple times, which is false. I did not participate in a [50:09] law enforcement activity, nor would I, because that does not exist within my authorities. [50:15] I was at- [50:16] You were present on the scene. [50:17] I was at- [50:17] Are the photos of you on the scene false? [50:18] I was at Fulton County, sir, at the request of the president, and to work with the FBI [50:25] to observe this action that had long been awaited. I was not aware of what was in the [50:30] warrant or was not in the warrant. [50:32] What was the president's specific request for you to go to- [50:34] And to say thank you to the FBI agents for their work. [50:35] What was the specific request that was made by the president for you to show up in Fulton [50:38] County? [50:39] To go and observe the FBI's activities on this issue. [50:42] So why- [50:43] When you look at the- [50:44] Your question, sir. [50:45] Do you have the answer why the president was knowing about this? [50:46] Affidavit before it was even served? [50:49] I'm not aware that the president knew about an affidavit before it was served. [50:52] Then why was he sending you to Fulton County? [50:55] This occurred the day that the FBI had it approved, their warrant approved, by a local [51:00] judge, and they began to execute this. [51:03] Director- [51:04] Address your question, sir, about the foreign nexus question. [51:07] In order for us to better understand the vulnerabilities in our election systems that may exist today, [51:13] as we look to 2026. [51:14] And yes, we are very focused on trying to make sure that we don't have to go back and [51:16] re-evaluate it. [51:17] We are very focused on trying to make sure that this election is one that the American [51:19] people have- [51:20] Director Gabbard, let me- [51:21] I've got a number of questions. [51:22] Director Gabbard, I have a number of questions. [51:24] Let me ask my next question, please. [51:28] You have not provided any of the required reports or briefings to this committee on [51:35] foreign interference. [51:38] This is the first threat assessment since 2017 that didn't even mention foreign interference. [51:46] Last year, when you were in- [51:48] Yes. [51:50] It was confirmed. [51:51] It mentioned it at high level. [51:52] Are you saying there is no foreign threat to our elections in the midterms this year? [51:58] As I stated in the outset of my remarks, this year's annual threat assessment matches the [52:03] prioritization of threats and- [52:06] Please answer the question. [52:07] Yes or no? [52:08] Is there foreign threat interference to our elections this year? [52:10] That the president has laid out. [52:11] Are there foreign- [52:12] Please allow me to answer the question, sir. [52:13] The intelligence community has been and continues to remain focused on any collection and intelligence [52:19] products- [52:20] Ma'am, you're- Ma'am- [52:21] A potential foreign threat for those who are seeking to- [52:24] So far, there has been none then because you've made no reports- [52:26] In our election system. [52:27] Excuse me, ma'am. [52:28] If you want to ask the questions, you should have stayed in Congress. [52:31] Please answer the questions. [52:32] I didn't ask you a question, sir. [52:33] I'm trying to answer your questions. [52:35] So you're saying the failure to provide any reports or the failure to have any mention [52:41] of a foreign threat assessment, I would draw the conclusion there must be no foreign threat [52:46] to our elections in 26. [52:47] So that brings me a question that I have for both you, ma'am, and Director Patel. [52:51] Yes. [52:52] There are reports that in 2020, the president was preparing an executive order to potentially [52:58] seize ballots or bring in federal forces. [53:03] There is a published report that there is a similar EO being drafted right now about [53:08] 2026, citing China. [53:11] Director Patel, do you have any knowledge of that draft EO? [53:15] Thank you, Vice Chairman. [53:16] I do not, sir. [53:17] Director Gabbard, do you have any? [53:18] I do not. [53:19] Thank you. [53:20] Let me move to Iran. [53:21] Now, I understand. [53:22] And I appreciate it. [53:24] Director Gabbard, your comments yesterday about agreeing that the president has sole [53:29] authority, I guess in his bones, to declare whether something is an imminent threat. [53:35] I didn't agree with your friend, Mr. Kent, but I didn't, again, I agreed with him yesterday [53:42] on the fact that there was no imminent threat. [53:45] I guess what I'm concerned about one thing is, even in your printed testimony today on [53:52] page six. [53:54] In your last paragraph on page six, as a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran's nuclear [53:58] enrichment program was obliterated. [54:00] There's been no efforts to try to rebuild their enrichment capability. [54:04] You omitted that paragraph from your oral opening. [54:10] Was that because the president said there was an imminent threat two weeks ago? [54:15] No, sir. [54:16] I recognized that the time was running long, and I skipped through some of the portions [54:20] of my oral delivered remarks. [54:21] So you chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:22] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:23] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:24] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:25] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:26] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:27] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:28] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:29] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:30] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:31] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:32] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:33] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:34] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:35] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:36] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:38] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:39] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:40] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:41] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:42] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:43] You chose to omit the parts that contradicted. [54:44] that the Iranians would try to move on the Strait? [54:47] I'm not aware of those remarks, [54:49] and I think those of us here at the table [54:50] can point to the fact that historically, [54:53] the Iranians have always threatened [54:55] to leverage their control over the Strait of Hormuz. [54:58] Why would the president say he was amazed? [55:00] I'm not aware of those remarks. [55:01] What about the comments the president made [55:02] that he was surprised, again, [55:04] reports that Iran struck the adjacent Gulf states? [55:09] Again, I'm not aware of those remarks. [55:11] We have been and continue to provide the intelligence. [55:12] Did you brief the president? [55:14] Did you brief the president? [55:16] Did you brief the president if he starts a war of choice [55:20] that the likely result would be [55:23] that Iran would strike adjacent Gulf nations [55:27] and close the Strait of Hormuz? [55:30] Did you brief him on those two facts [55:32] that I think have been consistently [55:34] the assumptions of the intelligence community? [55:38] I have not and won't divulge internal conversations. [55:42] I will say that those of us within the intelligence community [55:45] continue to provide the intelligence [55:46] and continue to provide the intelligence community. [55:46] I will say that those of us within the intelligence community [55:47] continue to provide the intelligence community. [55:47] with all of the best objective intelligence available [55:50] to inform his decisions. [55:51] Senator Collins. [55:53] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [55:56] Director Gabbard, you just testified [55:59] that ISIS and al-Qaeda [56:03] are significantly weaker. [56:07] And reflecting that view, [56:10] you have devoted declining budgets, [56:16] personnel, and emphasis [56:18] personnel, and emphasis on [56:19] and emphasis on [56:19] countering terrorism. Yet, the fact is that ISIS is growing and operating in Somalia, Afghanistan, [56:31] Syria, Pakistan, and Iraq. Al Qaeda is surging in Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, [56:40] and throughout Central Africa. The Houthis in Yemen and the rest of the Iranian proxies remain [56:50] a serious threat. Focusing, as you have done, on great power competitors seems to have diverted [57:01] resources from the fight against terrorism, a fight that's very much still going on. [57:11] As I have said repeatedly, it is terrorists who want and can kill Americans today. [57:21] We've been able to do this, we've been able to do this, we've been able to do this. [57:21] We've been able to do this. We've been able to do this. [57:22] We've been able to do this. We've been able to do this. [57:22] just seen the terrorists in Michigan attacking the synagogue. [57:28] In addition, it appears that a more stovepiped effort in the Intelligence Committee has returned. [57:37] How are you ensuring that Americans are safe and that you are countering counterterrorism [57:48] threats to our homeland and to U.S. citizens abroad? [57:54] Thank you, Senator Collins, for your question and the opportunity to clarify the comments [57:58] in my opening statement. [58:01] My reference to the size of ISIS and al-Qaeda organizationally is smaller and weaker than [58:08] it was during its peak over a decade ago. [58:11] However, I completely concur with your remarks about the threat of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other [58:17] Islamist terrorist groups around the world. [58:19] The threat they pose to U.S. interests, service members, and directly to the homeland. [58:25] Our ODNI National Counterterrorism Center has been at the forefront of ramping up and [58:30] I believe is more active today than it has been, certainly, in a long time. [58:35] We are dedicating every resource that they ask for, as well as the counterterrorism elements [58:39] across the IC, to make sure that we are never taking our eye off of this persistent threat [58:46] to the American people. [58:48] The [59:19] ISIS threat is a threat that we are able to have more indications of. [59:23] This remains and will be, and as we come to present our budgets to you, a foremost and [59:28] primary priority. [59:30] The integration across the intelligence community on the counterterrorism threat occurs every [59:35] single day with our teams working very effectively together to thwart terrorist attacks as we [59:41] have over the last year. [59:43] Director Patel, I'm going to follow up on this issue with you. [59:48] ISIS targets potential threats. [59:49] I'm going to follow up on this issue with you. [59:50] ISIS targets potential threats. [59:50] Through provincial recru online through social media, gaming platforms, encrypted messaging [59:59] apps, ISIS even facilitated a network online to smuggle illegal immigrants into the United [1:00:09] States. [1:00:10] Since April 2021 there have been more than 52 ja' ghadahs inspired cases across 30 states. [1:00:16] What can you document from this? [1:00:17] What do you plan to do? [1:00:18] You listen. [1:00:19] Think about yourselves. [1:00:19] Think about yourselves. [1:00:20] What measures is the FBI taking to prevent foreign terrorist organizations from recruiting or influencing Americans while also ensuring the protection of individuals' right to privacy? [1:00:40] Thank you, Senator, and I think you said it best. [1:00:44] They have transferred their capabilities in terms of personal recruitments to online recruitments, which makes any terrorist organization, including ISIS, all the more powerful. [1:00:55] What we have done is extended and expanded resources to environments like the Threat Screening Center, which allows us to collect biometric capabilities from all over the world. [1:01:05] We've had a double-digit increase in that and a double-digit increase in intelligence production. [1:01:09] But what we've also done in the CT space specifically is expand the number of— [1:01:14] agents and intel analysts that go online and detect based on our biometric capabilities and intelligence that we have from the interagency. [1:01:22] And what that leads us to is what we saw in December of last year, Senator, where we at the FBI stopped four terrorist attacks, four in California, Texas, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, three of which were ISIS-inspired. [1:01:37] We were able to detect these individuals both online and in person using our covert platforms. [1:01:42] And we shuttered a bombing campaign. [1:01:44] And we shut down the campaign in Southern California and two mass casualty events for New Year's Eve. [1:01:48] Director Gabbard, the intelligence community did not detect an extremely serious breach affecting our telecommunications industry due to the Chinese salt typhoon incursions for a very long time. [1:02:10] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:12] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:14] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:16] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:18] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:20] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:23] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:25] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:27] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:29] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:31] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:33] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:35] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:37] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:39] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:41] In addition, the Chinese vault typhoon threat is the most common. [1:02:43] is by our talented intelligence community thank you senator collins for the question [1:02:51] you know working with our partners at nsa and others to detect these threats and how they [1:02:58] may be evolve or developing is something we're continuing to work on building strong partnerships [1:03:05] with the private sector whether it be in the telecom industry the financial sector the [1:03:09] healthcare sector the energy sector is something that i'm rebuilding we've seen some of these [1:03:15] ongoing relationships falter over previous years i've personally been astounded by some of the [1:03:21] conversations i've had with leaders from these industries who are just as concerned as we are [1:03:26] about these threats to our critical infrastructure and yet don't feel that they have the connectivity [1:03:32] or the information to be able to secure their own infrastructure so in short building those [1:03:38] stronger partnerships [1:03:39] uh integrating and being able to share information intelligence where we can [1:03:44] is critical for us to be able to secure our country from these threats thank you senator collins [1:03:50] senator wyden thank you mr chairman director gabbard last year your agencies testified and i [1:03:55] quote iran's large conventional forces are capable of inflicting substantial damage to an attacker [1:04:03] executing regional strikes and disrupting shipping particularly energy supplies [1:04:09] with internal charges [1:04:37] uh [1:04:39] thank you senator white and the intelligencewheels [1:04:41] community has continued to provide the president and his team with the intelligence related [1:04:48] to this operation in Iran before and on an ongoing basis. [1:04:53] So right now we're in a global energy crisis. [1:04:56] We're paying more for gas. [1:04:58] The economy is in danger. [1:05:00] And it seems to me, and I heard you discuss this with Senator Warner too, that there's [1:05:05] a lot of hedging going on with respect to entirely foreseen consequences of the war. [1:05:11] And that strikes me, Madam Director, as what amounts to a historic mistake. [1:05:17] Now my second question is, did the intelligence agencies assess that the Iranians could respond [1:05:22] to a regime change attack from us by attacking U.S. forces and other Americans in the region? [1:05:30] The IC assessment has always taken very seriously the threat of the Iranian regime's missile [1:05:36] capabilities and how our American troops within the region may be put at risk. [1:05:42] Again, you know, it seems to me with Americans dying in the war, it's hard to see how you [1:05:49] can sit here and say that the intelligence agencies couldn't provide a clear warning [1:05:55] that if attacked, the Iranians would respond by attacking our people. [1:06:00] Now on Monday, Madam Director, Donald Trump was asked about Iranian strikes on the Gulf [1:06:05] states. [1:06:06] He said, and I quote, nobody, nobody, no, no, no, the greatest experts, nobody thought [1:06:12] they were going to hit the Gulf states. [1:06:13] You all are supposed to be the greatest experts. [1:06:16] That's what we have you there for. [1:06:19] Director Gabbard, did the intelligence agencies assess that Iran could conduct strikes on [1:06:23] our own partners in the region if it was attacked? [1:06:27] The intelligence community has continued to assess the potential threats to the region, [1:06:32] the existing threats to the region, and providing those assessments to the policy makers and [1:06:37] decision makers. [1:06:40] Let me move on to several others of you with respect to 702 of FISA, and I'm just going [1:06:45] to start with you, John. [1:06:45] General Hartman, when Congress last reauthorized Section 702 of FISA, it included a provision [1:06:51] that expanded the type of companies and individuals who could be forced to assist the government [1:06:58] in its spying. [1:06:59] Has this expansion resulted in any intelligence? [1:07:03] General Hartman. [1:07:05] Senator, thanks for the question. [1:07:07] Just to be clear, this provision provided us an ability to collect foreign intelligence [1:07:15] on personnel outside of the United States. [1:07:16] Thank you. [1:07:17] This is the major 702 issue in terms of expansion. [1:07:23] What was the effect of what was done? [1:07:26] Senator, I would prefer to talk to you about exact specifics in the closed session. [1:07:31] I'm happy to do that. [1:07:33] Let's understand, though, this is a dangerously broad provision that could be used to rope [1:07:39] in anybody with access to a cable box, a Wi-Fi router, or a server. [1:07:45] It was jammed into the 2024 reauthorization bill. [1:07:49] At the last minute, senators were told they had no choice but to support it. [1:07:54] And now, two years later, we've just had testimony from a very respected individual who's saying, [1:08:01] so far it has had no value. [1:08:04] So colleagues, we are getting ready to have another discussion on this, and this ought [1:08:08] to be a warning to every senator that not every new spying power that is sold is urgent [1:08:13] and critical actually is. [1:08:15] Senator, could I please respond to that? [1:08:17] Of course. [1:08:18] So, Senator. [1:08:19] I just want to be clear. [1:08:21] It provided us no additional authority that doesn't involve collecting intelligence on [1:08:27] foreigners that are outside of the United States of America. [1:08:30] Fine. [1:08:31] Director Patel, a question for you. [1:08:33] In 2023, your predecessor testified that, and I quote, to my knowledge, we do not currently [1:08:39] purchase commercial database information that includes location data derived from internet [1:08:45] advertising. [1:08:46] Is that the case still? [1:08:49] And if so, can you commit this morning to not buying Americans' location data? [1:08:55] Thank you. [1:08:57] The FBI uses all tools, Senator, thank you for the question, to do our mission. [1:09:02] We do purchase commercially available information that's consistent with the Constitution and [1:09:07] the laws under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. [1:09:11] And it has led to some valuable intelligence for us to be utilized with our private and [1:09:15] partner sectors. [1:09:16] So you're saying that the agency will buy Americans' location data? [1:09:18] Yes. [1:09:19] That's correct. [1:09:20] Thank you. [1:09:21] The FBI will buy Americans' location data. [1:09:22] I believe that that's what you've said in kind of intelligence lingo, and I just want [1:09:27] to say, as we start this debate, doing that without a warrant is an outrageous end run [1:09:33] around the Fourth Amendment. [1:09:35] It's particularly dangerous given the use of artificial intelligence to comb through [1:09:39] massive amounts of private information. [1:09:41] This is exhibit A for why Congress needs to pass our bipartisan, bicameral bill, the Government [1:09:48] Surveillance Reform Act. [1:09:50] I have time. [1:09:51] I believe for one more question, Director Patel, you, three weeks ago, indicated you [1:09:56] were dissatisfied about having your phone records subpoenaed. [1:09:59] Do you think the government ought to get a court order to collect phone records? [1:10:02] Senator, in my experience, the government does get court orders to obtain phone records. [1:10:11] One last question. [1:10:13] General Adams, for you, in 2021, your agency confirmed that it had purchased and searched [1:10:18] domestic location data. [1:10:19] Is it still your agency's position that you can buy Americans' location data? [1:10:20] Yes. [1:10:21] I believe for one more question, Director Patel, you, three weeks ago, indicated you were dissatisfied [1:10:22] with your personal information. [1:10:23] Is it still your agency's position that you can buy Americans' location data without a [1:10:24] warrant? [1:10:25] If so, are you still doing it? [1:10:26] Senator, thanks for the question. [1:10:29] With regards to commercially available information and publicly available information, the purchases [1:10:34] that this agency, that my agency makes, is it in alignment with the Constitution and [1:10:39] protects U.S. persons' information. [1:10:42] But you're buying location data, correct? [1:10:45] I mean, we've now had that referred to twice, and I don't think there's any question that [1:10:50] you're doing it. [1:10:51] All of the purchases? [1:10:52] All of the purchases? [1:10:53] Yes. [1:10:54] Purchasing of commercially available information by the agency is passed through legal channels and is in complete compliance with laws. [1:11:01] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:11:02] General Hartman, I want to give you a chance to answer more specifically what Senator Wyden said. [1:11:06] You did answer it indirectly. [1:11:08] Does anything in Section 702 give the government the authority to target any American with a cable box or a Wi-Fi router? [1:11:18] Sure. Chairman, nothing in 702 gives us the authority to target an American with a cable router or a Wi-Fi device. [1:11:27] Thank you. And I would observe about commercially available data that the keywords are commercially available. [1:11:33] If any other person can buy it and the FBI can buy it and it helps them locate a depraved child molester or savage cartel leader, [1:11:47] I would certainly hope the FBI is doing anything they can to keep Americans safe. [1:11:51] It's not much different from long-standing Supreme Court precedent that, for instance, says law enforcement can go through trash that you put on the side of the curb because you no longer have a privacy interest in it. [1:12:03] Senator Cornyn. [1:12:06] Thank you all for your service to our country and the people you represent. [1:12:11] You have our—we are in debt to all of you. [1:12:14] I want to ask you, Director Ratcliffe, yesterday the head of the National Counterterrorism Center resigned, [1:12:23] saying that Iran did not— [1:12:25] that Iran did not represent an imminent threat to the United States. [1:12:28] Is there anything to indicate that Iran had ceased in its nuclear ambitions or in its desire to continue to build ballistic missiles capable of threatening American troops and allies in the Middle East? [1:12:45] Senator, no. In fact, intelligence reflects the contrary. [1:12:49] So you disagree with Mr. Kent? [1:12:53] I do. [1:12:53] I would think any fair-minded assessment of the situation— [1:12:58] even based on open sources— [1:13:00] would reflect the danger Iran poses— [1:13:03] the regime poses to the United States. [1:13:05] Isn't it true they've basically been at war with the West since 1979 during the Iranian Revolution and have American blood on their hands? [1:13:13] That's absolutely correct. [1:13:15] I think Iran has been a constant threat to the United States for an extended period of time and posed an immediate threat at this time. [1:13:24] The threat assessment says that al-Qaeda and ISIS— [1:13:31] ISIS maintain the intent to launch operations targeting the U.S., [1:13:35] but it's most likely to occur through U.S.-based lone offenders. [1:13:41] I want to ask you, Director Patel, [1:13:43] it seems like there's been a raft of incidents recently. [1:13:50] On March the 1st in Austin, Texas, where I live, [1:13:54] a lone gunman wearing a sweatshirt saying, [1:13:57] property of Allah, [1:13:59] and who the T-shirt he wore underneath had an Iranian flag, [1:14:02] killed three innocent people and injured 12 more. [1:14:07] And then we know in Virginia, the Old Dominion shooting, [1:14:13] somebody who, unbelievably, was sentenced to 11 years in federal prison for attempting to support ISIS, [1:14:20] but then was released only to commit another terrorist attack. [1:14:24] We all are familiar with what's happened in Michigan, in New York, [1:14:29] and I applaud the important role [1:14:34] that the FBI has played in stopping some terrorist attacks, [1:14:40] but obviously the FBI can't be everywhere all the time. [1:14:44] Would you please talk about your cooperation and collaboration [1:14:50] with Homeland Security Investigations [1:14:53] in countering terrorist attacks against the United States? [1:14:56] Thank you, Senator. Absolutely. [1:14:58] It is essential that the FBI cooperates with the entire interagency, [1:15:02] but as to your question about DHS specifically, [1:15:04] what we have stood up around the country are 59 Homeland Security Task Forces [1:15:08] in 59 separate locations. [1:15:10] These are Joint Terrorism Task Forces? [1:15:12] Essentially, the JTTF model was expanded, [1:15:15] so the FBI owns 56 Joint Terrorism Task Forces in each of our field offices. [1:15:20] On top of that, we have 59 HSTFs, [1:15:24] which are co-led by the FBI and DHS. [1:15:27] And what that allows us to do is things like we did down in New Orleans [1:15:31] just over the holiday period, [1:15:33] where we served for a six-week period of time, [1:15:36] and where we dropped the murder rate by double-digit points, [1:15:39] and also it was the first time that Mardi Gras in its entire history [1:15:42] had not won homicide. [1:15:43] So when you bring the powers of the Homeland Security folks, [1:15:46] DHS, and the FBI together, [1:15:48] this is the purpose of it, to get after not just the terrorism threat, [1:15:51] but the violence and the criminal activity in our cities. [1:15:54] And that's why we're in 59 cities across the country, [1:15:56] and it's working in places like Memphis and every other city we have it. [1:16:00] Are you aware of the fact that [1:16:02] Homeland Security Investigation is a major directorate [1:16:06] within Immigration and Customs Enforcement? [1:16:09] Yes, sir. Yes, sir. [1:16:12] And are you aware that Senate Democrats [1:16:15] have uniformly voted not to fund [1:16:18] the Department of Homeland Security, [1:16:21] including Homeland Security Investigations, [1:16:24] TSA, FEMA, [1:16:27] and other functions of the Department of Homeland Security? [1:16:30] Senator, I'm aware that employees of DHS [1:16:33] are one month without pay. [1:16:35] They're not being paid, right? [1:16:36] Yes, sir. [1:16:37] And we're all seeing what's happening at airports [1:16:42] where people are having to wait hours at a time [1:16:45] because of the fact that these TSA agents are overburdened. [1:16:50] But what I wanted to focus on with you [1:16:54] is the refusal to fund [1:16:57] the functions of the Department of Homeland Security, [1:17:00] including Homeland Security Investigations, [1:17:02] making Americans, [1:17:04] less safe. [1:17:05] Absolutely. [1:17:06] So give us an example of some of the cooperation [1:17:18] that you all have engaged in with, [1:17:21] the FBI has engaged in with [1:17:23] the Homeland Security Investigations. [1:17:25] I'm looking at an article here [1:17:27] that talks about the 190,000 Afghan nationals [1:17:32] that were admitted to the United States, [1:17:35] literally unvetted. [1:17:37] And there are examples of individuals [1:17:41] within that 190,000 [1:17:44] who committed terrorist attacks [1:17:46] against the United States [1:17:49] and against American citizens. [1:17:51] Is that the sort of thing [1:17:53] that you are investigating with HSI? [1:17:56] Senator, that's one of the many things [1:17:58] we're investigating with HSI, DHS, CBP, ICE. [1:18:01] Give me some other examples of the collaboration [1:18:04] on what other topics, [1:18:05] including in addition to terrorism attacks. [1:18:09] What we're allowed to do [1:18:10] with our DHS partners, [1:18:12] Senator, [1:18:13] is enable their massive workforce [1:18:15] to supplement ours. [1:18:16] And what they're allowed to do [1:18:17] is share intelligence [1:18:18] on what you just, [1:18:19] things that you just talked about, [1:18:20] about the 100 plus thousand illegals [1:18:23] that came in from Afghanistan [1:18:25] during the Afghanistan withdrawal. [1:18:27] Unfortunately, [1:18:28] they weren't vetted thoroughly. [1:18:29] So what we're doing [1:18:30] is going back with our DHS partners [1:18:32] and vetting absolutely every single one of them [1:18:34] to the best that we can. [1:18:35] But unfortunately, [1:18:36] we're not able to go out into the country [1:18:38] and find every single one [1:18:39] of these individuals. [1:18:40] But we need more than 12,000 FBI agents [1:18:43] to do that job, [1:18:44] which is why we are utilizing [1:18:46] the 100,000 or so 1811s [1:18:49] at the Department of Homeland Security [1:18:51] to give us the information they have [1:18:52] from their immigration records, [1:18:54] from their travel records, [1:18:55] from their travel logs overseas [1:18:57] and within the country. [1:18:58] And what we're able to do [1:18:59] is remove these individuals off the streets [1:19:02] in every single state across the country [1:19:03] to include violent gang members, [1:19:05] to include Trende Aragua, [1:19:07] to include ISIS-affiliated individuals, [1:19:08] to include Al Qaeda-related affiliated individuals. [1:19:11] And hopefully, [1:19:12] we do it before and not after [1:19:16] like the tragedy that we witnessed [1:19:17] in Washington, D.C., [1:19:19] where an individual from Afghanistan [1:19:20] was allowed to enter into our country [1:19:22] and shot multiple members [1:19:23] of our uniformed military service. [1:19:25] Thank you. [1:19:26] Senator King. [1:19:27] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:19:28] I do need to point out [1:19:29] in response to some of the previous comments, [1:19:31] twice in the last two weeks, [1:19:33] as recently as last Thursday, [1:19:35] Senator Patty Murray, [1:19:36] the Appropriations Committee, [1:19:38] put a bill on the floor [1:19:39] that would have fully funded [1:19:40] TSA, FEMA, CISA, and the Coast Guard [1:19:43] for the rest of the year, [1:19:45] leaving the focus on the dispute [1:19:47] that we have with the conduct of ICE [1:19:51] as separately. [1:19:52] So inexplicably to me, [1:19:55] that bill was blocked [1:19:57] by my Republican colleagues. [1:19:59] It would have, as I say, [1:20:00] fully funded TSA, FEMA, CISA, Coast Guard, [1:20:04] and then focus the attention [1:20:06] on the situation with ICE. [1:20:08] So I just want to be clear [1:20:10] on who's blocking funding [1:20:11] for those four agencies. [1:20:14] I'd like to ask Ms. Gabbard [1:20:20] and Director Ratcliffe, [1:20:22] Director, both of you, [1:20:24] were either of you in the room [1:20:26] or your designees [1:20:27] when the President was making [1:20:29] the final decision [1:20:30] about taking this action [1:20:33] against Iran on February 27th, 28th, [1:20:37] was there an Intelligence Committee [1:20:40] or an intelligence community [1:20:43] present in those deliberations? [1:20:46] Mr. Ratcliffe, your response. [1:20:49] Senator King, [1:20:51] probably in dozens and dozens [1:20:53] of briefings with the President, [1:20:56] I don't know if there was a single meeting [1:20:59] where there was a single time [1:21:00] where a decision was made. [1:21:02] Were those dozens of meetings [1:21:03] right during the lead up [1:21:05] to this war? [1:21:09] I know you've met many times, [1:21:11] but I'm talking about [1:21:12] two weeks or so before the decision [1:21:14] to go into Iran was made. [1:21:15] Again, countless meetings [1:21:18] with the President. [1:21:20] During that period? [1:21:21] During that period. [1:21:22] Director Gabbard, [1:21:24] were you present in those discussions? [1:21:26] Likewise, yes. [1:21:28] The reason I'm asking the question [1:21:29] is there seems to be a discrepancy [1:21:30] between what the Intelligence Committee [1:21:32] community has reported over the years [1:21:35] and what the President has said [1:21:37] in terms of this action. [1:21:40] For example, Senator Wyden read [1:21:42] the report from a year ago [1:21:45] that strikes against neighboring states [1:21:48] and action to close the Strait of Hormuz [1:21:50] was predicted by the Intelligence community. [1:21:53] And yet the President says nobody knew. [1:21:55] And my question is, did you tell him? [1:21:58] Anybody want to answer that question? [1:22:04] Senator, I'll answer the question. [1:22:07] So, with regard to briefings, [1:22:11] the President gets briefings [1:22:13] constantly about intelligence. [1:22:15] Now, the comments that you talked about, [1:22:16] I had not heard, [1:22:18] but what I can tell you is [1:22:19] that Iran had specific plans [1:22:22] to hit U.S. interests [1:22:24] in energy sites across the region, [1:22:26] and that's why the Department of War [1:22:29] and the Department of State [1:22:30] took measures for force protection [1:22:32] and personnel protection [1:22:33] in advance of Operation Epic Fury. [1:22:36] I think that's what's most important. [1:22:38] Any predictions to the President [1:22:41] about the Strait of Hormuz? [1:22:42] All you got to do is look at a map [1:22:44] and you'll see that the vulnerability [1:22:46] of the Strait of Hormuz. [1:22:47] Was that part of the briefing, [1:22:49] Director Gabbard? [1:22:51] I think the Director Ratcliffe [1:22:54] made the point here is that [1:22:56] this has long been an assessment [1:22:58] of the I.C., [1:23:00] that Iran would likely hold [1:23:02] the Strait of Hormuz as leverage. [1:23:04] And my question is, [1:23:05] was that communicated to the President [1:23:06] in the lead up to this action? [1:23:07] And it's because of that [1:23:08] longstanding assessment [1:23:09] that the I.C. has continued to report [1:23:12] that the Department of War [1:23:14] took the preemptive planning measures [1:23:16] that it did. [1:23:18] Well, they've stated that they did not plan [1:23:21] for the Strait of Hormuz. [1:23:22] The President said, [1:23:23] who knew that was going to happen? [1:23:25] Anyway, let's move on. [1:23:26] Does the President take a daily brief [1:23:29] from the intelligence community? [1:23:34] This is a yes or no question, I think. [1:23:36] Yeah, the President, [1:23:38] I would say, Senator, [1:23:39] in my estimation on average, [1:23:41] I briefed the President of the United States [1:23:43] on intelligence [1:23:46] probably on average [1:23:49] 10 to 15 times a week [1:23:51] where I have conversations with him [1:23:53] about specific discreet issues. [1:23:55] Sometimes there are dedicated sessions [1:23:58] that last hours in length. [1:24:00] Sometimes I'm briefing him on specific issues, [1:24:03] sometimes three or four times a day. [1:24:05] But I would say on average, [1:24:07] my interactions where I'm briefing the President [1:24:09] on important national security matters [1:24:11] happens probably on average [1:24:13] 10 to 15 times per week. [1:24:15] Thank you. [1:24:16] Could you update us on the intelligence [1:24:18] on Russian intelligence sharing? [1:24:20] Is there any intelligence sharing [1:24:22] with Iran in the current conflict? [1:24:25] What do we know? [1:24:27] Senator, if there is that sharing going on, [1:24:32] that would be an answer [1:24:34] that would be appropriate [1:24:35] for a closed session. [1:24:37] Well, it's been in the public press. [1:24:39] This is open source that it's occurring. [1:24:42] Is it occurring? [1:24:45] Again, if it is occurring, [1:24:46] that would be an answer appropriate [1:24:48] for a closed session. [1:24:50] What I can tell you is that, [1:24:52] according to the Department of War, [1:24:55] any support that Iran may be receiving [1:24:58] is not inhibiting their operational effects. [1:25:02] Okay, that's sort of the first cousin [1:25:05] of a yes, I guess. [1:25:07] According to intelligence analysis, [1:25:10] can regime change or the elimination [1:25:13] of the estimated 1,000 pounds [1:25:15] of highly enriched uranium [1:25:18] be accomplished without boots on the ground? [1:25:26] Senator, the discussion about [1:25:29] the Iranian nuclear capability, [1:25:32] we intend in the closed session [1:25:34] to talk about that in great deal. [1:25:36] With regards to revealing any information [1:25:39] about the ability to do that, [1:25:42] I would have to defer that to closed session. [1:25:45] Okay, I'll see you in an hour. [1:25:47] Finally, there was very little, [1:25:50] if anything, in the report, [1:25:52] in the assessment about climate change, [1:25:55] and that's been in past reports. [1:25:57] There is a lot of discussion about migration. [1:25:59] The estimates are that climate migrants, [1:26:03] because of the changes in the climate [1:26:06] and the atmosphere, [1:26:08] and particularly in the center equatorial area [1:26:11] of the Earth, [1:26:12] will range from 200 million [1:26:14] to a billion people by 2050. [1:26:16] Do you believe that is a national security threat [1:26:19] that should be addressed? [1:26:21] The Syrian refugees were about six million, [1:26:24] and they upset the politics of Europe [1:26:27] for several years. [1:26:28] We're talking about 200 million. [1:26:30] 200 million to a billion people on the move. [1:26:33] I believe that's something we should be discussing [1:26:35] and that the intelligence community should be assessing. [1:26:39] Director Gabbard? [1:26:41] Yes, Senator, there are a number of drivers [1:26:43] of things like migration. [1:26:46] It would be an extensive and voluminous [1:26:49] annual threat assessment [1:26:50] if we included every single one. [1:26:52] This annual threat assessment is focused, again, [1:26:54] on the priorities laid out [1:26:57] by the president's national security strategy [1:26:59] and on the effectiveness [1:27:01] that we can take action, [1:27:04] operational action, [1:27:06] to protect U.S. interests. [1:27:08] Well, I would suggest combating climate change [1:27:11] is something we can take action on. [1:27:13] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:27:14] On the matter of media reports [1:27:17] about Russian or Chinese collaboration with Iran, [1:27:22] I would point out that the media [1:27:24] is not a classification authority. [1:27:27] And that kind of story, [1:27:30] whether true or not, [1:27:31] might be better suited for the FBI [1:27:33] to investigate on whether there's been [1:27:35] unlawful disclosures of classified information. [1:27:38] I would also say it sounds like something [1:27:40] Russia and China would do. [1:27:43] Communist Russia used to do it during the Cold War [1:27:45] and Communist China has always done stuff like that. [1:27:47] On the Patty Murray legislation, [1:27:49] not only would it have defunded ICE and CBP, [1:27:52] it would have also defunded [1:27:53] Homeland Security Investigations, [1:27:55] which do critical work on our streets [1:27:56] to protect our communities [1:27:58] from financial crimes, from predators, [1:28:00] from transnational gangs as well. [1:28:02] So while we would all like to see [1:28:04] the TSA and the Coast Guard [1:28:06] and other critical parts of Homeland Security as well, [1:28:08] we do not want to defund the police, [1:28:10] this time the immigration police. [1:28:12] Senator Moran. [1:28:13] Chairman, thank you. [1:28:14] I believe that it's in the U.S.'s national interest, [1:28:18] our security interest, [1:28:20] for Ukraine to be successful [1:28:23] in defeating the Russian invasion. [1:28:25] I'm concerned with the consequences [1:28:27] of Operation Epic Fury [1:28:29] on that ability of Ukraine [1:28:32] to succeed in defending its borders. [1:28:34] And General Adams, [1:28:36] in broad terms, [1:28:37] not necessarily, [1:28:39] not classified terms, [1:28:40] what are the consequences [1:28:42] to the supply chain, [1:28:43] to the capability of the United States [1:28:46] to supply NATO allies and Ukraine [1:28:52] as a result of Operation Epic Fury? [1:28:56] My question is that usual problem [1:28:58] of how do we do both? [1:29:00] Are we doing both? [1:29:01] Is U.S. support maintained [1:29:03] or diminished for Ukraine [1:29:05] as a result of Epic Fury? [1:29:09] Senator, [1:29:11] thank you for that question. [1:29:13] And we do continue to, [1:29:15] beyond Epic Fury, [1:29:17] observe what is happening [1:29:19] across the world [1:29:21] in crisis like Russian-Ukraine. [1:29:25] Unfortunately for the situation there now, [1:29:30] just based on the force composition [1:29:32] and the delta between the Russian forces [1:29:35] and the Ukrainian forces, [1:29:37] the advantage is to the Russians. [1:29:40] As we get into the classified hearing, [1:29:43] we can talk a little more specifically [1:29:45] about the items with regards [1:29:47] to the supply chain [1:29:49] and with regards to the information [1:29:53] that the Defense Intelligence Agency collects. [1:29:55] We look at the foreign threat [1:29:57] and what their capabilities are. [1:29:59] From a multi-int perspective, [1:30:02] we look a little bit less [1:30:05] at friendly capabilities. [1:30:07] And I would defer questions [1:30:08] with regards to, [1:30:09] U.S. supply chain limitations [1:30:13] with regards to the logistics [1:30:14] and the effort that the Secretary of War [1:30:16] is having with regards to trying to boost [1:30:18] the U.S. defense industrial base. [1:30:20] I would defer those to the department [1:30:22] to discuss. [1:30:24] Well, General, [1:30:26] please be prepared [1:30:27] for the classified session [1:30:28] for me to continue to pursue this. [1:30:31] I mean, I don't, [1:30:32] our supply chain issues [1:30:33] are not classified in the sense [1:30:35] that every hearing I'm in [1:30:36] as a defense appropriator [1:30:38] has officials [1:30:39] from the Department of Defense [1:30:41] testifying about the need [1:30:42] for further assistance. [1:30:44] And really, [1:30:45] I'm asking for the facts [1:30:47] of what has happened [1:30:49] as a result of Operation Fury, [1:30:52] Epic Fury, [1:30:53] in the last few weeks [1:30:56] in our supply to Ukraine [1:30:59] and our NATO allies [1:31:00] who are supplying Ukraine. [1:31:02] Yes, sir. [1:31:04] The department is executing [1:31:07] a comprehensive, [1:31:08] in fact, the second war [1:31:10] has gone around [1:31:11] the nation [1:31:12] to boost [1:31:13] the defense industrial base. [1:31:14] We know for a fact [1:31:15] that we have to increase [1:31:17] our defense industrial base capability. [1:31:20] Its impact, [1:31:21] based on the munitions expended [1:31:23] during Epic Fury, [1:31:25] will be an impact. [1:31:27] But we need to boost it. [1:31:29] The efforts are underway [1:31:30] to boost it. [1:31:32] Well, I'm interested [1:31:35] in helping accomplish that goal. [1:31:36] Director Ratcliffe, [1:31:38] perhaps along the same line, [1:31:42] I hope [1:31:43] I assume among, [1:31:44] let me first of all [1:31:45] compliment you [1:31:46] on your public service. [1:31:47] I appreciate you. [1:31:49] And that's not my usual [1:31:50] town hall meeting [1:31:51] when I get a compliment [1:31:52] from somebody [1:31:53] who then follows it [1:31:54] with a butt. [1:31:55] I am interested [1:31:57] in being of help [1:31:58] and in regard [1:31:59] to your conversations [1:32:01] in preparation [1:32:02] for Epic Fury, [1:32:03] I'd be interested [1:32:04] in knowing [1:32:05] if the consequences [1:32:06] to our abilities [1:32:07] to defend [1:32:08] the United States [1:32:09] against Russia [1:32:10] or China [1:32:11] or other adversaries [1:32:13] was taken into account. [1:32:16] How was that diminished [1:32:17] or increased [1:32:18] by Operation Epic Fury? [1:32:20] And particularly [1:32:21] in this instance [1:32:22] about what it means, [1:32:23] was the conversation had [1:32:25] about what it means [1:32:26] to our ability [1:32:27] to help Ukraine [1:32:28] defend itself. [1:32:30] U.S. support for Ukraine [1:32:34] includes military [1:32:38] and other assistance, [1:32:39] but also we've undertaken [1:32:41] economic sanctions [1:32:42] against Russia [1:32:43] for their invasion [1:32:44] of Ukraine. [1:32:45] And Epic Fury [1:32:46] has caused [1:32:48] a significant increase [1:32:49] in oil prices [1:32:50] and the administration [1:32:52] has waived sanctions [1:32:53] against Russian [1:32:54] oil companies, [1:32:56] which are reported [1:32:57] to say that Russia [1:33:00] is receiving [1:33:01] $150 million per day, [1:33:03] additional dollars [1:33:06] as a result [1:33:07] of the waiver. [1:33:08] What can you tell me [1:33:09] about our plans [1:33:13] or your understanding [1:33:16] of what's transpiring [1:33:17] as a result [1:33:18] of Operation Epic Fury [1:33:20] in regard to those [1:33:22] oil revenues [1:33:23] that are now being generated [1:33:24] in favor of Russia [1:33:25] and the lifting [1:33:26] of the sanctions, [1:33:27] at least for a temporary [1:33:28] period of time? [1:33:29] Senator, [1:33:31] thanks for the compliment, [1:33:32] I think. [1:33:36] I'll start with a couple things. [1:33:37] What I would tell you is [1:33:41] the same military [1:33:42] and intelligence professionals [1:33:44] who delivered, [1:33:46] not just for the administration, [1:33:47] but for the American people, [1:33:50] a flawless intelligence picture [1:33:52] and flawless military operations [1:33:54] in Operation Midnight Hammer [1:33:56] and Operation Absolute Resolve [1:33:58] are the same folks [1:34:00] involved with Operation Epic Fury. [1:34:03] And so I hope that provides you [1:34:05] some measure of comfort [1:34:06] with regard to how detailed, [1:34:09] how thoughtful the approach was [1:34:12] to the current operation. [1:34:16] And that's why I think [1:34:17] that to mischaracterize it [1:34:19] as it is being done in the media [1:34:21] is a disservice [1:34:22] to the folks involved [1:34:23] in what is a very specific campaign [1:34:27] that is different than the two [1:34:29] that I mentioned before. [1:34:30] It's why the president came out [1:34:31] and said, [1:34:32] this isn't over in a matter of hours, [1:34:34] this is a four to six week campaign, [1:34:36] and that it would come at some cost [1:34:39] because the goal of the president [1:34:43] and the administration [1:34:45] is to address a 47-year problem, [1:34:48] the most destabilizing [1:34:49] force in the Middle East [1:34:50] for the last 47 years, [1:34:52] one that has frankly been watered, [1:34:56] fed, and nurtured by policies [1:34:59] of prior administrations [1:35:01] that has allowed them [1:35:02] to become the threat that they have. [1:35:04] So I say all of that [1:35:05] sort of in context to understanding [1:35:07] that we have to address that, [1:35:09] but at the same time, [1:35:10] to your point on what's going on [1:35:12] with regard to Russia and Ukraine, [1:35:14] and you've mentioned the oil issue. [1:35:18] Sometimes policymakers have to take steps [1:35:22] that while they may benefit adversaries [1:35:24] like Russia or China, [1:35:26] do so because they also think [1:35:28] it will benefit U.S. citizens, [1:35:31] and in this case with respect [1:35:32] to keeping the economy on track [1:35:35] and keeping oil prices low. [1:35:37] So what I can tell you is [1:35:39] the intelligence is thoughtfully considered, [1:35:41] and I think the policymakers [1:35:43] have taken that, [1:35:45] and I'm confident [1:35:47] that we can walk and chew gum [1:35:49] at the same time, [1:35:51] pursue objectives in the Middle East, [1:35:53] and provide support [1:35:55] with regard to the conflict in Russia [1:35:58] and the Russian aggression in Ukraine. [1:36:02] Senator Bennett. [1:36:04] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:36:05] I appreciate that. [1:36:07] Director Ratcliffe, [1:36:09] you just described the specific campaign [1:36:13] that the president is engaged in, [1:36:15] the country is engaged in, [1:36:16] with respect to Iran. [1:36:18] I think the campaign [1:36:20] has been one, in my view, [1:36:22] without a specific rationale [1:36:24] for the American people. [1:36:26] Nineteen days into President Trump's [1:36:28] unauthorized war with Iran, [1:36:30] and by which I mean [1:36:33] there has been no congressional approval, [1:36:35] at least 13 American service members [1:36:37] are dead, [1:36:38] and many others are injured. [1:36:40] President Trump has offered [1:36:42] no credible justification [1:36:44] for an imminent threat, [1:36:47] no clear goals, [1:36:48] no strategy or timeline. [1:36:50] His message keeps changing, [1:36:52] I think, [1:36:53] in really damaging ways. [1:36:54] President Trump said [1:36:55] Iran's nuclear facilities [1:36:57] had been, quote, [1:36:58] totally obliterated [1:37:00] in June 2025. [1:37:02] But when he launched this latest war, [1:37:04] he said we need to eliminate [1:37:06] the imminent nuclear threat [1:37:08] of those totally obliterated [1:37:11] nuclear facilities. [1:37:13] President Trump has threatened [1:37:15] to seize Iranian oil [1:37:16] and demanded our allies [1:37:18] reopen the Strait of Hormuz. [1:37:20] He said that, [1:37:21] I'm demanding that these countries [1:37:23] come in and protect [1:37:24] their own territory [1:37:26] because it's their territory. [1:37:28] It's the place from which [1:37:29] they get their energy. [1:37:30] By the way, [1:37:31] he wasn't just asking [1:37:32] for our allies to protect [1:37:33] or to bail them out [1:37:35] in the Straits of Hormuz. [1:37:37] He was asking China [1:37:39] to bail them out [1:37:40] in the Straits of Hormuz. [1:37:42] And then he said maybe [1:37:43] we shouldn't even be here at all [1:37:44] because we don't need it. [1:37:46] We have a lot of oil. [1:37:48] And he said we do not need [1:37:49] the help of anyone. [1:37:51] President Trump has declared [1:37:53] we've won the war. [1:37:54] We won it in the first hour. [1:37:56] But then he said [1:37:58] we're not leaving [1:37:59] until the job is finished. [1:38:01] He said that there is [1:38:02] practically nothing left to bomb, [1:38:05] but then threatened to bomb Iran [1:38:07] again, [1:38:08] quote, just for fun. [1:38:10] I think words that probably [1:38:11] have never come out [1:38:12] of a military leader [1:38:14] in the history of the United States [1:38:16] of America. [1:38:17] It shouldn't come out of [1:38:19] the mouth of a civilian leader. [1:38:21] President Trump said [1:38:22] he will end the war [1:38:23] when I feel it, [1:38:24] feel it in my bones. [1:38:27] And any time I want to end it, [1:38:29] it will end. [1:38:31] But Director, [1:38:32] the war is not ending. [1:38:33] It is escalating [1:38:34] with thousands of U.S. Marines [1:38:36] reportedly sailing toward Iran [1:38:39] on an unclear mission, [1:38:42] a mission that's become [1:38:43] less clear over days, [1:38:44] not more clear. [1:38:46] Our airstrikes [1:38:47] wiped out Iran's missiles [1:38:48] and supreme leader. [1:38:50] Nobody here, [1:38:51] and certainly me, [1:38:53] is shedding a tear for him. [1:38:55] But the Iranian people [1:38:56] now live under martial law. [1:38:58] And by the way, [1:38:59] no surprise to our intelligence agencies [1:39:02] that that's the case. [1:39:04] And the first of a puppet leader [1:39:08] who's chosen by the IRGC. [1:39:11] No surprise to anybody [1:39:13] on the Intelligence Committee. [1:39:15] Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz [1:39:17] and is holding [1:39:18] the global economy hostage. [1:39:20] No surprise that Iran [1:39:22] is going to be able [1:39:23] to do that. [1:39:24] No surprise to anybody [1:39:25] who knows anything [1:39:26] about U.S. intelligence. [1:39:27] Launching drones [1:39:28] at our embassies [1:39:29] and military bases. [1:39:30] No surprise. [1:39:31] The President is surprised. [1:39:32] Nobody who has looked [1:39:33] at our intelligence [1:39:34] is surprised. [1:39:36] Iran's nuclear program [1:39:39] is damaged, [1:39:40] to be sure. [1:39:42] But it still has [1:39:43] a uranium stockpile. [1:39:44] We heard today [1:39:45] from the DNI [1:39:46] at the very beginning [1:39:47] of this conversation [1:39:48] that the regime [1:39:49] is in place [1:39:50] and they are going [1:39:51] to rebuild [1:39:52] their military capital. [1:39:53] Their military capabilities, [1:39:55] the ones that we are destroying [1:39:56] right now. [1:39:57] The question I think [1:39:58] is raised, [1:39:59] Director, [1:40:00] about your specific [1:40:01] engagement [1:40:02] is whether [1:40:03] it will become [1:40:04] a perpetual war [1:40:05] because what Iran [1:40:06] will do [1:40:07] is exactly [1:40:08] what they have [1:40:09] always done [1:40:11] and which the DNI [1:40:12] is saying [1:40:13] they will do again. [1:40:15] In its briefings [1:40:16] to the committee, [1:40:17] the Intelligence Committee [1:40:18] has been clear-eyed [1:40:19] about what would happen [1:40:20] in the Straits [1:40:21] of Hormuz, [1:40:22] has been clear-eyed [1:40:23] about whether [1:40:24] or not [1:40:25] our military bases, [1:40:26] our embassies, [1:40:27] and our personnel [1:40:29] in the region [1:40:30] would be placed [1:40:31] at risk [1:40:32] and in harm's way [1:40:33] even though [1:40:34] the administration [1:40:35] did very little [1:40:36] to protect them. [1:40:37] I know, [1:40:40] Director Radcliffe, [1:40:42] that you warned [1:40:44] President Trump [1:40:45] that if Israel [1:40:47] assassinated [1:40:48] the Supreme Leader, [1:40:49] the RRGC [1:40:50] would replace him [1:40:52] with potentially [1:40:53] a harder-line puppet. [1:40:55] In fact, [1:40:56] I think we'll have [1:40:57] to see [1:40:58] what happens [1:40:59] in the next [1:41:00] couple of years. [1:41:01] But what was clear [1:41:02] is that the likelihood [1:41:03] was that it would be [1:41:04] a hard-line puppet. [1:41:06] Do you disagree [1:41:07] with that characterization [1:41:08] of the intelligence? [1:41:09] To that specific [1:41:10] question, [1:41:11] what we knew [1:41:12] was, [1:41:13] first of all, [1:41:14] I guess I have to address [1:41:15] up front [1:41:16] so much of what [1:41:17] you related [1:41:18] in there, [1:41:19] the difference [1:41:20] between political [1:41:21] rhetoric versus [1:41:22] Not political rhetoric. [1:41:23] I'm quoting [1:41:24] the President [1:41:25] of the United States. [1:41:26] Political rhetoric [1:41:27] versus military [1:41:28] rhetoric. [1:41:29] The difference [1:41:30] between that [1:41:31] and military [1:41:32] and intelligence [1:41:33] execution. [1:41:34] But here's the most [1:41:35] important thing. [1:41:36] You mischaracterize [1:41:37] this as saying [1:41:38] there aren't clearly [1:41:39] defined goals. [1:41:40] The defined goals [1:41:41] are very clear. [1:41:42] Degrade and destroy [1:41:43] the missile inventory [1:41:44] and drone inventory. [1:41:45] Delay and degrade [1:41:46] the military [1:41:47] industrial base [1:41:48] and factories [1:41:49] that produce that. [1:41:50] Degrade and destroy [1:41:51] the IRGC Navy [1:41:52] that could control [1:41:53] the strait. [1:41:54] These are all [1:41:55] defined goals [1:41:56] that were [1:41:57] set out specifically. [1:41:58] So the question [1:41:59] is that [1:42:00] May I have my [1:42:01] time back, [1:42:02] Mr. Chairman? [1:42:03] I can't get a word [1:42:04] in edgewise. [1:42:05] He won't answer [1:42:06] the question [1:42:07] and then he's [1:42:08] taking a minute [1:42:09] of my time. [1:42:10] You're both big boys. [1:42:11] You can handle [1:42:12] it yourself. [1:42:13] Okay, well, [1:42:14] Director, I agree [1:42:15] that you are [1:42:16] and I appreciate [1:42:19] what you're saying. [1:42:20] And I would [1:42:21] I'm not [1:42:22] my point [1:42:23] is not what [1:42:24] your characterization [1:42:25] of the war is. [1:42:26] My point is [1:42:27] what the character [1:42:28] is. [1:42:29] I'm out of time [1:42:30] because of [1:42:31] how you use [1:42:32] the time. [1:42:33] The complete [1:42:34] lack of clarity [1:42:35] should matter [1:42:36] to everybody. [1:42:37] President Trump, [1:42:38] most of all, [1:42:39] he is the person [1:42:40] that got elected [1:42:41] on the criticism [1:42:42] that we had [1:42:43] we had fought [1:42:44] two wars [1:42:45] in the Middle East [1:42:46] that had lasted [1:42:47] for 20 years. [1:42:48] And now [1:42:49] we're hearing [1:42:50] the testimony [1:42:51] is to get [1:42:52] their ballistic missiles [1:42:53] to not [1:42:54] even get [1:42:55] to the nuclear [1:42:56] stuff. [1:42:57] We're going [1:42:58] to have to be [1:42:59] on the run. [1:43:00] And I don't [1:43:01] think that's [1:43:02] where the American [1:43:03] people are [1:43:04] on this. [1:43:05] This is a [1:43:06] serious threat. [1:43:07] This is a [1:43:08] serious threat [1:43:09] to us [1:43:10] into Israel. [1:43:11] The question [1:43:12] is how to handle [1:43:13] it. [1:43:14] And President [1:43:15] Trump said [1:43:16] we are not [1:43:18] the policemen [1:43:19] of the world. [1:43:20] He ran [1:43:21] on that. [1:43:22] And now [1:43:23] he's turned [1:43:24] us into [1:43:25] the world's [1:43:26] policemen [1:43:27] into its [1:43:28] jury [1:43:29] into its [1:43:30] jury. [1:43:31] It doesn't [1:43:32] mean [1:43:33] that we [1:43:34] should be [1:43:35] in a perpetual [1:43:36] war [1:43:37] all around [1:43:38] the world. [1:43:39] Thank you, [1:43:40] Mr. Chairman. [1:43:41] Senator Rounds. [1:43:42] Thank you, [1:43:44] Mr. Chairman. [1:43:45] I'd like [1:43:46] to maybe [1:43:47] follow up [1:43:48] a little bit [1:43:49] the same line [1:43:50] of questioning. [1:43:51] But I want [1:43:52] to do it [1:43:53] in a little [1:43:54] bit different [1:43:55] manner. [1:43:56] I've had [1:43:57] the opportunity [1:43:58] like all [1:43:59] of the other [1:44:00] people sitting [1:44:01] on the Armed Services [1:44:02] Committee have [1:44:03] the opportunity [1:44:04] to see what [1:44:05] our capabilities [1:44:06] are and [1:44:07] what we have [1:44:08] to do in order [1:44:09] to respond [1:44:10] to those threats. [1:44:11] Director Ratcliffe, [1:44:12] let me just [1:44:14] begin. [1:44:15] I think [1:44:16] it's been very [1:44:17] clear from [1:44:18] the beginning [1:44:19] that even [1:44:20] though there [1:44:21] were supposedly [1:44:22] diplomatic [1:44:23] activities going [1:44:24] on, behind [1:44:25] the scenes [1:44:26] it was very [1:44:27] clear. [1:44:28] And I just [1:44:29] ask if you [1:44:30] understand that [1:44:31] they had no [1:44:32] intentions of [1:44:33] following through [1:44:34] diplomatically with [1:44:35] eliminating any [1:44:36] of their nuclear [1:44:37] aspirations. [1:44:38] Correct? [1:44:39] Senator, [1:44:40] that's correct. [1:44:41] And in the [1:44:42] classified session [1:44:43] we can go [1:44:44] into detail. [1:44:45] But you've [1:44:46] characterized it [1:44:47] right. [1:44:48] Diplomatically, [1:44:49] they were saying [1:44:50] one thing. [1:44:51] The intelligence [1:44:52] was reflecting [1:44:53] quite the [1:44:54] contrary. [1:44:55] Okay. [1:44:56] Second of all, [1:44:57] with regard [1:44:58] to the [1:44:59] air defenses [1:45:00] that had been [1:45:01] taken out, [1:45:02] the use [1:45:03] of our [1:45:04] aircraft in [1:45:05] that area [1:45:06] was safer [1:45:07] because those [1:45:08] defensive [1:45:09] capabilities, [1:45:10] most of them [1:45:11] had been [1:45:12] significantly [1:45:13] reduced, [1:45:14] meaning our [1:45:15] young men and [1:45:16] women who [1:45:17] are flying [1:45:18] those aircraft [1:45:19] were safer. [1:45:20] Is it fair [1:45:21] to say that [1:45:22] they were [1:45:23] rebuilding [1:45:25] their defensive [1:45:26] capabilities [1:45:27] as well at [1:45:28] that time? [1:45:29] Any characterization [1:45:30] that Operation [1:45:31] Midnight Hammer [1:45:32] was anything [1:45:33] but a wild [1:45:34] success is [1:45:35] wildly [1:45:36] inaccurate. [1:45:37] So as a [1:45:38] result of [1:45:39] Operation [1:45:40] Midnight Hammer, [1:45:42] at the [1:45:43] time of [1:45:44] that, [1:45:45] in the [1:45:46] preceding [1:45:47] four years [1:45:48] as is [1:45:49] well documented [1:45:50] and admitted [1:45:51] to by [1:45:52] the [1:45:53] Iranians, [1:45:54] they enriched [1:45:55] uranium at [1:45:56] least 440 [1:45:57] kilograms [1:45:58] at 60% [1:45:59] for use [1:46:00] for weapons [1:46:01] grade to [1:46:02] deliver a [1:46:03] nuclear weapon. [1:46:04] As a result [1:46:05] of Operation [1:46:06] Midnight Hammer, [1:46:07] we sit here [1:46:08] today with [1:46:09] Iran having [1:46:10] exactly [1:46:11] the same [1:46:12] amount of [1:46:13] enriched uranium [1:46:14] to 60%, [1:46:15] meaning they [1:46:16] have been [1:46:17] unwilling and [1:46:18] incapable [1:46:19] of enriching [1:46:20] uranium [1:46:21] to 60% [1:46:22] as a result [1:46:23] of Operation [1:46:24] Midnight Hammer. [1:46:25] Okay, let [1:46:26] me go on [1:46:27] because I [1:46:28] think this [1:46:29] is a [1:46:30] very [1:46:31] important [1:46:32] question. [1:46:33] The [1:46:34] Iranians [1:46:35] have [1:46:36] a [1:46:37] very [1:46:38] strong [1:46:39] way of [1:46:40] delivering [1:46:41] a weapon. [1:46:42] It is fair [1:46:43] to say [1:46:44] they have [1:46:46] short-term [1:46:47] and intermediate [1:46:48] range [1:46:49] ballistic [1:46:50] missile [1:46:51] availability [1:46:52] today. [1:46:53] Were they [1:46:54] building [1:46:55] additional [1:46:56] short-range [1:46:57] and [1:46:58] mid-range [1:46:59] ballistic [1:47:00] missiles? [1:47:01] Were they [1:47:02] building [1:47:03] their [1:47:04] offensive [1:47:05] capabilities [1:47:06] while they [1:47:07] were negotiating [1:47:08] with us [1:47:09] at a [1:47:10] faster rate [1:47:11] than we [1:47:13] could build [1:47:14] defensive [1:47:15] capabilities? [1:47:16] Were they [1:47:17] continuing [1:47:18] to work [1:47:19] at and [1:47:20] deliver [1:47:21] additional [1:47:22] resources [1:47:24] to terrorist [1:47:25] organizations [1:47:26] that were [1:47:27] affiliated [1:47:28] with them [1:47:30] in the [1:47:31] past? [1:47:32] I [1:47:33] think [1:47:34] there [1:47:35] was [1:47:36] an [1:47:37] opportunity [1:47:38] here [1:47:39] and [1:47:40] I [1:47:42] think [1:47:43] the [1:47:44] president [1:47:45] made [1:47:46] the [1:47:47] right [1:47:48] choice [1:47:49] when [1:47:50] he [1:47:51] decided [1:47:52] at [1:47:53] this [1:47:54] time [1:47:55] that [1:47:56] simply [1:47:57] for [1:47:58] our [1:47:59] advantage [1:48:00] and [1:48:01] the [1:48:02] young [1:48:03] men and [1:48:04] women [1:48:05] that have [1:48:06] to go [1:48:07] in and [1:48:08] do this [1:48:09] that this [1:48:10] was a [1:48:11] safer time [1:48:12] if there [1:48:13] ever is [1:48:14] such a [1:48:15] thing as [1:48:17] a safer [1:48:18] time but [1:48:19] the right [1:48:20] time for [1:48:21] our [1:48:22] nation [1:48:23] to respond [1:48:24] to this [1:48:25] threat. [1:48:26] Is that [1:48:27] an appropriate [1:48:28] way of [1:48:29] putting [1:48:30] it, sir? [1:48:31] I [1:48:33] think [1:48:34] we [1:48:35] have [1:48:36] to move [1:48:37] on for [1:48:38] just a [1:48:39] minute. [1:48:40] Director Radcliffe, [1:48:41] let me [1:48:42] ask you [1:48:43] this because [1:48:44] there has [1:48:45] been a [1:48:46] discussion [1:48:47] and we [1:48:48] have never [1:48:49] been able [1:48:50] to talk [1:48:51] about this [1:48:52] in an [1:48:53] unclassified [1:48:54] setting and [1:48:55] I recognize [1:48:56] it is [1:48:57] sensitive but [1:48:58] 60 minutes [1:48:59] there has [1:49:00] been a [1:49:03] report [1:49:04] in the [1:49:05] state [1:49:06] department [1:49:07] that [1:49:08] we [1:49:09] have been [1:49:10] able to [1:49:11] in an [1:49:12] unclassified [1:49:13] setting at [1:49:14] least [1:49:15] acknowledge [1:49:16] that we [1:49:17] take these [1:49:18] issues [1:49:19] seriously. [1:49:20] Is there [1:49:21] anything you [1:49:22] can share [1:49:23] in this [1:49:24] unclassified [1:49:25] setting to [1:49:26] assure the [1:49:27] people of [1:49:28] the state [1:49:29] department [1:49:30] and your [1:49:31] agency [1:49:32] that this [1:49:33] is something [1:49:35] that when [1:49:36] I became [1:49:37] the director [1:49:38] as you [1:49:39] are aware [1:49:40] Senator, [1:49:41] there are [1:49:42] disparate [1:49:43] opinions [1:49:44] across the [1:49:45] IC about [1:49:46] what the [1:49:47] cause of [1:49:48] these [1:49:49] AHIs may [1:49:50] or may [1:49:51] not be. [1:49:52] Otherwise known [1:49:53] as Havana [1:49:54] syndrome. [1:49:55] The question [1:49:56] of whether [1:49:57] or not [1:49:58] they could [1:49:59] be the [1:50:00] result [1:50:01] of a [1:50:02] comprehensive [1:50:04] review of [1:50:05] that issue [1:50:06] across the [1:50:07] IC when [1:50:08] there are [1:50:09] disparate [1:50:10] opinions [1:50:11] among [1:50:12] agencies. [1:50:13] Director [1:50:14] Gabbard and [1:50:15] I had [1:50:16] a conversation [1:50:17] where she [1:50:18] agreed that [1:50:19] she would [1:50:20] undertake [1:50:21] a comprehensive [1:50:22] review of [1:50:23] that issue [1:50:24] across the [1:50:25] IC to [1:50:26] make sure [1:50:27] that it [1:50:28] is getting [1:50:29] the attention [1:50:30] that it [1:50:31] deserves. [1:50:32] So I [1:50:33] think that [1:50:34] the [1:50:35] time in [1:50:36] service [1:50:37] has been [1:50:38] very, [1:50:39] very special. [1:50:40] Working with [1:50:41] you on the [1:50:42] cyber security [1:50:43] subcommittee, [1:50:44] the armed [1:50:45] services committee, [1:50:46] I commend [1:50:47] you for [1:50:48] everything you [1:50:49] have done. [1:50:51] You are [1:50:52] truly a [1:50:53] hero and [1:50:54] you have [1:50:55] served your [1:50:56] country very, [1:50:57] very well. [1:50:58] Thank you for [1:50:59] your service. [1:51:00] Thank you, [1:51:01] Mr. Chairman. [1:51:02] Thank you, [1:51:03] Mr. [1:51:04] Chairman. [1:51:05] Thank you, [1:51:06] Mr. [1:51:07] Chairman. [1:51:08] The [1:51:09] U.S. [1:51:10] government [1:51:11] has tried [1:51:12] to make [1:51:13] a pivot [1:51:14] to Asia [1:51:15] in its [1:51:16] national [1:51:17] defense strategy [1:51:18] in order [1:51:19] to confront [1:51:20] significant [1:51:21] threats from [1:51:22] China. [1:51:24] For years, [1:51:25] administrations [1:51:26] of both [1:51:27] parties have [1:51:28] identified [1:51:29] China as [1:51:30] the top [1:51:31] threat [1:51:33] to the [1:51:35] world's [1:51:36] global [1:51:37] natural [1:51:39] gas [1:51:40] industry. [1:51:42] China [1:51:44] and Russia [1:51:45] are [1:51:46] the [1:51:47] largest [1:51:48] geopolitical [1:51:50] rival [1:51:51] against [1:51:52] the [1:51:53] U.S. [1:51:54] This [1:51:55] has [1:51:56] created [1:51:58] one [1:51:59] of the [1:52:00] largest [1:52:01] ever [1:52:02] supply [1:52:03] shocks [1:52:04] to [1:52:05] which has sent gas prices skyrocketing for Americans. [1:52:09] But not everybody is losing. [1:52:12] Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, [1:52:13] is it accurate that Russia has gained billions of dollars [1:52:16] in additional oil revenue due to price spikes [1:52:18] as a result of the war and loosened sanctions? [1:52:25] Director Gabbard. [1:52:29] That is what has been reported. [1:52:30] I defer to the Secretary of Treasury and Energy on that front for details. [1:52:37] Director Ratcliffe. [1:52:37] Yeah, I'm not an economist, not going to try and do those calculations. [1:52:43] But as I talked about earlier, [1:52:44] sometimes there are decisions made that will benefit adversaries [1:52:47] at the same time policymakers think that it will benefit the American people. [1:52:51] It's clear. [1:52:51] I think we'd all agree that sanctions were loosened, [1:52:54] and that means more money into the coffers of Vladimir Putin. [1:53:01] Would you agree that if he has more funding, [1:53:04] he is likely to put that to his war effort against Ukraine? [1:53:08] Director Gabbard. [1:53:11] I would defer to an actual intelligence assessment [1:53:14] on what they would believe his intentions are. [1:53:16] Director Ratcliffe. [1:53:20] Yeah, I wouldn't speculate on that. [1:53:22] You wouldn't speculate? [1:53:23] Okay. [1:53:24] Okay. [1:53:24] And is it accurate that China is continuing to receive preferential oil flows from Iran [1:53:29] despite the conflict as Iran allows its own tankers to transit the strait? [1:53:36] Director Gabbard. [1:53:37] I'm going to go back and forth between the two of you. [1:53:39] There has been some reporting of China, India, and other countries, [1:53:47] being able to move their tankers through the strait. [1:53:50] However, it is unclear the volume or the measure of that. [1:53:55] Okay, so it sounds like it's accurate. [1:53:56] Thank you. [1:53:57] I'm going to move on. [1:53:58] Director Gabbard, you tweeted yesterday that President Trump concluded [1:54:02] there was an imminent threat and made a decision to attack Iran [1:54:06] after carefully reviewing all of the information before him. [1:54:10] I think the country deserves to know what the information was. [1:54:15] I'm going to ask a series of questions, [1:54:16] and just to make sure that we're all clear, [1:54:17] I'm going to ask a series of questions, [1:54:17] I just want a yes or no. [1:54:19] We don't need any explanation, just yes or no, [1:54:23] starting with were you asked, I'm not asking if you did brief this, [1:54:28] were you asked to brief on whether Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz? [1:54:37] I'm not going to comment on what the President did or didn't ask me on any topic. [1:54:42] I'm not asking if you briefed it. [1:54:44] I'm just asking if there was a request by the White House. [1:54:47] Director Ratcliffe, were you asked to brief on whether Iran [1:54:52] would close the Strait of Hormuz? [1:54:56] The briefings to the President of the White House [1:54:59] typically don't come at the request of the White House, [1:55:01] so typically when we get intelligence that we want the President to be aware of, [1:55:06] the intelligence community brings that to the President. [1:55:09] Did you produce the analysis for the Straits of Hormuz? [1:55:12] There has been and continues to be analysis with respect to that. [1:55:16] Were you asked to brief on how our adversaries and allies would respond to the war in Iran? [1:55:24] I imagine I'll get the same answer. [1:55:26] So, just to point out here, it's challenging to forget about actually what was in the brief for a second. [1:55:35] We're having a hard time finding out not only if you briefed the President on something, [1:55:40] but even if the White House asked if they could be briefed on something or if analysis was produced. [1:55:49] So, I just want to point out here, this is about six days. [1:55:52] Can I comment on that? [1:55:54] I'll go back to the point. [1:55:55] It's the same approach that we took to the prior operations, [1:56:00] which, to your credit, Senator, you have praised the intelligence and military communities [1:56:06] in Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Absolute Resolve. [1:56:11] It's the same approach and the same professionals in terms of how they approached this particular operation. [1:56:15] We're trying to figure out if the President knew what the downside was of the Straits of Hormuz being closed. [1:56:24] And I'm having a hard time finding out. [1:56:26] We're trying to figure out if the President knew what the downside was of the Straits of Hormuz being closed. [1:56:26] And I'm having a hard time finding out whether the White House asked or whether there was a brief, [1:56:28] whether the President knew. [1:56:30] Did he know this was going to happen or did he just disregard it? [1:56:34] And I just want to point out something that was released about six days ago. [1:56:38] This is a fundraising email from the President, from the President of the United States. [1:56:45] And in this email here, where there's multiple links to donate money, [1:56:51] it says, as a national security briefing member, you'll receive my private national security briefings. [1:56:59] Director Gabbard or Director Radcliffe, do you think the public should be able to, [1:57:08] supporters of the President should be able to pay and receive his private national security briefings? [1:57:14] I assume these are briefings, Director Radcliffe, that you provide to the President [1:57:18] that is now going to be provided to somebody who makes a donation. [1:57:23] Regardless of what that, I don't know what that document is, but regardless of what it says, it didn't happen. [1:57:29] Oh, no, this is new. [1:57:30] But what I'm telling you is... [1:57:32] What I'm telling you is that the Hatch Act would prevent me, in a political role, from engaging in that. [1:57:37] I'm not aware that anything like that happened. [1:57:39] Yeah, this says unfiltered updates. [1:57:43] So, Director Gabbard, do you have any comment on whether unfiltered updates of private national security briefings [1:57:50] should be made to individuals that donate to the President? [1:57:54] I'm not familiar with that document. [1:57:58] It's been made very public six days ago. [1:58:02] We'll get you a copy. [1:58:04] Here, because I agree with you, Director Radcliffe, that the Hatch Act should prohibit this type of conduct. [1:58:11] Thank you. [1:58:12] Senator Lankford joins us, from what I gather, as a very exciting confirmation hearing for Senator Mullen. [1:58:17] It is, actually. [1:58:19] For all of you, thank you. [1:58:21] Thank you for the time that you give to the country to be able to serve, for your families and the sacrifice that you make [1:58:25] to be able to do this, and all the professionals that work around you. [1:58:28] Please pass on our gratitude to them, because they work incredibly hard and difficult tasks in this. [1:58:32] I want to talk about something that's a little closer. [1:58:34] I want to talk about something that's a little closer to home on this. [1:58:36] A lot of Oklahomans that I've talked to, and quite frankly, folks even outside the state on it, [1:58:40] when they think about threats, they, as strange as this may sound to those of us that deal with missiles and ballistics, [1:58:47] they think about the threat to their family, and to their income, and to who they are. [1:58:52] And a lot of it is international scammers that are now reaching into the United States to be able to gather data [1:58:59] or to be able to steal money from them. [1:59:01] AI has accelerated this dramatically. [1:59:03] AI has accelerated this dramatically. [1:59:04] I know the Worldwide Threats has mentioned this and some of the challenges that we face on it, [1:59:09] but the challenge is getting bigger. [1:59:11] FBI had noted that in 2024, it was almost $17 billion that was assumed lost to scammers, [1:59:19] a lot of those internationals. [1:59:20] Some estimates are as high as $50 billion on it. [1:59:23] AI continues to be able to accelerate the capabilities on it. [1:59:27] OpenAI even noted now that they're putting online ads saying, [1:59:33] if you've been scammed, here's a way to recover your money. [1:59:36] And that is actually a scam. [1:59:38] It's taking them to a fake FBI page where they can then turn in and to say, [1:59:44] if you've been scammed, here's how the FBI is going to actually come help you to recover it. [1:59:49] But even that page is fake, and they're going to be able to steal their information. [1:59:52] This is accelerating at a pace that's pretty dramatic with the use of AI on this. [1:59:57] Director Patel, I know that you guys are on it. [2:00:01] I know that there's multiple entities on it. [2:00:03] But this is a big challenge. [2:00:04] And a lot of Americans are very, very concerned about the threat to their families. [2:00:08] They may have their parents that are more vulnerable at this time and being targeted. [2:00:13] How do we take some of this on to be able to confront what's happening online to be able to attack people and to be able to scam them? [2:00:20] Thank you, Senator. [2:00:21] And with any other high-priority operation that the FBI runs, whether it's CICT or we're talking about scamming and scam centers here, [2:00:30] one, you have to drown and get online with your online account. [2:00:33] You have to know that we're online covert employees and platforms, and we've increased funding. [2:00:37] And we've also what we've done strategically is move people out of Washington, D.C., on the Intel analyst front and the support staff front, [2:00:44] to places like Oklahoma. [2:00:45] Actually, every single state across the country has received a plus-up because of that. [2:00:50] And what we've created is the Internet Crime Complaint Center, the IC3, which I know you're familiar with and referenced. [2:00:55] So what we're doing on the homeland is going out into the streets of America on the online platforms in America [2:01:01] and shutting down those networks. [2:01:03] We're going to shut down the capability of AI to interfere. [2:01:05] But I think the bigger-term project, what we're doing overseas, that's the key to this. [2:01:09] The scam center compounds are largely located in Cambodia and Burma and on the Thai border. [2:01:14] I've already engaged with the premiers of each and every one of those countries. [2:01:17] We've done so to switch off access to the Internet with those governments to make sure that those compounds, [2:01:24] they're literal compounds that are being built, and we can get into that in the classified center, [2:01:28] that are fleecing Americans and senior citizens all the way from Southeast Asia. [2:01:33] Because they are backed by the CCP to build those compounds because they know it's going to hurt everyday Americans. [2:01:38] So us, which we have successfully already eliminated and scuttled, excuse me, [2:01:43] numerous compounds in Cambodia and Burma and Thailand, is the big picture, the big part of the lift overseas. [2:01:49] What we're going to do is go into those countries and shut down every single scam center compound. [2:01:56] Which is very helpful, and every American is thinking about this and talking about it. [2:02:01] Director Patel, I'm going to stay with you. [2:02:02] Thank you. [2:02:03] The counter narcotics work has been phenomenal in the past year and a half. [2:02:07] The amount of methamphetamine and fentanyl that had been seized coming across our border has been dramatic. [2:02:14] And that has a real effect to what's actually coming at families in my state on it. [2:02:20] What I'm interested in is how are you partnering with local law enforcement to continue to accelerate this process? [2:02:26] What does that look like for FBI? [2:02:28] Absolutely, Senator. [2:02:29] The counter narcotic mission can't be complete without state and local law enforcement. [2:02:32] So we are embedding more task force officers across the country on the specific counter narcotics mission. [2:02:39] We've also stood up with our interagency partners in Tucson, Arizona, the Southern Border Intelligence Center, [2:02:45] specifically on the counter narcotic mission so that we can utilize the Department of War and interagency capabilities on the law enforcement front. [2:02:52] That's why we seized enough fentanyl in 2025 to kill 178 million Americans. [2:02:57] That's a 31% increase year over year. [2:03:00] And here's a statistic that everybody should be proud of. [2:03:03] Opioid overdose deaths from last year dropped 20 points, 20 points from across the country. [2:03:10] And in Oklahoma specifically, Senator, we seized enough kilograms of cocaine to include a 232% increase in the state of Oklahoma alone [2:03:20] and enough fentanyl to kill 500,000 Oklahomans. [2:03:24] We can't do that unless we have great police partnerships, which has been a priority of mine, [2:03:29] and we have embedded police officers here at headquarters from around the country to make sure we have that connectivity. [2:03:35] And I've shortened the task force officer onboarding pipeline from one to two years to 90 days. [2:03:41] We need them. [2:03:42] Yeah, we do. [2:03:43] Director Ratcliffe, the annual threat assessment highlights this year the Muslim Brotherhood in particular [2:03:51] and calls out some of their financial material supports on this. [2:03:55] That may be surprising to some folks here, [2:03:58] but it's not surprising to folks all across the country. [2:04:00] It's not surprising to folks across the Middle East in the threat that the Muslim Brotherhood continues to pose [2:04:05] to so many governments and entities across the world on that. [2:04:09] How is the Muslim Brotherhood financing itself and its acts of terrorism? [2:04:15] And is there something that we need to do here to be able to make sure that we're protecting Americans in the threat? [2:04:25] Senator, I think with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood abroad, [2:04:31] you know, we view that just as we do other proxies across the Middle East, [2:04:38] the Houthis and other groups, [2:04:41] and I can relate to you that the CIA is very focused on the counterterrorism front. [2:04:48] You weren't here before. [2:04:50] I said in the classified portion I would get into the CIA's success [2:04:57] with regard to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in a classified setting, [2:05:01] where I can share with you the impact that we're having. [2:05:06] And across the board with regard to terrorist groups and our counterterrorism activities, [2:05:15] I can publicly characterize it as saying we've accomplished more in the last year [2:05:21] than in the four years of the prior administration combined. [2:05:25] So hopefully it gives you some measure of comfort about how we're approaching things [2:05:30] and the effectiveness that we've had in the last year in that regard. [2:05:35] And I look forward to getting into detail in the classified portion. [2:05:39] Look forward to that. Thank you. [2:05:40] Senator Reid. [2:05:42] Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. [2:05:44] Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. [2:05:46] The Washington Post reported earlier this week in their words, [2:05:50] the U.S. intelligence assessments say Iran's regime likely will remain in place for now, [2:05:56] weakened but more hard-line, [2:05:58] with the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, [2:06:01] security forces exerting greater control. [2:06:04] Director Gabbard, do you stand by that reported intelligence community assessment? [2:06:09] I don't stand by any leaked so-called intelligence to the media. [2:06:15] I do stand by the intelligence community's assessment [2:06:19] that was included in the annual threat assessment [2:06:22] that speaks directly to this issue that as of this moment, [2:06:25] the regime maintains power within Iran, [2:06:30] even though they are vastly degraded [2:06:32] on almost every front. [2:06:34] Do you think that the killing of the Ayatollah [2:06:37] and his wife and other family members and key people [2:06:42] contributed to the picking of a hard-line successor? [2:06:50] Senator, the intelligence community's assessment [2:06:54] has pointed to a number of different scenarios [2:07:00] that went into play with the selection of the successor. [2:07:05] The details of that we can discuss in a closed hearing [2:07:09] with regard to the intelligence reporting. [2:07:11] Is the regime in Iran now trying to [2:07:19] promote the deceased Ayatollah as a martyr [2:07:25] who should be followed, [2:07:27] and does that help them consolidate support? [2:07:32] Senator, the Iranians are certainly using that as a call to action. [2:07:39] The effects of that from an intelligence standpoint [2:07:44] remain to be seen. [2:07:46] There is a tradition in Shia, though, to honor martyrs. [2:07:50] One of their greatest celebrations is the martyrdom [2:07:53] of the grandson of Mohammed. [2:07:56] Is that correct? [2:07:57] That's right. [2:07:59] So we might have played into their cultural biases erroneously. [2:08:04] General Adams, what conditions do you assess [2:08:07] would need to be present to make the regime collapse? [2:08:10] Or necessitate unconditional surrender? [2:08:15] And can it be done with air power alone? [2:08:20] Senator, we have at the Defense Intelligence Agency [2:08:23] put together a number of scenarios [2:08:26] coordinated across the IC with regards to what we would forecast [2:08:30] the future would be. [2:08:32] There are four specific goals that we've been told [2:08:36] to track and analyze with regards to the goals of the U.S. effort. [2:08:41] They've been articulated earlier in the hearing, [2:08:44] so I won't hammer on those. [2:08:46] But with regards to the collapse of the regime, [2:08:49] specific perpetuation, like what would precipitate that, [2:08:54] I would prefer to talk about that in the classified hearing. [2:08:58] Well, I understand. [2:09:02] But there's a very basic question here. [2:09:05] Will air power alone be able to destroy this regime, [2:09:10] given the culture, the politics, [2:09:13] the temperament of these people? [2:09:16] The Iraq-Iran war lasted for eight years [2:09:19] with a million casualties. [2:09:22] Do you think air power alone will do it? [2:09:30] Senator, the capabilities that our joint force brings to bear [2:09:35] can accomplish many missions. [2:09:38] To forecast exactly what can and can't accomplish this goal, [2:09:44] I prefer not to guess or prognosticate on that. [2:09:50] Well, I'll recognize your professional position. [2:09:56] U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff recently stated [2:10:01] that Russian leaders told Trump on a call [2:10:04] that they were not sharing intelligence with Iran. [2:10:07] Witkoff says, quote, [2:10:09] we can take them at their word. [2:10:11] Director Gabbard and Radcliffe, [2:10:13] do you take President Putin at his word? [2:10:15] I'll go ahead and answer. [2:10:19] No, I don't take Vladimir Putin at his word. [2:10:26] Are they providing intelligence to the Iranians? [2:10:29] Well, we talked about this before. [2:10:32] In the classified session, [2:10:34] what we can go into is [2:10:37] that the Iranians are requesting intelligence assistance [2:10:40] from Russia, from China, [2:10:43] and from other adversaries of the United States. [2:10:46] And whether or not [2:10:49] those countries are [2:10:52] is something we can talk about in the classified portion. [2:10:55] But you've made an assessment. [2:10:58] You've analyzed traffic communications and you can... [2:11:01] I know the answer and happy to discuss that with you [2:11:05] in the classified portion. [2:11:08] Yes, sir, go ahead. [2:11:11] Go ahead. [2:11:12] Thank you. [2:11:14] One of the aspects of this is the collateral effects, [2:11:18] particularly in Russia and Ukraine. [2:11:20] We were just talking about Russia probably [2:11:23] or possibly providing intelligence [2:11:25] that may be interfering [2:11:27] or inflicting casualties on our forces. [2:11:30] Russia is also benefiting from the lifting of sanctions [2:11:34] on their ability to sell oil throughout the world. [2:11:37] I heard one estimate of a $20 billion surge [2:11:40] in their potential revenues. [2:11:43] Ukraine, on the other hand, [2:11:45] is facing perhaps a disrupted supply chain [2:11:49] of missiles and other equipment [2:11:51] because they're being devoted to this operation. [2:11:53] So, General Adams, [2:11:55] can you just give me your impression [2:11:58] of the effect of the battle on Russia and Ukraine [2:12:02] at the moment of this battle? [2:12:04] Well, from our collections, [2:12:08] the effect of the epic fury [2:12:12] on the Russian-Ukrainian battle [2:12:19] has been indirect. [2:12:21] Not direct. [2:12:23] We do track very carefully what benefits [2:12:29] or, as you alluded to, [2:12:32] the collateral effects of what we're doing [2:12:36] and how it impacts. [2:12:38] There is a lot of, [2:12:41] from both the Russians and the Chinese, [2:12:43] observations of what we're doing [2:12:45] and figuring out what they can learn from that. [2:12:49] So I think that's a collateral effect. [2:12:51] As we expose what the joint force displays [2:12:56] on the battlefield. [2:12:58] And I think we can talk in a little more detail [2:13:05] as we move to the classified session [2:13:07] some of the things that we're collecting specifically [2:13:10] about what those effects are. [2:13:13] Thank you very much, sir. [2:13:14] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:13:15] Senator Ossoff. [2:13:17] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:13:18] Thank you all for being here. [2:13:19] Before I ask you a few questions, [2:13:21] I want to call everyone's attention again [2:13:23] to this fundraising email signed by the President [2:13:26] that Senator Kelly mentioned earlier [2:13:30] in which the President of the United States [2:13:33] invites his campaign donors to, quote, [2:13:36] claim your spot, claim your spot, [2:13:40] join now to receive private national security briefings [2:13:45] to his political donors [2:13:48] featuring a photo of the President [2:13:51] at a dignified transfer ceremony [2:13:54] with a flag-draped coffin of an American service member [2:13:58] killed in action returning to their family. [2:14:00] And the American people need to know [2:14:02] that the President of the United States [2:14:04] is fundraising for his political campaign [2:14:07] and his PAC using images [2:14:10] of American service members killed in action [2:14:13] and it's a disgrace. [2:14:19] Now, Director Gabbard, I'd like to reground this [2:14:21] in your core responsibilities. [2:14:23] Under the law, you are responsible [2:14:26] for providing national intelligence [2:14:28] to the President, correct? [2:14:29] Yes. [2:14:31] And to the heads of executive branch departments [2:14:33] and agencies, yes? [2:14:34] Yes. [2:14:35] And to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs [2:14:36] and Senior Military Commanders? [2:14:39] Across the IC, yes. [2:14:41] And to the Senate and the House [2:14:43] and relevant committees, correct? [2:14:44] Yes. [2:14:45] And the law states that the national intelligence [2:14:47] you provide to Congress, quote, [2:14:49] should be timely, objective, and independent [2:14:51] of political considerations, correct? [2:14:53] Yes. [2:14:55] And you noted in your opening statement [2:14:56] you're here fulfilling a statutory responsibility [2:14:58] and that your testimony, quote, [2:15:00] represents the IC's assessment of threats, correct? [2:15:03] That's right. [2:15:04] And that opening statement as submitted [2:15:07] to the committee in advance of this hearing [2:15:09] stated that as a result of last summer's airstrikes, [2:15:12] quote, Iran's nuclear enrichment program [2:15:15] was obliterated, end quote, correct? [2:15:17] That's right. [2:15:18] And is that in fact the assessment [2:15:20] of the intelligence community? [2:15:21] Yes. [2:15:22] So the assessment of the intelligence community [2:15:24] is that Iran's nuclear enrichment program [2:15:27] was obliterated by last summer's airstrikes? [2:15:29] Yes. [2:15:31] And the opening statement you submitted [2:15:32] to the committee last night [2:15:33] also stated, quote, [2:15:34] there has been no effort since then [2:15:36] to try to rebuild their enrichment capability, [2:15:38] end quote, correct? [2:15:39] That's right. [2:15:40] And that's the assessment [2:15:41] of the intelligence community? [2:15:42] Yes. [2:15:43] The White House stated on March 1st of this year [2:15:46] that this war was launched and was, quote, [2:15:49] a military campaign to eliminate [2:15:51] the imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime, [2:15:54] end quote. [2:15:55] That's a statement from the White House. [2:15:58] Quote, the imminent nuclear threat [2:16:00] posed by the Iranian regime. [2:16:02] Was it the assessment of the intelligence community [2:16:05] that there was an imminent nuclear threat [2:16:07] posed by the Iranian regime? [2:16:09] The intelligence community assessed [2:16:12] that Iran maintained the intention [2:16:15] to rebuild and to continue to grow [2:16:17] their nuclear enrichment capability. [2:16:19] Was it the assessment of the intelligence community [2:16:21] that there was a, quote, [2:16:22] imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime, [2:16:25] yes or no? [2:16:26] Senator, the only person who can determine [2:16:28] what is and is not an imminent threat [2:16:30] is the president. [2:16:31] False. [2:16:32] This is the worldwide threats hearing [2:16:34] where you present to Congress [2:16:35] national intelligence [2:16:36] timely, objective, and independent [2:16:38] of political considerations. [2:16:40] You've stated today that the intelligence community's [2:16:43] assessment is that Iran's nuclear enrichment program [2:16:46] was obliterated and that, quote, [2:16:48] there had been no efforts since then [2:16:50] to try to rebuild their enrichment capability. [2:16:52] Was it the intelligence community's assessment [2:16:55] that nevertheless, despite this obliteration, [2:16:59] there was a, quote, [2:17:00] imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime, [2:17:03] yes or no? [2:17:04] It is not the intelligence community's [2:17:06] responsibility to determine [2:17:07] what is and is not an imminent threat. [2:17:09] Okay. [2:17:10] That is up to the president [2:17:11] based on a volume of information [2:17:12] No, it is precisely [2:17:13] that he receives. [2:17:14] It is precisely your responsibility [2:17:16] to determine what constitutes a threat [2:17:18] to the United States. [2:17:19] This is the worldwide threats hearing [2:17:22] where, as you noted in your opening testimony, [2:17:26] quote, [2:17:27] you represent the IC's assessment of threats. [2:17:31] You are here to represent [2:17:33] the IC's assessment of threats. [2:17:36] That's a quote [2:17:37] from your own opening statement. [2:17:40] And so my question is, [2:17:41] as you're here to present the IC's assessment of threats, [2:17:45] was it the assessment of the intelligence community [2:17:50] that as the White House claimed on March 1st, [2:17:53] there was a, quote, [2:17:54] imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime, [2:17:57] yes or no? [2:17:58] Once again, Senator, [2:17:59] the intelligence community has provided the inputs [2:18:03] that make up this annual threat assessment. [2:18:05] You won't answer the question. [2:18:06] It is the nature of the imminent threat [2:18:08] that the president has to make that determination [2:18:11] based on a collection and volume [2:18:13] of information and intelligence [2:18:15] that he is provided with. [2:18:16] You're here to be timely, objective, [2:18:18] and independent of political considerations. [2:18:21] Exactly what I'm doing. [2:18:22] No, you're evading a question [2:18:24] because to provide a candid response to the committee [2:18:27] would contradict a statement from the White House. [2:18:31] Let me ask you about your presence in Fulton County [2:18:35] on January 28th of this year. [2:18:38] You were present at the FBI's raid [2:18:42] on the Fulton County elections office on January 28th, correct? [2:18:46] I was present for part of the FBI [2:18:48] exercising a warrant approved by a municipal judge. [2:18:52] Yes, and the FBI was there executing that warrant [2:18:56] to seize ballots and materials associated [2:18:59] with the 2020 election, correct? [2:19:01] Yes. [2:19:02] And are you aware that members of this committee [2:19:04] have already opened inquiries [2:19:06] into your election-related activities? [2:19:08] Yes. [2:19:09] And are you aware that your general counsel [2:19:11] and deputy general counsel have already provided testimony [2:19:13] to this committee regarding those activities? [2:19:16] Yes. [2:19:18] On February 2nd, you sent a letter to Senator Warner [2:19:20] regarding your presence at the raid. [2:19:21] Was that letter accurate? [2:19:24] I don't recall the exact date, [2:19:25] but if I sent a letter that had my signature, [2:19:27] it was accurate. [2:19:28] You stated in the letter that your presence at the raid [2:19:30] was, quote, requested by the president, correct? [2:19:32] Yes. [2:19:33] When did the president request your presence at the raid? [2:19:36] The day of the raid, the warrant execution commencing. [2:19:40] The day of the raid? [2:19:43] Yes. [2:19:44] He called you on the phone? [2:19:45] I'm not going to disclose how the message was delivered, [2:19:47] but it was a request from the president [2:19:49] and his administration to go and help oversee [2:19:52] this warrant being executed, [2:19:54] along with the deputy director of the FBI. [2:19:56] Is it your role to oversee? [2:19:57] And to thank the FBI agents who were conducting this warrant. [2:19:59] Is it your role to oversee the execution of criminal warrants? [2:20:02] It is my role, based on statute that Congress has passed, [2:20:06] to have oversight over election security, [2:20:09] to include counterintentions, [2:20:10] But you said you oversaw the raid, correct? [2:20:13] You just testified you oversaw the raid? [2:20:15] Portions of it. [2:20:16] Okay. [2:20:17] Did you handle any ballots or election-related materials? [2:20:19] No. [2:20:20] You were inside an FBI evidence truck, correct? [2:20:22] You were photographed inside an FBI evidence truck. [2:20:26] It was an empty truck, yes. [2:20:28] The president stated, quote, [2:20:30] you looked at votes that wanted to be checked out. [2:20:32] The senator's time is expired. [2:20:34] Did you look at votes as the president stated? [2:20:36] Senator Ossoff, your time has expired. [2:20:38] You can have her... [2:20:39] No, she cannot respond because... [2:20:41] No, for the record, [2:20:42] will the director please respond for the record to that question, [2:20:45] is my question. [2:20:46] I'm happy to respond to questions for the record. [2:20:48] Thank you, Director Gabbard. [2:20:49] Thank you. [2:20:50] Vice Chairman? [2:20:52] I just want to... [2:20:53] I'm not going to go back to this issue. [2:20:54] I'm sure we'll address in the closed setting, [2:20:58] but I am very disappointed. [2:21:01] This is the only one time a year [2:21:03] the public gets to hear from you guys in this kind of setting, [2:21:07] and the fact that we have repeated public reporting, [2:21:12] including a major story in the Wall Street Journal, [2:21:13] coming out today, [2:21:14] about China and Russia assisting Iran, [2:21:19] which seems obvious and evident, [2:21:23] and none of you would confirm that publicly, [2:21:26] I think, doesn't give the American people [2:21:30] the full challenges of this war. [2:21:33] I would add what I said earlier, [2:21:38] that the media is not a classification authority, [2:21:41] but certainly sounds like something Russia and China would do, [2:21:44] and they have done for decades in the past to Americans. [2:21:47] To wrap up, [2:21:48] a little business here before we adjourn the open session. [2:21:51] We will reconvene in 30 minutes [2:21:54] in our usual location for the closed session. [2:21:56] That's at 1256, promptly. [2:22:00] I do want to note, for the record, [2:22:03] that Senator Young cannot join us. [2:22:05] He is at Dover Air Force Base [2:22:07] for the dignified transfer of remains [2:22:09] for one of our fallen heroes, a Hoosier. [2:22:12] And I would invite everyone to join Senator Young [2:22:14] in praying for the family and friends of that soldier [2:22:18] and all the soldiers who have given their life [2:22:20] in the defense of our freedom and security. [2:22:23] General Hartman, I want to again acknowledge you, [2:22:25] given your impending retirement, [2:22:27] since this is your last appearance for the committee. [2:22:29] I'm sure you hope, [2:22:31] and I'm sure that the thing you'll miss most [2:22:33] about your long career in uniform [2:22:35] is testifying before Congress. [2:22:37] I remind members that questions for the record [2:22:39] will be due by the close of business [2:22:41] on Friday, March 20, [2:22:43] and the audience will remain seated for a moment [2:22:46] so that our witnesses and members [2:22:48] may exit and proceed promptly to the closed session. [2:22:51] This open session is adjourned.