Tulsi Gabbard and Kash Patel hearing on Iran war and worldwide threats

[0:00] Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment Hearing. Let me begin by welcoming our esteemed panel of witnesses, [0:07] the Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, the CIA Director, John Ratcliffe, [0:12] the FBI Director, Kash Patel, the Acting Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of [0:18] U.S. Cyber Command, Lieutenant General William Hartman, and the DIA Director, Lieutenant General [0:24] James Adams. Thank you all for your appearance today and for your service. I also want to offer [0:30] a special thanks to General Hartman, who is about to enter a well-earned and well-deserved [0:35] retirement. General, on behalf of the committee, thank you for your lifetime of service to our [0:39] nation. I'd first like to take this opportunity to commend the thousands of men and women in our [0:46] intelligence agencies whom our witnesses represent. Our intelligence professionals are second to none. [0:53] Because of their service, their dedication, and their sacrifice, Americans are safer at home and [0:57] around the world. But because of the nature of their work, grateful Americans don't buy their [1:02] lunch at restaurants. [1:03] Or even have a chance to say thank you. So on their behalf, let me simply say thank you. I want [1:09] to make two basic points this morning. First, the world is always a dangerous place, especially for [1:16] America. But thanks to your agencies and President Trump's leadership, the world isn't quite as [1:21] dangerous for Americans as it was a year ago. Thanks to the efforts of our military and [1:26] intelligence personnel, including my fellow Arkansans who are now serving in the Middle East, [1:31] the Iranian revolutionary regime that terrorized the world for [1:35] 47 years is finally knocked on its back foot. Last summer, we devastated Iran's nuclear facilities. [1:42] In recent weeks, we have eliminated Iran's top leadership, pummeled its military, sunk its navy, [1:48] destroyed its missiles, neutered its proxies, and left its economy reeling. After 47 years of [1:54] indecision and timidity, America has finally put our foot down. I'm also pleased to report that [2:01] things have improved a lot in our own backyard now that Venezuela's illegitimate communist dictator, [2:07] Maduro, is rotting in a New York prison. Only the United States could execute a military and [2:12] intelligence operation of this difficulty without a single American life lost. Our military is [2:20] awesome, but these operations wouldn't have succeeded and they probably wouldn't have even [2:25] been tried without timely, accurate, and fact-based intelligence from your agencies. These successful [2:31] operations are a testament to our intelligence professionals' ability to expose and uncover [2:37] critical details about American history. Thank you. [2:39] So let this be a warning to those who wish America harm. We leave no stone unturned, [2:46] and there's no one or no thing close to you that might not betray you. Today's hearing is an [2:54] opportunity for the American people to hear an unvarnished and unbiased account of the remaining [2:59] threats we face. From communist China, North Korea, and Russia, to the East, to narco-terrorist [3:04] cartels here at home, these threats truly do span the globe. And for my second point, your agencies [3:12] have improved over the last year thanks to reforms that have gotten them back to basics. [3:18] Of course, my two points are related. When our intelligence agencies return to their core mission, [3:24] stealing the secrets of our adversaries to deliver timely and needful intelligence, [3:29] America is safer for it. These efforts are already bearing fruit. For example, last year, [3:35] the CIA increased its foreign intelligence reporting by 25%. This year, the CIA is on track [3:44] to be the most effective intelligence agency in the world. And while I'm greatly encouraged by [3:48] the progress, more remains to be done. We must always equip our intelligence personnel with [3:53] the tools they need to do their jobs well and execute their missions. That's why I fully support [3:59] President Trump's request for a clean reauthorization of FISA Section 702. And it's [4:04] why I expect a healthy intelligence budget request in the administration's supplemental appropriations [4:10] request to fund operations against Iran and narco-terrorists. No doubt, [4:15] our military needs supplemental funding, but our intelligence agencies need it just as badly. [4:21] Moreover, I urge each of you to continue to make personnel and institutional reforms that [4:26] will cement these changes and foreclose a return in the future to bureaucratic bloat, [4:32] political bias, and excessive caution within your services. [4:36] When I became chairman, I promised real reform across the entire intelligence community. [4:41] Our first Intelligence Authorization Act set the foundation for a more efficient intelligence [4:46] community. When I became chairman, I promised real reform across the entire intelligence community. [4:46] When I became chairman, I promised real reform across the entire intelligence community. [4:46] When I became chairman, I promised real reform across the entire intelligence community by, [4:47] for example, reorganizing the ODNI, improving the security of CIA installations, [4:54] and directing resources towards foreign intelligence collection and covert action. [4:58] This year, I look forward to going further, namely by growing our cadre of collectors, [5:03] making generational investments in core capabilities, providing new [5:07] capabilities to defend our space assets, and further codifying reforms to guard [5:12] against any future return of bloated and biased bureaucracy. I look forward to [5:17] working with you towards these ends. I now recognize the vice chairman. [5:21] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me also offer a good morning to our witnesses. [5:28] Let me also join you, Mr. Chairman, and begin by thanking literally the tens of thousands of men [5:34] and women across America's intelligence community who work every day to keep our country safe. [5:40] Their work is by necessity secret. That is the nature of intelligence. [5:46] But that is also why hearings like this one matter so much. Over the past year, [5:52] we have seen a series of developments that raise serious concerns about the erosion of safeguards [6:00] that protect both our democracy and our security. And nowhere is that more worrying than when it [6:08] comes to the integrity of our elections. For decades now, our intelligence community [6:15] has warned that foreign adversaries, including Russia, China, and Iran, [6:21] are actively seeking to shape the outcome of American elections. These efforts have included [6:27] cyber-intrusions, disinformation campaigns, and covert influence operations designed to divide [6:34] Americans and undermine our confidence in our democratic institutions. Protecting our elections [6:40] from these threats should be one of the intelligence community's highest priorities. [6:45] The DNI is supposed to be coordinating intelligence on foreign election interference, [6:54] warning the American people about adversaries seeking to undermine our democracy, ensuring that [7:00] federal, state, and federal institutions are protected from these threats. And that is why [7:01] we are here today. We are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because [7:01] we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because [7:01] we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because [7:01] we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because [7:01] we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because [7:01] we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because we are here because [7:01] and local officials have the information they need. [7:05] Congress even required the creation [7:08] of a foreign malign influence center [7:11] inside the office of the DNI [7:14] to coordinate the intelligence community's response [7:17] to foreign election interference [7:19] and ensure that these threats are properly shared [7:22] across the government. [7:24] That is the mission Congress assigned to the DNI. [7:28] But while foreign adversaries are actively probing [7:31] our democratic institutions, [7:33] the DNI has eliminated the foreign malign influence center [7:38] and does not have a designated official [7:41] coordinating the response to election threats. [7:44] And for months, the committee has reportedly, [7:48] has repeatedly requested briefings from the IC, [7:52] briefings that are required by law [7:55] on legitimate foreign threats to the midterms. [7:59] We have received no response. [8:03] Now, that silence, I believe, [8:04] should concern every member of the committee [8:07] because it clearly demonstrates [8:08] the DNI is not interested in protecting American democracy [8:13] by combating foreign influence. [8:16] Instead, unfortunately, we have seen the DNI involve herself [8:20] in purely domestic matters. [8:24] Last month, we saw Director Gabbard personally participate [8:28] in a law enforcement raid to seize election ballots [8:32] and voting machine records in Fulton County, Georgia, [8:36] a raid tied to an election [8:38] that the president lost six years ago. [8:42] When the warrant supporting the raid [8:43] was unsealed, it showed something deeply troubling. [8:48] There was no foreign connection [8:51] to justify the involvement of our nation's top spy. [8:55] Instead, the predicate for the warrant [8:58] was a slop of debunked conspiracy theories [9:02] that had already been rejected repeatedly by courts, [9:06] by independent investigators, [9:08] and by even by Georgia's own Republican Secretary of State. [9:12] Yet the nation's top intelligence officer, official, [9:15] was personally involved in this operation. [9:18] This raises one very serious question. [9:21] If the intelligence community is not being deployed [9:27] to mobilize against foreign threats, [9:31] why is it being deployed at all on a domestic issue? [9:35] The DNI's appearance at this raid, [9:36] as well as her involvement in seizing voting machines [9:40] from Puerto Rico, [9:41] suggests something that should also alarm every American. [9:46] I believe an organized effort [9:47] to misuse her national security powers to interfere, [9:51] to misuse her national security powers, to interfere, [9:51] to misuse her national security powers, to interfere, [9:51] to misuse her national security powers, [9:51] to interfere, to interfere, [9:52] to interfere, to interfere, to interfere, to interfere, [9:52] to interfere, to interfere, to interfere, [9:52] to interfere, to interfere, to interfere, [9:53] to interfere, to interfere, to interfere, [9:53] to interfere, to interfere, to interfere, [9:54] and potentially provide a pretext [9:56] for the President's unconstitutional efforts [9:59] to seize control of the upcoming elections. [10:03] Don't take my word for it. [10:05] The President has repeatedly pushed [10:07] for the nationalization of our elections, [10:10] calling for federal government [10:12] to override the state election laws and, quote, [10:15] take over voting while continuing to make false statements [10:19] about election fraud. [10:21] And we have heard troubling rhetoric from senior officials [10:24] that reinforce these concerns. [10:26] As former Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem [10:30] said publicly, we've been, and this is a quote, [10:33] we've been proactive, trying to make sure [10:36] we have the right people voting, electing the right leaders [10:41] to lead this country. [10:45] At the same time, the administration [10:47] has brought into government individuals [10:49] promoting conspiracy theories about our elections. [10:52] The so-called White House Director of Election Security [10:56] and Integrity, Kurt Olson, played a key role [10:59] in efforts to overturn the results. [11:01] Now, Mr. Olson holds a position inside the federal government [11:05] with the authority to refer criminal investigations [11:08] and access our most sensitive security information, [11:12] all supposedly doing his witch hunts around elections. [11:15] As a matter of fact, according to the court filings, [11:20] he helped trigger the FBI seizure of the ballots [11:23] in Fulton County. [11:24] So it is worth asking, why is someone whose career [11:27] has been devoted to undermining the legitimate results [11:32] of the election that we're seeing today? [11:34] Thank you. [11:36] So, let me ask you, who, at the expense of our federal state, [11:38] the government is willing to allow us to stop criminal investigations [11:43] with a hold that isuffy the threshold of a democratic election [11:49] now operating from inside the federal government [11:53] with access to law enforcement and intelligence authorities? [11:56] What exactly has he been empowered to do? [11:58] As members of our committee know this committee [12:03] was created in the aftermath of the unconstitutional abuses [12:07] exposed after Watergate. [12:08] The guardrails have been built around our intelligence [12:09] them, America begins to look more like adversaries, emphasized in this year's annual threat [12:16] assessment. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and less like a democracy. Confronting these very clear [12:25] and present threats to American security requires experienced professionals and intelligence [12:32] agencies that are focused squarely on their mission. Instead, over the past year, we've seen [12:39] actions that only serve to weaken them. Politically motivated purges at the FBI has resulted in the [12:47] exodus of hundreds of agents and the reassignments of hundreds more from key national security areas [12:54] like counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber, and where they've been redeployed to [13:00] immigration enforcement. In one troubling case, agents working on a task force focused on threats [13:09] from Iran. Clearly something that's pretty damn important, right? [13:12] Now, we're dismissed because they had previously participated in the investigation of the [13:19] president's mishandling of classified information. Elsewhere, the bureau's budget is being slashed. [13:27] Last year, it cut over $500 million with the largest decreases from cyber, counterterrorism, [13:35] and counterespionage. And the remaining scarce resources are being squandered on things like a [13:41] $60 million jet for the director's personal travel so we can go golfing in Scotland or [13:46] partying with athletes. [13:47] In fact, according to a whistleblower account, those flights became so frequent they even [13:54] delayed the bureau's response to major incidents like the Charlie Kirk assassination or shooting [13:59] at Brown University. Credible reports also indicate that highly trained FBI agents from [14:05] elite SWAT units have been reassigned to chauffeur his girlfriend, an unprecedented use of personnel [14:13] whose training are actually intended for hunting violent criminals and neutralizing terrorists. [14:20] Unfortunately, this dispute has not been resolved. [14:21] The president's function has not been limited to the FBI. Both the National Security Agency and the [14:27] Defense Intelligence Agency, and this is no reflection on the two gentlemen sitting in front [14:31] of us, were both left leaderless for months after the president fired their directors, [14:38] one at the behest of a 9-11 conspiracy theorist and the other for providing a fact-based assessment [14:46] that contradicted the president's claims about obliterating Iran's nuclear program. [14:53] Clearly, if the [14:55] program had been truly obliterated, the president wouldn't be bombing again right now. And again, [15:02] more than one-third of the personnel at CISA created by Congress to protect critical infrastructure [15:08] like power, water, and election systems have been forced out. That seems like a real mistake [15:14] as we still grapple with the intrusion called Cyphoon and the recent Iranian cyber attack [15:21] on Stryker. And we are now seeing in real time the cost to the State Department. [15:28] Thousands of American citizens were trapped in a literal war zone with little assistance from [15:34] their own government. For a time, those calling the State Department hotline for assistance [15:39] were greeted with a pre-recorded message that said, quote, please do not rely on the U.S. [15:46] government for assisted departure or evacuation. This was a foreseeable security crisis. When you [15:54] start a war of choice, when there was no imminent threat, you should be able to prepare to make sure [16:02] Americans out of the war zone. That same attitude, pushing some of our closest friends into the arms [16:11] of our most capable foes, has profound consequences. Two of our most significant allies, Canada and the [16:17] U.K., are currently working to sign trade deals with China because they no longer believe the [16:25] United States is a dependable partner. That's a remarkable statement in 2026. And in the [16:33] president's war of choice with Iran, a war that has already killed 13 service members, [16:39] cost Americans, taxpayers, billions of dollars, and scrambled supply chains from oil to fertilizer [16:46] to aluminum. Nobody answered the call when the president asked our allies to help reopen the [16:52] Strait of Hormuz. As the president's own counterterrorism chief acknowledged in his [16:58] resignation yesterday, Iran posed no imminent threat to the United States. Unfortunately, [17:06] our allies have been alienated and distracted by the administration's unilateral threats like [17:14] Iran and Afghanistan. Our allies have been left out of the war zone. Our allies have been left out of the war zone. [17:22] Now, what I say, what I just outlined is quite a list. And it's a partial one at that. Matter of fact, we've got a full list we'd like to share with all the press. [17:31] So what does this all mean? It matters because I believe the warnings contained in this year's annual threat assessment. [17:40] I believe our I.C. when they say the global security environment is becoming more complex and that armed conflict is becoming more complex. [17:49] becoming more global. And I also agree with the assessment when it says that to succeed, [17:55] we must think prudently and prioritize our efforts. On the topic of the annual threat [18:01] assessment, I want to close where I began by noting that since the first time since 2017, [18:09] in the aftermath of Russia's intervention in our 2016 elections, the annual threat assessment [18:15] includes nothing, nothing about adversary attempts to influence American elections. [18:24] Now, I don't believe this omission means that the threat has disappeared. It means that the [18:31] intelligence community is no longer being allowed to speak honestly about it. And it raises serious [18:38] questions. And I will be asking about your priorities, Director Gabbard, in terms of what [18:44] you're choosing to prioritize instead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. [18:48] Before we go to the witnesses, now that we have a critical mass of members, I would simply like [18:51] to remind members that we will handle questions as we did last year, seniority at the time of [18:57] the Gabbard. [18:58] And alternating between Democrats and Republicans, we'll have one round of questions, [19:03] seven minutes per round. I will not entertain questions after seven-minute time has expired. [19:08] Furthermore, I expect to convene the closed session in our usual location [19:12] promptly 30 minutes after the open session begins. Director Gabbard, the floor is yours. [19:21] Thank you, Chairman Cotton, Vice Chair Warner, members of the committee. Good morning. [19:25] I'm here today to present the 2026 annual threat assessment joined by the [19:30] directors of the CIA, FBI, DIA, and NSA. Before I continue, on behalf of the intelligence community, [19:38] I want to extend our thanks to General Hartman for his 37 years of service in uniform and closing [19:46] out his 37 years with tremendous leadership of the NSA. This briefing is being provided in [19:52] accordance with ODNI's statutory responsibility. I'd like to remind those who are watching what [19:58] I am briefing here today conveys the intelligence community's assessment of the threats facing the [20:02] U.S. citizens, our homeland, and our interests, not my personal views or opinions. In this [20:10] assessment, we're following the structure of priorities that were laid out in the president's [20:14] national security strategy, starting with threats to our homeland and then shifting to global risks. [20:21] The defense of our homeland is of the utmost importance to the American people, and efforts [20:26] by this administration have shown over the last year the results of bolstering homeland defense [20:32] in the security of the American people. [20:34] For example, the strict enforcement of U.S. policies at the U.S.-Mexico border and regionally [20:40] have served as a deterrent, drastically reducing illegal immigration. Based on Customs and Border [20:46] Patrol data, January 2026's monthly encounters are down 83.8 percent compared to January 2025. [20:56] Encounters declined 79 percent compared to 2024. The drivers of migration are likely to continue, [21:03] potential worsening instability in countries like Cuba and [21:06] Haiti, risk triggering migration surges, and smugglers who have long operated as transnational [21:12] criminal organizations continue to view chaos as an opportunity for profit and will continue [21:19] to look to profit from illegal immigration flows. These transnational criminal organizations continue [21:25] to pose a daily and direct threat to the health and safety of millions of U.S. citizens, primarily [21:31] and directly by producing and trafficking in illegal drugs. Under President Trump's leadership, [21:37] fentanyl overdose, and illegal drugs have been used to mitigate the risk of illegal immigration. [21:38] deaths have seen a 30% decrease from September 2024 to September 2025. President Trump's [21:45] aggressive efforts to more directly and actively target these transnational criminal organizations [21:50] and reduce the inflow of fentanyl precursors has already had a significant impact, which is likely [21:56] to continue. We've seen fentanyl potency also decrease, likely due to disruptions to the [22:03] production supply chain. U.S. efforts to work with China and India to halt the flow of fentanyl [22:09] precursor chemicals to North America are demonstrating some improvement, but there is [22:14] more work to be done, as sadly, there are still tens of thousands of fentanyl-related deaths in [22:20] America every year. Mexico-based TCOs like the Sinaloa cartel and Jalisco New Generation cartel [22:27] dominate the production and smuggling of fentanyl, heroin, meth, and cocaine into the United States. [22:34] Colombia-based TCOs and illegal armed groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [22:39] and the National Liberation [22:41] Army are responsible for producing and trafficking large volumes of cocaine to [22:46] the U.S. and European markets, with now some indicators of attempts to expand their market [22:51] to the Asia-Pacific region. Colombia remains the world's largest producer of cocaine, [22:57] and Colombian criminal groups have expanded their trafficking relationships with [23:00] neighboring Ecuadorian and Brazilian gangs. As you know, MS-13 is well-established in [23:08] cells within the United States and uses violence to intimidate the Salvadoran diaspora. [23:13] The U.S. and the U.S. government has been working closely with the U.S. and the U.S. government [23:16] to address the problem, engaging in murder, extortion, retail drug trafficking, firearms offenses, [23:21] and prostitution, fueling increased violence and instability. These and other TCOs continue to [23:27] present a very tangible and individualized risk of violent crime to everyday Americans and contribute [23:33] to regional instability. As the president increases his focus on counter-drug and counter-cartel [23:38] pressures, they're likely to seek ways to try to adapt their operations, including shifting production locations and trafficking routes. [23:44] The U.S. continues to face a complex and evolving threat landscape with a geographically diverse set of Islamist terrorist actors [23:54] seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm Americans, even as Al-Qaeda and ISIS remain weaker today than they were at their respective peaks. [24:04] The spread of Islamist ideology, in some cases led by individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, [24:11] poses a fundamental threat to freedom and the foundational principles that unify Islamist [24:15] groups and individuals. Islamist groups and individuals use this ideology for recruiting [24:23] and financial support for terrorist groups and individuals around the world and to advance their [24:28] political objectives of establishing an Islamist caliphate which governs based on Sharia. [24:33] There are increasing examples of this in various European countries, and President Trump's [24:38] designation of certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organizations is a mechanism [24:43] to secure Americans against this threat. [24:47] In response to setbacks, the U.S. and the U.S. government continues to work together with the U.S. government and the U.S. government, [24:48] to setbacks to their capabilities of conducting large scale complex attacks. [24:53] Islamist terrorist groups have shifted toward focusing on executing information operations to spread propaganda and inspire or enable individuals located in, or with access to the West. [25:06] U.S. counterterrorism efforts, primarily in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria in 2025, were instrumental in removing key terrorist leaders and operatives, [25:17] degrading the ability of Al-Qaeda and ISIS [25:19] quickly reconstitute its leadership and plan large-scale attacks against the homeland and [25:24] U.S. interests abroad. Strict U.S. border enforcement measures and increased deportations [25:30] of individuals with suspected links to Islamist terrorists have reduced access to the homeland [25:34] and removed some potential sources of future terrorist attacks. Since January, U.S. officials [25:41] have only had a handful of encounters at our borders with individuals associated with terrorist [25:45] groups. This is a positive trend. However, our interagency coordinated efforts to continue to [25:52] identify, locate, and remove known or suspected terrorists who may already be in the United States [25:57] continues with vigilance. In 2025, there were at least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the [26:04] United States. Law enforcement disrupted at least 15 U.S.-based Islamist terrorist plotters. [26:11] Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some online contact with Islamist terrorists [26:16] in the United States. This is a positive trend. However, our interagency coordinated efforts to [26:17] identify, locate, and remove known or suspected terrorists who may already be in the United States. [26:17] This is a positive trend. However, our interagency coordinated efforts to identify, locate, and Sure, [26:17] some known or suspected terrorists who may already be in the United States. This is a positive trend. [26:27] Awesome crusher, yes. Thank you, Marl alcanz [26:48] guys. [26:49] It's [26:50] its ranks, expand support networks, and solicit funds by re-engaging with and recruiting from the [26:56] likely hundreds of ISIS detainees and thousands of ISIS-linked women and children who were [27:01] either released or escaped from prisons and displaced person camps that were previously [27:06] run by the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria. Meanwhile, state actors present a risk [27:13] broader in scope by seeking new capabilities in kinetic and cyber warfare. The United States' [27:20] secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure safety in the homeland against strategic threats. [27:26] However, the intelligence community assesses that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan [27:32] have been researching and developing an array of novel, advanced, or traditional missile delivery [27:37] systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland within range. The IC assesses [27:44] that threats to the homeland will expand collectively to more than 16,000 missiles by 2035 [27:50] from the current assessed figures. [27:51] The IC assesses that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems meant to be capable of penetrating or bypassing U.S. missile defenses. North Korea's ICBMs can already reach U.S. soil, and the IC assesses that it is committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal. [28:11] Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with the range capable of striking the homeland. [28:18] The IC assesses that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch on the Russian border. [28:23] space launch and other technology it could use to begin to develop a militarily viable ICBM [28:29] before 2035 should Tehran attempt to pursue that capability. However, these assessments [28:37] will clearly be updated as the full impact of Operation Epic Fury's devastating strikes on [28:42] Iran's missile production facilities, stockpiles, and launch capabilities is determined. These [28:48] nations collectively will likely seek to understand U.S. plans for advanced missile defense for the [28:52] homeland, probably for the purpose of shaping their own missile development programs and [28:57] assessing U.S. intentions regarding deterrence. Shifting to the cyber domain, the IC assesses [29:03] that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups will continue to [29:08] seek to compromise U.S. government and private sector networks, as well as critical infrastructure, [29:13] to collect intelligence, create options for future disruption, and for financial gain. [29:20] The IC assesses that China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats, [29:24] and are continuing their R&D efforts. North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. [29:31] In 2025 alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole $2 billion, which the IC assesses [29:37] is helping to fund the regime and include further development of its strategic weapons programs. [29:44] Financially or ideologically motivated non-state actors are becoming more bold, [29:49] with ransomware groups shifting to faster high-volume attacks that are harder to identify [29:53] and mitigate. [29:56] Innovation in the future is a key factor in the development of a new, [29:56] more efficient cyber domain. The IC assesses that it will increasingly shape cyber operations [30:05] with both cyber operators and defenders using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. [30:10] For example, in August of 2025, cyber actors used an AI tool to conduct a data extortion [30:17] operation against international government, healthcare, and public health emergency service [30:21] sectors, as well as religious institutions. Moving to the Arctic, the IC assesses that Russia, [30:28] and to a lesser extent China, aim to strengthen their presence in the region [30:32] through increased maritime trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity. [30:38] Russia, which has the longest coastline in the Arctic, has long sought recognition of its [30:42] polar great power status and is deploying more military forces and building new permanent [30:48] infrastructure. China, though not an Arctic country, is engaged in more limited efforts [30:53] in the region to advance its own strategic and economic interests. The IC assesses that China is [31:02] a capable competitor in the field of artificial intelligence. The IC assesses that AI capabilities [31:09] are rapidly advancing and changing the threat landscape, as this is a defining technology that [31:14] enables computers and machines to simulate human learning comprehension, problem solving, [31:19] creativity, and autonomy. It will be critical to ensure that humans remain in control of how AI is [31:25] used and of the machines that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests of the [31:29] American people across all domains. The IC assesses that AI adoption at scale, [31:34] across the spectrum of usage poses serious risks. AI has the potential to [31:40] aid in weapons and systems design and has been used in recent conflicts to [31:44] influence targeting and streamline decision-making, underscoring the risk [31:48] and likely threats that could manifest on the battlefield. Early developers in [31:53] quantum computers will give countries an extraordinary technological [31:59] advantage over others to quickly process national security information and break [32:03] current encryption methodology used to protect sensitive finance, health care [32:08] and government information. The global security landscape is volatile and [32:14] complex with armed conflict growing more common and posing potential threats [32:19] against U.S. interests. Strategic competition and regional and smaller [32:23] powers are becoming more willing to use force to pursue their interests, [32:27] heightening the risk of conflict. The ICS assesses the space domain is [32:31] becoming increasingly contested with China and Russia developing [32:35] counter-terrorist weapons in the United States, as well as obtain an important [32:36] space capabilities to challenge U.S. space efforts. [32:40] The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological warfare capabilities [32:45] continues to grow. [32:46] I'll turn now to our neighborhood in the Western Hemisphere, where flagging economies, high [32:51] crime rates, pervasive organized crime, migration flows, corruption, narcotics trafficking, [32:57] all of these present a spectrum of risks to U.S. interests and where strategic competitors [33:02] seek to gain greater influence in the region. [33:06] The IC assesses that Latin America and the Caribbean almost certainly will see hotspots [33:10] of volatility in the coming year. [33:14] Since Maduro's arrest, the IC assesses a shift in Venezuela's leadership towards cooperating [33:20] with the U.S. to open its economy, to develop the country's oil and gas extraction capability, [33:26] and we've seen their movement in releasing political prisoners. [33:29] The U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement review in 2026 will likely increase uncertainty in many [33:35] Latin American countries. [33:37] Especially those that rely on Mexico as an export destination for intermediate goods [33:42] for manufacture and onward export to the U.S. [33:45] China, Russia, and Iran are likely seeking to sustain economic, political, and military [33:51] engagement with Latin America. [33:54] The IC assesses that China's demand for raw materials is likely to continue to drive its [33:58] economic outreach, while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic [34:03] ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. [34:06] The IC assesses that China aims to elevate its own political and economic interests to [34:09] the U.S. and the U.S. in the long-term, while the U.S. and the U.S. in the long-term [34:10] are likely to have a strong political, economic, military, and technological power to increase [34:11] its own regional positioning and global influence to fend off threats to their interests. [34:12] While there are challenging areas where interests diverge, President Trump's diplomatic engagements [34:13] with President Xi to work towards U.S. interests have enabled progress where those interests [34:15] align. [34:16] The IC assesses that China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces across all domains [34:17] in pursuit of its goal to achieve world-class status by mid-century. [34:18] This includes building a force with the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and [34:20] the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and the [34:21] U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. and to achieve [34:47] their stated objective of developing the ability to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. [34:52] However, the IC assesses that China likely prefers to set the conditions for an eventual [34:58] peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict. [35:02] The IC assesses that an increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern [35:07] regionally and globally. [35:09] Its weapons of mass destruction, its conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities, [35:14] and demonstrated willingness to use asymmetric capabilities poses a threat to U.S. and its [35:20] allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. [35:23] North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing, and in 2025, Kim took steps to improve [35:29] ties with China, still North Korea's most important trading partner and economic benefactor. [35:35] The IC assesses that North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine has [35:39] increased North Korea's capabilities, as their forces have gained combat experience in 21st [35:45] century warfare, along with equipment. [35:48] In 2024, North Korea deployed more than 11,000 troops to Russia to support combat operations [35:53] in Kursk. [35:55] Pyongyang. [35:55] Pyongyang continues to develop and expand its strategic weapons programs, including [35:59] missiles that can evade U.S. and regional missile defenses. [36:03] It is continuing to work to increase its nuclear warhead stockpile and maintains biological [36:09] and chemical weapons capabilities. [36:13] Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally by military [36:17] and non-military means. [36:19] The IC assesses that the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is the potential [36:24] of an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict. [36:27] A new conflict, such as Ukraine, led to direct hostilities, including the potential deployment [36:33] of nuclear weapons. [36:34] The IC assesses that Putin continues to invest in Russia's defense industrial base, as well [36:40] as novel capabilities that may pose a greater threat to the U.S. homeland and forces abroad [36:45] than conventional weapons. [36:47] Russia has advanced systems, hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities designed to negate [36:52] U.S. military advantage. [36:54] Moscow also relies on other tools to exert weapons. [36:57] For innovations, Russia will be investing in nuclear weapons, specifically in black [36:57] and blue, which will be a potential use of nuclear weapons, including nuclear and nuclear [36:57] weapons. [36:57] pressure, using gray zone tactics to further its goals and compete below the level of armed [37:02] conflict. Russia is also building an extensive counter space capabilities to contest U.S. space [37:10] dominance. Its development of a nuclear counter space weapon poses the greatest single threat to [37:16] the world's space architecture. During the past year, the IC assesses that Russia has maintained [37:21] the upper hand in the war against Ukraine. U.S.-led negotiations between Moscow and Kiev [37:27] are ongoing. Until such an agreement is met, Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow [37:32] war of attrition until they view their objectives have been achieved. In the Middle East, conflict [37:38] and instability will shape security, political, and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. [37:43] The IC assesses that Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change in the region [37:48] that began with Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and continued with the 12-day war [37:56] last year, resulting in weakening Iran and Israel. [37:59] The IC assesses the regime in Iran appears to be intact but largely degraded due to attacks on its [38:07] leadership and military capabilities. Its conventional military power projection [38:12] capabilities have largely been destroyed, leaving limited options. Iran's strategic position has [38:18] been significantly degraded. The U.S.-led maximum pressure campaign and snapback of European [38:25] sanctions added additional pressure to an already bleak Iranian economy, resulting in mass protests [38:30] earlier this year. [38:31] That Tehran suppressed by killing thousands of protesters. Even if the regime remains intact, [38:38] the IC assesses that internal tensions are likely to increase as Iran's economy worsens. [38:46] Even so, Iran and its proxies continue to attack U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East. [38:53] The IC assesses that if a hostile regime survives, it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort [38:58] to rebuild its military, missiles, and UAV forces. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, [39:05] the IC assesses that Iran's military and its proxies continue to attack U.S. and allied interests in [39:06] the Middle East. [39:06] What? [39:07] In fact, with the immunization and [39:33] shots. [39:35] That's why the UN Security Council él 나올'. [39:35] These four countries, the IC assesses, are likely to continue toår. [39:35] the ICSSs are likely to continue their selective cooperation with each other which could bolster [39:41] their individual capabilities and threats to U.S. interests more broadly. However, currently these [39:46] relationships are primarily bilateral on selective issues and depend on broader circumstances, [39:53] divergent sovereign interests, and in some cases concerns over directly confronting the United [39:58] States. These factors the ICSSs are likely to constrain their relationships. Finally, conflicts [40:06] on the continent of Africa are likely to persist through 2026 due to poor governance, economic [40:12] demands, and external support. Tensions continue between Ethiopia, which could rapidly accelerate to [40:19] conflict. Contentious national elections in Somalia could distract the federal government away from [40:24] counter-terrorism actions against al-Shabaab, which continues to conduct terror attacks while providing [40:30] funding and propaganda support to other elements of al-Qaeda in Yemen. The civil war in Sudan [40:36] continues, even as al-Qaeda continues to dominate the country. The ICSSs are likely to continue their [40:38] bilateral cooperation with each other. However, currently these external negotiations occur. [40:40] ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel have increased the intensity of their attacks against local [40:46] security forces, expanding their areas of operation and moving closer to cities with the U.S. presence. [40:52] The ICSSs that African governments will likely use their wealth and critical minerals to seek [40:57] partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefit. Concurrent conflicts and crises across the [41:03] continent will continue to put U.S. citizens at risk and cause further instability. In closing, [41:11] the ICSSs have always been as strong as the US to the world. This is a day for new technology, [41:15] and we are committed to providing the president, and policy makers, with timely, unbiased, [41:19] relevant intelligence to inform decision making, and to ensure the safety, security, and freedom [41:25] of the American people. Thank you. Thank you, Director Gabbard. General Adams, Camden, Arkansas [41:31] is the home of brand new production lines for the Israeli missile defense interceptors. Could you [41:36] please explain how Critical Arrow and Iron Dome systems being built in Camden [41:41] not only Israel's defenses but the defense of hundreds of thousands of [41:46] American citizens and troops in the region chairman cotton thank you for [41:51] that question and I have to say that the arrow system in the Iron Dome system are [41:56] critical defensive systems that prevent adversary power projection from [42:02] impacting the the targets and the friendly areas in Israel the arrow system [42:09] itself is a high altitude primarily against mrb m's and it's proven to be [42:16] very very effective against those systems the Iron Dome is more of a [42:21] closer-in system protecting against rockets and things of that nature but [42:25] the combination of those two with US systems creates a shield to prevent [42:32] those attacks from the Iranians impacting key areas in in in areas where [42:39] they're present and in areas where they're present and in areas where they're [42:39] present and in areas where they're present and in areas where they're [42:39] protecting Thank You general Adams I was recently in Camden with secretary [42:43] Hegseth as part of his arsenal of freedom tour and they are greater [42:47] kansan to do great work to keep our nation safe general Hartman we've often [42:51] spoken about our pressing need for more cybersecurity manpower and part-time [42:56] formation such as the Arkansas Air National Guard's 223rd cyberspace [43:00] operations squadron are a great great way to grow the force what [43:05] recommendations do you have to grow the cyber protection teams and develop more [43:09] capacity for local and national missions chairman cotton thank thanks for the [43:15] question I did hear a little bit about the great team in Arkansas there and I [43:20] know 855 CPT operates from that formation and so for us certainly [43:25] looking at a number of different initiatives one ensure that we can share [43:29] all of the relevant top-secret classified information and other sort of [43:34] indications and warning that the organization's need but I will tell you [43:38] I'm an advocate for inability to establish some sort of [43:42] joint reserve cyber organization and so that at cyber comm we can ensure that [43:47] those organizations have all of the advanced training that they need to [43:53] ensure that those organizations have access to all of the intelligence that [43:56] they need and to ensure that we control some level of funding at both cyber [44:01] common NSA that can be used to mobilize those personnel to handle the most [44:06] difficult problems that we're faced with and we have been working with Congress [44:10] on some of that language and the department and we appreciate it sir I [44:12] thank you general Hartman as I said in my opening we only have this one [44:17] public hearing a year or even though the committee hears from each of you several [44:21] times that the year in classified settings so we don't often have a chance [44:25] to tell the American people what great work their intelligence professionals [44:30] are doing for them so director Ratcliffe could could you take the opportunity to [44:35] maybe join in excellent briefings that secretary hexeth and general Cain have [44:40] provided on a regular basis [44:41] over the last news week [44:42] who is in office [44:43] last couple months on the military aspects of both the Maduro raid and Operation Epic Fury to explain [44:49] the CIA's contributions to those operations. Thank you, Senator. You know, last year when I [44:56] was here in my confirmation, I promised you all, and you had all asked for, a more aggressive CIA, [45:04] one that was focused on core mission, getting back to the business of stealing secrets, [45:09] to be able to provide our policymakers with a decisive strategic advantage that would allow [45:16] and advance and contribute to foreign policy and national security successes. To the credit of the [45:25] CIA workforce, the CIA has delivered. Some of those successes have been very public. [45:32] As you mentioned, Senator, Operation Midnight Hammer, Operation Absolute Resolve, [45:39] Flawless Military Operations, [45:41] like that are hostage to a flawless intelligence picture. And the CIA, [45:47] as you know from classified briefings, contributed in myriad ways to the success of that. But what I [45:53] would say to you is those successes are just emblematic of the phenomenal progress and success [45:59] really by every measure, every metric, every standard across every national security space [46:06] with regard to the work of the CIA. Senator, you mentioned some of it in your open, [46:11] the increase of our assets stable and our human sources up by 25%. Our FI collection across the [46:19] board, our foreign intelligence collection up by 25% overall. And in important categories like [46:26] China, for instance, up 100%. In areas like tech and AI, up 45%. On the counter-narcotics front, [46:34] our operations up by 70%. And with regard to counter-terrorism, [46:39] those are classified numbers that I'll share with you in the classified portion of this hearing, [46:44] but they're off the charts good. The best way I can summarize it, Senator, is I had a 32-year [46:51] veteran of the agency retire this year, and he said to me, I hate to go. I don't know if this [46:58] is the best year that the CIA's ever had, but it's the best year I can ever remember. And I [47:02] think that reflects the current morale of the CIA. It's a workforce that knows it's doing a great job. [47:08] It knows it's doing a great job. It's doing a great job. It's doing a great job. It's doing a great job. [47:09] that it's being allowed to do what they signed up to do which is provide that [47:14] decisive strategic advantage to our country for great successes that [47:20] everyone can see so I thank you for the opportunity to let me recognize the CIA [47:24] workforce thank you director Radcliffe I want to address one specific threat from [47:29] Iran the threat of an intercontinental missile which is really just the [47:33] combination of two technologies one thrust to get something into space and a [47:37] reentry vehicle to get it back to earth Iran has always had a space launch [47:42] program which is flimsy cover for the first part of that intercontinental [47:46] missile program I haven't seen any Iranian astronauts in space lately and [47:49] second they have medium-range ballistic missiles which already have a reentry [47:53] vehicle so if you crudely married those two technologies together I've heard [47:58] some analysts say that Iran could have had a functioning intercontinental [48:03] missile to threaten the United States in as few as six months would you [48:07] agree with that assessment well you're you're right to be concerned about [48:10] Iran's development of longer-range ballistic missiles senator if if a lot [48:15] if Iran were allowed to develop at the IBR IRB M ranges which is 3,000 [48:21] kilometers it would it would threaten most of Europe and yes as you mentioned [48:26] we know that Iran is gaining experience in these larger more powerful booster [48:32] technologies through its so-called space launch vehicle [48:37] program [48:37] if left unimpeded yes senator they would have the ability to range missiles to [48:45] the continental US it's one of the reasons why degrading Iran's missile [48:52] production capabilities that is taking place right now in operation epic fury [48:56] is so important to our national security thank you vice chairman thank you mr. [49:02] chairman or gab director gabbert the whole country knows that you were [49:07] recently involved in a nuclear war in the United States in the United States in the United States in the United States in the United States in the United States in the United States [49:08] in the United States and you have led an extensive [49:10] conference in the United States from which you are have piece is that you [49:17] were involved in it [49:20] FBI operation to seize [49:22] ballots and Fulton county Georgia yeah this was despite the fact that the [49:26] warrant showed no foreign interference or nexus matter of fact the warrant was [49:32] based on entirely on conspiracy [49:34] theories that have already minute and withdrawal tipted yet now where is the [49:42] authorities to you to involve yourself and domestic law enforcement activity [49:45] detail in a letter, but I'm grateful for the opportunity to do it in this forum. As you stated, [49:51] Congress provided by statute, ODNI, with the responsibility of election security and [49:57] counterintelligence in 2021. As you also know, ODNI has purview and oversight. [50:04] Ma'am, could you, I know the history very well, but could you just address more? [50:07] I am addressing the question. ODNI also has purview and overview over two domestic related [50:14] agencies, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, both of which have purview over [50:19] election security responsibilities to ensure the integrity of our elections. [50:24] I want to correct one of your statements that you've made multiple times, which is false. [50:28] I did not participate in a law enforcement activity, [50:33] nor would I, because that does not exist within my authorities. [50:36] You were present on the scene. Are the photos of you on the scene false? [50:40] I was at Fulton County, sir, at the request of the president. [50:44] And- [50:45] And to work with the FBI to observe this action that had long been awaited. I was not aware of [50:52] what was in the warrant or was not in the warrant. [50:53] And what was the president's specific request for you to go to- [50:55] And to say thank you to the FBI agents for their work. [50:56] What was the specific request that was made by the president for you to show up in Fulton County? [51:00] To go and observe the FBI's activities on this issue. [51:04] So why- [51:04] When you look at the fort, your question, sir- [51:06] Do you have the answer why the president was knowing about this- [51:08] Your question, sir. [51:09] Affidavit before it was even served? [51:11] I'm not aware that the president knew about an affidavit before it was served. [51:14] Then why was he sending- [51:14] Why was he sending you to Fulton County? [51:16] This occurred the day that the FBI had it approved, their warrant approved by a local judge, and they began to execute this. [51:25] To address your question, sir, about the foreign nexus question. [51:28] In order for us to better understand the vulnerabilities in our election systems that may exist today, as we look to 2026, [51:36] and yes, we are very focused on trying to make sure that this election is one that the American people have- [51:42] Director Gabbard, let me- [51:43] I've got a number of questions. [51:43] Director Gabbard, I have a number. [51:45] Let me ask my next question, please. [51:48] You have not provided any of the required reports or briefings to this committee on foreign interference. [51:59] This is the first threat assessment since 2017 that didn't even mention foreign interference. [52:08] Last year, when you were already confirmed, it mentioned it at high level. [52:14] Are you saying there is no foreign threat to our elections in the midterms this year? [52:18] No. [52:20] As I stated in the outset of my remarks, this year's annual threat assessment matches the prioritization of threats and- [52:27] Please answer the question, yes or no. [52:29] Is there foreign threat interference to our elections this year? [52:32] That the president has laid out. [52:33] Are there foreign- [52:33] Please allow me to answer the question, sir. [52:35] The intelligence community has been and continues to remain focused on any collection and intelligence products- [52:41] Ma'am, you're- [52:41] That show a potential foreign threat for those who are seeking to- [52:45] So, so far, there has been none then because you've made no reports- [52:48] In our election system. [52:49] Excuse me, ma'am. [52:50] I'm trying to ask the question, you should have stayed in Congress. [52:53] Please answer the question. [52:54] I didn't ask you a question, sir. [52:55] I'm trying to answer your question. [52:56] So, you're saying the failure to provide any reports or the failure to have any mention of a foreign threat assessment, [53:04] I would draw the conclusion there must be no foreign threat to our elections in 26. [53:09] So, that brings me a question that I have for both you, ma'am, and Director Patel. [53:13] There are reports that in 2020, the president was preparing an executive order to potentially seize, [53:22] um, ballots or bring in federal forces. [53:24] There is a published report that there is a similar EO being drafted right now about 2026, citing China. [53:32] Director Patel, do you have any knowledge of that draft EO? [53:36] Uh, thank you, Vice Chairman. [53:37] I do not, sir. [53:38] Director Gabbard, do you have any? [53:40] I do not. [53:41] Thank you. [53:41] Let me move to Iran. [53:43] Now, I understand, and I appreciated Director Gabbard's comments yesterday, uh, about agreeing that the president has sole authority, I guess, in his bones. [53:53] He has the right to declare whether something is an imminent threat. [53:56] Um, I didn't agree with, uh, your friend, Mr. Kent, but I didn't, again, I agreed with him yesterday on the fact that there was no imminent threat. [54:06] Um, I guess what I'm concerned about one thing is, uh, even in your printed testimony today on page six, um, and your last paragraph on page six, [54:18] as a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran's nuclear enrichment program was obliterated. [54:22] There's been no efforts to try to rebuild. [54:24] There's been no efforts to try to rebuild. [54:24] There's been no efforts to try to rebuild. [54:24] There's been no efforts to try to rebuild. [54:25] There's been no efforts to try to rebuild. [54:25] There's been no efforts to try to rebuild. [54:25] You omitted that paragraph from your, uh, oral opening. [54:31] Was that because the president said there was an imminent threat two weeks ago? [54:37] No, sir, I recognized that the time was running long, and I skipped through some of the portions of my oral delivered remarks. [54:45] You chose to omit the parts that contradict the president. [54:49] The president continues to say as well that, you know, he had no idea. [54:53] It was shocked that the... [54:56] that the Iranians had moved to take over the Strait of Hormuz. [54:58] Did you, um, provide any intelligence that would say that it would be, um, that it was not likely that the Iranians would try to move on the Strait? [55:08] Uh, I'm not aware of those remarks, and I think those of us here at the table, uh, can point to the fact that, historically, the Iranians have always threatened to leverage their control of the Strait of Hormuz. [55:20] But why would the president say he was amazed? [55:22] I'm not aware of those remarks. [55:23] What about the comments the president made that thought that he was surprised again? [55:26] Reports... [55:27] Did he, uh, say anything else, um, about it, about Vladivostok, that Iran struck the adjacent Gulf States? [55:35] Um, again, I'm-I'm not aware of those remarks. [55:37] We-we have been- [55:37] Well, let me ask you this. [55:38] And continue to provide the intelligence... [55:40] Did you... Did you brief the president? [55:41] Did you brief the president? [55:44] Did you brief the president if he starts a war of choice that the likely result would be that Iran would strike adjacent Gulf nations and close the Strait of Hormuz? [55:58] Did you brief him on those two facts that I think have been consistently... [55:59] I mean, I'm listening and I am noticing a lot there, but I've noticed a lot that has gone unanswered. [55:59] д свои maintains. [55:59] the intelligence community i have not and won't divulge internal conversations i will say that [56:05] those of us within the intelligence community continue to provide the president with all of [56:09] the best objective intelligence available to inform his decisions senator collins thank you [56:15] mr chairman director gabbert you just testified that isis and al-qaeda are significantly weaker [56:29] and reflecting that view you have devoted declining budgets personnel and emphasis [56:40] on countering terrorism yet the fact is that isis is growing and operating in somalia [56:51] afghanistan syria pakistan and iraq al-qaeda is surging in afghanistan the arabian peninsula [57:02] and throughout central africa the houthis in yemen and the rest of the iranian proxies remain [57:12] a serious threat focusing as you have done on great power competitors seems to have diverted [57:23] resources from the fight against terrorism a fight that's very much still going on [57:34] as i have said repeatedly it is terrorists who want and can kill americans today we've just seen [57:44] the terrorists in michigan attacking the synagogue in addition it appears that a more stove piped [57:54] effort in the intelligence committee has returned how are you ensuring that americans [58:05] are safe and that you are countering counter-terrorism threats to our homeland [58:12] and to us citizens abroad thank you senator collins for your question and the opportunity to clarify [58:20] the comments in my opening statement my reference to the size of isis and al-qaeda organizationally [58:28] is smaller and weaker than it was during its peak over a decade ago however i completely concur with [58:35] your remarks about the threat of isis al-qaeda and other islamist terrorist groups around the world [58:41] and the threat that they pose to u.s interest service members and directly to the homeland [58:46] our odni national counter-terrorism center has been at the forefront of ramping up and i [58:52] believe is more active today than it has been certainly in a long time we are dedicating every [58:58] resource that they ask for as well as the counter-terrorism elements across the ic to make [59:03] sure that we are never taking our eyes to the center of the problem that we face which is [59:05] off of this persistent threat to the American people. [59:09] The change in tactics based on the current environment [59:13] is something we continue to be most concerned about. [59:17] Increasingly, we are seeing less indicators [59:20] of large-scale organized complex threats or attacks [59:24] and instead efforts focused on individuals [59:28] either who have been radicalized by Islamist propaganda [59:32] and may not have ever had contact with ISIS or al-Qaeda, for example, [59:37] and others who have had contact, [59:39] of which we are able to have more indications of. [59:45] This remains and will be, [59:46] and as we come to present our budgets to you, [59:49] a foremost and primary priority. [59:52] The integration across the intelligence community [59:54] on the counterterrorism threat occurs every single day [59:58] with our teams working very effectively together [1:00:00] to thwart terrorist attacks [1:00:02] and to prevent them from happening again. [1:00:02] as we have over the last year. [1:00:04] Director Patel, I'm going to follow up on this issue with you. [1:00:09] ISIS targets potential recruits online through social media, [1:00:16] gaming platforms, encrypted messaging apps. [1:00:20] ISIS even facilitated a network online [1:00:24] to smuggle illegal immigrants into the United States [1:00:29] since April 2021. [1:00:32] There have been more than 52 jihadist-inspired cases [1:00:38] across 30 states. [1:00:41] What measures is the FBI taking [1:00:46] to prevent foreign terrorist organizations [1:00:50] from recruiting or influencing Americans [1:00:55] while also ensuring the protection [1:00:58] of individuals' right to privacy? [1:01:01] Thank you, Senator. [1:01:03] And I think you said it best. [1:01:06] They have transferred their capabilities [1:01:10] in terms of personal recruitments [1:01:11] to online recruitments, [1:01:13] which makes any terrorist organization, [1:01:15] including ISIS, all the more powerful. [1:01:17] What we have done is extended and expanded resources [1:01:20] to environments like the Threat Screening Center, [1:01:23] which allows us to collect biometric capabilities [1:01:25] from all over the world. [1:01:26] We've had a double-digit increase in that [1:01:28] and a double-digit increase in intelligence production. [1:01:31] But what we've also done in the CT space, specifically, [1:01:33] is expand the number of agents and intel analysts [1:01:37] that go online and detect, [1:01:40] based on our biometric capabilities and intelligence [1:01:42] that we have from the interagency. [1:01:44] And what that leads us to is what we saw [1:01:45] in December of last year, Senator, [1:01:47] where we at the FBI stopped four terrorist attacks, [1:01:51] four in California, Texas, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, [1:01:57] three of which were ISIS-inspired. [1:01:58] We were able to detect these individuals [1:02:00] both online and in person using our covert platform, [1:02:03] and we shuttered a bombing campaign in Southern California [1:02:06] and two mass-casualty events for New Year's Eve. [1:02:09] Director Gabbard, the intelligence community [1:02:14] did not detect an extremely serious breach [1:02:20] affecting our telecommunications industry [1:02:24] due to the Chinese salt typhoon incursions [1:02:28] for a very long time. [1:02:31] In addition, the Chinese vault, [1:02:35] a typhoon threat, poses a terrible threat [1:02:40] to U.S. critical infrastructure. [1:02:43] Specific sectors throughout the United States [1:02:46] have been overlooked and underprotected. [1:02:51] What are you doing to deal with the threat [1:02:55] to critical infrastructure, our electric grid, [1:02:59] our communication systems, given this huge miss [1:03:05] by our talented intelligence community? [1:03:09] Thank you, Senator Collins, for the question. [1:03:12] You know, working with our partners at NSA and others [1:03:18] to detect these threats and how they may be evolved [1:03:21] or developing is something we're continuing to work on. [1:03:25] Building strong partnerships with the private sector, [1:03:27] whether it be in the telecom industry, the financial sector, [1:03:30] the healthcare sector, the energy sector, [1:03:33] is something that I am rebuilding. [1:03:35] We've seen some of these ongoing relationships [1:03:38] falter over previous years. [1:03:41] I've personally been astounded by some of the conversations [1:03:43] I've had with leaders from these industries [1:03:46] who are just as concerned as we are about these threats [1:03:49] to our critical infrastructure and yet don't feel [1:03:52] that they have the connectivity or the information [1:03:55] to be able to secure their own infrastructure. [1:03:58] So in short, building those stronger partnerships, [1:04:01] integrating and being able to share information and intelligence [1:04:04] where we can is critical for us to be able to secure [1:04:08] our country from these threats. [1:04:10] Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator Wyden. [1:04:12] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:04:14] Director Gabbard, last year your agencies testified, [1:04:17] and I quote, Iran's large conventional forces are capable [1:04:21] of inflicting substantial damage to an attacker, [1:04:24] executing regional strikes, and disrupting shipping, [1:04:28] particularly energy supplies, through the Strait of Hormuz. [1:04:32] In other words, [1:04:34] every problem we're seeing now was not only foreseeable, [1:04:39] but was actually predicted by the intelligence agencies. [1:04:44] So, Director, in the lead-up to the start of this war [1:04:48] three weeks ago, did the intelligence agencies stick [1:04:52] to their assessment that in response to an attack, [1:04:56] the Iranians had the capability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz? [1:05:01] Thank you, Senator Wyden. [1:05:03] The intelligence community has continued to provide the President [1:05:06] and his team with the intelligence related to this operation in Iran [1:05:12] before and on an ongoing basis. [1:05:14] So, right now, we're in a global energy crisis. [1:05:18] We're paying more for gas, the economy is in danger, [1:05:21] and it seems to me, and I heard you discuss this with Senator Warner too, [1:05:26] that there's a lot of hedging going on with respect to entirely [1:05:30] foreseen consequences of the war. [1:05:33] And that strikes me, Madam Director, [1:05:35] as what amounts to a historic mistake. [1:05:38] Now, my second question is, did the intelligence agencies assess [1:05:42] that the Iranians could respond to a regime change attack from us [1:05:45] by attacking U.S. forces and other Americans in the region? [1:05:50] The IC assessment has always taken very seriously [1:05:55] the threat of the Iranian regime's missile capabilities [1:05:59] and how our American troops within the region may be put at risk. [1:06:04] Again, you know, [1:06:05] it seems to me [1:06:06] with Americans dying in the war, [1:06:09] it's hard to see how you can sit here and say [1:06:12] that the intelligence agencies couldn't provide a clear warning [1:06:16] that if attacked, the Iranians would respond by attacking our people. [1:06:20] Now, on Monday, Madam Director, [1:06:24] Donald Trump was asked about Iranian strikes on the Gulf states. [1:06:27] He said, and I quote, [1:06:29] nobody, nobody, no, no, no, the greatest experts, [1:06:32] nobody thought they were going to hit the Gulf states. [1:06:35] You all are supposed to be [1:06:36] the greatest experts. [1:06:38] That's what we have you there for. [1:06:40] Director Gabbard, did the intelligence agencies assess [1:06:43] that Iran could conduct strikes on our own partners in the region [1:06:46] if it was attacked? [1:06:47] The intelligence community has continued to assess [1:06:52] the potential threats to the region, [1:06:54] the existing threats to the region, [1:06:56] and providing those assessments to the policymakers and decision makers. [1:07:01] Let me move on to several others of you with respect to 702 of FISA, [1:07:06] and I'm just going to start with you, General Hartman. [1:07:08] When Congress last reauthorized Section 702 of FISA, [1:07:12] it included a provision that expanded the type of companies [1:07:15] and individuals who could be forced to assist the government in its spying. [1:07:21] Has this expansion resulted in any intelligence, General Hartman? [1:07:25] Senator, thanks for the question. [1:07:28] Just to be clear, this provision provided us an ability [1:07:34] to collect foreign intelligence on personnel outside of the United States. [1:07:41] This is the major 702 issue in terms of expansion. [1:07:45] What was the effect of what was done? [1:07:48] Senator, I would prefer to talk to you about exact specifics in the closed session. [1:07:53] I'm happy to do that. [1:07:54] Let's understand, though, this is a dangerously broad provision [1:07:59] that could be used to rope in anybody with access to a cable box, [1:08:04] a Wi-Fi router, or a server. [1:08:07] It was jammed into the 2024 reauthorization bill [1:08:10] at the last minute. [1:08:11] Senators were told they had no choice but to support it. [1:08:15] And now, two years later, we've just had testimony [1:08:19] from a very respected individual who's saying, [1:08:22] so far it has had no value. [1:08:26] So, colleagues, we are getting ready to have another discussion on this, [1:08:29] and this ought to be a warning to every senator [1:08:31] that not every new spying power that is sold is urgent and critical actually is. [1:08:37] Senator, could I please respond to that? [1:08:39] Of course. [1:08:40] So, Senator, I just want to be clear. [1:08:42] It provided us no additional authority [1:08:45] that doesn't involve collecting intelligence [1:08:48] on foreigners that are outside of the United States of America. [1:08:52] Fine. [1:08:53] Director Patel, a question for you. [1:08:55] In 2023, your predecessor testified that, and I quote, [1:08:59] to my knowledge, we do not currently purchase commercial database information [1:09:03] that includes location data derived from Internet advertising. [1:09:07] Is that the case still? [1:09:10] And if so, [1:09:11] can you commit this morning to not buying Americans' location data? [1:09:16] Thank you. [1:09:19] The FBI uses all tools, Senator, thank you for the question, [1:09:22] to do our mission. [1:09:24] We do purchase commercially available information [1:09:27] that's consistent with the Constitution and the laws [1:09:29] under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, [1:09:32] and it has led to some valuable intelligence for us [1:09:35] to be utilized with our private and partner sectors. [1:09:38] So, you're saying that the agency will buy Americans' location data [1:09:43] from the FBI? [1:09:44] I believe that that's what you've said [1:09:46] in kind of intelligence lingo, [1:09:48] and I just want to say, as we start this debate, [1:09:52] doing that without a warrant [1:09:54] is an outrageous end run around the Fourth Amendment. [1:09:57] It's particularly dangerous, [1:09:59] given the use of artificial intelligence [1:10:01] to comb through massive amounts of private information. [1:10:04] This is exhibit A for why Congress needs to pass [1:10:08] our bipartisan, bicameral bill, [1:10:10] the Government Surveillance Reform Act. [1:10:12] I have time, I believe, for one more question. [1:10:14] Director Patel, you, three weeks ago, [1:10:17] indicated you were dissatisfied [1:10:19] about having your phone records subpoenaed. [1:10:21] Do you think the government ought to get a court order [1:10:23] to collect phone records? [1:10:26] Senator, in my experience, [1:10:27] the government does get court orders [1:10:29] to obtain phone records. [1:10:33] One last question. [1:10:35] General Adams, for you, [1:10:36] in 2021, your agency confirmed [1:10:38] that it had purchased and searched domestic location data. [1:10:41] Is it still your agency's position [1:10:43] that you can buy Americans' location data [1:10:45] without a warrant? [1:10:46] And if so, are you still doing it? [1:10:49] Senator, thanks for the question. [1:10:51] With regards to commercially available information [1:10:53] and publicly available information, [1:10:55] the purchases that this agency, [1:10:57] that my agency makes, [1:10:59] is it in alignment with the Constitution [1:11:01] and protects U.S. persons' information? [1:11:03] So, but you're buying location data, correct? [1:11:06] I mean, we've now had that referred to twice, [1:11:09] and I don't think there's any question [1:11:11] that you're doing it. [1:11:14] All of the purchases, [1:11:16] the purchasing of commercially available information [1:11:18] by the agency is passed through legal channels [1:11:21] and is in complete compliance with laws. [1:11:23] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:11:24] General Hartman, [1:11:25] I want to give you a chance [1:11:26] to answer more specifically [1:11:27] what Senator Wyden said. [1:11:28] You did answer it indirectly. [1:11:30] Does anything in Section 702 [1:11:32] give the government the authority [1:11:34] to target any American [1:11:37] with a cable box or a Wi-Fi router? [1:11:42] Chairman, nothing in 702 [1:11:44] gives us the authority to target an American [1:11:46] with a cable router [1:11:48] or Wi-Fi device. [1:11:49] Thank you. [1:11:50] And I would observe [1:11:51] about commercially available data [1:11:53] that the keywords are commercially available. [1:11:56] If any other person can buy it [1:11:59] and the FBI can buy it [1:12:02] and it helps them locate a depraved child molester [1:12:06] or savage cartel leader, [1:12:08] I would certainly hope the FBI [1:12:10] is doing anything they can [1:12:12] to keep Americans safe. [1:12:13] It's not much different [1:12:14] from longstanding Supreme Court precedent [1:12:16] that, for instance, says [1:12:18] law enforcement can go through trash [1:12:20] that you put on the side of the curb [1:12:21] because you no longer have [1:12:22] a privacy interest in it. [1:12:24] Senator Cornyn. [1:12:25] Thank you all for your service [1:12:29] to our country [1:12:30] and the people you represent. [1:12:33] We are in debt to all of you. [1:12:35] I want to ask you, [1:12:37] Director Ratcliffe, [1:12:38] yesterday the head of the [1:12:41] National Counterterrorism Center [1:12:43] resigned saying that Iran [1:12:46] did not represent an imminent threat [1:12:48] to the United States. [1:12:50] Is there anything to indicate [1:12:51] that Iran had ceased [1:12:53] in its nuclear ambitions [1:12:55] or in its desire to continue [1:12:57] to build ballistic missiles [1:12:59] capable of threatening American troops [1:13:02] and allies in the Middle East? [1:13:04] Senator, no. [1:13:07] In fact, intelligence reflects the contrary. [1:13:10] So you disagree with Mr. Kent? [1:13:14] I do. [1:13:15] I would think any fair-minded assessment [1:13:18] of the situation, [1:13:19] even based on open sources, [1:13:21] would reflect the danger [1:13:23] Iran regime poses to the United States. [1:13:26] Isn't it true they've basically been at war [1:13:28] with the West since 1979 [1:13:30] during the Iranian Revolution [1:13:32] and have American blood on their hands? [1:13:35] That's absolutely correct. [1:13:36] I think Iran has been a constant threat [1:13:38] to the United States [1:13:39] for an extended period of time [1:13:41] and posed an immediate threat [1:13:43] at this time. [1:13:45] The threat assessment says that [1:13:52] Al-Qaeda and ISIS maintain the intent [1:13:54] to launch operations targeting the U.S., [1:13:56] but it's most likely to occur [1:13:58] through U.S.-based lone offenders. [1:14:01] I want to ask you, Director Patel, [1:14:04] it seems like there's been a raft [1:14:08] of incidents recently. [1:14:11] On March the 1st in Austin, Texas, [1:14:14] where I live, [1:14:15] a lone gunman wearing a sweatshirt [1:14:18] saying, property of Allah, [1:14:20] and who the T-shirt he wore underneath [1:14:22] had an Iranian flag [1:14:24] killed three innocent people [1:14:26] and injured 12 more. [1:14:30] And then we know in Virginia, [1:14:32] the Old Dominion shooting, [1:14:35] somebody who unbelievably was sentenced [1:14:37] to 11 years in federal prison [1:14:39] for attempting to support ISIS, [1:14:41] but then was released [1:14:44] only to commit another terrorist attack. [1:14:46] We all are familiar with what's happened [1:14:48] in Michigan, in New York, [1:14:51] and I applaud the important role [1:14:56] that the FBI has played [1:14:58] in stopping some terrorist attacks, [1:15:01] but obviously the FBI [1:15:03] can't be everywhere all the time. [1:15:05] Would you please talk about [1:15:07] your cooperation and collaboration [1:15:11] with Homeland Security Investigations [1:15:14] in countering terrorist attacks [1:15:16] against the United States? [1:15:17] Thank you, Senator. [1:15:19] Absolutely. [1:15:20] It is essential that the FBI [1:15:22] cooperates with the entire interagency, [1:15:24] but as to your question about DHS specifically, [1:15:27] what we have stood up around the country [1:15:28] are 59 Homeland Security Task Forces [1:15:30] in 59 separate locations. [1:15:32] These are Joint Terrorism Task Forces? [1:15:34] Essentially, the JTTF model was expanded. [1:15:37] So the FBI owns 56 Joint Terrorism Task Forces [1:15:41] in each of our field offices. [1:15:42] On top of that, we have 59 HSTFs, [1:15:46] which are co-led by the FBI and DHS. [1:15:49] And what that allows us to do [1:15:51] is things like we did down in New Orleans [1:15:53] just over the holiday period [1:15:55] where we served for a six-week period of time, [1:15:57] and where we dropped the murder rate [1:15:59] by double-digit points, [1:16:00] and also it was the first time [1:16:02] that Mardi Gras in its entire history [1:16:04] had not one homicide. [1:16:05] So when you bring the powers [1:16:06] of the Homeland Security folks, DHS, [1:16:08] and the FBI together, [1:16:09] this is the purpose of it, [1:16:11] to get after not just the terrorism threat, [1:16:13] but the violence and the criminal activity [1:16:15] in our cities. [1:16:16] And that's why we're in 59 cities across the country, [1:16:18] and it's working in places like Memphis [1:16:20] and every other city we have it. [1:16:22] Are you aware of the fact [1:16:24] that Homeland Security Investigation [1:16:26] is a major directorate [1:16:28] within Immigration and Customs Enforcement? [1:16:30] Yes, sir. Yes, sir. [1:16:33] And are you aware that Senate Democrats [1:16:36] have uniformly voted not to fund [1:16:39] the Department of Homeland Security, [1:16:42] including Homeland Security Investigations, [1:16:46] TSA, FEMA, [1:16:49] and other functions [1:16:50] of the Department of Homeland Security? [1:16:53] Senator, I'm aware that employees of DHS [1:16:55] are one month without pay. [1:16:57] They're not? [1:16:58] They're not being paid, right? [1:16:59] Yes, sir. [1:17:01] And we're all seeing [1:17:02] what's happening at airports [1:17:04] where people are having to wait hours at a time [1:17:07] because of the fact [1:17:09] that these TSA agents are overburdened. [1:17:12] But what I wanted to focus on with you [1:17:16] is the refusal to fund [1:17:19] the functions of the Department of Homeland Security, [1:17:22] including Homeland Security Investigations, [1:17:24] making Americans less safe? [1:17:27] Absolutely. [1:17:28] So give us an example [1:17:38] of some of the cooperation [1:17:40] that you all have engaged in with... [1:17:43] The FBI has engaged in [1:17:45] with the Homeland Security Investigations. [1:17:47] I'm looking at an article here [1:17:49] that talks about the 190,000 Afghan nationals [1:17:54] that were admitted to the United States [1:17:57] literally unvetted. [1:17:59] And there are examples of individuals [1:18:03] within that 190,000 [1:18:05] who committed terrorist attacks [1:18:08] against the United States [1:18:10] and against American citizens. [1:18:13] Is that the sort of thing [1:18:15] that you are investigating with HSI? [1:18:18] Senator, that's one of the many things [1:18:20] we're investigating with HSI, DHS, CBP, ICE. [1:18:23] Give me some other examples [1:18:24] of the collaboration [1:18:26] on what other topics, [1:18:27] including in addition to terrorism attacks. [1:18:31] What we're allowed to do [1:18:32] with our DHS partners, Senator, [1:18:34] is enable their massive workforce [1:18:36] to supplement ours. [1:18:37] And what they're allowed to do [1:18:38] is share intelligence [1:18:39] on things that you just talked about, [1:18:41] about the 100-plus thousand illegals [1:18:44] that came in from Afghanistan [1:18:46] during the Afghanistan withdrawal. [1:18:49] Unfortunately, they weren't vetted thoroughly. [1:18:51] So what we're doing [1:18:52] is going back with our DHS partners [1:18:54] and vetting absolutely every single one of them [1:18:56] to the best that we can. [1:18:57] But unfortunately, [1:18:58] we're not able to go out into the country [1:18:59] and find every single one of these individuals. [1:19:02] What we need more than [1:19:04] 12,000 FBI agents to do that job, [1:19:06] which is why we are utilizing [1:19:08] the 100,000 or so 1811s [1:19:11] at the Department of Homeland Security [1:19:13] to give us the information they have [1:19:14] from their immigration records, [1:19:16] from their travel records, [1:19:17] from their travel logs overseas [1:19:19] and within the country. [1:19:20] And what we're able to do [1:19:21] is remove these individuals [1:19:23] off the streets [1:19:24] in every single state across the country [1:19:25] to include violent gang members, [1:19:27] to include Trende Aragua, [1:19:29] to include ISIS-affiliated individuals, [1:19:31] to include al-Qaeda-related [1:19:32] affiliated individuals, [1:19:33] and hopefully we do it before [1:19:36] and not after like the tragedy [1:19:38] that we witnessed in Washington, D.C., [1:19:40] where an individual from Afghanistan [1:19:42] was allowed to enter into our country [1:19:44] and shot multiple members [1:19:45] of our uniformed military service. [1:19:47] Senator King. [1:19:49] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:19:50] I do need to point out in response [1:19:52] to some of the previous comments, [1:19:54] twice in the last two weeks, [1:19:55] as recently as last Thursday, [1:19:57] Senator Patty Murray, [1:19:59] the Appropriations Committee, [1:20:00] put a bill on the floor [1:20:01] that would have fully funded [1:20:03] TSA, FEMA, CISA, and the Coast Guard [1:20:06] for the rest of the year, [1:20:07] leaving the focus on the dispute [1:20:09] that we have with the conduct of ICE [1:20:13] as separately. [1:20:15] So inexplicably to me, [1:20:17] that bill was blocked [1:20:19] by my Republican colleagues. [1:20:21] It would have, as I say, [1:20:23] fully funded TSA, FEMA, CISA, Coast Guard, [1:20:26] and then focus the attention [1:20:28] on the situation with ICE. [1:20:31] So I just want to be clear [1:20:32] on who's blocking funding [1:20:34] for those four agencies. [1:20:40] I'd like to ask Ms. Gabbard [1:20:42] and Director Ratcliffe, [1:20:44] Director, both of you, [1:20:46] were either of you in the room [1:20:48] or your designees [1:20:49] when the President was making [1:20:51] the final decision about [1:20:53] taking this action against Iran [1:20:56] on February 27th, 28th, [1:20:58] was there an intelligence committee, [1:21:02] intelligence community present [1:21:04] in those deliberations? [1:21:06] Mr. Ratcliffe, your response. [1:21:11] Senator King, [1:21:12] probably in dozens and dozens [1:21:15] of briefings with the President, [1:21:18] I don't know if there was a single meeting [1:21:20] where there was a single time [1:21:21] where a decision was made. [1:21:23] Were those dozens of meetings [1:21:25] right during the lead up to this war? [1:21:30] I know you've met many times, [1:21:31] but I'm talking about it [1:21:32] in the two weeks or so [1:21:34] before the decision to go into Iran [1:21:35] was made. [1:21:36] Again, countless meetings [1:21:39] with the President. [1:21:41] During that period? [1:21:43] During that period. [1:21:44] Director Gabbard, [1:21:45] were you present in those discussions? [1:21:47] Likewise, yes. [1:21:50] The reason I'm asking the question [1:21:51] is there seems to be a discrepancy [1:21:52] between what the intelligence community [1:21:55] has reported over the years [1:21:57] and what the President has said [1:21:59] in terms of this action. [1:22:02] For example, Senator Wyden read [1:22:05] the report from a year ago [1:22:07] that strikes against neighboring states [1:22:10] and action to close the Strait of Hormuz [1:22:13] was predicted by the intelligence community, [1:22:15] and yet the President says nobody knew. [1:22:17] And my question is, did you tell him? [1:22:20] Anybody want to answer that question? [1:22:25] Senator, I'll answer the question. [1:22:28] So with regard to briefings, [1:22:32] the President gets briefings [1:22:35] constantly about intelligence. [1:22:37] Now, the comments that you talked about, [1:22:39] I had not heard, [1:22:40] but what I can tell you is [1:22:42] that Iran had specific plans [1:22:45] to hit U.S. interests [1:22:46] in energy sites across the region, [1:22:49] and that's why the Department of War [1:22:51] and the Department of State [1:22:52] took measures for force protection [1:22:54] and personnel protection [1:22:56] in advance of Operation Epic Fury. [1:22:59] I think that's what's most important. [1:23:01] Any predictions to the President [1:23:02] about the Strait of Hormuz? [1:23:04] All you got to do is look at a map, [1:23:06] and you'll see the vulnerability [1:23:08] of the Strait of Hormuz. [1:23:10] Was that part of the briefing, [1:23:11] Director Gabbard? [1:23:13] I think the Director Ratcliffe [1:23:16] made the point here is that [1:23:18] this has long been an assessment [1:23:20] of the I.C., [1:23:22] that Iran would likely hold [1:23:24] the Strait of Hormuz as leverage. [1:23:26] And my question is, [1:23:27] was that communicated to the President [1:23:28] in the lead-up to this action? [1:23:29] And it's because of that [1:23:30] long-standing assessment [1:23:32] that the I.C. has continued to report [1:23:34] that the Department of War [1:23:36] took the preemptive planning measures [1:23:38] that it did. [1:23:40] Well, they've stated that they did not plan [1:23:42] for the Strait of Hormuz. [1:23:44] The President said, [1:23:45] who knew that was going to happen? [1:23:47] Anyway, let's move on. [1:23:48] Does the President take a daily brief [1:23:51] from the intelligence community? [1:23:56] This is a yes or no question, I think. [1:23:58] Yeah, the President, [1:24:00] I would say, Senator, [1:24:01] in my estimation, on average, [1:24:03] I brief the President of the United States [1:24:05] on intelligence [1:24:08] probably on average [1:24:11] 10 to 15 times a week [1:24:13] where I have conversations with him [1:24:14] about specific discreet issues. [1:24:17] Sometimes there are dedicated sessions [1:24:20] that last hours in length. [1:24:22] Sometimes I'm briefing him on specific issues, [1:24:25] sometimes three or four times a day. [1:24:27] But I would say on average, [1:24:29] my interactions where I'm briefing the President [1:24:31] on important national security matters [1:24:33] happens probably on average [1:24:35] 10 to 15 times per week. [1:24:37] Thank you. [1:24:38] Could you update us on the intelligence [1:24:40] on Russian intelligence sharing [1:24:43] with Iran in the current conflict? [1:24:45] What do we know? [1:24:47] Senator, if there is that sharing going on, [1:24:51] that would be an answer [1:24:53] that would be appropriate [1:24:54] for a closed session. [1:24:56] Well, it's been in the public press. [1:24:58] This is open source that it's occurring. [1:25:01] Is it occurring? [1:25:04] Again, if it is occurring, [1:25:07] that would be an answer appropriate [1:25:09] for a closed session. [1:25:11] What I can tell you is that, [1:25:13] according to the Department of War, [1:25:17] any support that Iran makes [1:25:19] or may be receiving [1:25:21] is not inhibiting their operational effects. [1:25:26] Okay, that's sort of the first cousin of a yes, I guess. [1:25:31] According to intelligence analysis, [1:25:33] can regime change or the elimination [1:25:36] of the estimated 1,000 pounds [1:25:38] of highly enriched uranium [1:25:40] be accomplished without boots on the ground? [1:25:49] Senator, the discussion about [1:25:52] the Iranian nuclear capability, [1:25:54] we intend in the closed session [1:25:56] to talk about that in great deal. [1:25:58] With regards to revealing any information [1:26:01] about the ability to do that, [1:26:04] I would have to defer that to closed session. [1:26:07] Okay, I'll see you in an hour. [1:26:09] Finally, there was very little, [1:26:12] if anything, in the report, [1:26:14] in the assessment about climate change, [1:26:17] and that's been in past reports. [1:26:19] There is a lot of discussion about migration. [1:26:22] The estimates are that climate migrants, [1:26:26] because of the changes [1:26:28] in the climate and the atmosphere, [1:26:31] particularly in the center equatorial area of the Earth, [1:26:34] will range from 200 million [1:26:36] to a billion people by 2050. [1:26:39] Do you believe that is a national security threat [1:26:42] that should be addressed? [1:26:44] The Syrian refugees were about 6 million, [1:26:47] and they upset the politics of Europe [1:26:49] for several years. [1:26:51] We're talking about 200 million [1:26:53] to a billion people on the move. [1:26:55] I believe that's something we should be discussing, [1:26:57] and that the intelligence community should be assessing. [1:27:01] Director Gabbard? [1:27:03] Yes, Senator. [1:27:04] There are a number of drivers of things like migration. [1:27:08] It would be an extensive and voluminous [1:27:11] annual threat assessment [1:27:12] if we included every single one. [1:27:14] This annual threat assessment is focused, again, [1:27:16] on the priorities laid out [1:27:19] by the president's national security strategy [1:27:21] and on the effects that we can take action, [1:27:26] operational action, [1:27:28] to protect U.S. interests. [1:27:30] Well, I would suggest combating climate change [1:27:32] is something we can take action on. [1:27:34] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:27:36] On the matter of media reports [1:27:39] about Russian or Chinese collaboration with Iran, [1:27:43] I would point out that the media [1:27:45] is not a classification authority, [1:27:48] and that kind of story, [1:27:51] whether true or not, [1:27:52] might be better suited for the FBI to investigate [1:27:55] on whether there's been unlawful disclosures [1:27:59] of classified information. [1:28:00] I would also say, [1:28:01] it sounds like something Russia and China would do. [1:28:04] Communist Russia used to do it during the Cold War, [1:28:06] and Communist China has always done stuff like that. [1:28:08] On the Patty Murray legislation, [1:28:10] not only would it have defunded ICE and CBP, [1:28:13] it would have also defunded [1:28:14] Homeland Security Investigations, [1:28:16] which do critical work on our streets [1:28:17] to protect our communities [1:28:19] from financial crimes, from predators, [1:28:21] from transnational gangs as well. [1:28:23] So while we would all like to see [1:28:25] the TSA and the Coast Guard [1:28:27] and other critical parts of Homeland Security as well, [1:28:29] we do not want to defund the police. [1:28:31] This time, the immigration police. [1:28:33] Senator Moran. [1:28:34] Chairman, thank you. [1:28:35] I believe that it's in the U.S.'s national interest, [1:28:40] our security interest, [1:28:42] for Ukraine to be successful [1:28:44] in defeating the Russian invasion. [1:28:46] I'm concerned with the consequences [1:28:49] of Operation Epic Fury [1:28:51] on that ability of Ukraine [1:28:53] to succeed in defending its borders. [1:28:55] And General Adams, [1:28:58] in broad terms, [1:29:00] not necessarily classified terms, [1:29:02] what are the consequences [1:29:04] to the supply chain, [1:29:06] to the capability of the United States [1:29:08] to supply NATO allies [1:29:10] and Ukraine [1:29:13] as a result of [1:29:16] Operation Epic Fury? [1:29:18] My question is [1:29:20] that usual problem of how do we do both? [1:29:22] Are we doing both? [1:29:24] Is U.S. support maintained or diminished [1:29:26] for Ukraine [1:29:28] as a result of Epic Fury? [1:29:30] Senator, thank you for that question. [1:29:33] And we do [1:29:35] continue to, [1:29:38] beyond Epic Fury, [1:29:40] observe what is happening [1:29:42] across the world [1:29:44] in crises like [1:29:46] Russia and Ukraine. [1:29:48] Unfortunately for [1:29:50] the situation there now, [1:29:52] just based on the force composition [1:29:54] and the delta between [1:29:56] the Russian forces [1:29:58] and the Ukrainian forces, [1:30:00] the advantage is to the Russians. [1:30:02] As we get into [1:30:04] the classified hearing, [1:30:06] more specifically about [1:30:08] the items with regards to [1:30:10] supply chain and [1:30:12] with regards to [1:30:14] the information that the [1:30:16] Defense Intelligence Agency collects, [1:30:18] we look at the foreign threat [1:30:20] and what their capabilities are [1:30:22] from a multi-int [1:30:24] perspective. [1:30:26] We look a little bit less at [1:30:28] friendly capabilities. [1:30:30] And I would defer questions with regards to [1:30:32] U.S. supply chain [1:30:34] limitations with regards to [1:30:36] U.S. logistics and the effort [1:30:38] that the Secretary of War is having [1:30:40] with regards to trying to boost [1:30:42] the U.S. defense industrial base. [1:30:44] I would defer those to [1:30:46] the Department to discuss. [1:30:48] Well, General, please be prepared [1:30:50] for the classified session for me [1:30:52] to continue to pursue this. [1:30:54] Our supply chain issues are not [1:30:57] classified in the sense that [1:30:59] every hearing I'm in as a defense appropriator [1:31:01] has officials from the [1:31:03] Department of Defense testifying [1:31:05] about the need for further assistance. [1:31:07] So, really, I'm asking for the [1:31:09] facts of what [1:31:11] has happened as a result of [1:31:13] Operation Fury, Epic Fury, [1:31:15] in the last few weeks [1:31:17] in our supply [1:31:19] to Ukraine and our NATO allies [1:31:21] who are supplying Ukraine. [1:31:23] Yes, sir. [1:31:26] The Department is executing [1:31:28] a comprehensive, in fact, [1:31:30] the second war has gone around [1:31:32] the nation to boost the defense [1:31:34] industrial base. We know for a fact [1:31:37] that we have to increase [1:31:39] our defense industrial base capability. [1:31:41] Its impact [1:31:43] based on the munitions [1:31:45] expended during Epic Fury [1:31:47] will be an impact. [1:31:49] But we need to boost it. [1:31:51] The efforts are underway to boost it. [1:31:53] Well, [1:31:56] I'm interested in helping accomplish [1:31:58] that goal. Director Ratcliffe, [1:32:00] perhaps along the same [1:32:02] line, I assume [1:32:05] among, let me first of all compliment you [1:32:07] on your public service. I appreciate [1:32:09] you. And that's not my [1:32:11] usual town hall meeting when I get a compliment [1:32:13] from somebody who then follows it with a but. [1:32:15] I am [1:32:17] interested in being of help and I [1:32:19] in regard to your [1:32:22] conversations in preparation [1:32:24] for Epic Fury, I'd be [1:32:26] interested in knowing if the [1:32:28] consequences to our abilities to [1:32:30] defend the United States [1:32:32] against Russia or China or other [1:32:34] adversaries was taken into [1:32:37] account. How is that diminished [1:32:39] or increased by Operation [1:32:41] Epic Fury and [1:32:43] particularly in this instance about what it [1:32:45] means, was the conversation had [1:32:47] about what it means to our [1:32:49] ability to help Ukraine defend [1:32:51] itself. [1:32:54] U.S. support for Ukraine [1:32:56] includes [1:32:58] military and other [1:33:00] assistance, but also we've [1:33:03] undertaken economic sanctions against [1:33:05] Russia for their invasion [1:33:07] of Ukraine. And Epic Fury [1:33:10] has caused a significant increase [1:33:12] in oil prices and the [1:33:14] administration has waived sanctions [1:33:16] against Russian oil companies, [1:33:18] which have reported [1:33:21] to say that Russia [1:33:23] is receiving $150 million [1:33:25] per day, additional [1:33:27] dollars as a result of the [1:33:29] waiver. What can you tell me [1:33:32] about our [1:33:34] plans or [1:33:36] your understanding of what's [1:33:39] transpiring as a result of [1:33:41] Operation Epic Fury in regard [1:33:43] to those oil revenues [1:33:45] that are now being generated in favor of Russia [1:33:47] and the lifting of the sanctions [1:33:49] at least for a temporary period of time? [1:33:51] Senator, thanks for the [1:33:54] compliment, I think. [1:33:56] I'll [1:33:58] start with a couple things. What I would [1:34:00] tell you is [1:34:03] the same military and intelligence [1:34:05] professionals who delivered [1:34:07] not just for the administration [1:34:09] but for the American people [1:34:11] a flawless [1:34:13] intelligence picture and flawless military [1:34:15] operations in Operation [1:34:17] Midnight Hammer and Operation [1:34:19] Absolute Resolve are the same [1:34:21] folks involved with Operation [1:34:23] Epic Fury. [1:34:25] And so I hope that provides you some [1:34:27] measure of comfort with regard [1:34:29] to how detailed, how [1:34:31] thoughtful the approach [1:34:33] was to the [1:34:35] current operation. [1:34:37] And that's why I think that [1:34:39] to mischaracterize it as [1:34:41] it is being done in the media is [1:34:43] a disservice to the folks involved [1:34:45] in what is [1:34:47] a very specific campaign [1:34:49] that is different than the two that I [1:34:51] mentioned before. It's why the President [1:34:53] came out and said, this isn't over in a matter of [1:34:55] hours, this is a four to six week [1:34:57] campaign, and that it [1:34:59] would come at some cost [1:35:01] because the [1:35:03] goal of the President [1:35:05] and the administration is [1:35:07] to address a 47-year [1:35:09] problem, the most destabilizing [1:35:11] force in the Middle East for the last [1:35:13] 47 years, one that has frankly [1:35:15] been [1:35:17] watered, fed, and nurtured [1:35:19] by policies [1:35:21] of prior administrations that has [1:35:23] allowed them to become the threat that they [1:35:25] have. So I say all of that sort of in [1:35:27] context to understanding [1:35:29] that we have to address that, but [1:35:31] at the same time, to your point on [1:35:33] what's going on with regard to Russia [1:35:35] and Ukraine, and [1:35:37] you mentioned the oil issue. [1:35:39] Sometimes policymakers [1:35:41] have to [1:35:43] take steps that while they may benefit [1:35:45] adversaries like Russia or China, [1:35:47] do so [1:35:49] because they also think it will benefit [1:35:51] U.S. citizens, in this [1:35:53] case with respect to keeping [1:35:55] the economy on track [1:35:57] and keeping oil prices low. [1:35:59] So what I can tell you is [1:36:01] the intelligence is thoughtfully considered [1:36:03] and I think the policymakers [1:36:05] have taken that [1:36:07] and I am confident [1:36:09] that we can walk and chew gum at the same [1:36:11] time, pursue [1:36:13] objectives in the Middle East, and [1:36:15] provide support [1:36:17] with regard to the conflict in [1:36:19] Russia and the Russian [1:36:21] aggression in Ukraine. [1:36:24] Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:36:27] I appreciate that. [1:36:29] Director Ratcliffe, you just [1:36:31] described the specific [1:36:34] campaign that the President is engaged [1:36:36] in, the country is engaged in, [1:36:38] with respect to Iran. [1:36:40] I think the campaign has been [1:36:42] won, in my view, without [1:36:44] a specific rationale for the [1:36:46] American people. Nineteen [1:36:48] days into President Trump's [1:36:50] unauthorized war with Iran, [1:36:52] and by which I mean there has [1:36:55] been no congressional approval, [1:36:57] at least thirteen American service [1:36:59] members are dead, and many others [1:37:01] are injured. President Trump [1:37:03] has offered no credible justification [1:37:05] for [1:37:07] an imminent threat, [1:37:09] no clear goals, no strategy [1:37:11] or timeline. His message [1:37:13] keeps changing, I think, in [1:37:15] really damaging ways. President Trump [1:37:17] said Iran's nuclear facilities [1:37:19] had been, quote, totally [1:37:21] obliterated in June [1:37:23] 2025, but when he [1:37:25] launched this latest war, he said [1:37:27] we need to eliminate the imminent [1:37:29] nuclear threat of those [1:37:31] totally obliterated [1:37:33] nuclear facilities. [1:37:36] President Trump has threatened to seize [1:37:38] Iranian oil and demanded our [1:37:40] allies reopen the Strait of [1:37:42] Hormuz. He said that, I'm [1:37:44] demanding that these countries come in and [1:37:46] protect their own territory [1:37:48] because it's their territory. [1:37:50] It's the place from which they get [1:37:52] their energy. By the way, he wasn't just asking [1:37:54] for our allies to protect or to [1:37:56] bail them out in the [1:37:58] Straits of Hormuz. He was asking [1:38:00] China to bail them out [1:38:02] in the Straits of Hormuz. And then [1:38:04] he said maybe we shouldn't even be here [1:38:06] at all because we don't need it. We have [1:38:08] a lot of oil. And [1:38:10] he said we do not need the help [1:38:12] of anyone. President Trump [1:38:14] has declared we've won the war. [1:38:16] We won it in the first hour. [1:38:18] But then he said we're not leaving [1:38:21] until the job is finished. [1:38:23] He said that there is practically [1:38:25] nothing left to bomb. [1:38:27] But then threatened to bomb Iran [1:38:29] again, quote, just for [1:38:31] fun. I think words that probably [1:38:33] have never come out of a military [1:38:35] leader in the history of the [1:38:37] United States of America. [1:38:39] It shouldn't come out of the mouth [1:38:41] of a civilian leader. President [1:38:43] Trump said he will end the war when [1:38:45] I feel it. Feel it in my bones. [1:38:48] And any time I want [1:38:50] to end it, it will end. But [1:38:53] Director, the war is not ending. [1:38:55] It is escalating with thousands of [1:38:57] U.S. Marines reportedly [1:38:59] sailing toward Iran [1:39:01] on an unclear mission, a mission [1:39:04] that's become less clear over [1:39:06] days, not more clear. Our [1:39:08] airstrikes wiped out Iran's [1:39:10] missiles and supreme leader. [1:39:12] Nobody here, and certainly [1:39:14] me, is shedding a tear [1:39:16] for him. But the Iranian [1:39:19] people now live under martial law. [1:39:21] And by the way, no [1:39:23] surprise to our intelligence agencies [1:39:25] that that's the case. [1:39:27] And the first [1:39:29] of a puppet leader who's [1:39:31] chosen by the IRGC. [1:39:33] No surprise to anybody [1:39:35] on the Intelligence Committee. [1:39:37] Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz [1:39:39] and is holding the global [1:39:41] economy hostage. No [1:39:43] surprise to anybody who knows anything [1:39:45] about U.S. intelligence. [1:39:47] Launching drones [1:39:49] at our embassies and military bases. [1:39:51] No surprise. The President [1:39:53] is surprised. Nobody who has [1:39:55] looked at our intelligence is [1:39:57] surprised. Iran's nuclear [1:40:00] program is damaged. To be sure, [1:40:02] but it still has a uranium [1:40:05] stockpile. We heard today [1:40:07] from the DNI at the very [1:40:09] beginning of this conversation that [1:40:11] the regime is in place and they are [1:40:13] going to rebuild their [1:40:15] military capabilities, the ones that [1:40:17] we are destroying right now. [1:40:19] The question I think is raised, [1:40:21] Director, about your specific engagement [1:40:23] is whether it will become a [1:40:25] perpetual war because [1:40:27] what Iran will do is exactly [1:40:29] what they have always done. [1:40:32] And which the DNI is saying they will do [1:40:34] again. In its briefings to the committee, [1:40:37] the Intelligence Committee has been [1:40:39] clear-eyed about what would happen [1:40:41] in the Straits of Hormuz. [1:40:43] Has been clear-eyed about [1:40:45] whether or not our military [1:40:47] bases, our embassies, [1:40:49] and our personnel [1:40:51] in the region would be placed [1:40:53] at risk and in harm's way [1:40:55] even though the administration did [1:40:57] very little to protect them. [1:40:59] I know, Director Radcliffe, [1:41:03] that [1:41:05] you warned President Trump [1:41:07] that if Israel [1:41:09] assassinated the Supreme Leader, [1:41:11] the RRGC would replace [1:41:13] him with potentially [1:41:15] a harder-line puppet. [1:41:17] In fact, I think what was clear [1:41:19] is that the likelihood was [1:41:21] that it would be a hard-line puppet. [1:41:23] Do you disagree with that characterization [1:41:25] of the intelligence? [1:41:28] To that specific question, [1:41:30] what we knew was [1:41:32] first of all, I guess I have to address [1:41:34] up front [1:41:36] so much of what you related [1:41:38] in there, the difference between [1:41:40] political rhetoric versus... [1:41:42] Not political rhetoric, I'm quoting [1:41:44] the President of the United States. [1:41:46] Political rhetoric versus military... [1:41:48] Director, I'll ask you a question. [1:41:50] The difference between that and military [1:41:52] and intelligence execution, [1:41:54] but here's the most important thing. [1:41:56] You mischaracterize this as saying [1:41:58] there aren't clearly defined goals. [1:42:00] The defined goals are very clear. [1:42:02] Degrade and destroy the missile inventory [1:42:04] and drone inventory, delay and degrade [1:42:06] the military industrial base, [1:42:08] the factories that produce that, [1:42:10] degrade and destroy the IRGC Navy [1:42:12] that could control the strain. [1:42:14] These are all defined goals [1:42:16] that were set out specifically. [1:42:18] The premise of the question is that... [1:42:20] May I have my time back, Mr. Chairman? [1:42:22] I can't get a word in edgewise. [1:42:24] He won't answer the question [1:42:26] and then he's taking a minute of my time. [1:42:28] You're both big boys. [1:42:30] You can handle it yourself. [1:42:32] Okay, well, Director, I agree that you are [1:42:34] and I appreciate what you're saying. [1:42:36] And I would... [1:42:40] My point is not what your characterization [1:42:42] of the war is. [1:42:44] My point is what the character... [1:42:46] Your question about regime change? [1:42:48] I'm not asking you anymore, Mr. Director. [1:42:50] I'm sorry because I'm out of time [1:42:52] because of how you use the time. [1:42:54] The complete lack of clarity [1:42:56] should matter to everybody. [1:42:58] President Trump, most of all, [1:43:00] he is the person that got elected [1:43:02] on the criticism [1:43:04] that we had fought [1:43:06] two wars in the Middle East [1:43:08] that had lasted for 20 years. [1:43:10] And now we're hearing the testimonies [1:43:12] to get their ballistic missiles [1:43:14] to not even get [1:43:16] to the nuclear stuff. [1:43:18] We're going to have to be in a perpetual war [1:43:20] with Iran. [1:43:22] And I don't think that's where the American people [1:43:24] are on this. [1:43:26] This is a serious threat. [1:43:28] This is a serious threat [1:43:31] to us and to Israel. [1:43:33] The question is how to handle it. [1:43:35] And President Trump said [1:43:37] we are not the policemen of the world. [1:43:39] And now he's turned us [1:43:41] into the world's policemen, [1:43:43] into its jury, [1:43:45] into its judge, [1:43:47] into its executioner. [1:43:49] And just because we have [1:43:51] the most advanced military in the world, [1:43:53] it doesn't mean [1:43:55] that we should be in a perpetual war [1:43:57] all around the world. [1:43:59] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:44:01] Senator Rounds. [1:44:03] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:44:05] I'd like to maybe follow up [1:44:07] a little bit this same line of questioning, [1:44:09] or I've had the opportunity, [1:44:11] like all of the other members [1:44:13] on this committee, [1:44:15] to see the threats [1:44:18] that we discuss regularly [1:44:20] in the classified settings. [1:44:22] I also, sitting on the Armed Services Committee, [1:44:24] have the opportunity to see [1:44:26] what our capabilities are [1:44:28] and what we have to do [1:44:30] in order to respond to those threats. [1:44:32] Director Ratcliffe, [1:44:34] let me just begin. [1:44:36] I think it's been very clear [1:44:38] from the beginning that even though [1:44:40] there were so many diplomatic activities [1:44:42] going on, [1:44:45] behind the scenes it was very clear, [1:44:47] and I just ask if you would disagree [1:44:49] or agree with me on this, [1:44:51] it was very clear that Iran, [1:44:53] while they were talking, [1:44:55] they had no intentions [1:44:57] of following through diplomatically [1:44:59] with eliminating any of their nuclear aspirations. [1:45:01] Correct? [1:45:03] Senator, that's correct. [1:45:05] And in the classified session [1:45:07] we can go into detail, [1:45:09] but you've characterized it right. [1:45:11] Quite the contrary. [1:45:13] Okay. Second of all, [1:45:15] with regard to the capabilities [1:45:17] earlier in the 12-day war, [1:45:19] a lot of their defensive capabilities [1:45:21] had been taken out. [1:45:23] Their air defenses had been taken out. [1:45:25] The use of our aircraft [1:45:27] in that area was safer [1:45:29] because those defensive capabilities, [1:45:31] most of them had been significantly reduced, [1:45:33] meaning our young men and women [1:45:35] who are flying those aircraft [1:45:37] were safer. [1:45:39] Is it fair to say that they were [1:45:41] building their defensive capabilities [1:45:43] as well at that time? [1:45:45] Yes. [1:45:48] I'll just comment on that. [1:45:50] So much is being made. [1:45:52] Any characterization that Operation Midnight Hammer [1:45:54] was anything but a wild success [1:45:56] is wildly inaccurate. [1:46:02] As a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, [1:46:05] at the time of that, [1:46:07] in the preceding four years [1:46:09] as is well documented [1:46:11] and admitted to by the Iranians, [1:46:13] they enriched uranium [1:46:15] at least 440 kilograms [1:46:17] at 60 percent [1:46:19] for use that could be used [1:46:21] for weapons grade [1:46:23] to deliver a nuclear weapon. [1:46:25] As a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, [1:46:27] we sit here today [1:46:29] with Iran having exactly [1:46:31] the same amount [1:46:33] of enriched uranium [1:46:35] to 60 percent, [1:46:37] meaning they have been unwilling [1:46:39] and incapable of enriching uranium [1:46:41] to 60 percent [1:46:43] as a result of Operation Midnight Hammer. [1:46:45] Okay, let me go on [1:46:47] because I think this is an important part of this. [1:46:49] You also have to have a way [1:46:51] of delivering a weapon. [1:46:53] It's fair to say that they have [1:46:55] short-term and intermediate range [1:46:57] ballistic missile availability today. [1:46:59] Were they building additional [1:47:01] short-range and [1:47:03] mid-range [1:47:05] ballistic missiles? [1:47:08] Yes. [1:47:10] Were they continuing to develop them? [1:47:12] Continuing to develop them [1:47:14] is alarming. [1:47:16] And what about our ability [1:47:18] to respond to those? [1:47:20] We have very good defensive capabilities, [1:47:22] but it takes time for us to build [1:47:24] our defensive capabilities. [1:47:26] Were they building their offensive capabilities [1:47:28] while they were negotiating with us [1:47:30] at a faster rate than we could build [1:47:32] defensive capabilities? [1:47:35] Yes. [1:47:37] Were they continuing to work at [1:47:39] and deliver additional resources [1:47:41] to terrorist organizations [1:47:43] that were affiliated with them in the region? [1:47:46] While they were supposedly [1:47:48] diplomatically working with us [1:47:51] during that entire time, [1:47:53] they were continuing with regard [1:47:55] to their nuclear intentions. [1:47:57] They were building additional [1:47:59] missile systems to deliver [1:48:01] or conventional weapon systems [1:48:04] to threaten their neighbors. [1:48:06] Their defensive capabilities [1:48:08] were going to be increased, [1:48:10] making our young men and women at risk [1:48:12] when at some point in the future [1:48:14] we would have to basically go in [1:48:16] and clean the mess up. [1:48:18] And I think the president [1:48:20] made the right choice [1:48:22] when he decided at this time [1:48:24] that simply for our advantage [1:48:26] and for the young men and women [1:48:28] that have to go in and do this, [1:48:30] that this was a safer time, [1:48:32] if there ever is such a thing [1:48:34] as a safer time, [1:48:36] but the right time for our nation [1:48:39] to respond to this threat. [1:48:41] Is that an appropriate way of putting it, sir? [1:48:43] I agree with that. [1:48:45] Thank you. [1:48:47] I think the president made the right choice. [1:48:49] He made the right choice [1:48:51] for protecting those young men and women [1:48:54] who are in harm's way. [1:48:56] Let me move on for just a minute. [1:48:58] Director Ratcliffe, let me just ask you this [1:49:00] because there's been a discussion [1:49:02] and we've never been able to talk about this [1:49:04] in an unclassified setting [1:49:06] and I recognize it's sensitive, [1:49:08] but 60 Minutes, there's been a report [1:49:10] about Havana Syndrome [1:49:12] and about individuals [1:49:14] who are within the agency [1:49:16] and within state departments [1:49:18] that have actually had significant illnesses, [1:49:20] and we've been able to [1:49:22] look at those sources. [1:49:26] I don't think we have been able to [1:49:28] in an unclassified setting [1:49:30] at least acknowledge [1:49:32] that we take these issues seriously. [1:49:34] Is there anything you can share [1:49:36] in this unclassified setting [1:49:38] to assure the people of the State Department [1:49:40] and your agency [1:49:42] that this is not something which is being ignored? [1:49:44] Thanks for the question. [1:49:46] I can. [1:49:48] I appreciate the opportunity to address that. [1:49:50] Yes, we have to be careful about [1:49:52] the detail in the classified session, [1:49:54] but this is something that [1:49:56] when I became the Director, [1:49:58] as you're aware, Senator, [1:50:00] there are disparate opinions [1:50:02] across the IC [1:50:04] about what the cause of these AHIs [1:50:06] may or may not be. [1:50:08] Otherwise known as Havana Syndrome. [1:50:10] Havana Syndrome, yeah. [1:50:12] And the question of whether or not [1:50:14] they could be the result of [1:50:16] a directed energy weapon [1:50:18] from a foreign adversary. [1:50:20] So when you, having been the Director [1:50:22] of the DNI, [1:50:24] understanding the role of the DNI [1:50:26] is to coordinate across the IC [1:50:28] when there are disparate opinions [1:50:30] among agencies, [1:50:32] Director Gabbard and I had a conversation [1:50:34] where she agreed [1:50:36] that she would undertake [1:50:38] a comprehensive review [1:50:40] of that issue across the IC [1:50:42] to make sure that it is getting the attention [1:50:44] that it deserves. [1:50:46] And I know that she has undertaken that [1:50:48] and will be able to brief you [1:50:50] in further detail in the classified session. [1:50:52] Mr. Hartman, [1:50:54] your time in service [1:50:56] has been very, very special. [1:50:58] Working with you on the Cyber Security Subcommittee [1:51:00] of the Armed Services Committee, [1:51:02] I commend you for everything you have done. [1:51:04] You are truly a hero [1:51:06] and you have served your country [1:51:08] very, very well. [1:51:10] Thank you for your service. [1:51:13] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:51:15] Senator Kelly. [1:51:17] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, [1:51:19] and thank you for being here today [1:51:21] to all of our witnesses. [1:51:23] The United States [1:51:25] has tried to make a pivot to Asia [1:51:28] in its national defense strategy [1:51:30] in order to confront [1:51:32] significant threats from China. [1:51:34] For years, administrations [1:51:36] of both parties have identified China [1:51:38] as the top threat facing our country [1:51:40] and worked to build relationships [1:51:42] across Asia [1:51:44] and deter Chinese aggression. [1:51:47] At the same time, [1:51:49] we have bolstered our European allies [1:51:51] and asked them to contribute more [1:51:53] to their defense to deter Russia. [1:51:56] President Ratcliffe, [1:51:58] would you agree that China and Russia [1:52:00] are our primary geopolitical rivals? [1:52:02] Director Gabbard. [1:52:04] Yes, they are our primary strategic competitors. [1:52:08] Thank you. [1:52:10] Director Ratcliffe. [1:52:12] I would agree with that, [1:52:14] although I don't think they're equal [1:52:16] in terms of the threats that they pose. [1:52:19] Understand. Thank you. [1:52:21] So that brings us to the war with Iran. [1:52:23] So this has created [1:52:25] one of the largest ever supply shocks [1:52:27] to the global oil supply, [1:52:29] for Americans. [1:52:31] But not everybody is losing. [1:52:34] Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, [1:52:36] is it accurate that Russia has gained [1:52:38] billions of dollars in additional oil revenue [1:52:40] due to price spikes [1:52:42] as a result of the war [1:52:44] and loosened sanctions? [1:52:47] Director Gabbard. [1:52:52] That is what has been reported. [1:52:54] I defer to the Secretary of Treasury [1:52:56] and Energy on that front for details. [1:52:58] Director Ratcliffe. [1:53:00] I'm not an economist. [1:53:02] I'm not going to try and do those calculations. [1:53:04] But as I talked about earlier, [1:53:06] sometimes there are decisions made [1:53:08] that will benefit adversaries at the same time [1:53:10] policymakers think that it will benefit the American people. [1:53:12] It's clear, I think we'd all agree [1:53:14] that sanctions were loosened [1:53:16] and that means more [1:53:18] money into the coffers [1:53:20] of Vladimir Putin. [1:53:23] Would you agree that if he has more funding, [1:53:25] he is likely to put [1:53:27] that to his war effort against Ukraine? [1:53:29] Director Gabbard. [1:53:31] I would defer to [1:53:34] an actual intelligence assessment [1:53:36] of what they would believe his intentions are. [1:53:40] Director Ratcliffe. [1:53:43] I wouldn't speculate on that. [1:53:45] And is it accurate that China [1:53:47] is continuing to receive preferential [1:53:49] oil flows from Iran despite the conflict [1:53:51] as Iran allows its own tankers [1:53:53] to transit the strait? [1:53:55] Director Gabbard. [1:54:00] I'm going to go back and forth between the two of you. [1:54:04] There has been some reporting of [1:54:06] China, India, [1:54:08] and other countries being able to [1:54:10] move their tankers through the strait. [1:54:12] However, it is [1:54:14] unclear the volume [1:54:16] or the measure of that. [1:54:18] Okay, so it sounds like it's accurate. [1:54:20] Thank you. I'm going to move on. [1:54:22] Director Gabbard, you tweeted yesterday [1:54:24] that President Trump concluded [1:54:26] there was an imminent threat [1:54:28] and made a decision to attack Iran [1:54:30] after carefully reviewing [1:54:32] all of the information before him. [1:54:34] I think the country deserves to know [1:54:36] what the information was. [1:54:38] I'm going to ask a series of questions [1:54:40] and just want a yes or no. [1:54:42] We don't need any explanation. [1:54:44] Starting with, [1:54:47] were you asked, [1:54:49] I'm not asking if you did brief this, [1:54:51] were you asked to brief [1:54:53] on whether Iran would close [1:54:55] the Strait of Hormuz? [1:54:59] I'm not going to comment on what the President [1:55:01] did or didn't ask me on any topic. [1:55:04] I'm not asking if you briefed it. [1:55:06] I'm just asking if there was a request [1:55:08] by the White House. [1:55:10] Director Ratcliffe, were you asked to brief [1:55:13] on whether Iran would close [1:55:15] the Strait of Hormuz? [1:55:18] The briefings to the [1:55:20] President and the White House [1:55:22] typically don't come at the request of the White House. [1:55:24] So typically when we get intelligence [1:55:26] that we want the President to be aware of, [1:55:28] the intelligence community brings that to the President. [1:55:30] Did you produce the analysis [1:55:32] for the Straits of Hormuz? [1:55:34] There has been and continues to be analysis [1:55:36] with respect to that. [1:55:38] Were you asked to brief on how [1:55:40] our adversaries and allies would respond [1:55:42] to the war in Iran? [1:55:47] I imagine I'll get the same answer. [1:55:50] So it's, [1:55:52] just to point out here, it's challenging to, [1:55:54] think about actually what was in the brief for a second. [1:55:56] We're having a hard time finding out [1:55:58] not only if you briefed the President [1:56:00] on something, but even if the [1:56:02] White House asked [1:56:04] if they could be briefed on something [1:56:08] or if analysis was produced. [1:56:10] So I just want to point out here, [1:56:12] this is about six days. [1:56:14] Can I comment on that? [1:56:16] I'll go back to the point. [1:56:18] It's the same approach that we took to the [1:56:20] prior operations, which [1:56:22] to your credit, Senator, you have [1:56:24] praised the intelligence [1:56:26] and military communities in [1:56:28] Operation Midnight Hammer [1:56:30] and Operation Absolute Resolve. [1:56:32] It's the same approach and the same [1:56:34] professionals in terms of how they approached [1:56:36] this particular operation. [1:56:38] We're trying to figure out if the President knew [1:56:40] what the downside was [1:56:42] of the Strait of Hormuz being closed. [1:56:44] And I'm having [1:56:46] a hard time finding out whether the White House [1:56:48] asked or whether there was a brief, [1:56:50] whether the President knew. [1:56:52] Did he know this was going to happen [1:56:54] or did he just disregard it? [1:56:56] And I just want to point out something that was [1:56:58] released about six days ago. [1:57:00] This is a fundraising email [1:57:03] from the President, from the President [1:57:06] of the United States. And in this email here [1:57:08] where there's multiple links to donate [1:57:10] money, it says [1:57:13] as a national security briefing [1:57:15] member, you'll receive [1:57:17] my private national [1:57:20] security briefings. [1:57:24] Director Gabbard or Director Radcliffe, [1:57:26] do you think the public should [1:57:28] be able to, supporters of the [1:57:30] President should be able to pay? [1:57:32] And receive his private national [1:57:34] security briefings? I assume [1:57:36] these are briefings, Director Radcliffe, [1:57:38] that you provide to the President [1:57:40] that is now going to be provided to [1:57:42] somebody who makes a donation. [1:57:44] Regardless of what that, I don't know what that document [1:57:46] is, but regardless of what [1:57:48] it says, it didn't happen. [1:57:50] Well, no, this is new. [1:57:52] But what I'm telling you is that [1:57:54] the Hatch Act would prevent me [1:57:56] in an apolitical role from engaging [1:57:58] in that. I'm not aware that anything like that [1:58:00] happened. Yeah, this says unfiltered [1:58:02] updates. So, [1:58:05] Director Gabbard, do you have any comment on [1:58:07] whether unfiltered updates [1:58:09] of private national security briefings [1:58:11] should be made to individuals [1:58:13] that donate to the President? [1:58:15] I'm not familiar with [1:58:17] that document and [1:58:19] It's been made very public [1:58:21] six days ago. [1:58:24] We'll get you a copy here because [1:58:26] I agree with you, Director Radcliffe, [1:58:28] that the Hatch Act [1:58:30] should prohibit this type of [1:58:32] conduct. Thank you. [1:58:34] Thank you, [1:58:36] Director Gabbard. [1:58:38] Joins us from what I gather is a very exciting [1:58:40] confirmation hearing for Senator Mullen. [1:58:42] It is actually. For all of you, thank you. [1:58:44] Thank you for the time that you give to the country [1:58:46] to be able to serve for your families and the [1:58:48] sacrifice that you make to be able to do this [1:58:50] and all the professionals that work around you. [1:58:52] Please pass on our gratitude to them because [1:58:54] they work incredibly hard and difficult tasks in this. [1:58:56] I want to talk about something that's a little [1:58:58] closer to home on this. [1:59:00] A lot of Oklahomans I've talked to, [1:59:02] and quite frankly, folks even outside the state on it, [1:59:04] as strange as this may sound to those of us [1:59:06] that deal with missiles and [1:59:08] ballistics, they think about [1:59:10] the threat to their family and to their [1:59:12] income and to who they are. [1:59:14] And a lot of it is international scammers [1:59:16] that are now reaching [1:59:18] into the United States to be able to gather [1:59:20] data or to be able to steal money [1:59:22] from them. AI has [1:59:24] accelerated this dramatically, and I know [1:59:26] the worldwide threats has mentioned this [1:59:28] and some of the challenges that we face on it. [1:59:30] But the challenge is getting bigger. [1:59:32] FBI had noted that in [1:59:34] 2024, it was [1:59:36] almost $17 billion that was [1:59:38] assumed lost to scammers, [1:59:40] a lot of those internationals. Some estimates [1:59:42] are as high as $50 billion on it. [1:59:44] AI continues [1:59:46] to be able to accelerate the capabilities on it. [1:59:48] OpenAI even noted [1:59:50] now that there is a [1:59:52] they're putting online ads saying [1:59:54] if you've been scammed, here's [1:59:56] a way to recover your money, and [1:59:58] that is actually a scam. [2:00:00] It's taking them to a fake [2:00:02] FBI page where they can [2:00:04] then turn in and to say, [2:00:06] if you've been scammed, here's how the FBI [2:00:08] is going to actually come help you to [2:00:10] recover it, but even that page is fake, [2:00:12] and they're going to be able to steal their information. [2:00:14] This is accelerating at a pace [2:00:16] that's pretty dramatic with the use [2:00:18] of AI on this. Director Patel, [2:00:21] I know that you guys are on it. [2:00:23] I know that there's multiple entities on it, [2:00:25] but this is a big challenge, and a lot of Americans [2:00:27] are very, very concerned about the threats [2:00:29] to their families. They may have [2:00:31] their parents that are more [2:00:33] vulnerable at this time and being targeted. [2:00:35] How do we take some of this on [2:00:37] to be able to confront what's happening [2:00:39] online to be able to attack people [2:00:41] and to be able to scam them? Thank you, Senator, [2:00:43] and it's with any other high [2:00:45] priority operation [2:00:47] that the FBI runs, whether it's CICT [2:00:49] or we're talking about scamming and scam [2:00:51] centers here, one, you have to drown [2:00:53] and get online with your online [2:00:55] covert employees and platforms, and we've [2:00:57] increased funding, and we've also, what we've [2:00:59] done strategically is move people out of [2:01:01] Washington, D.C. on the intel analyst [2:01:03] front and the support staff front to places [2:01:05] like Oklahoma. Actually, every single state [2:01:07] across the country has received a plus up [2:01:09] because of that, and what we've [2:01:11] created is the Internet Crime Complaint [2:01:13] Center, the IC3, which I know you're [2:01:15] familiar with and referenced. So what we're doing on the [2:01:17] homeland is going out into the streets of [2:01:19] America on the online platforms in America [2:01:21] and shutting down those networks [2:01:23] and shutting down the capability [2:01:25] of AI to interfere, but I think the bigger [2:01:27] term project, what we're doing overseas, [2:01:29] that's the key to this. The [2:01:31] scam center compounds are largely [2:01:33] located in Cambodia and Burma and on the [2:01:35] Thai border. I've already engaged with the [2:01:37] premiers of each and every one of those countries. [2:01:39] We've done so to switch off [2:01:41] access to the Internet [2:01:43] with those governments to make sure that [2:01:45] those compounds, they're literal compounds [2:01:47] that are being built, and we can get into that in the [2:01:49] classified center, that are [2:01:51] fleecing Americans and senior citizens [2:01:53] all the way from Southeast Asia [2:01:55] because they are backed by the CCP [2:01:57] to build those compounds because they know it's [2:01:59] going to hurt everyday Americans. So us, [2:02:01] which we have successfully already [2:02:03] eliminated and scuttled, [2:02:05] we have successfully eliminated [2:02:07] numerous compounds in Cambodia and Burma and Thailand, [2:02:09] is the big picture, the big part of the [2:02:11] lift overseas. What we're going to do [2:02:13] is go into those countries [2:02:15] and shut down every single scam center [2:02:17] compound. Which is very helpful [2:02:20] and every American is [2:02:22] thinking about this and talking about it. [2:02:24] Director Patel, I'm going to stay with you. [2:02:26] The counter narcotics work has been phenomenal [2:02:28] in the past year and a half. [2:02:30] The amount of methamphetamine and [2:02:32] fentanyl that have been seized [2:02:34] coming across our border has been [2:02:36] dramatic and that has a real [2:02:38] effect to what's actually coming at [2:02:40] families in my state on it. [2:02:42] What I'm interested in is [2:02:44] how are you partnering with local law enforcement [2:02:46] to continue to accelerate this process? [2:02:48] What does that look like for FBI? [2:02:50] Absolutely, Senator. [2:02:52] The counter narcotic mission can't be complete [2:02:54] without state and local law enforcement. [2:02:56] So we are embedding more task force officers [2:02:58] across the country on the specific [2:03:00] counter narcotics mission. We've also stood up [2:03:02] with our interagency partners [2:03:04] in Tucson, Arizona. [2:03:06] The Southern Border Intelligence Center [2:03:08] specifically on the counter narcotic mission [2:03:10] so that we can utilize the Department of War [2:03:12] and interagency capabilities on the law enforcement front. [2:03:14] That's why we seized [2:03:16] enough fentanyl in 2025 [2:03:18] to kill 178 million Americans. [2:03:20] That's a 31% increase year over year. [2:03:22] And here's a statistic that [2:03:24] everybody should be proud of. [2:03:26] Opioid overdose deaths from last year [2:03:28] dropped 20 points. [2:03:30] 20 points from across the country. [2:03:32] And in Oklahoma specifically, [2:03:34] Senator, we seized enough [2:03:36] kilograms of cocaine [2:03:38] to include a 232% [2:03:40] increase in the state of Oklahoma alone [2:03:42] and enough fentanyl to kill [2:03:44] 500,000 Oklahomans. [2:03:46] We can't do that unless we have great [2:03:48] police partnerships, which has been a priority [2:03:50] of mine, which is why I've embedded [2:03:52] police officers here [2:03:54] at headquarters from around the country [2:03:56] to make sure we have that connectivity. [2:03:58] And I've shortened the task force officer [2:04:00] onboarding pipeline from one to two years [2:04:02] to 90 days. We need them. [2:04:04] Yeah, we do. [2:04:06] Senator Ratcliffe, the annual threat assessment [2:04:08] highlights this year [2:04:10] the Muslim Brotherhood in particular [2:04:12] and calls out some of their [2:04:14] financial material supports on this. [2:04:16] That may be surprising [2:04:18] to some folks here, [2:04:20] but it's not surprising to folks [2:04:22] all across the Middle East [2:04:24] in the threat that the Muslim Brotherhood [2:04:26] continues to pose to so many governments [2:04:28] and entities across the world on that. [2:04:30] How is the Muslim Brotherhood [2:04:32] financing itself [2:04:34] and its acts of terrorism [2:04:36] and is there [2:04:39] something that we need to do here [2:04:41] to be able to make sure that we're [2:04:43] protecting Americans in the threat? [2:04:46] Senator, I think [2:04:48] with regard [2:04:50] to the Muslim Brotherhood abroad, [2:04:52] we view that [2:04:54] just as we do other proxies [2:04:56] across [2:04:58] the Middle East, [2:05:00] the Houthis and other [2:05:02] groups, and I can [2:05:04] relate to you that the CIA [2:05:06] is very focused [2:05:08] on the counterterrorism front. [2:05:10] You weren't here before. [2:05:12] I said in the classified portion [2:05:14] I would get into [2:05:16] the CIA's success [2:05:19] with regard to groups like the [2:05:21] Muslim Brotherhood in a classified setting [2:05:23] where I can [2:05:25] share with you the impact [2:05:27] that we're having, [2:05:29] and across the board with regard [2:05:31] to [2:05:33] terrorist groups [2:05:35] and our counterterrorism activities, [2:05:37] I can publicly characterize it [2:05:39] as saying we've [2:05:41] accomplished more in the last year [2:05:43] than in the four years of the prior [2:05:45] administration combined. [2:05:47] So hopefully it gives you some measure [2:05:49] of comfort about how we're [2:05:51] approaching things and the effectiveness [2:05:53] that we've had in the last [2:05:55] year in that regard, and [2:05:57] I'll look forward to getting into detail [2:05:59] in the classified portion. [2:06:01] Senator Reid. [2:06:04] Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. [2:06:06] Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. [2:06:08] The Washington Post reported earlier this [2:06:10] week in their words, [2:06:12] the U.S. intelligence assessments say [2:06:14] Iran's regime likely to remain [2:06:16] in place for now, weakened [2:06:18] but more hard-line, with the powerful [2:06:20] Islamic Revolutionary Guard [2:06:22] Corps security forces [2:06:24] exerting greater control. [2:06:26] Director Gabbard, do you stand [2:06:28] by that reported intelligence [2:06:30] community assessment? I don't stand by [2:06:33] any leaked [2:06:35] so-called intelligence to the media. [2:06:37] I do stand by the [2:06:39] intelligence community's assessment [2:06:41] that was included in the annual threat [2:06:43] assessment that speaks directly to this [2:06:45] issue that as of this moment [2:06:47] the regime maintains [2:06:49] power within Iran [2:06:51] even though they are vastly [2:06:53] degraded on almost every front. [2:06:55] Do you think that the [2:06:57] killing of the Ayatollah [2:06:59] and his wife and [2:07:01] other family members [2:07:04] and key people contributed [2:07:06] to the picking of a [2:07:08] hard-line successor? [2:07:12] Senator, the intelligence community [2:07:14] assessment [2:07:16] has pointed to [2:07:18] a number of different [2:07:20] scenarios [2:07:22] that went into [2:07:24] play with the selection of the [2:07:26] successor. The details [2:07:28] of that we can discuss in a [2:07:30] closed hearing with regard to the [2:07:32] intelligence reporting. [2:07:34] Is the regime [2:07:36] in Iran [2:07:39] now trying to [2:07:41] promote the [2:07:44] deceased Ayatollah as a [2:07:46] martyr? Who should be [2:07:48] followed and does that help them [2:07:50] consolidate [2:07:53] support? Senator, the Iranians [2:07:56] are certainly using [2:07:58] that as a call to action. [2:08:00] The effects [2:08:02] of that from an intelligence [2:08:04] standpoint [2:08:06] remain to be seen. [2:08:08] There is a tradition in Shia though [2:08:10] to honor martyrs. One of their [2:08:12] greatest celebrations is [2:08:14] the martyrdom of [2:08:16] the grandson of Mohammed [2:08:18] Mohammed. [2:08:21] That's right. [2:08:23] So we might have played into [2:08:25] their cultural biases [2:08:27] erroneously. [2:08:29] General Adams, what conditions [2:08:31] the USS would need to be present [2:08:33] to make the regime collapse [2:08:35] or necessitate [2:08:37] unconditional surrender? [2:08:41] And can it be done with air power alone? [2:08:43] Senator, we have [2:08:45] at the Defense Intelligence Agency [2:08:47] put together a number of [2:08:49] scenarios coordinated across the IC with regards [2:08:51] to the future. [2:08:53] One of the [2:08:55] four specific goals that we've [2:08:57] been told to track [2:08:59] and analyze with regards to the goals [2:09:01] of the US effort. [2:09:03] They've been articulated [2:09:05] earlier in the hearing so I won't hammer [2:09:07] on those. But with regards [2:09:09] to the collapse of the regime [2:09:11] specific [2:09:13] perpetuation, like what would precipitate [2:09:15] that, we would like to [2:09:17] I would prefer to talk about that in the [2:09:19] classified hearing. Well [2:09:22] I understand, but [2:09:24] there's a very basic [2:09:26] question here. Will air power alone [2:09:28] be able to [2:09:30] destroy this regime [2:09:32] given the culture, the [2:09:34] politics, the temperament [2:09:36] of these people? [2:09:38] The Iraq-Iran war lasted [2:09:40] for eight years with a million casualties. [2:09:44] Do you think air power alone will do it? [2:09:47] Senator, the capabilities [2:09:53] that our joint force brings to [2:09:55] bear [2:09:58] can accomplish many missions. [2:10:00] To forecast exactly what [2:10:02] can and can't [2:10:04] accomplish this goal [2:10:06] I prefer [2:10:08] not to guess [2:10:10] or prognosticate on that. [2:10:14] I'll recognize your professional [2:10:16] position. [2:10:19] US Special Envoy Steve [2:10:21] Witkoff recently stated that Russian [2:10:23] leaders told Trump on a call [2:10:25] that they were not sharing intelligence [2:10:27] with Iran. Witkoff stated [2:10:29] quote, we can take them at the [2:10:31] word. [2:10:33] Director Gabbard and Radcliffe, do you [2:10:35] take President Putin at his word? [2:10:40] I'll go ahead and answer. No, [2:10:42] I don't take Vladimir Putin [2:10:44] at his word. [2:10:46] Are they [2:10:49] providing intelligence to the Iranians? [2:10:51] We talked about this before. [2:10:53] In the classified [2:10:55] session, what we can [2:10:57] go into is that [2:10:59] the Iranians are requesting intelligence [2:11:01] assistance from Russia, [2:11:03] from China, [2:11:05] and from other adversaries [2:11:07] of the United States. [2:11:09] Whether [2:11:11] or not those countries are [2:11:13] is something we can [2:11:15] talk about in the classified portion. [2:11:18] But you've made an assessment. [2:11:20] You've analyzed traffic communications [2:11:22] and you can... [2:11:25] I know the answer and happy to discuss that [2:11:27] with you in the classified portion. [2:11:29] Yes, sir. Go ahead. [2:11:31] Go ahead. [2:11:33] Thank you. [2:11:36] One of the aspects of this is the [2:11:38] federal effects, [2:11:40] particularly in Russia and Ukraine. [2:11:42] We were just talking about Russia [2:11:44] probably or possibly [2:11:46] providing intelligence that may be interfering [2:11:48] or inflicting casualties [2:11:50] on our forces. Russia is also [2:11:52] benefiting from the [2:11:54] lifting of sanctions on their [2:11:56] ability to sell oil throughout the world. [2:11:58] I heard one estimate of a [2:12:00] $20 billion surge in their [2:12:02] potential revenues. [2:12:04] Ukraine, on the other hand, [2:12:06] is facing perhaps [2:12:08] a disrupted [2:12:10] supply chain of missiles and other [2:12:12] equipment because they're being devoted [2:12:14] to this operation. [2:12:16] General Adams, can you just give me [2:12:18] your impression of the [2:12:20] effect of the battle [2:12:22] on Russia and Ukraine [2:12:24] at the moment, of this battle? [2:12:28] Well, from our collections, [2:12:30] the effect of the [2:12:32] epic fury [2:12:34] on the [2:12:37] Russian-Ukrainian [2:12:39] battle [2:12:42] has been indirect, [2:12:44] not direct. [2:12:46] We do [2:12:48] track very carefully [2:12:50] what benefits [2:12:52] or, as you alluded to, [2:12:54] the collateral [2:12:56] effects of what we're doing [2:12:58] and how it impacts. [2:13:00] There is [2:13:02] a lot of, from both the [2:13:04] Russians and the Chinese, [2:13:06] observations of what we're doing and [2:13:08] figuring out [2:13:10] what they can learn from that. [2:13:12] It's a collateral effect [2:13:14] as we expose what the joint force [2:13:16] displays on [2:13:18] the battlefield. [2:13:20] And [2:13:22] I think we can talk [2:13:25] in a little more detail [2:13:27] as we move to the classified session [2:13:29] some of the things that we're collecting [2:13:31] specifically about [2:13:34] what those effects are. [2:13:36] Thank you very much, sir. [2:13:38] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:13:40] Thank you all for being here. [2:13:43] Before I ask you a few questions, [2:13:45] I'd like to turn to this fundraising email [2:13:47] signed by the President [2:13:49] that Senator Kelly mentioned earlier [2:13:52] in which the President [2:13:54] of the United States [2:13:56] invites his campaign donors [2:13:58] to, quote, [2:14:00] claim your spot, [2:14:02] claim your spot, [2:14:04] join now to receive [2:14:06] private national security briefings [2:14:08] to his political donors [2:14:10] featuring a photo [2:14:12] of the President [2:14:14] at a dignified transfer ceremony [2:14:16] to the United States. [2:14:19] Now, [2:14:21] the American people [2:14:23] need to know [2:14:25] that the President [2:14:27] of the United States [2:14:29] is fundraising [2:14:31] for his political campaign [2:14:33] and his PAC [2:14:35] using images [2:14:40] of American service members [2:14:42] killed in action [2:14:44] and it's a disgrace. [2:14:48] Now, Director Gabbard, [2:14:50] I'd like to reground this [2:14:53] and to the heads of executive branch departments [2:14:55] and agencies, yes? [2:14:57] Yes. [2:14:59] And to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs [2:15:02] and senior military commanders? [2:15:04] Across the IC, yes. [2:15:06] And to the Senate and the House [2:15:08] and relevant committees, correct? [2:15:10] Yes. [2:15:12] And the law states that the national intelligence [2:15:14] you provide to Congress, quote, [2:15:17] should be timely, objective, and independent [2:15:19] of political considerations, correct? [2:15:21] Yes. [2:15:23] And to the IC's assessment of threats, correct? [2:15:25] That's right. [2:15:27] That opening statement as submitted to the committee [2:15:29] in advance of this hearing stated that [2:15:31] as a result of last summer's airstrikes, [2:15:33] quote, [2:15:36] Iran's nuclear enrichment program [2:15:38] was obliterated, end quote, correct? [2:15:40] That's right. [2:15:42] And is that in fact the assessment of the intelligence community? [2:15:44] Yes. [2:15:46] So the assessment of the intelligence community [2:15:48] is that Iran's nuclear enrichment program [2:15:50] was obliterated by last summer's airstrikes? [2:15:53] Yes. [2:15:55] Quote, there has been no effort since then [2:15:57] to try to rebuild their enrichment capability, [2:16:00] end quote, correct? [2:16:02] That's right. [2:16:04] And that's the assessment of the intelligence community? [2:16:06] Yes. [2:16:08] The White House stated on March 1st of this year [2:16:11] that this war was launched and was, quote, [2:16:13] a military campaign to eliminate the imminent nuclear threat [2:16:15] posed by the Iranian regime, end quote. [2:16:17] That's a statement from the White House. [2:16:20] Quote, the imminent nuclear threat [2:16:22] posed by the Iranian regime. [2:16:24] Was it the assessment of the intelligence community [2:16:26] that there was an imminent nuclear threat [2:16:28] posed by the Iranian regime? [2:16:30] The intelligence community assessed [2:16:34] that Iran maintained the intention [2:16:36] to rebuild and to continue to grow [2:16:38] their nuclear enrichment capability. [2:16:40] Was it the assessment of the intelligence community [2:16:42] that there was a, quote, [2:16:44] imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime, [2:16:46] yes or no? [2:16:48] Senator, the only person who can determine [2:16:50] what is and is not an imminent threat [2:16:52] is the president, and he made that determination. [2:16:54] False. This is the worldwide threats hearing [2:16:56] where you present to Congress national intelligence, [2:16:58] timely objective and independent [2:17:00] of political considerations. [2:17:02] You've stated today that [2:17:04] the intelligence community's assessment [2:17:06] is that Iran's nuclear enrichment program [2:17:08] was obliterated and that, quote, [2:17:10] there had been no efforts since then [2:17:12] to try to rebuild their enrichment capability. [2:17:14] Was it the intelligence community's assessment [2:17:17] that nevertheless, [2:17:19] despite this obliteration, [2:17:21] there was a, quote, [2:17:23] imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime, [2:17:25] yes or no? [2:17:27] It is not the intelligence community's responsibility [2:17:29] to determine what is and is not an imminent threat. [2:17:31] That is up to the president [2:17:33] based on a volume of information [2:17:35] that he receives. [2:17:37] It is precisely your responsibility [2:17:39] to determine what constitutes a threat [2:17:41] to the United States. [2:17:43] This is the worldwide threats hearing [2:17:46] where, as you noted in your opening testimony, [2:17:48] quote, [2:17:50] you represent the IC's [2:17:52] assessment of threats. [2:17:54] You are here to represent [2:17:56] the IC's assessment of threats. [2:17:58] That's a quote from your own [2:18:00] opening statement. [2:18:02] So my question is, [2:18:04] as you're here to present the IC's assessment [2:18:06] of threats, [2:18:09] was it the assessment of the intelligence community [2:18:11] that, as the White House claimed [2:18:13] on March 1st, [2:18:15] there was a, quote, [2:18:17] imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime, [2:18:19] yes or no? [2:18:21] Once again, Senator, [2:18:23] the intelligence community has provided the inputs [2:18:26] that make up this annual threat assessment. [2:18:28] You won't answer the question. [2:18:30] It is the nature of the imminent threat [2:18:32] that the president has to make that determination [2:18:34] on a collection and volume [2:18:36] of information and intelligence [2:18:38] that he has provided with. [2:18:40] You're here to be timely, objective, [2:18:42] and independent of political considerations. [2:18:44] Exactly what I'm doing. [2:18:46] No, you're evading a question [2:18:48] because to provide a candid response [2:18:50] to the committee would contradict [2:18:52] a statement from the White House. [2:18:54] Let me ask you about your presence [2:18:56] in Fulton County on January 28th [2:18:58] of this year. [2:19:01] You were present [2:19:03] at the FBI's raid [2:19:05] in the Fulton County elections office [2:19:07] on January 28th, correct? [2:19:09] I was present for part of the FBI [2:19:11] exercising a warrant approved [2:19:13] by a municipal judge. [2:19:15] Yes, and the FBI was there executing [2:19:17] that warrant to seize ballots [2:19:19] and materials associated [2:19:21] with the 2020 election, correct? [2:19:23] Yes. [2:19:25] And are you aware that members of this committee [2:19:27] have already opened inquiries [2:19:29] into your election-related activities? [2:19:32] Yes. [2:19:34] And are you aware that your general counsel and deputy general counsel [2:19:36] have already opened inquiries into your election-related activities? [2:19:38] Yes. [2:19:40] On February 2nd, you sent a letter to Senator Warner [2:19:42] regarding your presence at the raid. [2:19:46] Was that letter accurate? [2:19:48] I don't recall the exact date, [2:19:50] but if I sent a letter that had my signature, [2:19:52] it was accurate. [2:19:54] You stated in the letter that your presence [2:19:56] at the raid was, quote, [2:19:58] requested by the president, correct? [2:20:00] Yes. [2:20:02] When did the president request your presence at the raid? [2:20:04] The day of the raid, [2:20:07] I'm not going to disclose how the message was delivered, [2:20:09] but it was a request from the president [2:20:11] and his administration to go and help oversee [2:20:13] this warrant being executed, [2:20:15] along with the deputy director of the FBI. [2:20:17] Is it your role to oversee [2:20:19] the FBI agents who were conducting this warrant? [2:20:21] Is it your role to oversee the execution [2:20:23] of criminal warrants? [2:20:25] It is my role, based on statute [2:20:27] that Congress has passed, [2:20:29] to have oversight over election security, [2:20:31] to include counterintelligence. [2:20:33] But you said you oversaw the raid, correct? [2:20:35] You just testified you oversaw the raid. [2:20:37] Portions of it. [2:20:39] Okay, did you handle any ballots [2:20:41] or election-related materials? [2:20:43] No. [2:20:46] You were inside an FBI evidence truck, correct? [2:20:48] You were photographed inside an FBI evidence truck. [2:20:52] It was an empty truck, yes. [2:20:54] The president stated, quote, [2:20:56] you looked at votes that wanted to be checked out. [2:20:58] The senator's time is expired. [2:21:00] Did you look at votes as the president stated? [2:21:02] Senator Ossoff, your time has expired. [2:21:04] You can have her... [2:21:06] No, she cannot respond because... [2:21:08] For the record, will the director please respond [2:21:10] to questions for the record? [2:21:12] Thank you, Director Gabbard. [2:21:15] Thank you. [2:21:17] Vice Chairman? [2:21:19] I just want to... [2:21:21] I'm not going to go back to this issue. [2:21:23] I'm sure we'll address in the closed setting. [2:21:25] But I am very disappointed. [2:21:27] This is the only one time a year [2:21:29] the public gets to hear from you guys [2:21:32] in this kind of setting. [2:21:35] And the fact that we have repeated [2:21:37] public reporting, including a major story [2:21:39] in the Wall Street Journal today [2:21:41] about China and Russia [2:21:44] is obvious and evident. [2:21:46] And none of you would confirm that publicly [2:21:48] I think doesn't give [2:21:51] the American people the full [2:21:53] challenges of this war. [2:21:55] I would add what I said earlier [2:22:00] that the media is not a [2:22:03] classification authority, but [2:22:05] certainly sounds like something Russia and China would do [2:22:07] and they have done for decades in the past [2:22:09] to Americans. [2:22:11] To wrap up a little business here before we adjourn [2:22:13] the open session, we will [2:22:15] reconvene in 30 minutes [2:22:17] in our usual location for the closed session [2:22:19] that's at 1256 [2:22:21] promptly. [2:22:23] I do want to note for the record [2:22:25] that Senator Young cannot join us. [2:22:27] He is at Dover Air Force Base for the [2:22:29] dignified transfer of remains [2:22:31] for one of our fallen heroes, a Hoosier. [2:22:33] And I would invite everyone [2:22:35] to join Senator Young in praying [2:22:37] for the family and friends [2:22:39] of that soldier and all the soldiers who have given [2:22:41] their life in the defense of our freedom [2:22:43] and security. [2:22:45] General Hartman, I want to again acknowledge you [2:22:47] given your impending retirement since this is your [2:22:49] last appearance for the committee. [2:22:51] I'm sure you hope, and I'm sure that [2:22:53] the thing you'll miss most about your long [2:22:56] career in uniform is testifying [2:22:58] before Congress. [2:23:00] I remind members that questions for the record will be [2:23:02] due by the close of business on [2:23:04] Friday, March 20, and [2:23:06] the audience will remain seated for a [2:23:08] moment so that our witnesses and members [2:23:10] may exit and proceed promptly [2:23:12] to the closed session. [2:23:14] This open session is adjourned.