Head of Central Command testifies before Senate committee on Iran war

[49:02] directed its terrorist proxies to kill hundreds of American service members, take dozens of [49:08] Americans hostage and assassinate senior American officials, including attempts on the life [49:14] of President Trump. [49:15] It has also developed a nuclear and ballistic missile program that aimed to hold multiple [49:22] continents and dozens of U.S. partners at risk. [49:27] Every American president since Carter has had to deal with the consequences of Iran's [49:32] war on the United States. [49:34] Yet rather than dealing with the problem, successive Democrat and Republican administrations [49:39] sought so-called de-escalation with Iran. [49:44] This often afforded Iran the time and resources to develop its nuclear program, the ballistic [49:49] missile program and global terrorist infrastructure. [49:54] I commend President Trump for recognizing that the Iranian regime cannot be appeased and for [50:02] directing action to defeat this threat. [50:05] Doing so will not be easy. [50:07] The Iranian threat, the Iranian regime is deeply ideological and insists that it is winning [50:14] even when it is losing by every conceivable metric. [50:18] I look forward to Admiral Cooper sharing his assessment of how close we are to destroying [50:23] Iran's military capabilities. [50:25] I would also like to hear what he needs from Congress to ensure our men and women in the [50:32] uniform have what they need to finish the job. [50:35] Valey, to complete the Iran mission would send our adversaries a dangerous signal about [50:42] our nation's wherewithal and resolve. [50:45] I would send that erroneous message to Iran and to other adversaries around the globe. [50:53] As we've seen, the nature and scope of the threats we face transcend geographic boundaries. [51:00] This is particularly true as we look to Africa, and that's where General Anderson comes in. [51:06] The continent is not a distant concern for American national security. [51:10] Rather, it is an arena of growing strategic consequence, defined by converging threats from [51:17] adversarial nation states like China and Russia, radical Islamist terrorism and instability driven [51:25] by weak governance. [51:28] China and Russia recognize the strategic importance of Africa. [51:32] China is leveraging economic coercion, debt diplomacy, and military basing to support President [51:39] Xi's global ambition. [51:43] Through its mercenaries and other proxies, Russia is destabilizing fragile states and extracting [51:48] resources in order to bankroll its malign activities in Ukraine and elsewhere around the world. [51:55] I look to General Anderson to provide his assessment of Chinese and Russian objectives in Africa, [52:02] and to update the committee on how Africa Command is addressing the threat posed by these nefarious actors. [52:09] The terrorist threats across Africa remain persistent, adaptive, and dangerous. [52:15] Increasingly, Africa is becoming the epicenter of global terrorism. [52:20] Al-Qaeda and ISIS senior leadership now reside in Africa, and their terrorist affiliates are expanding [52:28] in size, capability, and geographic reach, from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. [52:34] Their murderous ambitions are not confined to that continent. [52:38] These groups remain intent on killing Americans around the world, yet significant shortfalls in [52:44] key military capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, [52:50] complicate our ability to track these groups and the threat they pose. [52:55] So we look to General Anderson to let the committee know how these resource shortfalls are impacting [53:02] his ability to combat the terrorist threat and where this committee can be helpful. [53:07] I have noted in my remarks Africa is of increasing strategic importance to American national security [53:14] interests. This is precisely why dedicated combatant command for Africa is indispensable. [53:20] Africa Command was established in 2007 because the United States recognized that these [53:27] challenges require sustained and dedicated focus. This committee remains committed to ensuring [53:33] Africa Command has the authority's resources and strategic support necessary to protect American [53:41] interests across the continent. With that, I turn to my partner and colleague, Ranking Member Reed. [53:50] Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral Cooper, General Anderson, thank you for your [53:54] dedication and service with great distinction over many years. Thank you. And also, I think I expressed [54:03] the concern to all of us or the hopes of us that you convey our congratulations and appreciation to the men [54:10] and women that you lead in your areas. I want to also begin by expressing my deepest condolences to the [54:18] families of the service members who we recently lost in the Middle East and Africa. And we owe [54:24] them our greatest respect and gratitude. Amber Cooper, we are 75 days into this war with Iran, [54:31] and I am concerned the President does not have a credible strategy to win. Every member of this [54:38] committee shares the goal of preventing Iran from having a nuclear weapon, but there is no purely military [54:45] solution to this problem. Instead, every President over the past 50 years has used diplomacy, sanctions, [54:52] and international cooperation to this point successfully prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. [54:59] President Trump tore up the Iran nuclear deal, and instead of negotiating a new deal, [55:05] unilaterally took our nation to war. More than a dozen service members have lost their lives and [55:10] hundreds more have been wounded. We have suffered significant damages to our bases, dramatically [55:17] expended our munitions stockpiles, and sustained billions of dollars of damaged equipment. The Strait of [55:23] Hormuz is still closed, despite attempts to escort commercial ships. While Secretaries Hegseth and Rubio [55:32] have said Operation Epic Fury is concluded, it is unclear what objectives have been accomplished. [55:39] Iran's regime is intact. Its nuclear material remains in place. The majority of its missiles and [55:46] launchers have reportedly been recovered. Iran has demonstrated its ability to shut down the Strait. [55:53] And most importantly, or certainly of equal weight, American families are bearing real costs at the gas [56:00] pump and the grocery store for a war they did not want and Congress has not authorized. [56:06] Admiral Cooper, the military forces under your command have performed with exceptional skill and bravery, [56:13] and that is attributable to your leadership and your chain of command. The firepower that we have [56:20] brought to bear in Iran has been formidable, but we have not yet, I think, articulated a clear strategy going [56:29] forward. And this is continuing to hamper our objectives. I don't, I think everyone on this [56:39] committee would love to see these peace negotiations succeed. And I'd be the first one to applaud [56:46] significant results achieved through diplomacy. But one of the issues we're facing, and we've talked about it [56:55] in the closed session, is at every term, we are not receiving the information that we are legally entitled to. [57:05] We've not seen the legal justification for this operation, nor the execute orders, [57:11] and the administration's explanations for course and the path forward have shifted constantly. [57:16] This week the president said that the ceasefire is on life support, and it leaves us a fundamental question. [57:27] Where are we and where are we going? And I hope you can touch on that, Admiral Cooper. [57:33] There's two other concerns in CENTCOM I'd like to address. First, we withdrew all of our troops from Syria, [57:40] and this has created some adverse consequences in my view. Our modest military footprint there produced [57:49] significant returns, including a very reliable partner in the Syrian Democratic Forces, [57:56] a sustained counter-ISIS mission, which we conducted, and a degree of leverage in a strategically important [58:02] area of the world. And we gave that up very quickly when we withdrew. And if you could provide some [58:08] understanding of the current situation, I'd appreciate it. Second, the ceasefire in Lebanon is fragile, [58:15] and Israel's continued airstrikes and demolition operations in the south are eroding it. [58:22] The Lebanese Armed Forces are one of the few genuine stabilizing instruments we have left in the [58:27] region, and we should be seriously investing in it. And again, Admiral, I'd like to know what resources [58:33] you need to make this partnership successful, our partnership with the Lebanese military, [58:39] in displacing Hezbollah and establishing a reliable government. [58:45] General Anderson, I'm concerned by discussions about whether AFRICOM should be maintained as an [58:50] independent combatant command. The same concerns I believe the chairman has. That fight should be not necessary. [58:59] And it really, I think, reveals a misunderstanding of the continuing [59:04] importance of Africa in so many different ways. If we were to merge AFRICOM with UCOM, I think that [59:11] would be a mistake. It would signal to our allies and adversaries that Africa is not a priority for [59:16] the United States. Russia and China are not making that mistake. Russia's Africa core has expanded [59:24] steadily across numerous countries, and China continues to build ports, infrastructure, and relationships [59:29] across the continent. Both nations are filling a space that America has created for them by our [59:36] disengagement. And, General, I would ask you to share your views on the current security situation [59:42] and how you are working with allies and partners to address the political and economic instability in [59:47] Africa. Finally, I would note that the dismantling of USAID has made this situation worse. More than [59:54] 12 billion dollars in annual assistance to sub-Sahara Africa is largely gone. This has translated [1:00:02] directly into instability, radicalization, and openings for our adversaries. The administration's [1:00:08] from aid to trade slogan in Africa may be a reasonable long-term aspiration, but it's not a [1:00:14] near-term substitute for what has been lost, and I have partners on the ground know it. I'd like to know [1:00:21] what authorities and support you need from this committee to effectively partner with vulnerable [1:00:25] nations in Africa to keep us from losing more ground to China and Russia. Admiral Cooper, [1:00:31] General Anson, thank you for your leadership, your outstanding service, and I look forward to your [1:00:35] testimony. Thank you. Admiral Cooper, you are now recognized for your opening statement, sir. [1:00:40] Well, thank you very much. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, members of this committee, [1:00:46] thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, and thank you all [1:00:50] in this committee for your very steadfast support to the United States military and to our men and [1:00:56] women deployed today. I'm pleased to be sitting here today with my good friend, the Commander of [1:01:00] U.S. Africa Command, General Dogg Anderson, and I'm joined by Fleet Command Master Chief Lateef Compton, [1:01:06] our Senior Enlisted Leader at Central Command. Events in the Central Region have shown how quickly [1:01:12] the course of history can change. In just the last few years, decades-old features of the strategic [1:01:18] landscape, once thought immutable, have been upended, bringing both challenges and opportunities. [1:01:24] I strongly believe that every success that we have starts and ends with our people. In just the last [1:01:31] seven months, America's sons and daughters serving in CENTCOM have played key roles in world events, [1:01:37] implementing the President's 20-point peace plan in Gaza, degrading the ISIS threat in Syria, preventing what [1:01:44] I would characterize as an ISIS crisis by conducting a historic prisoner transfer to Iraq, creating the [1:01:50] most integrated and effective air defense architecture ever seen, which was decades in the making, and [1:01:57] most recently, addressing the Iranian threat. The performance of our warfighters and combined joint task [1:02:02] force, Operation Inherent Resolve, often referred to as CJTF OIR, is particularly noteworthy. In January, [1:02:10] responding to a rapidly deteriorating security situation, they executed an extraordinary transfer [1:02:17] of more than 5,700 ISIS prisoners, all terrorists, from Syria to Iraqi custody. Their effort prevented a [1:02:24] mass prison break that risked large-scale ISIS reconstitution and acute risk to the American [1:02:30] homeland. In parallel, OIR has maintained relentless pressure on ISIS remnants in Syria. Most recently, [1:02:36] Operation Hawkeye strike removed over 50 ISIS terrorists and 100 terror infrastructure targets [1:02:42] from the battlefield. U.S. Central Command was created in direct response to the threats posed by [1:02:48] the Islamic Republic of Iran, and I am the 16th CENTCOM commander to deal with the Iranian problem set. [1:02:56] For 47 years, the Iranian regime has terrorized the region and made hostility to the United States [1:03:01] a core tenet of its rule. Their hostile, lethal track record against the United States is well documented, [1:03:08] but I don't know that it is always well understood. Here's a data point. In just the last 30 months [1:03:14] prior to the commencement of Epic Fury, Iranian-supported terror groups have attacked U.S. troops and [1:03:20] diplomats more than 350 times, the equivalent of an attack more than every third day, killing four U.S. [1:03:27] service members and wounding nearly 200 more. After more than two years of Iranian attempts to leverage [1:03:33] October 7th of 2023 to tear the region apart, at the direction of the president, United States Central [1:03:39] Command initiated Operation Epic Fury. In less than 40 days, CENTCOM forces achieved our military [1:03:45] objectives. Most notably, we degraded Iran's ability to project power outside its borders and threaten the [1:03:52] region and threaten our interests. As an example, we can all remember April and October of 2024, hundreds of [1:03:59] Iranian ballistic missiles and drones raining down in the Middle East. Today, Iran can no longer attack [1:04:06] with that mass and scale. And further, with 90 percent of its defense industrial base destroyed, [1:04:12] Iran won't be able to reconstitute those weapons for years. We also all watched Iran spend decades and [1:04:20] billions and billions of dollars arming proxies. Today, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis are all cut off [1:04:27] from Iran's weapons supply and support. This result was not foreordained, nor was it brought [1:04:35] by chance. It's the culmination of months of careful planning built upon decades of experience. These [1:04:41] results also do not come without cost. We honor the memories of the 14 service members who paid the [1:04:47] ultimate sacrifice during Operation Epic Fury and the two soldiers and the one civilian killed in [1:04:54] Palmyra, Syria. They represent truly the very best of all of us. As I sit here, we are clear-eyed. The [1:05:01] situation in front of us is very complex. High-stakes negotiations continue. Our job is to be ready, [1:05:09] and we are. I testify today on behalf of the 50,000-plus servicemen and women deployed to the [1:05:15] Central Region. It's a great honor and privilege of a lifetime to serve as their commander, and thank you [1:05:20] very much, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. General Anders. [1:05:28] Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, [1:05:32] thank you for the opportunity to provide you an update on U.S. Africa Command. [1:05:35] I am joined today by Command Sergeant Major Garrick Banfield, our senior enlisted leader, [1:05:40] and I'm proud to sit beside my friend from U.S. Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper. [1:05:43] We both appreciate your unwavering support to our nation's warfighters. [1:05:48] Before I start, I'd like to recognize the service of First Lieutenant Kendrick Lamont Key, Jr., [1:05:53] and Specialist Mariah Collington, who lost their lives in a tragic accident during [1:05:58] African Lion in our returning home today. I would also like to express my appreciation to our allies [1:06:03] and partners, particularly Morocco, who stepped forward when it mattered most. Africa sits at the [1:06:10] crossroads of global commerce and security, bridging the strategic terrain between the Atlantic and the [1:06:15] Indo-Pacific. It's the world's supplier of critical minerals for advanced defense system, [1:06:20] and home to 12 of the world's 20 fastest growing economies. By 2050, it will account for a third of the [1:06:26] global working age population. Today, the epicenter of global terrorism is in Africa. ISIS leadership [1:06:34] is African. Al-Qaeda's economic engine is in Africa. Both of these groups share the will and intent [1:06:43] to strike our homeland. Their affiliates, once isolated nodes, now show increased connectivity. [1:06:50] Just as concerning is the nexus between Al-Qaeda's Al-Shabaab and the Iranian-sponsored Houthis. [1:06:58] AFRICOM is prioritizing willing and capable partners. We support partners with capabilities [1:07:02] that only the U.S. can bring. ISR, targeting, precision strike. These efforts have driven ISIS [1:07:09] leaders in Somalia underground, disrupting their command and control of the global ISIS network. [1:07:15] In West Africa, Al-Qaeda affiliate JNM has demonstrated increased capacity to control key [1:07:20] terrain in the Sahel, most notably by strangling fuel supplies around population centers. The capture of [1:07:26] a capital city would provide Al-Qaeda with all the trappings of a nation state to sponsor global [1:07:31] terrorism. With a 75% reduction in our regional posture over the past decade, compounded by the [1:07:38] drawdown of our allies, we struggle with an intelligence black hole. And without sufficient [1:07:43] indicators and warnings, we risk being blind to the gathering dangers and threats in the region. [1:07:48] AFRICOM's lack of expeditionary capabilities and diminished force posture compromised our crisis response. [1:07:54] In a crisis, we can always surge assets, but you cannot surge trust. Our reduced presence on the [1:08:00] continent also allows disruptive actors to drive the agenda, undercutting American interests. China [1:08:07] views Africa as its second continent, securing control over critical minerals and infrastructure, [1:08:12] potentially boxing us out of resources that energize our industrial base. Africa also serves as Putin's [1:08:18] purse, where Russia exploits instability to extract resources to include human lives to fuel its war machine. [1:08:26] To contend with these threats, AFRICOM must think and operate differently. With less than one-tenth of [1:08:31] one percent of the department's budget, we must maximize every taxpayer dollar to deliver an outsized [1:08:37] return on investment. AFRICOM continues to leverage low-cost, high-yield activities to amplify our impact [1:08:43] on the continent. Programs like the International Military Education and Training and the State Partnership [1:08:48] Program are reliable force multipliers that forge enduring relationships with African militaries [1:08:54] and our proven models for cost-effective burden sharing. The AFRICOM exercise program is emerging [1:09:00] as a battle lab to test and validate new technologies on behalf of both the joint force and our African [1:09:05] partners. And finally, AFRICOM is focused on the critical convergence of security and economics. Our efforts [1:09:12] span all elements of national power as we coordinate closely with state, commerce, energy and treasury. The [1:09:18] department's new economic defense unit has been an invaluable partner. To defend the homeland, promote U.S. [1:09:24] interests and ensure effective crisis response, AFRICOM needs targeted investments in layered, [1:09:30] non-traditional ISR, innovative force protection, programs that enable willing and capable partners, [1:09:38] the opportunity to conduct experimentation of emerging technologies, and the ability to respond [1:09:43] to crisis at the time and point of need. Africa is a continent of opportunities, not only crises. [1:09:50] With the continued support of this committee, I can assure you that every dollar you authorize for AFRICOM [1:09:55] will contribute directly to the security, safety, and prosperity of the United States. Thank you. I look [1:10:02] forward to your questions. Well, thank you very much. Let's get right into Iran, Admiral Cooper. [1:10:10] And I think one of the basic questions is, was this exercise of ours, was this operation of ours a war of [1:10:20] choice or a war of necessity? Let me get your military perspective. Did Iran have enriched uranium up to six [1:10:31] percent prior to Operation Midnight Hammer? Yes, sir, they did. And is there a civilian use at all for [1:10:40] uranium that is enriched to 60 percent? There's not, Senator. Is it fair to say that Iran's nuclear breakout [1:10:51] time has been set back then, thanks to Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Epic Fury? Without [1:11:00] talking specifics, that's accurate, Senator. All right. And has Iran ever been willing to curtail [1:11:07] its ballistic missile program, ballistic missile program, through negotiations? They have not, sir. [1:11:16] And then perhaps you can explain in some detail to what extent Operation Epic Fury has set back [1:11:23] Iran's ballistic missile program. To what extent you can tell us in this open setting. Yes, sir, [1:11:31] Senator. Thank you. Thank you very much for that question. Our military mission in Operation Epic Fury [1:11:36] was crystal clear from the very outset and remained steady throughout. The mission was to degrade Iran's [1:11:43] ability to project power on its neighbors and U.S. interests. It had three key components. Degrade Iran's [1:11:49] ballistic missiles and the defense industrial base that supports it. Degrade Iran's drones and the defense [1:11:56] industrial base that supports that. And degrade their navy and the defense industrial base that [1:12:02] supports that. In each of those categories, we met all of the achievements. Each of those systems were [1:12:08] significantly degraded. If I gave you just a couple of examples, the defense industrial base for their drones [1:12:15] and their missiles and their navy were degraded by 90 percent. They have about 10 percent left. For the navy, [1:12:21] my military assessment would be that the navy will not begin to rebuild for five to ten years. Many of [1:12:27] you serve in states that build ships. It's complex. It's particularly complex when you don't have an [1:12:33] industrial base to build it. My professional perspective on this also is that Iran would not return to [1:12:40] the same level of navy that it had for a generation. Now, this 10 percent of drones left, [1:12:46] are they exquisite or the sort of relatively inexpensive drones we've been hearing about? [1:12:53] Senator, thank you for this question. I think I'd like to use the opportunity to [1:12:56] to myth bust on drones. Okay. The days of $35,000 drones that we saw in the last couple of years, [1:13:03] particularly in the fight against the Houthis in Yemen, those days are behind us. Today, we face [1:13:08] an increased threat from drones that are highly sophisticated. They're jet powered. They have [1:13:13] high-end sensors. They have electronic warfare. They have signals intelligence. So those days of using [1:13:20] high-value defenses to shoot down cheap targets are behind us. Quite the contrary. What we have been [1:13:26] doing lately is using our own low-cost one-way attack drones attacking Iran, making them use higher [1:13:34] and more expensive weapons. So I can confidently tell you, we have flipped the cost curve in many [1:13:39] ways. Always work to be done. But I like where we are in this regard. Okay. And you know, there's been [1:13:44] a lot of talk about part of the negotiations being giving up the nuclear ambitions. But almost as important [1:13:55] to me is the support of terrorist proxies. So has Iran ever been willing into support for the terrorist [1:14:05] proxies, Hamas, Houthis, Hezbollah? They have not, Senator. So to what extent has this exercise, [1:14:14] this operation, denied Iran resources for funding terrorism? Senator, this has been a significant [1:14:21] priority from the outset. And as we sit here today, there are no resources and equipment [1:14:26] that are flowing from Iran to Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Houthis. Those transfer paths and methods have [1:14:35] been cut off. To the extent that that source of support has been cut off, what are the other [1:14:43] sources of support that these terrorist groups can look to? I think some of those pieces are best [1:14:50] discussed in a more classified environment. But I think the key element of this is the main [1:14:56] supplier of resources and training for decades and billions of dollars. And we've seen all this [1:15:03] before our very eyes. Those pieces have been completely cut off today. Thank you very much. [1:15:07] We'll take another round. But at this point, I recognize the ranking member. Thank you very much, [1:15:12] Mr. Chairman. Admiral Cooper, is Iran militarily still able to inflict significant damage on [1:15:23] infrastructure of the surrounding countries in the Persian Gulf? Senator, in this environment, [1:15:29] what I would tell you is their capabilities have been dramatically degraded. That certainly doesn't [1:15:33] mean that they don't have anything left. But the large-scale volleys that we've seen over the last couple [1:15:38] years, Iran is no longer capable of executing those. This would be less large-scale volleys than [1:15:46] directed attacks on critical infrastructure, which would set back petroleum production, [1:15:52] even if the Strait of – or petroleum distribution, I would say, even if the Strait of Hamuz is open. [1:15:58] Does that capability still exist? Capabilities across the board inside Iran still exist at a degraded scale. [1:16:05] We've also planned accordingly for each of these scenarios, if necessary, to deal with them from [1:16:10] a defensive perspective. So would you characterize Iran as no longer a threat? [1:16:18] Iran has a significantly degraded threat, and they no longer threaten regional partners or the United [1:16:26] States in ways that they were able to do before. Across every domain, they've been significantly degraded. [1:16:32] But they can still threaten their partners? It's a very large country. [1:16:37] In the country, they have – they retain some mineral capability. That's correct, and that's accurate. [1:16:41] Thank you, sir. And of course, we've accounted for that from a defensive perspective. [1:16:44] General Anderson, what's happened is that the administration recalled over 30 career ambassadors [1:16:53] in Africa, including – excuse me, over 30 career ambassadors overall, 12 in Africa. [1:17:00] In the United States, there's only 14 confirmed ambassadors. In other words, [1:17:04] 40 ambassadorial posts in Africa are vacant or filled by charge affairs. [1:17:11] Is it essential to your work to have fully functioning embassies with ambassadors? [1:17:19] Senator, we work very closely with all the embassies across the continent to pursue and [1:17:24] further American interests. And so that relationship with these embassies is critical for AFRICOM's [1:17:29] effective engagements. But what about the ambassadors? [1:17:32] Senator, yes, sir. So the ambassadors do enjoy access. I think that that's important to have [1:17:39] ambassadors in place because of the hierarchical nature of many of the African countries is that [1:17:45] if you're not an ambassador, you don't always get access. And so there is obviously benefit to that. [1:17:50] And we coordinate with them quite closely when we engage. [1:17:54] Senator, thank you very much, sir. You are combating one of the most sophisticated [1:18:03] information warfare operations we've seen in a long time from Russia. What can we do to [1:18:12] improve your ability to withstand this information operation and also to engage in something on the [1:18:19] same level by the United States? Senator, I appreciate the recognition of this concern because our [1:18:27] adversaries are very active in the information domain. As you highlighted, Russia, I would also [1:18:31] say China is also very active in these domains. They use this to undercut not only our interest, [1:18:37] but undercut and disrupt the democracies that are in Africa. And this is an area that I've talked to [1:18:44] several of the leaders across especially coastal West Africa that are very concerned about the Russian [1:18:48] propaganda that is destabilizing their democracies. For me, we have a limited budget that we are mostly in [1:18:57] a reactive mode to respond to issues. What would be beneficial as one of the few entities that looks [1:19:02] across the entirety of the continent is a consistent budget that would allow us to campaign in the [1:19:09] information space. We coordinate very closely with State Department and others on this and work with [1:19:14] the embassies. But our ability to look across the continent and highlight these things, I think, [1:19:18] is an area where we could be of benefit to the American interest. [1:19:21] Thank you, sir. Admiral Cooper, one more question. Do we still maintain a relationship with the Syrian [1:19:28] Democratic Forces? [1:19:29] Senator, we do have a nascent relationship with them in the context of evacuating the more than 5,700 [1:19:38] ISIS prisoners from predominantly northeast Syria to Iraq. A small number of prisoners, mostly chronically [1:19:45] ill and with multiple amputees, stayed in the primary prison known as Hasakah. And SDF is today serving as the guards. [1:19:53] Just a follow-on question. Do you detect any kind of resentment to our rapid departure from SDF? [1:20:05] I think, Senator, we've had a long-standing relationship with the SDF. The ceasefire that they [1:20:12] have in place today with the Syrian government remains in effect, and we remain engaged. [1:20:16] Thank you very much, sir. Thank you. [1:20:18] Thank you. Senator Fischer. [1:20:20] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Admiral. General, thank you for your service. [1:20:27] Admiral, what did the Iranians' attempted missile attack on the island of Diego Garcia [1:20:37] tell us about the ballistic missile program and their intent to use it? Did it come as a surprise? [1:20:46] Senator, appropriate to talk in this forum, because there's clearly a classified component of this. [1:20:54] I think we've all heard publicly what Iran described as their self-imposed limitations on their missile [1:21:00] force. The execution of that particular attempted strike, which failed, was twice the distance of [1:21:06] what they previously advertised that they said that they would self-constrained themselves to. [1:21:10] Thank you. And as you look at the total operation, the conflict there, what lessons have you learned [1:21:19] from that? And how have you used those lessons thus far to ensure that your command is prepared [1:21:27] for the fight that we have today? [1:21:30] Senator, thank you very much for this. It's fair to say that we have captured thousands of lessons, [1:21:35] mostly tactical. I think there's no military in the world that makes adjustments as well as the United [1:21:40] States military does and whether they were in stride tactically with a lot of support from [1:21:46] organizations back in the United States or they're more at the operational level. We took a very hard [1:21:52] look inward to see where can we improve our defenses. Force protection and protecting our people is my [1:21:58] number one priority. We focused on that first, made a significant number of adjustments to enhance [1:22:04] what was already a very effective air defense umbrella. And that's where we are predominantly focused, [1:22:10] as well as putting ourselves in a position to meet a wide range of contingencies going forward. [1:22:15] Thank you, sir. General Anderson, ISIS is on the rise in Africa and you've been very, [1:22:22] very clear about that. How is your command working with our partners in order to address that? [1:22:28] Senator, you are correct. ISIS is putting a concerted effort in its establishment on the continent. [1:22:38] We have been working very closely with willing partners who have been willing to address this threat. [1:22:42] So two examples of that in Northern Somalia, working with the Somali and the Putlan forces there to go [1:22:49] up into those mountains. What has been key there to putting pressure and isolating the ISIS leadership [1:22:55] there is the partner's ability to stay in those mountains. And so our partnership to provide them [1:23:00] the intelligence, some training and some limited logistics that allow them to stay is helping isolate [1:23:05] that leadership node in Somalia. We've also been working very closely with Nigeria, who is in the last few [1:23:12] years, opened up with a very positive engagement with intel sharing and ability to go after and target [1:23:20] some of these terrorist threats that are in Northern Nigeria. And so that has been a positive area that [1:23:25] we've seen as well. We would like to reestablish some pragmatic relationships in the Sahel where ISIS [1:23:31] also has a stronghold where they are currently holding an American hostage in order to gain better access. [1:23:37] And that's an area we need to continue to improve to work with those partners for a intel sharing and [1:23:42] understanding of what that threat is there. But we are working very deliberately with our partners to [1:23:47] address these common threats. Do you feel that you are appropriately resourced to address these threats? [1:23:53] We have the minimum necessary resources in order to address the threats. In order to do this, [1:24:01] because of the size of the continent and the complexity of those attacks or of those threats, [1:24:06] in order to thwart these, we have to shift resources. And that entails taking some risk in those other [1:24:11] areas in order to address the primary efforts. I'd like to have you address some of the connections [1:24:21] that we see with the drug cartels, with the terror groups. Can you elaborate on those, especially with [1:24:29] regards to the Central and South American cartels? Yes, Senator. That's an area that is emerging that is [1:24:38] causing us great concern. So two points to that. Recently, there was a interdiction based on some [1:24:44] intelligence that we were able to provide that the Spanish interdicted a shipment of cocaine that was 35 tons [1:24:52] of cocaine. We believe that's about a billion dollars of street value. We believe that's the largest [1:24:56] interdiction in history. That came out of South America. It was transiting along the west coast of [1:25:02] Africa towards another location that I could talk about in a classified environment. And so we're [1:25:08] seeing more of that drug trafficking coming in. And the terrorist organizations are helping transit that. [1:25:14] They're getting payments through that. And there's a symbiotic relationship that money then comes back to our [1:25:19] hemisphere, to those drug cartels, but also helps provide fuel for those terrorists. Another area that I think is [1:25:26] important to highlight is that in the last 18 to 24 months, we have assisted in, or at least tipped off [1:25:35] many partner nations to drug activities and labs in their country. In this time, 11 of the 12 drug labs [1:25:43] that have been interdicted have had Mexican cartel members on site to include the largest drug lab that [1:25:49] had ever been disrupted in South Africa, that there were Sinaloa cartel members on site. And so they are [1:25:55] actually doing production now in Africa, as well as the transit of that across the continent. So we're [1:26:01] watching this develop, and it's of concern as this fuels both the terrorists and the cartels. [1:26:06] What's the destination of those drugs? Those drugs are destined for the Middle East, for Europe, [1:26:13] but we're also seeing them then come in through the northern route back into America. As we have applied [1:26:18] pressure on the southern border, they're finding other means to bring those drugs into our nation. [1:26:22] Thank you. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Blumenthal. [1:26:28] Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here. Thank you for your extraordinary service [1:26:34] in a difficult time. General Anderson, I want to express my condolences to you and your team and [1:26:40] the families of Lieutenant Kendrick Lamont and Specialist Maria Collington. The Army's lost two [1:26:50] young patriots and dedicated man and woman. And I'm certain that the recovery mission was difficult. [1:27:02] And I want to commend your team for bringing closure to their families. [1:27:07] Admiral, there's been public reporting that Iran continues to have as much as 70 to 75 percent of its [1:27:19] missiles and launchers available to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Does that reporting conform [1:27:29] roughly with your estimate as to Iran's continuing strength? Senator, thank you for the question. And [1:27:38] first, thank you for your time these past few days. It's been meaningful and very much appreciated. [1:27:44] I think it's appropriate in this forum not to discuss specific intelligence assessments. What I would say, [1:27:49] from my perspective, is the numbers that I've seen in open source are not accurate. I think what also [1:27:54] is not taken into consideration, it's more than just the numbers. It's the command and control that's [1:28:00] been shattered. It's a significant degradation and capability, and it's the lack of any ability to [1:28:07] then produce any missiles or drones on the back end. I think we have to take a holistic look at that, [1:28:11] and that's what we've done. But regardless of what the numbers are, [1:28:17] Iran continues to pose a significant threat to shipping because it has missiles and fast boats [1:28:24] and other assets that are available to attack shipping in the area, correct? Senator, all in [1:28:31] each of those cases, their capability have been significantly degraded. If I just use my own [1:28:36] professional experience in 100 transits through the Strait of Hormuz, you would typically see [1:28:42] 20 to 40 fast boats, and lately we've seen two or three. So the degradation means it's been super, [1:28:51] it's been significant, but some residual capability does exist. With respect to the threat that remains, [1:29:01] your forces were successful in Project Freedom in enabling ships to go through the Strait, correct? [1:29:08] That's correct, sir. And Project Freedom was stopped for what reason? Senator, I think I'll look back a [1:29:18] couple of days ago on the Chairman of the Joint Chief's testimony before the Senate Appropriations [1:29:22] Committee. I think he characterized it well. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz is rather complex [1:29:28] these days, and I would offer just these quick points. First and foremost, the United States controls [1:29:37] via our blockade, which I'd be happy to talk about, the overall flow of commerce going into and out of [1:29:42] Iran. The Iranian capability to stop commerce has been dramatically degraded through the Straits, [1:29:49] but their voice is very loud. And those threats are clearly heard by the merchant industry and the [1:29:55] insurance industry. Those are factors. They're certainly factors in energy. And on top of all that... [1:29:59] Project, and I apologize for interrupting, but I'm going to run out of time, as [1:30:03] you understand. I think the point that I want to make here is that Project Freedom could be started [1:30:12] again, and the voices of the Iranians, large as they are, could be contradicted or reduced in impact [1:30:24] if Project Freedom were ongoing and the world could see that shipping was going through the Straits. [1:30:32] Am I off base in that view? Senator, there's a wide range of contingencies that we are prepared to [1:30:39] execute. And I would defer to the policymakers on anything having to do specifically with the [1:30:43] Strait of Hormuz, particularly during this time of sensitive negotiations, where it's front and center [1:30:47] in the negotiations. And have you seen any progress in those negotiations? Senator, I'd refer to the [1:30:57] the diplomats and the team engaged in the negotiations. Let me ask you, in the time that I have left, [1:31:05] one of the objectives that President Trump articulated at the beginning of this war, which in my view could [1:31:12] not be accomplished with bombing, was to secure the enriched uranium. Would you agree that taking [1:31:23] possession of that uranium would require boots on the ground and significant casualties for United [1:31:32] States forces? Senator, in this particular forum, I think it would be highly inappropriate, given the [1:31:38] classified nature of any contingencies, to talk about the nuclear program. Well, let me just finish by [1:31:44] making the observation that you have, I think, sought to be forthcoming to the committee in the classified [1:31:54] setting where we had an earlier conversation with questions and answers. My view is that the vast [1:32:03] majority of what you told us should also be told to the American people. They deserve to know. And our [1:32:11] adversaries know a lot of what we know. The ones who really don't know are the American people, and they [1:32:21] deserve more information, which is not a criticism of you. It is of the system which causes the [1:32:31] withholding of this information, and the administration, which has refused to provide [1:32:36] figures as to the costs of the war and other details that are relevant and important for the [1:32:45] American people to know. So I'm hopeful that we can have a way to make more information available to [1:32:54] the American people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Cooper, during the brief time of Project Freedom, [1:33:04] before it was closed off again, did we, can you say in this setting whether or not [1:33:16] our service, our services were able to open the strait? Senator, thank you for this, very much [1:33:24] appreciated. As has been publicly highlighted, the first two ships to flow from the Arabian Gulf, from [1:33:33] from the western part into the east through the Strait of Hormuz, were U.S. flagged vessels that was [1:33:39] successfully executed, and U.S. Navy destroyers then came into the Arabian Gulf, operated for a number of [1:33:46] days, and then as you subsequently saw, float out of the Arabian Gulf. Okay, so Senator Blumenthal's question [1:33:54] presumed that that you could give in public your judgment as to whether, whether the United States is [1:34:02] capable of doing that again. Senator, there's a, there's a military component of this, and then [1:34:07] there's also a policy component that I believe to the policy makers. But from the military standpoint, [1:34:13] we could, we could do that again, could we not? We just did it last week. Thank you. Senator Ernst, [1:34:21] I believe. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank you for being here today, and to your teams as well. We [1:34:27] truly, truly appreciate your service and dedication to our nation, and I also want to acknowledge the [1:34:34] loss of the two individuals in Morocco and thank our Moroccan partners as well for their contribution [1:34:42] in the recovery efforts. I do want to recognize Admiral Cooper, those that we have lost during this [1:34:50] current operation, or the former operation, Epic Fury, as well as the two Iowa National Guardsmen that we [1:34:56] lost in Syria this last December. We have also more than 380 who have been wounded in this fight. [1:35:05] So for all of those service members that have given so much and to their families, they will not be [1:35:10] forgotten. The operations that have been conducted against Iran and its proxies across the Central [1:35:16] Command AOR wouldn't have been possible without some really tremendous partners in that region. [1:35:24] And we have seen a large burden borne by Israel and Jordan. We've seen assistance coming from Bahrain [1:35:35] and UAE, who has taken a significant amount of incoming fire, Saudi Arabia, Qatar. They haven't all been [1:35:44] passive bystanders. They've been actively engaged. So they have contributed to every line of effort, [1:35:51] and we appreciate them contributing to our successes. We can't overstate what their basing access logistics, [1:35:59] their networks and intelligence cooperations have meant operationally to us. So Admiral Cooper, [1:36:06] what is the one, or maybe two things, that you want all of us to understand as we walk out of this [1:36:13] hearing, knowing about what our allies have assisted with in this fight? [1:36:18] Senator, first, thank you for the question, and thank you for your leadership, and thank you for [1:36:25] all that has been done by the great men and women from your state. They've played an outsized role, [1:36:30] so thank you for that. Thank you. In terms of our partners, I think a key feature is we have enhanced [1:36:36] mill-to-mill relationships across the board in the Middle East. As we sit here right now, we have five [1:36:43] specific partner nations who are not just conceptually side by side, but literally side by side with the United [1:36:50] States in defense. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Over the course of [1:36:58] epic fury, they defended themselves and they defended Americans. In addition to those key allies, [1:37:05] everything that we've accomplished would have been impossible without the Kingdom of Jordan, [1:37:10] and clearly we were operating very closely with the State of Israel. I think that group in particular [1:37:15] should be commended. They didn't just execute missions, they served side by side with Americans [1:37:20] and protected Americans. Thank you. And this takes years to develop those friendships, those [1:37:25] relationships, the mill-to-mill work that you do, is that correct? It does. There's the mill-to-mill work, [1:37:32] there's the friendships. It's all about bringing these together, and the air defense umbrella that's [1:37:36] been created has been in concept for the better part of a decade and a half, now fully realized. [1:37:42] And again, I just want to reiterate that we have such tremendous partnerships with so many of those [1:37:48] nations, and we thank them for that. I'll move to AFRICOM now, General Anderson. Over the past couple of [1:37:56] years, the U.S. has been withdrawing forces from a number of countries, including Niger, Mali, and Chad. [1:38:04] And Russia's African Corps has moved in to fill that vacuum. Where we don't exist, others will. [1:38:13] But just a few weeks ago, they retreated from Kidal Mali under fire. They had surrendered to the very [1:38:20] militants that they were sent to defeat. So we have some really interesting dynamics going on in that [1:38:28] region. And AFRICOM is left with the responsibility for a lot more high-risk, high-threat posts than any [1:38:36] other combatant command in the world. So walk us through just very briefly what AFRICOM cannot do [1:38:43] today that it could five years ago. Well, Senator, I think there's one very [1:38:52] poignant example that I can use very quickly, is that five years ago, as a commander of Special [1:38:56] Operations Command in Africa, Philip Walton was taken hostage in Niger and transported by bandits [1:39:02] who were being prepared to be sold to terrorist organizations. We were able to identify him in [1:39:06] 24 hours. We were able to pinpoint his location within 48. He was rescued in less than 96. That was [1:39:12] largely due to the access that we had, also the partnerships and the relationships that we enjoyed. [1:39:17] Today, Kevin Rideout is on day 205 of captivity, largely because we don't have the access that [1:39:25] we had before and the relationships that are necessary. And that posture reduction has been [1:39:30] difficult. And he was also taken out of Niame. Unfortunately, he was then sold by the bandits to [1:39:35] ISIS and is being held there today. And thank you for that. And Mr. Chairman, I just want folks to [1:39:41] understand the lack of presence that we have in AFRICOM and that exact difference. So thank you, [1:39:48] General Anderson, for a very, very specific example of what a lack of presence has meant. [1:39:56] Thank you, Senator Ernst. There's a proposal for substantially more funding for your command. Is [1:40:04] that right, General Anderson? Senator, that is correct. The presidential budget [1:40:09] significantly increases our budget and addresses some of these key concerns. Well, that that one [1:40:15] example you just gave, would that be addressed by these proposed additional? So not entirely, [1:40:22] Senator, because the access and relationships are what were key there. But we do, because of this, [1:40:28] because of that lack of posture, need more investment in expeditionary capabilities. And that is [1:40:33] being addressed in the proposed budget. But those that those relationships that the center highlight [1:40:39] and maintaining those relationships are absolutely critical, because you cannot surge trust in the [1:40:43] time of need. Okay, well, you and I have gone back and forth about unfunded requirements. And so I guess [1:40:49] your testimony is, is that that's not a matter of funding, it's just a matter of relationships. [1:40:59] Senator, that is a matter of relationships, the funding that we would ask for, [1:41:03] that would encourage that would help us is the contingency response ability expeditionary, [1:41:08] but also some targeted programs to work with key partners who are willing and able to address the [1:41:13] threat to increase their capability and capacity to do that. So those are the investments. Those are all [1:41:19] included in the proposed budget. So right now, I don't have many. Very well, very well. Senator Cain. [1:41:27] Thank you, Mr. Chair. And to our witnesses, President Trump's decision to unilaterally take the United [1:41:33] States into a war with Iran is deeply unpopular in Virginia. We are a very pro-military state, [1:41:40] a very pro-military state. And as I've traveled around Virginia and talked to Virginians, the [1:41:45] unpopularity sort of gets crystallized into, have we learned nothing from 25 years of war in the region? [1:41:52] 14,000 American troops and contractors died in the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, [1:41:58] more than 65,000 injured, $8 trillion spent. And Virginians who've watched their friends and family [1:42:04] repeatedly deployed over the last quarter century have grave concerns about what was accomplished [1:42:11] and was the sacrifice worth it? Our troops sacrificed so bravely. Chief Warrant Officer Robert Marzon, [1:42:18] one of the 14 who have died in epic fury, Spotsylvania County, Virginia. Our forward carrier strike group just [1:42:25] return longest post-Vietnam deployment of any carrier. Our folks sacrifice. They want civilian [1:42:33] leaders to make the right decisions about whether and when and how they should sacrifice. And there's [1:42:38] deep concern that in this instance, the decision is a wrong one. Part of it is a failure to really [1:42:47] grapple with history. In the hearings in this committee, I've heard over and over again and I've [1:42:51] heard the President, Secretary of Defense, talk about Iran's bad actions since 1979. And everything [1:42:57] that's been said about Iran's bad actions are true. But there's a lot of the story that folks don't [1:43:03] talk about. History didn't begin in 1979. Iran and the United States were allies in World War II. One of [1:43:09] the pivotal events in World War II was the Tehran Conference, where President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, [1:43:15] Joseph Stalin, met in Tehran to guarantee Iran independence, stable borders, and sovereignty. [1:43:23] Iran loved the United States. The United States led a coup to topple the democratically elected [1:43:30] government of Iran in 1953 during the Eisenhower administration. The United States propped up a [1:43:36] dictatorship, the Shah of Iran, trained the secret police, the Savak, that tortured, exiled, [1:43:43] imprisoned, killed Iranians by the thousands. And 26 years after that, there was a revolution in 1979. [1:43:51] And yes, then it was death to America. The U.S. funding a dictatorship and toppling a democratic [1:43:58] elected government led to an Iran that has been very hostile. And all the events my colleagues have [1:44:03] talked about since then are accurate. But just as Iran seized our embassy in violation of international law, [1:44:12] then the United States funded Saddam Hussein for Iraq to wage war against Iran in the 1980s, [1:44:17] killing hundreds of thousands of Iranians. And just as Iran funded proxies that bombed a marine [1:44:23] barracks on our embassy in Beirut, the USS Navy shot down an Iranian civilian aircraft in 1989, [1:44:30] killing 290 civilians. And the U.S. invaded Iran's next-door neighbors to topple their government. And then, [1:44:37] yes, Iranians attacked U.S. troops arrayed near their border. And we've attacked and killed their [1:44:42] leadership. I'm not saying that Iran is good. Iran is horrible. Horrible to its neighbors, horrible to [1:44:51] people outside its borders, and even worse to its own people. But if you ignore the history of the [1:44:56] back and forth between the U.S. and Iran, you will not get this right. If more war between the U.S. and [1:45:03] Iran were the answer, we would have found the answer sometime between 1953 and now. Here's something I [1:45:09] think it's important for my colleagues to know. We did look for a path, a diplomatic path, to end [1:45:17] this hostility that's been going on since 1953. And President Trump tore up a diplomatic deal over [1:45:24] the advice of his secretary of defense and secretary of state. And many of us said at the time, if you do [1:45:30] this, it is likely to lead to Americans dying. If you make diplomacy impossible, you will make war [1:45:37] inevitable. And I believe the troops who have been killed in Epic Fury would be alive today [1:45:42] if the United States had not decided to abandon a diplomatic deal. Admiral Cooper and to my colleagues [1:45:48] on the committee, here's something that's pretty amazing that we shouldn't settle for. The [1:45:53] administration is refusing to allow members of this committee to see the OLC opinion stating the [1:46:00] legal case for war. We've always had the ability. We're armed services members. We're being asked to fund [1:46:07] a $1.5 trillion budget, but our request of the DOJ to see the OLC opinion justifying this war. They [1:46:14] have refused to allow members of the armed services committee to see it. U.S. senators, appropriators, [1:46:21] we're not allowed to see it. What are they hiding? If they will not allow us to see the legal rationale [1:46:30] for the war, what are they hiding? And Mr. Charles just concluded and say, I hope we might as a committee, [1:46:37] whatever our agreements about the wisdom or the legality of the war, I hope we might as a committee [1:46:42] agree that we should at least, in a classified setting, be able to read the legal opinion [1:46:48] upon which this entire 76-day war is based. Thank you, Mr. Chair. [1:46:55] Yes. Thank you, Senator. You have made a statement that raises questions that these two witnesses [1:47:05] are unable to answer because you've asked, you've raised policy questions. And so just for the benefit [1:47:13] of those listening in, we have had the civilian leadership before this committee to answer questions [1:47:21] like that. And these two gentlemen would have to decline. If you had formed that and stated that [1:47:30] in the form of a question, they would have to decline to answer because that is a matter of policy. [1:47:36] Who is next? Senator Moody, you're recognized. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for being here [1:47:47] today. Admiral Cooper, General Anderson, thank you for your leadership to the men and women of CENTCOM [1:47:53] and AFRICOM. Thank you for everything that you have have done over the course of your careers and are [1:47:58] continuing to do to serve our country. And I see there are so many men and women with you behind [1:48:02] you to support these efforts today, to speak with us, to meet with us, to answer our questions. [1:48:08] I know a lot of preparation goes into that. And so I thank you as well. Admiral Cooper, the fight you're [1:48:14] leading certainly with CENTCOM under your command. I'm always proud to say that that is from my home, [1:48:22] based in my home county in Florida, Hillsborough County, Florida. That's where I was born and raised. [1:48:27] It's been there since 1983, 43 years of commanding operations like we're involved in today. So proud [1:48:36] to have you here, sir. Florida is so involved from SOCOM, Space Forces Central, Patrick Space Force Base, [1:48:44] Cape Canaveral. We're both the command hub and launch pad for most all conflict. So we are proud to be [1:48:51] that, proud to be a stakeholder in everything that's done within the military. And so on behalf of all the [1:48:58] service members in Florida, civilian and their families, we want to say thank you to them. [1:49:05] I am the newest member of this committee. It's always interesting to me to hear the different [1:49:09] perspectives from other members on this committee. You would think from some of the questioning [1:49:14] previously that the United States willy-nilly abandoned all diplomatic efforts. Didn't think [1:49:21] through that. There was no justification. And I'm wondering, I know, if you could tell me, [1:49:28] Admiral Cooper, what is your background working with CENTCOM and all of the leadership positions [1:49:33] you've held? Senator, first, thank you for the question. And thanks for your time yesterday. [1:49:39] And thanks for your leadership. Thousands of Floridians are serving in the Middle East today, [1:49:44] and they're serving honorably as well. And what specifically have been your roles [1:49:47] with CENTCOM? I've been focused on the Middle East for the last five years, three years of [1:49:52] which we're serving in Bahrain as the fleet commander, and then about 16 months as the deputy [1:49:58] commander prior to my current position. And how long have you been familiar with [1:50:02] Iran and its leadership and its attacks against the United States? I've studied or been a part of it [1:50:11] for the better part of three decades, particularly acutely in the last five years. And leading up to [1:50:17] February 28th, months prior to that, what was jarring to you that you saw different than what had been [1:50:26] for those many decades that you've been involved? I think it's important to note just in the 30 months [1:50:31] before Epic Fury commenced, Iran and its proxies had been attacking U.S. service members and diplomats [1:50:38] about 350 times. Can you repeat that? About every, about every third day. Iran and its proxies [1:50:43] attacked American service members 350 times in the Middle East. I don't think that that Americans [1:50:49] were aware of that, that in the 30 months that they had attacked Americans or their service members [1:50:54] 350 times. Does that surprise you that I would say that? That I don't believe that everyday American [1:51:00] going to work knew that? It's disappointing, but between the actions of proxies in Iraq and Syria, [1:51:08] as well as the Houthis, that's, that's simply the fact of what happened. [1:51:12] And the, and the months leading up to that decision, that very serious decision on February the 28th, [1:51:18] what were your concerns regarding the proliferation of missiles or the ability of the United States to [1:51:23] do anything if that nuclear threat escalated? Senator, in this venue, what I would say is, [1:51:29] since our number one priority is to prevent a nuclear capable Iran, I always every day focused on [1:51:36] that problem. But what we saw in the weeks and months leading up to the, to Epic Fury was an increase [1:51:43] in the production capability of ballistic missiles, which presented a very significant risk, both to [1:51:48] the partners and ourselves. And this is why it was part of our military objectives to eliminate those [1:51:53] missiles and equally, if not more importantly, eliminate the ability for Iran to generate any more. [1:51:57] And those couple of months leading right up until that, you saw a dramatic escalation in that [1:52:02] ability on Iran's part? That's correct. Between starting in about November and December, [1:52:06] you started, you started to see an increase in Iran's capability and intent to produce more [1:52:11] ballistic missiles. And if we couldn't have, um, neutralized that threat diplomatically, [1:52:17] does there come a point where that that's not an option anymore, where there may be a slippery slope, [1:52:21] where we can't get back to our ability to be effective to, um, quell that threat? Without crossing into [1:52:28] classified lanes, uh, the short answer is yes. Iran has a large, had a large scale capability to produce [1:52:35] ballistic missiles beyond, uh, which could potentially be defended. I think that's a very important point. [1:52:41] The second point is that capability has been virtually eliminated. And I believe I heard you say [1:52:45] at this point, you believe Epic Fury has satisfied its mission? Senator, we met every military objective [1:52:51] for Epic Fury. And what is the difference between where we were on the 28th of February and right now? [1:52:56] If I used a couple of examples, uh, the Iranian Navy went from, uh, harassing, uh, throughout the region [1:53:04] and being a regional power to having no Navy. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Moody. Uh, Senator King. [1:53:11] Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, Admiral, you mentioned, you used the word myth-busting a few [1:53:16] minutes ago. And, uh, I have, I have to do a little myth-busting. Uh, it's sort of a common rhetoric [1:53:22] today that no administration prior to this one has confronted the threats of Iran. In fact, [1:53:27] the most effective confrontation with the threat from Iran, the nuclear threat, was during President [1:53:34] Obama's administration with the JCPOA. I would point out that at the time that President Trump [1:53:40] tore up, unilaterally tore up the, uh, nuclear agreement with Iran, Iran had zero highly enriched [1:53:48] uranium. As you know, today, one of the focuses of this whole enterprise is 400 kilograms of highly [1:53:56] enriched uranium that's in place in Iran that was produced since the unilateral dissolution of the [1:54:03] JCPOA. I, uh, the, the idea that nobody ever confronted this, this problem is just not true. [1:54:11] And we're now confronting a problem that was created by the abandonment of the JCPOA, which is [1:54:17] the most comprehensive nuclear control agreement ever, and the most highly inspected by the International [1:54:25] Atomic Energy Agency, in world history. So, we're confronted with a problem now that, in many [1:54:33] ways, this administration created in 2018 by abandoning this, uh, this agreement. Uh, let, let me move on. [1:54:42] Uh, do we, do we have any clarity now as to who's in charge in Iran? Do we know who, who is, has the [1:54:50] power to negotiate and make agreements? Senator, the, the negotiations themselves are held [1:54:57] uh, via diplomatic channels. And I would really refer to the diplomats to address that. But clearly, [1:55:01] from a military perspective, their command control was significantly fractured as a result of our [1:55:06] strikes in Operation Epic Fury. And, uh, command and control is another way of saying their leadership, [1:55:11] they, there's a communications difficulty. Is the IRGC in charge at this point? The IRGC is [1:55:19] exercising, uh, significant authority. Uh, General Anderson, uh, talk to me about the loss of soft power [1:55:29] in Africa, our abandonment of, of USAID and what, what's happened with the Chinese and the Russians [1:55:36] that, my understanding is, are now filling that, that gap, uh, in addition to the other aggressive [1:55:43] actions that they're taking. Senator, I would say that, uh, we look at all facets of national power and how [1:55:51] to bring those to bear on the continent in order to provide, uh, security outcomes. Oftentimes, uh, [1:55:56] They've taken one facet of our national power off the table, unilaterally, for no, for no apparent [1:56:01] reason. So, the, the, the whim of Elon Musk. Senator, we, uh, work very closely with state, [1:56:10] with commerce and energy in order to look at the security requirements on the continent. I have a [1:56:15] foreign service commercial officer joining my staff this summer along with a liaison from [1:56:19] Department of Energy in order to look at economic opportunities. But it is a fact, is it not, that we [1:56:22] have essentially left all of the, the role that USAID played on the continent. That's gone. Isn't that, [1:56:29] that, that, that's a yes or no question. Senator, there are still, uh, aid programs that are active [1:56:36] on the continent. They are much reduced from what they were before. Much, much reduced. That's a fair way [1:56:41] of stating it. You mentioned earlier that the, uh, Al-Qaeda and, and ISIS have a, have resurged in, in Africa. [1:56:49] Now, the, the term epicenter has been used several times of, of world terrorism. You, you use the term, [1:56:55] they said, you said, they have the will and intent to attack the homeland. My question is, do they [1:57:01] have the capacity? Do they, are they developing weapons, strategies, uh, other ways to, to take that [1:57:10] will and intent and turn it into something, uh, of imminent danger to the American people? Senator, [1:57:17] that is the, uh, exact issue that is my top concern is for being able to provide, they have the assets [1:57:22] necessary to provide the indication warnings to know and to be able to identify when they shift [1:57:27] from that will intent to have to have the cape capacity and capability. That is something that [1:57:32] is very difficult for us to ascertain in the Sahel right now, given our limited posture. That was, [1:57:36] that was going to be my follow-up question is, do we have the capacity to determine their capacity? [1:57:42] It sounds like you just said, uh, we have, we don't have the capacity that we should have or need. [1:57:48] Senator, we are, uh, that's why we, in the president's bucket, we have asked for additional [1:57:53] intelligent surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and why we're also looking at [1:57:57] a layered approach to look at everything from surface to space, to look at commercial assets, [1:58:02] to look at emerging technologies, open source as well, and use these technologies, especially artificial [1:58:07] intelligence in order to fuse these multiple different types of layered ISR, in order to gain [1:58:12] that understanding and illuminate this black hole of intelligence in the Sahel. We cannot, uh, sustainably [1:58:18] afford to do that solely with airborne ISR, so we have to look at a multi-faceted approach. There are some [1:58:24] very promising emerging technologies that we are looking into and that are affordable and sustainable, [1:58:30] and that also can work with our partners, because one of the key points to this is this is not [1:58:34] necessarily ours to action, so having that tech, uh, the intelligence that we can share with partners [1:58:39] so they can then action those, uh, on a mutual threat is going to be key to our future, uh, but being [1:58:45] able to understand that is the number one priority of the command and where we are looking at investing [1:58:50] with emerging technology. And I think as you've testified, if they take over the capital of Mali, [1:58:54] that's a, that's a, that's a very dangerous moment. That, that would be a game changer, I believe, in, uh, [1:59:00] how they would be viewed, uh, internationally and what attraction they would be then, I think, to other [1:59:05] adherents. Thank you. Thank you. How would that affect Americans, General? Well, I think that would then [1:59:11] give momentum to these terrorist organizations that have the will and intent, and it would allow them [1:59:16] to then start moving towards the capability and capacities that Senator King just mentioned. And so that [1:59:20] then, I think, poses a threat in the long term to the United States as they continue to develop this. We know that [1:59:26] they have not given up this intent, and it's just a matter of having the time and space to develop them. [1:59:32] And it would be Vladimir Putin that would be happiest about this. Is that correct? [1:59:37] Uh, the prudent that what, sir? That, uh, it would be President Vladimir Putin who would rejoice at [1:59:44] such a, um, contingency. Or would it be Xi Jinping? I, I can't speak for what either one of those leaders [1:59:53] would believe, but I think that, that we, they would be able to parlay that to their interests. [1:59:58] Well, who's financing this contingency if it were to happen? Uh, the terrorists? [2:00:05] Yes. They're gaining, uh, they're through lots of illicit materials. So it's not necessarily [2:00:09] directly from an estate actor. They're working with, as I mentioned earlier, the narco-terrorist, [2:00:13] uh, trafficking. They're doing this through, uh, kidnap for ransom. They're doing this for other [2:00:18] legal smuggling. They even do have their own taxation networks in the territories that they control, [2:00:23] where they generate millions of dollars. And before I turn to Senator Scott, with regard to [2:00:28] the, the funds that we're not spending anymore on USAID, but have been supplemented elsewhere, [2:00:41] in, in terms of dollars, let's, let's talk in, in terms of US dollar, uh, equivalence. How does the [2:00:50] food aid, health aid, and, um, and development aid that we're currently delivering in your jurisdiction [2:00:59] compare to, to, to, um, to what China and Russia are doing? Uh, Senator, I don't have those exact [2:01:09] numbers. Uh, I'd have to get back to you on those, as those are often in other departments, other agencies [2:01:14] within the government, but we can look into that for you and look at what that comparison is between [2:01:18] Okay, um, well, if you would then supplement that on the record for us, because I don't know the answer [2:01:23] either. Uh, Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thank, uh, thank both of you for, um, for your [2:01:31] service and all the men and women that work for you. Admiral Cooper, can you, I know this is not a [2:01:36] classified study, but can you talk a little bit about, uh, what other countries have done, uh, to [2:01:40] help us either with intelligence or with military capabilities and, and I don't know whether you want [2:01:46] to do this or not, some that you would like to have done more? Senator, I think the most prominent [2:01:54] seven countries, uh, that have been most helpful and serve side by side are five of the six GCC [2:01:59] countries, uh, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Also, indispensable in our effort has [2:02:06] been the Kingdom of Jordan and clearly Israel, uh, with whom, uh, we conducted the strikes. Um, [2:02:11] we're always eager to expand partnerships. Uh, there's a couple that I think I could address in a [2:02:15] classified setting, uh, that were less than stellar. And do you feel like we've been a great partner to [2:02:21] them and helping them build up their, uh, their capabilities over the last, over the last 20 [2:02:26] years or so? Senator, I think it's been an excellent two-way street. And if I look at [2:02:30] mill-to-mill relationships, it's been very strong. I, I'd simply highlight, uh, the result of years of [2:02:35] effort and collaboration and partnership, uh, put our partners literally side by side with Patriot [2:02:41] defenses, with our partners defending Americans. I think that sends a lot. I think that sends a good [2:02:45] signal and says a lot. So, uh, uh, I think, uh, Senator Wicker asked you some questions about drones. We had a [2:02:52] we had a meeting the other day and, um, the new individual came in and said that Ukraine is [2:02:57] building 5 million drones a year. Um, and so they probably are ahead of most people because they've [2:03:03] had to, um, because of war they're in. So can you talk about, um, are we where we need to be with drone [2:03:11] technology? Are we using it everywhere we can? Are we using, are we where we need to be with regard, [2:03:16] with regard to drone, um, defense capabilities? Can you just talk a little bit more about that? [2:03:22] Yes, Senator. First, I, I, I would say that the, the secretary and the department's, uh, [2:03:26] focus on drone domination. Drone dominance has really kick-started, uh, our, our capabilities [2:03:33] and flowed, uh, more capabilities into the region much faster than we had seen before. And many of [2:03:38] those capabilities have now been proven in combat. I think in a classified setting, I, I, I'd like to [2:03:42] tell you what that looked like. But as we sit here today, we have drone capabilities in the air, [2:03:47] on the sea, and under the sea as a result of this initiative. Do you have any feel for whether, [2:03:52] uh, the, the impact you've had on, uh, Iran has impacted, uh, their ability to help Russia [2:03:58] in their war against Ukraine? So I think, uh, best to discuss that in a classified setting. Clearly, [2:04:04] uh, uh, Iran and Russia have had a years-long relationship, particularly when it comes to drones. [2:04:10] So what are you most proud of? What do you, what do you, what are you most proud of that you've [2:04:13] accomplished since you've had this role? Absolutely. Number one, two, and three. Uh, [2:04:18] I'm most proud of the men and women who executed an extraordinarily complex mission. The first major [2:04:24] combat operations that the United States has seen in a generation establishing, in my mind, [2:04:29] the latest greatest generation of American warriors. Same question, General Anderson. What [2:04:34] are you most proud of that you've accomplished so far? Senator, I think the, uh, uh, I would agree with, [2:04:41] uh, Admiral Cooper. That's the men and women of the very small footprint and very small [2:04:46] recent amount of resources, uh, punch way above their weight class and have outsized impacts on [2:04:51] the continent. What we just did in African line in Morocco was significant in our largest exercise [2:04:56] on the continent of bringing over 40 nations together, uh, to include over three dozen African [2:05:02] countries and nations as far away as Brazil and Japan. That ability to convene is one of the great [2:05:07] powers of the United States and it differentiates us from many others. So I am proud of the fact that we [2:05:13] can do that and that we can not just, uh, pursue our own readiness, but actually bring multiple nations [2:05:18] together to get, address common threats. Thanks both of you. And thanks to all the men and women [2:05:22] that work for you. Thank you very much, Senator. We have, uh, Shaheen and then Hirono. Thank you, [2:05:30] Mr. Chairman. And again, thank you to both of you for being here and for your service. Um, I wanted to [2:05:37] pick up on Senator King's questions about the closing of so much of our foreign assistance in Africa, [2:05:45] General Anderson and, um, Senator Wicker asked what we're seeing in terms of China. I have a couple [2:05:51] of examples that I think are worth pointing out how much, um, that has meant in terms of China's [2:05:59] ability to make inroads because China has actually eclipsed Russia as the largest weapons exporter [2:06:05] to sub-Saharan Africa, which I'm sure you're aware of. And 70% of all African armies now operate [2:06:12] vehicles from the PRC as opposed to the United States. Beijing's looking to expand military grants, [2:06:20] training and joint exercises between the PRC and African countries. And we don't have the kind of [2:06:28] foreign assistance, um, soft power that we did before the elimination of USAID. Um, but you mentioned, [2:06:37] General Anderson, that you've taken on a foreign, uh, commercial service officer, which I think is [2:06:43] a really interesting idea. And as you're aware, I'm sure, at Indopaycom, Admiral Paparo has really [2:06:50] used this to good advantage, coordinating with the State Department, with the Development Finance [2:06:54] Corporation, with the U.S. Trade Development Agency, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, [2:06:59] to identify potential projects, um, to work on in that AOR. So can you talk a little bit more about how [2:07:08] you're identifying development projects and whether you need any other authorizations from Congress or [2:07:13] support for this effort from us, so that you can help implement the kind of coordination [2:07:20] that's going on in Indopaycom? Senator, yes, I very much appreciate your interest here, [2:07:26] because this is an area I think is emerging on the continent. With just the demographics of the [2:07:31] continent and the growing economies, being able to identify these, the intersection of security and [2:07:36] economics is absolutely vital. All of the agencies you mentioned are ones that we are coordinating [2:07:41] with to make sure that those investments go into the continent and have the greatest effect, [2:07:45] but they're also informed by what are the security implications. So sometimes it may not have the [2:07:49] same economic return, but that return may come in security. And that's where we come in, [2:07:54] is being able to convene some of these different agencies, as well as private industry, to be able [2:07:58] to articulate what those security concerns are, what those implications are, and then also the fact that [2:08:04] we are able to execute exercises and other things around the continent helps go into the calculus [2:08:08] of those investments and buy down some of that risk. So that is what we are looking to develop. [2:08:13] So do those agencies routinely check with you if there's a major project that they're looking [2:08:19] to fund in Africa? So historically no, and that's why we're standing up a very small unit within the [2:08:24] headquarters in order to have that point where they can help facilitate these discussions, because often [2:08:30] they didn't know where to have them. And is that something that Congress can be helpful with [2:08:34] in terms of trying to encourage that sort of coordination? I think there is, there are ways [2:08:40] that encouraging that coordination would be very helpful and being able to articulate this across [2:08:45] the committees that oversee these various agencies and understanding how that interrelation of national [2:08:50] power can come together, that it's not always the military lever that produces a security outcome, [2:08:55] but being able to have that dialogue I think would be critical. The other area that I think would be [2:08:59] very helpful also is incentive structures that help energize our industrial base to help produce [2:09:05] the equipment that our partners want. They would much prefer to buy U.S. equipment, but often our [2:09:11] systems take so long and are so long to deliver because often the incentive structure is not there [2:09:18] that they go to, they turn to China out of necessity, not because of desire. They often see that as inferior [2:09:23] equipment and they would much prefer to buy American. We need to incentivize our industrial base [2:09:29] to meet that demand. Yeah, I agree. And as you know, it's an issue not just in that, [2:09:35] in that respect, but in a whole lot of other areas in terms of the challenges with the industrial base. [2:09:40] Admiral Cooper, one of the things that's gotten a fair amount of tension in recent weeks has been [2:09:49] President Zelensky's working with some of our allies and partners in the Middle East in response to the [2:09:56] war in Iran on the expertise that the Ukrainians have developed to address counter-drone responses. [2:10:05] Can you talk a little bit about what you're seeing with respect to that and whether our allies and [2:10:11] partners find that kind of support helpful from the Ukrainians? Senator, I think most significantly [2:10:18] we adopted a large number of tactics, techniques, and procedures that the Ukrainians have passed us, [2:10:24] that have helped us defend Americans. And all of our partners are working with Ukraine in some way, [2:10:29] shape, or form. I'd really defer to them and talk about it. But are they more effective as a result? [2:10:33] Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:10:37] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I give my questions, I want to again take a moment to highlight the true [2:10:46] costs both for the military and everyday Americans of the President's illegal war with Iran and summarize [2:10:52] how we got here. 13 brave U.S. soldiers have been killed and more than 400 have been wounded. The DOD [2:11:01] is now estimating that this war has cost over 29 billion dollars and costing more every single day. [2:11:08] The continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which somehow caught the President by surprise, [2:11:12] is directly contributing to the growing affordability crisis that Americans are facing. [2:11:17] 15. And negotiations are at a stalemate, but it's becoming clear. This President's plan is to attempt [2:11:26] to secure an agreement that looks very similar to the 2015 JCPOA, which my colleague Senator King referred [2:11:34] to, which this President recklessly tore up in 2018. As you recall, the JCPOA, which was an agreement that [2:11:42] also included countries, not just us, included France, the UK, Germany, China, and Russia. And the JCPOA put [2:11:53] limits on Iran's nuclear program with a rigorous inspection and monetary program run by the IAEA, [2:12:02] all of which was tossed out by President Trump. And while that agreement did have a sunset clause, [2:12:09] what we should have done was work diplomatically with our allies to extend it. Instead, here we are, [2:12:15] engaged in another endless war in the Middle East, no end in sight, that is driving up costs, [2:12:22] undermining military readiness, and alienating our allies with neither a clear rationale for starting [2:12:28] the conflict, which the President originally said, oh, well, then maybe there'll be reduced regime [2:12:33] change. And now he seems to have landed on preventing a nuclear nuclear capable Iran, [2:12:39] which was exactly what the JCPOA was intended to do. Admiral Cooper, did the President ever [2:12:45] explain to you why he tore up the JCPOA? Senator, that's a policy matter that I would have expected [2:12:55] anyone to discuss with me. He never explained to you why he tore up the JCPOA. He either explained it to [2:13:02] you or he didn't? I'm not asking you for the actual conversation, but did he happen to explain to [2:13:08] you why he did something which led to the very nuclear crisis that we're now confronting regarding [2:13:16] Iran and their enriched uranium? Senator, I was in a completely different assignment when this [2:13:22] occurred eight years ago. So apparently the President didn't have a discussion with anybody. In fact, [2:13:28] it was a unilateral decision that he made. Now, you have vast experience, Admiral and the Navy, et cetera. [2:13:39] And before we went into, before we attacked Iran, did it cross your mind that Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz? [2:13:47] Senator, as you know, one of my responsibilities as a combatant commander is to generate a wide range [2:13:53] of options with associated risks and opportunities, present those to the Secretary and the President. I think [2:13:59] it'd be inappropriate to talk about what those specifically are. But we always make them very [2:14:03] comprehensively. Excuse me. I'm asking whether with your experience, the thought that should we [2:14:10] attack Iran, that they would close the Strait of Hormuz, did that cross your mind? Senator, I've [2:14:17] transited through the Strait about a hundred times. I think of the Strait of Hormuz virtually every day. [2:14:22] So is that a yes? That you are very aware that the Strait of Hormuz, the very thing that happened, [2:14:30] that that is something that you contemplated happening. I hope that is the case because [2:14:35] with your experience, I have to conclude that you contemplated that possibility. [2:14:43] So you did mention that our diplomats are engaged in the negotiations. Well, who are those diplomats? [2:14:50] Senator, I really would refer to the White House. Who specifically is engaged? [2:14:55] Senator, well, apparently the diplomats are Jared Kushner, a Christian who I don't think even works [2:15:00] for our country. And Mr. Whitlock, Steve Whitlock, who happens to be a, I don't know, a, I don't think [2:15:09] he has a lot of experience engaging in these kinds of negotiations. So here we are. The JCPOA, which was [2:15:17] a very intense, the results of very intense negotiations among many countries. And for us to act as [2:15:24] though, the, the idea of a nuclear Iran is just something that occurred to President Trump and [2:15:29] not to his predecessors is pretty ridiculous. And in fact, we had in place a regime that was intended [2:15:38] to do that, that very thing, which was to prevent a nuclear Iran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. [2:15:44] Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton. [2:15:48] Gentlemen, thank you for your appearance and your service to our nation. And many thanks to all the [2:15:52] troops that you represent. Um, Admiral Cooper, um, some critics of Operation Epic Fury have referred [2:16:00] to it as another forever war. And your opening statement in the third sentence, in fact, you say [2:16:08] since 1979, the Iranian regime has terrorized the region. Is it fair to say the only forever war [2:16:14] here is the war of terror that Iran has waged against the United States and the civilized world [2:16:20] for 47 years? I, I would agree that, that that was a sustained effort by the, by Iran. [2:16:26] Okay. Um, let's, uh, take a look in context since my democratic friends have wanted to talk so much [2:16:32] about the JCPOA, about not just Epic Fury, but about midnight hammer as well. So where we stand today [2:16:39] in mid-May versus where we were not even a year ago, 12, 11 months ago. Um, based on your [2:16:48] extensive military experience, do you believe that, uh, Iran posed a significant threat to the United [2:16:53] States 11 months ago before Operation Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury? Senator, they attacked U.S. [2:16:59] forces 350 times in the 30 months preceding Epic Fury. Do you believe that it, absent Midnight Hammer and [2:17:06] Epic Fury, do you believe that threat was likely to continue to grow? Yes. Microphone, please. [2:17:13] Yes, sir. I do. Um, is Iran now less of a threat than it was 11 months ago? [2:17:20] No, they are significantly less of a threat. Um, is it fair to say that the Iranian regime is still [2:17:26] a revolutionary terrorist regime, even after all the deaths of their senior leaders? They are. Yeah. [2:17:32] Um, is it fair to say the revolutionary terrorist regime no longer has nearly as much military [2:17:39] capability to act on its revolutionary terrorist intentions? Uh, that is fair. Uh, and I think it's [2:17:45] also fair to say across, uh, every element of national power, they've been significantly degraded. [2:17:51] You, you state in your opening statement that CENTCOM forces systematically dismantled what Iran spent [2:17:59] four decades and tens of billions of dollars building. How long do you assess that it will [2:18:05] take them to get back to where they were in terms of their military and other capabilities just 11 [2:18:12] months ago before CENTCOM dismantled it all? Senator, I would assess that the drone and missile force will [2:18:17] take years, uh, to reconstitute, uh, the Navy likely will not get back to its previous size for a full [2:18:23] generation. Is that why you say in your opening statement that CENTCOM assesses Iran can no longer [2:18:30] project power across the region nor pose a persistent threat to the United States or our partners than it [2:18:37] did prior to Operation Epic Fury? They certainly cannot do it at the level of mass that we all saw [2:18:43] with hundreds of missiles and drones raining across the Middle East. That doesn't mean they don't have [2:18:47] any capability, uh, but that broad power projection capability no longer exists. And the whole world [2:18:56] saw that just in a number of days after the beginning of your operation, correct? And the number of, [2:19:01] I think it was a near 90% decline, um, in Iran's attacks on the United States and its neighbors in the region? [2:19:08] That's correct. Uh, early on the, the attacks were in the hundreds and they went to, uh, to the teens. [2:19:14] Okay. Um, I, I know that there's been a lot of questions about the Strait of Hormuz. To, to be clear, [2:19:21] the Strait of Hormuz was never part of our objectives, but we knew as anyone who looks at a map would know [2:19:29] that Iran has the power to temporarily close the Strait of Hormuz. Is that correct? Uh, that's accurate, [2:19:34] Senator. Is it fair to say that the United States and our partners have the [2:19:38] power to permanently open the Strait? Without getting into specifics, we have the military [2:19:44] power. Yes. Um, could you talk to us a little bit about what the blockade in the meantime has done [2:19:50] to Iran? Yes, sir. The blockade was implemented, uh, within 24 hours of presidential direction, [2:19:57] uh, based on a plan that we had on the shelf. Uh, uh, the blockade itself is designed to prevent [2:20:02] any commerce from leaving Iranian ports, uh, going to global distribution and any commerce from coming [2:20:08] around the world, going back to global, uh, going back into Iran. Uh, there's been zero trade going [2:20:14] into or out of Iran in the last month. And just finally, what, what is Iran's current ability, [2:20:19] since it retains its revolutionary terrorist ambitions, to support its terror proxy network [2:20:25] in the region versus where, uh, it was just 11 months ago? Uh, as we sit here today, uh, they are unable to [2:20:32] resource and supply, uh, Hezbollah, Hamas, uh, or the Houthis. Uh, chapter to be seen of what that [2:20:39] looks like in Iraq. New, uh, prime minister wants to distance himself, uh, from Iran, but we'll see. [2:20:44] That's what it's committed to. We'll see what that looks like. So they, they can't support their [2:20:48] terrorist proxies. They're years and years away from reconstituting, if at all, their missile and [2:20:53] drone forces and their nuclear program. And they're a generation away from rebuilding their navy. [2:21:00] Seems to me like a little bit better position than we were relative to Iran [2:21:04] under Barack Obama and Joe Biden's disastrous nuclear deal. Thank you. [2:21:09] Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Slotkin. Um, thank you, uh, gentlemen, for being here. [2:21:14] And thank you for what you're doing. Um, I'm gonna direct my questions to, uh, General, um, uh, Cooper. [2:21:21] I'm sorry, Admiral Cooper, excuse me. And I'm gonna give a good pass to my fellow Michigander, [2:21:25] um, from Ipsy, Michigan. Um, we're, we're happy to see you in service. [2:21:29] Thank you for what you're doing. And you're always welcome back home when you retire. [2:21:34] Um, uh, I, I think the, you know, I feel, um, like whatever, whatever feelings I have [2:21:42] about the imminence of the threat from Iran, um, or not, um, we want our military to come through [2:21:50] this war as successfully and safely as possible. I am interested, um, in making sure we get out of this, [2:21:59] um, quickly and safely. Um, and I have actually no doubt that with all the firepower we've used in [2:22:09] this war that we've degraded their nuclear capability, their ballistic missile capability, [2:22:13] their terrorism capability. And as someone who served, um, three tours in Iraq, I saw that terrorism [2:22:19] up close and personal. Um, but it is hard to say sitting here, um, with the Strait of Hormuz closed [2:22:27] and every American feeling, um, a deep, deep spike in the price of gas and that we're only in the [2:22:35] beginning of that that we can't say we, we are overall better off until that strait is opened. And [2:22:43] while, um, I believe we could militarily, um, open the straits, um, it seems to me that the Iranians [2:22:52] have strategic geography. They have the ability, even though though it's degraded, to project power onto [2:22:59] things like the oil infrastructure in places like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or anywhere they want, [2:23:04] further hurting the world economy, you know, the United States. Um, do you believe, is that correct, [2:23:11] that, um, while militarily we may be able to physically open the straits, that they still [2:23:18] retain the ability to affect infrastructure in the region, um, and therefore kind of have a veto power [2:23:26] over the world economy right now? Senator, I would, from a military perspective, I would, [2:23:32] I would characterize Iran as having, uh, a remnant, uh, capability, uh, across multiple domains, [2:23:38] uh, uh, in terms of veto power. I'd really, uh, would defer to policy makers for that characterization. [2:23:45] But sorry, can they strike oil infrastructure across the Persian Gulf? [2:23:52] They have a very moderate, uh, if not small capability to continue strikes. And we, of course, [2:23:57] have, uh, uh, accordingly, uh, prepared for such a contingency. Okay. But, but if we could, [2:24:04] if we have the power to militarily open the straits and their threat is, quote, moderate or small, [2:24:10] why wouldn't we just do it? Senator, I really would defer to policy makers on in this particular [2:24:15] matter. Uh, and the straight clearly is in the middle of the negotiation being undertaken now. [2:24:20] Yeah. I mean, it just seems to me that they still certainly have, it may be diminished power, [2:24:26] but if the United States military is not physically opening the straits right now, it's because [2:24:31] the Iranians do have the real capability to affect, um, uh, strikes in or drone strikes into the Gulf [2:24:39] countries affecting their oil infrastructure and sending the price of oil worldwide even higher. So, [2:24:46] you know, it may be diminished, but it's real capability unless I'm missing something. Um, [2:24:51] you know, can you describe for me, I'm, I'm very sensitive about the, the, um, way that place, [2:24:58] countries like Russia or China may be enabling the Iranians to target and kill American forces or to [2:25:05] provide, um, intelligence on their locations in real or near real time. Um, uh, is it fair to say [2:25:13] that the, that the Chinese are providing intelligence to the Iranians to help them target U.S. forces? [2:25:21] Senator, I think best to talk about anything regarding intelligence in a classified manner. [2:25:26] What I can say is, uh, the Iranian, uh, military is largely made up of Russian and Chinese equipment. [2:25:32] Okay. I, I, I think, you know, um, it, it feels like either Chinese government and or Chinese [2:25:42] companies are helping and aiding and abetting, um, the Iranians in, in providing that information. [2:25:48] I understand we don't want to go into the details, but some of this is like out in open press. [2:25:53] I would just say, I personally feel like that crosses a Rubicon. Um, anytime we have another [2:25:59] country providing that kind of intelligence to an adversary, I think that should play very heavily [2:26:05] in our calculus and our conversations. I know the president is with the Chinese government right now. [2:26:10] Um, but I hope that no matter what party we're from, that's just a Rubicon. We all believe once you [2:26:16] cross it, we're in a very different conversation, and I hope that's playing out in Beijing. I yield [2:26:21] back, Chairman. Thank you. Senator Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Cooper, any, [2:26:26] any update at all on activities in Afghanistan? Increased, uh, activity from ISIS or any other [2:26:34] groups that concern you? Anything at all that you can tell us? Senator, just, uh, thank you for the [2:26:39] question. Uh, Afghanistan remains, uh, on the forefront of, of what we're watching in terms of terrorist [2:26:45] activity. I think best to address that in a classified forum, uh, for right now, our partnerships [2:26:49] in the region are suppressing that threat. Can you give any update at all, uh, uh, for the record? [2:26:54] Uh, no, no. Remain, remains, uh, area of concern for CENTCOM. You're, you're, you're tracking, [2:27:00] paying attention to it. We're not, we're not completely ignoring Afghanistan. Remains area of concern. [2:27:06] We're paying close attention through a variety of partnerships. Uh, we're suppressing any threat. [2:27:10] Thanks. Um, uh, thank you for your leadership. I mean, I think this is, uh, an incredible moment. [2:27:16] You're doing an incredible job when it comes to Iran and degrading, uh, their military, their defense [2:27:22] industrial base. You cite in your testimony that the U.S. has, quote, delivered a long-term rollback [2:27:27] of Iran's ability to project power in the region and beyond, end quote, damaging or destroying over 85 [2:27:35] of its ballistic missile drone and naval defense industrial base and 82 percent of its air defense [2:27:40] missile systems. That, that's, that's pretty damn good. Um, that, that's a strong, um, statement, [2:27:46] and I'm, I'm proud of your efforts. The NDS talks about the concept of simultaneity in which our [2:27:55] adversaries could undertake simultaneous aggression across multiple theaters. Does Operation Epic Fury's [2:28:02] degradation of the Iranian military and defense industrial base reduce the problem of simultaneity? [2:28:10] Senator, I think there's, uh, it remains to be seen what happens, uh, uh, going forward with Iran, [2:28:16] uh, but I, what I think we've seen is a combination of ability for the United States to project power and [2:28:21] influence, uh, and defeat an adversary very quickly, 38 days. Uh, the effects, uh, on other theaters, [2:28:28] I think I would really refer to U.S. European commander and the Pacific command commander, [2:28:33] but clearly the United States is agile and we can move from theater to theater very quickly. [2:28:38] Can you unpack this concept of simultaneity? Well, the United States, uh, to us, the United States [2:28:43] has significant capacity. We have forces, uh, deployed around the world addressing a variety [2:28:48] of issues. We're focused today largely on Iran, but, uh, clearly, uh, General Anderson, uh, is actioning, [2:28:54] uh, key and critical, uh, matters in Africa. We're doing it in Europe, we're doing it in Asia, [2:29:00] and we're doing it in South America. And we're, we're, we're, we're able to do that at the same [2:29:04] time effectively. That's how the United States military rolls. You also write in your testimony [2:29:07] that Iran's ability to reconstitute its military capability will, quote, depend in large part on [2:29:13] decisions we and our partners make. What should we be doing to press our advantage? I think there's a [2:29:21] policy component, uh, to this, Senator, and potential, potentially a legislative component. [2:29:26] Uh, then there are a restricted number of countries. There's a finite number of countries that, uh, [2:29:31] historically, uh, had trade with Iran, uh, addressing those countries and what they are trading, [2:29:38] how they're doing, and what that looks like, uh, I think is something we should take a look at. [2:29:42] Yeah, uh, because if they don't have the parts, they're not going to build the weapons. [2:29:45] Well put. I, I was very proud to see the Lucas drones deployed and used in CENTCOM. [2:29:51] Uh, the Indiana National Guard played a really important role in testing the Lucas drone at Camp [2:29:56] Atterbury in my state. What, if anything, can we extrapolate from the performance of our Lucas [2:30:01] drones and other conflicts? Yes, Senator, so the Lucas drones were the United States' first [2:30:07] opportunity to use our own one-way attack drones against an adversary. I remember well the training [2:30:12] that happened at Camp Atterbury. I was watching it like a hawk. That training has produced, uh, [2:30:17] additional capability that we've now employed against an adversary very effectively. What, [2:30:21] what else can we learn from it? Well, there's a lot more to be learned from it. Uh, I'd love to [2:30:26] take it in a classified setting and particularly given where we are right now vis-a-vis Iran, [2:30:30] I think I would just like to keep that in a classified setting. For more than a month, [2:30:33] our warfighters in the Middle East were hammered by small drones. How can we ensure that doesn't [2:30:38] happen again if combat operations resume? Yes, Senator, a little bit of a myth buster on this. Uh, [2:30:43] Iranian drones, uh, are, uh, significantly capable in the days of $35,000 Walmart light drones. Those, [2:30:52] those things are behind us. Iran is, has a very capable drone force. We have very capably defeated [2:30:57] it. Good. Uh, well put. Thank you very much. Uh, that's all I have. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. [2:31:02] Thank you, Senator Kelly and then Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Cooper, [2:31:09] General Anderson. Thank you both for being here today. Admiral Cooper, I want to start with you. [2:31:13] I've got questions for both of you, but, um, I want to talk a little bit about the civilian [2:31:19] harm mitigation team, uh, at CENCOM. My understanding is that you've gone from 10 down to 1 as part of a [2:31:28] department-wide reduction in CHIMR, that their role is to try to minimize harm to civilians when we're [2:31:39] conducting combat, combat operations. Is that correct? You've gone from 10 to 1? [2:31:44] Yes, sir. That's the bill. There's a larger component to this. Over, over a course of years, [2:31:49] we've gone from, uh, compliance to, uh, civilian casualties and risk mitigation being just part of [2:31:56] the culture. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of people who are involved in this process. [2:31:59] What, what did those nine individuals do who were, um, removed from their, from their jobs? [2:32:06] They're now, uh, integrated in other capacities. They're retained in other capacities in the joint, [2:32:10] what we would call joint. But what were they doing when they were part of the civilian harm mitigation [2:32:16] team? They're paying, playing a key role in, uh, helping us move from compliance to culture, uh, on, [2:32:23] on CIFCAS, focusing on it every day, which they continue to do. So by your estimates, how many [2:32:29] civilians have been killed or injured over the course of this war? The investigation on, uh, on the one [2:32:36] incident that we've had after more than 13,000 strikes is still underway, uh, will, uh, certainly [2:32:42] be transparent release that when, when we can. This is a matter that I'm, I'm, I'm passionate about. [2:32:46] I'd like to use the occasion, uh, to invite you, other members of the committee and your staffs to [2:32:51] Tampa to take a look at what our targeting process looks like. If you were to find out that there was [2:32:56] an error in the targeting process, would you reinstate some of those people that were removed from that [2:33:01] team? Sir, it's a hypothetical. I think we, we, I'm, I'm always looking to organize to purpose, uh, and [2:33:07] we'll just see what the investigation is. Are you taking any additional steps now because of the [2:33:12] civilian, civilian casualties to date? We have taken additional steps. Our additional steps have been [2:33:17] very proactive throughout, uh, Epic Fury. Uh, our staff specifically warned the Iranian people more than [2:33:22] a hundred times about the threat of them being, being used as human shields. I personally warned the [2:33:27] Iranian people on March 8th, 11th, and the 23rd that they were, had the potential to be human shields. [2:33:32] And that, that communication was very effective. So again, we're moving, not just targeting, [2:33:36] but a proactive measures to minimize. All right. Well, thank you for doing that. [2:33:40] Uh, General Anderson. So China and Russia continue to expand their influence across Africa. We discussed [2:33:46] this with misinformation, uh, disinformation, uh, across many African countries. You requested 94 million [2:33:56] dollars for information operation activities. You were promised, and this is in fiscal year [2:34:02] 26. You were promised 25 million from the department. You ultimately received only 19 million. [2:34:07] Could you talk about the difference between having 19 million to do that job and 94 million? [2:34:13] Like, what are you able to do if you were fully funded? General Anderson, I, I, I get it. I mean, [2:34:19] we see this stuff all the time. The amount of misinformation that comes from the Chinese and [2:34:23] the Russians. It is a huge problem. But if you could just explain to us a little bit about what [2:34:29] you could do if you had the full request. Senator, I think the, the key point there is right now we [2:34:35] are in a reactionary mode to propaganda and to other information operations to what we can do at the [2:34:42] moment. What the fuller funding would do, especially if it's consistent over time, would allow us to build an [2:34:47] information campaign and address these issues across the continent. We're one of the few organizations [2:34:52] that looks across the entirety of the continent and can understand how these, uh, propaganda and [2:34:57] misinformation play across borders. We work very closely with the State Department and U.S. embassies [2:35:02] on this to make sure our messaging is key, but this would allow us to do is help coordinate that messaging [2:35:07] across regions and across the continent to highlight the, the issues that come with this misinformation, [2:35:13] especially as much of it is destabilizing the democracies across the region. Do you ever feel [2:35:18] like we should be countering some of their disinformation with disinformation of our own? [2:35:24] Sir, I think the most powerful tool we have is the truth. What America brings is very unique. We're [2:35:28] still a beacon of hope and light in the world, and I think we should be willing to talk about who we are. [2:35:33] This is America's 250th anniversary. There's a long history on the continent that is, I mean, it's good and [2:35:39] bad, but there's a lot of good that we can talk about of what America brings. The fact that John [2:35:44] C. Robinson founded the Tuskegee Airmen, two years later founded the Ethiopian Air Force, and then went [2:35:50] on to found Ethiopian Airlines, which is now the pride, not only of Ethiopia, but Africa. It's not a [2:35:55] story that's well known, but that is a tie that we have had between the aviation communities for years. [2:35:59] There are multiple stories like that across the continent that we need to propagate and talk about, [2:36:03] so I would say we should focus on the goodness and the positivity of engaging with America and worry [2:36:09] less about the disinformation that our partners put out, but we have to engage in this environment. [2:36:13] We have to be active in the information space. So you got about 25% of the request, [2:36:17] so if you got the full amount, you could put more out there positive stuff that the United States is [2:36:24] doing, and I know these are challenging times with resources, even beyond what DOD has, USAID and others, [2:36:32] but do you think that that would be sufficient to counter Chinese and Russian misinformation? [2:36:42] Senator, I think information operations is one of the lower cost investments that we can make that [2:36:49] have outsized return and help amplify the limited resources we have in the military side and highlight [2:36:55] the benefits that those provide. And being able to talk about that broadly, I do think, has outside [2:37:00] proportion. So small investments can have a large impact, and this is an area of information where [2:37:05] I think we can make a lot of gains, even despite our smaller physical presence, that can highlight [2:37:11] the totality of what the United States brings. I 100% agree with you, General, and we should really [2:37:17] look into getting you the resources you need to do this job. Thank you. Thank you. General Anderson, [2:37:22] I 100% agree with you. Senator Gillibrand. [2:37:28] Admiral Cooper, we had Secretary Hegseth here a week or so ago, and we did not get satisfactory [2:37:37] answers about Iran. So what is your mission in Iran right now? Senator, with Epic Fury now formally ended [2:37:48] per the president's notification, we shifted our mission to a blockade mission in the following day, [2:37:53] and that we're implementing that mission in accordance with international armed conflict. [2:37:57] That's our main mission today, as well as to be ready for a broad range of contingencies. [2:38:02] And do you feel that President Trump's declaration that we have obliterated [2:38:10] all of Iran's capabilities and their nuclear program, is that accurate? Senator, I speak from [2:38:16] a military perspective. We have significantly degraded their drone, missile, and naval capabilities. We've [2:38:23] fractured their command and control. We've eliminated the large preponderance of their space program. [2:38:29] They, by every measure, are degraded significantly across all measures of national power. [2:38:35] So what's your exit strategy to end the conflict with Iran? [2:38:38] Senator, that's a policy decision. [2:38:41] And don't you have to offer the president various exit strategies so he knows how to get from A to B? [2:38:46] Senator, consistent with my statutory obligations, I've provided a broad range of options, [2:38:52] along with the risks and mitigations through the secretary to the president. [2:38:56] So given your current mission, how many more days, weeks, months, years are we going to be at war with Iran? [2:39:02] Well, as we sit here today, we are in a ceasefire, and the way ahead will be determined by our policy makers. [2:39:09] Well, currently, we are still spending a billion dollars a day on this war with Iran. [2:39:13] And I can tell you from my New York constituents, they're furious about it, because a billion dollars a day [2:39:19] could be lowering their housing costs, lowering their food costs, lowering their health care costs, [2:39:24] lowering the cost of everyday expenses that continue to go up because of the war in Iran. [2:39:29] With the price of gas as high as it is, the price of diesel as high as it is, [2:39:32] it means everything that they have to buy for their families is more expensive. [2:39:37] So we expect from our military leaders a plan about why and how long we are going to be spending a [2:39:44] billion dollars a day. And I have not seen that plan or the why from President Trump or Secretary Hegseth. [2:39:51] So I'm hoping, as the military person in charge of operations, that you have a plan to end this war [2:39:58] and to stop spending a billion dollars a day. [2:40:01] Senator, we have a broad range of plans and contingencies consistent with my obligation to provide that advice, [2:40:10] both the secretary and the president. We've done so. Decisions will be made by our civilian leadership, [2:40:15] and my job will be to execute them. The second concern I have, Admiral Cooper, [2:40:19] is how we've prosecuted this war to date. We have data and information publicly available in [2:40:26] publications like the New York Times that 22 schools have been hit, hospitals, dozens of hospitals have [2:40:32] been hit. We have regulations. We have the law of war. We have human rights obligations. We have our own [2:40:41] targeting requirements to avoid civilian harm and death. Have you been implementing all the laws that [2:40:47] are required under current law to minimize civilian death? Senator, we have executed every operation [2:40:56] consistent with the law of armed conflict. The subject of civilian casualties is a particular passion of [2:41:01] mine. We pay attention to it. We follow all the procedures and have gone above and beyond to, in my case, [2:41:07] personally warned the Iranian people of several instances during conflict where they were being [2:41:11] potentially used as human targets. If they've been warned, how did we then bomb 22 schools? [2:41:16] There is no indication that we have that that has been corroborated. How many schools have we [2:41:21] bombed? There is one active civilian casualty investigation from the 13,629 munitions. So how do you [2:41:28] explain the publicly available information that 22 schools have been hit and multiple hospitals? There's no way [2:41:34] that we can corroborate that. No indication of that whatsoever, Senator. There's no way you can [2:41:38] corroborate or no indication of it. Which one? No indication. Well, the indication is what's publicly [2:41:44] available. There is indication. Have you investigated those claims? We have not. Why have you not? If this [2:41:51] is a passion of yours, if you believe that the civilian casualties are not consistent with the law of war [2:41:57] and not consistent with human rights obligations, that our military regularly follows with great pride and [2:42:03] great diligence. Why have you not investigated those allegations when they're publicly being made on [2:42:08] the cover of the New York Times? I'll be happy to take a look at the in each instance. I would like [2:42:13] a report to do that. I would like a report from you, from your team, about whether there have been [2:42:22] attacks that have resulted in the destruction of schools and hospitals. And if so, why? And how then, [2:42:29] last, have you managed the 90% cut to the personnel who are supposed to avoid civilian targets? [2:42:36] Happy to provide any report. And I would invite you and every staff member here to come to Tampa to [2:42:41] look at the process to see exactly how it works. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. Senator Duckworth. [2:42:52] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Admiral Cooper, the Senate received a [2:42:57] letter from President Trump on Friday, May 1st, stating that hostilities with Iran have ended. And you [2:43:03] just stated here that we are no longer operating under Operation Urgent Fury. Would you say that [2:43:11] we are still engaged in hostilities with Iran, or have they ended? Consistent with the President's [2:43:17] letter, those epic fury is complete. We are operating under international armed conflict [2:43:23] rules in the implementation of the blockade. So are we engaged in hostilities with Iran, [2:43:27] yes or no? We are not. We're in a ceasefire. The Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, right? You're [2:43:33] you're engaged in a blockade, are you not? The blockade is against Iranian ports, [2:43:38] commerce going in and coming out. It is the last thing we would want to do is blockade the Strait [2:43:43] of Hormuz. And as we've seen in the last week, there have been instances of ships coming in and out, [2:43:47] including our own. But under international law, a blockade is an act of war. So if you're blockading, [2:43:54] actively blockading Iran, then you are engaged in an act, we are currently in an act of war with Iran, [2:44:00] under international law. That a blockade is one of the definitions of an act of war, [2:44:05] under international law. Consistent with the direction we've been given, [2:44:08] those characterizations are best done through the department's legal counsel. It's not, [2:44:12] it's not characterization. It's international law. It's listed. A blockade is an act of war. [2:44:18] So let's, we've now engaged in the United States and, and the United States and Iranian forces are [2:44:26] trading fire as they continue to launch missiles, drones from our boat stacks. President Trump himself [2:44:30] says the ceasefire is on life support and he repeatedly threatens to renew U.S. military strikes. [2:44:35] And to be clear, no one is disputing the valor and professionalism of our military. [2:44:41] But the civilian leaders are abdicating their responsibility to craft a clear strategy and [2:44:46] service members and American people are the ones who will suffer under this leadership vacuum. [2:44:50] Admiral Cooper, before Operation Epic Fury began, what desired end state for the operation were you given [2:44:57] by your civilian leadership? Senator, I was given crystal clear guidance. Our military mission [2:45:02] was to degrade Iran's ability to project power on its neighbors and U.S. interests. It included three [2:45:07] specific objectives. Degrade Iranian ballistic missiles and their defense and, uh, defense industrial base. [2:45:14] Degrade their drones and the defense industrial base. Degrade their navy and the defense, uh, [2:45:19] industrial base. All of those were achieved, uh, as, uh, as I've discussed. [2:45:23] And because they were achieved, that's why the operation ended? Or did the operation end because [2:45:28] the president said, let's end operation? Operations commencing and ending are made by our civilian [2:45:35] leadership, uh, and not a military decision. Okay. Well, that civilian leadership, President Trump [2:45:40] has provided many possible end states in only two months, including in just two months, he said, [2:45:45] unconditional surrender and regime change in Iran, which have not happened. Um, he's talked about, [2:45:51] okay, operations will end when there's destruction of Iranian nuclear sites, allegedly already accomplished [2:45:55] last summer under operation Midnight Hamburg. Um, he has also said that Iran will never have nuclear [2:46:02] weapons, which cannot be accomplished with only a bombing campaign. He said that his goal is to destroy [2:46:07] the Iranian military forces and infrastructure completely, which the intelligence community [2:46:12] assesses has not happened. And now, uh, he said that it's a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, [2:46:18] which is a reminder was open before the war began. So if we don't know what we're fighting for, [2:46:22] we certainly don't know how long we'll be fighting. Admiral Cooper, what have you been given, [2:46:27] have you been given any timeline for how long our forces will be in the Strait of Hormuz or near Iran [2:46:32] or blockading Iran, um, whether by a timeline or a condition, an end state for how long you'll be [2:46:38] blockading Iran? Senator, I think it's important from a military perspective that, uh, my advice, [2:46:44] uh, related to options, uh, be provided to both the secretary and the president. We've done that. [2:46:48] The decisions on timeline and execution are up to our civilian leadership. [2:46:52] Okay. Um, so you mentioned the secretary of defense who only talks tactics and a president [2:46:57] who changes his strategy on social media multiple times a day. This is who's giving you the orders. [2:47:03] Secretary Hexeth has touted the destruction of tens of thousands of targets across Iran. [2:47:07] He said that Iran's air defenses are flattened, his words, and its industrial base overwhelmingly [2:47:12] destroyed and claims that Iran's Navy is at the bottom of the sea. [2:47:15] Every metric that the secretary offers is one of destruction and destruction alone is not an end [2:47:20] state, especially not with new public reporting that U.S. intelligence officials believe Iran has [2:47:25] operational access to most of its missile capacity and that Iran is clearly still capable of controlling [2:47:31] the Strait of Hormuz. Americans are not safer. Our service members are at risk. Prices at home are higher [2:47:36] and Iran has more control over the strait and global economy than it did before this, this whole thing [2:47:40] started. The American people, our service members deserve clear answers. What does done with the [2:47:45] war look like and how do we get there? We have no strategy as we saw in Afghanistan. If you don't [2:47:49] have a sound strategy, you keep doing tactics forever. This is not your fault, but this is where we are. [2:47:54] And Admiral Cooper, have you been asked for your advice and under what conditions would you advise [2:47:59] deploying ground troops for any purpose in Iran? Senator, I think it would be inappropriate to talk [2:48:05] about any contingency planning in this particular forum. It's my obligation as a combatant commander [2:48:11] to provide a broad range of options through the secretary and to the president. Can you answer [2:48:15] that question for me in the SCIF at a later time? I'd be more than happy to talk about anything [2:48:19] classified. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Kelly. No further questions. [2:48:29] Mr. Chairman. Sorry, I didn't mark off. Senator Peters. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, [2:48:38] thank you both for being here. And I speak for myself and I think everybody on this panel. We [2:48:44] appreciate the incredible professionalism of men and women in uniform and the job that they do every [2:48:50] day with professionalism and heroism. And thank you for doing that. But we do have a number of questions [2:48:56] about how we win this war and end it going forward. And those are usually political questions related to [2:49:04] political leadership. The men and women in uniform execute those orders and they have demonstrated [2:49:11] that they're certainly the best in the world. But Emerald Cooper, you mentioned that the current [2:49:15] mission right now is basically the U.S. blockade of Iranian ships or ships that are transiting the [2:49:23] Straits of Hormuz to Iranian ports. That's in response to Iran basically effectively shutting down [2:49:30] the Strait of Hormuz before that. As you know, experts across the political spectrum and multiple [2:49:37] administrations, political administrations, have all agreed that a war against Iran, Iran's first moves [2:49:44] would be to mine the Straits of Hormuz to prevent tanker traffic. But despite these known risks and [2:49:51] repeated claims that the DoD has planned, and I'm sure you have plans. I attended the War College, [2:49:56] I've served in the Navy, there are no shortage of plans that we have. That you have plans to deal [2:50:02] with the closing of the strait. We had four mine sweepers that were stationed in the Middle East, [2:50:07] were just retired last year. And our remaining mine sweepers were either stationed in Japan [2:50:13] or not pre-positioned in the region. This is despite public reporting that we currently already have [2:50:20] limited unmanned mine clearance capacity. And reports from the New York Times and Reuters is [2:50:27] also indicated that Iran still has hundreds, if not thousands, of small boats that can lay mines [2:50:34] or perform hit-and-run attacks on top of their existing land missiles and drones, which I'm sure [2:50:40] they're building at a furious pace right now to restock what they have. And this is on top of existing [2:50:47] land missiles and drones. The American people, as we all know, are already paying higher prices [2:50:54] in the United States. Inflation is up as a result of chaotic tariffs that President Trump has put into [2:51:00] place. And now, thanks to this war and the straits closure, they're paying high gas prices that continue [2:51:06] to rise as well, putting a strain on family budgets. So my question for you is, if there was advanced [2:51:11] planning, and I'm sure there was advanced planning about the straits closure, why were the mine sweepers not [2:51:17] pre-positioned in the region when it had been publicly reported that we already have limited unmanned [2:51:24] mine clearance capacities? When you have a plan, usually before you execute the plan, you make [2:51:29] sure that all your assets are in place to actually execute that plan. So it's curious that those assets [2:51:34] were not there. Why? Senator, I think best to talk specific tactics and operations in a classified [2:51:40] environment. What I can say here is we did have sufficient and continue to have sufficient mine [2:51:45] clearance capability in the theater. Because it happened to not be in those four vessels that were [2:51:50] decommissioned after decades of service, I think is an interesting point. The support and the ability [2:51:56] to conduct counter mining comes in a lot of different flavors, best to discuss in a classified [2:52:00] environment. And I don't mean to get into that. I understand that totally you don't want to do it, [2:52:04] but it's clear that there is a concern about mines. We aren't seeing ships go through there. Commercial [2:52:09] companies do not want to go through the straits. They're not going to put their ships at risk so they [2:52:12] don't feel safe. To me, that speaks volumes as to whether or not it's safe, that there is a real concern [2:52:18] there. And we know that the Iranians have significant capabilities to deal with that. [2:52:23] You know, I asked a previous question related to strategy and really talked about Von Clausewitz [2:52:30] on war, which is, as you know, the seminal text on strategy that is taught in all the war colleges. [2:52:36] And you know it better than I will ever know it. The concept of that is that in order to win a war, [2:52:42] you've got to know the center of gravity of your enemy. And you have to be focused on able to [2:52:47] neutralize that. What is the center of gravity in Iran? How are you planning? And that's a military [2:52:55] decision as to what is the center of gravity. That's the kind of advice you would give a president. [2:52:58] What is the center of gravity? So I really would defer to our policy makers to determine what they [2:53:04] view from a policy perspective as a center of gravity. From a military perspective, we're focused [2:53:08] on achieving military objectives, which is exactly what our men and women have done, and they've done [2:53:13] it extremely well. Well, you do, as you know, and every war plan has a center of gravity that you [2:53:19] identify, and then you work around that. So the war plan that we have for Iran would have the center [2:53:26] of gravity. Why can't you share what that is? In the past, it's been before we knew the center of [2:53:31] gravity in the Persian Gulf War for Iraq. Colin Powell said it was the Republican Guard troops, [2:53:38] the Iraq's elite unit there. Obama administration in Afghanistan, Admiral Mike Mullen defined the [2:53:44] center of gravity as building Afghan government support. They made this public. They weren't [2:53:49] hiding the center of gravity. And our enemy knows what our center of gravity is. And we know what [2:53:55] theirs is. There's no reason to keep that secret, because the American people have a right to know [2:53:59] what is it that we're trying to accomplish. And that's outlined very clearly in that term, [2:54:04] a part of every military plan that is put forward. Yes, sir. I agree. Every war plan has a center of [2:54:10] gravity. And those war plans are classified. I'd be more than happy to talk about in a classified [2:54:15] environment. Fair enough. Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Wicker. And thank you, [2:54:22] Admiral Cooper, General Anderson, for your service and your willingness to continue to serve our nation. [2:54:30] Admiral Cooper, I want to talk about the International Stabilization Force. [2:54:35] It's been publicly reported that CENTCOM is going to play a role in the proposed International [2:54:39] Stabilization Force in Gaza. We'll just call it ISF. Going forward, though many questions remain, [2:54:46] though many questions remain on what the ISF is, when it will be deployed, and how it will operate. [2:54:52] Can you clarify the roles of the U.S. and CENTCOM in the ISF? Specifically, is the vision for CENTCOM to [2:54:59] retain command and control? Or is there a timeline and mechanism for transitioning oversight to a [2:55:05] multinational or civilian-led structure? Senator, first, great to see you again, [2:55:11] and thank you for the question. Our role can be simply defined as one of support right now. The [2:55:18] International Stabilization Force commander who's been designated is also dual-hatted as the commander of [2:55:24] Special Operations Command Central. He has about 45 members of the Joint Force presently working for [2:55:30] him. We're really at the infancy of forming that International Stabilization Force. Thus far, [2:55:35] there have been four countries who've committed to provide forces. And so I think as we look to the [2:55:40] future, I'd be happy to come back to you on what that looks like later on. We're heading in the right [2:55:45] direction, but we're just at the infancy of the process. Thank you. And speaking of hitting in a [2:55:49] direction, we need to talk about munitions sustainment, because Admiral Cooper, according to [2:55:54] publicly available resources, the U.S. has fired at least 45 percent of its Patriot missile interceptors [2:56:00] and more than half of its THAAD interceptors so far in Operation Epic Fury. And it's had to move [2:56:06] air defense from other theaters. So can you talk to me about how this constrains our air and missile [2:56:12] defense and those of our regional partners and allies like the Israel, UAE, and others who are also [2:56:17] under attack? Senator, I have all the munitions necessary to both defend our forces as well as [2:56:25] conduct a broad range of contingencies. Our partners also have the sufficient munitions necessary for [2:56:33] defensive operations. Do you have estimates about how long it would take us to replenish or rebuild [2:56:36] or stockpile? I would really defer to the folks who do this on an everyday basis, both in the department [2:56:41] and the services. Thank you. I'm going to continue on you, and then we'll move over to General Anderson [2:56:46] in a minute because I want to just take a moment to talk about Lebanon, because I do appreciate [2:56:51] that you've applauded the Lebanese Armed Forces for their efforts to disarm Hezbollah. While the [2:56:57] current effort in conflict has demonstrated the extent to which Hezbollah is rearmed, a strong [2:57:02] Lebanese Armed Forces remains the best pathway for Lebanon through which Hezbollah can be disarmed once [2:57:08] and for all, and we know that needs to happen. So what can the U.S. do to support the Lebanese Armed Forces [2:57:14] to ensure that they have the necessary capacity to disarm Hezbollah, while also holding them [2:57:19] accountable? Senator, taking on the disarmament of Hezbollah is a tall order. They've been funded [2:57:26] by Iran for decades with billions of dollars, and Hezbollah is inculcated into every fabric of the [2:57:32] Lebanese society. I think right now our continued commitment with modest dollars to the Lebanese Armed [2:57:39] Forces is helpful. They have, in particular, several units who can do more. I believe our commitment [2:57:46] could be to provide the funding necessary so that they can do more. Thank you. I'm going to move over [2:57:52] to AFRICOM now, General Anderson, because ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates, well, we know they've spanned the [2:58:00] African continent. And so understanding, of course, this is an open setting. Can you talk about the [2:58:05] extent to which these franchises, that they work cross borders within local settings to coordinate [2:58:11] with one another, and the threat that this poses to our priorities in the regions? And do you think [2:58:16] there's a need for a comprehensive CT strategy on the continent? And if so, could you outline again, [2:58:23] considering it's an open setting, broadly what that strategy might include, please? Senator, I appreciate [2:58:30] the highlighting of the transnational threat that both Al-Qaeda and ISIS pose. I can say in this setting [2:58:38] that ISIS has several affiliates across the continent that are coordinating more and more, whether that's [2:58:44] in the Golis Mountains of Somalia or the Lake Shad Basin of Nigeria or in the Sahel, as well as Mozambique [2:58:50] and others. So this terrorist network has to be addressed holistically. They have to look at the entirety of [2:58:57] the network. It's not any single node anymore. And so as we look at this, I work, coordinate very closely [2:59:01] with Admiral Cooper, because ISIS still has a strong presence in CENTCOMS, AOR, as well as Al-Qaeda. [2:59:08] As we look at this, the strategy to go after this is to work with our partners, those willing and capable [2:59:13] partners, enable them first and foremost to take on this threat. When they are unable to do that, then [2:59:19] bringing in only the unique capabilities that the U.S. can bring in order to address those threats. [2:59:24] We've seen that in the Golis Mountains, where we have been able to bring intelligence, [2:59:28] limit ISR, some limited strike capabilities that have been able to disrupt their leadership network. [2:59:34] This needs to be applied across all of these areas. So investments in additional ISR, [2:59:40] investments in expeditionary capabilities, such as in a float forward staging base like the Herschel [2:59:44] Woody Williams that allow us to move to the point of need at the time of need, and then the force [2:59:50] protection requirements that are necessary to protect that force in the expeditionary area. And I would [2:59:54] add not just the force protection as in the counter UAS and the integrated air missile defense, [2:59:58] which are critical, but also investments in emerging technologies that allow austere medicine, [3:00:03] forward medicine, remote medicine, automated CASAVAC. These types of things allow us to become more [3:00:09] expeditionary in order to get after these critical threats, and only the critical threats that pose [3:00:14] threat to the U.S., and then enable partners as able to address these common threats. So it is a [3:00:20] multifaceted strategy. I could even go into more, I won't in this detail, but really maintaining the [3:00:24] relationships and the engagements are equally important and having that pragmatic approach, [3:00:29] opening dialogue with the AES states and the Sahel again, addressing this with places like Algeria [3:00:35] and Morocco and Libya even, who share these concerns. Building those relationships are absolutely vital [3:00:40] because you cannot surge trust. If the chairman would indulge me, can I have a follow-up question on the [3:00:45] Sahel since he brought it up? Yes, why don't you do that? Thank you. We know since you brought up the [3:00:51] Sahel, but last month the JNIM and local militias in Mali executed coordinated nationwide offensive [3:00:57] attacks attacking Mali's capital, seizing the key towns, killing the Malayan defense minister, [3:01:03] though these attacks were greater in scale intensity than any other since 2012, and to clearly demonstrate [3:01:09] the attackers' ability to strike against an expansive geographical area. So you're talking a little [3:01:15] bit about the Sahel, but the permissive environment in the Sahel that's making these attacks possible, [3:01:21] and what more would you like to add if you want to speak a little bit more about instability there? [3:01:27] Senator, there are a few things I would like to add in this setting. I can talk to you more in a [3:01:31] classified setting that would be highly appropriate to this, but to your point, there is no effective [3:01:36] external counterterrorism effort in the Sahel right now. The Russians have claimed to do that, [3:01:42] but we saw that they had to withdraw from Qadal. We're unable to defend against that threat there. [3:01:47] They are providing some limited support, but we do not see the same Western presence. Because of that, [3:01:52] then how do we enable the partners, the other nations that are there, how do we look at expeditionary [3:01:57] capabilities again that we can result in this? One of the key areas that we would need some assistance [3:02:02] with is the authorities and ability to bring in an experiment with emerging technologies, [3:02:07] whether that's in the surveillance and ISR type of technologies or in other over the horizon type [3:02:12] capabilities, like I mentioned with the medicine and others, in order to reach when there is a threat [3:02:19] that threatens the homeland to be able to reach it and take care of it. But more importantly, continue [3:02:23] to enable the partners to address the threats in their local areas. And a lot of that's through [3:02:28] intelligent sharing. I would be happy in a classified environment to talk in more depth. [3:02:32] Thank you. I appreciate that. Thank you, Admiral General. Thank you, Chairman Wicker. [3:02:37] Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. And I'm glad you brought up Lebanon and Hezbollah. [3:02:45] So I'm going to take another round, Admiral Cooper. And stop me when I'm wrong. On March 2nd of this year, [3:02:57] Hezbollah attacked Israel in response to Operation Epic Fury. Is that correct? [3:03:06] That's correct, sir. According to Israel's foreign minister, Hezbollah has fired 10,000 missiles, [3:03:16] rockets and drones at Israel during the past two months. Is that correct? [3:03:19] I believe that's correct, sir. And in response to these attacks, Israel initiated a ground offensive [3:03:27] in southern Lebanon, aiming to create an uninhabited buffer zone along its northern border and border and [3:03:34] to push Hezbollah north to the Latini River. Is that correct? [3:03:41] That's correct, Senator. [3:03:43] To enable this operation, the Israeli military ordered the evacuation of southern Lebanon, [3:03:54] displacing over one million people, nearly 20% of Lebanon's population. That is also correct. [3:04:01] I don't know that that number specifically is correct, but the concept of the evacuation is correct. [3:04:08] While governments of Israel and Lebanon declared a ceasefire in April of this year, [3:04:19] Hezbollah Secretary General Naeem Qasem announced that his organization would not recognize the ceasefire [3:04:26] and would never agree to disarm. Is that correct? [3:04:31] His statement, that statement is correct. [3:04:32] Yeah, he made that statement. Hezbollah then continued to fire projectiles into Israel and [3:04:37] Israel has continued to strike Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon. That's also correct, isn't it? [3:04:42] That's correct, sir. And I think Senator Rosen would wholeheartedly agree with me that peace between [3:04:56] Israel, and I can't ask questions to my friend and colleague, but I think we would both agree that [3:05:04] peace between Israel and Lebanon would be a wonderful development and a wonderful development [3:05:09] government for America and for Israel. But peace between Israel and Lebanon depends on the Lebanese [3:05:20] government having both the capability and the will to disarm Hezbollah. Has the United States provided [3:05:29] the Lebanese armed forces with approximately three billion dollars since 2006? [3:05:34] So I'd have to take that specific volume, that specific number of the record and follow up. [3:05:41] But we have been providing aid for two decades. [3:05:44] Is it fair to say that the primary goal of U.S. support for the LAF, the Lebanese armed forces, [3:05:51] was to counter Hezbollah? [3:05:53] Yes, sir. [3:05:55] And from 2006 until 2023, is it accurate to say that Hezbollah's rocket and missile arsenal grew [3:06:04] from 2006 to 2023 from approximately 9,000 rockets and missiles to 150,000? [3:06:15] As a result of decades and billions of dollars in Iranian support? That's correct. [3:06:21] Israel's foreign minister alleges that Hezbollah fired more than 10,000 projectiles at Israel since the [3:06:35] beginning of March of this year. In light of the Lebanese armed forces in action, [3:06:45] was Israel's offensive into southern Lebanon military, militarily necessary, [3:06:51] if Hezbollah's attacks were going to be countered? Was there another way to do that? [3:06:57] Senator, I would really defer to Israel on intent and effectiveness, but just as a general statement. [3:07:03] Militarily necessary, though. It is an option among options, of which there are few, [3:07:10] to deal with the Hezbollah problem. I appreciate Senator Rosen bringing this up, [3:07:19] and just would go back to the central point. It would be a tremendous achievement for Israel, [3:07:29] Lebanon, the United States, and the Middle East if Hezbollah could be eliminated and allow the Lebanese [3:07:41] people and the Lebanese government to resume the happy relations that we once had and strive for [3:07:53] for between the United States and Lebanon. Would Senator Rosen have any further questions? [3:08:03] Then this concludes today's hearing. I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony, [3:08:10] and I would acknowledge that many of the arrows aimed at these two witnesses [3:08:19] witnesses were better aimed at people in the civilian leadership who, according to our great [3:08:30] constitution and our principles dating back to George Washington, are in control of policy, [3:08:39] and I would commend these two military veterans for adhering to that constitutional principle. And with that, [3:08:49] I would inform members that questions of the record will be due to the committee within two business days, [3:08:57] and we are adjourned.