LINDSAY CLANCY LIVE: Closing Arguments End in Lindsay Clancy Trial, Final Verdict Handed to Jury

[00:00:00] Speaker 1: For the purpose of the record, we return back to the matter of Commonwealth versus Lindsay Clancy, all parties at present, excluding the jury. [00:00:14] Speaker 2: All right. Council, have you seen the question? Yes, Your Honor. [00:00:18] Speaker 1: Aye. [00:00:19] Speaker 2: Yes. Aye. And the question is, it is with a heavy heart that we report we are unable to come to a unanimous decision and will not be able to. My well, let me ask what is the party's position in regards to their question? [00:00:43] Speaker 3: Your Honor, from the Commonwealth's perspective, since the TUI instruction has already been given and then there was lengthy deliberation after that, I think that it would require a mistrial at this point. [00:00:53] Speaker 2: Attorney Reddington. Your Honor. [00:00:55] Speaker 4: Your Honor, my understanding is that this court has the discretion to have the jury sent back for the second time. The first time that there was a report, we did not treat it as a report of deadlock. We did not instruct them under TUI. We did not give them soft TUI. We didn't give them anything. We just sent them back to deliberate. So technically, we have one report of deadlock that your Honor gave the TUI Rodriguez charge to, I believe under the statute, as well as the case law, this court has the ability to send the jury back. The fact that that jury foreperson wrote very unusually, it is with a heavy heart that we are unable to come to a decision based on the earlier questions that we have. It would be a sound and a wise decision for this court to send it back under the law. [00:01:49] Speaker 2: Well, I would find that under Massachusetts case law and statutory law, the jury did not ask to be sent back, which would be a possibility if they had requested it to be sent back to them. Under the statute and the case law, I don't feel I have any choice but to declare a mistrial. [00:02:12] Speaker 4: Well, before you do, I'd like to be heard, Your Honor. Well, that's why I asked you before, but go ahead. Well, I just got to that first one and you can get to the other one. All right. Your Honor, I would suggest to the court that as we are pretty much all familiar with under Karen Reed versus the Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court through Justice George's back in February of '25 held that under Rule 27 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, "gives a trial judge discretion to require a jury to return a verdict for charges on which they have agreed before declaring a mistrial as it relates to," and again I continue, "judge may first require the jury to return verdicts on those charges upon which the jury can agree and direct that such verdicts be received and recorded." It goes on further, and I quote, Rule 27 D also permits the judge to poll the jury when a verdict is returned and before the verdict is recorded. However, a judge is not required to accept a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial. So I'm asking that the court would entertain a poll of the jurors as to whether or not there or not there has been a decision on murder one, murder two, manslaughter, anything like that, and if that's the case, then I certainly would argue that double jeopardy is attached and those judges cannot be prosecuted again. All right. Colmell? [00:03:34] Speaker 3: I would object to that, Your Honor. I would go into the deliberations. I think we're in a different scenario here than the Reed case, where I believe in that case they did reach a verdict on certain charges and not on others. But I think here, where we've had a jury who's been deliberating for six and a half days, who's come back on multiple occasions saying that they're deadlocked, who have been given Tui, I don't think anything else is required at this point other than the declaration of a mistrial, unfortunately. [00:04:02] Speaker 2: Over the defendant's objection, I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. All right, if we bring the jury in. [00:04:32] Speaker ?: I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. [00:06:13] Speaker 4: While we're waiting for the jury, forgive me for raising this issue. I would ask that before you formally declare a mistrial at the court afford us the opportunity to take a 211-3 appeal direct to the Supreme Judicial Court single justice on this issue, because of any number of issues that are of concern. Others that have been addressed in the motions, the objections. But I further raise the issue of the American with Disabilities Act. I believe that this is a situation where there is a clear and present danger that this individual, for some reason, what it is, we don't know, but is taking a position that's intractable, regardless of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. So I want an opportunity to take an appeal to the single justice if the court will afford us that opportunity. [00:07:04] Speaker 2: How much time do you need to do that? [00:07:08] Speaker 4: I'd have it filed today and argue tomorrow. Saturday? They would do it on an emergency, yeah. [00:07:16] Speaker 2: I mean, I can try. So we're going to tell this jury to come back tomorrow? I'm just trying to, I don't care. The reason I'm asking it, I know, but as they're walking in, you're asking for this. I'm just trying to find out what it is that you're asking for. [00:07:34] Speaker 4: What I'm asking for is time to file a single justice appeal for this travesty. That's what I'm asking for. [00:07:40] Speaker 2: So you're asking for an emergency stay at this point? [00:07:42] Speaker 4: Yes, and the jurors don't have to come back tomorrow. They can be told they don't even have to come back if I lose the motion. But if I win the motion, then obviously they would have to come back Tuesday. [00:07:54] Speaker 2: I'll, if you want to go up and petition to the SJC for a stay, I'll give you an hour before we bring the jury back down. I think you could, it's just a request for the stay of the declaration of the mistrial. So I'll hold off for an hour and then we'll come back in in regards to that. [00:08:14] Speaker 4: Okay. [00:08:15] Speaker 2: All right. [00:08:18] Speaker ?: All rise. [00:08:20] Speaker 1: Jennifer Sprague, an assistant district attorney in Buckingham. [00:08:25] Speaker 2: All right. Good morning, everyone. Good morning, council. Good morning. Hi. Good morning, Ms. Clancy. [00:08:28] Speaker 1: Good morning, Your Honor. [00:08:29] Speaker 2: All right. So at the end of the day yesterday, there was a note that was sent in from the jury. And we put over to today to address it. Como, if you had the opportunity to review that note. [00:08:49] Speaker 3: Yes, Your Honor. [00:08:49] Speaker 2: All right. A defendant, you had the opportunity. Yes, Your Honor. All right. And so I will hear from the parties as to how the each party suggests a request. I deal with that note. So I want to hear from the Commonwealth first. [00:09:15] Speaker 3: Thank you, Your Honor. I apologize for my voice. So Commonwealth's suggestion is that the jurors be instructed to return to the deliberations without any further instruction or voir dire. The basis for that request is Commonwealth versus Ronchi, R-O-N-C-H-I 491 Mass 284 from 2023. In that case, it's a similar situation where it's reported one juror is having issues with the other jurors. And it says in that case where reliable information comes to a judge suggesting a lack of impartiality, bias, extraneous influence or inability to deliberate that there should be an individual voir dire hearing regarding that. We don't have any of those circumstances here. There's no indication of a lack of impartiality or bias or extraneous influence and no indication of inability to deliberate. In fact, if deliberated for a very long time in this case and very conscientiously. So what we have here is a note that indicates a disagreement about how to weigh the evidence and that's deliberation. So it's the Commonwealth's position, especially considering the fact that Your Honor voir dire at each of the jurors yesterday and they all said that they could follow your instructions. So when you couple that with the requirements of Ronchi, I don't think an individual voir dire is necessary. If Your Honor does determine to do one, we would just ask along the lines of all the case law in this area, Ronchi, Williams, Torres, the whole string of cases, that the juror be instructed not to comment on the deliberations and that the juror be told that he or she cannot be discharged unless a personal problem unrelated to their relationship with the jurors or their views on the case and that any attempt or any comments by the juror that tend to get into deliberations that Your Honor interrupt and remind the juror that we're not to get into that and that questioning be ceased of the juror unless he or she indicates that there is a personal problem unrelated to the case or the relationships. All right, thank you. Defendant. [00:11:27] Speaker 4: Thank you very much, Your Honor. Appreciate the opportunity to argue this to you. A couple of points that occur to me. First of all, as Your Honor is well aware, a defendant, any defendant in this courtroom or any courtroom in our country, is entitled to have a juror who is true to their oath, who will agree that they will apply the facts as they determine them to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the law or as given to them by you as a judge or any other judge. If a jury consists of people and there's one person who is refusing to actually apply the law to the facts as determined for reasons that are not arising out of the case but are personal to the juror's position regarding their review of their oath and how they should apply their oath. In other words, if it's personal to this individual, which I believe it is based on the first question that you had. And I have never seen a situation like this where a foreperson on the jury is so courageous as to speak on behalf of 11 jurors and indicate the juror number, which I will not mention, and I quote, has made statements acknowledging doubt but refuses to apply it to the verdict as the law states. Clearly, Judge, we have a person who, under their oath, stood in front of you yesterday when you did the individual voir dire and according to this information, under oath, looked you in the eye and lied. That juror told you that he would be able to apply the law to the facts as you asked him. And based on this note from this juror, it clearly and unequivocally indicates that they are basically 11 to 1 and this person will not apply reasonable doubt to the evidence to return a not guilty verdict. I would ask that the court would, and I know it's awkward, I'm familiar with the law. I know that we try to protect and preserve the sanctity, if you will, of the jury. We don't want to invade their deliberations. We want to keep that private. Obviously, that's a good thing to do. But when you have a situation where you have not one but two notes that clearly indicates that this individual has acknowledged doubt but refuses to apply it to the verdict, he is, as the law states, he is not being honest with you at the sidebar. I would go so far as to reluctantly say that the individual has made a false statement under oath to this court. There has to be an issue that is not arising out of deliberations and the facts of this case. But the individual is refusing to apply your instructions on proof beyond a reasonable doubt to allow that jury to return a verdict of not guilty. [00:14:55] Speaker 3: If I may, Your Honor, I just wanted to put on the record that the note does not indicate that this juror lied to Your Honor when responding. The note indicates that the parties disagree on what is reasonable doubt or what doubt is and how it should be applied. And we are in no position to judge if the 11 are right or the one is right. But there's no indication that the juror is intentionally trying to mislead the court or lie to the court. [00:15:19] Speaker 2: All right. Thank you. Well, as all three counsel are aware, the case law spells out kind of the concerns that everybody has in a situation like this, where it says the discharge of a deliberating juror is a sensitive undertaking, fraught with potential error. It's to be done only in special circumstances with special precautions. A judge must take the utmost caution to avoid invading the province of the jury. And that's what I'm concerned with at this point. And as even under the statute, during deliberations, a juror properly may be discharged only for reasons personal to that juror, having nothing whatever to do with the issues of the case or with the juror's relationship with their fellow jurors. In this case here, I see no showing of the need for an inquiry of this particular juror. The note that we were referring to, the one from late yesterday afternoon, indicates that the juror has acknowledged doubt but refuses to apply it to the verdict. Well, the instruction that the SJC has suggested we give in regards to reasonable doubt and that both parties agreed to says that reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt. And so in reading that note carefully and strictly in the way that I have to before I possibly invade the province of the jury, that note does not indicate that this is a person who has refused to follow the law. And in addition, as the parties recognized yesterday, we brought all the jurors in, including the juror who is at issue here, and we asked, I asked, whether or not those jurors could follow the instructions, including the instruction I just referred to. And all the jurors indicated that they could. This is not a case that there's any indication that the juror has refused to deliberate or has any reason, has indicated that they would not follow the law or that they're physically suffering or there's no note from the juror that indicates that the juror cannot or will not be able to continue deliberating as some of the other cases talk about. So for reasons of that, I'm not going to do a further inquiry of this juror over the defendant's objection. And at that point, my inclination would be to bring the jury back. My thought would be, though, to remind them that it's their duty to accept the law as I give it to them, and that they have to follow that law. And I think this is what I told them a week ago, they have to follow whether they like it or not. So I'm going to give them that instruction and remind them of that. [00:18:34] Speaker 3: I was just going to ask that the court also instruct the jurors or remind them that any future notes should not contain any information about deliberation. [00:18:45] Speaker 2: Here's what I was going to say. If there's any notes or any future notes, if there are any, you should refrain from detailing any of the actual deliberations and do not indicate where they stand numerically. [00:18:56] Speaker 4: A couple of things. First of all, Your Honor acknowledges that I have an objection, which I appreciate. And I do have an objection. And I am, again, citing Article 12, Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This goes beyond Massachusetts law. This is constitutional. It's a structural, I suggest respectfully, defect in the procedure that we're engaged in. We're elevating form over substance, and that's Your Honor's ruling. I understand. I've objected. But I would ask that you not instruct the jury that they cannot indicate anything. And I understand why traditionally we tell jurors, don't let us know what your division is or what your split is. But in this case, I'm concerned that if you do that, that foreperson is going to feel that that is some type of that she violated something and might feel that Your Honor is kind of coming down on her not to do that. And I think it's too delicate right now a situation. And in addition, and finally, I would ask that you not just give them, as I described it yesterday, a soft inquiry. Will you listen to my instructions? I would ask that you specifically direct their attention to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and re-instruct them on that forcefully. I think I did that yesterday, didn't I? Yes. You did it yesterday, you did it soft, you didn't do it forcefully and I'm asking that you do it forcefully. [00:20:18] Speaker 2: What do you want me to do? Get a brass band? I read the instruction as written by the SJC. The fact that I perhaps didn't give it my full inflection, I'm sorry about that. I'm not an actor. [00:20:32] Speaker 4: I've just given the instructions. Well, my point, Judge, simply is that you're kind of glossing over the issue. The issue is this juror will not, according to that note, apply the law of reasonable doubt. And that's why I've requested, you know what I've requested, so I know my objection. [00:20:52] Speaker 2: But just in case the record is clear, I am specifically not glossing over this issue. I have thought about this issue long and hard. I know the defendant objects, but the characterization that I'm glossing over it, trust me, that's not the situation. I've been thinking about this for quite a while. So that's what I'm going to do. I'm going to just give that instruction, as I said, that they have to follow my instructions. I'm not going to reiterate the reasonable doubt at this point. It may come to that again as we go through it. And I'll try and give this with more pizzazz than I gave yesterday, I suppose. So with that, we'll bring the jury back in and I'll ask the questions. I'll give those kind of that instruction, then we'll send them back out. Okay. [00:22:03] Speaker ?: All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. [00:22:38] Speaker 5: All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. [00:22:51] Speaker 1: All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. [00:22:53] Speaker 2: Let's give it to Andrew. [00:22:54] Speaker 1: All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. Let's give it to Andrew. Let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. All right, let's give it to Andrew. Let's give it to Andrew. Let's give it to Andrew. Andrew is represented by Attorney Kevin Reddington. The Commonwealth is represented by Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Sprague and Assistant District Attorney Shannon Buckingham. [00:23:10] Speaker 2: All right, thank you, Madam Clerk. Good morning, everyone. Good morning, Judge. What I want to do is first ask you those questions and then move on from there. So the first question, as we all know, is going to be, is any member of the jury read, seen, heard, or overheard anything from any source about this case that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial juror? [00:23:33] Speaker 5: All right. [00:23:34] Speaker 2: The last of these questions is, is there any other serious matter or concern bearing on your service as a juror in this case that anybody needs to bring to my attention at this time? [00:23:43] Speaker 1: No. [00:23:44] Speaker 2: Thank you. All right, so I did get the note yesterday. And one thing I would say, if there are any notes in the future, and I'm not saying there are, but if there are, just make sure we don't put down where everybody is numerically, okay? But what I wanted to do was give you, go over one thing. I wanted to remind you, as I instructed you earlier, it's your duty as jurors to accept the law as I stated to you. You should consider all of my instructions as a whole. You may not ignore any instruction or give special attention to any one instruction. You must follow the law as I give it to you, whether you agree with it or not. The law that I'm instructing you on is the law that's been established by our legislature and our appellate courts. And it applies to everyone. And you must apply the law as I have instructed you. And you have a copy of the instructions that I gave you. You should still have them back there with the jury room. And with that, you may now resume your deliberations. [00:24:46] Speaker 4: Court, all rise. Court, this way please. [00:24:49] Speaker ?: Court, this way please. [00:25:17] Speaker 5: The jurors have exited the floor on this portion session. Please be seated. [00:25:21] Speaker 2: All right. Council, anything we need to address at this time? No, Your Honor. The defendant? [00:25:25] Speaker 4: One second, Your Honor, please. No, thank you. [00:25:29] Speaker 2: Okay. All right. So we'll be in recess on this matter. Thank you, everyone. [00:25:33] Speaker 5: Court, all rise. [00:25:35] Speaker ?: All right. All right. Council, have you seen the question? Yes, Your Honor. All right. Yes. All right. All right. Yes. All right. And the question is, it is with a heavy heart that we report. [00:25:43] Speaker 5: we are unable to come to a unanimous decision and we will not be able to come to a unanimous decision. And we'll not be able to. My. [00:25:52] Speaker 1: My. Well, let me ask what the. Yes. Okay. All right. To the purpose of the record, we return back to the matter of Commonwealth versus Lindsay Clancy. [00:25:59] Speaker 2: All parties are present, excluding the jury. All right. Council, have you seen the question? [00:26:02] Speaker 1: Yes, Your Honor. [00:26:03] Speaker 2: Yes. All right. And the question is, it is with a heavy heart that we report we are unable to come to a unanimous decision and will not be able to. But my. Well, let me ask what what is the party's position in regards to their question. [00:26:27] Speaker 3: Your Honor. From the Commonwealth's perspective, since the TUI instruction has already been given. And then there was like a deliberation after that. I think that it would require a mistrial at this point. Attorney Reddington. [00:26:38] Speaker 4: Your Honor, my understanding is that this court has the discretion to have the jury sent back for the second time. The first time that there was a report, we did not treat it as a report of deadlock. We did not instruct them under TUI. We did not give them soft TUI. We didn't give them anything. We just sent them back to deliberate. So technically, we have one report of deadlock that Your Honor gave the TUI Rodriguez charge to, I believe, under the statute, as well as the case law. This court has the ability to send the jury back. The fact that that jury foreperson wrote very unusually, it is with a heavy heart that we are unable to come to a decision. Based on the earlier questions that we have, I think that it would be a sound and a wise decision for this court to send it back under the law. [00:27:33] Speaker 2: Well, I would find that under Massachusetts case law and statutory law, the jury did not ask to be sent back, which would be a possibility if they had requested it to be sent back to them. But under the statute in the case law, I don't feel I have any choice but to declare a mistrial. [00:27:55] Speaker 4: Well, before you do, I would like to be heard, Your Honor. Well, that's why I asked you before, but go ahead. Well, I just got to that first one. You can get to the other one. All right. Your Honor, I would suggest to the court that, as we are pretty much all familiar with under Karen Reed versus the Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court through Justice Georges back in February of '25 held that under Rule 27 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, quote, gives a trial judge discretion to require a jury to return a verdict for charges on which they have agreed before declaring a mistrial as it relates to, and again I continue, quote, judge may first require the jury to return verdicts on those charges upon which the jury can agree and direct that such verdicts be received and recorded. It goes on further, and I quote, Rule 27 D also permits the judge to poll the jury when a verdict is returned and before the verdict is recorded. However, a judge is not required to accept a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial. So I'm asking that the court would entertain a poll of the jurors as to whether or not there has been a decision on murder one, murder two, manslaughter, anything like that. And if that's the case, then I certainly would argue that double jeopardy is attached and those judges cannot be prosecuted again. All right. Como? [00:29:19] Speaker 3: I would object to that, Your Honor. I would go into the deliberations. I think we're in a different scenario here than the Reid case, where I believe in that case they did reach a verdict on certain charges and not on others. But I think here where we've had a jury who's been deliberating for six and a half days, who's come back on multiple occasions saying that they're deadlocked who have been given Tui, I don't think anything else is required at this point other than the declaration of a mistrial, unfortunately. [00:29:47] Speaker 2: Over the defendant's objection, I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. All right. [00:29:54] Speaker ?: All right. If we bring the jury in. All right. All right. [00:29:55] Speaker 2: If we bring the jury in. All right. [00:29:57] Speaker ?: All right. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. [00:31:58] Speaker 4: While we're waiting for the jury, forgive me for raising this issue. I would ask that before you formally declare a mistrial that the court afford us the opportunity to take a 211-3 appeal direct to the Supreme Judicial Court single justice on this issue because of any number of issues that are of concern, others that have been addressed in the motions, the objections, but I further raise the issue of the American with Disabilities Act. I believe that this is a situation where there is a clear and present danger that this individual, for some reason, what it is, we don't know, but is taking a position that's intractable, regardless of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. So I want an opportunity to take an appeal to the single justice if the court will afford us that opportunity. [00:32:49] Speaker 2: How much time do you need to do that? [00:32:53] Speaker 4: I'd have it filed today and argue tomorrow. Saturday? They would do it on an emergency, yeah. I mean, I can try. [00:33:01] Speaker 2: So we're going to tell this jury to come back tomorrow? I'm just trying to, you know, the reason I'm asking it, I know, but as they're walking in, you're asking for this. I'm just trying to find out what it is that you're asking for. [00:33:19] Speaker 4: What I'm asking for is time to file a single justice appeal for this travesty. That's what I'm asking for. [00:33:24] Speaker 2: So you're asking for an emergency stay at this point? [00:33:27] Speaker 4: Yes, and the jurors don't have to come back tomorrow. They can be told they don't even have to come back if I lose the motion. But if I win the motion, then obviously they would have to come back Tuesday. [00:33:40] Speaker 2: If you want to go up and petition to the SJC for a stay, I'll give you an hour before we bring the jury back down. I think you could, it's just a request for the stay of the declaration of the mistrial. So I'll hold off for an hour, and then we'll come back in in regards to that. [00:33:59] Speaker ?: Okay. [00:34:00] Speaker 2: All right. [00:34:02] Speaker ?: Report. All rise. [00:34:05] Speaker 1: Attorney Jennifer Sprague, an assistant district attorney sheet in Buckingham. [00:34:10] Speaker 2: All right. Well, good morning, everyone. Good morning, counsel. Good morning. Hi. Good morning, Ms. Clancy. [00:34:13] Speaker 1: Good morning, Your Honor. [00:34:14] Speaker 2: All right. So at the end of the day yesterday, there was a note that was sent in from the jury, and we put over to today to address it. Come on, if you had the opportunity to review that note. [00:34:34] Speaker 3: Yes, Your Honor. [00:34:34] Speaker 2: All right. A defendant, you had the opportunity. Yes, Your Honor. All right. And so I will hear from the parties as to how the each party suggests or requests I deal with that note. So I want to hear from the Commonwealth first. [00:35:00] Speaker 3: Thank you, Your Honor. I apologize for my voice. So Commonwealth's suggestion is that the jurors be instructed to return to the deliberations without any further instruction or order. The basis for that request is Commonwealth versus Ronchi, R-O-N-C-H-I, 491, Mass, 284, from 2023. In that case, it's a similar situation where it's reported one juror is having issues with the other jurors. And it says in that case where reliable information comes to a judge suggesting a lack of impartiality, bias, extraneous influence, or inability to deliberate that there should be an individual voir dire hearing regarding that. We don't have any of those circumstances here. There's no indication of a lack of impartiality, or bias, or extraneous influence, and no indication of inability to deliberate. In fact, if deliberated for a very long time in this case and very conscientiously. So what we have here is a note that indicates a disagreement about how to weigh the evidence, and that's deliberation. So it's the Commonwealth's position, especially considering the fact that Your Honor voir dire at each of the jurors yesterday, and they all said that they could follow your instructions. So when you couple that with the requirements at Ronke, I don't think an individual voir dire is necessary. If Your Honor does determine to do one, we would just ask along the lines of all the case law in this area, Ronke, Williams, Torres, the whole string of cases, that the juror be instructed not to comment on the deliberations, and that the juror be told that he or she cannot be discharged unless a personal problem unrelated to their relationship with the jurors or their views on the case. And that any attempt or any comments by the juror that tend to get into deliberations that Your Honor interrupt and remind the juror that we're not to get into that, and that questioning be ceased of the juror unless he or she indicates that there is a personal problem unrelated to the case or the relationships. Alright, thank you. [00:37:07] Speaker 4: Defendant. [00:37:08] Speaker 3: Thank you very much, Your Honor. [00:37:09] Speaker ?: I appreciate the opportunity to argue this to you. [00:37:10] Speaker 4: A couple of points that occur to me. First of all, as Your Honor is well aware, a defendant, any defendant in this courtroom or any courtroom in our country, is entitled to have a juror who is true to their oath, who will agree with the law. If a jury consists of people and there's one person, and there's one person who has a judge, and there's one person who has a judge, and there's one person who has a judge. If a jury consists of people and there's one person who is refusing to actually apply the law to the facts as determined for reasons that are not arising out of the case, but are personal to the juror's position regarding their review of their oath and how they should apply their oath. In other words, if it's personal to this individual, which I believe it is, based on the first question that you had. And I have never seen a situation like this where a foreperson on the jury is so courageous as to speak on behalf of 11 jurors and indicate the juror number, which I will not mention, and I quote, "has made statements acknowledging doubt, but refuses to apply it to the verdict as the law states." Clearly, judge, we have a person who, under their oath, stood in front of you yesterday when you did the individual voir dire, and according to this information, under oath, looked you in the eye and lied. That juror told you that he would be able to apply the law to the facts as you asked him. And based on this note from this juror, it clearly and unequivocally indicates that they are basically 11 to 1, and this person will not apply reasonable doubt to the evidence to return a not guilty verdict. I would ask that the court would, and I know it's awkward, I'm familiar with the law, I know that we try to protect and preserve the sanctity, if you will, of the jury. We don't want to invade their deliberations, we want to keep that private, obviously that's a good thing to do. But when you have a situation where you have not one but two notes that clearly indicates that this individual has acknowledged doubt, but refuses to apply it to the verdict, he is, as the law states, he is not being honest with you at the sidebar. I would go so far as to reluctantly say that the individual has made a false statement under oath to this court. There has to be an issue that is not arising out of deliberations and the facts of this case, but the individual is refusing to apply your instructions on proof beyond a reasonable doubt to allow that jury to return a verdict of not guilty. [00:40:37] Speaker 3: If I may, Your Honor, I just wanted to put on the record that the note does not indicate that this juror lied to Your Honor when responding. The note indicates that the parties disagree on what is reasonable doubt or what doubt is and how it should be applied. And we are in no position to judge if the 11 are right or the one is right, but there's no indication that the juror is intentionally trying to mislead the court or lie to the court. [00:41:04] Speaker 2: All right, thank you. Well, as all three counsel are aware, the case law spells out the concerns that everybody has in a situation like this, where it says the discharge of a deliberating juror is sensitive undertaking, fraught with potential error. It's to be done only in special circumstances with special precautions. A judge must take the utmost caution to avoid invading the province of the jury. And that's what I'm concerned with at this point. And as even under the statute, during deliberations, a juror properly may be discharged only for reasons personal to that juror, having nothing whatever to do with the issues of the case or with the juror's relationship with their fellow jurors. In this case here, I see no showing of the need for an inquiry of this particular juror. The note that we were referring to, the one from late yesterday afternoon, indicates that the juror says acknowledge doubt but refuses to apply it to the verdict. Well, the instruction that the SJC has suggested we give in regards to reasonable doubt and that both parties agreed to says that reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt. And so in reading that note carefully and strictly in the way that I have to before I possibly invade the province of the jury, that note does not indicate that this is a person who has refused to follow the law. And in addition, as the parties recognized yesterday, we brought all the jurors in, including the juror who is at issue here. And we asked, I asked, whether or not those jurors could follow the instructions, including the instruction I just referred to. And all the jurors indicated that they could. This is not a case that there's any indication that the juror has refused to deliberate or has any reason has indicated that they would not follow the law or that they're physically suffering or there's no note from the juror that indicates that the juror cannot or will not be able to continue deliberating as some of the other cases talk about. So for reasons for that, I'm not going to do a further inquiry of this juror over the defendant's objection. And at that point, my inclination would be to bring the jury back. My thought would be, though, to remind them that it's their duty to accept the law as I give it to them and that they have to follow that law. And I think this is what I told them a week ago. They have to follow whether they like it or not. So I'm going to give them that instruction and remind them of that. So with that. Go ahead. [00:44:22] Speaker 3: I was just going to ask that the court also instruct the jurors or remind them that any future notes should not contain any information about deliberation. [00:44:30] Speaker 2: Well, here's what I was going to say. If there's any notes or any future notes, if there are any, you should refrain from detailing any of the actual deliberations and do not indicate where they stand numerically. [00:44:42] Speaker 4: A couple of things. Sure. First of all, I want to acknowledge that I have an objection, which I appreciate. And I do have an objection. And I am, again, citing Article 12, Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This goes beyond Massachusetts law. This is constitutional. It's a structural, I suggest respectfully, defect in the procedure that we're engaged in. We're elevating form over substance. And that's Your Honor's ruling. I understand. I've objected. I would ask that you not instruct the jury that they cannot indicate anything. And I understand why traditionally we tell jurors, don't let us know what your division is or what your split is. But in this case, I'm concerned that if you do that, that foreperson is going to feel that that is some type of, that she violated something and might feel that Your Honor is kind of coming down on her and not to do that. And I think it's too delicate right now a situation. And in addition, and finally, I would ask that you not just give them, as I described it yesterday, a soft inquiry. Will you listen to my instructions? I would ask that you specifically direct their attention to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and re-instruct them on that forcefully. I think I did that yesterday, didn't I? Yes. You did it yesterday. You did it soft. You didn't do it forcefully. And I'm asking that you do it forcefully. [00:46:02] Speaker 2: I mean, what do you want me to do? I want you to tell this. Get a brass band? I read the instruction as written by the SJC. Right. The fact that I perhaps didn't give it my full inflection, I'm sorry about that. I'm not an actor. I've just given the instructions. [00:46:18] Speaker 4: Well, my point, Judge, simply, is that you're kind of glossing over the issue. The issue is, this juror will not, according to that note, apply the law of reasonable doubt. And that's why I've requested, you know what I've requested, so I know my objection. Right. [00:46:38] Speaker 2: But just in case the record is clear, I am specifically not glossing over this issue. I have thought about this issue long and hard. I know the defendant objects, but the characterization that I'm glossing over it, trust me, that's not the situation. I've been thinking about this for quite a while. So that's what I'm going to do. I'm going to just give that instruction, as I said, that they have to follow my instructions. I'm not going to reiterate the reasonable doubt at this point. It may come to that again as we go through it. And I'll try and give this with more pizzazz than I gave yesterday, I suppose. So with that, we'll bring the jury back in, and I'll ask the questions. I'll give those kind of that instruction, and then we'll send them back out. Okay. [00:47:35] Speaker ?: All right. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. We're going to get back out. Hey, hey, hey. [00:48:20] Speaker 5: With all the persons having anything to do before the auto, William Sullivan, Justice of the Sperry Court, now sitting on Plymouth, within and for the Commonwealth. We're on the air. Give your attendance and you shall be heard. God save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This court is now in session. Please be seated. [00:48:38] Speaker 1: Yes, please. Your Honor, present before the court, we have 12 deliberating jurors and six alternates in the matter of Commonwealth versus Lindsay Clancy. Ms. Clancy is present. She is represented by Attorney Kevin Reddington. The Commonwealth is represented by Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Sprague and Assistant District Attorney Shannon Buckingham. All right. [00:48:56] Speaker 2: Thank you, Madam Clerk. Good morning, everyone. Good morning, Judge. What I want to do is first ask you those questions and then move on from there. So the first question, as we all know, is going to be, is any member of the jury read, seen, heard or overheard anything from any source about this case that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial juror? [00:49:18] Speaker 5: No. [00:49:19] Speaker 2: All right. The last of these questions is, is there any other serious matter or concern bearing on your service as a juror in this case that anybody needs to bring to my attention at this time? [00:49:28] Speaker 1: No. [00:49:29] Speaker 2: Thank you. All right. So I did get the note yesterday. And one thing I would say, if there's, if there are any notes in the future, and I'm not saying there are, but if there are, just don't, make sure we don't put down where everybody is numerically. Okay. But what I wanted to do was give you, go over one thing. I wanted to remind you, as I instructed you earlier, it's your duty as jurors to accept the law as I stated to you. You should consider all of my instructions as a whole. You may not ignore any instruction or give special attention to any one instruction. You must follow the law as I give it to you, whether you agree with it or not. The law that I'm instructing you on is the law that's been established by our legislature and our appellate courts. And it applies to everyone. And you must apply the law as I have instructed you. And you have a copy of the instructions that I gave you. You should still have them back there with the jury room. And with that, you may now resume your deliberations. [00:50:31] Speaker 4: Court, all rise. Sure. This way, please. [00:51:01] Speaker ?: Court, all rise. Court, all rise. [00:51:02] Speaker 5: Thank you. Thank you. [00:51:04] Speaker ?: All right. [00:51:04] Speaker 5: All right. All right. [00:51:06] Speaker ?: All right. [00:51:06] Speaker 2: All right. [00:51:07] Speaker ?: All right. [00:51:07] Speaker 2: All right. [00:51:08] Speaker ?: All right. [00:51:08] Speaker 2: So we'll be in recess on this matter. Thank you, everyone. [00:51:10] Speaker ?: Court, all rise. [00:51:10] Speaker 4: All right. [00:51:11] Speaker ?: All right. [00:51:11] Speaker 4: All right. [00:51:13] Speaker ?: All right. [00:51:14] Speaker 2: All right. All right. [00:51:16] Speaker ?: All right. [00:51:16] Speaker 2: We'll be in recess on this matter. [00:51:17] Speaker ?: All right. [00:51:17] Speaker 2: We'll be in recess on this matter. [00:51:18] Speaker 5: Thank you, everyone. All right. [00:51:20] Speaker ?: All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. [00:51:34] Speaker 5: All right. All right. All right. [00:51:37] Speaker 1: All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. All right. [00:51:44] Speaker 2: All right. All right. [00:51:46] Speaker ?: All right. [00:51:46] Speaker 2: All right. All right. [00:51:48] Speaker 1: All right. [00:51:49] Speaker 2: All right. All right. And the question is, it is with a heavy heart that we report we are unable to come to a unanimous decision and will not be able to. My, well, let me ask what is the party's position in regards to that question. [00:52:12] Speaker 3: Your Honor, from McConnell's perspective, since the TUI instruction has already been given, and then there was like a deliberation after that, I think that it would require a mistrial at this point. [00:52:23] Speaker 2: The Attorney Regan. Attorney Regan. [00:52:25] Speaker 4: Your Honor, my understanding is that this court has the discretion to have the jury sent back for the second time. The first time that there was a report, we did not treat it as a report of deadlock. We did not instruct them under TUI. We did not give them soft TUI. We didn't give them anything. We just sent them back to deliberate. So technically, we have one report of deadlock that your Honor gave the TUI Rodriguez charge to, I believe under the statute, as well as the case law. This court has the ability to send the jury back. The fact that that jury foreperson wrote very unusually, it is with a heavy heart that we are unable to come to a decision. Based on the earlier questions that we have, I think that it would be a sound and a wise decision for this court to send it back under the law. [00:53:19] Speaker 2: Well, I would find that under Massachusetts case law and statutory law, the jury did not ask to be sent back, which would be a possibility if they had requested it to be sent back to them. But under the statute and the case law, I don't feel I have any choice but to declare a mistrial. [00:53:41] Speaker 4: Well, before you do, I'd like to be heard, Your Honor. Well, that's why I asked you before, but go ahead. Well, I just got to that first one. I didn't get to the other one. All right. Your Honor, I would suggest to the court that, as we are pretty much all familiar with, under Karen Reed versus the Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court through Justice George's back in February of '25 held that under Rule 27 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, "gives a trial judge discretion to require a jury to return a verdict on those charges upon which the jury can agree and direct that such verdicts be received and recorded." It goes on further, and I quote, Rule 27 D also permits the judge to poll the jury when a verdict is returned and before the verdict is recorded. However, a judge is not required to accept a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial. So I'm asking that the court would entertain a poll of the jurors as to whether or not there has been a decision on murder one, murder two, manslaughter, anything like that. And if that's the case, then I certainly would argue that double jeopardy is attached and those judges cannot be prosecuted again. I would object to that, Your Honor. [00:55:04] Speaker 3: I would go into the deliberations. I think we're in a different scenario here than the Reed case, where I believe in that case they did reach a verdict on certain charges and not on others. But I think here, where we've had a jury who's been deliberating for six and a half days, who's come back on multiple occasions saying that they're deadlocked, who have been given TUE. I don't think anything else is required at this point other than the declaration of a mistrial, unfortunately. [00:55:32] Speaker 2: Over the defendant's objection, I'm going to declare a mistrial at this point. All right. [00:55:40] Speaker ?: All right. [00:55:41] Speaker 2: If we bring the jury in. [00:56:02] Speaker ?: We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. [00:57:44] Speaker 4: We're going to declare a mistrial at this point. We're waiting for the jury. Forgive me for raising this issue. I would ask that before you formally declare a mistrial that the court afford us the opportunity to take a 211-3 appeal direct to the Supreme Judicial Court single justice on this issue because of any number of issues that are of concern, others that have been addressed in the motions, the objections. But I further raise the issue of the American with Disabilities Act. I believe that this is a situation where there is a clear and present danger that this individual, for some reason, what it is, we don't know, but is taking a position that's intractable regardless of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. So I want an opportunity to take an appeal to the single justice if the court would afford us that opportunity. [00:58:34] Speaker 2: How much time do you need to do that? [00:58:37] Speaker 4: I'd have it filed today and argue tomorrow. Saturday? They would do it on an emergency, yeah. I mean, I can try. [00:58:46] Speaker 2: So we're going to tell this jury to come back tomorrow? I'm just trying to find out what it is that you're asking for. [00:59:03] Speaker 4: What I'm asking for is time to file a single justice appeal for this travesty. That's what I'm asking for. [00:59:09] Speaker 2: So you're asking for an emergency stay at this point? [00:59:12] Speaker 4: Yes. And the jurors don't have to come back tomorrow. They can be told that they don't even have to come back if I lose the motion. But if I win the motion, then obviously they would have to come back Tuesday. [00:59:23] Speaker 2: I'll, if you want to go up and petition to the SJC for a stay, I'll give you an hour before we bring the jury back down. I think you could, it's just a request for the stay of the declaration of the mistrial. So I'll hold off for an hour and then we'll come back in in regards to that. Okay. All right. [00:59:46] Speaker ?: All right. All right. All right. [00:59:50] Speaker 1: All right. Jennifer Sprague, an assistant district attorney in Buckingham. All right. [00:59:54] Speaker 2: Well, good morning, everyone. Good morning, council. Good morning. Hi, good morning, Ms. Clancy. [00:59:58] Speaker 4: Good morning, Your Honor. [00:59:59] Speaker 2: All right. So at the end of the day yesterday, there was a note that was sent in from the jury. And we put over to today to address it. Come off. You had the opportunity to review that note. Yes, Your Honor. All right. A defendant, you had an opportunity. Yes, Your Honor. All right. And so I will hear from the parties as to how the each party suggests a request. I deal with that note. So I want to hear from the Commonwealth first. [01:00:45] Speaker 3: Thank you, Your Honor. I apologize for my voice. So Commonwealth's suggestion is that the jurors be instructed to return to the deliberations without any further instruction or order. The basis for that request is Commonwealth versus Ronchi, R-O-N-C-H-I 491 Mass 284 from 2023. In that case, it's a similar situation where it's reported one juror is having issues with other jurors, and it says in that case where reliable information comes to a judge suggesting a lack of impartiality, bias, extraneous influence, or inability to deliberate that there should be an individual wardier hearing regarding that. We don't have any of those circumstances here. There's no indication of a lack of impartiality or bias or extraneous influence and no indication of inability to deliberate. In fact, they've deliberated for a very long time in this case and very conscientiously. So what we have here is a note that indicates a disagreement about how to weigh the evidence and that's deliberation. So it's the Commonwealth's position, especially considering the fact that Your Honor wardiered each of the jurors yesterday and they all said that they could follow your instructions. So when you couple that with the requirements of Ronchi, I don't think an individual wardier is necessary. If Your Honor does determine to do one, we would just ask along the lines of all the case law in this area, Ronchi, Williams, Torres, the whole string of cases, that the juror be instructed not to comment on the deliberations and that the juror be told that he or she cannot be discharged unless a personal problem unrelated to their relationship with the jurors or their views on the case. And that any attempt or any comments by the juror that tend to get into deliberations that Your Honor interrupt and remind the juror that we're not to get into that and that questioning be ceased of the juror unless he or she indicates that there is a personal problem unrelated to the case or the relationships. All right. [01:02:52] Speaker 2: Thank you. [01:02:53] Speaker 3: Defendant. [01:02:54] Speaker 4: Thank you very much, Your Honor. I appreciate the opportunity to argue this to you. A couple of points that occur to me. First of all, as Your Honor is well aware, a defendant, any defendant in this courtroom or any courtroom in our country, is entitled to have a juror who is true to their oath, who will agree that they will apply the facts as they determine them to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the law as given to them by you as a judge or any other judge. If a jury consists of people and there's one person who is refusing to actually apply the law to the facts as determined for reasons that are not arising out of the case but are personal to the juror's position regarding their review of their oath and how they should apply their oath. In other words, if it's personal to this individual, which I believe it is, based on the first question that you had, and I have never seen a situation like this where a foreperson on the jury is so courageous as to speak on behalf of 11 jurors and indicate the juror number, which I will not mention, the judge has made statements acknowledging doubt, but refuses to apply it to the verdict as the law states. Clearly, judge, we have a person who under their oath stood in front of you yesterday when you did the individual voir dire, and according to this information, under oath, both looked you in the eye and lied. That juror told you that he would be able to apply the law to the facts as you asked him. And based on this note from this