House hearing on terror threats after 9/11

[0:00] PLA scientists and others who are there to extract intellectual property, to [0:04] extract know-how, apply it to gain commercial advantage, but importantly to [0:08] gain military advantage. Also at the same time what we were doing is actually [0:13] underwriting our own demise by investing in Chinese companies. One of them is [0:18] called Eversec, one of those is Ford Paradigm. There are many other examples [0:22] where US banks, US private equity firms invested in these companies and now [0:27] those two companies I mentioned do all the offensive cyber tools for the PLA [0:32] and do all the battlefield artificial intelligence for the PLA. So we were not [0:38] only so behind, I think we were extraordinarily negligent in this period [0:42] of time and I think we're racing to catch up and we have a lot of work to do [0:46] Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, one of the big challenges leading up to [0:53] 9-11 was information sharing across federal, state, and local agencies which [0:58] was a problem leading up to the attacks on 9-11. So one of the solutions was the [1:05] creation of organizations like the National Counterterrorism Center, the [1:08] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI itself, as well as the [1:13] Joint Terrorism Task Forces and some of the fusion centers in states. Well the [1:19] unfortunate reality is that most of these organizations, none of them really, are [1:23] sufficiently equipped to deal with the threat from state-based actors. So we are [1:28] not sharing information, in fact I would argue that our fusion centers and our JTTFs [1:33] and most of our state and local entities don't even know what to look for, aren't [1:38] equipped to look for the activities of the MSS in our states, the United Front [1:47] Workers' Activity. And they're often the ones with, that are the sort of front-line [1:51] organizations that may see it ideally on a regular basis. So I do not think we are [1:59] prepared for this intelligence challenge inside of our own borders and we don't [2:04] have the infrastructure to effectively deal with it. Thank you. Mr. Silofo. Oh, not [2:09] much I can add to that because I agree a hundred percent. One thing though I will add [2:14] is we've got to move beyond information sharing toward operational collaboration [2:19] in a cyber environment. So when you look at the cyber sets of issues, who's on the [2:24] front lines of this war? Industry, private sector, SLTT, state, local, tribal, [2:29] territorial. They don't have the resources. None of them went into business thinking [2:33] they have to defend themselves against foreign intelligence services, but that's [2:36] precisely what they're doing today. That's what's being asked of them today. So [2:41] when I look at the broader counter intelligence challenge, it's not just spy [2:47] versus spy. Of course our intelligence services and agencies are going to have [2:51] secrets that are always going to be of top desire to our foreign intelligence [2:56] adversaries. But if you're MSS today, you're looking at frontier model companies. [3:01] You're not necessarily looking at what you can steal from CIA because it's a harder [3:05] target or NSA or you name the alphabet soup agency. So I think we've got to actually rethink [3:13] counter intelligence. It's not just the traditional spy versus spy information versus information. [3:18] It's who holds the keys right now is not going to be in government alone. So how do we get [3:24] our arms around that challenge? And then very briefly, pre 9-11, if you were to ask me when [3:32] I had the privilege to work for the president after 9-11, I would tell you the biggest and [3:37] greatest breakthrough after 9-11 was not the creation of new bureaucracy. It was the synchronization [3:44] of authorities. It was the Title 10, Title 50 synchronization that culminated through JSOC, [3:50] Joint Special Operations Command, that ultimately had massive impact in our ability to prosecute [3:58] the war on terrorism. That said, a lot of our infrastructure was state-based before 9-11. [4:05] It's sort of like this fulcrum. We keep going back and forth. Now we've got to recognize that [4:09] we've got to walk and chew gum simultaneously. You're still going to have non-state threats, [4:15] transnational criminal organizations. They're going to have access to much more sophisticated [4:19] weaponry. But you're also going to have nation states that can bring all-source intelligence [4:23] to the problem. [4:24] Thank you. And Dr. Buchanan, final thoughts? [4:26] Yeah. I think my colleagues have covered it well. I would emphasize what Mr. Salufo said [4:30] about the range of counterintelligence targets being broader now, including private companies, [4:35] in a way that is rooted in the private company's invention of this technology. And I would note [4:40] as well that I think counterintelligence operations will change as a result of artificial intelligence. [4:45] Of course, cyber operations have already changed. But even if you look at things like human intelligence [4:49] and detecting human intelligence operations, it is a different technical paradigm that yields different [4:54] kinds of analysis that AI alone can do. And America has to be prepared to adjust that [4:59] changing technological landscape. [5:00] Thank you. Ranking Member Himes. [5:01] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [5:06] Gentleman McMaster, I wasn't going to go here, but you brought up concerns about the election [5:13] and the division that generates amongst Americans. And of course, we all watched Thursday night [5:19] as the President of the United States lied to the American people, told the American people [5:24] that there was a massive Chinese interference effort, which never happened, and for which [5:30] there is no evidence. And he told the American people that there was a massive deep state cover-up [5:37] of this effort, which never happened, and for which there is no evidence at all in the record. [5:42] The latter troubles me intensely because it serves the purpose of our adversaries who are working [5:50] very hard, along with the President of the United States, to develop anxieties, concerns, and skepticisms [5:56] about the core function of our democracy, not to mention the fact that it flies in the face of [6:02] the thousands of analysts who go to work every single day so that the people who repeat those lies [6:07] don't get turned into pink mist at the Pentagon or at the World Trade Center. [6:12] Sir, you brought it up. On 9-11, even on that day, I thought about these terrorists. I thought about their [6:19] nihilistic, violent, disgusting ideology, and I had no doubt that they couldn't end the United States. [6:23] And I sit here and look at the threats from Russia, Iran, China, and I actually think we [6:27] win those battles, too, for all the right reasons. So I'm kind of with Lincoln. Lincoln said, [6:33] if destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. And I think we're headed [6:39] down that road. General McMaster, I looked through your written testimony. I didn't find what you said [6:43] about election doubt, but you said some pretty powerful things. Give me another minute or so. [6:49] What's happening? Who's behind it? And should Americans trust in their electoral process? [6:55] Yes. First of all, yes, Americans should trust in the electoral process. [6:59] Certainly, there are improvements that can be made. And I think in the face of [7:02] of these kind of attacks to reduce our confidence in the outcome of elections, [7:07] we should do everything we can to make elections more transparent and more secure, [7:12] while guaranteeing access to all qualified voters. I think there has to be [7:16] some movement forward to make it more transparent, whether it's IDs, whatever it is. I mean, I know [7:21] that Congress is working on this. To your point, really, what our adversaries want is they want [7:28] Americans to doubt the legitimacy of the result. And what happens too often, whether it's the president [7:34] or whether it's certain members of Congress, of both political parties, when they raise doubts about [7:40] elections, they're actually doing the bidding of our adversaries. This happened about the 2016 election. [7:47] We know what happened on January 6th of 2021. We see these current statements by the president. [7:56] But I think anytime a political leader compromises confidence in our democratic processes to score [8:04] partisan points, I think that they're actually aiding and abetting our adversaries who want to reduce [8:10] that confidence. So I think it's incumbent, I think, on all of us to be more transparent and more secure [8:17] with our elections, but also, you know, hold one another accountable if somebody is trying to, [8:23] you know, to raise doubts about the legitimacy of our elections to score partisan points or gain advantage. [8:30] You served in the highest national security roles in the first Trump administration. The nation respects you. [8:37] Do you believe that there is any systemic or organized effort on the part of the intelligence community [8:44] to mislead the president of the United States? Is there a deep state plot to keep Chinese interference [8:50] from the American people? Did you see any evidence of that? No, no, I did not. Okay. [8:56] As I said, I don't think there are a lot of people that I respect more in the realm of national [9:00] security, but I'm going through your statement here, and I just think your statement is wrong. [9:05] The intelligence community is engaged in protecting U.S. citizens from cognitive warfare. [9:09] The Federal Bureau of Investigation investigates foreign influence activities. No, it does not. [9:14] The Foreign Influence Task Force was dismantled at the FBI. You say the Cyber Security and Infrastructure [9:21] Security Act, CISA, helps ensure citizens' confidence in elections. No, it does not. They've lost a thousand [9:27] people, 30 percent of the staff. Morale is in the toilet at CISA. You say the Department of State [9:32] tracks foreign propaganda and influence campaigns abroad. No, it does not. The Global Engagement [9:38] Center was eliminated. These are odd things from an administration that is doing everything they can [9:42] to generate the notion that there are attacks on election. None of these statements, ODNI, [9:49] the Foreign Malign Influence Center, eliminated. So let me ask you as an expert and highly regarded, [9:55] how are we doing with respect? Your statement here suggests that we're doing the right thing. How are [9:59] we doing in identifying these attempts? Well, Congressman, there are obviously still people [10:03] within the Intelligence Committee working on these portfolios. Those offices have been greatly reduced [10:08] in terms of numbers, as you mentioned. Many of them have gone away. I remember, you know, when the [10:12] Biden administration came in, they got rid of the China office within the Department of Justice, [10:17] yet investigations still continued on the full range of Chinese espionage and influence [10:24] activities. So, I mean, these are what these organizations are engaged in. I think that there [10:29] has been, again, the self-destructive behavior in both political parties to compromise our confidence [10:36] in our institutions. And, of course, you know, with this, these... Wait a minute. I'm sorry, General. [10:40] Yeah. You said both political parties. Yeah. Tell me about what the Democratic Party has done to [10:45] damage confidence in American elections. Well, I mean, there's a long list, I mean, going back to 2016. [10:50] No, no, specifically. I mean, there were a lot of, I mean, election deniers, whether it was from the [10:53] Speaker of the House or whether it was from other members of Congress, you know, who were raising [10:58] doubts about the 2016 elections and the legitimacy of President Trump's election then. I mean, I just [11:04] think, you know, I think we have to all get beyond this. I guess I think the real point is that Russia [11:11] and China believe that we are weak, decadent, and divided. And it is that perception of weakness that [11:19] emboldens them. If deterrence is the simple equation of capability times will, it doesn't [11:26] matter what our capability is if our will is zero. And that's what they're attacking. They're trying [11:31] to drag us down. And so this is why I think it's really important at this moment for Americans in [11:38] recognition of this threat, and this is why the work of this committee is so important, to transcend the [11:43] partisan differences, recognize the nature of the threat, and don't aid and abet our adversaries [11:49] in sort of intensifying this vitriolic discourse, which is part, I think, of the of the of the [11:56] problem in terms of our lack of confidence and in our democratic principles, institutions, processes, [12:01] and in our common identity as Americans. I appreciate that. I would I would note that this is not a [12:08] question of partisan differences. Partisan differences are good. We're up here to have debates. Partisan [12:13] difference. But there is a decision. And you're right, there were a number of Democrats who in 2016, [12:18] you know, wondered whether Trump had but but let's not make the mistake of saying that that is in any [12:24] way equivalent to a presidential primetime speech to the American people. But anyway, this is not [12:29] fundamentally about partisanship. This is about whether you use doubt about our election to advance [12:36] your personal goals and no politician of any party should do that. I yield back. [12:42] Thank you. Gentleman yields. Ms. Stefanik. Dr. Jones, you said in your opening statement, [12:50] and I agree with you, China and the Chinese Communist Party present the most serious threat to the United [12:54] States, including the U.S. homeland. I wanted to follow up on that. There is ample evidence to suggest [13:01] our adversaries, including China, sponsor influence campaigns against our national interests. You see it [13:06] with campaigns against the development of AI data centers and other American business interests. [13:12] You see this with the pushing of anti-Semitic and anti-American propaganda on U.S. college campuses. [13:17] And you see this in their attempt to shape our electoral process. This has been extremely apparent, [13:23] if any American is reading the news, with the unrest we're seeing on college campuses, [13:28] something we know that both China and Iran have actively participated in promoting. How prevalent are [13:34] these foreign influence campaigns on campus, online, and in the media? And how effective have our [13:40] adversaries been at injecting divisive and destructive topics into public discourse? [13:46] That's a great question. I think the answer is pretty straightforward. The Chinese in particular, [13:55] although we can certainly talk about the Russians and the Iranians, the Chinese threat is pervasive [14:00] inside of the United States. And that runs from everything from Chinese intelligence operations [14:05] by the MSS, the Ministry of State Security, including the recruitment of individuals on campuses [14:13] to steal sensitive technology in companies to steal sensitive technology, the Ministry of Public Security [14:19] to put pressure on dissidents in cities like New York City, which have led to the FBI arrests of [14:27] individuals that have set up so-called Chinese police stations in American cities. We have seen [14:34] a very concerning activity on the cyber side, including Volt Typhoon, to set up the possibility to [14:45] begin offensive cyber operations in the United States. We've seen intense pressure on American companies [14:53] not to say things that are critical of the Chinese government, and then we see significant activity [15:00] by the United Front Work Department inside of the United States. Thank you. Can I follow? I want to follow [15:07] up on the cyber with Mr. Salufo. Salufo. To follow up on Dr. Jones' testimony regarding cyber actors, [15:16] we know that hostile cyber actors can remain inside American networks for months or even years before [15:22] discovery. How concerned or confident should the American public be that the government knows the [15:28] extent to which our adversaries have already penetrated critical infrastructure? And in your opinion, [15:33] which critical infrastructure sectors are least prepared to withstand a coordinated cyber attack [15:39] from an adversary? Mr. Stefanik, that's an excellent question. I'll try to unpack it quickly since I've [15:47] never had an unspoken thought, but I'll just try to take a couple of top-line views on that. Firstly, [15:54] Volt Typhoon should have been the wake-up call that everyone is paying attention to. Volt Typhoon was no [16:01] longer simply computer network exploit or espionage. It was no longer intelligence preparation of the [16:07] battlefield. It was operational preparation of the battlefield, i.e. there was no intent other than [16:13] to compromise systems that could be, at the time of their choosing, exploited. One thing to recognize [16:20] when you look at cyber, if you can exploit, you can also attack. So the line is very thin, but in this [16:26] case, there's no questioning what the intent was because there was no other value other than that. [16:32] If you were to take Salt Typhoon, which I think we're still reeling in terms of recognizing the full [16:39] implications of that, that was more of an espionage campaign. Really bad day, but I'm shocked there's [16:45] gambling going on in the casino. I can expect some of that. But when you start seeing the transition from [16:52] exploit to attack, that's a really bad day. The good news is dwell time is improving, [16:57] but we're only finding out when it's too late. The whole game is seizing the initiative and shaping [17:06] it in our favor. We are playing a defensive, reactive game. That's a fool's errand. [17:11] And my follow-up, I want to turn to AI because they're all interrelated. So we talked about the [17:17] cyber intrusions. Could AI, and we know it could, enable hostile actors to identify and exploit software [17:24] vulnerabilities at a speed that overwhelms our existing defensive and software patching processes. [17:30] How should the U.S. prepare for that possibility and vulnerability? [17:34] The short answer is yes, Congresswoman. AI will enable much more powerful offensive [17:39] and defensive cyber operations. That is one reason amongst many why I think it is imperative [17:44] the United States has a lead in inventing and deploying AI systems and making sure we do everything [17:49] in our power to deny China these capabilities. As Mr. Salufo said in his opening statement, [17:54] it would be in a very different world if it were Chinese companies that were inventing the most powerful [17:59] offensive cyber-enabled tools. And I think it should be a bipartisan priority to say America must retain [18:06] its lead here in AI in part because of cyber. Thank you. Yield back. Thank you. Mr. Gottheimer. [18:11] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to start by focusing on AI and adding to what Ms. Stefanik said. [18:16] Since 2023, Iran, China, and Russia have run covert operations to divide our country. We know that. [18:22] Funding front groups, flooding social media, and targeting our college campuses, especially with [18:26] anti-American and divisive rhetoric. AI supercharges all of it. A single adversary can now generate fake [18:32] voices and fake videos and millions of fake messages. Nearly impossible to tell the real thing. The 9-11 [18:37] framework was built to track terrorist organizations with physical networks. Today, the lies and radicalization [18:44] spread online and instantly at a scale no human network could ever match. And I'm concerned we [18:49] don't have the infrastructure for right now. I guess I'll start with you, Dr. McKinnon. How much more [18:55] dangerous does AI make foreign disinformation campaigns targeted at Americans? And do we have [19:00] any ways to detect them and fight back at the same speed our enemies are attacking? [19:04] Yeah, I think similar to the Congressman's question, the answer is yes here. AI does enable more powerful [19:10] foreign influence operations and, in general, more persuasive campaigns. It does it through a number [19:17] of mechanisms. The first is the message itself, whether that's a deep fake video in the way that you [19:23] suggested or even a text-based message that is more persuasive. One of the things that is concerning is [19:30] the possibilities of greater personalization in that messaging. [19:34] But do you feel, sorry to interrupt you, but do you feel like we are, are we, we're talking about [19:38] threats, modern threats, and if we have the capabilities to fight back, do you feel like [19:43] right now we have the capabilities to fight back? Are we structured to fight back? Is the IC built [19:48] to be able to handle this new threat? No, I think, I think across the board, when it comes to managing [19:53] threats for artificial intelligence, we need to posture much better. And what are the things, [19:56] some of the things you might do? The first, I think, is, is making sure our intelligence [20:01] community can actually use these tools to track these threats. A lot of times they yield a very [20:05] large data spray of, you can see the campaign unfolding across the digital network in the way [20:12] that you suggest. AI tools can be useful in finding those campaigns. I think that's an important piece [20:18] of this. Of course, enabling our own cyber operations against the perpetrators of these campaigns, [20:23] our own collection against those campaigns, orchestrators, that's another piece of this as well. [20:29] Thank you. General McMaster, can I ask you a quick question? Do you feel, given that you, [20:34] in the role you occupied when you were in the White House, in the administration, did you feel like [20:39] we were structured currently in a way that you said sometimes, I wish we had, you know, it's been 20 [20:47] years, I wish we were structured this way or that way, or it was built differently, you know, this, this [20:52] doesn't make much sense. Like, Department of Homeland Security is too unwieldy, or whatever the issue is. [20:57] What were a couple things that you found led to gaps in terms of coordination? [21:02] Well, thank you for that question. I think the biggest gap is the integration of intelligence, [21:08] and I would describe as operations broadly defined. That's bridging intelligence into actions, [21:14] and integrated actions. So, for example, if we're looking at the terrorist threat, and that, [21:19] and how these terrorist threats have now combined with transnational organized crime networks, [21:24] we have to be able to map those networks, understand nodes in those networks, [21:28] see the international flows of people, money, weapons, narcotics, precursor chemicals, [21:33] and also see the connections to states, because we know states are often using these networks, [21:37] like Maduro was in Venezuela, or like the Iranians use the IRGC as a major narcotics trafficking [21:43] organization, and that's a moneymaker for them. So, you map the networks, and then what we have to be [21:48] able to do better is break out of the law enforcement idea of following a case, and getting kingpins, [21:54] and trying to take out the networks with economic tools, sanctions, financial actions, [22:01] offensive cyber capabilities, where those are relevant, applying extraterritorial jurisdictions, [22:08] law enforcement across partner nations, and military operations, where we have the authorizations, [22:13] and to do so as near simultaneous as we can to cripple these networks. It was that bridge into [22:19] operations. And so, what we relied on there was to use the National Security Council staff, Homeland [22:25] Security Council staff, and the NEC, bring people together, and convene them at the White House. [22:31] So, did you not feel DNI, like, so DNI is supposed to play that role in some ways. Did, were they, [22:36] are they playing that role? Like, is that happening? I don't think sufficiently. I think what we need is [22:40] something like the, a more, an effective version of, of the National Counterterrorism Center to take [22:46] on some of these other activities against hostile states, because these hostile states also, as we know, [22:52] they use criminal organizations. Look at Russia's use of, of organized crime networks, or Iran's use of, [22:58] of criminal networks, for example. So, I think we need... So, it's less of a stove piping issue and more just [23:03] what's not structured to coordinate properly. Yes, and I think what it is, is you need teammates to come [23:09] together, who have two things, knowledge of the problem set, and second, knowledge of the resources [23:15] that can be brought to bear from the departments and agencies, and from international partners, [23:20] and to put together, you know, like a strategy, uh, on how to cripple these networks, uh, oriented on, [23:26] on clearly defined objectives, and the integration of all these elements of national power. I think if we [23:30] did this, if we could, you know, even, it doesn't have to be like a new agency, a new organization, [23:35] or anything, it just has to be as, uh, as, as Frank was mentioning here, a lot, a lot has to do with [23:40] info flow and authorities, rather than big, uh, really big organizational changes. Thank you. Thank you. [23:47] Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, I want to start, um, Mr. Salufa, uh, you talked about the Title 10, [24:01] Title 50, the JSOC, and all those things. I think that's one, but before we get to that, I really want to talk about, uh, [24:09] they're using strategy, they're playing chess, we're playing checkers. I mean, if you look at [24:13] October 7th, on October 8th, riots broke out on college campuses in protest, okay, saying stop the [24:22] genocide before any strikes had even been made. The only strikes that had been made were the [24:26] Palestinians against Jews. An actual stop the genocide was the genocide of the other side, [24:32] but before any strikes even happened, you already had the protest. Uh, recently AI, just speakers who [24:40] say AI get booed on college campuses because China knows that AI is the nuclear weapon of the 21st century. [24:50] So we have to stop that. We have to get ahead. So they are playing strategy. They are trying to plant seeds, [24:56] especially among our college youth. How do we stop that? And how do we integrate Title 10, [25:02] Title 50 to make sure that there aren't seams? And then, uh, finally, I know Mr. Salufo, you have a [25:09] personal story that started after 9-11 and I think it ties in to why you are so committed now. If you [25:15] will start with that and what happened immediately after 9-11 and how that ties in to how we can address [25:21] some of these issues I talked about with that, uh, Mr. Salufo. Well, thank you, Congressman, and thank [25:27] you for the, uh, overly nice, uh, question. So yes, it is personal. It's personal for all of us, but, uh, [25:34] I had the opportunity to look at these issues. Counterterrorism, Al-Qaeda, that was a backwater [25:40] set of issues pre-9-11. CSIS afforded me that opportunity, where Seth is now, to look at some of [25:46] these issues. I, I led a significant effort on homeland defense. We weren't calling it homeland [25:51] security because we were looking, uh, more from a, a defensive perspective and, uh, I had family, [25:59] friends, and others. Uh, I'm from New York, so, uh, it's personal on so many levels and I prefer not to [26:05] go there because it's still hard to, to get my arms around it. So I get to focus on what we do about it [26:11] and that is sort of looking at synchronizing some of our authorities. When you look at, and, and the reason [26:17] I brought up the counterterrorism example is because it does have application in cyber. And I think [26:23] you're starting to see some of that culminate, uh, if you were to look at absolute resolve in [26:30] Venezuela. Cyber played an integral role. Was it the shiny object? No, but it was cyber. The, the real [26:38] question to ask is not winning the cyber war. It's winning the war and how cyber can enable that, how it [26:43] can help our offensive capabilities. If you look at midnight hammer, cyber also played a significant [26:50] role in our, in, in achieving the operational effects we're looking for. Uh, absolute resolve, uh, uh, uh, [26:58] epic fury as well. But, but bottom line is, is I think we're finally recognizing that cyber isn't the [27:04] little black magic. It's not a separate box that sits over here. It has to be integrated in our doctrine [27:11] and our war fighting strategy and capabilities. You're starting to see that. Is it enough? In my [27:16] eyes, no, because ultimately we shouldn't be reacting. We should be shaping the environment. [27:21] We should be, if we're, if deterrence is failing, we ought to be compelling because here's the thing, [27:26] every one of these incidents that we're seeing, it's not only the perpetrator, everyone else is [27:31] watching how we respond. And if we respond by building more firewalls and more defenses, which is [27:38] essential, don't get me wrong. But in itself, that's never going to change the, uh, the equation. [27:44] Let, let's address this. I think the cyber rules and, and a lot of realm that's in the gray zone, [27:50] I think that the rules have to change that there are things that are above the level of conflict [27:54] that we just classify below. And if they're not above the level of conflict, then we need to be [27:59] offensive below the level of conflict. We can't have it both ways. We can't say this, when you attack us, [28:05] it's below the level of conflict, but we won't do it because it's above. So comment on that, please. [28:10] No, that's well said. Maybe you should be sitting in the, I, I, I mean, here's the truth. The, the, the, [28:15] the national cyber strategy for the first time, a principal pillar is to impose cost and consequence [28:22] on bad cyber behavior. We needed to have it in strategy, but as we all know, strategy itself is [28:29] insufficient. Now it's as general McMaster mentioned, it's operationalizing that it's taking from theory [28:35] into practice. I think we're starting to see some of that play out, but we do it very well when we [28:41] have a defined mission set and a defined outcome. What we don't do as well as this is happening every [28:47] day. So how do we not, uh, only bring the best and the brightest when, when something bad is happening, [28:54] but how do we do this on an everyday environment? And, and one point, and I just want to pick on, [28:59] and I know I'm on the other side of the dais here, so I apologize, but Mr. Gottheimer, [29:04] one of the questions I think that the intelligence community uniquely plays, industry is going to have [29:09] more data than the government in, in many of these campaigns. What the government can bring is context, [29:16] it can enrich that data, and let's not forget, you don't always have to fight cyber on cyber. [29:21] You've got other collection means that can enrich our visibility. So that's, to me, [29:28] where that marriage has to be. Right now, we're, we're, we're not even at the dating session, [29:33] and I'd like to see that accelerate. Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, [29:40] gentlemen, for your testimony and for being here today. I want to start by asking you a question about [29:45] the war in Iran. There's been reporting over the months about the United States being surprised [29:51] about Iran's capabilities and what it's been able to do. I wanted you all to reflect. I know that [29:56] each of you is testifying in slightly different areas, but give you an opportunity to reflect on [30:01] any of your surprises on Iran capabilities or U.S. capabilities that you thought would be greater. [30:07] I know that Israel is also included in this, and please. Just quickly, I don't think we were [30:16] surprised on Iran's capabilities. I think what precipitated the president's decision to, to act [30:21] directly against the missile drone strike complex was our knowledge of, of how they were racing to [30:27] deepen those arsenals and to really hold the region at risk and the global economy at risk, [30:32] but also to, to build a conventional shield behind which they would develop the most destructive weapons [30:37] on earth. So I think that we knew that. I think what we didn't really understand maybe is the degree to [30:42] which they had perfected that missile drone strike complex, what they've been experimenting with for [30:46] a long time, using the Houthis and others. But then, but then also, the, we didn't have the, the drone, [30:53] in particular, defenses necessary, I think, to, to prevent a lot of the damage that they've been able to inflict. [30:59] I think a lot of- [31:00] General, let me, let me ask you, because you've been at this a long time, very accomplished in your field, [31:06] but how would we not have anticipated that a year ago or two years ago? [31:10] Yeah. I think we did anticipate it. I think a lot of the remedies for drone defense, you're, are being [31:17] fielded now, you know, I mean, a little bit too late. I think we should, we should, maybe we had a degree [31:22] of complacency within the Department of War for some period of time in terms of fielding these. [31:26] But is, is if, if we anticipated, if we knew it, and you say that we were unprepared, then why would we go do it? [31:31] Well, I think what we've seen is the ex post facto justification for acting. I think over time, [31:39] that the cost of not acting, as we did, would have exceeded the cost of acting, because, [31:45] because Iran was deepening that arsenal even further, and, and was restarting its, its nuclear [31:50] capability. So, so, it's a, uh, program. Sure. So I, I think, you know, I don't think any of this was a [31:56] surprise. I, I, to hear, everybody else's thoughts here, too. Yeah, I've got one more question. So, [32:00] if you guys, other gentlemen, you have any other quick comment? Uh-huh. So you think we didn't, we didn't [32:30] learn or take a lesson from the Ukraine, Russia war that we should have? That's correct. And, and [32:36] also, that, that, that also applies to the United States. Well, I do not think our, uh, stadiums are [32:42] sufficiently protected from drone attacks in the United States. Sure. Uh, let me ask a question, [32:47] Mr. Buchanan, on, on AI. I guess about a year ago, my, you know, maybe a little bit off on the timing, [32:53] but about a year ago, I guess, uh, China surprised the world with DeepSeq, uh, and now, I think about [33:00] two days ago, came out with Kimi, uh, which is a very capable model. Um, so, you know, we keep, [33:10] there's a lot of discussion on the committee about AI, about quantum computing, about the race with [33:15] China, the competition with China, and all these things. Uh, where do you assess now their capabilities [33:21] with this new information about what they've developed, even though we've act, we've limited [33:25] their access to the most sophisticated chips? Uh, thank you, Congressman. I'm not sure we've [33:30] successfully eliminated their access to the most, uh, advanced chips. And I think, uh, the evidence, [33:35] at least in public reporting, seems to suggest that both the models you mentioned were trained on [33:40] US-designed, uh, chips, and that China still struggles greatly, uh, due to bipartisan efforts from [33:47] both the first Trump administration and the Biden administration to produce its own chips. Uh, [33:51] uh, you don't need to take my word for it. Secretary Lutnik testified, uh, that China would make 200,000 [33:56] chips, all of which were much worse than the US chips, um, in 2025. The democratic ecosystem produces [34:02] millions. So, to my mind... So your, I mean, your testimony is that we did this to ourself? [34:07] My, my testimony is that America has a, a large structural advantage in AI due to the democratic [34:13] ecosystem of producing chips, and we should exploit that structural advantage to the fullest. I think we [34:18] have done some of it, but we have not done enough, and we should be much more aggressive on enforcement [34:23] and smuggling to stop China from trying to, to catch up. All right. I'm almost out of time, [34:28] so I'm going to yield back. Thank you, gentlemen. Chairman Yields, Ms. Tinney. Well, thank you so [34:34] much, uh, for being here. Excellent testimony. I just want to say a couple things, uh, not sure. Just, [34:40] I'm going to get this out of the way, because I don't think we should get into election integrity. I want [34:43] to talk about 9-11, because I, too, am a New Yorker. But, uh, when Mr. Heim spoke, I, I have to say about all the, [34:50] you know, partisanship on the, on the, and what did the Democrats do? I think of George Bush's [34:54] election being stolen. Uh, he wasn't a rightful president. Hillary Clinton said her election was [34:59] stolen. Stacey Abrams said her election was stolen. Katie Porter said her election was stolen. Hakeem [35:04] Jeffries said President Trump wasn't a legitimate president. Kamala Harris all said the same thing [35:09] over and over, raising this rhetoric to another level. And as president, President Joe Biden signed [35:14] Executive Order 14019, which tasks our federal agencies who should be helping people to do, [35:21] engage in voter, uh, uh, registration and voter turnout. And those are things that they should [35:25] stay on their mission, not on those. So, but I felt like, uh, there were just so many things that [35:30] have happened, uh, unfortunately on the election integrity issue. And I think it's a really important [35:34] issue, but I want to ask, uh, Mr. Chalufo. Did I get that right? Yes. I, I, I'm from Utica, so I know a [35:41] lot of Italians. I think it's a, I think I'm better at pronunciation than some others on that [35:46] issue. I wanted to ask you because I come from New York, as you know, and after having the worst [35:50] terrorist attack in our nation's history, we're talking about 9-11, uh, you know, how could we be [35:55] where we are 25 years ago? Uh, I have friends, I don't think I know anyone that didn't have friends [35:59] who died on 9-11, uh, in the towers, uh, a childhood friend died, uh, in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. I mean, [36:05] these are, these are really, this, these, this hits home to so many. Uh, in New York in 2019, [36:12] they passed a law that prohibited, uh, interaction and, and use of, uh, for example, DMV records, [36:20] Department of Motor Vehicle records, when there was a stop by local police. Uh, and this meant if [36:26] somebody was a, you know, a would-be terrorist in our, in our state coming across the border, [36:31] there was no way to check or, or, or confer with federal and state agencies. Uh, how would you rate [36:37] that, uh, type of, you know, the so-called green light law? How would you rate that as, as part of, [36:42] uh, the problem that we have in, in, after the 9-11 commission famously said, we need our federal [36:49] agencies to work together. You're talking about synchronization. And now here we are telling us, [36:54] them, they can't work together. Kathy Hochul also just came out with an order. Our governor [36:59] saying that we can't have, uh, our federal, our local agencies working with ICE to determine if [37:04] they're dangerous illegal immigrants in our communities. Uh, they're prohibiting them from [37:08] using the 287G program. These are all things that are tools for our police to keep our community safe, [37:14] the primary role of our government. Could you address those issues? Because I think they're really [37:17] important to a state like New York, still the fourth largest state, with a northern border, [37:22] which I and, uh, Representative Stefanik represent. Uh, Congresswoman, thank you for the question. [37:27] I'm not exceedingly well versed on, on all of the, uh, developments here, but I can tell you, [37:36] NYPD is almost an intelligence service in and of itself and, uh, and have some of the best, uh, women [37:45] and men in, in service. So I, I, I, when I look back to 9-11, basically it was NYPD, LAPD, and everyone else. [37:53] And it's not taking away from the everyone else because everyone else matters. Um, but all things [37:59] said and done, yes, we need to do more to be able to get information into the hands of the, the, the, [38:05] the frontline officers who can stop something before it becomes an issue. [38:09] This is really just a common sense issue. I mean, the 9-11 commission said we need to work together. [38:13] That's why we had lapses. That's why we, there's something like this occurred. And now we have the [38:18] situation where we can't even have our local police and our county police working with our federal [38:25] agencies that are providing us with the data and a lot of the intelligence that may be from this [38:28] committee. That's what worries me is that with the intelligence sharing, the ability to know what's [38:33] happening and the, the really just cutting off the data. And I think this is an open door for countries [38:38] and, and adversaries and enemies like China, Russia to come in and actually take advantage of us. [38:43] And I would just add not to sort of move to another top, but, but at the end of the day, [38:49] our fusion centers and some of the capabilities that we have, they, they need to do exponentially [38:55] more in the cyber environment as well, which is where I spend most of my time focused these days. [39:01] Cause, cause you're right. I, I mean, at the end of the day, I'm not even sure it's about collecting. [39:06] It's all about the connecting and being able to, to see the rich picture in terms of what that threat [39:12] environment is about. I think we have a lot of collection. [39:14] Thank you. I appreciate it. Just one last, uh, for general McMaster, uh, great book by the way. [39:20] Uh, you, you have a concept in your book called strategic narcissism, and I just wondered if you [39:24] could maybe comment on that in the intelligence realm of how we could, should approach, I only [39:29] have a couple seconds left, approach our, our foreign policy, uh, from that perspective using [39:34] intelligence and, and, and being more strategic as opposed to more political. [39:37] Thank you so much. I think what's most important is to recognize that, uh, that our adversaries [39:42] enemies rivals, they have aspirations that are, that go far beyond anything that's in reaction to us. [39:48] Oftentimes we, we, we kind of get at each other, uh, because we, we tend to see our engagement or [39:54] intervention or disengagement as being decisive toward achieving a favorable outcome. [39:59] And so I think what's really important is to pay particular attention to the emotions, [40:04] the ideology and the aspirations that drive and constrain our adversaries. [40:09] For example, in this case, the theocratic, uh, you know, military dictatorship in, in, in Iran, [40:14] uh, or, uh, you know, the, the Chinese Communist Party with Xi Jinping on it or, or, or Putinist Russia. [40:20] And we tend to think that, well, we, maybe we, you know, that, that we, that we caused this problem, [40:25] you know, with like the Putin's argument about the enlargement of, of NATO. No, actually, [40:30] Putin has these aspirations to reestablish the Russian empire, for example. So I think [40:35] it's important to have this term strategic empathy to pay particular attention to what drives and [40:40] constrains the other rivals, adversaries, and, and enemies. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you. [40:46] Joelman yields. Mr. Christian Morthy. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to our witnesses for coming in. [40:51] Really appreciate your testimony. Dr. Buchanan, you noted that you were the first ever White House [40:57] special advisor for artificial intelligence, right? You have to answer. Yes, I was. So let's, [41:04] starting out easy here. Okay. Let's talk about deep fakes. Anyone can make convincing AI generated images, [41:12] audio and videos nowadays. I was actually able to make a few images of us just by plugging in pictures [41:20] that are available online. And within seconds, I had a picture of us playing basketball, Dr. Buchanan. [41:27] Now, just to be clear, you and I have never played pickup basketball, right? No, we've not. Okay. [41:33] AI can also make audio recordings, like when someone pretended to be Secretary of State Rubio, [41:40] using an AI generated voice to contact several officials and videos, like when a deep fake of [41:47] Ukrainian President Zelensky being used to try to convince Ukrainian soldiers to surrender. And this [41:55] year, according to President Trump himself, he was even fooled by a viral AI generated video of Iran [42:03] striking the USS Abraham Lincoln. He even called one of his generals to say it, quote, [42:09] looks like it's burning down. Dr. Buchanan, as you note in your testimony, the 9-11 Commission [42:16] concluded that the attacks revealed a failure of imagination. With such convincing deep fakes as the [42:23] ones showing me and you playing basketball, which is kind of rather odd, we need to have an even larger [42:30] imagination about how deep fakes are going to be used to confuse and mislead people going forward. [42:35] Would you agree with that? I would, yes. Let me turn to a slightly different topic. [42:40] General McMaster, one of the key recommendations from the 9-11 Commission report was that we needed to [42:46] improve intelligence sharing between federal, state, and local authorities. Isn't that right? [42:52] Yes, Congressman. And I believe we can agree that [42:56] intelligence sharing among these different levels of government actually improved after 9-11. [43:03] Wouldn't you agree? Absolutely. [43:07] One of the reasons was, you know, joint terrorism task forces came into being fusion [43:11] centers. There are 80 fusion centers across the country. But as I've mentioned before in this [43:16] committee, unfortunately, the Trump administration has diverted our JTTF efforts to support the [43:21] President's immigration agenda. And the President is now putting the funding of fusion centers at risk. [43:29] General McMaster, this month, the New York Times reported that the administration is demanding [43:34] that states change voting rules or lose their anti-terrorism funds. That's what this headline says, [43:39] right? Yes, it does. And according to DHS, states must comply with the President's election agenda, [43:49] including running voter rolls through DHS's controversial citizenship verification database, [43:55] or DHS will withhold 20% of their anti-terrorism funds. So General McMaster, in this time of heightened [44:03] threats, we should not be attaching strings to any anti-terrorism funding, right? [44:08] Not unless it's related, I think, to securing the nation. [44:12] Right. And this isn't necessarily that. And so, in my humble opinion, we certainly shouldn't be [44:19] requiring the citizenship verification database that 30 states, including Republican and Democratic-led [44:25] states, refuse to use because, as ABC News has reported, the very system that DHS is urging states [44:32] to use has unfortunately been found to be faulty itself. Let me turn to my final topic. General McMaster, [44:40] in September 2020, before the November 2020 election, President Trump refused to commit [44:45] to a peaceful transfer of power, suggesting he could invoke the Insurrection Act to involve the military. [44:52] And in response, you told Meet the Press that it was, quote, irresponsible to discuss the military's [44:58] role in the 2020 election. You said that, right? Yes, I did. And now, as we approach the 2026 elections, [45:05] President Trump, again, is not ruling out sending the National Guard or ICE to polling, including, [45:13] in this headline, it says President Trump says he's willing to send those elements to the elections, [45:19] election polls this year. General, I assume it's, again, irresponsible to discuss the military's role [45:25] in the upcoming 2026 election, right? Yeah, I think it's really important to recognize that [45:32] there are founders, you know, 250 years ago were most concerned about the military becoming involved in [45:38] in politics. And George Washington set the example with the Continental Congress during our revolution. [45:45] Lately, I think, again, you know, and not to say equivalence between what the president's saying, [45:50] what others are saying, there has been a tendency to lay out an expectation that the military should be [45:56] a check on executive authority or should be an arm of executive authority in activities such as this, [46:03] which threaten to politicize the military. I think it's extremely dangerous and damaging to that bold [46:10] line that has to remain in place between our military and partisan politics. And so whether it's [46:17] some of your colleagues who made a video about not following, you know, illegal orders with the subtext of [46:23] which, from my view, was that the military should be a check on executive power, I think any of this kind of [46:29] activity is profoundly damaging. And we ought to all, you know, pledge to avoid it. Thank you. [46:37] The gentleman's time's expired. Mr. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the panel for your expertise. [46:44] We're grateful to have you back before the committee. And I'm glad we're paying attention 25 years later [46:50] to what we learned from 9-11. And like everyone here, I share the loss of that day, know where I was, [46:56] and know my dear friend from working on the Senate Banking Committee, Neil Levin, who ran the Port [47:03] Authority in New York, was lost at breakfast that morning. So I'm glad we're doing this. I thank the [47:08] chairman for it. Mr. Cephalo, I want to focus on you, though, because there are two issues that I'm [47:14] most concerned about. One, I think we are so far behind from a homeland security point of view on cyber risk [47:22] and that we keep naming all these suspected and actual Chinese operations after various typhoons. [47:29] I think with AI, we're going to have a tsunami that comes across the entire lower 48 and beyond. [47:35] So that's a big concern. Secondly, I'm not convinced that the 9-11 report's been implemented as it relates [47:42] to removing silos. I think everywhere we take testimony about remaining in silos, no matter who the ODNI is or [47:50] what good efforts we make through fusion centers. And so when it comes to data about the homeland, [47:57] we've worked for three years in a classified and unclassified setting that TSA data, CSIS data, [48:07] border CBP data is not fused with DOJ and FBI. So I want to leave that out, ask you to comment [48:15] on that. But I want to also talk about something that is very important and a lot of questions for [48:21] you about integrating cyber security into the counter-terrorism type fusion centers that members [48:28] have talked about. I just came back from Cyber Shield at Camp Robinson in Arkansas, [48:33] represent Little Rock, proud to represent the 19th Air Wing at Little Rock Air Force Base and Camp [48:37] Robins for the National Guard. We had 1,100 people, 44 states and territories, and 23 countries. They're [48:46] working on a tabletop exercise on critical infrastructure. But with AI, would you agree [48:52] that all infrastructure in the United States is now critical infrastructure? It's not just water and power [48:57] dreads? [48:57] That, firstly, Congressman, I love the, it's moving from typhoons to tsunamis. That's [49:03] absolutely correct. And I think that is going to be the outcome. And I do think that AI will enable [49:13] all of our critical infrastructures to be critical. And, and, and, and not just the cyber attack, [49:18] but to kinetic attacks as well. One of the earlier conversation around some of the Iranian activity, [49:23] they're targeting data centers through precision guided munitions through, through kinetic means. [49:29] So I, I, I do buy your philosophy. But let me just say one thing. When we look at critical [49:37] infrastructure, it is not just an economic set of issues anymore. It is our national defense. [49:44] We will not be able to project power or deploy forces if we, once you get outside of the wire of [49:50] any military base, they're dependent upon civilian entities to be able to ensure that the power's on, [49:57] that the transportation's working and that logistics, which is ultimately what wins wars, [50:02] can work. So I, I think we are a little slow to recognize that, but you cannot have a modern [50:10] military without a secure critical infrastructure. And to me, they're inextricably interwoven. [50:16] And the reason why I think the AI issue is critical is because let's say JPMorgan Chase is fully [50:21] compliant with mythos and is part of the tabletop exercise to review their own data. Good for them. [50:28] What about their entire supply chain? Well said. What about every customer? And so I view this as a [50:33] national, national. Do we even know what's in our supply chains? Correct. [50:36] We don't have visibility. And this is where I think that we, [50:40] Trent Kelly talked about integrating title 10 and title 50. I think our tabletop exercises are too [50:47] too rudimentary, too infrequent, and they don't engage our air guard, air reserves, [50:53] and cyber squadrons around the country that should be able to be called out for a civil defense threat [50:59] of a volt tsunami. And there's no integration between our offices of director, as of emergency [51:06] management, our tags across the country, and civilian leadership on this point. So would you support [51:14] broadening our fusion centers to bring in not only the usual suspects, but for the air guard, for [51:21] example, our adjutant generals in the states that could be working in a more direct way? [51:27] You know, I do. I think pre-9-11, the civil support teams of the National Guard played a key [51:34] role in enabling our ability to respond to the horrific attacks. Clearly, when you look at cyber, [51:40] you have the adjunct set of issues that I think ought to be considered. Because, yes, our tags, [51:46] ultimately, our adjutant generals are going to play critical roles here. And not just the National [51:54] Guard Bureau, but down at the Title 32 role. So I do support that. [51:59] I thank you. Thanks for the panel. I yield back. [52:02] Gentleman yields Mr. Quigley. [52:04] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [52:05] General, I take from your testimony two intermixed questions. Are we fighting and preparing for [52:14] this war or the last war, and can we govern? And intertwined in that is the fact that we have [52:21] large, cumbersome, bureaucratic military intel services trying to intertwine with the state and [52:29] private sector. And we make slow decisions, often political, based on all of those. And can we govern [52:41] while we try to do all this? General, you just referenced a little bit about lessons learned [52:47] from the Ukraine war. Can we adapt? Can we be nimble? And can we do so without being overtly political [52:56] and get out of our own way? [52:57] General, these are great questions. War is the great auditor of military institutions, Congressman. [53:04] And I think we didn't act fast enough, based on the lessons that Seth pointed out on Ukraine. [53:11] He mentioned hardening infrastructure, but also the counter-drone capabilities. [53:16] We're doing that now. I think we are racing. There are a lot of new capabilities that are being fielded, [53:21] and I'm encouraged by the Department of War's changes to a lot of the contracting [53:26] and procurement procedures. I think that's going extremely well. And then I'm hoping that Congress [53:33] does pass the emergency appropriations bill for the Department of War. I think what we're seeing [53:40] in our military, to a large extent, is there's a huge bow wave of deferred modernization, [53:45] and I think a failure to procure weapons and capabilities at scale. And so that's where I think [53:52] that we have a lot of catch-up to do there. In terms of the broader questions on our civilian [54:02] infrastructure that's at risk, I think what is encouraging is there have been free market incentives [54:08] that have led to the creation of some very significant civilian capabilities for defense [54:15] and for intelligence in a lot of areas in terms of insider threat and espionage, but then being [54:22] able to harden with the many great cybersecurity companies that we have, with tiered and layered [54:28] defense capabilities, and I think now recovery capabilities, which are really important. [54:33] If it is going to be the tsunami of AI, maybe we have to assume you're going to get attacked. [54:39] Something may get through, but once it gets through, what have you built in terms of resilience and [54:43] the ability to recover and restore operations? So I think that encouraging those kind of private sector [54:50] solutions, because the government, there's no way the government can do it all, and I defer to some of [54:54] our real cyber experts here, but I feel good about the private sector initiatives. I think from a defense [54:59] capability and the threats associated with that, there is a bow wave of deferred modernization. There [55:05] are mature technologies that we can apply to these emerging threats, but they have not been fielded at [55:12] scale yet. [55:12] Mr. Sullivan. [55:14] Can I just, so firstly, not to throw a bumper sticker here, but technology changes warfare. [55:21] It doesn't replace strategy, so there are a number of things that I think we still have to get our arms [55:26] around. There is a ruling right now, 2209, from a counter-UAS perspective, a counter-unmanned aerial [55:34] vehicle. All the comments are coming in from hobbyists, who obviously don't want to restrict any airspace, [55:41] including some of our most critical infrastructure, including nuclear, chemical, and others. This is, [55:49] there's a, I think the window's only open for another week, so if anyone's listening and you're a critical [55:55] infrastructure owner-operator, this is the time to step in, because ultimately that's what these [55:59] companies are being asked to do, not just in cyber, but from a UAS perspective. And, and to Seth's good [56:05] points and General McMaster, these are all movies coming to a theater near you. We shouldn't be surprised. [56:11] We've seen what can happen. This is coming. [56:15] Mr. Jones. [56:16] Yeah, just on the AI front, you know, one of the things that's been interesting is, uh, I was out in Europe last [56:22] week, uh, looking at, uh, some of the advances in technology used in the Ukraine war. There are now [56:27] AI-enabled drones that are launched and then able to hit targets, uh, with AI guiding, uh, uh, able to [56:36] identify, uh, uh, potential targets night and day. I do not think we, and we had hosted a couple weeks ago, [56:44] Kathy Lanier, the vice president for the NFL, NFL security, former police chief of Washington DC. [56:52] She is not confident that our, uh, NFL stadiums other than the, uh, uh, you know, Super Bowl, [56:59] that level of tier can confidently have both the authority and the ability to conduct counter-drone [57:06] operations. It's a challenge, let alone critical infrastructure and, and, and, uh, uh, a private [57:13] industry. We have a huge challenge in the advances of technology, including from drones and AI-enabled [57:19] drones, a huge threat and an inability right now to find a practical solution. [57:25] Gentleman yields. Mr. Carson. [57:29] General McMaster, one of the biggest failures before 9, before 9-11, uh, was that the government [57:39] had pieces of info, uh, but did not understand what they meant when, when, when brought together. [57:45] What emerging threat is our current intelligence system least prepared to recognize? And what would [57:54] change, um, the way we receive warnings, particularly from fusion centers? Um, I, I served as a watch [58:03] officer in a fusion center and I know how critical it is for state and local agencies to have access to [58:09] federal databases as well as those federal agencies to have access to local law enforcement and state law [58:15] enforcement who are actually on the ground getting intel about white supremacist threats, about, uh, so-called [58:24] Islamic threats. Um, how can we better prepare, um, to avoid and avert the next 9-11? God forbid. [58:33] Well, Carson, I put this in my, in my state for the record. I'm very concerned about how AI is sort of [58:40] creating this situation, what you might call the democratization of destruction, where you have [58:45] non-state actors who can quite easily now gain capabilities previously associated only with [58:51] nation states. I think this may be most severe in the area of bioengineering combined with AI, [58:57] and so we, and we don't have really the, the biological surveillance capabilities at this time [59:03] internationally to get early warning of any kind of a biological agent, uh, and then, and then be able [59:08] to, of course, rapidly develop and prototype vaccines and countermeasures and that sort of thing. [59:14] Obviously we had the Syrian experience of, of COVID-19. Uh, I believe that came from the lab at, [59:19] at Wuhan. Uh, I, we know that our adversaries and, uh, are, are, are developing these kinds of [59:25] capabilities, but now, you know, with, with AI that could easily be transferred, uh, to an ISIS type [59:30] of organization for, for example, uh, or, uh, or any of the range of terrorist organizations that's [59:36] supported by, by Iran. So I think that's the area that I would be most concerned about. And so [59:41] surveillance and, you know, wastewater, the, the rapid, your rapid blood tests that you can take [59:46] and so forth, as well as working forward, uh, to our intelligence community to rapidly identify [59:53] and then, and then preempt as we, uh, if we can, those threats as we did, for example, in the Euphrates [59:58] river valley, uh, against, uh, against ISIS, uh, when, when they were developing the, trying to develop [1:00:04] this kind of capability. Might now be the time general or anyone on the panel to really lean [1:00:09] in into AI as it could, as it relates to protecting our supply chain integrity and security. Yeah, [1:00:14] this is a great, this is a great opportunity here as well. Uh, and, and, uh, and, and Frank already [1:00:20] mentioned this. I, I, I do think that gaining visibility of that supply chain, hardware, software, [1:00:24] OT, IT, uh, and then also understanding the kind of vulnerabilities associated with [1:00:30] China's control of critical parts of that supply chain, uh, where they can put in capabilities [1:00:35] that could commit to cripple our infrastructure later, like we saw, for example, uh, in, in solar [1:00:40] panels or, or, or cranes at, uh, at our, at our port facilities. Uh, and, and, uh, and so I, I think [1:00:47] that we now have the capability, thanks to AI, to gain a much greater degree of visibility on those [1:00:52] supply chains, understand where the vulnerabilities are and, and, and work to reduce those vulnerabilities. [1:00:57] Yes, sir. Thank you. I yield back, chairman. [1:01:00] Gentleman yields Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I'm the last one, so I get extra time. [1:01:08] Yeah, keep, keep thinking that. There's so many questions I'd like to ask. You appreciate your [1:01:14] being here. Um, do, do, do, do, do any of y'all have any worries about the threat being in the United [1:01:21] States? My concern, Trump went to Pennsylvania during the election and all of a sudden about a, [1:01:27] we, we, two weeks before the election, he kind of updated. Oh, we're, we're okay. We're going to win. [1:01:30] You know, you know, we don't need any more votes. Uh, Musk knows all about these computers. He's just a [1:01:36] genius, especially these connected to getting the vote counts. Uh, Mr. Mc, General Mcgaster, [1:01:42] you dealt with Mr. Trump a lot. Do you think he was kind of signaling to us that, that, uh, [1:01:45] Musk has the ability to interfere with some of the elections? [1:01:48] Well, I, I don't, I don't, I don't know, I have any knowledge about that statement or anything, [1:01:52] but I, I know that, you know, with, with our election machines, the way, the way that I see it, [1:01:56] and, and I looked at this pretty hard when I was National Security Advisor, and I'm a bit dated, [1:02:01] because there's been even a lot more work done since then. You know, these machines are disconnected, [1:02:05] you know, from the, from the internet. There are paper backups. There are audit capabilities. [1:02:09] I really think what's most important at this moment, and, and I kind of appeal to all of you, [1:02:14] really, you know, there is a way, I think, to make our, our elections more transparent, [1:02:19] to make sure that only eligible voters vote without restricting access to those who are eligible voters. [1:02:24] But you don't have a concern about anybody in America interfering with the election? [1:02:27] No, I don't. I don't. Not to my knowledge. Not any. [1:02:30] You've got a lot of experience. I'd like to ask another question about Iran. Have, have we had, [1:02:35] excuse me, about Ukraine. I'm just amazed they've got these [1:02:37] robots or whatever that do the, even military, infantry work. Yeah. [1:02:42] Is our military anywhere near that capability? And our, I think Ukraine's offered us that some of [1:02:47] their defensive drone capabilities, and we've rejected it. Yeah. [1:02:51] We need them. They have cards to play, so to speak. Yeah, absolutely. If you saw the, [1:02:57] the operation that was conducted, maybe two months ago, where Ukraine used exclusively aerial and [1:03:03] ground drones, and actually defeated and accepted the surrender of Russian soldiers with an all [1:03:09] autonomous organization. What, what, you know, what, what Dr. Jones mentioned is, is the next frontier. [1:03:15] What's happening here is computing power at the edge, self-healing communications networks, [1:03:20] such that you'll go from one soldier controlling one drone to one soldier controlling many, [1:03:26] and to be able to give missions to formations of drones, you know, and, and to, and they'll be able [1:03:32] to learn, take out the air defense system, for example. One will get shot down, the others will [1:03:37] learn, communicate with each other. And so I think that's, that's what we have to stay on top of there. [1:03:42] And then also, we have these capabilities, we have the technology, we have not demonstrated the ability [1:03:47] to, to produce and field them at scale, and to have the innovation cycle that you see in Ukraine, [1:03:54] which is weeks. So the, the Russians will develop a countermeasure, the Ukrainians will see that [1:03:58] countermeasure, they'll bring it back to, for re-engineering, and they'll, they'll have this open [1:04:02] architecture where they can make changes to the software, sometimes the hardware, and improve, [1:04:07] improve their own capabilities relative to the Russians. So that innovation cycle, and they'll be able to [1:04:11] fill it at scale, but, but I know that other members of the panel have, have followed this [1:04:15] closely as well, so. Dr. Buchanan, you mentioned something about the, uh, trying to move my notes [1:04:25] here, I wrote it down. You, you mentioned something about chips and the need to have chips. What, what [1:04:29] did we give up when Trump gave some chips to China? Were there any of those, the central chips that you said [1:04:34] we should not give to China? That's right. Uh, computing power, computer chips are the lifeblood of AI [1:04:40] systems, and we have something called the scaling law in AI, which is the more computing powers you use to [1:04:45] train or develop the AI system, the more powerful the AI system is as a result. That's why computing [1:04:50] chips are, uh, one of the most sought after commodities in the world right now. Uh, President [1:04:55] Trump said he was willing to sell a particular generation of computing chips called the Hopper [1:05:00] chip, uh, to China. Uh, I disagree with that decision. I think, uh, President Trump and his first [1:05:05] administration took, um, some very important actions denying China, uh, chip making equipment that was [1:05:11] built on the Biden administration. And, uh, my policy, my, my world view is that given how important [1:05:17] AI is to national security, to the threats we have talked about here today, we need to have a very [1:05:21] clear lead for the United States in AI, and therefore we need to have a very clear lead for the United [1:05:25] States in, uh, computing power and chip making equipment. So he gave away chips that were essential [1:05:30] and could give China an advantage. He lifted the export controls on, uh, a certain class of chips. [1:05:36] That's right. And, uh, and I, my concern is that, uh, chips like that would enable Chinese, uh, military [1:05:41] operations and would enable some of the, the models, DeepSeek and, and otherwise that, uh, your colleague [1:05:46] was asking about earlier. [1:05:47] Taiwan. You could, Taiwan has got a great computer, uh, chips, chips development. Do they have the chips that [1:05:55] you're- The, as far as the questions about, uh, the role of computing power in Taiwan, yes. Essentially, [1:06:13] all of the advanced computer chips in the world, uh, are made in Taiwan. The Bipartisan Chips Act aims to bring, [1:06:18] uh, some of that to the United States, which is a terrific thing. But all of the chips we are [1:06:23] talking about here, with, with very narrow exceptions, are made in Taiwan. Yes. [1:06:27] Jim, Jimman's time's expired. Yeah, yeah. We're not, we're not, we're not doing stoppage time. No, [1:06:37] no, you've, he's, he's, he's answered your question, so we're going to move on. Okay. All right. Mr. Perry. [1:06:46] Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Jones, uh, looked into and kind of an expert on unrestricted and irregular warfare, [1:06:57] especially in, as it pertains to the Communist Party of China. Has our government taken a, a, um, [1:07:06] whole of government approach to combating unrestricted or irregular warfare? And do we have [1:07:13] a comprehensive strategy, agency by agency? I don't believe we do have a comprehensive strategy, [1:07:22] either at the federal level or just talking last week to members of some of our joint [1:07:28] terrorism task forces and fusion centers, where, uh, there is little, uh, activity at the state and [1:07:36] local level to understand and, and operationalize, uh, the threat from unrestricted warfare happening, [1:07:43] particularly by the Chinese, but also the Russians and Iranians inside of our borders. [1:07:48] So just out of curiosity, some of the top level stuff, because maybe some people aren't familiar, [1:07:53] can you kind of just name half a dozen of maybe the top unrestricted, irregular, irregular warfare, [1:08:01] whole of government approaches that the Communist Party of China uses against the United States of [1:08:05] America? Uh, the, there are far too many, uh, to, to go through in detail, uh, for this testimony, [1:08:12] unless we added, uh, added another four hours, but they range, uh, from everything from, um, uh, [1:08:18] influence operations. Most recently, uh, the, uh, influence, uh, influence operations inside the United States [1:08:27] about AI data centers, uh, to discourage the building of AI centers across the United States. Uh, [1:08:33] we've seen, uh, uh, the Chinese Communist Party involved in, uh, activity in cities in the United [1:08:40] States, uh, to pressure in some cases to, to try to seize individuals from China that are, um, conducting [1:08:49] actions on, uh, social media platforms that the Chinese Communist Party does not like. Uh, there's, uh, [1:08:56] espionage on university campuses, uh, there's offensive cyber operations, the Volt Typhoons and [1:09:03] the Salt Typhoons, uh, that we've talked about. Those are just, uh, examples, just a couple of [1:09:08] examples. So it's almost quite literally anything you can think of. Almost anything you can think of [1:09:13] that can be used as a weapon against this country, the Chinese Communist Party either considers or [1:09:19] actually uses. I, I think that's a fair characterization as legislators. We're here in Congress, [1:09:25] right? We're not the executive branch. Um, can you recommend legislative solutions, legislative [1:09:33] efforts in that regard to, to combat this unrestricted irregular warfare? The point is, is what [1:09:40] can we be doing to assist the administration? What can we be doing to put ourselves, uh, in the window [1:09:49] of success? I think there are a few things in my written testimony. I go through some of the details. [1:09:54] I think there should be an effort to broaden the mandate for the JTTFs and the fusion centers [1:09:59] to focus on some of these state-sponsored threats, particularly, uh, the Chinese Communist Party in [1:10:05] the United States. Uh, I think there could also be strengthening of the legislation against foreign [1:10:09] agents operating in the United States. There has been some stronger legislation that criminalizes [1:10:16] foreign agents that harass, surveil, or conduct other types of actions, but I think that can be [1:10:21] strengthened. This gets into the FARA issues. Uh, there are a few others. I think section 702, [1:10:27] uh, the, uh, reauthorization would actually be quite helpful as well. So those are a couple of things. [1:10:32] How about, how, how about their, China's involvement in our financial markets and the deference that we [1:10:37] give to them that we don't give to American companies and individuals? Yeah, I think that's a huge problem. [1:10:42] Yes. And legislatively, what we should? Uh, I, I have not thought, and maybe others on the panel have [1:10:48] thought about what legislation might look like. I have not thought and, and put anything down on [1:10:53] paper along those lines. So I could certainly come back to you on that. I think that people on this [1:10:57] panel, certainly people in Congress are looking for, you know, everybody's busy, but we're looking for [1:11:04] your expertise in this regard to point in the right direction so that we, we can hit the target, [1:11:10] so to speak. And so, so those things, if you could, um, would be, would be welcome, would be welcome [1:11:18] additions. And I would just finally say this, irregular unrestricted warfare also it regards, uh, [1:11:25] election meddling or, or what have you. It was the Democrats that first brought it up, but once the [1:11:29] president brought it up, this president, now you're actually playing into hands of China. Having questions [1:11:35] about elections that are fraught with problems like counting on somebody's affidavit to prove [1:11:42] their citizenship or their validity to, to vote, um, having questions about that is not playing into [1:11:49] the Communist Party of China's hands. It is asking legitimate questions that are righteous. I yield. [1:11:55] Gentleman yields, we had a miscue on the clock, so that was the reason for, for, yeah, we were watching, [1:12:01] believe me, we were watching. Appreciate it. Gentleman yields, Ms. Stefanik. [1:12:07] Thank you so much. For my second round of questions, I want to delve more into the specifics of AI. [1:12:12] Mr. McMaster will remember this. General McMaster will remember in 2018, um, I was chair of the [1:12:17] Emerging Threats for the House Armed Services Committee, and I wrote legislation called the AI [1:12:22] Commission that was signed into law as part of the NDAA. This is when AI was just a buzzword that many [1:12:27] members of Congress didn't know about. Now it is, you can see how much it is taking up these questions. [1:12:33] So to delve into AI, this attack on data centers, can you discuss, maybe I'll start with Dr. Buchanan, [1:12:42] the importance of data centers and that the U.S. be the leader when it comes to data, compute power, [1:12:49] as data is the fuel for AI? Thank you, Congresswoman. Thank you for your leadership in creating that, [1:12:56] that commission. Yeah, as I said before, computing power is the fulcrum of AI progress, [1:13:02] and computing power is very scarce right now in the world. So my position, and I believe it's a [1:13:07] bipartisan one, is that the United States needs to retain access to this computing power alongside [1:13:14] democratic nations, and that it should be denied to China, given the ways in which China will use [1:13:20] the computing power to advance its military, to propagate some of the threats we're talking about [1:13:24] here today. So I think it's unmistakable, it's one of the core tenets of AI policy, that the United [1:13:29] States should lead, in the democratic world, should lead in the development and use of computing power [1:13:36] for AI. Yes, and last week, my home state of New York, in a policy that I vehemently disagreed with, [1:13:42] set a moratorium on data centers. Can you talk about the national security risks when you have a [1:13:48] moratorium on data centers? My viewpoint is that allows China to win. We cannot afford to lose this [1:13:55] race. Failure is not an option. We need to lead in AI and win this. How does the moratorium on data [1:14:01] centers impact our ability to win this race? Certainly, I think if we were to stop constructing [1:14:05] data centers, that would impede America's AI development. There are legitimate community [1:14:11] concerns and so forth that companies should address, in my view. One of the postures that we had in the [1:14:16] Biden administration, an executive order the president signed, was to make federal lands available. [1:14:20] Companies would pay for everything, including the power and so forth, but to make federal lands [1:14:25] available for rapid data center construction for national security purposes as well, to try to [1:14:33] address some of the community concerns. My view here is computing power is central to AI, [1:14:38] AI is central to national security, and America must lead. Dr. Jones, you referenced China's attempt to [1:14:46] foment this opposition to data centers. Can you add on that? [1:14:50] Yes, there is evidence. It's been published in multiple media outlets of both Chinese and Russian [1:14:56] attempts to foment concern in American communities about data centers. It's not unlike the service, [1:15:04] say, of the KGB doing in the United States for parts of the Cold War, but along these very lines, [1:15:10] to foment concerns in American communities about data centers. [1:15:14] And, General McMaster, I want to get your thoughts on this topic. [1:15:17] Yes. And the other analogy I would make is how Russians financed anti-fracking groups as well [1:15:24] to prevent America from achieving energy independence and challenging Russia's ability to [1:15:30] apply coercive power through control of energy supplies. And so I think this is really important [1:15:35] to understand. They're trying to hold us back and to do so with disinformation, supporting these groups [1:15:39] that oppose the development of data centers and the energy capabilities that are so critical to it as [1:15:44] well. Yes. Unfortunately, in New York State, we also have a moratorium on fracking, a policy which [1:15:49] I also oppose. But going back to AI, generative AI, this is separate from data centers, but related. [1:15:56] Generative AI can produce realistic text, audio images, and video at enormous scale. What is the [1:16:03] greater national security threat from your assessment? A highly convincing individual deep fake or the mass [1:16:09] production of tailored content designed to manipulate different audiences and deepen social divisions. [1:16:15] Is that for me, Congressman? Yes. Yes. I'm worried about the scale that AI can enable in terms of [1:16:23] especially personalization and the like. And when General McMaster was talking about some of the [1:16:28] the AI-enabled threats earlier, the word that I kept thinking of was scale and breadth. And I think that [1:16:34] that is a risk in the information space. It's also, to his point from before, I think a very significant [1:16:39] risk in the biology space in which it is enabling, AI is enabling a diffusion of biological capabilities as [1:16:46] well. So I think it shows up in a number of different categories of AI-enabled threat we've been discussing today. [1:16:52] And Mr. Chalufo, thoughts on this in the last 15 seconds? So firstly, to your first question, [1:16:59] you cannot be AI-dominant unless you're energy-dominant. They're both in our national interest to be able to [1:17:05] achieve those objectives. The challenge with the scale is you don't need, so if you think about [1:17:13] ransomware and if you think about some of these scams, all you need is one person clicking and it's a [1:17:17] good day for the bad guy. If they send a thousand and you get two people hitting, that's success on [1:17:24] their side. So I think you got to deal with both. You got to deal with our grandparents are going to [1:17:29] think that their kids or grandkids were kidnapped and it's going to look pretty darn real with our [1:17:35] actual voices. That's a scary thought. But the flip side is you're going to see this at scale where it [1:17:40] is going to be targeted very specifically to different audiences to achieve very specific outcomes. [1:17:46] I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. It is greatly appreciated, very enlightening, [1:17:53] and we hope to look to work with you on this subject matter in the future. Thank you all very much. [1:17:59] This hearing is adjourned. [1:18:59] This hearing is adjourned. [1:19:12] I'm not sure it was good, but I'm not sure it was good. [1:19:19] Thank you. [1:19:31] Thank you.