Intel Chiefs Gabbard, Patel, and Others Testify at House Intelligence Hearing

[0:02] Good morning, everyone. [0:03] I call the committee to order. [0:04] Without objection, the chair may declare [0:06] the committee in recess at any time. [0:08] Before we begin today's hearing, [0:09] I would like to provide a few important reminders. [0:12] First, today's open portion is being broadcast live [0:14] on C-SPAN and streamed on the committee's YouTube channel. [0:18] This open portion as part of the hearing [0:21] will be conducted entirely on an unclassified basis. [0:25] All participants are reminded to refrain [0:26] from discussing classified or other sensitive information [0:29] protected from public disclosure. [0:31] I will adjourn this open session following completion [0:33] of one round of questions and we'll then move [0:34] into a closed session where such questions can be asked. [0:37] Second, I wanna welcome the audience and inform them [0:40] that while I fully support constitutionally protected rights [0:43] of speech and protest, this is not the time or the place. [0:47] Any would-be disruptors in the audience [0:49] who interfere with the committee's business [0:50] will not be tolerated. [0:52] For this event, members will have five minutes [0:54] with the witnesses. [0:55] I ask each of my colleagues to keep both your questions [0:57] and complete answers from the witnesses [0:59] within that allotted five minutes. [1:01] Any last minute questions or responses [1:03] that can't be completed in time will be submitted [1:05] for the record. [1:06] We do expect a vote series at 10 o'clock this morning. [1:08] The vote will be held open so we don't plan to recess. [1:12] We'll address that when the time comes. [1:14] Additionally, in the same manner in which the House [1:16] Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence [1:17] has conducted itself in a recent worldwide threat hearings, [1:20] I expect that we will continue to act in a bipartisan [1:22] and respectful manner during today's event. [1:24] I'm confident all members can treat each of our witnesses [1:27] today with due respect consistent with past practices. [1:32] Again, thank you for being here today. [1:33] The Worldwide Threats Hearing provides the American people [1:36] the opportunity to hear directly from our intelligence [1:38] community leadership on the threats that face our nation. [1:41] It's my pleasure to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing. [1:44] Director of National Intelligence, [1:45] the Honorable Tulsi Gabbard. [1:47] Director of Central Intelligence Agency, [1:49] the Honorable John Ratcliffe. [1:51] Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, [1:53] the Honorable Kash Patel. [1:55] Acting Director of the National Security Agency, [1:57] Lieutenant General William J. Hartman. [1:59] And Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, [2:01] Lieutenant General James H. Adams III. [2:03] Thank you all for being here. [2:05] It's a gross understatement to say that a lot has occurred [2:08] since we met at this hearing last year. [2:09] Before I address the issues I had planned, [2:11] I want to address Iran. [2:13] Once it was clear that diplomacy would not stop Iran [2:15] from developing a nuclear weapon or holding the world [2:18] under threat through ballistic missiles and terrorist networks, [2:20] President Trump took decisive action to eliminate the threat. [2:24] Make no mistake, Iran is committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. [2:27] It's been their policy and it is their intent. [2:30] Anyone who thinks we weren't on borrowed time is refusing [2:32] to acknowledge the failure of prior policies. [2:35] It's a simple fact that the consecutive administrations had exhausted [2:39] all other options to end this threat. [2:42] Our witnesses here are tasked with providing intelligence [2:44] to inform decision makers. [2:45] But there's only one person in America who has the responsibility [2:49] and the obligation to act when he believes there is a clear [2:52] and present danger to our safety. [2:54] The Commander-in-Chief has that duty and I commend his decisiveness [2:57] in this most difficult of decisions. [3:00] I've been in briefings that the administration provided to all members, [3:03] to this committee, and to the Gang of Eight. [3:05] The classified case is clear even if it can't be fully discussed in the open. [3:09] The President made a difficult but necessary decision. [3:12] My Democrat colleagues have made it clear that they don't agree. [3:15] What we shouldn't disagree on is that the United States has effectively been [3:18] at war with the Iranian regime for the last 47 years. [3:22] Death to America is not just a slogan on a t-shirt that you buy [3:25] at Tehran International Airport or at the campus bookstore at Columbia University. [3:30] It's their ethos and their policy. [3:32] They are responsible for the deaths of countless Americans. [3:36] I want to thank the many service members and intelligence officers involved [3:39] in Operation Epic Fury for their selfless service. [3:42] For those who have lost loved ones in this fight, [3:43] please know that you are in our prayers most sincerely. [3:47] Your loved ones died in service to the United States of America. [3:50] We honor them and you for their service. [3:53] Freedom-loving people everywhere are thankful for their sacrifice. [3:56] That said, there are a few other topics it's important for me to address. [3:59] First, after four years of Biden's wide-open borders and anemic foreign policy, [4:03] in just one short year, the Trump administration has secured our borders [4:07] and reasserted America as a decisive leader that commands respect on the world stage. [4:12] This administration has secured a stunning number of wins [4:15] for the United States, including reasserting the importance of the Western Hemisphere [4:19] and disrupting China's predatory belt and road activities in our neighborhood, [4:22] negotiating a ceasefire in Gaza resulting in the freeing of the hostages [4:26] held by the bloodthirsty Hamas terrorists, [4:29] and working with our NATO partners to more than double their defense spending [4:33] against pressing threats from CCP and Russia. [4:36] I thank each of the witnesses here today for their parts [4:38] in the reassertion of American leadership. [4:41] Second, our role here is to both authorize your authorities and resources [4:44] and oversee their implementation. [4:46] One of those authorities is FISA 702, which expires in just over a month. [4:51] The president is seeking an 18-month clean extension to provide more time [4:55] to assess the implementation of the 56 reform measures included [4:59] in the last reauthorization. [5:01] I'm working with the ranking member, House leadership, [5:03] and Judiciary Chairman Jordan to support that request. [5:06] We look forward to an update from the panel today on compliance efforts, [5:09] ERISA implementation, and mission value. [5:12] Third, last year I made clear my expectation that we would work together [5:15] to end the weaponization of the intelligence community, improve analytic integrity, [5:19] and fix our broken counterintelligence enterprise. [5:22] Many in Congress and across our nation have lost trust in the intelligence community. [5:26] While we have made progress, there's still much work that remains to be done. [5:29] I hope to continue working with each of you to do the hard things necessary [5:33] to protect American citizens while regaining their trust. [5:36] I also remain committed to tackling the issues that allow hostile foreign powers to operate [5:39] so effectively against us, including within the United States. [5:43] Specifically, foreign intelligence threats targeting the United States now surpass levels [5:48] seen at the height of the Cold War in both scale and complexity. [5:51] These threats include cyber penetrations of critical infrastructure, U.S. government systems, [5:55] and private sector innovators, as well as surveillance near sensitive military installations, [6:00] intelligence collection against foreign dissidents living in the United States. [6:04] Like in the Cold War, where conflict often gave way to irregular operations below the level [6:08] of traditional warfare, today's adversary tactics have made the homeland a contested environment. [6:13] We must properly resource and reform our nation's counterintelligence enterprise to meet that threat. [6:19] We must transform our approaches in order to confront adversarial intelligence services at scale, [6:23] driving back operational activities in the homeland and forcing our adversaries [6:27] to rethink their risk calculus for operating in the United States. [6:31] Unfortunately, in recent years, the counterintelligence enterprise lost a significant amount [6:35] of credibility with the American people due to the actions of those involved in cases [6:39] like Crossfire Hurricane and Arctic Frost. [6:42] For our intelligence community to best serve America, the CIA community and the larger IC must stay [6:46] out of domestic policy debates and focus on unrelenting aggressive mission execution. [6:52] For our intelligence community to best serve America, the CIA community and the larger IC must stay [6:57] out of those debates. [6:59] Director Gabbert, I want to particularly commend your efforts in this space. [7:04] Specifically, I want to thank you and President Trump for working with us to declassify the [7:08] HIPSE majority staff report on the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment on Russian plans [7:13] and intentions in the 2016 election. [7:16] The majority staff report, which had been kept from the American people for eight years, proves [7:20] that the 2017 ICA, the public genesis of the Russia collusion hoax, was a politicized document. [7:27] Its key assessment on Putin's hopes for the 2016 election was built on, at best, abysmal and analytic [7:33] tradecraft and, at worst, willful political charged intentions. [7:39] This was a necessary act of transparency to begin the process of rebuilding trust with the American people [7:44] and the IC. [7:45] But please know the challenges facing each one of you that are testifying here is not lost on this committee. [7:53] Getting a large ship back on the right course is never easy. [7:56] The task can certainly be challenged by unforeseen obstacles and obstructions. [7:59] You know you are doing something right when all the weapons in the media's arsenal are pointed directly at you. [8:04] Thank you all for pressing forward. [8:06] We can walk and chew gum at the same time, and we must. [8:09] We must have our IC as aggressive as ever in pursuing its mission while holding those accountable [8:14] who participated in its misuse. [8:16] I thank each of you for doing this and encourage you to all keep moving on both fronts. [8:21] Finally, now I want to speak to our remarkable IC workforce. [8:26] I'm immensely proud of the incredible work that you do, especially over the last year, [8:30] to support critical military intelligence and law enforcement operations. [8:34] From operations Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, Southern Spear, and Epic Fury, [8:38] to the many other operations you've conducted in the shadows with no fanfare, [8:42] Americans will never be able to fully appreciate all you do to protect this nation. [8:48] I think I can speak for the entire committee when I say we extend our deepest gratitude. [8:51] America truly has the best of the best in our ranks. [8:55] It's for this primary reason I would like to address the House Intelligence Committee's ongoing investigation [9:00] into the intelligence community's mishandling of anomalous health incidents, [9:03] also known as Havana Syndrome, and the mistreatment of AHI survivors. [9:08] I'm aware of the drastic increase in media reporting around this issue, [9:11] and I'd like to first reiterate the committee's commitment [9:14] to releasing additional unclassified information. [9:17] Our team has worked diligently to conduct this investigation with the utmost integrity, [9:21] and we cannot be driven by outside timelines. [9:24] I commit to the workforce to release additional reports as appropriate. [9:28] Put simply, it's my clear opinion that individuals in the intelligence community were involved in a cover-up. [9:33] Manipulating intelligence processes and a breach of intelligence community directive 203 to provide [9:38] a desired outcome rather than a forthright analysis to inform decision makers. [9:43] Our investigation, the vast majority of which remains appropriately classified, [9:46] continues to show that the intelligence community assessment was constructed upon flawed analytic trade craft. [9:52] This includes the use of study results from the National Institutes of Health that were manufactured [9:56] through highly unethical means and in collaboration with individuals working for the CIA. [10:01] ICAs carry a great deal of weight. [10:03] While typically classified, the impact is increased exponentially when declassified and released as part of public messaging effort, [10:10] as was done with the AHI ICA. [10:13] As I have repeatedly stated since December of 2024, the AHI ICA and its follow-on updates caused real, [10:20] serious harm to some of our nation's bravest. [10:23] Last month, I called for its immediate recall, and I reiterate my position today. [10:28] According to recent media reporting, Director Gabbard, your office has said, [10:31] your review of the ICA will be, quote, comprehensive and complete, end quote, [10:36] and that you remain committed to sharing findings from your review with the American people. [10:39] Thank you for that. [10:40] And separately, Director Ratcliffe, your team has also quoted in recent media reporting, [10:44] saying that you support the ODNI review and look forward to the report. [10:47] Thank you so much for that, Director. [10:49] I thank both of you for your commitment to this review's completion and publishing. [10:53] This issue is complex, and the underlying facts are not as simple as often portrayed in the public. [10:57] No fully informed analysis will make everyone happy. [11:00] That said, today I call for this review to be provided to the committee and strongly urge you to release the public [11:05] whatever portion of this review can be made unclassified. [11:08] This is vital to rebuilding trust moving forward. [11:11] I want to thank our witnesses again for being here today. [11:13] And with that, I want to recognize the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Himes, for his opening statement. [11:19] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and a big welcome to all of our witnesses. [11:23] I hope that whatever else is said today that you will convey to your workforces our deep admiration [11:28] and appreciation for their diligence, their commitment, and their sacrifice. [11:33] Sometimes this moment feels a little bit like that old Billy Joel song, [11:36] we didn't start the fire. North Korea, Red China, War in Ukraine, Greenland, Cuba, [11:40] terrorism, burning drug boats, and, of course, the massive fire that we did start, [11:46] our latest Middle Eastern War. Where to begin? [11:51] Our national elections are about seven months away, and plenty of Americans are worried that [11:56] President Trump may indeed, as he said, take control. [12:01] Meanwhile, we are not receiving the traditional indications or warnings of foreign intelligence efforts [12:07] to interfere in those elections. There have been several terrorist attacks in recent weeks, [12:12] and, meanwhile, the FBI, our premier counterterrorism agency, [12:16] has pivoted hard to immigration enforcement. But I can't begin today with anything other than that fire [12:23] that we did start, Iran. The Constitution to which every single one of us swears an oath [12:30] reserves decisions of war to the representatives of the people. And that's not ink on parchment. [12:40] There are good reasons for that. First, let's start with why. Why did we and are we risking [12:49] our blood and treasure on a deeply risky venture, one that the President of the United States and [12:57] the Director of National Intelligence have spent years telling us is a terrible idea. The President [13:07] has said that Iran was preparing an imminent attack on the United States. That is not true. As awful as the [13:15] regime is and always has been, not one of your agencies has produced a single report saying that [13:24] Iran posed an imminent threat to the United States. The President also claimed that Iran would soon [13:31] possess a nuclear weapon, perhaps in weeks. That is also not true. It is not supported by a single [13:39] report from your agencies. And it is certainly belied by the repeated claim that Iran's nuclear capability [13:47] was obliterated mere months ago. Second, let's consider the consequences, [13:54] as the Congress should have done. The Congress, not one man, should consider whether our constituents in [14:03] uniform will live or die. The Congress, not one man, should decide if Americans will spend an additional [14:12] $30 a week to fill their gas tanks. The Congress, not one man, should consider if it is wise to allow the [14:21] Russians to sell their oil to India so that they have millions of dollars with which to kill the [14:26] Ukrainians that we are now begging for help to defend ourselves against Iranian drones. Finally, had the [14:35] administration chosen to abide by the Constitution, Congress might have considered the answer to General [14:43] Petraeus's all-important question. Tell me how this ends. When the Iranian Navy is sunk and the missile launchers are [14:56] destroyed and we have re-obliterated the nuclear infrastructure, do we declare victory and sail away? [15:03] How do we feel about a new supreme leader who is more extreme and vicious and dedicated to the [15:11] development of a nuclear weapon than the last one? Do we do a deal with him? How do we get him to open [15:19] the Strait of Hormuz? Do we bomb more? And if we sail away and declare victory, are we back there nine months [15:25] from now to re-sync a rebuilt Navy and re-bomb rebuilt missile launchers? Is this going to be an [15:33] every nine-month thing or is it going to be annual? The very core purpose of the intelligence community [15:44] is to answer these questions for the president, for us, and for the American people. Right now, [15:56] as we watch the dignified transfer of lost American patriots at Dover, as we watch gasoline approach $5 a [16:04] gallon, as we watch our allies mocking us on the world stage, we need to know. Were those questions [16:13] asked? How did you answer them for the president of the United States? And did he listen? I understand [16:23] that the administration may come to the Congress to ask for funding of $200 billion for this war. [16:32] As you answered those questions for us today, I'd ask you to remember that old saying, [16:37] if you want me there for the landing, make sure I'm there at the takeoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. [16:45] Thank the gentleman for his comments. Before I turn it over to Director Gabbard, I would like to thank [16:50] General Hartman for nearly four decades of service. I know you're retiring, I think, tomorrow. You are [16:56] here. I just applaud your service to this nation and your leadership at the NSA, and thank you, [17:01] and wish you all the best in your retirement. Thank you, Chairman. I think tomorrow as well. [17:05] All right. Thank you. Director Gabbard, you're recognized. Thank you very much. Good morning, [17:13] Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes. Members, I'm here today to present the 2026 Annual Threat [17:20] Assessment and joined by my colleagues, the directors of the CIA, the DIA, FBI, and NSA. This briefing is [17:28] being provided in accordance with ODNI's statutory responsibility. What I'm briefing here today does [17:34] not represent my personal views or opinions, but rather the assessments of the intelligence community, [17:40] of the threats facing the United States, our homeland, and our interests. In this assessment, [17:46] we're following the structure of priorities that were laid out in the President's national security [17:50] strategy, starting with threats to our homeland, and then shifting to global risks. The defense of [17:56] our homeland is of the utmost importance to the American people, and efforts by this administration [18:01] over the last year to bolster homeland defense have yielded significantly positive results. [18:07] For example, the strict enforcement of U.S. policies at the U.S.-Mexico border and regionally [18:13] have served as a deterrent and drastically reduced illegal immigration. Based on Customs and Border [18:19] Patrol data, January 2026's monthly encounters are down 83.8 percent compared to January of 2025. [18:28] The drivers of migration are likely to continue. Potential worsening instability in countries like Cuba and [18:35] Haiti risk triggering migration surges. Smugglers who often operate as transnational criminal [18:41] organizations view chaos as an opportunity for profit, and will likely continue to profit from [18:47] these illegal immigration flows. These TCOs continue to pose a daily and direct threat to the health and [18:54] safety of millions of U.S. citizens, primarily by producing and trafficking in illegal drugs. Under President [19:01] Trump's leadership, fentanyl overdose deaths have seen a 30 percent decrease from September of 2024 to [19:06] September of 2025. His aggressive efforts to more directly and actively target these transnational [19:13] criminal organizations and reduce the inflow of fentanyl precursors has already had a significant [19:19] impact, which is likely to continue. Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations like the Sinaloa [19:25] Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel dominate the production and smuggling of fentanyl, [19:31] heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine into the United States. Colombia-based TCOs and illegal armed [19:37] groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army are [19:42] responsible for producing and trafficking large volumes of cocaine into the U.S. and European markets, [19:48] with some indicators that that they are now attempting to expand to the Asia-Pacific region. [19:54] Colombia remains the world's largest producer of cocaine, and Colombian criminal groups have expanded [19:59] their trafficking relationships with neighboring Ecuadorian and Brazilian gangs. MS-13 is well [20:05] established and sells in the United States and uses violence to intimidate the Salvadoran diaspora, [20:11] engaging in murder, extortion, retail drug trafficking, firearms offenses, and prostitution fueling [20:18] increased violence and instability. These and other TCOs present a very tangible and individualized risk of [20:25] violent crime to everyday Americans and contribute to regional instability. As the President increases [20:31] counter drug and counter cartel pressures, they are likely to seek ways to try to adapt their operations, [20:37] including shifting and decentralizing production locations and trafficking routes and methods. [20:44] The United States continues to face a complex and evolving threat landscape with a geographically diverse [20:50] set of Islamist terrorist actors seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm Americans, [20:57] even as Al-Qaeda and ISIS organizationally remain weaker today than they were at their respective peaks. [21:04] The spread of Islamist ideology in some cases led by individuals and organizations associated with the [21:10] Muslim Brotherhood pose a fundamental threat to freedom and foundational principles that underpin Western [21:15] civilization. These Islamist groups and individuals use this ideology for recruiting and financial support for [21:21] terrorist groups and individuals around the world and to advance their political objectives of [21:27] establishing an Islamist caliphate which governs based on Sharia. There are increasing examples of [21:33] this in various European countries. President Trump's designation of certain chapters of the Muslim [21:38] Brotherhood as foreign terrorist organizations is a mechanism to secure Americans against this threat. [21:45] In response to setbacks of their capabilities of conducting large-scale complex attacks, [21:51] the IC assesses that Islamist terrorist groups have shifted towards focusing on executing information [21:56] operations to spread propaganda and inspire or enable individuals located in or with access to the [22:02] West. U.S. counter-terrorism operations are ongoing, primarily in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Syria, [22:10] and have removed key terrorist leaders and operatives, degrading the ability of Al-Qaeda and ISIS to quickly [22:16] reconstitute its leadership and launch large-scale attacks against the homeland. [22:22] Strict U.S. border enforcement measures and increased deportations of individuals with [22:26] suspected links to Islamist terrorists have reduced access to the homeland and removed some potential [22:31] sources of future terror attacks. Since January, U.S. officials have only had a handful of encounters [22:38] at our borders with individuals associated with terrorist groups. This is a positive trend, however, [22:44] our interagency coordinated efforts to identify, locate, and remove known or suspected terrorists [22:49] who are already in the U.S. continues with vigilance. In 2025, there were at least three Islamist [22:55] terrorist attacks in the U.S. Law enforcement disrupted at least 15 U.S.-based Islamist terrorist [23:02] plotters. Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some online contact with Islamist [23:09] terrorists inspired by Islamist foreign terrorist organizations abroad. Al-Qaeda and ISIS posed the biggest [23:16] threat to U.S. interests overseas in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia where these groups [23:22] operate. In the Middle East, AQAP in Yemen, ISIS-K in South Asia, and ISIS in Syria are among the most [23:31] likely groups conducting external plotting. ISIS in Syria specifically is likely seeking to rebuild its [23:38] ranks, expand support networks, and solicit funds by re-engaging with and recruiting from the likely [23:43] hundreds of ISIS detainees and thousands of ISIS-linked women and children who escaped or were released [23:49] from prisons and displaced persons camps. Meanwhile, state actors present a risk broader in scope by [23:58] seeking new capabilities in kinetic and cyber warfare. The U.S. secured nuclear deterrent continues to ensure [24:05] safety in the homeland against strategic threats. However, the IC assesses that Russia, China, North Korea, [24:11] Iran, and Pakistan have been researching and developing an array of novel advanced or traditional missile [24:17] delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland within range. [24:22] The IC assesses that threats to the homeland will expand collectively to more than 16,000 missiles by 2035 [24:30] from the current assessed figure of more than 3,000 missiles. The IC assesses that China and Russia are [24:37] developing advanced delivery systems meant to be capable of penetrating or bypassing U.S. missile [24:43] missile defenses. North Korea's ICBMs can already reach U.S. soil. The IC assesses that it is committed [24:51] to expanding its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development [24:56] potentially could include ICBMs with range capable of striking the homeland. The IC assesses that Iran has [25:03] previously demonstrated space launch and other technology it could use to begin to develop a [25:09] militarily viable ICBM before 2035 should Tehran attempt to pursue the capability. However, [25:17] these assessments will be observed and updated as the full impact of Operation Epic Fury's devastating [25:23] strikes on Iran's missile production facilities, stockpiles, and launch capabilities is determined. [25:31] Shifting to the cyber domain, the IC assesses that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state [25:37] ransomware groups will continue to seek to compromise U.S. government and private sector networks [25:42] as well as critical infrastructure to collect intelligence and create options for future [25:47] disruption and for financial gain. The IC assesses China and Russia present the most persistent [25:54] and active threats and are continuing R&D efforts. North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. [26:01] In 2025 alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole two billion dollars, [26:06] which is helping to fund the regime, including further development of a strategic weapons program. [26:13] Financially or ideologically motivated non-state actors are becoming more bold, [26:17] with ransomware groups shifting to faster high-volume attacks that are harder to identify and mitigate. [26:24] Innovation in the field of artificial intelligence will likely accelerate the threats in the cyber domain. [26:29] They will increasingly shape cyber operations with both cyber operators and defenders, [26:34] using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. For example, in August of 2025, [26:40] cyber actors used an AI tool to conduct data extortion against international government, [26:46] healthcare, and public health emergency service sectors and religious institutions. [26:52] Shifting to the Arctic, the IC assesses that Russia, and to a lesser extent China, [26:56] aim to strengthen their presence in the region through increased maritime trade, [27:00] natural resource extraction, and military activity. Russia, which has the longest coastline in the [27:06] Arctic, has long sought recognition of its quote-unquote polar great power status, [27:12] and is deploying more military forces and building new permanent infrastructure. China, [27:18] though not an Arctic country, is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its [27:22] strategic and economic interests. On the technology front, artificial intelligence [27:27] capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing the threat landscape. As this is a defining technology [27:34] that enables computers and machines to simulate human learning, comprehension, problem solving, [27:39] creativity, and autonomy, it will be critical to ensure that humans remain in control of how AI is [27:45] used and of the machines that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests of the American [27:49] people across all domains. The IC assesses that China is the most capable competitor in this field, [27:56] and aims to displace the US as the global AI leader by 2030. AI adoption at scale across the spectrum [28:03] of usage poses serious risks. AI has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design and has been [28:10] used in recent conflicts to influence targeting and streamline decision making, underscoring the risk [28:16] and likely threats that could manifest on the battlefield. Early developers in quantum computers will [28:22] give countries an extraordinary technology technological advantage over others to quickly process national [28:29] security information and break current encryption methodology used to protect sensitive finance, [28:35] healthcare, and government information. The global security landscape is volatile and complex with [28:42] armed conflict growing more common and posing potential threats against US interests. The space domain is [28:49] becoming increasingly contested with China and Russia developing counter space capabilities to challenge US [28:55] space efforts. The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological warfare capabilities [29:01] continues to grow. Turn now to the western hemisphere where flagging economies, high crime rates, [29:07] pervasive organized crime, migration flows, corruption, narcotics trafficking present a broad spectrum of risks to US [29:14] its interests and where strategic competitors seek to gain greater influence in the region. The ICSS is that Latin [29:22] America and the Caribbean almost certainly will see hot spots of volatility in the coming year with the potential [29:27] to undermine or distract from countries, some countries from improving economies and living conditions and [29:34] tackling illicit drug flows and cartels. The US-Mexico-Canada agreement review in 2026 will likely increase uncertainty in many [29:43] Latin American countries, especially those that rely on Mexico as an export destination for intermediate goods for [29:49] manufacture and onward export to the US. China, Russia, and Iran are seeking to sustain economic, political, and military [29:58] engagement with Latin America. The ICSS is that China's demand for raw materials is likely to drive continued [30:05] economic outreach, while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. [30:13] The ICSS is that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, military, and technological power [30:20] to increase its own regional positioning, global influence, and to fend off threats to their interests. [30:27] While there are challenging areas where interests diverge, President Trump's diplomatic engagements with [30:32] President Xi have enabled progress on areas where mutual interests align. The ICSS is that China continues to [30:39] rapidly modernize its military forces across all domains in pursuit of its goal to achieve [30:46] world-class status by mid-century. This includes building a force with the aim of being capable of [30:51] deterring US and allied forces in the region and to achieve their stated objective of having the capability [30:58] to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. However, the ICSS is that China likely prefers to set the conditions [31:05] for an eventual peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict. An increasingly confident North Korean [31:11] regime remains a source of concern regionally and globally. Its weapons of mass destruction, [31:17] conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities, and demonstrated willingness [31:22] to use asymmetric capabilities poses a threat to the US and its allies, particularly South Korea [31:28] and Japan. North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing, and in 2025, Kim took steps to improve ties [31:37] with China, still North Korea's most important trading partner and economic benefactor. The ICSS is that [31:44] North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine has increased North Korean capabilities as their [31:49] forces have gained combat experience in 21st century warfare, along with equipment. Pyongyang [31:55] continues to develop and expand its strategic weapons programs, including missiles that can evade US [32:01] and regional missile defenses. Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge US interests [32:08] globally by military and non-military means. The ICSS is that the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to [32:14] the US is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict such as Ukraine, or a new conflict that led to direct [32:22] hostilities, including the deployment of nuclear weapons. The ICSS is that Putin continues to invest in [32:28] Russia's defense industrial base, as well as novel capabilities that may pose a greater threat to the [32:33] US homeland and forces abroad than conventional weapons. The ICSS is Russia has advanced systems, [32:41] hypersonic missiles and undersea capabilities designed to negate US military advantage. Russia is also [32:49] building extensive counter space capabilities to contest US space dominance. Its development of a nuclear [32:56] counter space weapon poses the greatest single threat to the world's space architecture. During the [33:03] past year, the ICSS is that Russia has maintained the upper hand in its war against Ukraine. [33:08] Ongoing US-led negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv continue. Until such an agreement is met, [33:15] if an agreement is found, Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow war of attrition until they view [33:20] their objectives have been achieved. In the Middle East, conflict and instability will shape security, [33:26] political and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. The ICSS is that Operation Epic Fury is advancing [33:33] fundamental change in the region that began with Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, [33:40] continued with the 12-day war last year, resulting in weakening Iran and its proxies. The ICSS is that [33:47] the regime in Iran appears to be intact, but largely degraded due to attacks by Israel and the US on its [33:54] leadership and military capabilities. Its conventional military power projection capabilities have largely been [34:01] destroyed, leaving limited options. Iran's strategic position has been significantly degraded. The US-led [34:09] maximum pressure campaign and snapback of European sanctions added additional pressure to an already [34:15] bleak Iranian economy, resulting in mass protests earlier this year that Tehran suppressed by killing [34:21] thousands of protesters. Even if the regime remains intact, internal tensions are likely to increase as Iran's economy [34:28] worsens. Even so, Iran and its proxies continue to attack US and allied interests in the Middle East. [34:36] If a hostile regime survives, it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort to rebuild its military [34:43] missiles and UAV forces. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, the IC assesses Iran was trying to recover from [34:50] the severe damage to its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-day war. Iran maintained the [34:57] intention to rebuild its infrastructure and nuclear enrichment capability and continued to refuse to [35:02] comply with its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, refusing them access to key facilities. [35:08] The IC assesses that China, Russia, and North Korea see the United States as a strategic competitor and [35:15] potential adversary. Iran has long viewed the US as an adversary and has engaged in active conflict [35:21] with the US as of this writing. These four countries are likely to continue their selective cooperation [35:27] with each other, which could bolster their individual capabilities and threats to US interests more [35:33] broadly. However, currently, these relationships are primarily bilateral on selective issues and depend [35:39] on broader circumstances, divergent sovereign interests, and in some cases, concerns over directly [35:45] confronting the US. These factors are likely to constrain their relationships. Finally, conflicts on the [35:53] continent of Africa are likely to persist through 2026 due to poor governance, economic demands, [35:58] and external support. Tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which could rapidly accelerate [36:05] to conflict. Contentious national and federal elections in Somalia could distract the federal [36:10] government away from counterterrorism actions against al-Shabaab, which continues to conduct terror [36:16] attacks while providing funding and propaganda support to other elements of al-Qaeda in Yemen. [36:21] The civil war in Sudan continues even as external negotiations occur, and ISIS in West Africa and the [36:28] Sahel have increased the intensity of their attacks against local security forces, expanding their areas [36:34] of operation and moving closer to cities with the US presence. African governments will use their wealth [36:41] and critical minerals to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefit. Concurrent conflicts [36:46] and crises across the continent will continue to put US citizens at risk and cause further instability. [36:53] In closing, as leaders of the intelligence community, we remain committed to providing the president [36:59] and policymakers with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to ensure the safety, security, [37:05] and freedom of the American people. Thank you. Thank you for your comments, [37:10] Director Gabbard. We appreciate that. We'll now move to member questions, five-minute increments. [37:15] With that, I recognize myself for five minutes. Director Patel, our state and local officials are on the [37:21] front lines of increasingly dangerous unrestricted warfare activities being undertaken by Chinese [37:26] nationals, such as marijuana grow operations protected by armed militants, secret police stations [37:31] engaged in transnational repression, Chinese-operated sim farm sites, crypto mining facilities, and land [37:37] purchases near strategic locations. The CCP is exploiting legal gray areas and the lack of awareness at the [37:43] state and local level to establish strategic footholds. Two states, in fact, New Hampshire and Florida, [37:49] are now advancing legislation to establish offices of counterintelligence which would bolster a state's [37:55] ability to confront foreign adversaries without relying on the federal government. Do you support [37:59] that? What can be done to better support the states and local officials? Absolutely. Thank you, [38:05] Mr. Chairman. So we have infused funding into our entire program taking on the CCP. And while we are well [38:14] versed in the fact that we have our capabilities with folks like CFIUS when it comes to the [38:19] purchases of land around military bases, that only extends one mile under the current law. So the [38:24] FBI had to get creative. So what we did was directly engage with our state and local partners. And I'll [38:29] give you two examples. A 400-acre farm in the state of Texas was owned by a CCP official, but because he was [38:35] outside the reach of the CFIUS law, the FBI executed an unlawful possession of firearms, a criminal complaint, [38:43] and received it, we seized the land in its entirety. And that CCP national is back in mainland China, [38:49] and we are working to get him back here. In another example, off the coast of Louisiana, we worked with [38:53] Governor Landry's team on drilling sites off the coast of Louisiana, because again, they were outside the [38:59] hole of CFIUS in the one mile radius. And with the intelligence we were able to provide our state and [39:03] local authorities, they shut down that CCP drilling center, which we believed was actually used to provide and [39:09] steal data and intelligence from American lives. So that's just a little bit of an example. On the [39:13] marijuana grow houses, we have six active ongoing investigations in six multiple jurisdictions [39:18] for specifically taking down CCP-affiliated grow houses from Maine to Georgia and across the country. [39:24] So it sounds like from your characterization of CFIUS, it's inadequate at this point. Maybe we [39:28] could do something legislatively here in this body to provide some broader authority to address that [39:33] challenge? I would love that. Okay, great. Excellent. Thank you. Director Ratcliffe, in January 2021, [39:39] in your role at DNI as the director, you sent this committee a letter outlining your concerns about [39:43] an intelligence community assessment in which, among other things, analysts tailored their analysis [39:49] towards a preferred policy outcome. CIA management pressured analysts to withdraw their support from [39:53] an alternative viewpoint, and the full body of intelligence reporting wasn't considered. [39:58] Now in your role as CIA director, you have retracted several reports for political bias [40:03] and not meeting IC analytic standards. That's good progress. Retracting faulty reporting is a [40:08] critical step, but I remain concerned about that it maybe doesn't get to the root of the problem. [40:12] How many analysts were involved in the products you recently retracted? I don't know the specific [40:19] number, Chairman. What remediation actions have taken place as a result? Well, I've made the focus of, [40:27] as you pointed out, both as DNI and now as CIA director, focused on the importance of analytic objectivity. [40:36] As you pointed out, when I was the DNI, when I saw conduct from Russia and China, [40:45] the exact same conduct result in different assessments, [40:48] that's not a good reflection on the analytic judgments. [40:54] What you referenced in my role as CIA director, withdrawing reports that we went back and looked [41:00] that didn't reflect the analytic standards that we would expect, I retracted those judgments because [41:08] they show bias and influence for political reasons or otherwise. So that has continued to be a focus, [41:14] and will be. I think that that message has been received within our analytic community within the CIA [41:22] and really across the CIA because this administration has put a focus on taking politics out of our [41:28] analytic judgments. Excellent. Thank you, Director. Appreciate that. I want to, as I made clear my opening [41:34] statement, I'm just trying to get this done in the little time that I have remaining. The intelligence [41:38] community assessment on AHI is deeply flawed, and I've called for its recall immediately to start for [41:44] a fresh start. Similar to my question in last year's session, but I'd like to get a yes or no answer from [41:52] each of you on whether you agree this ICA should be retracted. Director Gabbard? Yes. Director Ratcliffe? [41:58] The ICA, say it again. The AHI ICA? Yeah, so for the ICA, I understand that Director Gabbard is [42:08] is reviewing that, and I've deferred all AHI investigations to her review. So if in her judgment [42:16] that is something that should be retracted, then I would agree with that. And yes. Okay, Director Patel? [42:21] Yes. Thank you. General Hartman? Yes. And General Adams? Yes, sir. Thank you. I appreciate that. Thank you [42:31] all for your responses. I'm going to recognize the ranking member for five minutes. Thank you, Chairman. [42:37] Chairman. Director Gabbard, as was well covered yesterday in January, you were present at the [42:43] execution of an FBI warrant at the Fulton County Georgia Election Office, at the direction of the [42:48] President and to all appearances in connection with the President's false claims about the 2020 election. [42:55] The unsealed affidavit submitted by the FBI made zero reference to foreign powers or outside [43:00] interference. I don't want to relitigate the reasons why you were there, but I do want to know [43:05] whether as a result of your visit there is credible intelligence in your possession pointing to foreign [43:10] interference in Georgia in the 2020 election. Thank you for the question, ranking member. [43:19] As you know, over each of the previous elections, there is an ongoing effort by different foreign [43:24] entities to try to interfere in our elections. Ma'am, it's a very specific question. Is there [43:27] intelligence in your possession relative to foreign interference in the 2020 elections? Very simple, [43:32] straightforward question. We are continuing to look at previous attempts to interfere in our [43:37] elections and any ongoing threats that may exist for the upcoming elections. Okay, but can I assume [43:42] that the answer to my question is no, that you have no specific intelligence related to foreign meddling [43:48] in the Georgia election? We are continuing to look into this matter. Okay. Director, the ODNI has confirmed [43:57] on the record that your office took custody of voting machines from Puerto Rico last May. I'm not aware [44:05] of any previous DNI taking similar actions. Did your office promptly notify the committee about taking [44:12] custody of Puerto Rico's voting machines? I don't believe we did. However, this was done at the request [44:20] of the Puerto Rico AUSA attorney. It's a yes or no question. The answer, as you have acknowledged, [44:26] is no, you did not inform the committee about the taking of a territory's voting machines. Is there [44:31] a specific foreign threat? And I've read the reporting that you were looking for possible foreign threats, [44:35] but is there a specific foreign threat that drove you to take this action? There were questions about whether [44:41] or not there were vulnerabilities that a threat could have taken advantage of, and that was the purpose [44:46] for their requesting us to look into those vulnerabilities. Where are those voting machines now? [44:51] I believe they are held in a secure facility at ODNI. Have you or other ODNI officials taken any other [45:00] state or territories voting equipment into custody? Not to my knowledge. I want to turn on the subject [45:08] of elections to a paradoxical thing. You will all be aware that the U.S. government is apparently going [45:14] to grind to a halt. The president is going to sign no more bills. The Senate will spend two weeks [45:19] weeks, apparently debating the SAVE Act. The SAVE Act, of course, would make illegal foreigners voting [45:26] in U.S. elections, which is already illegal. So we are to do no more business because of apparently [45:32] the existential threat to our democracy associated with foreigners voting in our elections. [45:37] I am therefore puzzled by the fact that neither the unclassified nor the classified threat assessment [45:43] makes any reference to risk or danger associated with foreigners voting in our elections. Director Patel, [45:52] how many non-citizens have been convicted of voting in U.S. elections in the last 10 years? [45:59] The conviction stats are with the Department of Justice. I defer to them on that. [46:04] You are the director of the FBI. Give me a guess. How many convictions in the last one year, [46:10] five year, or 10 years? Ballpark. I don't have that with me, sir. Again, it's with the department. [46:14] You don't have that. Okay. Director Patel, how many active investigations does the FBI [46:21] have into foreign individuals voting in U.S. elections? We have a number of investigations, [46:30] generally speaking, ongoing about individuals across the country. I'm asking for that number. [46:36] I don't have that number with me, but I have a number of them. You have a number of investigations. [46:41] Okay. Is that number 10,000? Is it closer to 10,000 or closer to 10? It's probably somewhere in between. [46:49] Okay. Will you please provide the committee with that number? Yes, sir. Okay. Director Patel, [46:55] since you don't have the numbers, would it surprise you to know that the Heritage Foundation, which is not [47:02] exactly the Columbia University faculty lounge, found only 77 instances of non-citizen voting in the 24 [47:11] years between 1999 and 2023, each of which faced investigation by the appropriate authorities. So [47:17] Heritage has a number of 77 examples in 24 years. Does that number surprise you? No, because it's low. [47:26] I don't understand your answer. Are you disputing that the number is in the range of 77 examples [47:36] of non-U.S. citizens voting in U.S. elections in a 24-year period? I just said that number is low. [47:41] You think that number is low? Okay. So why, if this is a meaningful issue, do we have no, [47:48] and I guess I direct this to Director Gabbard, why is there no mention of this thing that will grind [47:52] the American government to a halt for a two-week period in the worldwide threats analysis? [47:57] This annual threat assessment was shaped around the national security strategy's prioritization [48:05] of threats to our nation and our nation's interests. There are multiple platforms and venues [48:11] where there have been and there will be reporting on threats to our foreign threats to our elections. [48:17] Fieldback. Gentleman yields. Vice Chairman Kelly. I'd first just like to say, Director Gabbard, [48:24] you being in Georgia was a part of your duties as DNI to make sure that our elections remain safe, [48:32] secure, and free from every type of influence. That was why you were there. Is that correct? [48:39] Yes. Okay. I would argue, I want to talk about some of the points about the strikes on Iran, [48:46] the current attacks, epic fury. And I would state that not only are there imminent threats from Iran, [48:54] but there are actual threats. And I've been on the receiving end of those threats. I was in Iraq in [48:59] 2005 where Iranian-based and manned and equipped units attacked American soldiers, including me, [49:08] multiple times. I will also tell you I went back in 9 and 10 where EFPs developed by the Iranians [49:15] struck my soldiers and our equipment. I would tell you the Houthis have continued to strike Saudi Arabia. [49:22] I will tell you Hamas and Hezbollah has continued to strike throughout the Middle East. And although [49:27] we're not in an armed services hearing, we had that yesterday. But I will tell you, [49:31] because we took out their ballistic missiles and their ability to defend from the air, [49:36] that Europe is no longer under threat from Iran, who showed they will strike everyone that they can [49:42] by striking all of their Arab neighbors and Azerbaijan and Turkey and everywhere else. [49:47] With that being said, Director Ratcliffe, I think the CIA has had a great year in providing [49:53] intelligence, whether that's in Venezuela, the initial midnight hammer strikes, [49:58] or also the current strikes in Iran. Can you tell us kind of some of the things the CIA has done [50:03] over the past year that you're proud of? Congressman, good to see you again. Thank [50:07] you for the question. Good to see all of you and be back in the House. I guess I'll start by saying, [50:13] I think you all know there was bipartisan concern when I took over the CIA that our human collection [50:21] was in a downward spiral and had been for some period of time. And you all wanted [50:27] a more aggressive CIA, one that was focused on core mission, one that was collecting the kind of [50:34] intelligence and stealing secrets that would provide a decisive strategic advantage that can contribute to [50:42] national security and foreign policy successes. I do think that the CIA, I agree with you, [50:49] has had a great year. And that's a credit to our workforce. You talked about some of the very [50:55] public successes like Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Absolute Resolve, where our agency [51:02] contributed to a, frankly, flawless intelligence picture that allowed for flawless military operations. [51:09] And I want to credit everyone here. There's been bipartisan praise from this committee, [51:15] even from those of you who may disagree with the underlying policies. But I think those successes are [51:20] really emblematic of success that the agencies had across the board on all national security matters, [51:28] in all national security spaces. And it's not just an opinion, it's reflected in, in our statistics. [51:34] So when we talk about stealing secrets, you need assets and sources on the ground around the world. [51:42] We're up 25 percent in that regard just in the past year. Our foreign intelligence reporting, [51:48] meaning the intelligence that really matters to you as decision makers and the president as commander [51:53] in chief, that's up across the board 25 percent. Other categories, specific [51:58] targets and adversaries like China, it's up 100 percent. Areas like technology, it's up 100 percent. [52:06] Issues like counter-narcotics, our operations are up by 70 percent. With regard to counter-terrorism, [52:13] those are classified numbers that we'll get into in the classified portion, but those are triple digits. [52:18] We've accomplished more on the counter-terrorism front in the past year than in the prior four years [52:23] combined. Again, really a credit to the CIA workforce. Morale at the agency is high because [52:31] people are doing the work that they signed up to do, and this administration is calling on them to do [52:37] more. I would say they are tired but happy. If I can steer back the final 45 seconds, I have one question [52:42] for Director Patel. Director Patel, the current shutdown that is caused by us not funding TSA, [52:50] border control, DHS and all those things. How hard has that made the job of counterintelligence FBI [52:57] to protect us here in the homeland from threats that came through our borders or internally and [53:02] already existing in the United States? Director Patel. Thank you for the question. When it comes [53:06] specifically to the combination efforts between the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, [53:10] we have 59 Homeland Security Task Forces that we have stood up in every single state [53:15] and then some that are co-led by the FBI and HSI. And obviously having a stop gap in funding is [53:21] hurting those abilities to go out there and fight crime and pick up violent offenders across the [53:26] country. Even though the DHS workforce shows up every day, I think they've gone one month without [53:30] a paycheck now. We also have things like our Southern Border Intelligence Center in Tucson, Arizona, [53:35] that is our hub for intelligence collection operations on foreign terrorist organizations. [53:40] It's specifically the the narco traffickers down in Mexico. Thank you. My time's expired. [53:48] Mr. Carson is recognized. Thank you, Chairman. The Trump administration has justified this war with Iran [53:54] as necessary to stop an imminent threat. But the administration has not provided this committee [53:59] with any intelligence indicating Iran was preparing a nuclear weapon, planning a preemptive attack on the [54:05] United States or possess any immediate capability to strike the U.S. homeland. That raises very serious [54:12] questions about what the analysis of the IC provided before the decision to go to war was made. [54:18] Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, is there any evidence that Iran intended to conduct a preemptive [54:23] attack on the United States? And I ask this because 13 service members have been killed in Trump's war, [54:30] including Captain Seth Koval, a husband and a dad from my state of Indiana, and my constituents want answers. [54:37] So is there any evidence that Iran intended to conduct a preemptive attack on the U.S. prior to beginning [54:43] this war? Yes or no? Congressman, the answer to this question needs to be reserved for a closed hearing. [54:54] I will say, however, the intelligence community does provide the assessments of the threats that exist [55:02] to the president so that he can make that determination within the body of information and intelligence [55:08] and activities within the region that ultimately he is responsible for. What is an imminent threat, [55:13] and if there is an imminent threat, what actions need to be taken? Congressman, as the DNI said, [55:24] there's a body of intelligence that we'll be able to cover in the classified portion of this hearing [55:28] that reflects, that does reflect, that in the likely event of a conflict between Iran and Israel, [55:36] that the U.S. would be immediately attacked, regardless of whether the United States stayed [55:40] out of that conflict. Shifting gears to ranking Member Himes' point, let me read to you from the 2025 [55:48] Annual Threat Assessment under your watch last year. Quote, Moscow's maligned influence activities will [55:54] continue for the foreseeable future and will almost certainly increase in sophistication volume. Moscow [56:01] probably believes information operations efforts to influence U.S. elections are advantageous, [56:07] regardless of whether they affect election outcomes. By contrast, this year's threat assessment [56:13] makes no mention of foreign threats to elections. Meanwhile, the IC has been publicly [56:18] warning about foreign powers interfering in our elections for nearly a decade. So the omission is [56:24] very striking. And to that point, sitting here today, I'm not aware of any intelligence products [56:29] in the past year dedicated to foreign plans and intentions toward current and future U.S. elections. [56:38] Director Gabbard, yes or no, ma'am, have you directed or been directed to stop or limit dissemination [56:44] of intelligence reports or finish intelligence reporting concerning foreign plans and intentions about [56:51] upcoming U.S. elections or foreign threats to the midterms? [56:54] No. Director Patel, same question for the FBI, sir. Yes or no, sir? No, sir. Director Ratcliffe, [57:01] same question for the CIA, sir. Yes or no? No. General Hartman, same question for NSA. Yes or no, [57:07] sir? No, sir. General Adams, same question for the DIA. Yes or no, sir? No, sir. I yield back, chairman. [57:13] The gentleman yields. Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Gabbard, [57:19] when you began your testimony, you stated that your remarks do not represent your personal beliefs. [57:27] That's the first time I've heard that at a committee hearing. Why did you say that? Or is there anything [57:34] in the threat assessment that you personally disagree with? Thank you for the question, [57:40] Congresswoman. The reason I've said that is twofold. Number one is when I assumed this role as director [57:46] of national intelligence through the confirmation process and beyond, many members of Congress rightly [57:53] said, your personal views and your politics in this role get checked at the door. And as director of [57:59] national intelligence, my responsibility is to report the intelligence community's assessments [58:05] objectively and to make sure that they are not politicized in any way, shape, or form. [58:09] Unfortunately, there are those who, for one reason or another, have tried to mischaracterize [58:16] the intelligence community's assessments and saying, well, this is just a political view or [58:22] trying to misdirect from what the intelligence community is reporting. So I took the opportunity [58:26] to state that from the outset that this is the intelligence community's assessments. [58:31] Thank you. I also wanted to ask this because this week there was a high profile resignation [58:36] of a director of national counterterrorism center. Now, I want to be clear from the outset, [58:41] I've communicated directly with President Trump, my support for Operation Epic Fury, [58:45] and I was very, not only disappointed, but how inappropriate this letter was. And I want to read [58:52] a statement that, and get your personal assessment whether you agree or disagree with that. And that's [58:58] this. Early in this administration, high-ranking Israeli officials and influential members of the [59:03] American media deployed a misinformation campaign that wholly undermined your America First platform [59:08] and pro-war sentiments to encourage a war with Iran. This echo chamber was used to deceive you into believing that [59:15] there is no imminent threat to the United States and that you should strike now. There was a clear path to a swift victory. [59:20] This was a lie and is the same tactic the Israelis used to draw us into a disastrous Iraq war. [59:26] Now, I cannot say how much I disagree with that statement. Do you agree or disagree with [59:32] what this letter was put out by former director Kent? [59:35] He said a lot of things in that letter. Ultimately, we have provided the president with the intelligence [59:43] assessments, and the president is elected by the American people and makes his own decisions based [59:50] on the information that's available to him. But do you agree with — does that statement he made, [59:54] blaming Israel, concern you? Yes. [59:57] My next question is, I want to touch on the rise of terrorist attacks on the homeland. In the month [1:00:04] of March alone, there were multiple high-profile Islamic terrorist attacks. You had Temple Israel [1:00:09] Synagogue in Michigan. You had — in Texas, you had an ISIS-inspired attack where they threw an IED [1:00:16] in New York City. What is your assessment as to the rise of Islamic terrorism on the homeland? [1:00:22] As you've pointed — pointed to, Congresswoman, this continues to be an extreme concern, [1:00:29] not only because of the rise of these attacks, but the mechanisms which they're carried out, [1:00:34] and the challenges that the intelligence community has in being able to try to detect some of these [1:00:40] threats and attacks in advance. I'd like to defer to the FBI director on some of this, because they [1:00:46] have been very successful in many cases over the last year in detecting them and preventing these [1:00:52] attacks. But due to the nature of the challenge in — in — in many of these attackers, not having [1:01:01] contact with known foreign terrorist entities or individuals makes this a much more challenging [1:01:09] threat to deal with. And I want to turn to Director Patel. I think that's a good, [1:01:13] important segue to get your assessment. And I also want to add another aspect of the question. We're [1:01:18] working on a 9-11 Commission review, 25-year review. What other tools do you need to make sure that we [1:01:24] are able to have the most robust, effective CT efforts? [1:01:28] Yeah. Thank you, Congresswoman. Just real quick. So last year, we had 2,300 arrests related to foreign [1:01:33] terrorist organizations. We had 700 counterterrorism arrests, and the FBI had 640 counterterrorism [1:01:39] disruptions where we stopped attacks on the homeland. Specifically in December, we stopped four in an 18-day [1:01:45] span. What I need is specifically highlighted in the Norfolk attack. In Norfolk, an individual who [1:01:52] was convicted of terrorism and sentenced based upon that conviction should have still been in prison. [1:01:58] The Department of Justice in the first Trump administration sought a sentence of 240 months. [1:02:03] The judge in that case downward departed and gave a variance to nearly half that sentence. If that had [1:02:09] not occurred, that individual would still be in prison, and a member of our uniformed military [1:02:13] service would still be alive. I want to work with the legislature to figure out how to increase the [1:02:18] sentencing for convicted terrorists and also work on the denaturalization process for someone who [1:02:23] should not be in this country who wants to attack and kill American citizens and American service members. [1:02:28] Thank you. Yieldback. [1:02:29] The gentleman yields Mr. Castro. [1:02:31] Thank you. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you all for your testimony today. I want to start with a question [1:02:38] about Iran and discuss first how the war began. Secretary Rubio told us that Israel was going to [1:02:46] strike Iran regardless and that doing so would have triggered Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces [1:02:52] already in the region. And Director Ratliff, you seem to affirm that in comments just a few moments ago. [1:02:58] So rather than tell Israel to stand down, the president joined the war. The Congress and the American [1:03:04] people still don't know what the president's actual goals are. And yet we have lost 13 U.S. service [1:03:11] members. But here's what we do know. The president has said that he wants a deal. He said Iran wants [1:03:17] to make a deal and that he's not ready because, quote, the terms aren't good enough yet. Yet they just [1:03:23] killed Ali Larijani, the de facto leader of Iran, who, while not a friend of the United States, would [1:03:29] have been the person to negotiate any agreement with. The president explicitly said that the United States did [1:03:35] not strike Iran's energy infrastructure because, in his words, having to rebuild it, quote, would take [1:03:41] years. Yet this morning, Israel struck the South Par's gas field, the world's largest natural gas [1:03:48] reserve, triggering Iranian attacks on Qatari gas facilities. Oil prices are up 15 percent in the [1:03:55] last 24 hours. In San Antonio, my hometown, where I represent, the cost of gas has gone up nearly 40 percent [1:04:03] in three weeks. Last night, the president said that the United States knew nothing about the attack [1:04:09] and called on Israel to stop similar attacks on energy. Israel denies this and says that the attack [1:04:15] was cleared by the United States. So my question is, what does the intelligence community assess Israel's [1:04:21] goals in this war to be? And are those goals aligned with the goals of the United States? [1:04:27] I'm thinking carefully here about what can be said in this open setting versus a closed setting. [1:04:41] Are the goals aligned? The objectives that have been laid out by the president [1:04:49] are different from the objectives that have been laid out by the Israeli government. [1:04:53] And how do they differ? We can see through the operations that the Israeli government has been [1:05:01] focused on disabling the Iranian leadership and taking out several members, obviously, beginning with [1:05:09] the Ayatollah and the Supreme Leader. And they continue to focus on that effort. [1:05:14] And how does that differ from our goals? The president has stated that his objectives are to [1:05:21] destroy Iran's ballistic missile launching capability, their ballistic missile production [1:05:29] capability, and their navy, the IRGC navy and mine length capability. [1:05:34] So the death and destruction continues. The economic cost of the United States, to Israel, to the Gulf [1:05:42] states and to the world continues to increase. So I want to ask you, to the best of your knowledge, [1:05:47] do you know whether Israel is supportive of the president's call to make a deal with Iran? [1:05:51] I don't know the answer to that. I don't know Israel's position on that. [1:06:00] And to what do you attribute Israel's decision to strike Iranian energy infrastructure, [1:06:04] despite President Trump's call to keep those facilities off limits? [1:06:08] I don't have an answer for that. [1:06:11] So they ignored the president. Do you agree with that? [1:06:22] I'm not privy to any of their deliberations or what went into their calculus in launching this [1:06:33] or other attacks. I'm not, we are not involved in the operational element of this. We're providing [1:06:40] continuously on a daily basis the intelligence assessments of the events that are occurring. [1:06:45] I guess I know the FBI can't because they're domestic, but can anybody else at the table [1:06:52] provide any insight into that? [1:06:54] I guess I'm not sure what the question you're asking, Congressman Castro. I guess a couple things. [1:07:06] The goals that the president set out are clearly defined. The DNI related those. What was not included [1:07:12] as a goal of the U.S. [1:07:15] Well, Director, let me start with this. [1:07:16] Let me start with this. Let me start with this question. You asked what my question is. [1:07:20] Let me reclaim my time, Director. Come on. Do you know why Israel decided to strike that [1:07:26] infrastructure despite the fact that the president said it should be off limits? [1:07:30] I wouldn't, I wouldn't speak for Israel. And what do you guys know? We're at war. What do you guys know? [1:07:38] We'll have to take that for the record. Yes, let's take it for the record. [1:07:42] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the panelists here today. [1:07:45] Today is March 19th. On April 19th, FISA goes dark. 702 goes dark. And it's been talked about many times, [1:07:58] but up to 60 percent of the president's daily briefing is derived from FISA 702. And we look [1:08:06] at the successes that we've had in protecting the homeland and also the conflicts the U.S. has been [1:08:12] involved with. The flawless operation in Venezuela. Operation Fury in Iran. Troop protection. [1:08:21] The successes we've had on the battlefield in Ukraine. The recovery and release of the Hamas [1:08:30] hostages in the tunnels in Israel. All derived from FISA 702. There is not a military operation that we've [1:08:39] been involved with where FISA 702 was not, as Director Radcliffe has said, been indispensable [1:08:46] to the United States in the protection of our country. Director Patel has also said FISA 702 is [1:08:52] indispensable. We're 30 days away from it going dark. Director Radcliffe, can you clarify the [1:09:00] president's position on an 18-month clean reauthorization and how that's going to proceed moving forward? [1:09:06] Congressman, thank you. And thank you for highlighting this issue. So the president is in [1:09:12] favor of an 18-month clean reauthorization of FISA 702. And I would add to that, I'm heartened by the [1:09:22] fact to hear that the chairman of this committee and the ranking member are in agreement with that. [1:09:28] And I know there's bipartisan support for that, and there should be. And I know this is an important [1:09:34] vote for you to take, but I would ask that you all consider when you do that, that when you look [1:09:39] at the fact that former DNIs and former CIA directors and former FBI directors and DIA directors [1:09:48] and NSA directors across Republican and Democrat administrations are in support of FISA 702 in its [1:09:57] current form. These are the people that are making the decisions to keep Americans safe. And so I wish the [1:10:04] reauthorization was longer than 18 months, Congressman. I think that this is something that I wish you all [1:10:09] would consider for longer than that, so that regardless of who the president is, who the president is in the [1:10:15] future, he or she would have the benefit of, as you said, a tool that's indispensable across [1:10:22] administrations provides more than half of the important actionable intelligence that the president and [1:10:29] the commander in chief relies upon. Thank you for that. Director Gabbert, you're supportive of the [1:10:34] 18-month extension the president's seeking without a warrant requirement? That is the president's [1:10:40] position, and that is the position of the intelligence community. And you will be supporting that, correct? [1:10:44] I will support the president's decision to execute this. Correct. Thank you. Director Gabbert, [1:10:51] we implemented two years ago a number of reforms, actually 56 of them, that were part of the [1:10:56] Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, RISA. And that was done in a bipartisan way. That was a reflection [1:11:03] of what we thought were problems with FISA 702, going back during the first Trump administration and even [1:11:10] before that. These reforms that have been put in place and that you have helped implement, and we [1:11:17] wonder if you could talk specifically about those reforms on the cutting down of FBI agents having access to [1:11:24] querying of FISA information, the fact that there are criminal penalties now for FBI agents that are [1:11:30] engaged in inappropriate activity as it relates to FISA. Please tell us some of those reforms and how [1:11:36] those have been implemented. Director Patel. Sorry, I thought you were asking, D&I. Absolutely. So we've gone [1:11:46] above and beyond what RISA requires since I became director 13 months ago. We not only require supervisory [1:11:53] special agents to approve the query request of U.S. persons. We also require the general counsel's [1:12:00] office and lawyers to come in and agree with that request before we can proceed. Also, we used to, [1:12:06] before this, had a default which allowed queries when we were utilizing our system to say it automatically [1:12:12] searches 702. You now have to actually opt in and select that box to make sure that you are intentionally [1:12:20] doing so. On top of that, we've reduced the number of personnel at the FBI from 6,600 before I got there [1:12:26] to 3,500 that have access to it. Not that use it, but that have access to it. And we've also gone above [1:12:33] and beyond what RISA requires in terms of if you misuse it unintentionally or recklessly. If you use it [1:12:39] unintentionally, misuse it unintentionally, like you typed a name wrong in terms of spelling or whatnot, [1:12:44] you have to, your access is suspended and be retrained. If you recklessly use it, you're immediately [1:12:49] terminated your access forever. Thank you. Mr. Crowe. Thank you, Chairman. [1:12:56] Director Gabbard, it is your job and the job of your agency and department to assess the views of [1:13:03] Iranian leadership, their policy beliefs and policy positions, correct? Yes. [1:13:09] That includes now deceased Ali Khomeini of Iran, correct? Yes. [1:13:13] And the now leader, his son, Mujtaba Khomeini, correct? Yes. [1:13:18] The son is considered more of a hardliner than his father, isn't that correct? Yes. [1:13:25] So hardline that even some of Iran's leaders thought he was too aggressive, isn't that correct? [1:13:30] That is the intelligence community assessment, yes. [1:13:32] Mujtaba, the son, is particularly close to the brutal Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and their [1:13:37] most hardline commanders, correct? That is the intelligence community assessment. [1:13:41] He was involved in ordering violent crackdowns on Iranian protesters, including their murder, [1:13:46] correct? Yes. And we don't know if the son will continue his father's religious ban on developing [1:13:51] nuclear weapons, is that correct? It is unknown at this time. [1:13:54] You testified before this committee last year that the elder, now deceased, Khomeini had, in 2003, [1:14:03] banned the nuclear weapons program or suspended it, correct? There was a fatwa in place that stated that. [1:14:08] And that fatwa remained in place last year when you testified before this committee, correct? Yes. [1:14:13] And that fatwa remained in place recently, correct? As far as I know, it has not been lifted. [1:14:19] Yeah, you're aware of no information that would lift that fatwa? I'm not aware of any [1:14:24] intelligence reporting that states that. To be clear on the Mujtaba, the son who has been named to [1:14:31] replace him, it is unclear of his status or his involvement. He was injured very severely through one [1:14:39] of the Israeli strikes. And so the decision-making is unclear about what's happening in the Iranian [1:14:46] leadership. So it's unclear. So we're less certain of the positions of Iranian leadership [1:14:50] and their intentions than we were 60 days ago, correct? That's an accurate assessment. [1:14:56] One of your jobs is to create products assessing Iran and the threats it poses the United States, [1:15:03] correct? Yes. And that includes potential outcomes for military action, correct? [1:15:12] It includes potential outcomes of a variety of scenarios. [1:15:15] And the likelihood of those outcomes? Yes. [1:15:19] Generally, when you make assessments about threats facing the United States, you will look at, [1:15:25] in Iran, in any instance, the likely scenarios that have come out of military action, correct? [1:15:31] The intelligence community takes all of those factors into account when they create these [1:15:35] assessments. When you look at the threats posed by foreign countries, you also assess timelines to [1:15:41] those threats, correct? What do you mean by timelines? Like a breakout time, for example, [1:15:47] for nuclear weapons or the development of ballistic missiles. Yes, based on the information available [1:15:52] at any given time. In the timeline also for potential terrorist attacks, correct? Broadly, yes. [1:16:00] It is common practice for the IC to assess the timeline of all threats. Nuclear weapons development, [1:16:06] ballistic, right? Yes. Ballistic weapons development? Based on the information available, yes. [1:16:12] Terrorist attacks? Same applies. Cyber attacks? Timelines for all of those, correct? When there is [1:16:21] information available that point to that, yes. In likelihood, as well as the timeline, correct? Based on [1:16:28] the information available. Timing is important, is it not? It is an important factor that goes into the assessment. [1:16:35] So it is your position sitting here today that you made no timeline determination as to threats [1:16:44] that Iran had facing the United States, correct? That's a very broad statement, but where the [1:16:51] information is available, the intelligence community factors that into their assessment products. Did you [1:16:56] or the IC make any assessments as to the timing of potential threats facing the United States from Iran [1:17:04] in the last 90 days? I'm sure there was timelines factored into the intelligence assessments that [1:17:12] were delivered. Did any of them show imminence? The imminent nature of a threat is determined by [1:17:20] the president based on a totality of the intelligence and information provided to him. Did any of them [1:17:26] show that there were attacks anticipated within the next 90 days from Iran? It's too simplistic of a [1:17:32] statement to say that because it depends on various scenarios occurring or not occurring. Did those [1:17:38] assessments show timelines for the threats that Iran posed to the United States? The totality of threats, [1:17:46] yes. There were timelines involved where it applied and where that information was available. But again, [1:17:51] to your question about the determination of imminence, the president makes that determination based on the [1:17:56] totality of information and intelligence. The bottom line is there was no imminent threat, [1:18:00] and you know that, and there's no product that shows that. I yield back. Mr. Fitzpatrick. [1:18:07] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here today. I want to expand on the questioning [1:18:10] from my colleague, Mr. LaHood, regarding FASA 702. Obviously, it is the imminent issue right before us. [1:18:18] We'll expire in a month. Unequivocally, the most critical national security tool our nation has to [1:18:23] keep us safe from fentanyl, from foreign wars, and everything in between. Mainly to, you know, [1:18:31] to Director Ratcliffe, but any of you can answer this. One of the most perplexing debates that [1:18:36] I've been subject to in my time here is this debate over what warrants are and when they're needed. [1:18:43] In the 250-year history of this country, and going back to the very origins of law enforcement, [1:18:49] we have always had a warrant requirement, always had a warrant requirement on the collection of [1:18:55] evidence. We have never had a warrant requirement on the querying of already lawfully collected data, [1:19:02] which is why we don't require police officers to get warrants when they run license plates, [1:19:07] querying off of already lawfully collected DOT data. It's why we don't require police officers [1:19:14] to get a warrant to enter the evidence locker in their police precincts, which contains already [1:19:19] lawfully collected data. It would literally shut down the system. And that's not a warrant requirement, [1:19:25] that's a secondary warrant requirement. That's a warrant requirement on steroids. [1:19:29] So, Director Ratcliffe, for any of you, I know you've been subject to these questions as well. [1:19:35] Is it just a confusion over the difference between the collection of evidence versus the querying of [1:19:42] our already lawfully collected data? Is it a lack of understanding of what incidental collection is, [1:19:49] which is a fundamental precept of law enforcement? But if we have a warrant requirement on steroids, [1:19:56] for now, the querying of already lawfully collected data, just by the numbers, that would require an [1:20:02] expansion of the federal judiciary by a factor of 100. It would literally shut down our law [1:20:07] enforcement apparatus at perhaps the most dangerous time in our nation's history. So, [1:20:12] Director Ratcliffe, for any of you, if you could just walk me through your analysis there. [1:20:16] Well, I'll start. Congressman, thanks for the question. Again, thanks for highlighting this [1:20:21] important issue. And as has been pointed out, reforms should be implemented where they're necessary. [1:20:29] And I think, speaking for myself, and I know Director Patel supported the reforms from two years [1:20:35] ago to make improvements, and they did. And so some reforms should be considered. A warrant isn't one of [1:20:42] them. And with respect to the reforms that have been implemented, we're talking about, when we talk [1:20:51] about Fourth Amendment rights and privacy concerns, we're at a 99.9 percent compliance rate with respect [1:20:59] to that. So I would start by saying, why are you trying to fix what's not broken with something that I [1:21:06] can tell you from this seat? The fix would not work. And I go back to my comment before. DNIs, CIA [1:21:16] directors, FBI directors, the people that have been in all of these chairs before on a bipartisan basis [1:21:22] agree that a warrant won't work and don't advocate for it. You're, again, Congressman, you're correct. This [1:21:29] is lawfully collected information. And we have, these things come at you very fast. And you have to [1:21:36] make decisions very quickly and sometimes in a matter of hours. You have to act on the information [1:21:44] that you have lawfully, you know, that has been lawfully collected to interdict drug shipments or [1:21:50] terrorist activities. And a warrant requiring you to go to the court to seek probable cause [1:21:57] for information that has already been lawfully collected only prevents that from happening. I don't [1:22:01] understand. I understand that it's well-meaning for people that are proposing it. But again, I would [1:22:06] defer to the people who sit in these chairs and make these decisions who would tell you that it [1:22:11] doesn't work. Anybody else want to comment on the warrant requirement? So, Congressman, I'd love to [1:22:16] comment. Thanks. Thanks for the question. I do just want to add a couple of points, agree with everything [1:22:21] Director Radcliffe said. You know, not only is this already collected data on foreign personnel outside of [1:22:29] the United States, but the data that is being queried has also already been analyzed to ensure that it [1:22:37] contains foreign intelligence value, which I think is a very important part of this. And then when we [1:22:43] query a U.S. person term, we're not querying for U.S. person information. We're querying for foreign [1:22:50] intelligence that has already been evaluated at least once to contain foreign intelligence in the [1:22:56] database that's being accessed. And then the final piece that I think is important is that both the FISC [1:23:01] and the Department of Justice have established robust legal and compliance rules that we adhere to [1:23:09] and that is audited by DOJ for every query that we make. Thank you. I yield back. Dr. Barra. [1:23:16] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Gabber, we've known each other for a long time. We were both elected to [1:23:22] Congress in 2012 and served together for a while. I may not have always agreed with your positions, but I [1:23:29] respected the consistency of some of your positions. Director Gabber, following the January 3rd, 2020 [1:23:36] drone strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, you gave a speech on the House floor six days later on January [1:23:42] 9th, 2020. In this speech that is currently in the congressional record and available for anyone to view, [1:23:48] you stated, quote, President Trump has committed an illegal and unconstitutional act of war pushing our [1:23:56] nation headlong into a war with Iran without any authorization from Congress. A war that would be [1:24:02] so costly and devastating, it would make our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan look like a picnic. On February [1:24:09] 28th, 2026, the Trump administration, under which you are the president's principal intelligence advisor, [1:24:16] launched an illegal and unconstitutional act of war pushing our nation headlong into a war with Iran [1:24:22] without any authorization from Congress. This war has already been costly and devastating. 13 American [1:24:29] service members have lost their lives, including Chief Warrant Officer Robert Marzen from my home of [1:24:35] Sacramento, California. Approximately 200 service members have been wounded. The Pentagon reported that [1:24:41] the first six days of Operation Epic Fury cost $11.3 billion. That averages almost $2 billion per day. [1:24:50] That was the first six days. And now we're in the 19th day of this war. That's ballooned into a regional [1:24:56] conflict, putting the lives of Americans and our allies throughout the Middle East in danger. [1:25:01] Director Gabbard, do you still believe that strikes against Iran that don't have congressional [1:25:06] authorization constitute an illegal and unconstitutional act of war? Congressman, thank you for the [1:25:13] question. The cost of war weighs very heavily upon me and my colleagues here, especially for those of us [1:25:23] who have experienced and seen the cost of war firsthand. My own personal and political views, [1:25:29] as I mentioned earlier, I was asked and required by Congress and by the president in this role as the [1:25:37] director of national intelligence to check those views at the door to ensure that the intelligence [1:25:43] assessments are not colored by my personal views. And that's exactly what I'm responsible to deliver. [1:25:48] Do you still believe that war with Iran would be so costly and devastating that it would make our wars [1:25:53] in Iraq and Afghanistan look like a picnic? Once again, in this role, it is essential that I do not allow any of my [1:26:01] personal views on any issues to color or bias the intelligence reporting that we deliver to you and to [1:26:07] the president. Director Gabbard, in this hearing one year ago, I asked some questions. And I'll paraphrase [1:26:17] my exact question. It's like, we should keep politics out of this, even if the president disagrees [1:26:24] with a directive, if it goes against his personal wishes, if he's considering an order that potentially [1:26:29] is unconstitutional or illegal or compromises our security, I want your word that you will always [1:26:36] provide and give the honest advice to the president, even if it will make him angry. I asked you that [1:26:40] question. I'm going to read your answer. And to your specific question, the answer is yes. I will inform [1:26:48] the president of that accurate, timely, unbiased intelligence reporting, whether it is something that [1:26:54] agrees with an assumption or a view or an objective or not. That's my responsibility to him and [1:26:59] to the American people. Director Gabbard, did you there is no imminent threat of nuclear breakout? [1:27:08] Did you deliver that assessment to the president? I have delivered the intelligence community's [1:27:14] assessments to the president. There was no imminent nuclear threat to the United States. There was no [1:27:21] evidence of imminence that Iran was going to attack American assets. That was different from anything [1:27:28] they've done over four decades that was going to attack our homeland. There was no imminent threat. [1:27:33] Imminent is defined in the dictionary as something that is about to happen, not something that's been [1:27:40] happening for four decades, not something that is going to happen three months from now, not something [1:27:44] that's going to happen a year from now. Imminent said this is about to happen. Did you deliver [1:27:48] that assessment to the president? I delivered the intelligence community's objective analysis of [1:27:54] the threats, the severity of those threats, and the scope, along with assessments of the different [1:28:00] scenarios and contexts that exist within the Middle East. The president owes it to the American people [1:28:06] to go on television, to explain to the American people, to the service members who have died in [1:28:11] action serving our country, why we are at war with Iran. He needs to go on television and explain that [1:28:18] directly to the American people what the imminent threat was. [1:28:21] The gentleman's time has expired. I would advise the members that a vote has been called. It's a [1:28:28] single vote, and if members want to shuttle back and forth so we can maintain the continuity of the [1:28:33] hearing, we'll do that. So if you start to see it, just to our witnesses, you know how this works. [1:28:37] They'll be moving in and out to go address that vote and then returning to their seat. But [1:28:42] at this time, I recognize Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would [1:28:47] like to submit an article from Politico dated February 24th, 2026, and the title of it is [1:28:55] Head of State of the Union, Dems Demand, Trump Make Iran Plans Public. I think most Americans [1:29:01] understand that if the president of the United States makes those plans public, then the enemies [1:29:06] get to see them as well. Without objection, so or not. And that was the date of the State of the Union. [1:29:11] Director Patel, I'm going to come to you very quickly, and then I'm going to move on. But I [1:29:16] listened closely to Senator Langford's testimony yesterday about fraud and the other things that [1:29:24] are going on, and I want to bring your attention. This was in March 25th of 2024. An unsuspecting [1:29:33] Uber driver named Lalitha Tulanda Hall drove to a house near Columbus, Ohio to pick up a package. She [1:29:38] had no idea that the 81-year-old man who lived there had just received a series of phone calls [1:29:43] from scammers who had threatened to kill him if he did not give the woman coming to his house [1:29:48] $12,000 in cash. He killed the lady, so she's dead. He now has a life sentence. Are you aware [1:29:56] of any action or investigation that the Justice Department has taken to pursue justice to bring [1:30:02] the scammers and put them and make them pay for what they did? I think you're referring to Congressman [1:30:09] Scam Centers and Scam Compounds that are wreaking havoc on our citizens. I'm referring to this individual [1:30:14] case. This lady was murdered and a man now has life in prison. I can't speak to that individual [1:30:19] case. I can tell you what we're doing generally if you wish, but as you said. No, sir. I want to bring [1:30:23] that case to your attention. I think that we need to pursue that. Someone is dead and someone else has [1:30:27] life in prison, and it was the scammers that did it. My heart goes out to both families, but the [1:30:34] scammers are the ones that need to pay the price. They're the guilty party here. Director Gabbard, you [1:30:40] made a lot of changes at ODNI, changes that I think were necessary that I want to give you the chance to [1:30:45] talk about. So what concrete steps in ODNI 2.0, what are they taking to address politicization, [1:30:54] weaponization of intelligence, and unauthorized leaks, and how will these reforms help rebuild [1:30:59] public trust in the intelligence community and help the United States of America? [1:31:03] Thank you very much for the question, Congressman. I committed to all of you before taking this role [1:31:09] that I would execute on that, to bring back ODNI's focus on its core mission, to cut the fat, to cut [1:31:16] away any detractions away from that, and to ensure that our intelligence community was providing objective, [1:31:22] timely, and relevant intelligence to the president and to policymakers. I conducted a ground-based review [1:31:30] of the mission, the capabilities, and measuring effectiveness of ODNI, which resulted in a reduction [1:31:37] of force by roughly 40 percent, and a narrowing of focus and reorganization that consolidated and [1:31:44] coordinated the experts within the ODNI in order to be able to deliver those effects. Leaking continues [1:31:53] to be a prolific problem across the IC. We have and continue to implement tools and capabilities within [1:32:02] the Zero Trust framework to be able to get after those leakers and refer them to the Department of [1:32:08] Justice for investigation and prosecution. We've seen, we are continuing to focus on the issue of [1:32:18] analytic tradecraft and the integrity of it, once again, to make sure that the analysis that's being [1:32:24] conducted is not being colored by anyone's political or personal views on any issue. To that effect, we have [1:32:32] and continue to conduct re-looks at different intelligence products that have been provided in [1:32:38] the past, as the chairman mentioned, one related to anomalous health incidents, to identify politicization [1:32:46] of these products in the past, and also make updates to intelligence community directives to ensure that [1:32:52] these things don't happen again. Could you speak briefly to China's presence in the Caribbean and the [1:32:59] western hemisphere? I'll be able to speak to this more in the classified setting, sir. Okay. Director [1:33:07] Ratcliffe, I'm going to have questions for you there as well. We do not, we have not heard much about [1:33:12] Haiti lately in the news, but it's very close to the United States. My understanding is that one in four [1:33:18] Haitians, about two and a half million people, now live in an area controlled by an armed group. [1:33:23] Can you speak to what is happening in Haiti? Yes, sir. This was something that [1:33:28] we talked about within the annual threat assessment. Haiti along with Cuba continue to be areas of [1:33:36] volatility. Haiti, as you mentioned specifically, is being controlled by a gang, and we've seen [1:33:41] increasing threats on U.S. persons within Haiti. These two countries continue to create challenges [1:33:48] where, with increased instability, may be one of those drivers of increased migration flows to the U.S. [1:33:54] Thank you all for your service. Gentlemen, time's expired. Now recognize Mr. Gottheimer. [1:34:01] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I can start by talking about something I was disappointed in [1:34:10] from the administration about comments made by members of the administration that Israel drew [1:34:15] the United States into conflict with Iran, seeming to buy conspiracy theories that scapegoat Israel, [1:34:20] while dismissing that Iran poses a persistent threat to America and our service members and diplomats [1:34:25] in the region. While the president then clarified this is not the case and that America entered into [1:34:30] a joint operations with our ally under our own accord, many still seem confused about what precipitated [1:34:35] this conflict and the threat Iran posed to us directly. So if I could ask Director Radcliffe just [1:34:40] a couple questions, yes or no, if that's okay with you. Is the Iranian regime committed to America's [1:34:44] destruction, in your opinion? Yes. Does the Iranian regime have American blood on their hand since [1:34:49] its founding in 1979? Yes. Has Iran plotted assassination attempts against Americans on [1:34:54] American soil? Yes. Was Iran developing a nuclear weapon prior to our military action last June, [1:34:59] and did Iran remain committed to developing a nuclear weapon in the lead up to this conflict? [1:35:03] Yes. So I want to clarify on that because there's been much talk about about a fatwa against the [1:35:10] development of a nuclear weapon. Can you come back to that one second? Let me finish the season. [1:35:13] Yes, you bet. If left unchecked, do you think Iran would have the ability to develop missiles capable of [1:35:17] reaching the United States? Yes. Did Israel force the U.S.'s hand and make us take action as some [1:35:22] have claimed? No. Director Gabbert, do you agree with the CIA's director assessment on that last [1:35:27] question in particular? Yes. Great. Do you want to go back to that point you want to make? Yeah, [1:35:31] much had been made by some about a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding the [1:35:37] fatwa, what we know, and the intelligence community is in agreement on this, is that Iran possesses at least [1:35:44] 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to weapons grade 60 percent, which doesn't have a civilian use. The [1:35:52] only use for that would be the development of nuclear weapons. Thank you, Director. Director Gabbert, [1:35:58] I want to raise serious concerns about your recent hiring of Dan Caldwell, a strict critic of U.S. [1:36:02] foreign policy in the Middle East, who's argued that U.S. forces in the Middle East are, quote, [1:36:05] more of a burden than a benefit, has claimed that Iran's nuclear program does not pose a risk to [1:36:09] America despite the ISC's assessment to the contrary. Dan has also said that our relationship [1:36:14] with Israel has no benefit to American national security. This follows the resignation of Joe [1:36:18] Kent this week, a senior ally of yours who is a conspiracy theorizing white supremacist with a [1:36:22] tattoo panzer referring to Nazi tanks. He has made known his backwards opinions of Israel in his [1:36:28] resignation letter, scapegoating them for U.S. intervention in Iran and Iraq. Director, what role [1:36:33] do you anticipate Mr. Caldwell playing in shaping intelligence assessments or internal discussions [1:36:37] related to Iran and Israel? And can you guarantee to this committee that no individuals in your [1:36:41] leadership are undermining the objective objectivity of intelligence at this critical moment? [1:36:46] Sir, my understanding is one of my elements sought to hire Dan Caldwell months ago for a purely [1:36:54] administrative role that would not have any position over the intelligence analysis or assessments on [1:37:01] any topic. Thank you. Director, as you know, the Iranian regime has been responsible for the deaths that [1:37:07] we've talked about of scores of Americans since coming to power in 79. Iran's terror proxies must be [1:37:12] crushed. I've been clear on that point in the last weeks and throughout my time in Congress. I supported [1:37:18] the decisive action taken on February 28th to remove key regime leaders and degrade Iran's ballistic missile [1:37:24] and naval capabilities. However, I think it's really important the administration make its goals clear [1:37:28] to Congress and to the American people. Director, were you in a meeting to discuss a possible strike on Iran? [1:37:34] Congressman, there were several meetings that were held in advance. I'm sure I was in at least some of [1:37:42] them. Did the intelligence community brief the president on the potential impacts a conflict could [1:37:48] have on global supply chains and on oil and gas prices prior to the outbreak of hostilities? [1:37:53] Yes. Were you in a meeting? Were you in any meetings where that came up? [1:37:58] Yes. That is the intelligence community's assessments and those were provided. Director, did the IC, [1:38:04] Director Radcliffe, if I can ask this to you, did the IC brief the president on who would succeed the [1:38:08] Supreme Leader if he was killed and the likelihood that our replacement would be a hardliner? [1:38:16] Did the IC brief the president on who would succeed the Supreme Leader if he was killed [1:38:20] and the likelihood that our replacement would be a hardliner or could be a hardliner? [1:38:25] So, to be clear, the president's objectives with respect to Operation Epic Fury did not [1:38:30] include regime change. That may be different from what Israel's objectives were, but you can – but [1:38:36] yes, the president was briefed in the event that Supreme Leader – [1:38:39] That's good. That's great. Thank you so much. I'm sorry to cut you off. I just have 20 seconds. [1:38:43] Director Patel, does Iran pose a threat to the homeland and what specific steps are you taking to [1:38:47] detect, prevent, and disrupt terrorist plots targeting Americans at home? [1:38:52] Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terror, does pose a continuing threat to the homeland. [1:38:56] And just last year, our Iran threat mission center housed in the FBI, our fusion cell, [1:39:01] saw 43% increase in Iranian spy actors willing to steal our information and attack our citizens. [1:39:07] So, that's just one example, sir. Thank you. I yield. Dr. Jackson. [1:39:12] Good morning. First off, I want to say thank you all for your time today and thank you for our [1:39:19] service to our country. Much appreciated. I thank the chairman for his opening remarks on [1:39:27] anomalous health incidents, AHI. As many of you are aware, one of my primary responsibilities [1:39:35] in this particular committee, I am the subcommittee chairman of Oversight and Investigations, [1:39:41] where the investigation of AHI is and has been a central oversight effort. So, I am going to ask a [1:39:48] quick question about this. Director Ratcliffe, during the Biden administration, the CIA very poorly, [1:39:54] in my opinion, handled this issue. Since then, a CIA doctor has provided perjured testimony under oath and [1:40:02] obstructed our congressional investigation. A quick question for you. Do you affirm that the CIA personnel [1:40:08] are under no direction to make false statements to Congress in order to conceal CIA equities or [1:40:13] activities related to the handling of AHI during the Biden administration? Yes. Thank you, sir. I appreciate [1:40:19] that. I want to ask Mr. Patel, I got a question for you here. As a member of this committee, I also have a [1:40:26] regional responsibility that includes Africa. I'm very concerned about the radical Islamic terror threat [1:40:33] that exists there and is growing by the day. Whether it's Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups such as JNMI, AQIM, [1:40:40] Al-Shabaab, or ISIS-inspired groups such as ISIS-West Africa, ISIS-Shahel, ISIS-Somalia, or Boko Haram. [1:40:47] These are radical, dangerous groups that want to kill Americans. After four years of an open border during [1:40:53] the Biden administration, where we know countless individuals with terror ties, many to these groups [1:40:59] across our southern border, and at a time when we are actively engaged with the largest state sponsor [1:41:06] of radical jihadi terror, can you confirm that the threat to the American people in this setting [1:41:12] is much higher due to the Democrats' current defunding of the Department of Homeland Security? [1:41:17] As I highlighted earlier, Congressman, the FBI works hand-in-glove with the Department of Homeland [1:41:23] Security and our 59 established Homeland Security Task Forces around the country, [1:41:27] and those officers are now going one month without pay, but they're still showing up to work. But yes, [1:41:32] funding would absolutely help us protect the homeland. Thank you. I appreciate that. [1:41:38] One more question. Anyone that feels inclined can answer this, but according to the Council on Foreign [1:41:43] Relations, another Africa-related question, 51 percent of global terrorism-related deaths occurred in [1:41:48] Africa's Sahel region, including the Lake Chad Basin. Does the intelligence community assess that Boko Haram, [1:41:54] ISIS West Africa, and other terrorist groups operating in the Lake Chad Basin are a threat [1:41:58] to the U.S. interests, whether it's here in the homeland or regional U.S. interests? If so, [1:42:03] how does this lack of counterterrorism cooperation that we're currently experiencing with the allied [1:42:08] states of the Sahel, Niger, Mali, and Burkino Faso impact that? And tied to that, how does the rise of [1:42:16] alternative security forces such as Russia's Wagner Group, or now Africa Corps, how has that impacted our [1:42:22] counterterrorism efforts in the region? Congressman, the continued rise of these Islamist terrorist groups, [1:42:31] as you've pointed out, in Africa, West Africa, and around the world, continues to be a serious concern [1:42:37] and major focus of the intelligence community. The challenges within the region are very complex [1:42:42] because they have to do with governance challenges in many of these countries. They have to do with [1:42:47] economic challenges, as well as external influences, both with funding and equipping of these terrorist [1:42:54] organizations. So, yes, it has made our counterterrorism, longstanding counterterrorism [1:43:00] efforts in these regions, as well as those of our allies in this fight, such as the French and other [1:43:05] countries, far more difficult because of the very real threat within that region to U.S. persons. [1:43:15] If we are not able, if the U.S., if the Department of War is not able to coordinate with and get the [1:43:20] support of the governments of these countries in order to tackle this terrorist threat, then it's [1:43:26] not a safe or operable environment for them to continue that fight. Thank you. And the assumption I'm [1:43:32] working off of, too, is that the Russian influence via Wagner or Africa Corps has made it very difficult [1:43:39] for us to develop those relationships and get those agreements so that we can continue to, you know, [1:43:45] make sure that we're not – this is not being brought home to the homeland. Is that correct? [1:43:47] That is a factor of many. Thank you. I appreciate it. I yield back. Ms. Houlihan. [1:43:57] Thank you. My question is basically starting with some HR questions, and they're first for Director Patel. [1:44:06] If you could help me a little bit understand – I come out of the military-military family, as well, [1:44:11] but I don't know very much about the FBI's HR process or the growing up of an FBI expert. Could you help [1:44:19] me understand how long it takes for a senior counterintelligence expert – especially one [1:44:24] maybe focused on a very narrow threat – to be developed? How many years, I guess, would be my [1:44:29] question? Thank you, Congresswoman. That varies. Sometimes right out of Quantico, new agent trainees [1:44:34] are placed on the counterintelligence mission set, and some people come in from the fraud section, [1:44:38] so the answer varies. It could take a couple months to a couple years. And the next question is, [1:44:43] when a person comes up in your system in the military, it was always the needs of the Navy or the needs of the [1:44:48] Air Force. It was never the needs of the airmen or the soldier or the sailor. In terms of prioritizing [1:44:54] our readiness, in terms of making sure that we have met the mission, is the FBI similar? [1:45:00] It is similar, ma'am. It's a dynamic threat landscape, so we flux and surge based on the CICT [1:45:05] cyber threats and other threats to the homeland, and violent crime mission has seen a surge as well. [1:45:10] So my specific question is that there was a report that came out in February from CNN that the FBI had [1:45:18] let go or fired dozens of agents and staff members from a counterintelligence unit tasked with [1:45:23] monitoring Iran. And apparently the reason, at least reported in the press, was that these individuals [1:45:29] had been involved in the investigation of classified document handling from President Trump at Mar-a-Lago, [1:45:36] and that this was the reason why they were summarily let go. First of all, are you aware of those [1:45:42] firings, and do you concur with the rationale or reason for those firings? I'm aware of that, [1:45:48] and I know there's a pendency of litigation, so I'm not able to comment on them. Did you yourself order [1:45:53] those firings? The FBI, every time there is someone who violates their code of conduct or ethical standard, [1:46:00] conducts an internal investigation with the careers there, and they present a decision point to me. [1:46:06] The Iranian threat mission center has seen an increase of 43 percent in arrests for Iranian spy actors, [1:46:12] so the Iranian threat mission center has never been stronger. So I'm not asking about, I'm asking [1:46:18] about whether those people were fired because they were involved in the investigation of the document [1:46:23] handling by President Trump, not for any behavior issues. Is that your understanding as well? Again, [1:46:29] ma'am, I can't comment on them because those are in pending litigation. I guess I'm a little stymied [1:46:36] here, Director, because it feels as though right literally when there was a possible pending war, [1:46:42] I'm outside of this intelligence circle in many ways, even though I serve on the Intelligence Committee. [1:46:49] You collectively must have been aware when these firings happened that there was a meaningful [1:46:54] chance that the U.S. might be engaged with a war in Iran, and having these very expert, super qualified [1:47:00] folks summarily dismissed at this time, it just feels like an odd choice in timing. Were you aware at the [1:47:07] time that this was going down that this may end up weakening the mission and the readiness of that [1:47:12] group? The mission, as I stated, has never been stronger when you see a 43 percent increase in [1:47:17] counterintelligence arrests and 21 percent increase in cyber arrests against the Iranian threat mission [1:47:23] center. My focus is on providing the American people as strong as the FBI as possible. I don't [1:47:27] work on timelines, I work on evidence that's presented to me. I guess my concern is that it feels as [1:47:32] though, and I very much honor the tone and tenor of this hearing, that this is about making sure that [1:47:40] that we depoliticize what is the most important thing that we all do, which is keep us safe, [1:47:46] and it feels as though this issue is a political issue, and I just am worried that we are taking [1:47:53] really good, really qualified people and picking fights with one another across party lines, [1:48:01] rather than making sure that we protect ourselves and keep ourselves safe. With the remainder of my [1:48:06] time, Director Gabbard, I have a question regarding the fact that the Secretary of the Treasury loosened [1:48:10] restrictions this week on Russian oil exports, and now that the Russians are able to sell oil again. [1:48:17] Did the IC assess that clearing the way for increased Russian oil sales would benefit Moscow, possibly? [1:48:22] I don't believe there's been a formal IC assessment on this topic yet, as it is underway. [1:48:31] So I would highly encourage that, because it feels as though, by easing these sanctions, [1:48:36] we are directly providing the Kremlin with revenue, the revenue that will be used directly to kill [1:48:42] Ukrainian soldiers, and an increased likelihood that Putin will be successful in his war with Ukraine. [1:48:48] I thank you for your time, and I yield. [1:48:51] Ms. Wagner. [1:48:52] I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today. [1:49:02] As we sit here in Washington, our armed forces and our intelligence assets are engaged in conflict with [1:49:11] the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, Iran, a radical, ruthless and murderous regime [1:49:20] that has killed and maimed thousands of United States troops and citizens over the past 50 years. [1:49:31] CIA Director Ratcliffe, can you elaborate for the American people on the threat that Iran posed [1:49:40] to our American personnel in the region prior to Operation Epic Fury to the extent you can in open hearing? [1:49:52] Sure, Congresswoman. Happy to address that. [1:49:55] I think as well-documented and as you've encapsulated, Iran has been a constant threat for the last 47 years. [1:50:03] Hundreds, if not thousands, of Americans killed, certainly thousands of Americans maimed as a result of [1:50:09] activities of Iran and its IRGC over the years, but particularly no cessation with respect to [1:50:20] the threats to U.S. interests and forces in the region, not just from Iran but from its proxies, [1:50:26] from Iraqi militia groups like Qatab Hezbollah, Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, [1:50:34] all of these proxies, if you will, of the Iranian regime funded by the Iranian regime [1:50:42] committing assaults and attacks on American interests persistently. [1:50:47] So they did pose? [1:50:49] Absolutely. [1:50:51] An absolute threat? [1:50:52] A constant and immediate threat at all times. [1:50:55] Thank you. General Adams, as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, [1:51:00] can you inform the American people about the threat our armed forces have eliminated thus far? [1:51:07] Yes, ma'am. [1:51:10] Representative Wagner, thanks for the question. [1:51:12] And I will like to go in detail. [1:51:15] I'm going to cover a little bit here. [1:51:17] We will be able to cover more detail in the classified session. [1:51:20] But the goals that the President has set out and that have been accomplished and executed by the [1:51:26] Central Command were aligned along the DNI's discussion earlier. [1:51:34] One, eliminate their ability to power project. [1:51:38] And that was inclusive of ballistic missiles, but it also includes their UASs. [1:51:44] And so we have been very effective. [1:51:45] We can talk about specific numbers in the closed session. [1:51:50] Okay. [1:51:50] Their ability to reproduce both missiles and UASs has been – we've been very effective. [1:51:57] And you can tell from the news – in fact, the Chairman talked about it this morning – we have [1:52:03] sunk their navy. And so those specific objectives have been very well accomplished and will go into [1:52:09] great detail in the closed session. [1:52:10] General Hartman, as Acting Director of the National Security Agency, can you explain how weakening [1:52:16] the Iranian regime is impacting the availability of resources to our adversaries like China? [1:52:26] Mike, please. [1:52:27] Hey, thanks for the question. [1:52:31] Obviously not able to go into any classified discussion here. [1:52:36] But certainly weakening the regime and weakening the collaboration between Iran, China, Russia, [1:52:44] other adversaries has a global effect of making the world safer. [1:52:48] Yes, thank you very much. [1:52:50] Thank you for all your insights, and thank you for keeping our troops and our American people safe. [1:52:56] As you know, I chair the first-ever subcommittee on open-source intelligence. [1:53:01] Over the past year, our subcommittee has been working tirelessly to ensure the intelligence [1:53:06] community is leveraging the vast amount of commercially available information to the [1:53:10] highest degree of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. [1:53:13] Director Ratcliffe, as the CIA, is the functional manager of open-source intelligence. [1:53:18] Does the CIA know which data has been acquired across all agencies within the IC? [1:53:25] Thanks for the question, Congresswoman. [1:53:27] As you know, the CIA's open-source enterprise is driving the open-source collection [1:53:35] across the entire IC in support of the administration's top priorities. [1:53:39] Two of those priorities I've already talked about, counter-narcotics and threats from adversaries, [1:53:46] use of emerging technologies. [1:53:47] Those collections, as a result of our open-source, are up 70 percent and 40 or 45 percent collectively. [1:53:55] The CIA does lead the IC in pioneering new uses of AI to extract insights from the vast amounts of [1:54:07] open-source data that are there that we then share with analysts, war fighters, everyone across the IC. [1:54:12] I thank you. [1:54:13] My time has expired. [1:54:14] I have a lot more questions dealing with open-source that we will do in closed session. [1:54:17] So I thank you. [1:54:18] I yield back, Mr. Chairman. [1:54:19] Before I recognize Mr. Gomez, I want to make sure that all members have had an opportunity to vote, [1:54:23] because they are prepared to close that vote on the floor. [1:54:25] If you haven't, please go do so at this time. [1:54:29] It looks like we're good. [1:54:31] All right, Mr. Gomez. [1:54:33] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:54:34] I just want to get right into it. [1:54:36] Director Gabbard, last year you testified that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon. [1:54:41] Do you stand by that statement? [1:54:44] Yes or no? [1:54:46] Context matters with that statement. [1:54:48] Yes or no. [1:54:48] Iran had all of the materials and capabilities to do so. [1:54:52] Mr. Chairman, I reclaim my time. [1:54:55] It's an easy answer. [1:54:56] You either stand by what you said last year or not. [1:54:59] It is a serious question that requires the totality of the information available. [1:55:02] Director Gabbard, I reclaim my time. [1:55:04] I reclaim my time. [1:55:09] When President Trump was asked about your testimony, he said you were wrong. [1:55:14] Were you lying or not? [1:55:16] I stand by the intelligence community's complete assessment. [1:55:21] Director Ratcliffe, when it came to the director's testimony, she said that [1:55:27] Iran was not building a nuclear weapon last spring in Congress. [1:55:32] And so the Supreme Leader has not authorized the nuclear weapons program. [1:55:38] Do you agree with what she said or not? [1:55:41] Yes or no? [1:55:41] The director's right here. [1:55:42] She can speak for herself. [1:55:44] Oh, so I thought this was an intelligence community briefing. [1:55:50] Let's move on. [1:55:52] Trump also said he didn't care what you thought or said. [1:55:56] Should he care about what you have to say when it comes to intelligence? [1:56:01] I continue to provide the president with the intelligence community's assessments on all matters. [1:56:07] So let me just kind of get this straight. [1:56:09] The department, you said that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon last year. [1:56:17] President Trump said he didn't care what you thought and you were wrong. [1:56:22] They engaged in Operation Midnight Hammer. [1:56:25] He then says it was obliterated. [1:56:27] We hear later reports that in open source reporting that it was only set back by a few months. [1:56:35] Then at the beginning of this war, he said that they were weeks away. [1:56:40] I just want to kind of get a sense of were they weeks away of achieving a nuclear weapon? [1:56:48] Yes or no? [1:56:50] Congressman, this is a serious matter. [1:56:52] And you've made some very serious mischaracterizations. [1:56:55] Yes or no? [1:56:56] Were they weeks away? [1:56:57] Yes or no? [1:56:57] It would be a disservice to you and the American people to answer this question with Amir, yes or no? [1:57:01] Reclaiming my time. [1:57:02] Reclaiming my time. [1:57:02] Were they weeks away or not? [1:57:03] The American people need to know if this was an imminent threat or not. [1:57:08] If they're weeks away or not. [1:57:10] If they're months away or not. [1:57:12] None of this dodging. [1:57:14] Were they an imminent threat? [1:57:16] Yesterday, you said that only the president, [1:57:19] the only person who can determine what is an imminent threat is the president of the United States. [1:57:28] Do you stand by that statement? [1:57:30] Yes, I do. [1:57:31] Director Ratcliffe, do you agree with that assessment? [1:57:36] That the president is the only person that can determine if something is an imminent threat or not? [1:57:40] The president's commander in chief gets to make a decision about what's an imminent threat. [1:57:45] The intelligence community has provided a body of intelligence that supports the decision that the president made. [1:57:54] The reason why is that if the president can determine and ignore what you're doing, [1:57:58] why do you guys even have a job? [1:58:00] Why do you even advise them? [1:58:03] So you're saying tomorrow the president of the United States can say China is an imminent threat, [1:58:09] and then he can take his own, no matter what the intelligence says, he can take his own action. [1:58:14] So that's what you're basically saying. [1:58:16] Okay, let's go on. [1:58:17] Director Gabbard, you said that North Korea has intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach [1:58:24] the homeland. [1:58:25] Yet, the Defense Department said that Iran was at least 10 years away from achieving an [1:58:32] intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the homeland. [1:58:36] Which one is a more serious threat? [1:58:38] North Korea or Iran? [1:58:40] North Korea? [1:58:43] North Korea? [1:58:44] North Korea, we're going to be on. [1:58:45] These threats are taken within the context of the of the total body of intelligence reporting. [1:58:49] So, so that's, it should be, and that's my, that's my point. [1:58:55] It's not just about having the capability of building a weapon. [1:59:00] It's just they can actually deliver that weapon. [1:59:02] If they can, they, they have the intention of doing that. [1:59:07] How many weeks away are they? [1:59:09] I haven't like we haven't we haven't heard that there were weeks away we [1:59:15] haven't heard that there are months away we're like but that's what we're [1:59:20] waiting for imminent to me means is that they're they're mobilizing troops [1:59:26] they're moving things into position artillery there are they're getting [1:59:30] getting ready to attack but everything that we've heard is that this is not the [1:59:36] case gentlemen's time is expired mr. Klein thank you mr. chairman thank you [1:59:43] all for being here and for the work you do it's a marvel that just one year of [1:59:48] strong leadership from the White House has shifted the conversation in this room [1:59:50] from that of appeasement and passivity from the Biden administration that of [1:59:54] American strength brought about by the doctrine in Venezuela and operation Eric [1:59:59] epic fury in Iran and it's not lost on me that as we sit here we have one side of [2:00:04] the dais talking a big game on threats and yet they're unwilling to even fund our [2:00:08] Department of Homeland Security I want to thank President Trump's leadership in [2:00:12] each of your efforts because of your efforts Americans are safer today with [2:00:15] two less despots to deal with nevertheless there remains work to be [2:00:18] done while Venezuela and Iran are in decline aggression from adversarial [2:00:22] nations like China and Russia and near constant threats of terrorism and [2:00:25] cyber warfare continue to persist the Chinese Communist Party in particular [2:00:32] remains a top adversary that routinely deals in bad faith and this was [2:00:35] highlighted most recently by White House office director of national drug [2:00:38] control policy Sarah Carter when she delivered recent remarks in Vienna saying quote we [2:00:44] know that China's weak export controls and lacks enforcement allow its chemical [2:00:47] industry to foster friendships with the drug cartels at the same time China's [2:00:51] overtly overly effective controls over rare earth minerals we wreak havoc on [2:00:56] legitimate industries end quote of course we're now seeing reports of a new [2:01:00] synthetic opioid called cyclorphine that is said to be ten times more potent than [2:01:05] fentanyl and undetectable on fentanyl test strips as you know President Trump may [2:01:09] meet with President Xi in the near future where trade and export controls [2:01:13] will most certainly be discussed director Gabbert what is your assessment of the [2:01:20] quality and quantity of AI compute that China can indigenously manufacture the [2:01:30] majority of this question should be addressed in a closed hearing we the [2:01:35] intelligence community's assessment is that China continues to rapidly advance [2:01:39] its AI capability do you assess that export controls on semiconductor [2:01:44] manufacturing equipment and AI compute have been effective slowing the [2:01:49] development and deployment of Chinese AI the intelligence community's [2:01:53] assessment is that one of the effects of those export controls is China has [2:01:58] increased its focus on developing its own organic capability what do you assess [2:02:04] would be the economic and national security impacts if the u.s. decided to loosen [2:02:09] export controls and allow the sale of Nvidia blackwell GPUs or large numbers of [2:02:14] h-200s to China I don't believe there is an intelligence community assessment on [2:02:20] that specific scenario I think that these national security implications should be [2:02:25] weighed heavily when conducting these talks considering that fentanyl overdoses are [2:02:28] only down in the u.s. thanks to the president's leadership in securing our [2:02:32] borders and taking the fight directly the cartels in our hemisphere and not the [2:02:36] empty words and actions of the Chinese Communist Party our adversaries are [2:02:42] constantly conducting cyber operations on u.s. government and private sector [2:02:46] networks to steal information and money or conduct disruptive cyber attacks we've [2:02:51] just been tracking the Chinese typhoon actors for several years and just last [2:02:55] week the Wall Street Journal reported that salt typhoon actors which were [2:02:58] responsible for targeting u.s. telecom may have access sensitive FBI [2:03:01] networks I may have more to follow up on in the closed session for now I want to [2:03:06] discuss how the overall u.s. government posture is going to change based on [2:03:09] president Trump's cyber strategy which was released last week been frustrated for [2:03:13] some time about the unwillingness of prior administrations to decisively take [2:03:17] action including the use of offensive cyber operations director Patel beginning [2:03:22] with you what can we expect from the FBI moving forward to be more aggressive on [2:03:25] both defensive and offensive cyber activity thank you congressman so as you [2:03:30] stated the president just launched a new national security cyber strategy and [2:03:33] within that is what the FBI just launched 60 days ago it's the most [2:03:37] comprehensive cyber program we've ever put out called winter shield and what we [2:03:40] do connecting pillar one and pillar four of the president's strategies is go on [2:03:44] offense and defense and so what we've done already is while we are always going [2:03:48] after nation-state actors we also have to engage with the private sector [2:03:52] communities because they are going after the private sector as well we've held [2:03:55] 355 engagements in the last 60 days with enterprises across America to [2:04:00] harden their networks and as you recall just a couple of months ago our banking [2:04:04] infrastructure was hit by a ransomware attack from overseas in one weekend the [2:04:09] FBI disrupted and kicked off every one of those bad actors from that network [2:04:13] saving the American people their valued billions in those bank vaults so this is [2:04:17] some of the things we're doing but we need constant engagement with the private [2:04:21] sector great general Hartman what efforts are underway at NSA to bolster [2:04:25] intelligence collection and threat detection and coordination with other [2:04:28] federal agencies to target adversary cyber operations congressman that recently [2:04:34] significant effort to to really focus our cyber security director working very closely with [2:04:42] director Patel and the our cyber security collaboration center which has thousands of [2:04:48] analyst-to-analyst relationships with private organizations across the country we we need [2:04:53] more work not just from an offensive standpoint but working across government and certainly [2:04:58] working across private industry and we're both dedicated and resourced to doing that [2:05:02] congressman thank you for what you do your back gentleman yields mr. [2:05:05] Quigley thank you lightning round please general I understand tomorrow is your last day before [2:05:10] retirement yes congress I can think of better ways to finish things for you but we [2:05:15] appreciate your being here I want to respectfully ask you and each of you if you have full-time [2:05:21] personnel dedicated to analyzing and collecting foreign threats on the 2026 elections and if so just yes or no and how many [2:05:32] personnel we have congressman I'll get yes I'll get you the exact number but certainly we have people paying attention to those right thank you [2:05:40] congressman yes we have an election crimes coordinator in each one of our 56 field [2:05:45] offices and election crimes coordinators at headquarters thank you yes we have [2:05:49] personnel dedicated both to election security as well as foreign intelligence [2:05:53] related to election influence thank you yes we do as well I don't know the [2:05:59] numbers but what we do collect then we contribute to the larger IC coordination [2:06:05] thank you representative quickly we do not to my knowledge have anyone at DA on that [2:06:12] topic a question again for all of you well first director Gabbard you've seen the [2:06:20] reports about whether or not Russia has helped around in targeting in the current [2:06:26] war in Iran can you confirm that or is that something we're going to save for a [2:06:31] closed session we'll save that for the closed session sir but within that context [2:06:36] on CNBC Steve Witkoff said on a recent call with President Trump Russian leaders [2:06:46] deny they were sharing this target information shock surprise all that they [2:06:50] would do that about US military assets with the Iranians mr. Witkoff said so you [2:06:55] know quote we can take them at their word let's hope they're not doing this just [2:07:02] from your own sense and for many of you who have been fighting in the Cold War for [2:07:07] a long time long lost sense of a Russian of a Reagan doctrine just general it is [2:07:15] your sense that you can take Putin at his word on anything involving military [2:07:23] diplomatic or Intel assessments hey congressman from a intelligence [2:07:32] standpoint we don't take anyone at their word from a foreign standpoint we execute [2:07:37] intelligence operations to to provide that information decision makers I [2:07:42] appreciate that mr. Patel director I agree with the general yes I agree we don't [2:07:50] take anyone at their word and from an intelligence standpoint we don't rely on [2:07:55] single sources of intelligence and always look for multiple sources to confirm [2:08:00] director yeah congressman I actually answered this question yesterday I don't [2:08:05] take Putin Xi Kim Jong-un supreme leader any foreign adversary leader at their [2:08:11] word rely on our intelligence to reflect what those adversaries are actually doing [2:08:17] general we absolutely do not take any of those enemies at their word can I get a [2:08:23] hallelujah mr. Gabbard let me I understand that you have to put your own [2:08:31] personal views aside in your position but I honestly think that the issue our [2:08:38] grandchildren are going to be most upset about us with is climate change so you [2:08:43] know you know your quote and when you talked about climate change as a member [2:08:49] it threatens the safety and security of the planet especially in places like [2:08:52] Hawaii where we already experience in its devastating effects but respectfully it [2:08:57] it's not in worldwide threats used to be in worldwide threats so let me help me [2:09:05] just help me understand who makes the final decision on what goes in here and what [2:09:10] is a threat congressman it's a collection of the intelligence community's assessments [2:09:17] that the National Intelligence Council and our experts there work on this year [2:09:22] we've structured the annual threat assessment around the president's [2:09:25] national security strategy to address the most tangible and direct threats to [2:09:31] our security and our interests I get that part did you make the case that [2:09:36] maybe climate change should be considered a worldwide threat when we are this [2:09:41] collective process did you make the case with what you said not that long ago yeah [2:09:47] once again we focused on the most tangible and direct threats given the [2:09:50] complexity of those threats that exist here and on the homeland and around the [2:09:55] world that's stating that there's that climate change isn't in any way a [2:09:59] tangible threat now or in the future it's it's basically saying we think so [2:10:05] little of as a threat we don't even mention it I think the changing of the [2:10:09] climate the weather the environment is a factor that goes into the different [2:10:15] intelligence community assessments on effects [2:10:18] gentleman's time is expired miss tinney thank you mr chairman and thank you so [2:10:24] much to our briefers and for your service to our country in multiple cases for some [2:10:30] of you and everyone who serves in the intelligence community to give the support [2:10:36] to everyone that's serving I fully support President Trump's efforts through your [2:10:41] agencies over the last 18 months 18 days 18 days we have to emphasize it's only [2:10:45] been 18 days and I think it was a courageous decision and to the American [2:10:51] people I know many have recited this but for the past past 47 years Iran has been [2:10:56] the world's largest sponsor of terrorism the Islamic Republic of Iran has [2:11:01] operated with impunity they've destabilized the Middle East brutalized [2:11:05] their own citizens and have the blood of countless Americans and others on their [2:11:10] hands and now they're paying the price for that despotism and I want to thank [2:11:14] our service members and President Trump and making these difficult and stunning [2:11:17] decisions but it is also stunning what the Iranian people and so many in the [2:11:22] Middle East and around the world have suffered from the regime and I want to [2:11:25] point out that in 2022 when Masa Amini was killed in the hands of the so-called [2:11:31] morality police by the Iranian regime it spurned a I would say probably one of the [2:11:38] most profound women's rights movements of our time so many women stood up in the [2:11:45] face of certain death or at least imprisonment definitely having an eye [2:11:50] gouged out like so many others to stand up and I am so grateful that these [2:11:56] people now have an opportunity to actually have some kind of regime that [2:12:00] would be give them a chance at freedom after all these years and I want to ask [2:12:05] director Gobbard some of these people and many of these people do not seem to [2:12:11] have access to outside information can you characterize what the access would be [2:12:15] to the internet or cell phones for for those in Iran who have no idea about [2:12:21] anything and are only receiving the propaganda from the regime [2:12:24] congressman I can expand on this in the closed setting but I will say briefly [2:12:29] that throughout the period of protests that we saw previously and during this [2:12:34] ongoing conflict the access of the Iranian people to basic things like power [2:12:40] or internet or cell phone access is extremely limited so I wouldn't I ask the [2:12:46] general since General James in this same vein do you think that the suspension the [2:12:52] internet suppression by the Iranian regime is is an objective that would be [2:12:57] protecting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps yes ma'am the it's a TTP and and we [2:13:05] will go into in great detail in the classified but it's definitely a TTP to [2:13:09] maintain control thank you I appreciate that I look forward to that I want to [2:13:12] turn to the northern border which I represent most of the northern border [2:13:16] with the state of New York across the Lake Ontario shoreline we know that many [2:13:21] many on the foreign terror watch list in 2024 358 suspects were found and [2:13:29] arrested on the northern border fiscal year 2025 that number has been reduced to [2:13:32] 307 I want to ask director Patel how would you characterize the type of those those [2:13:40] types of people that you have appeared obtained arrested or encountered on the [2:13:44] northern border cartels Islamic terror organized crime how would you characterize [2:13:50] those people if you can thank you Congresswoman with the solidification [2:13:54] and reinforcement the southern border the northern border has become a target of [2:13:57] opportunity for foreign terrorist organizations cartels those that wish to [2:14:03] conduct espionage activities basically all of the above how would you [2:14:06] characterize the partnership of our Canadian friends to the north and their [2:14:11] willingness to stop these individuals especially in the last year or so at the [2:14:15] FBI we have engaged with the RCMP and their Intel services at levels never seen [2:14:19] before to specifically focus on the fentanyl productions north of our border the [2:14:25] cartels have shifted their operations to produce the lethal fentanyl that kills so [2:14:30] many Americans so that's one example where we're focused and locked in with our [2:14:33] partners north of the border thank you very much I appreciate that one last thing I [2:14:36] just want to ask upstate New York is now the new home to Micron one of the [2:14:40] world's three leading memory manufacturers and the only US leading memory [2:14:45] company memory produced in Micron is integral an integral component of the GPUs used to [2:14:52] train America's dominant frontier models I'd love to to find out a director [2:14:57] Ratcliffe what would be the economic and national security implications of China [2:15:03] were to catch up on the US on memory GPUs critical minerals all those things that go [2:15:08] into everything and leading up to this including the the advent of AI well what [2:15:15] you've seen Congresswoman is that when China can take advantage of things in the [2:15:20] supply chain like critical minerals they'll do that this is particularly [2:15:26] problematic in the area of all emerging technologies and AI in particular [2:15:31] obviously whoever is dominant in the technology fields in the future will [2:15:36] dictate the the rules in the international marketplace it would be [2:15:40] devastating if China were ahead of us thank you I appreciate the impact mr. Cohen thank [2:15:46] you mr. chair director Patel you you had a question from dr. Jackson about the [2:15:54] shutdown we're in now with homeland security and I believe you said that [2:15:59] this would at this time this would be harmful to America because of the threat [2:16:06] from Iran is that correct do I recall that correctly generally yes sir how many [2:16:11] days before we invaded Iran did you know we were gonna launch an invasion we can get [2:16:17] into those details in classified settings but I work with my colleagues across the [2:16:20] spectrum here to give me advance warning so that we can reinforce it two days three [2:16:25] days of a month it was it was sometime before that sir sometime before that you [2:16:29] had done with that knowledge why did you fire at least a dozen agents and [2:16:35] counterintelligence unit 12 that specializes in Iran counterintelligence [2:16:39] which makes us much less secure and safe with this war going on from Iranian [2:16:44] attacks potentially against our country as I said earlier congressman I don't work on [2:16:48] timelines when these terminations occur their internal investigations conducted [2:16:52] by the careers at the FBI that highlight unethical or inappropriate conduct and [2:16:57] it's up to me to make the decision but our Ron threats mission center has never [2:17:00] been more resources I've highlighted a 43 percent increase in counter espionage [2:17:04] arrest from Iran alone and 360 ongoing terrorism investigations with Iran [2:17:09] affiliated and the people you fired those 12 people they were experts on Iran were [2:17:12] they not I don't believe so they worked in counterintelligence do they not I'm [2:17:18] taking you at your word sir I'm not familiar you're the chief director I'm [2:17:21] not you should know the answer you fired the people where did they work I've [2:17:25] people were terminated for violating their ethical obligations in the high [2:17:30] standards was the ethical violations that they dealt with the case of the [2:17:33] classified documents that were found at the bathroom in Mar-a-Lago was that [2:17:38] the ethical issue as I said earlier all those matters are pending [2:17:42] litigation so I'm not going to comment on them director Gabbert are you familiar [2:17:48] with CI 12 I'm not congressman okay let me ask you this question in the [2:17:56] intelligence community's unclassified annual threat assessment from last year [2:18:00] it said quote Iran's large conventional forces are capable of inflicting [2:18:04] substantial damage to an attacker executing regional strikes and disrupting [2:18:10] shipping particularly energy supplies to the strait of Hormuz it seems the IC was [2:18:16] entirely correct in its assessment about Iranian retaliation in the strait did the [2:18:21] IC's assessment about the Iranian capabilities and the straits of Hormuz [2:18:24] change in the past year no congressman does Iran still have the capability of [2:18:30] threatened shipping in the straits of Hormuz with missiles mines and small boats [2:18:35] their capabilities have been largely degraded but yes they still have means to [2:18:41] threaten passage to the strait of Hormuz and how long can they keep the [2:18:44] strait closed based on current events I'd have to get an updated assessment from [2:18:51] the intelligence community on that did you have an analysis of the impact of a [2:18:58] war on global supply change and the price of oil and gas I believe that [2:19:04] assessment may have come from the Department of Treasury or energy who didn't [2:19:10] come through your office it came from their element within Department of Energy or [2:19:17] Energy do you know if the president was briefed on those assessments I [2:19:20] believe so but I can't confirm so if he was briefed those assessments that that [2:19:27] was a problem and the straits of Hormuz could be shut off and that's causing a [2:19:32] great problem in the world's economy with oil prices going up to under 120 [2:19:37] dollars or something a barrel and an effect on all countries economies why [2:19:43] would the president not have taken actions to strengthen defense around the [2:19:47] strait of Hormuz all I can say is that the president ultimately is responsible for [2:19:54] making the decisions based on the totality of information intelligence that he [2:19:58] has available to him the intelligence that he has available to him that's a scary thought [2:20:03] does the IC know where Iran's enriched uranium is the IC has high confidence that [2:20:13] we know where it is and can you tell us that in classified we can speak more [2:20:18] about this topic in the classified setting okay you could it be we have methods of [2:20:23] destroying it this is a conversation for a closed setting sir do you have any idea what the purpose of the Marines being sent the [2:20:37] units that are being sent over there is the idea that we will put troops with boots on the ground in Iran [2:20:43] ODNI and the and the IC is not involved in the operational planning and movements of [2:20:49] the Department of War assets thank you I'll be very honest with you when you made [2:20:54] your read us your original comments it was kind of scary because of all the [2:20:59] craziness that goes on in the world can't wait for the classified setting thank you [2:21:03] Mr. Perry thank you Mr. Chairman it's good to see some old colleagues I'm going to start and [2:21:10] thank you for the service gentlemen and ma'am I'm going to start with General Hartman General Adams do [2:21:16] you know how many days it's been since Russia went into Ukraine I'll answer it for you it's 1480 [2:21:23] do you know how much money the United States government has spent the taxpayers had spent in [2:21:29] the war in Ukraine I'm going to round it for you it's about 200 billion dollars I mean maybe it's a [2:21:35] lot more maybe it's a little less it's hard to tell around the this this place to your best of your [2:21:41] knowledge was Russia an imminent threat to the United States when they went into Ukraine to the best of your [2:21:47] knowledge sir um congressman I wasn't in this position I understand when uh when that decision was [2:22:01] made I'm saying to the best of your knowledge I know goes back 1480 days but so so certainly I don't [2:22:07] think it was in the best interest of the United States for was Russia an imminent threat is what [2:22:11] I'm asking um not not my uh decision to make or advice to provide okay how about you General Adams [2:22:18] like uh General Hartman I was in a different yeah position uh many four years ago uh in in to make [2:22:28] that assessment yeah are you I guess can I ask you to clarify are you saying was Russia gonna attack [2:22:34] the United States 1480 days ago not to my knowledge yeah all right um you recall who the president was [2:22:44] at that time gentlemen I'll help you out it was President Biden do you know who the Speaker of the [2:22:50] House was at that time the name Miss Pelosi ring a bell do you recall this Congress um declaring war [2:23:02] Russia and Ukraine 1480 days ago or any time between then and now I don't I don't either do you [2:23:11] know gentlemen how many American service members have been killed or maimed attributed to Iran the [2:23:21] IRGC their proxies etc roughly any idea could could we say probably a thousand killed if not 10,000 over [2:23:31] 10,000 killed and maimed probably a reasonable assessment you know how many uniformed service [2:23:38] members have been killed by Russia in the last 1480 days American uniformed service personnel I'm just [2:23:46] asking I don't know of any but do you know of any I I it seems to me that it's almost like a political [2:23:54] narrative being constructed here and I just want to you know point out this it seems like a bit of an [2:24:01] irony I'm going to go to the director of the FBI it's good to see you Mr Patel um crossfire hurricane [2:24:10] round river plasmic echo arctic frost seem to have emanated from the counterintelligence division [2:24:18] of the FBI is that a reasonably correct assessment generally speaking generally speaking congressman I [2:24:26] want to be careful here because there are a number of ongoing investigation understand um there's a [2:24:31] filing system that prohibited well with prohibited access is it possible that that politicized [2:24:39] investigation and filing system violated sixth amendment rights to the discovery and congress's [2:24:45] article one oversight authorities if possible uh without giving you a definitive answer that is [2:24:51] rest with the DOJ let me just talk about prohibited case files real quick sure prohibited case files [2:24:55] are basically files that prior um uh directors had created to essentially hide what was going on [2:25:02] they do not exist in our sentinel systems they do not exist anywhere and if you search for that [2:25:07] specific case it won't even come up which is why I as the first FBI director to do so have terminated [2:25:13] prohibited case files and as you know I'm wed to constitutional oversight here at congress and I've [2:25:17] delivered 50,000 pages which is 400 percent more increase than my two predecessors combined [2:25:22] director would ensnaring individuals or organizations based solely on their political affiliations or viewpoints [2:25:29] be a potential violation of the fourth amendment I believe so have any of the personnel associated with [2:25:35] these activities and I understand that investigations may be ongoing have they been removed from duty [2:25:41] pending the outcome investigation uh yes many have okay moving on I'm concerned about a a lab that was [2:25:50] found in a clandestine Chinese bio lab that was found in California and then one that was found later in in um [2:25:59] Las Vegas yeah Nevada and I'm wondering is are you concerned about a lack of vision or imagination in agents that [2:26:06] solely work on a case and can't see that China has the you know has the capability and the impetus to do [2:26:13] these things all around the country and things like those things and have you done anything about [2:26:18] changing that that training or that operational uh conduct of agents I can only speak to what I've done and [2:26:25] this FBI is keenly aware of it we're the ones that figured it out not just in Las Vegas but places like [2:26:29] Michigan where we arrested multiple individuals who were pretending to be researchers at the University of [2:26:34] Michigan while bringing in lethal pathogens and trying to steal our trade secrets and our agricultural [2:26:38] secrets which is national security so this FBI is laser focused on the Chinese threat um especially [2:26:44] related to bio labs and agricultural appreciate the response I yield the balance Mr Fallon thank you [2:26:51] Mr Chairman you know I I would be remiss if I didn't mention Operation Absolute Resolve and the arrest [2:26:57] and capture of Nicolas Maduro and his wife it was incredibly complex it was bold it was unprecedented [2:27:05] it was a wild success it really uh harkens thoughts of raid on Entebbe 50 years ago except this actually [2:27:13] remarkably exceeded that in its success it was historic and it altered undeniably the geopolitical [2:27:20] landscape in the United States's favor so our military and our IC should be lauded and I want [2:27:27] to offer a hearty and uh deserved congratulations to all of you that are testifying before us today thank [2:27:35] you uh Director Ratcliffe I want to just visit with you a little bit uh first I do want to take a point [2:27:40] of personal privilege uh I attended Coach Holtz's funeral Monday he was very proud of you uh how long has [2:27:49] uh Iran been pursuing a nuclear weapon director um congressman let me respond I appreciate the the [2:27:57] kind remarks and um uh I also want to congratulate the people of the fourth district of Texas uh for [2:28:04] getting a lot better representation than they ever did from the guy that was previously in that seat [2:28:09] um uh notwithstanding as I talked about um uh a fatwa that was issued I believe in 2004 [2:28:16] um uh Iran has had a dedicated uh nuclear program beyond civil limits for the development uh of nuclear [2:28:25] weapons they currently possess at least 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium at 60 percent weapons grade [2:28:32] that would be capable of of uh putting together 10 nuclear weapons director what nation state has [2:28:40] achieved 60 percent enrichment and then not produced a nuclear weapon [2:28:46] I'm not aware of any there's none you get to 60 percent there's a reason you're at 60 percent [2:28:51] because you are pursuing nuclear ambitions so we have um sanctions have been imposed in the past [2:28:58] and yet that pursuit continued their economic their economy was teetering the pursuit continued [2:29:03] their people were suffering the pursuit continued under the bush obama trump 45 biden now trump 47 [2:29:10] that pursuit continued then last june operation midnight hammer nuclear program was [2:29:16] dealt a significant setback but not only that the autocratic illegitimate regime in tehran [2:29:23] witnessed firsthand that the american resolve under this administration should be taking very [2:29:28] seriously i want to read you a few quotes iran will never be permitted to build a nuclear weapon [2:29:35] barack obama 15 the message to iran should be loud and clear we will never allow you to acquire a nuclear [2:29:40] weapon never hillary clinton iran will never get a nuclear weapon on my watch iran can never develop [2:29:47] or acquire a nuclear weapon joe biden make no mistake as president i will never hesitate to take [2:29:53] whatever action is necessary to defend american forces and interests from iran kamala harris so last june we [2:30:01] have new uh midnight hammer and not only did they see the resolve uh i mean they saw uh that we were [2:30:09] committed to actually taking action and not just the words this time and even after all of that did they [2:30:15] abandoned their pursuit uh and their nuclear program they absolutely did not uh congressman i think you [2:30:21] point out uh the success of operation midnight hammer is that uh one of the things that we assess in the [2:30:28] intelligence community broadly is that um since that operation iran has been unable to enrich a single [2:30:37] kilogram of uranium uh to sixty percent since that operation but as you correctly point out congressman [2:30:44] notwithstanding that our intelligence is also clear that um they have not lost their ambition and that [2:30:51] the activities to rebuild or reconstitute uh their nuclear uh facilities uh and centrifuges is something [2:31:00] that the intelligence there's a body of intelligence that i think uh confirms that then we had eight [2:31:06] months of negotiations and attempted diplomacy they proved fruitless and yet the pursuit continued and the [2:31:13] director uh and is there any intelligence or evidence that the supreme leader and his thug mullahs after [2:31:20] all that at the beginning of this year were going to finally stop their pursuit uh their nuclear weapon in [2:31:28] their program no so we have some folks here that are splitting hairs about imminent threat you know what [2:31:35] was it a grave threat director in your opinion nuclear weapons are a grave threat in the hands of religious [2:31:42] id logs sixty percent enrichment no nation state that achieved that hadn't produced a nuclear weapon [2:31:47] we can either talk about it kick the can down the road and let them get a nuclear weapon to get [2:31:52] danger close to it on the precipice or we can take action now and this is what this administration [2:31:56] chose to do thank you mr chairman i yield back mr stubby thank you mr chairman every day the brave men [2:32:02] and women of our intelligence community armed forces and federal law enforcement work to protect our [2:32:06] homeland from a constant and evolving array of threats but since democrats chose to shut down the [2:32:11] department of homeland security those threats have grown more acute our country has already [2:32:15] experienced four terrorist attacks since the shutdown began the consequences are no longer hypothetical [2:32:20] they are unfolding in real time at a moment when the global threat environment is intensifying [2:32:25] terrorist organizations are resurging and adversaries continue to encourage violence against americans [2:32:31] congress should be reinforcing our defenses instead democrats have sidelined the very department [2:32:36] responsible for keeping the homeland safe not a single democrat here on this committee voted to [2:32:40] reopen the department of homeland security that was not an accident it was a political decision made [2:32:45] at the expense of the safety and security of the american people as threats to our homelands rise and [2:32:50] our enemies grow more emboldened this decision has weakened our defenses and replaced action with [2:32:55] dysfunction each day the threat environment worsens and with it the risk to the american people which is [2:33:00] indefensible do each of you agree that the reckless democratic shutdown of the department of homeland security [2:33:07] has affected your agency's ability to detect deter and respond to threats against the homeland [2:33:12] specifically has it impacted intelligence sharing operational coordination or your capacity to prevent [2:33:17] attacks general hartman congressman it hasn't had a significant impact on the foreign intelligence [2:33:25] mission of the national security agency director patel uh the shutdown has had a significant impact on how [2:33:30] we protect and defend the homeland director gabbert this has directly affected the intelligence elements [2:33:37] within the department of homeland security negatively director atcliffe i would agree with the director [2:33:43] of national intelligence general adams no significant impact on the defense intelligence agency and [2:33:51] the foreign threat that we uh analyze so director gabbert you in your opening statement talked about the [2:33:56] threats to the homeland and the changes that you've made as it relates to the border and the changes that the [2:34:00] president has made um after four years of open border policies under president biden during which cartels and [2:34:06] gangs expanded their operations into american cities what specific actions has odni taken to disrupt these [2:34:13] criminal cartels and networks and stop the fentanyl poisoning and murdering u.s citizens thank you for [2:34:19] the question congressman we've taken several actions to be able to get after this threat that the president [2:34:25] made a priority number one being making historic shifts in intelligence collection towards addressing this [2:34:33] threat i believe it is the biggest shift in intelligence uh capabilities that we've ever seen or certainly [2:34:39] in a long time uh the integration and cooperation between our national counterterrorism center uh with [2:34:47] the dea and other department of homeland security elements um is also unprecedented we have taken and [2:34:55] coordinated the collection of individuals known and suspected terrorists known and suspected cartel members [2:35:02] leaders uh and inputted that into the tide system which has radically increased and improved our ability [2:35:07] to identify those who are cartel and gang members trying to enter our country and those who may already [2:35:14] be in our country national counterterrorism center has been working again in coordination with our [2:35:19] interagency partners to get after the financial networks that these cartels and gangs rely upon to be able to [2:35:25] continue to def uh to fund uh as director patel has spoken about we have national counterterrorism [2:35:34] elements that sit within the joint terrorism task forces and support the interagency efforts to [2:35:40] continue to get after this threat very effectively thank you um director patel mr cohen was asking you [2:35:46] about a recent firing of counter espionage agents with iranian expertise uh you and the fbi are taking [2:35:53] will continue to take all required steps to keep the american people safe during president trump's [2:35:57] historic military action against an oppressive and evil iranian regime is that correct absolutely and [2:36:03] there's 36 000 people employed at this fbi and i reject the notion wholeheartedly that the termination [2:36:09] of those that were weaponizing law enforcement are the only ones that can do the mission there's a 43 [2:36:14] increase in counterintelligence and espionage arrest just related to iran alone which is a record year for [2:36:19] the fbi well and you plussed up nearly a thousand agents in the field throughout the united states [2:36:23] since this has occurred yes sir and there's a document that you posted on um x and i think [2:36:29] that's what you have in front of you about all of the wins and the changes that the fbi has made [2:36:33] under your leadership and president trump's leadership during 2025 and the little time that [2:36:38] i have remaining could you just highlight some of that for the american people thank you under the [2:36:41] trump administration this fbi has literally had a historic year we have 112 increase 112 percent increase [2:36:47] in violent offenders arrested last year alone a 20 decrease in homicides 20 decrease in robberies we [2:36:54] have disrupted 1800 criminal gangs that's a 210 increase we've seized enough fentanyl to kill 178 [2:37:01] million americans that's a 31 increase we have gone after the most vulnerable in our society protecting [2:37:07] children a 490 increase in arrest on those that prey on our children online we have located found and [2:37:14] identified 6 200 missing kids that's a 30 percent increase we have dismantled and taken down 1700 [2:37:21] child predators that's a 17 increase and those that wish to traffic our young american citizens and women [2:37:28] 300 human traffickers have been arrested that's a 15 increase and seven seven of the fbi's top 10 most [2:37:37] wanted fugitives in the world have been apprehended in the last 13 months to put that into perspective [2:37:42] there was four in the prior four years so this fbi under president trump is fully stocked to get [2:37:48] after every single fight we have and these are just some of the statistics so i thank you for letting [2:37:51] me highlight those thank you my time's expired mr crinshaw thank you all for being here in this marathon [2:38:00] uh two day two day marathon appreciate y'all i want to talk about fisa because we all have scars on [2:38:06] our back from uh two years ago when we were authorized fisa i anticipated being easier this time but [2:38:11] i still want to go over the myths that public believes and that many members of this congress [2:38:17] believe uh mr patel i'll i'll focus on you here myth number one has to do with 702 versus fisa title [2:38:27] one um trump was targeted with fisa 702 is that a myth that that's a myth it's not true well how it's [2:38:35] just real quick how how was president trump targeted targeted under crossfire hurricane under fisa title one [2:38:41] title three authorities uh information was presented to the foreign intelligence surveillance [2:38:45] court a search warrant to surveil individuals associated with the trump campaign which was [2:38:50] later revealed through the house intelligence committee's work that the information collected [2:38:54] was not only unverified but individuals lied in that application individuals that were government [2:38:58] officials i think it's worth worth pointing out that whether whether this process was fisa or in [2:39:03] regular court it was still lies told by the people trying to get the warrant nothing to do with fisa [2:39:11] it was simply the people trying to get the warrant were lying okay myth number two a query means that [2:39:17] we're spying on americans means we're reading in their inboxes we're getting inside their text messages [2:39:23] all of that is that true no i'm going to borrow general hartman's answer a query of 702 [2:39:29] is pursuant to lawfully collected information of non-us citizens overseas right so if you query an american [2:39:37] citizen are you accessing their inbox no you're just seeing if they have spoken to somebody who [2:39:46] was a foreign intelligence officer let's say and you would know they've spoken to them because they [2:39:51] would show up as part of that conversation in foreign intelligence collection foreign intelligence [2:39:55] collection so if and if you wanted to get inside their inbox you would have to get an actual warrant [2:40:04] under current law right a u.s person a warrant or a subpoena process yes sir okay so that's a really [2:40:10] important distinction congressman if i could just sure but you wouldn't use fa 702 to do that [2:40:17] correct to get in the i just want to be clear about that yes there is there is you would use your [2:40:21] regular court process no authority under 702 to collect intelligence um intentionally against u.s [2:40:28] persons absolutely right um yeah so when somebody and let's say their name rhymes with i don't know [2:40:35] tucker carlson is claiming that the cia is is spying on him i would i'm going to guess here because [2:40:42] i don't know i'm going to guess that the most likely scenario is that in the process of him [2:40:46] speaking with iranian intelligence officials it is incidentally collected nobody is spying on [2:40:52] tucker carlson or his inbox to my knowledge at least number three another myth a warrant requirement [2:40:58] should it be required by law is it's it for a simple query that should be easy to get right what's [2:41:06] the problem it's easy to get a warrant we do it all the time would it be easy in my opinion no but [2:41:16] and and the reason it wouldn't be easy is because oftentimes these queries are part of a very typical [2:41:22] analytical process and they would not meet the judicial standards of probable cause and i've seen [2:41:28] many examples of this i would love if you guys had some examples that are declassified i've seen them in [2:41:33] a classified session so i guess my my point is and now that we've debunked these myths is you put that [2:41:41] warrant process on a simple query you're taking away our analysts ability to connect the dots to connect [2:41:47] the dots from the outside actors which we we can collect on they have no constitutional protections [2:41:52] but you're removing our ability to connect them with the inside actors which is kind of where it [2:41:57] matters it's like it's like giving up when you're when you're when you're right at the goal line that makes [2:42:03] zero sense to do and that's exactly what this would do do you i've already i've already heard [2:42:08] director ratcliffe's answer on this but 18 months uh reauthorized clean reauthorization does that i don't [2:42:14] know where that number came from but is would you rather have it longer as director ratcliffe said i'd [2:42:19] like five or ten years okay me too um we went over that really quickly and well i yield back thank you [2:42:29] mr hill thank you chairman thank you panel for being with us this morning and uh let me start with [2:42:37] director gabbard you've heard from mr steube you've heard from admiral jackson you've heard from miss [2:42:42] tinney all this aspect of who we've encountered at our borders north and south and during the [2:42:48] bite administration with the open border that has been overly discussed today at length there's this [2:42:55] known and suspected terrorist and i want to congratulate the trump administration for getting [2:42:59] i think 1300 people identified out of the country under your 13 months so congratulations on that [2:43:06] but for three years uh in both classified unclassified sessions here i've raised this issue that we [2:43:12] don't have the data and we don't track it in a fused way meaning border patrol tsa fbi and follow-up doj [2:43:21] and prosecutions and we don't really have that at our fingertips for oversight purposes and i asked you [2:43:28] last year's worldwide threats would you commit to uh helping us achieve as the odni that fused data [2:43:36] you agreed but it was only three days ago i got that commitment to from you in writing so let me ask [2:43:42] you again can you help drive that process across the bureaucracy to get that regularly provided to [2:43:49] the intelligence committees sir thank you for the follow-up on that we have continued to work to [2:43:55] improve that consolidated use of systems that will better help us identify who is in our country [2:44:04] who are known or suspected terrorists to include those who are members or leaders of cartels and [2:44:09] gangs and drug traffickers and and we're continuing to uh we're continuing to pursue that particularly [2:44:16] with the department of state and their screening and vetting practices as well as the department of [2:44:21] homeland securities uh i will say that there has been a drastic improvement in our own screening and [2:44:28] vetting systems and that coordination is occurring but there are still some silos that need to be broken [2:44:33] down also in in follow-up to the discussion today i heard my friend from california mr barra assert that [2:44:41] president trump's action in epic fury was unconstitutional do you think it was unconstitutional the [2:44:47] decision taken by the president that's a legal question sir that i i believe has been asked and [2:44:53] answered by uh the white house council but don't you think in article two power and the war powers [2:44:58] act the president has the right to defend american interest allied and he does and he can do that for [2:45:04] 60 days and do you did the president uh and you consult with the gang of eight in congress before the [2:45:09] president took military operations uh my understanding is the secretary of state uh fulfilled that [2:45:17] responsibility i think that's clear i don't recall president uh uh obama for example declaring war for [2:45:24] seven months of operations in libya so i think there's a lot of hypocrisy here as we try to defend [2:45:29] american interests uh mr klein asked you about and made a good comment i thought about uh and he talked [2:45:38] to director patel about this on this issue of winter shield and doing a better job of coordinating [2:45:47] offensive and decent defensive cyber here in the homeland and i think that's another place director [2:45:54] where i think you should play an outsized role to coordinate again this issue of all [2:45:59] operations i'm very concerned that we don't have a fused i'm going to use that word again [2:46:05] civil defense posture on cyber defense because we're too compartmentalized we're too siloed between [2:46:13] who's with the military and not with the military who's got classifications and who doesn't would you work [2:46:19] with me on trying to design a way for our governors our private sector the fbi to work better on [2:46:28] countering state actors in our private sector yes sir i would look forward to working with you on that [2:46:35] and we'll just comment this would have to be done in conjunction with the department of homeland [2:46:39] security and cissa given their statutory responsibilities the integration and coordination with the private [2:46:45] sector remains one of the biggest imperatives but also in some cases challenges for folks who choose [2:46:52] not to work with the u.s government i agree i sit on the cissa you know subcommittee here and i just i'm [2:46:58] very uh concerned about it and i think our whole committee's been concerned about the assessment we have [2:47:02] on offensive cyber so we look forward to that finally uh director ratcliffe thanks for you being here [2:47:08] and it's wonderful to see you thanks for our decade of friendship i want to say that i've traveled [2:47:13] significantly with the chairman to latin america and i want to say your stations throughout the western [2:47:19] hemisphere are doing an outstanding job would you say that we're back on track countering great power [2:47:24] rivals in the western hemisphere i would thank you for the compliments for uh the workforce um that [2:47:31] i'm privileged to lead uh and i do think um the president's policies in making um the western hemisphere [2:47:38] a priority of really clear obviously the uh success of uh operation absolute resolve it's funny uh congressman [2:47:48] no one's talking about venezuela because things are going so well in venezuela [2:47:53] but it really shows the commitment that the president has to taking care of business [2:47:57] for american interests in our own hemisphere and it's it's not limited to venezuela it's throughout [2:48:03] central and south america and i think that you'll continue to see continued [2:48:08] progress with respect to that thank you and i thank all of you for your service to your country and [2:48:12] i yield back thank you mr hill before we dismiss i'm going to ask all members of the audience all [2:48:20] members and staff to remain seated until the witnesses have cleared uh giving them an opportunity to [2:48:27] proceed to our closed setting which we will reconvene at 11 30 to resume in hvc 304 with that said [2:48:37] please remain seated until the witnesses have cleared and this proceeding is adjourned