CENTCOM Chief Admiral Brad Cooper Testifies on Iran War and U.S. Security Before Senate — AC1N

[0:09] strategic terrain between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. It's the world's supplier of critical [0:14] minerals for advanced defense system and home to 12 of the world's 20 fastest growing economies. [0:19] By 2050, it will account for a third of the global working age population. [0:25] Today, the epicenter of global terrorism is in Africa. ISIS leadership is African. Al-Qaeda's [0:33] economic engine is in Africa. Both of these groups share the will and intent to strike our homeland. [0:41] Their affiliates, once isolated nodes, now show increased connectivity. Just as concerning [0:47] is the nexus between Al-Qaeda's Al-Shabaab and the Iranian-sponsored Houthis. [0:53] AFRICOM is prioritizing willing and capable partners. We support partners with capabilities [0:58] that only the U.S. can bring. ISR, targeting, precision strike. These efforts have driven [1:05] ISIS leaders in Somalia underground, disrupting their command and control of the global ISIS network. [1:11] In West Africa, Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM has demonstrated increased capacity to control [1:16] key terrain in the Sahel, most notably by strangling fuel supplies around population centers. [1:21] The capture of a capital city would provide Al-Qaeda with all the trappings of a nation-state [1:26] to sponsor global terrorism. With a 75% reduction in our regional posture over the past decade, [1:33] compounded by the drawdown of our allies, we struggle with an intelligence black hole. [1:37] And without sufficient indicators and warnings, we risk being blind to the gathering dangers [1:42] and threats in the region. AFRICOM's lack of expeditionary capabilities and diminished [1:47] force posture compromise our crisis response. In a crisis, we can always surge assets, [1:52] but you cannot surge trust. Our reduced presence on the continent also allows disruptive actors to [2:00] drive the agenda, undercutting American interests, ensuring control over critical minerals and infrastructure, [2:07] potentially boxing us out of structure, potentially boxing us out of resources that energize our [2:12] industrial base. Africa also serves as Putin's purse where Russia exploits instability to extract [2:18] resources to include human lives to fuel its war machine. To contend with these threats, AFRICOM must [2:26] think and operate differently. With less than one-tenth of one percent of the department's budget, [2:31] we must maximize every taxpayer dollar to deliver an outsized return on investment. AFRICOM continues [2:37] to leverage low-cost, high-yield activities to amplify our impact on the continent. Programs like [2:42] the International Military Education and Training and the State Partnership Program are reliable force [2:47] multipliers that forge enduring relationships with African militaries and are proven models for [2:52] cost-effective burden sharing. The AFRICOM exercise program is emerging as a battle lab to test and [2:58] validate new technologies on behalf of both the joint force and our African partners. And finally, AFRICOM is [3:05] focused on the critical convergence of security and economics. Our efforts span all elements of [3:10] national power as we coordinate closely with state, commerce, energy, and treasury. The department's [3:16] new economic defense unit has been an invaluable partner. To defend the homeland and promote U.S. [3:22] interests and ensure effective crisis response, AFRICOM needs targeted investments in layered, [3:27] non-traditional ISR, innovative force protection, programs that enable willing and capable partners, [3:36] the opportunity to conduct experimentation of emerging technologies, and the ability to respond to [3:41] crisis at the time and point of need. Africa is a continent of opportunities, not only crises. [3:47] With the continued support of this committee, I can assure you that every dollar you authorize for AFRICOM [3:52] will contribute directly to the security, safety, and prosperity of the United States. Thank you. [3:59] I look forward to your questions. Well, thank you very much. Let's get right into Iran, Admiral Cooper. [4:08] And I think one of the basic questions is, was this exercise of hours, was this operation of hours [4:16] a war of choice or a war of necessity? Let me get your military perspective. Did Iran have enriched [4:25] uranium up to 6% prior to Operation Midnight Hammer? Yes, sir. They did. And is there a civilian [4:35] use at all for uranium that is enriched to 60%? There's not, Senator. Is it fair to say that Iran's [4:47] nuclear breakout time has been set back then, thanks to Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Epic Fury? [4:57] Without talking specifics, that's accurate, Senator. All right. And has Iran ever been [5:03] willing to curtail its ballistic missile program, ballistic missile program through negotiations? [5:09] They have not, sir. And then perhaps you can explain in some detail to what extent [5:18] Operation Epic Fury has set back Iran's ballistic missile program. To what extent you can tell us in [5:26] this open setting? Yes, sir. Senator, thank you. Thank you very much for that question. Our military [5:32] mission in Operation Epic Fury was crystal clear from the very outset and remained steady throughout. [5:38] The mission was to degrade Iran's ability to project power on its neighbors and U.S. interests. [5:44] It had three key components. Degrade Iran's ballistic missiles and the defense industrial base that [5:49] supports it. Degrade Iran's drones and the defense industrial base that supports that. And degrade their [5:57] Navy and the defense industrial base that supports that. In each of those categories, we met all of [6:02] the achievements. Each of those systems were significantly degraded. If I give you just a [6:08] couple of examples, the defense industrial base where their drones and their missiles and their Navy [6:14] were degraded by 90 percent. They have about 10 percent left. For the Navy, my military assessment would be [6:20] that the Navy will not begin to rebuild for five to 10 years. Many of you serve in states that build [6:26] ships. It's complex. It's particularly complex when you don't have an industrial base to build it. My [6:32] professional perspective on this also is that Iran would not return to the same level of drones left. [6:41] Are they exquisite or the sort of relatively inexpensive drones we've been hearing about? [6:50] Senator, thank you for this question. I think I'd like to use the opportunity to [6:54] to myth bust on drones. Okay. The days of $35,000 drones that we saw in the last couple of years, [7:00] particularly in the fight against the Houthis in Yemen, those days are behind us. Today, we face an [7:06] increased threat from drones that are highly sophisticated. They're jet powered. They have high-end [7:11] sensors. They have electronic warfare. They have signals intelligence. So, those days of using [7:17] high-value defenses to shoot down cheap targets are behind us. Quite the contrary, what we have been [7:23] doing lately is using our own low-cost one-way attack drones attacking Iran, making them use higher-end, [7:32] more expensive weapons. So, I can confidently tell you we have flipped the cost curve in many ways. [7:37] Always work to be done, but I like where we are in this regard. [7:40] Okay. And you know, there's been a lot of talk about part of the negotiations being [7:45] giving up the nuclear ambitions. But almost as important to me is the support of terrorist proxies. [7:57] So, has Iran ever been willing into support for the terrorist proxies, Hamas, Houthis, Hezbollah? [8:05] They have not, Senator. So, to what extent has this exercise, [8:11] this operation denied Iran resources for funding terrorism? [8:16] Senator, this has been a significant priority from the outset. And as we sit here today, [8:22] there are no resources and equipment that are flowing from Iran to Hamas, Hezbollah, [8:27] or the Houthis. Those transfer paths and methods have been cut off. [8:34] To the extent that that source of support has been cut off, [8:39] what are the other sources of support that these terrorist groups can look to? [8:45] I think some of those pieces are best discussed in a more classified environment, [8:50] but I think the key element of this is the main supplier of resources and training [8:56] for decades and billions of dollars. And we've seen all this before our very eyes. [9:01] Those pieces have been completely cut off today. [9:03] Thank you very much. We'll take another round. But at this point, I recognize the ranking member. [9:08] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [9:10] Admiral Cooper, is Iran militarily still able to inflict significant damage on infrastructure [9:21] of the surrounding countries in the Persian Gulf? [9:23] Senator, in this environment, what I would tell you is their capabilities have been [9:28] dramatically degraded. That certainly doesn't mean that they don't have anything left. [9:32] But the large-scale volleys that we've seen over the last couple of years, [9:37] Iran is no longer capable of executing those. [9:39] This would be less large-scale volleys and directed attacks on critical infrastructure, [9:46] which would set back petroleum production, or petroleum distribution, I would say, [9:54] even if the Strait of Hamoush is open. Does that capability still exist? [9:58] Capabilities across the board inside Iran still exist at a degraded scale. We've also planned [10:04] accordingly for each of these scenarios, if necessary, to deal with them from a defensive perspective. [10:09] So, would you characterize Iran as no longer a threat? [10:15] Iran has a significantly degraded threat, and they no longer threaten regional partners or the [10:23] United States in ways that they were able to do before. Across every – they threaten their partners. [10:31] It's a very large country. They have – partners. [10:33] It's a very large country. They have – they retain some mineral capability. That's correct, [10:38] and that's accurate. And, of course, we've accounted for that from a defensive perspective. [10:42] General Anderson, what's happened is that the administration recalled over 30 career ambassadors [10:50] in Africa, including – excuse me – over 30 career ambassadors overall, 12 in Africa. [10:57] The United States has only 14 confirmed ambassadors. In other words, 40 ambassadorial posts in Africa [11:05] are vacant or filled by charge affairs. Is it essential to your work to have fully functioning embassies [11:13] with ambassadors? Senator, we work very closely with all the embassies across the continent to pursue [11:21] and further American interests. And so, that relationship with these embassies is critical for AFRICOM's [11:27] effective engagement. But what about the ambassadors? [11:29] Yes, sir. So, the ambassadors do enjoy access. I think that that's important to have ambassadors in place, [11:37] because the hierarchical nature of many of the African countries is that if you're not an ambassador, [11:43] you don't always get access. And so, there is obviously benefit to that. And we coordinate [11:50] with them quite closely when we engage. Thank you very much, sir. You are combating [11:58] one of the most sophisticated information warfare operations we've seen in a long time from Russia. [12:05] What can we do to improve your ability to withstand this information operation and also to engage in [12:15] something on the same level by the United States? Yes, sir. I appreciate the recognition of this [12:23] concern because our adversaries are very active in the information domain. As you highlighted Russia, [12:28] I'd also say China is also very active in these domains. They use this to undercut not only our interest, [12:34] but undercut and disrupt the democracies that are in Africa. And this is an area that I've talked to [12:41] several of the leaders across, especially coastal West Africa, that are very concerned about the [12:45] Russian propaganda that is destabilizing their democracies. For me, we have a limited budget [12:53] that we are mostly in a reactive mode to respond to issues. What would be beneficial as one of the few [12:59] entities that looks across the entirety of the continent is a consistent budget that would allow [13:05] us to campaign in the information space? We coordinate very closely with State Department and [13:10] others on this and work with the embassies. But our ability to look across the continent [13:14] and highlight these things, I think, is an area where we could be of benefit to the American interest. [13:18] Thank you, sir. Admiral Cooper, one more question. Do we still maintain a relationship with the Syrian [13:25] Democratic Forces? Senator, we do have a nascent relationship with them. In the context of [13:34] evacuating the more than 5,700 ISIS prisoners from predominantly Northeast Syria to Iraq, a small [13:40] number of prisoners, mostly chronically ill and with multiple amputees, stayed in the primary prison [13:46] known as Hasakah. And SDF is today serving as the guards. Just a follow-on question. Do you detect any [13:55] kind of resentment or to our rapid departure from SDF? I think, Senator, we've had a long-standing [14:06] relationship with the SDF. The ceasefire that they have in place today with the Syrian government [14:12] remains in effect, and we remain engaged. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you. Thank you. Senator [14:17] Fisher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Admiral. General, thank you for your service. Admiral, [14:26] what did the Iranians' attempted missile attack on the island of Diego Garcia tell us about the [14:36] ballistic missile program and their intent to use it? Did it come as a surprise? Senator, [14:46] appropriate to talk in this forum, because there's clearly a classified component to this, I think [14:51] we've all heard publicly what Iran described as their self-imposed limitations on their missile force [14:58] the execution of that particular attempted strike, which failed, was twice the distance of what they [15:04] previously advertised that they said that they would self-constrained themselves to. [15:09] Thank you. And as you look at the total operation, the conflict there, what lessons have you learned [15:17] from that? And how have you used those lessons thus far to ensure that your command is prepared for the [15:25] fight that we have today? Senator, thank you very much for this. It's fair to say that we have captured [15:31] thousands of lessons, mostly tactical. I think there's no military in the world that makes adjustments [15:37] as well as the United States military does. And whether they were in stride tactically, with a lot of [15:43] support from organizations back in the United States, or they're more at the operational level, we took a very [15:48] hard look inward to see where can we improve our defenses. Force protection and protecting our [15:54] people is my number one priority. We focused on that first, made a significant number of adjustments to [16:00] enhance what was already a very effective air defense umbrella. And that's where we are predominantly [16:06] focused, as well as putting ourselves in a position to meet a wide range. Anderson, ISIS is on the rise in [16:18] Africa, and you've been very, very clear about that. How is your command working with our partners in order to [16:25] address that? Senator, you are correct. ISIS is putting a concerted effort in this establishment on the continent. [16:35] We have been working very closely with willing partners who have been willing to address this threat. So, two examples of the [16:39] that in northern Somalia, working with the Somali and the Putlan forces there to go up into those mountains. [16:48] What has been key there to putting pressure and isolating the ISIS leadership there is the [16:53] partners' ability to stay in those mountains. And so, our partnership to provide them the intelligence, [16:58] some training, and some limited logistics that allow them to stay, is helping isolate that leadership [17:03] node in Somalia. We've also been working very closely with Nigeria, who is in the last few months [17:09] opened up with a very positive engagement with intel sharing and ability to go after and target some [17:17] of these terrorist threats that are in northern Nigeria. And so, that has been a positive area [17:22] that we've seen, as well. We would like to reestablish some pragmatic relationships in the Sahel, where [17:28] ISIS also has a stronghold, where they are currently holding an American hostage in order to gain better [17:34] access. And that's an area we need to continue to improve, to work with those partners for a intel [17:39] sharing and understanding of what that threat is there. But we are working very deliberately with [17:44] our partners to address these common threats. Do you feel that you're appropriately resourced to [17:49] address these threats? We have the minimum necessary resources in order to address the threats. In order [17:58] to do this, because of the size of the continent and the complexity of those attacks, [18:02] or of those threats, in order to thwart these, we have to shift resources. And that entails taking [18:07] some risk in those other areas in order to address the primary efforts. [18:15] I'd like to have you address some of the connections that we see with the drug cartels, [18:22] with the terror groups. Can you elaborate on those, especially with regards to the Central and South [18:29] American cartels? Yes, Senator. That's an area that is emerging that is causing us great concern. [18:37] So two points to that. Recently, there was a interdiction based on some intelligence that we [18:42] were able to provide that the Spanish interdicted a shipment of cocaine that was 35 tons of cocaine. [18:50] We believe that's about a billion dollars of street value. We believe that's the largest interdiction [18:54] in history. That came out of South America. It was transiting along the west coast of Africa [19:00] towards another location that I could talk about in a classified environment. [19:05] And so we're seeing more of that drug trafficking coming in. And the terrorist organizations are [19:10] helping transit that. They're getting payments through that. And there's a symbiotic relationship [19:14] that that money then comes back to our hemisphere, to those drug cartels, but also helps provide fuel [19:21] for those terrorists. Another area that I think is important to highlight is that in the last 18 to 24 [19:28] months, we have assisted in or at least tipped off many partner nations to drug activities and labs in [19:35] their country. In this time, 11 of the 12 drug labs that have been interdicted have had Mexican cartel [19:43] members on site to include the largest drug lab that had ever been disrupted in South Africa, [19:49] that there were Sinaloa cartel members on site. And so they are actually doing production now in Africa, [19:55] as well as the transit of that across the continent. So we're watching this develop, [20:00] and it's of concern as this fuels both the terrorists and the cartels. [20:03] What's the destination of those drugs? [20:06] Those drugs are destined for the Middle East, for Europe, but we're also seeing them then come in [20:12] through the northern route back into America. As we have applied pressure on the southern border, [20:16] they're finding other means to bring those drugs into our nation. [20:20] Thank you. [20:21] Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Blumenthal. [20:25] Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here. Thank you for your [20:30] extraordinary service in a difficult time. General Anderson, I want to express my condolences to you [20:37] and your team and the families of Lieutenant Kendrick Lamont and Specialist Maria Collington. [20:46] The Army's lost two young patriots and dedicated man and woman, and I'm certain that the recovery [20:57] mission was difficult. And I want to commend your team for bringing closure to their families. [21:03] Admiral, there's been public reporting that Iran continues to have as much as 70 to 75 percent [21:16] of its missiles and launchers available to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. [21:24] Does that reporting conform roughly with your estimate as to Iran's continuing strength? [21:34] Senator, thank you for the question. And first, thank you for your time. These past few days, [21:38] it's been meaningful and very much appreciated. I think it's appropriate in this forum. My perspective [21:45] is the numbers that I've seen in open source are not accurate. I've seen in open source are not [21:49] accurate. I think what also is not taken into consideration is more than just the numbers. It's [21:55] the command and control that's been shattered. It's a significant degradation and capability, [22:01] and it's the lack of any ability to then produce any missiles or drones on the back end. I think [22:07] we have to take a holistic look at that, but that's what we've done. [22:10] But regardless of what the numbers are, Iran continues to pose a significant threat to shipping [22:18] because it has missiles and fast boats and other assets that are available to attack shipping in [22:25] the area, correct? Senator, all in each of those cases, [22:30] their capability have been significantly degraded. If I just use my own professional experience [22:35] and 100 transits through the Strait of Hormuz, you would typically see 20 to 40 fast boats, [22:41] and lately we've seen two or three. So the degradation means it's been super, it's been [22:48] significant, but some residual capability does exist. With respect to the threat that remains, [22:58] your forces were successful in Project Freedom in enabling ships to go through the Strait, correct? [23:05] That's correct, sir. And Project Freedom was stopped for what reason? [23:14] Senator, I think I'll look back a couple of days ago on the Chairman of the Joint Chief's testimony [23:18] before the Senate Appropriations Committee. I think he characterized it well. The situation [23:23] in the Strait of Hormuz is rather complex these days, and I would offer just these quick points. [23:33] First and foremost, the United States controls via our blockade, which I'd be happy to talk about, [23:40] the overall flow of commerce going into and out of Iran. The Iranian capability to stop commerce has [23:46] been dramatically degraded through the Straits, but their voice is very loud, and those threats are [23:52] clearly heard by the merchant industry and the insurance industry. Those are factors, [23:57] they're certainly factors in energy, and on top of all that- [24:01] But Project, and I apologize for interrupting, but I'm going to run out of time, as you [24:05] understand. I think the point that I want to make here is that Project Freedom could be started again, [24:14] and the voices of the Iranians, large as they are, could be contradicted or reduced in impact if Project [24:26] Freedom were ongoing and the world could see that shipping was going through the Straits. Am I off base [24:34] in that view? Senator, there's a wide range on anything having to do specifically with the Strait of [24:42] Hormuz, particularly during this time, Strait of Hormuz, particularly during this time of sensitive [24:46] negotiations, where it's front and center in the negotiations. And have you seen any progress in [24:54] those negotiations? Senator, I'd refer to the diplomats and the team engaged in the negotiations. [25:01] Let me ask you, in the time that I have left, one of the objectives that President Trump articulated at [25:10] the beginning of this war, which in my view could not be accomplished with bombing, was to secure the [25:17] enriched uranium. Would you agree that taking possession of that uranium would require boots on [25:29] the ground and significant casualties for United States forces? Senator, in this particular forum, I think [25:36] it would be highly inappropriate, given the classified nature of any contingencies, to talk about the [25:42] nuclear program. Well, let me just finish by making the observation that you have, I think, sought to be [25:50] forthcoming to the committee in the classified setting where we had an earlier conversation that the vast [26:02] majority of what you told us, the vast majority of what you told us, should also be told to the American [26:09] people. They deserve to know. And our adversaries know a lot of what we know. The ones who really don't know [26:20] are the American people, and they deserve more information, which is not a criticism of you. It is [26:27] of the system which causes the withholding of this information and the administration, which has refused [26:36] to provide figures as to the costs of the war and other details that are relevant and important for the [26:45] American people to know. So I'm hopeful that we can have a way to make more information available to [26:54] the American people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Cooper, during the brief time of Project Freedom, [27:05] before it was closed off again, did we, can you say in this setting whether or not our- Senator, [27:22] thank you for this, very much appreciated. Senator, thank you for this, very much appreciated. [27:26] As has been publicly highlighted, the first two ships to flow from the Arabian Gulf from the western part [27:35] into the east through the Strait of Hormuz were U.S. flagged vessels that was successfully executed. [27:42] And U.S. Navy destroyers then came into the Arabian Gulf, operated for a number of days, [27:47] and then as you subsequently saw, float out of the Arabian Gulf. [27:50] Okay, so Senator Blumenthal's question presumed that, that you could give in public your judgment [27:59] as to whether, whether the United States is capable of doing that again. [28:05] Senator, there's a, there's a military component of this, and then there's also a policy component [28:09] that I believe to the policy makers. But from the military standpoint, we could, [28:15] we could do that again, could we not? We just did it last week. [28:20] Thank you. Senator Ernst, I believe. [28:23] Thank you, Mr. Chair. And gentlemen, thank you for being here today and to your teams as well. [28:28] We truly appreciate your service and dedication to our nation. And I also want to acknowledge the loss [28:35] of the two individuals in Morocco and thank our Moroccan partners as well for their contribution [28:43] in the recovery efforts. I do want to recognize Admiral Cooper, those that we have lost during [28:50] this current operation or the former operation Epic Fury, as well as the two Iowa National Guardsmen [28:57] that we lost in Syria this last December. We have also more than 380 who have been wounded [29:03] in this fight. So for all of those service members that have given so much and to their families, [29:10] they will not be forgotten. The operations that have been conducted against Iran and its proxies [29:16] across the Central Command AOR wouldn't have been possible without some really tremendous partners [29:24] in that region. And we have seen a large burden borne by Israel and Jordan. We've seen assistance coming [29:34] from Bahrain and UAE, who has taken a significant amount of incoming fire, Saudi Arabia, Qatar. [29:44] They haven't all been passive bystanders. They've been actively engaged. So they have contributed to [29:50] every line of effort and we appreciate them contributing to our successes. We can't overstate [29:58] cooperations have meant operationally to us. So operationally to us. So Admiral Cooper, what is the one, [30:08] maybe two things that you want all of us to understand as we walk out of this hearing, [30:15] knowing about what our allies have assisted with in this fight? Senator, first, thank you for the [30:23] question and thank you for your leadership. And thank you for all that has been done by the great [30:27] men and women from your state. They've played an outsized role. So thank you for that. Thank you. [30:32] In terms of our partners, I think a key feature is we have enhanced middle to middle relationships across [30:39] the board in the Middle East. As we sit here right now, we have five specific partner nations who are [30:46] not just conceptually side by side, but literally side by side with the United States in defense. The United [30:53] Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Over the course of epic fury, they defended [31:01] themselves and they defended Americans. In addition to those key allies, everything that we've accomplished [31:07] would have been impossible without the Kingdom of Jordan. And clearly we were operating very closely [31:13] with the State of Israel. I think that group in particular should be commended. They didn't just [31:17] execute missions. They served side by side with Americans and protected Americans. Thank you. [31:22] And this takes years to develop those friendships, those relationships, the mill to mill work that [31:29] you do. Is that correct? It does. There's the mill to mill work. There's the friendships. It's all [31:34] about bringing these together. And the air defense umbrella that's been created has been in concept [31:39] for the better part of a decade and a half, now fully realized. And again, I just want to reiterate that [31:45] we have such tremendous partnerships with so many of those nations, and we thank them for that. [31:52] I'll move to AFRICOM now, General Anderson. Over the past couple of years, the U.S. has been withdrawing [31:58] forces from a number of countries, including Niger, Mali, and Chad. And Russia's African Corps has moved [32:08] in to fill that vacuum. Where we don't exist, others will. But just a few weeks ago, they retreated from [32:16] Qidal Mali under fire. They had surrendered to the very militants that they were sent to defeat. [32:24] So we have some really interesting dynamics going on in that region. And AFRICOM is left with the [32:32] responsibility for a lot more high risk, high threat posts than any other combatant command in the world. [32:39] So walk us through just very briefly what AFRICOM cannot do today that it could five years ago. [32:47] Well, Senator, I think there's one very poignant example that I can use very quickly is that [32:56] five years ago, as a commander of Special Operations Command Africa, Philip Walton was taken hostage in [33:00] Niger and transported by bandits who were prepared to be sold to terrorist organization. We were able to [33:06] identify him in 24 hours. We were able to pinpoint his location within 48. He was rescued in less than 96. [33:12] That was largely due to the access that we had, also the partnerships and the relationships that we [33:17] enjoyed. Today, Kevin Rideout is on day 205 of captivity, largely because we don't have the access [33:25] that we had before and the relationships that are necessary. And that posture reduction has been [33:30] difficult. And he was also taken out of Niameh. Unfortunately, he was then sold by the bandits to [33:35] ISIS and is being held there today. And thank you for that. And Mr. Chairman, I just want folks to [33:41] understand the lack of presence that we have in AFRICOM and that exact difference. So thank you, [33:49] General Anderson, for a very, very specific example of what a lack of presence has meant. Thank you, [33:57] Senator Ernst. There's a there's a proposal for substantially more funding for your command. Is [34:04] that right, General Anderson? Senator, that is correct. The presidential budget significantly [34:11] increases our budget and addresses some of these key concerns. Well, that that one example you just [34:17] gave, would that be addressed by these proposed additional? So not entirely, Senator, because the [34:24] access and relationships are what were key there. But we do, because of this, because of that lack of [34:29] posture, need more investment expeditionary capabilities. And that is being addressed in the proposed [34:35] budget. But those that those relationships that the center highlight and maintaining those [34:41] relationships are absolutely critical because you cannot surge trust in the time of need. [34:45] Okay, well, you and I have gone back and forth about unfunded requirements. And so I guess your [34:50] testimony is, is that that's not a matter of funding. It's just a matter of relationships. [34:58] Senator, that is a matter of relationships. The funding that we would ask for that would [35:04] encourage that would help us is the contingency response ability expeditionary, but also some [35:10] targeted programs to work with key partners who are willing and able to address the threat [35:15] to increase their capability and capacity to do that. So those are the investments. Those are all [35:20] included in the proposed budget. So right now, I don't have many, very well, very well. Senator Cain. [35:27] Thank you, Mr. Chair. And to our witnesses, President Trump's decision to unilaterally take [35:33] the United States into a war with Iran is deeply unpopular in Virginia. We are a very pro-military [35:40] state, a very pro-military state. And as I've traveled around Virginia and talked to Virginians, [35:46] the unpopularity sort of gets crystallized into, have we learned nothing from 25 years of war [35:52] in the region? 14,000 American troops and contractors died in the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, [35:58] more than 65,000 injured, $8 trillion spent. And Virginians who've watched their friends and family [36:05] repeatedly deployed over the last quarter century have grave concerns about what was accomplished [36:11] and was the sacrifice worth it. Our troops sacrificed so bravely. Chief Warrant Officer Robert Marzon, [36:19] one of the 14 who have died in Epic Fury, Spotsylvania County, Virginia. Our forward carrier strike [36:25] group just returned longest post-Vietnam deployment of any carrier. Our folks sacrifice. They want [36:33] civilian leaders to make the right decisions about whether and when and how they should sacrifice. [36:39] And there's deep concern that in this instance, the decision is a wrong one. Part of it is a failure [36:47] to really grapple with history. In the hearings in this committee, I've heard over and over again, [36:51] and I've heard the president and secretary of defense talk about Iran's bad actions since 1979. [36:57] And everything that's been said about Iran's bad actions are true. But there's a lot of the story [37:03] that folks don't talk about. History didn't begin in 1979. Iran and the United States were allies in [37:08] World War II. One of the pivotal events in World War II was the Tehran Conference, where President [37:14] Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin met in Tehran to guarantee Iran independence, stable borders, [37:21] and sovereignty. Iran loved the United States. The United States led a coup to topple the democratically [37:30] elected government of Iran in 1953 during the Eisenhower administration. The United States [37:36] propped up a dictatorship, the Shah of Iran, trained the secret police, the Savak that tortured, exiled, [37:44] imprisoned, killed Iranians by the thousands. And 26 years after that, there was a revolution, 1979. [37:52] And yes, then it was death to America. The U.S. funding a dictatorship and toppling a democratic [37:58] elected government led to an Iran that has been very hostile. And all the events my colleagues have [38:04] talked about since then are accurate. But just as Iran seized our embassy in violation of international [38:11] law, then the United States funded Saddam Hussein for Iraq to wage war against Iran in the 1980s, [38:18] killing hundreds of thousands of Iranians. And just as Iran funded proxies that bombed a marine barracks [38:24] on our embassy in Beirut in 1989, killing 290 civilians. And the U.S. invaded Iran's next-door [38:35] neighbors to topple their government. And then, yes, Iranians attacked U.S. troops arrayed near their [38:40] border. And we've attacked and killed their leadership. I'm not saying that Iran is good. Iran is [38:48] horrible. Horrible to its neighbors, horrible to people outside its borders, and even worse to its [38:54] own people. But if you ignore the history of the back and forth between the U.S. and Iran, [38:59] you will not get this right. If more war between the U.S. and Iran were the answer, [39:04] we would have found the answer sometime between 1953 and now. Here's something I think it's important [39:11] for my colleagues to know. We did look for a path, a diplomatic path, to end this hostility that's [39:19] been going on since 1953. And President Trump tore up a diplomatic deal over the advice of his [39:26] Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. And many of us said at the time, if you do this, it is [39:33] likely to leave inevitable. And I believe the troops who have been killed in Epic Fury would be [39:39] alive today if the United States had not decided to abandon a diplomatic deal. Admiral Cooper and to my [39:48] colleagues on the committee, here's something that's pretty amazing that we shouldn't settle for. [39:53] The administration is refusing to allow members of this committee to see the OLC opinion stating the [40:00] legal case for war. We've always had the ability. We're armed services members. We're being asked to fund a [40:07] $1.5 trillion budget, but our request of the DOJ to see the OLC opinion justifying this war. They have [40:15] refused to allow members of the armed services committee to see it. U.S. senators, appropriators, [40:22] we're not allowed to see it. What are they hiding? If they will not allow us to see the legal rationale for [40:31] the war, what are they hiding? And Mr. Charles just concluded and say, I hope we might as a committee, [40:37] whatever our agreements about the wisdom or the legality of the war, I hope we might as a committee [40:43] agree that we should at least in a classified setting be able to read the legal opinion upon [40:49] which this entire 76-day war is based. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Yes. Thank you, Senator. You have [41:02] made a statement that raises questions that these two witnesses are unable to answer because you've asked, [41:10] you've raised policy questions. And so just for the benefit of those listening in, [41:16] we have had the civilian leadership before this committee to answer questions like that. And [41:24] these two gentlemen would have to decline. If you had stated that in the form of a question, [41:31] they would have to decline to answer because that is a matter of policy. Who is next? Senator Moody. [41:41] You're recognized. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for being here today. [41:49] Admiral Cooper, General Anderson, thank you for your leadership to the men and women of CENTCOM and [41:53] AFRICOM. Thank you for everything that you have have done over the course of your careers and are [41:59] continuing to do to serve our country. And I see there are so many men and women with you behind [42:03] you to support these efforts today to speak with us, to meet with us, to answer our questions. [42:09] I know a lot of preparation goes into that. And so I thank you as well. Admiral Cooper, the fight [42:14] you're leading certainly with CENTCOM under your command. I'm always proud to say that that is from [42:22] my home based in my home county in Florida, Hillsborough County, Florida. That's where I was born and raised. [42:27] It's been there since 1983, 43 years of commanding operations like we're involved in today. So, [42:36] proud to have you here, sir. Florida is so involved from SOCOM, Space Forces Central, Patrick Space Force [42:44] Base, Cape Canaveral. We're both the command hub and launch pad for most all conflict. So we are proud [42:52] to be that, proud to be a stakeholder in everything that's done within the military. And so on behalf of [42:58] all the service members in Florida, civilian and their families, we want to say thank you to them. [43:05] You know, I am the newest member of this committee. It's always interesting to me to hear the different [43:10] perspectives from other members on this committee. You would think from some of the questioning [43:15] previously that the United States willy-nilly abandoned all diplomatic efforts. Didn't think [43:21] through that. There was no justification. And I'm wondering, I know, if you could tell me, [43:29] Admiral Cooper, what is your background working with CENTCOM and all of the leadership positions you've [43:33] held? Senator, first, thank you for the question. And thanks for your time yesterday. And thanks [43:40] for your leadership. Thousands of Floridians are serving in the Middle East today, and they're [43:45] serving honorably and well. And what specifically have been your roles with CENTCOM? [43:49] I've been focused on the Middle East for the last five years, three years of which we're serving [43:54] in Bahrain as the fleet commander, and then about 16 months as the deputy commander prior to my current [44:00] position. And how long have you been familiar with Iran and its leadership and its [44:07] attacks against the United States? I've studied or been a part of it for the better part of three [44:12] decades, particularly acutely, in the last five years. And leading up to February 28th, [44:20] months prior to that, what was jarring to you that you saw different than what had been for those many [44:27] decades that you've been involved? I think it's important to note just in the 30 months before [44:32] Epic Fury commenced, Iran and its proxies had been attacking U.S. service members and diplomats [44:38] about 350 times. Can you repeat that? About every third day, Iran and its proxies [44:44] attacked American service members 350 times in the Middle East. I don't think that Americans were [44:49] aware of that, that in the 30 months that they had attacked Americans or their service members 350 [44:56] times. Does that surprise you that I would say that? That I don't believe that everyday American [45:01] going to work knew that? It's disappointing, but between the actions of proxies in Iraq and Syria, [45:09] as well as the Houthis, that's simply the fact of what happened. And in the months leading up to [45:14] that decision, that very serious decision on February 28th, what were your concerns regarding the [45:20] proliferation of missiles or the ability of the United States to do anything if that nuclear threat [45:26] escalated? Senator, in this venue, what I would say is, since our number one priority is to prevent [45:33] a nuclear-capable Iran, I always, every day, focused on that problem. But what we saw in the weeks and [45:39] months leading up to Epic Fury was an increase in the production capability of ballistic missiles, [45:46] which presented a very significant risk both to the partners and ourselves. And this is why it was part [45:51] of our military objectives to eliminate those missiles and equally, if not more importantly, [45:56] eliminate the ability for Iran to generate any more- And those couple of months leading right [45:59] up until that, you saw a dramatic escalation in that ability on Iran's part? That's correct. Between [46:05] starting in about November and December, you started to see an increase in Iran's capability [46:11] and intent to produce more ballistic missiles. And if we couldn't have neutralized that threat [46:17] diplomatically, does there come a point where that's not an option anymore, where there may be a [46:21] slippery slope where we can't get back to our ability to be effective to quell that threat? [46:27] Without crossing into classified lanes, the short answer is yes. Iran has a large- [46:33] had a large-scale capability to produce ballistic missiles beyond which could potentially be defended. [46:40] I think that's a very important point. The second point is that capability has been virtually eliminated. [46:45] And I believe I heard you say at this point, you believe Epic Fury has satisfied its mission? [46:49] Senator, we met every military objective for Epic Fury. [46:53] And what is the difference between where we were on the 28th of February and right now? [46:58] If I used a couple of examples, the Iranian Navy went from harassing throughout the region and [47:04] being a regional power to having no Navy. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Moody. Senator King. [47:12] Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, you mentioned, you used the word myth-busting a few minutes [47:17] ago. And I have to do a little myth-busting. It's sort of a common rhetoric today that no administration [47:24] prior to this one has confronted the threats of Iran. In fact, the most effective confrontation with [47:31] the threat from Iran, the nuclear threat, was during President Obama's administration with the JCPOA. [47:37] I would point out that at the time that President Trump tore up, unilaterally tore up, [47:43] the nuclear agreement with Iran, Iran had zero highly enriched uranium. As you know, today, [47:52] one of the focuses of this whole enterprise is 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium [47:58] that's in place in Iran that was produced since the unilateral dissolution of the JCPOA. [48:06] The idea that nobody ever confronted this problem is just not true. And we're now confronting a problem [48:14] a problem that was created by the abandonment of the JCPOA, which is the most comprehensive nuclear [48:19] control agreement ever and the most highly inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency in world [48:28] history. So we're confronted with a problem now that in many ways this administration created in 2018 [48:37] by abandoning this agreement. Let me move on. Do we have any clarity now as to who's in charge in Iran? [48:47] Do we know who has the power to negotiate and make agreements? [48:55] Senator, the negotiations themselves are held via diplomatic channels, and I would really refer to [49:00] the diplomats to address that. But clearly, from a military perspective, their command control was [49:05] significantly fractured as a result of our strikes in Operation Epic Fury. [49:08] And command and control is another way of saying their leadership. There's a communications [49:14] difficulty. Is the IRGC in charge at this point? [49:18] The IRGC is exercising significant authority. [49:25] General Anderson, talk to me about the loss of soft power in Africa, our abandonment of USAID and what's [49:35] happened with the Chinese and the Russians that my understanding is are now filling that gap [49:41] in addition to the other aggressive actions that they're taking. [49:45] Senator, I would say that we look at all facets of national power and how to bring those to bear [49:52] on the continent in order to provide security outcomes. Oftentimes- [49:57] We've taken one facet of our national power off the table, unilaterally, for no apparent reason. [50:02] Senator, the whim of Elon Musk. Senator, we work very closely with state, [50:10] with commerce and energy in order to look at the security requirements on the continent. [50:15] I have a Foreign Service Commercial Officer joining my staff this summer along with a liaison from [50:19] Department of Energy in order to look at economic opportunities. [50:21] Senator, is it not that we have essentially left all of the role that USAID played [50:28] on the continent? That's gone. Isn't that a yes or no question? [50:33] Senator, there are still aid programs that are active on the continent. They are much reduced [50:38] from what they were before. [50:39] Senator, much reduced. That's a fair way of stating it. You mentioned earlier that the [50:45] Al Qaeda and ISIS have resurged in Africa. The term epicenter has been used several times of world [50:53] terrorism. You used the term, you said they have the will and intent to attack the homeland. My [51:01] question is, do they have the capacity? Are they developing weapons, strategies, other ways to take [51:11] that will and intent and turn it into something of imminent danger to the American people? [51:17] Senator, that is the exact issue that is my top concern is for being able to provide. They have [51:22] the assets necessary to provide the indication warnings to know and be able to identify when [51:27] they shift that will intent to have to have the capacity and capability. That is something that is [51:32] very difficult for us to ascertain in the Sahel right now, given our limited posture. [51:36] That was going to be my follow-up question is, do we have the capacity to [51:41] determine their capacity? It sounds like you just said we don't have the capacity that we should [51:47] have or need. Senator, that's why in the president's [51:52] bucket we have asked for additional intelligent surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and [51:56] why we're also looking at a layered approach to look at everything from surface to space, [52:01] to look at commercial assets, to look at emerging technologies, open source as well, and use these [52:06] technologies, especially artificial intelligence, in order to fuse these multiple different types [52:11] of layered ISR, in order to gain that understanding and illuminate this black hole of intelligence in [52:16] the Sahel. We cannot sustainably afford to do that solely with airborne ISR, so we have to look at a [52:22] multi-faceted approach. There are some very promising emerging technologies that we are looking into [52:28] and that are affordable and sustainable and that also can work with our partners. Because one of the key [52:33] points to this is this is not necessarily ours to action, so having that intelligence that we can share with [52:40] partners so they can then action those on a mutual threat is going to be key to our future. But being [52:46] able to understand that is the number one priority of the command and where we are looking at investing [52:51] with emerging technology. And I think as you testified, if they take over the capital of Bali, [52:55] that's a very dangerous moment. That would be a game changer, I believe, in how they would [53:02] be viewed internationally and what attraction they would be then, I think, to other adherents. [53:07] Thank you. Thank you. How would that affect Americans, General? [53:10] Well, I think that would then give momentum to these terrorist organizations that have the will [53:15] and intent and it would allow them to then start moving towards the capability and capacities that [53:19] Senator King just mentioned. And so that then, I think, poses a threat in the long term to the [53:24] United States as they continue to develop this. We know that they have not given up this intent [53:29] and it's just a matter of having the time and space to develop them. [53:32] And it would be Vladimir Putin that would be happiest about this. Is that correct? [53:37] The prudent at what, sir? [53:38] That it would be President Vladimir Putin who would rejoice at such a contingency. [53:48] Or would it be Xi Jinping? [53:50] I can't speak for what either one of those leaders would believe, [53:54] but I think that they would be able to parlay that to their interests. [53:58] Well, who's financing this contingency? [54:01] If they're gaining, they're through lots of illicit materials. So it's not lots of illicit [54:08] materials. So it's not necessarily directly from a state actor. They're working with, [54:12] as I mentioned earlier, the narco terrorist trafficking. They're doing this through [54:16] kidnap for ransom. They're doing this for other legal smuggling. They even do have their own taxation [54:22] networks in the territories that they control where they generate millions of dollars. [54:25] And before I turn to Senator Scott, with regard to the funds that we're not spending anymore on USAID, [54:35] but have been supplemented elsewhere, in terms of dollars, let's talk in terms of U.S. dollar [54:45] equivalents. How does the food aid, health aid, and development aid that we're currently delivering [54:58] in your jurisdiction compare to what China and Russia are doing? [55:05] Senator, I don't have those exact numbers. I'd have to get back to you on those, as those are [55:13] often in other departments, other agencies within the government. But we can look into that for you [55:17] and look at what that comparison is. Okay. Well, if you would, then supplement [55:21] that on the record for us, because I don't know the answer either. Senator Scott. [55:28] Thank you, Chairman. Thank both of you for your service and all the men and women that work for [55:33] you. Admiral Cooper, I know this is not a classified setting, but can you talk a little bit about [55:39] what other countries have done to help us, either with intelligence or with military capabilities, [55:44] and I don't know whether you want to do this or not, some that you would like to have done more? [55:50] Senator, I think the most prominent seven countries that have been most helpful and served side by [55:58] side are five of the six GCC countries, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Also, [56:05] indispensable in our effort has been the Kingdom of Jordan, and clearly Israel, with whom we conducted [56:10] the strikes. We're always eager to expand partnerships. There's a couple that I think I could address in a [56:16] classified setting that were less than stellar. And do you feel like we've been a great partner [56:22] to them in helping them build up their capabilities over the last 20 years or so? [56:27] Senator, I think it's been an excellent two-way street, and if I look at mill-to-mill relationships, [56:32] it's been very strong. I'd simply highlight the result of years of effort in collaboration and [56:37] partnership, but our partners literally side by side with Patriot defenses, with our partners [56:43] defending Americans. I think that sends a lot. I think that sends a good signal and says a lot. [56:47] So I think Senator Wicker asked you some questions about drones. We had a meeting the other day and [56:55] the individual came in and said that Ukraine is building five million drones a year. [57:00] And so they probably are ahead of most people because they've had to because of war they're in. [57:06] So can you talk about are we where we need to be with drone technology? Are we using it everywhere we [57:13] can? Are we using are we where we need to be with regard with regard to drone defense capabilities? [57:20] Can you just talk a little bit more about that? Yes, Senator. First, I would say that the secretary [57:26] and the department's focus on drone domination. Drone dominance has really kick-started our capabilities [57:33] and flowed more capabilities into the region much faster than we had seen before. And many of those [57:39] capabilities have now been proven in combat. I think in a classified setting, I'd like to tell you [57:43] what that looked like. But as we sit here today, we have drone capabilities in the air, on the sea, [57:48] and under the sea as a result of this initiative. Do you have any feel for whether the impact you've [57:54] had on Iran has impacted their ability to help Russia in their war against Ukraine? So I think best to [58:02] discuss that in a classified setting. Clearly, Iran and Russia have had a years long relationship, [58:08] particularly when it comes to drones. So what are you most proud of? What are you most proud of that [58:13] you've accomplished since you've had this role? Absolutely. Number one, two, and three. I'm most [58:19] proud of the men and women who executed an extraordinarily complex mission, the first major [58:25] combat operations that the United States has seen in a generation establishing, in my mind, the latest, [58:30] greatest generation of American warriors. Same question, General Anderson. What are you most proud [58:35] of that you've accomplished so far? Senator, I think I would agree with Admiral Cooper that it's [58:44] the men and women of the very small footprint and very small amount of resources punch way above their [58:50] weight class and have outsized impacts on the continent. What we just did an African line in [58:54] Morocco was significant in our largest exercise on the continent of bringing over 40 nations together [59:01] to include over three dozen African countries and nations as far away as Brazil and Japan. That ability to [59:07] convene is one of the great powers of the United States and it differentiates us from many others. [59:12] So I am proud of the fact that we can do that and that we cannot just pursue our own readiness, [59:17] but actually bring multiple nations together to address common threats. Thanks both of you. And [59:22] thanks to all the men and women that work for you. Thank you very much, Senator. We have Shaheen and then Hirono. [59:29] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, thank you to both of you for being here [59:33] and for your service. I wanted to pick up on Senator King's questions about the closing of so much of [59:44] our foreign assistance in Africa, General Anderson. And Senator Wicker asked what we're seeing in terms [59:50] of China. I have a couple of examples that I think are worth pointing out how much that has meant in [59:58] terms of China's ability to make inroads because China has actually eclipsed Russia as the largest weapons [1:00:05] exporter to sub-Saharan Africa, which I'm sure you're aware of. And 70 percent of all African [1:00:11] armies now operate vehicles from the PRC as opposed to the United States. Beijing's looking to expand [1:00:19] military grants, training and joint exercises between the PRC and African countries. And we don't have [1:00:27] the kind of foreign assistance soft power that we did before the elimination of USAID. But you mentioned, [1:00:38] General Anderson, that you've taken on a foreign commercial service officer, which I think is a [1:00:44] really interesting idea. And as you're aware, I'm sure, at Indopaycom, Admiral Paparo has really [1:00:51] used this to good advantage, coordinating with the State Department, with the Development Finance [1:00:55] Corporation, with the U.S. Trade Development Agency, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, [1:01:00] to identify potential projects to work on in that AOR. So, can you talk a little bit more about how [1:01:08] you're identifying development projects and whether you need any other authorizations from Congress or [1:01:14] support for this effort from us so that you can help implement the kind of coordination that's going on [1:01:21] in Indopaycom? Senator, yes, I very much appreciate your interest here because this is an area I think [1:01:28] is emerging on the continent. With just the demographics of the continent and the growing [1:01:33] economies, being able to identify the intersection of security and economics is absolutely vital. [1:01:39] All of the agencies you mentioned are ones that we are coordinating with to make sure that [1:01:42] those investments go into the continent and have the greatest effect. But they're also informed by what [1:01:47] are the security implications. So, sometimes it may not have the same economic return, [1:01:51] but that return may come in security. And that's where we come in is being able to convene some of [1:01:56] these different agencies as well as private industry to be able to articulate what those security concerns [1:02:01] are, what those implications are, and then also the fact that we are able to execute exercises and other [1:02:06] things around the continent helps go into the calculus of those investments and buy down some of that risk. [1:02:11] So, that is what we are looking to develop. So, do those agencies routinely check with you if there's a [1:02:18] major project that they're looking to fund in Africa? So, historically no, and that's why we're [1:02:23] standing up a very small unit within the headquarters in order to have that point where they can help [1:02:29] facilitate these discussions because often they didn't know where to have them. And is that something [1:02:33] that Congress can be helpful with in terms of trying to encourage that sort of coordination? [1:02:39] I think there is, there are ways that encouraging that coordination would be very helpful and being able [1:02:44] to articulate this across the committees that oversee these various agencies and understanding how that [1:02:49] interrelation of national power can come together that it's not always the military lever that produces [1:02:54] a security outcome, but being able to have that dialogue I think would be critical. The other area [1:02:59] that I think would be very helpful also is incentive structures that help energize our industrial base [1:03:05] to help produce the equipment that our partners want. They would much prefer to buy U.S. equipment, [1:03:10] but often our systems take so long and are so long to deliver because often the incentive structure's [1:03:18] not there that they go to, they turn to China out of necessity, not because of desire. They often see [1:03:23] that as inferior equipment and they would much prefer to buy American. We need to incentivize our [1:03:29] industrial base to meet that demand. I agree. And as you know, it's an issue not just in that, [1:03:36] in that respect, but in a whole lot of other areas in terms of the challenges with the industrial base. [1:03:41] Admiral Cooper, one of the things that's gotten a fair amount of tension in recent weeks has been [1:03:49] President Zelensky's working with some of our allies and partners in the Middle East in response to [1:03:56] the war in Iran on their, the expertise that the Ukrainians have developed to address counter drone [1:04:05] responses. Can you talk a little bit about what you're seeing with respect to that and whether our [1:04:11] allies and partners find that kind of support helpful from the Ukrainians? Senator, I think [1:04:18] most significantly we adopted a large number of tactics, techniques, and procedures that the [1:04:23] Ukrainians have passed us that have helped us defend Americans. And all of our partners are [1:04:28] working with Ukraine in some way, shape, or form. I'd really defer to them and talk about it. But are [1:04:32] they more effective as a result? Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:04:36] Senator Hirani. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I give my questions, I want to again take a moment to [1:04:45] highlight the true costs, both for the military and everyday Americans, of the President's illegal [1:04:51] war with Iran and summarize how we got here. 13 brave U.S. soldiers have been killed and more than 400 [1:04:59] have been wounded. The DOD is now estimating that this war has cost over $29 billion and costing more [1:05:07] every single day. The continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which somehow caught the President by [1:05:12] surprise, is directly contributing to the growing affordability crisis that Americans are facing. [1:05:18] And negotiations are at a stalemate, but it's becoming clear. This President's plan is to attempt to [1:05:27] secure an agreement that looks very similar to the 2015 JCPOA, which my colleague, Senator King referred [1:05:35] to, which this President recklessly tore up in 2018. As you recall, the JCPOA, which was an agreement that [1:05:43] also included countries, not just us, it included France, the UK, Germany, China, and Russia. [1:05:52] And the JCPOA put limits on Iran's nuclear program with a rigorous inspection and monetary program run [1:06:01] by the IAEA, all of which was tossed out by President Trump. And while that agreement did have a sunset [1:06:09] clause, what we should have done was work diplomatically with our allies to extend a war in the [1:06:16] Middle East, no end in sight. That is driving in sight. That is driving up costs, undermining military [1:06:23] readiness, and alienating our allies with neither a clear rationale for starting the conflict, which [1:06:30] the President originally said, oh, well, then maybe there'll be reduced regime change. And now he seems [1:06:35] to have landed on preventing a nuclear-capable Iran, which was exactly what the JCPOA was intended to [1:06:44] do. Admiral Cooper, did the President ever explain to you why he tore up the JCPOA? [1:06:49] Senator, that's a policy matter that I would have expected anyone to discuss with me. [1:06:57] He never explained to you why he tore up the JCPOA? He either explained it to you or he didn't. I'm not [1:07:04] asking you for the actual conversation, but did he happen to explain to you why he did something [1:07:11] which led to the very nuclear crisis that we're now confronting regarding Iran and their enriched [1:07:18] uranium? Senator, I was in a completely different assignment when this occurred eight years ago. [1:07:24] So apparently the President didn't have a discussion with anybody. In fact, it was a unilateral [1:07:31] decision that he made. Now, you have vast experience, Admiral and the Navy, et cetera. And [1:07:40] before we went into – before we attacked Iran, did it cross your mind that Iran may close the Strait [1:07:47] of Hormuz? Senator, as you know, one of my responsibilities as a combatant commander is [1:07:52] to generate a wide range of options with associated risks and opportunities, present those to the [1:07:58] Secretary and the President. I think it'd be inappropriate to talk about what those specifically are. [1:08:02] I'm just asking whether we always make them very comprehensively. Excuse me. [1:08:07] I'm asking whether with your experience, the thought that should we attack Iran, that they would [1:08:13] close the Strait of Hormuz, did that cross your mind? Senator, I've transited through the Strait [1:08:19] about a hundred times. I think of the Strait of Hormuz virtually every day. So is that a yes? [1:08:26] That you are very aware that the Strait of Hormuz, the very thing that happened, [1:08:31] that that is something that you contemplated happening. I hope that is the case because [1:08:36] with your experience, I have to conclude that you contemplated that possibility. [1:08:44] So you did mention that our diplomats are engaged in the negotiations. Well, [1:08:50] who are those diplomats? Senator, I really would refer to the White [1:08:54] House. Who specifically is engaged? Well, apparently the diplomats are [1:08:58] Jared Kushner, who I don't think even works for our country. And Mr. Whitlock, Steve Whitlock, [1:09:05] who happens to be a, I don't know, I don't think he has a lot of experience engaging in these kinds of [1:09:13] negotiations. So here we are. The JCPOA, which was a very intense, the results of very intense [1:09:20] negotiations among many countries. And for us to act as though the idea of a nuclear one is just [1:09:27] something that occurred to President Trump. And in fact, we had in place a regime that had in [1:09:36] place a regime that was intended to do that, that very thing, which was to prevent a nuclear Iran. [1:09:43] Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton. [1:09:47] Chairman, thank you for your appearance and your service to our nation. And many thanks to all the [1:09:53] troops that you represent. Admiral Cooper, [1:09:56] some critics of Operation Epic Fury have referred to it as another forever war. In your opening [1:10:05] statement in the third sentence, in fact, you say, since 1979, the Iranian regime has terrorized the [1:10:12] region. Is it fair to say the only forever war here is the war of terror that Iran has waged against [1:10:19] the United States and the civilized world for 47 years? [1:10:21] Mr. I would agree that that was a sustained effort by Iran. [1:10:27] Mr. Okay. Let's take a look in context, since my Democratic friends have wanted to talk so much [1:10:33] about the JCPOA, about not just Epic Fury, but about Midnight Hammer as well. So where we stand today [1:10:40] in mid-May versus where we were not even a year ago, 12, 11 months ago. Based on your extensive [1:10:49] military experience, do you believe that Iran posed a significant threat to the United States 11 months [1:10:55] ago before Operation Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury? Mr. Senator, they attacked U.S. forces 350 times [1:11:01] in the 30 months preceding Epic Fury. Mr. Do you believe that, absent Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury, [1:11:07] do you believe that threat was likely to continue to grow? Mr. Yes. Mr. Microphone, please, [1:11:13] so we can fix the record. Mr. Yes, I do. Mr. Is Iran now less of a threat than it was 11 months ago? [1:11:20] Mr. They are significantly less of a threat. Mr. Is it fair to say that the Iranian regime is still a [1:11:27] revolutionary terrorist regime, even after all the deaths of their senior leaders? Mr. They are. [1:11:32] Mr. Yeah. Mr. Is it fair to say the revolutionary terrorist regime no longer has nearly as much [1:11:39] military capability to act on its revolutionary terrorist intentions? Mr. That is fair. And I [1:11:45] think it's also fair to say across every element of national power, they've been significantly degraded. [1:11:50] Mr. You state in your opening statement that CENTCOM forces systematically dismantled what Iran spent [1:11:59] four decades and tens of billions of dollars building. How long do you assess that it will [1:12:06] take them to get back to where they were in terms of their military and other capabilities just 11 [1:12:12] months ago before CENTCOM dismantled it all? Mr. Senator, I would assess that the drone and [1:12:17] missile force will take years to reconstitute. The Navy likely will not get back to its previous size [1:12:23] for a full generation. Mr. Is that why you say in your opening statement [1:12:28] that CENTCOM assesses Iran can no longer project power across the region nor pose a persistent threat [1:12:34] to the United States or our partners than it did prior to Operation Epic Fury? Mr. They certainly cannot [1:12:41] do it at the level of mass that we all saw with hundreds of missiles and drones raining across the [1:12:46] Middle East. That doesn't mean they don't have any capability, but that broad power projection capability [1:12:51] no longer exists. Mr. And the whole world saw that just in a number of days after the beginning of your [1:13:00] operation, correct? And the number of, I think it was a near 90 percent decline in Iran's attacks on [1:13:07] the United States and its neighbors in the region? Mr. That's correct. Early on the attacks were in [1:13:12] the hundreds and they went to the teens. Mr. Okay. I know that there's been a lot of questions [1:13:18] about the Strait of Hormuz. To be clear, the Strait of Hormuz was never part of our objectives, [1:13:26] but we knew, as anyone who looks at a map would know, that Iran has the power to temporarily close [1:13:32] the Strait of Hormuz. Is that correct? Mr. That's accurate, Senator. Is it fair to say that the United [1:13:37] States and our partners have the power to permanently open the Strait? Mr. Without getting into specifics, [1:13:43] we have the military power, yes. Mr. Could you talk to us a little bit about what the blockade [1:13:50] in the meantime has done to Iran? Mr. Yes, sir. The blockade was implemented within 24 hours of [1:13:56] presidential direction based on the plan that we had on the shelf. The blockade itself is designed [1:14:02] to prevent any commerce from leaving Iranian ports going to global distribution and any commerce from [1:14:08] coming around the world going back to global. Going back into Iran, there's been zero trade going [1:14:14] into or out of Iran in the last month. Mr. And just finally, what is Iran's current ability, [1:14:20] since it retains its revolutionary terrorist ambitions, to support its terror proxy network [1:14:26] in the region versus where it was just 11 months ago? Mr. As we sit here today, they are unable to [1:14:33] resource and supply Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis. Chapter to be seen of what that looks like in Iraq. [1:14:40] New prime minister wants to distance himself from Iran, but we'll see. That's what he's committed [1:14:46] to. We'll see what that looks like. Mr. So they can't support their terrorist proxies. They're [1:14:51] years and years away from reconstituting, if at all, their missile and drone forces and their nuclear [1:14:55] program, and they're a generation away from rebuilding their navy. Seems to me like a little [1:15:02] bit better position than we were relative to Iran under Barack Obama and Joe Biden's disastrous [1:15:07] nuclear deal. Thank you. Mr. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Slotkin. [1:15:12] Ms. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and thank you for what you're doing. [1:15:16] I'm going to direct my questions to General Cooper, I'm sorry, Admiral Cooper, excuse me, [1:15:23] and I'm going to give a good pass to my fellow Michigander from Ipsy, Michigan. We're happy to see [1:15:29] you in service. Thank you for what you're doing, and you're always welcome back home when you retire. [1:15:34] I think the, you know, I feel like whatever feelings I have about the imminence of the threat [1:15:45] from Iran or not, we want our military to come through this war as successfully and safely as [1:15:54] possible. I am interested in making sure we get out of this quickly and safely. [1:16:03] And I have actually no doubt that with all the firepower we've used in this war that we've degraded [1:16:10] their nuclear capability, their ballistic missile capability, their terrorism capability, [1:16:15] and as someone who served three tours in Iraq, I saw that terrorism up close and personal. [1:16:22] But it is hard to say sitting here with the Strait of Hormuz closed and every American feeling [1:16:30] a deep, deep spike in the price of gas and that we're only in the beginning of that, that we can't [1:16:37] say we are overall better off until that strait is opened. And while I believe we could militarily [1:16:47] open the straits, it seems to me that the Iranians have strategic geography. They have the ability, [1:16:56] even though though it's degraded, to project power onto things like the oil infrastructure [1:17:01] in places like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or anywhere they want, further hurting the world economy, [1:17:07] you know, the United States. Do you believe, is that correct, that while militarily we may be able [1:17:15] to physically open the straits, that they still retain the ability to affect infrastructure in the [1:17:23] region and therefore kind of have a veto power over the world economy right now? [1:17:28] Senator, from a military perspective, I would characterize Iran as having a remnant capability [1:17:37] across multiple domains. In terms of veto power, I really would defer to policy makers for that [1:17:45] characterization. But, sorry, can they strike oil infrastructure across the Persian Gulf? [1:17:53] They have a very moderate, if not small, capability to continue strikes. And we, of course, have [1:17:58] uh, accordingly prepared for such a contingency. Okay. But, but if we could, if we have the power [1:18:06] to militarily open the straits and their threat is quote moderate or small, why wouldn't we just do it? [1:18:13] Senator, I really would defer to policy makers on, in this particular matter, uh, and the strait clearly [1:18:18] is in the middle of the negotiation being undertaken now. Yeah. I mean, it just seems to me that they [1:18:23] still certainly have, it may be diminished power, but if the United States military is not physically [1:18:29] opening the straits right now, it's because the Iranians do have the real capability to affect, [1:18:36] um, uh, strikes in or drone strikes into the Gulf countries affecting their oil infrastructure and [1:18:42] sending the price of oil worldwide even higher. So, you know, it may be diminished, but it's real [1:18:48] capability unless I'm missing something. Um, you know, can you describe for me, I'm, I'm very sensitive [1:18:55] about the, the, um, way that place countries like Russia or China may be enabling the Iranians to [1:19:03] target and kill American forces or to provide, um, intelligence on their locations in real or near [1:19:10] real time. Um, uh, is it fair to say that the, that the Chinese are providing intelligence to the [1:19:19] Iranians to help them target U S forces? So I think best to talk about anything regarding intelligence [1:19:25] in a classified manner. What I can say is, uh, the Iranian, uh, military is largely made up of Russian [1:19:31] and Chinese equipment. Okay. I, I, I think, you know, um, it, it feels like either Chinese government [1:19:40] and or Chinese companies are helping and aiding and abetting, um, the Iranians in, in providing that [1:19:48] information. I understand we don't want to go into the details, but some of this is like out in open [1:19:53] press. I would just say, I personally feel like that crosses a Rubicon. Um, anytime we have another [1:20:00] country providing that kind of intelligence to an adversary, I think that should play very heavily [1:20:05] in our calculus and our conversations. I know the president is with the Chinese government right now. [1:20:12] Um, but I hope that no matter what party we're from, that's just a Rubicon. We all believe once you [1:20:17] cross it, we're in a very different conversation and I hope that's playing out in Beijing. I yield back, [1:20:22] Chairman. Thank you. Senator Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Cooper, any, any update at all on [1:20:29] activities in Afghanistan, increased, uh, activity from ISIS or any other groups that concern you? [1:20:36] Anything at all that you can tell us? Uh, Senator, just, uh, thank you for the question. Uh, Afghanistan [1:20:41] remains, uh, uh, on the forefront of, of what we're watching in terms of terrorist activity. I think best to [1:20:46] address that in a classified forum, uh, for right now, our partnerships in the region are suppressing [1:20:51] that threat. Can you give any update at all, uh, uh, for the record? Uh, no, no. Remain, remains an area [1:20:58] of concern for CENTCOM. You're, you're, you're tracking, paying attention to it. We're not, we're not [1:21:04] completely ignoring Afghanistan. Remains area of concern. We're paying close attention through a variety [1:21:08] of partnerships. Uh, we're suppressing any threat. Thanks. Um, thank you for your leadership. I mean, [1:21:13] I think this is, uh, an incredible moment. You're doing an incredible job when it comes to Iran and [1:21:20] degrading, uh, their military, uh, their defense industrial base. You cite in your testimony that [1:21:25] the U.S. has, quote, delivered a long-term rollback of Iran's ability to project power in the region and [1:21:30] beyond, end quote, damaging or destroying over 85% of its ballistic missile drone and naval defense [1:21:38] industrial base and 82% of its air defense missile systems. That's, that's pretty damn good. Um, [1:21:44] that, that's a strong, um, statement and I'm, I'm proud of your efforts. The NDS talks about the [1:21:51] concept of simultaneity in which our adversaries could undertake simultaneous aggression across [1:21:59] multiple theaters. Does Operation Epic Fury's degradation of the Iranian military and defense [1:22:05] industrial base reduce the problem of simultaneity? Senator, I think there's, uh, it remains to be [1:22:13] seen what happens, uh, uh, going forward with Iran. Uh, but I, what I think we've seen is a combination [1:22:19] of ability for the United States to project power and influence, uh, and defeat an adversary very [1:22:24] quickly, 38 days, uh, the effects, uh, on other theaters. I think I would really refer to U.S. [1:22:30] European commander in the Pacific camp command commander, but clearly the United States [1:22:35] is agile and we can move from theater to theater very quickly. Can you unpack this concept of [1:22:40] simultaneity? Explain it to us. The United States has significant capacity. We have forces, uh, deployed [1:22:47] around the world addressing a variety of issues. We're focused today largely on Iran, but, uh, clearly, [1:22:53] uh, General Anderson, uh, is actioning, uh, key and critical, uh, matters in Africa. We're doing it in [1:22:59] Europe, we're doing it in Asia, and we're doing it in South America. All at the same time. We're able to do [1:23:04] that at the same time effectively. That's how the United States military rolls. You also write [1:23:07] in your testimony that Iran's ability to reconstitute its military capability will, quote, [1:23:12] depend in large part on decisions we and our partners make. What should we be doing to press [1:23:19] our advantage? I think there's a policy component, uh, to this, Senator, and potentially a legislative [1:23:26] component. Uh, then there are a restricted number of countries. There's a finite number of countries that, [1:23:31] uh, historically, uh, had trade with Iran, uh, addressing those countries and what they are [1:23:38] trading, how they're doing and what that looks like. Uh, I think it's something we should take a [1:23:42] look at. Yeah. Uh, because if they don't have the parts, they're not going to build the weapons. [1:23:46] Well put. I was very proud to see the Lucas drones deployed and used in CENTCOM. Uh, the Indiana [1:23:53] National Guard played a really important role in testing the Lucas drone at Camp Atterbury in my [1:23:58] state. What, if anything, can we extrapolate from the performance of our Lucas drones and other [1:24:03] conflicts? Yes, Senator, so the Lucas drones were the United States' first opportunity to use our own [1:24:09] one-way attack drones against an adversary. I remember well the training that happened at Camp [1:24:14] Atterbury. I was watching it like a hawk. That training has produced, uh, additional capability [1:24:19] that we've now employed against an adversary very effectively. What else can we learn from it? [1:24:23] Well, there's a lot more to be learned from it. Uh, I'd love to take it in a classified [1:24:27] setting and particularly given where we are right now vis-a-vis Iran. I think I would just like to [1:24:31] keep that in the classified setting. For more than a month, our war fighters in the Middle East [1:24:35] were hammered by small drones. How can we ensure that doesn't happen again if combat operations resume? [1:24:41] Yes, Senator, a little bit of a myth buster on this. Uh, Iranian drones, uh, are, uh, significantly [1:24:48] capable on the days of $35,000 Walmart light drones. Those, those things are behind us. Iran is, [1:24:54] has a very capable drone force. We have very capably defeated it. Good. Uh, well put. Thank [1:25:00] you very much. Uh, that's all I have. I yield back Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kelly and then [1:25:05] Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Cooper, General Anderson. Thank you [1:25:11] both for being here today. Admiral Cooper, I want to start with you. I've got questions for both of you, [1:25:15] but, um, I want to talk a little bit about the civilian harm mitigation team, uh, at CENCOM. My [1:25:24] understanding is that you've gone from 10 down to one as part of a department-wide reduction in [1:25:32] shimmer that their role is to try to minimize harm to civilians when we're conducting combat, combat [1:25:42] operations. Is that correct? You've gone from 10 to one? Yes, sir. That's the bill. There's a larger [1:25:48] component to this over, over a course of years. We've gone from, uh, compliance to, uh, civilian casualties [1:25:54] and risk mitigation being just part of the culture. There are dozens, if not hundreds of people who [1:25:59] are involved in this process. What did those nine individuals do who were, um, removed from their, [1:26:06] from their jobs? They're now, uh, integrated in other capacities. They retain other capacities in the [1:26:11] joint, what we would call joint. But what were they doing when they were part of the civilian harm [1:26:16] mitigation team? They're paying, playing a key role in, uh, helping us move from compliance to culture, [1:26:23] uh, on, on CIFCAS, focusing on it every day, which they continue to do. So by your estimates, [1:26:29] how many civilians have been killed or injured over the course of this war? The investigation on, [1:26:36] uh, on the one incident that we've had after more than 13,000 strikes is still underway. Uh, [1:26:41] we'll, uh, certainly be transparent release that when, when we can. This is a matter that I'm, [1:26:46] I'm, I'm passionate about. I'd like to use the occasion, uh, to invite you, other members of the [1:26:50] committee and your staffs to Tampa to take a look at what our targeting process looks like. [1:26:55] If you were to find out that there was an error in the targeting process, would you reinstate some [1:27:00] of those people that were removed from that team? Sir, it's a hypothetical. I think we, we, [1:27:05] I'm, I'm always looking to organize to purpose, uh, and we'll just see it with the investigation. [1:27:09] Are you taking any additional steps now because of the civilian, civilian casualties to date? [1:27:15] We have taken additional steps. Our additional steps have been very proactive throughout, uh, [1:27:19] Epic Fury. Uh, our staff specifically warned the Iranian people more than a hundred times [1:27:23] about the threat of them being, being used as human shields. I personally warned the Iranian people on [1:27:28] March 8th, 11th, and the 23rd that they were, had the potential to be human shields. Uh, and that, [1:27:33] that measures to minimize. All right. Well, thank you for doing that. Uh, [1:27:39] General Anderson. So China and Russia continue to expand their influence across Africa. We discussed [1:27:47] this with misinformation, uh, disinformation, uh, across many African countries. You requested $94 [1:27:56] million for information operation activities. You were promised, and this is in fiscal year 26, [1:28:03] you were promised 25 million from the department. You ultimately received only 19 million. Can you talk [1:28:09] about the difference between having 19 million to do that job and 94 million? Like, what are you able [1:28:14] to do if you were fully funded? General Anderson, I, I, I get it. I mean, we see this stuff all the time, [1:28:21] the amount of misinformation that comes from the Chinese and the Russians. It is a huge problem. [1:28:26] But if you could just explain to us a little bit about what you could do if you had the full request. [1:28:32] Senator, I think the, the key point there is right now we are in a reactionary mode [1:28:38] to propaganda and to other information operations to what we can do at the moment. What the fuller [1:28:44] funding would do, especially if it's consistent over time, would allow us to build an information [1:28:48] campaign and address these issues across the continent. We're one of the few organizations [1:28:53] that looks across the entirety of the continent and can understand how these, uh, propaganda and [1:28:58] misinformation play across borders. We work very closely with the State Department and U.S. embassies [1:29:03] on this to make sure our messaging is key, but this would allow us to do is help coordinate that [1:29:07] messaging across regions and across the continent to highlight the, the issues that come with this [1:29:13] misinformation, especially as much of it is destabilizing the democracies across the region. [1:29:17] Senator Anderson, Do you ever feel like we should be countering some of their disinformation with [1:29:22] disinformation of our own? General Anderson, Sir, I think the most powerful tool we have is the truth. [1:29:27] What America brings is very unique. We're still a beacon of hope and light in the world, [1:29:32] and I think we should be willing to talk about who we are. This is America's 250th anniversary. [1:29:36] There's a long history on the continent that is, I mean, it's good and bad, but there's a lot of good [1:29:41] that we can talk about of what America brings. The fact that John C. Robinson founded the Tuskegee Airmen, [1:29:47] two years later founded the Ethiopian Air Force, and then went on to found Ethiopian Airlines, [1:29:52] which is now the pride not only of Ethiopia, but Africa. It's not a story that's well known, [1:29:56] but that is a tie that we have had between the aviation communities for years. There are multiple [1:30:01] stories like that across the continent that we need to propagate and talk about, so I would say [1:30:05] we should focus on the goodness and the positivity of engaging with America and worry less about the [1:30:10] disinformation that our partners put out, but we have to engage in this environment. We have to be [1:30:14] active in the information space. So you got about 25 percent of the request, so if you got the full [1:30:19] amount, you could put more out there positive stuff that the United States is doing, and I know these [1:30:25] are challenging times with resources even beyond what DOD has, USAID and others, but do you think [1:30:36] that that would be sufficient to counter Chinese and Russian misinformation? Senator, I think information [1:30:45] operations is one of the lower cost investments that we can make that have outsized return and help amplify [1:30:52] the limited resources we have in the military side and highlight the benefits that those provide, and [1:30:58] being able to talk about that broadly I do think has outside proportion, so small investments can have [1:31:03] a large impact, and this is an area of information where I think we can make a lot of gains even despite our [1:31:09] smaller physical presence that can highlight the totality of what the United States brings. [1:31:14] I 100 percent agree with you, General, and we should really look into getting you the resources you [1:31:19] need to do this job. Thank you. General Anderson, I 100 percent agree with you. Senator Gillibrand. [1:31:28] Admiral Cooper, we had Secretary Hegseth here a week or so ago, and we did not get satisfactory answers [1:31:39] about Iran. So what is your mission in Iran right now? Senator, with Epic Fury now formally ended [1:31:48] for the president's notification. We shifted our mission to a blockade mission in the following day, [1:31:54] and we're implementing that mission in accordance with international armed conflict. That's our main mission [1:31:59] today, as well as to be ready for a broad range of contingencies. And do you feel that President Trump's [1:32:07] declaration that we have obliterated all of Iran's capabilities and their nuclear program, is that accurate? Senator, I [1:32:17] speak from a military perspective. We have significantly degraded their drone, missile, and naval capabilities. [1:32:23] We've fractured their command and control. We've eliminated the large preponderance of their space [1:32:29] program. They, by every measure, are degraded significantly across all measures of national power. [1:32:36] So what's your exit strategy to end the conflict with Iran? Senator, that's a policy decision. [1:32:41] And don't you have to offer the president various exit strategies so he knows how to get from A to B? [1:32:48] Senator, consistent with my statutory obligations, I've provided a broad range of options along with [1:32:53] risks and mitigations through the secretary. So given your current mission, how many more days, [1:32:59] weeks, months, years are we going to be at war with Iran? Well, as we sit here today, we are in a ceasefire, [1:33:07] and the way ahead will be determined by our policymakers. Well, currently, we are still [1:33:11] spending a billion dollars a day on this war with Iran. And I can tell you from my New York [1:33:16] constituents, they're furious about it because a billion dollars a day could be lowering their housing [1:33:21] costs, lowering their food costs, lowering their health care costs, lowering the cost of everyday [1:33:26] expenses that continue to go up because of the war in Iran. With the price of gas as high as it is, [1:33:31] the price of diesel as high as it is, it means everything that they have to buy for their [1:33:35] families is more expensive. So we expect from our military leaders a plan about why and how long we [1:33:44] are going to be spending a billion dollars a day. And I have not seen that plan or the why from [1:33:49] President Trump or Secretary Hegseth. So I'm hoping, as the military person in charge of operations, [1:33:55] that you have a plan to end this war and to stop spending a billion dollars a day. [1:34:02] Senator, we have a broad range of plans and contingencies consistent with my obligation [1:34:09] to provide that advice. Both the secretary and the president, we've done so. Decisions will be [1:34:14] made by our civilian leadership and my job will be to execute them. [1:34:17] The second concern I have, Admiral Cooper, is how we've prosecuted this war to date. [1:34:23] We have data and information publicly available in publications like the New York Times that 22 [1:34:29] schools have been hit. Hospitals, dozens of hospitals have been hit. We have regulations. We have the law [1:34:37] of war targeting requirements to avoid civilian harm and death, to avoid civilian harm and death. Have you [1:34:46] been implementing all the laws that are required under current law to minimize civilian death? Senator, [1:34:54] we have executed every operation consistent with the law of armed conflict. The subject of civilian [1:34:59] casualties is a particular passion of mine. We pay attention to it. We follow all the procedures [1:35:04] and have gone above and beyond to, in my case, personally warn the Iranian people of several [1:35:10] instances during conflict where they were being potentially used as human targets. [1:35:13] If they've been warned, how did we then bomb 22 schools? [1:35:16] Senator, there's no indication that we have that that has been corroborated. [1:35:20] How many schools have we bombed? [1:35:22] There is one active civilian casualty investigation from the 13,629 munitions. [1:35:28] So how do you explain the publicly available information that 22 schools have been hit and [1:35:33] multiple hospitals? [1:35:34] There's no way that we can corroborate that. No indication of that whatsoever, Senator. [1:35:38] There's no way you can corroborate or no indication of it? Which one? [1:35:41] No indication. [1:35:42] Well, the indication is what's publicly available. There is indication. [1:35:47] Have you investigated those claims? [1:35:48] We have not. [1:35:49] Why have you not? If this is a passion of yours, if you believe that the civilian casualties are not [1:35:56] consistent with the law of war and not consistent with human rights obligations, that our military [1:36:01] regularly follows with great pride and great diligence, why have you not investigated those [1:36:06] allegations when they're publicly being made on the cover of the New York Times? [1:36:10] I'll be happy to take a look at each instance, our team will be able to do that. [1:36:14] I would like a report. I would like a report from you, from your team, [1:36:19] about whether there have been attacks that have resulted in the destruction of schools and hospitals. [1:36:27] And if so, why? And how then, last, have you managed the 90% cut to the personnel who are supposed [1:36:34] to avoid civilian targets? [1:36:36] I'm happy to provide any report. And I would invite you and every staff member here to come [1:36:41] to Tampa to look at the process, to see exactly how it works. [1:36:45] Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. [1:36:46] Senator Duckworth. [1:36:51] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. [1:36:56] Admiral Cooper, the Senate received a letter from President Trump on Friday, May 1st, [1:37:00] stating that hostilities with Iran have ended. And you just stated here that we are no longer [1:37:06] operating under Operation Urgent Fury. Would you say that we are still engaging hostilities with Iran, [1:37:13] or have they ended? Consistent with the President's [1:37:17] letter, international armed conflict rules and the implementation of the blockade. [1:37:26] So are we engaged in hostilities with Iran, yes or no? [1:37:29] We are not. We're in a ceasefire. [1:37:31] The Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, right? You're engaged in a blockade, are you not? [1:37:36] The blockade is against Iranian ports, commerce going in and coming out. [1:37:40] It is the last thing we would want to do is blockade the Strait of Hormuz. [1:37:44] And as we've seen in the last week, there have been instances of ships coming in and out, [1:37:48] including our own. But under international law, a blockade is an act of war. [1:37:53] So are we, if you're blockading, actively blockading Iran, then you are engaged in an act, [1:37:59] we are currently in an act of war with Iran under international law. [1:38:02] That a blockade is one of the definitions of an act of war under international law. [1:38:06] Consistent with the direction we've been given. [1:38:09] Those characterizations are best done through the department's legal counsel or the White House. [1:38:13] It's not characterization. It's international law. It's listed. [1:38:16] A blockade is an act of war. [1:38:19] So let's, we've now engaged in the United States and the United States and Iranian forces are [1:38:26] trading fire as they continue to launch missiles, drones from our boat stacks. [1:38:30] President Trump himself says a ceasefire is on life support and he repeatedly threatens [1:38:34] to renew U.S. military strikes. And to be clear, no one is disputing the valor and professionalism [1:38:40] of our military. But the civilian leaders are abdicating their responsibility to craft a clear [1:38:46] strategy and service members and American people are the ones who will suffer under this leadership [1:38:50] vacuum. Admiral Cooper, before Operation Epic Fury began, what desired end state for the operation [1:38:56] were you given by your civilian leadership? [1:38:59] Senator, I was given crystal clear guidance. Our military mission was to degrade Iran's ability [1:39:05] to project power on its neighbors and U.S. interests. It included three specific objectives. [1:39:09] Degrade Iranian ballistic missiles and their defense and defense industrial base, [1:39:15] degrade their drones and the defense industrial base, degrade their navy and the defense industrial base. [1:39:20] All of those were achieved, as I've discussed. [1:39:24] And because they were achieved, that's why the operation ended? Or did the operation end because [1:39:28] the president said, let's end operation? [1:39:32] Operations commencing and ending are made by our civilian leadership and not a military decision. [1:39:38] Okay. Well, that civilian leadership president Trump has provided many possible end states in only two [1:39:43] months, including in just two months, he said unconditional surrender and regime change in Iran, which have not [1:39:49] happened. He's talked about, okay, operations will end when there's destruction of Iranian nuclear sites, [1:39:55] allegedly already accomplished last summer under Operation Midnight Hammer. [1:39:59] He's also said that Iran will never have nuclear weapons, which cannot be accomplished with only a [1:40:05] bombing campaign. He said that his goal is to destroy the Iranian military forces and infrastructure [1:40:10] completely, which the intelligence community assesses has not happened. And now, he said that it's a [1:40:17] reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which is a reminder, was open before the war began. So, if we don't [1:40:22] know what we're fighting for, we certainly don't know how long we'll be fighting. Admiral Cooper, [1:40:26] what have you been given, have you been given any timeline for how long our forces will be in the [1:40:31] Strait of Hormuz or near Iran or blockading Iran, whether by a timeline or a condition, an end state, [1:40:38] for how long you'll be blockading Iran? Senator, I think it's important from a military perspective that [1:40:44] my advice related to options be provided to both the Secretary and the President. We've done that. [1:40:49] The decisions on timeline and execution are up for our civilian leadership. [1:40:52] Okay. So, you mentioned the Secretary of Defense who only talks tactics and a President who changes [1:40:58] his strategy on social media multiple times a day. This is who's giving you the orders. [1:41:03] Secretary Hekseth has touted the destruction of tens of thousands of targets across Iran. [1:41:07] He said that Iran's air defenses are flattened, his words, and its industrial base overwhelmingly [1:41:13] destroyed and claims that Iran's Navy is at the bottom of the sea. Every metric that the Secretary [1:41:18] offers is one of destruction, and destruction alone is not an end state, especially not with [1:41:23] new public reporting that U.S. intelligence officials believe Iran has operational access to most of its [1:41:28] missile capacity and that Iran is clearly still capable of controlling the Strait of Hormuz. [1:41:33] Americans are not safer. Our service members are at risk. Prices at home are higher, and Iran has more [1:41:38] control over the strait and global economy than it did before this whole thing started. American people, [1:41:42] our service members deserve clear answers. What does done with the war look like, and how do we get [1:41:47] there? We have no strategy, as we saw in Afghanistan. If you don't have a sound strategy, you keep doing [1:41:52] tactics forever. This is not your fault, but this is where we are. And Admiral Cooper, have you been asked [1:41:57] for your advice, and under what conditions would you advise deploying ground troops for any purpose in Iran? [1:42:04] Senator, I think it would be inappropriate to talk about any contingency planning in this particular forum. [1:42:09] It's my obligation as a combatant commander to provide a broad range of options through the [1:42:14] secretary and to the president. Can you answer that question for me in the [1:42:16] SCIF at a later time? I'd be more than happy to talk about anything classified. [1:42:20] All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Kelly. [1:42:28] No further questions. Mr. Chairman. Sorry, I didn't mark off. Senator Peters. [1:42:37] Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you both for being here. And [1:42:41] I speak for myself and I think everybody on this panel. We appreciate the incredible professionalism [1:42:46] of men and women in uniform and the job that they do every day with professionalism and heroism. And [1:42:53] thank you for doing that. But we do have a number of questions about how we win this war and end it [1:43:00] going forward. And those are usually political questions related to political leadership. The men and [1:43:06] women in uniform execute those orders and they order and that they have demonstrated that they're [1:43:12] certainly the best in the world. But Admiral Cooper, you mentioned that the current mission [1:43:16] right now is basically the block of the U.S. blockade of Iranian ships or ships that are transiting the [1:43:24] Straits of Hormuz to Iranian ports. That's in response to Iran basically effectively shutting down [1:43:31] the strait of Hormuz before that. As you know, experts across the political spectrum and multiple [1:43:38] administrations, political administrations have all agreed that a war against Iran, Iran's first moves [1:43:45] would be to mine the Straits of Hormuz to prevent tanker traffic. But despite these known risks and [1:43:52] repeated claims that the DOD has planned, I'm sure you have plans. I've been to the War College. I've served in [1:43:58] the Navy. There are no shortage of plans that we have. That you have plans to deal with the closing of [1:44:04] the strait. We had four minesweepers that were stationed in the Middle East were just retired last [1:44:09] year. And our remaining minesweepers were either stationed in Japan or not prepositioned in the [1:44:16] region. This is despite public reporting that we currently already have limited unmanned mine clearance [1:44:23] capacity. And reports from the New York Times and Reuters has also indicated that Iran still has [1:44:30] hundreds, if not thousands, of small boats that can lay mines or perform hit-and-run attacks on top of [1:44:37] their existing land missiles and drones, which I'm sure they're building at a furious pace right now to [1:44:43] restock what they have. And this is on top of existing land missiles and drones. The American people, [1:44:51] as we all know, are already paying higher prices in the United States. Inflation is up as a result of [1:44:58] chaotic tariffs that President Trump has put into place. And now, thanks to this war and the straits [1:45:03] closure, they're paying high gas prices that continue to rise as well, putting a strain on family budgets. [1:45:10] So my question for you is, if there was advanced planning, and I'm sure there was advanced planning [1:45:14] about the straits closure, why were the minesweepers not prepositioned in the region when it had been [1:45:21] publicly reported that we have limited unmanned mine clearance capacities? When you have a plan, [1:45:28] usually before you execute the plan, you make sure that all your assets are in place to actually [1:45:32] execute that plan. So it's curious that those assets were not there. Why? Senator, I think best to talk [1:45:38] specific tactics and operations in a classified environment. What I can say here is, we did have [1:45:44] sufficient and continue to have sufficient mine clearance capability in the theater. Because [1:45:48] it happened to not be in those four vessels that were decommissioned after decades of service, [1:45:53] I think is an interesting point. The support and the ability to conduct counter mining comes in [1:45:58] a lot of different flavors, best to discuss in a classified environment. And I don't mean to get into [1:46:02] that. I understand that totally you don't want to do it. But it's clear that there is a concern about [1:46:07] mines. We aren't seeing ships go through there. Commercial companies do not want to go through the [1:46:11] straits. They're not going to put their ships at risk so they don't feel safe. [1:46:14] To me, that speaks volumes as to whether or not it's safe, that there is a real concern there. [1:46:19] And we know that the Iranians have significant capabilities to deal with that. You know, I asked [1:46:24] a previous question related to strategy and really talked about von Klauswitz on war, which is, as you [1:46:31] know, the seminal text on strategy that is taught in all the war colleges. And you know it better than I [1:46:37] will ever know it. The concept of that is that in order to win a war, you've got to know the center [1:46:44] of gravity of your enemy. And you have to be focused on able to neutralize that. What is the center of [1:46:50] gravity in Iran? What would you, how are you planning? And that's a military decision as to what is the [1:46:57] center of gravity. That's the kind of advice you would give a president. What is the center of gravity? [1:47:00] Senator, I really would defer to our policymakers to determine what they view from a policy perspective [1:47:06] as a center of gravity. From a military perspective, we're focused on achieving military objectives, [1:47:11] which is exactly what our men and women have done. And they've done it extremely well. [1:47:15] Well, you do, as you know, and every, every war plan has a center of gravity that you identify [1:47:20] and then you work around that. So, so there is the war plan that we have for Iran would have the center [1:47:27] of gravity. Well, why can't you share what that is? That's in the past, it's been before we knew the [1:47:31] center of gravity in the Persian Gulf War for Iraq. Colin Powell said it was the Republican Guard troops, [1:47:38] the Iraq's lead unit there. Obama administration in Afghanistan, Admiral Mike Mullen defined the [1:47:45] center of gravity as building Afghan government support. These, they made this public. They [1:47:50] weren't hiding the center of gravity and our enemy knows what our center of gravity is. And we know [1:47:56] what theirs is. There's no reason to keep that secret because the American people have a right to know [1:48:00] what, what, what is it that we're trying to accomplish? And that's outlined very clearly in that term, [1:48:05] a part of every military plan that is put forward. Yes, sir. I, I agree. Every war plan has a center of [1:48:11] gravity and those war plans are classified. I'd be more than happy to talk about in a classified environment. [1:48:16] Fair enough. Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Wicker. And thank you, [1:48:23] Admiral Cooper, General, General Anderson for your service and your willingness to continue to serve [1:48:29] our nation. Admiral Cooper, I want to talk about the international stabilization force. It's been [1:48:36] publicly reported that CENTCOM is going to play a role in the, in the proposed international stabilization [1:48:41] force in Gaza. We'll just call it ISF going forward through many questions remain. Though many questions [1:48:47] remain on what the ISF is, when it will be deployed and how it will operate. So can you clarify the roles [1:48:54] of the U.S. and CENTCOM in the ISF? Specifically, is the vision for CENTCOM to retain command and control [1:49:01] or is there a timeline, a mechanism mechanism for transitioning oversight to a multinational [1:49:06] or civilian-led structure? Senator, first, great to see you again. Thank you for the question. [1:49:14] Our role can be simply defined as one of support right now. The International Stabilization Force [1:49:21] commander who's been designated is also dual-hatted as the commander of Special Operations Command Central. [1:49:26] He has about 45 members of the Joint Force presently working for him. We're really at the infancy of [1:49:32] forming that international stabilization force. Thus far, there have been four countries who've [1:49:38] committed to provide forces. And so I think as we look to the future, I'd be happy to come back on [1:49:42] what that looks like later on. We're heading in the right direction, but we're just at the infancy of [1:49:47] the process. Thank you. And speaking of hitting in a direction, we need to talk about munitions [1:49:52] sustainment. Because Admiral Cooper, according to publicly available resources, the U.S. has fired at least [1:49:58] 45 percent of its Patriot missile interceptors and more than half of its THAAD interceptors [1:50:03] so far in Operation Epic Fury. And it's had to move air defense from other theaters. So can you talk to [1:50:10] me about how this constrains our air and missile defense and those of our regional partners and allies [1:50:15] like the Israel, UAE, and others who are also under attack? Senator, I have all the munitions necessary [1:50:24] to both defend our forces as well as conduct a broad range of contingencies. Our partners [1:50:29] also have the sufficient munitions necessary for defensive operations. Do you have estimates [1:50:34] about how long it would take us to replenish or rebuild or stockpile? I would really defer [1:50:39] to the folks who do this on an everyday basis, both in the department and the services. [1:50:43] Thank you. I'm going to continue on you and then we'll move over to General Anderson in a minute, [1:50:47] because I want to just take a moment to talk about Lebanon, because I do appreciate that you've [1:50:53] applauded the Lebanese Armed Forces for their efforts to disarm Hezbollah. While the current effort [1:50:58] in conflict has demonstrated the extent to which Hezbollah is rearmed, a strong Lebanese Armed Forces [1:51:04] remains the best pathway for Lebanon through which Hezbollah can be disarmed once and for all. And [1:51:10] we know that needs to happen. So what can the U.S. do to support the Lebanese Armed Forces [1:51:14] to ensure that they have the necessary capacity to disarm Hezbollah while also holding them accountable? [1:51:21] Senator, taking on the disarmament of Hezbollah is a tall order. They've been funded by Iran for [1:51:28] decades with billions of dollars and Hezbollah is inculcated into every fabric of the Lebanese [1:51:33] society. I think right now our continued commitment with modest dollars to the Lebanese Armed Forces [1:51:40] is helpful. They have in particular several units who can do more. We have to be, I believe our [1:51:46] commitment could be to provide the funding necessary so that they can do more. Thank you. I'm going to [1:51:52] move over to AFRICOM now, General Anderson, because ISIS and Al Qaeda affiliates, well, we know they've [1:52:00] spanned the African continent. And so understanding, of course, this is an open setting. Can you talk [1:52:05] about the extent to which these franchises that they work cross borders within local settings to [1:52:11] coordinate with one another and the threat that this poses to our priorities in the regions? And do you [1:52:17] think there's a need for a comprehensive CT strategy on the continent? And if so, could you outline again, [1:52:23] considering it's an open setting, broadly what that strategy might include, please? Senator, I appreciate [1:52:31] the highlighting of the transnational threat that both Al Qaeda and ISIS pose. I can say in this setting [1:52:39] that ISIS has several affiliates across the continent that are coordinating more and more, whether that's in [1:52:45] the Golis Mountains of Somalia or the Lake Shad Basin of Nigeria or in the Sahel as well as Mozambique [1:52:51] and others. So this terrorist network has to be addressed holistically. They have to look at the [1:52:57] entirety of the network. It's not any single node anymore. And so as we look at this, I work, [1:53:01] coordinate very closely with Admiral Cooper because ISIS still has a strong presence in CENTCOMS, AOR, [1:53:07] as well as Al Qaeda. As we look at this, global partners enable them first and foremost to take on [1:53:14] this threat. When they are unable to do that, then bringing in only the unique capabilities that the [1:53:22] U.S. can bring in order to address those threats. We've seen that in the Golis Mountains where we've [1:53:26] been able to bring intelligence, limit ISR, some limited strike capabilities that have been able to [1:53:32] disrupt their leadership network. This needs to be applied across all of these areas. So investments in [1:53:39] additional ISR, investments in expeditionary capabilities such as in a float forward staging [1:53:44] base like the Herschel Woody Williams that allow us to move to the point of need at the time of need, [1:53:50] and then the force protection requirements that are necessary to protect that force in the [1:53:53] expeditionary area. And I would add not just the force protection as in the counter UAS and the [1:53:58] integrated air missile defense, which are critical, but also investments in emerging technologies that [1:54:03] allow austere medicine, forward medicine, remote medicine, automated CASAVAC. These types of things [1:54:09] allow us to become more expeditionary in order to get after these critical threats and only the [1:54:13] critical threats that pose threat to the U.S. and then enable partners as able to address these common [1:54:19] threats. So it is a multifaceted strategy. I could even go into more, I won't in this detail, but really [1:54:24] maintaining the relationships and the engagements are equally important and having that pragmatic [1:54:29] approach, opening dialogue with the AES states and the Sahel again, addressing this with places like [1:54:35] Algeria and Morocco and Libya even, who share these concerns, building those relationships are [1:54:40] absolutely vital because you cannot surge trust. If the chairman would indulge me, can I have a [1:54:44] follow-up question on the Sahel since he brought it up? Yes, why don't you do that? Thank you. [1:54:50] We know since you brought up the Sahel, but last month the JNIM and local militias in Mali executed [1:54:56] coordinated nationwide offensive attacks attacking Mali's capital, seizing the key towns, killing the [1:55:02] Malayan defense minister, though these attacks were greater in scale, intensity than any other since [1:55:08] 2012, and to clearly demonstrate the attacker's ability to strike against an expansive geographical [1:55:15] area. So you're talking a little bit about the Sahel, but the permissive environment in the Sahel [1:55:20] that's making these attacks possible. And what more can you do, would you like to add if you want to [1:55:26] speak a little bit more about the stability there? Senator, I would, there are a few things I would [1:55:30] like to add in this setting. I can talk to you more in a classified setting that would be highly [1:55:34] appropriate to this. But to your point, there is no effective external counterterrorism effect or [1:55:40] effort in the Sahel right now. The Russians have claimed to do that, but we saw that they had to [1:55:44] withdraw from Qadal. We're unable to defend against that threat there. They are providing some limited [1:55:49] support, but we do not see the same Western presence. Because of that, then how do we enable the [1:55:54] partners, the other nations that are there, how do we look at expeditionary capabilities again that we can [1:55:59] result in this? One of the key areas that we would need some assistance with is the authorities and [1:56:04] ability to bring in and experiment with emerging technologies, whether that's in the surveillance [1:56:09] and ISR type of technologies or in other over the horizon type capabilities, like I mentioned with the [1:56:15] medicine and others, in order to reach, when there is a threat that threatens the homeland, to be able to [1:56:21] reach it and take care of it. But more importantly, continue to enable the partners to address the [1:56:26] threats in their local areas. And a lot of that's through intelligence sharing. I would be happy [1:56:31] in a classified environment to talk in more depth. Thank you. I appreciate that. Thank you, [1:56:35] Admiral General. Thank you, Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. And I'm glad you [1:56:41] brought up Lebanon and Hezbollah. So I'm going to take another round, Admiral Cooper. And stop me when I'm [1:56:52] wrong. On March 2nd of this year, Hezbollah attacked Israel in response to Operation Epic Fury. Is that [1:57:04] correct? That's correct, sir. According to Israel's foreign minister, Hezbollah has fired 10,000 missiles, [1:57:16] rockets and drones at Israel during the past two months. Is that correct? I believe that's correct, [1:57:21] sir. And in response to these attacks, Israel initiated a ground offensive in southern Lebanon, [1:57:29] aiming to create an uninhabited buffer zone along its northern border and border and to push Hezbollah [1:57:37] north to the Latini River. Is that correct? That's correct, Senator. To enable this operation, [1:57:49] the Israeli military ordered the evacuation of southern Lebanon, displacing over 1 million people, [1:57:58] nearly 20 percent of Lebanon's population. That is also correct. I don't know that that number [1:58:04] specifically is correct, but the concept of the evacuation is correct. While governments of Israel [1:58:16] and Lebanon declared a ceasefire in April of this year, Hezbollah Secretary General Naeem Qasim [1:58:23] announced that his organization would not recognize the ceasefire and would never agree to disarm. Is [1:58:29] that correct? His statement, that statement is correct. Yeah, he made that statement. Hezbollah then continued [1:58:36] to fire projectiles into Israel, and Israel has continued to strike Hezbollah positions in southern [1:58:41] Lebanon. That's also correct, isn't it? That's correct, sir. And I think Senator Rosen would wholeheartedly [1:58:54] agree with me that peace between Israel, and I can't ask questions to my friend and colleague, but I think we [1:59:03] would both agree that peace between Israel and Lebanon would be a wonderful development, and a wonderful [1:59:09] development for America and for Israel. But peace between Israel and Lebanon depends on the Lebanese [1:59:21] government having both the capability and the will to disarm Hezbollah. Has the United States provided the [1:59:30] Lebanese armed forces with approximately three billion dollars since 2006? So I'd have to take that [1:59:37] specific volume that that's a lot of money number of the record and follow up. But we have been providing [1:59:43] aid for two decades. Is it fair to say that the primary goal of U.S. support for the LAF, the Lebanese [1:59:51] armed forces, was to counter Hezbollah? Yes, sir. And from 2006 until 2023, is it accurate to say that [2:00:01] Hezbollah's rocket and missile arsenal grew from 2006 to 2023 from approximately 9,000 rockets [2:00:13] and missiles to 150,000? As a result of decades and billions of dollars in Iranian support, that's correct. [2:00:25] Israel's foreign foreign minister alleges that Hezbollah fired more than 10,000 projectiles at Israel [2:00:34] since the beginning of March of this year. In light of the Lebanese armed forces in action, was Israel [2:00:45] was Israel's offensive into southern Lebanon military, militarily necessary if Hezbollah's attacks were [2:00:54] going to be countered? Was there another way to do that? Senator, I would really defer to Israel on [2:01:00] intent and effectiveness, but just as a general statement. Militarily necessary, though. [2:01:06] There are, it is an option among options, of which there are few, to deal with the Hezbollah problem. [2:01:13] I just, I appreciate Senator Rosen bringing this up, and just would go back to the central point. It would, [2:01:24] it would be a tremendous achievement for Israel, Lebanon, the United States, and the Middle East, [2:01:36] if Hezbollah could be eliminated and allow the Lebanese people and the Lebanese government to resume the [2:01:47] happy relations that we once had and strive for between the United States and Lebanon. Would Senator [2:02:00] Rosen have any further questions? That, then this concludes today's hearing. I want to thank our [2:02:08] witnesses for their testimony, and I would acknowledge that many, many of the arrows aimed at these two [2:02:19] witnesses were better aimed at people in the civilian leadership who, according to our great constitution [2:02:32] and our principles dating back to George Washington, are in control of policy, and I would commend these two [2:02:43] military veterans for adhering to that constitutional principle. And with that, we are, I would [2:02:53] inform members that questions of the record be due to the committee within two business days, and we are adjourned.