Is Putin Losing His Grip on Russia? — Steve Rosenberg

[0:00] Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the authorities have passed a series of laws [0:05] designed to silence dissent and to silence criticism. That is why expressing publicly [0:11] criticism of the Kremlin can get people into trouble. Independent Russian journalists who [0:16] are critical of the authorities are very much on the front line, putting themselves in a lot of [0:21] danger. Because of its decision primarily to launch this full-scale invasion of Ukraine, [0:25] we've seen Russian influence wane. Two-thirds of Russians approximately would like [0:29] peace talks rather than a continuation of the war. This is the house that Vlad built. It was built [0:35] by Putin. It was built for Putin. It was built around Putin, which raises the question, [0:40] can the house survive post-Putin? Welcome to The Restless Politics Leading with me, [0:46] Rory Stewart. And me, Alistair Campbell. And our guest today is the BBC's Russia editor, [0:50] Steve Rosenberg. If there's one voice that's been the soundtrack of Britain's understanding of Russia, [0:56] it is definitely Steve's. He's one of the few foreign journalists who seems to be allowed [1:00] to ask questions at Putin's marathon press conferences. And he's regularly abused on [1:06] state media. But let's start with the war. We keep hearing that there's real war fatigue [1:11] in Russia. Is that so? I think there is war fatigue, certainly amongst the population. I mean, [1:17] we're still allowed to travel across the country. We go to towns and villages and cities and speak to [1:22] people and people still willing to speak to us on the street. Wherever we go, yes, people talk about, [1:28] well, we hope the war will be over. And people do use the word war. You know, officially, [1:33] it's not a war. Officially, it's still a special military operation. But most people call it a war [1:38] now because when they switch on their television sets, they see a war, basically. And this war is [1:44] now in its fifth year. And yes, you certainly feel that people are feeling the effects of it more than [1:49] ever. You know, a couple of years ago, when I used to ask people on the streets, [1:54] in what ways are they affected by the war? A lot of people said, well, we're not affected by it. [1:59] You know, it's something on our television sets. But now, you know, a lot of people know other [2:03] people who've been fighting in Ukraine, who've been getting injured, who've been being killed in [2:08] Ukraine. And people are feeling the economic effects more of more than four years of international [2:13] sanctions. And the latest polling here suggests that, you know, two thirds of Russians approximately [2:21] would like peace talks rather than a continuation of the war. [2:25] This episode is presented by IG. [2:30] So whether it's the vetting of senior political appointments or it's costly policy U-turns, [2:34] the last few months of UK politics have been a masterclass of what happens when you don't [2:39] do your homework. And the consequences, as we've seen, can ripple out far beyond the initial decision. [2:45] And the same rules apply when choosing your investment platform, because picking the wrong one [2:49] can hit you directly and in a very measurable way. Some investment platforms charge hundreds [2:54] of pounds more a year than others, losing you money that never got the chance to grow. [2:58] With IG, there are no annual fees, meaning more of your money stays invested from day one. [3:02] And on top of that, you pay zero commission on stocks, shares and ETFs. So there are no hidden [3:08] charges quietly eating into your returns. [3:10] And even better, IG has been trusted by British investors for over 50 years. [3:15] Does it feel like a totalitarian state where people are worried that if they openly criticise [3:32] Putin, they're going to end up getting thrown in jail or getting their heads chopped off? Or is [3:36] it a state which somehow operates in quite a different way where people are able to talk pretty [3:41] freely? It's an interesting question. I mean, you know, despite the level of anti-Western bile [3:47] in the state media here, and anti-UK rhetoric, on the street, people are willing to stop and to speak [3:54] to us when we tell them we're the BBC. Obviously, there are things I wouldn't ask people. There are [3:59] questions I wouldn't ask that could get people into trouble. I wouldn't ask people directly, [4:04] what do you think? Do you support Vladimir Putin? Or do you support the war? But there are plenty of [4:09] other questions you can ask around the subject to get an idea of the mood. And because of that, [4:14] I think it's very, it's worth being here still, because you can get a sense, you could put the [4:20] jigsaw pieces together and get an idea of what the mood of the country is. I would say that, [4:25] you know, 95% of my interactions with ordinary Russians are positive. So on the one hand, you've got [4:32] a very sort of anti-Western attitude from the state media, from the authorities. On the other hand, [4:38] Russians are happy to chat. Russians still believe that they're Europeans. You know, [4:42] many people have said to me, we're glad you're here. We're glad you stayed. [4:45] Just to explain for an audience that doesn't know Russia as well as you do, [4:48] why wouldn't you be able to ask, do you support Vladimir Putin? Do you support the war? What would [4:54] be the consequences for an individual who spoke out in a very open and critical way on the BBC, [4:59] attacking Putin or the government? [5:00] On paper, Russia is a democracy. It says that in the constitution. But particularly since the full-scale [5:07] Russian invasion of Ukraine, the authorities have passed a series of laws designed to silence dissent [5:14] and to silence criticism of the authorities. That is why expressing publicly criticism of the Kremlin [5:22] can get people into trouble. That doesn't mean it doesn't happen. And over the last few months [5:28] on social media, voices have popped up openly critical of the authorities and of the president. [5:35] But it is, you know, quite dangerous. [5:38] When you're out and about, let's say you want to travel to, I don't know, Novgorod, would you be [5:43] under surveillance the whole time? And for example, would they know before this interview [5:47] goes out that you've done this interview? And would they be aware of things that you might say? [5:52] It's a good question. I don't know to what extent, you know, we're under surveillance. [5:56] I'm sure that these days, there are lots of different ways in which the authorities can sort of keep an eye [6:01] eye on what we're doing. And if you thought about that all the time, then, you know, you'd probably [6:06] never leave the house. [6:08] Yeah, you'd go mad. [6:08] You know, we try not to think about that all the time. So I'm not doing anything wrong. I'm just [6:13] doing my job. And, you know, we go out. I think if you fly somewhere or you take a train somewhere, [6:18] then probably the authorities are more alerted to the fact that you're going somewhere. But as soon [6:25] as you register in a local hotel, they certainly know you're there. [6:29] And do you ever feel that you have to pull your punches or just be a little bit more careful than [6:34] maybe you would be, say, you're in the UK or France or Germany? [6:38] It's a really difficult balancing act because on the one hand, there's no point me being here [6:43] if I can't tell the stories I think it is. You know, there's no point me being here if I can't say [6:48] anything. On the other hand, you know, I'm aware that there are kind of restrictions and new [6:53] restrictions coming in all the time. For example, in Moscow, recently, they brought in new rules [6:59] saying that we can't report about the consequences of drone attacks, for example, in the Moscow area. [7:07] So all these rules and regulations and laws, they're in my head. So it's kind of, yeah, I'm [7:14] walking a bit of a tightrope kind of when I go on air because I want to get the story out, but I want [7:19] to remain so I can get more stories out. [7:21] Let's take us back in time and give us a bit of a portrait of how you've seen Russia change. [7:28] Tell us about what Russia was like when you first arrived and maybe give us three or four [7:32] moments in history to show the changes during your professional life. [7:35] Well, I've seen several different kinds of Russias, Rory. I saw the end of Soviet Russia [7:40] as a student of Russian. I spent a year here in 1989, 1990. So just before the collapse of the [7:47] Soviet Union. And in fact, that was the year the Berlin Wall came down. It was an amazing time. [7:54] People, I remember, in 89, 90, believed that they had the power to change their country. [8:00] People were energised by politics. There were sort of semi-free elections for a new Soviet parliament. [8:07] People were listening to their radios, watching the television. They were really interested in the [8:12] changes that Gorbachev had brought into their country. Changes which led to the collapse of [8:17] their country, but still. And Soviet television at the end of the 80s was incredibly interesting. [8:22] People, millions, tens of millions of people sat watching the popular talk shows at the time. [8:27] That was the end of Soviet Russia. Then you had Yeltsin's Russia, independent Russia, [8:32] which was a mixture of chaos. Millions of people fell into poverty because of the switchover from the [8:42] command economy to the free market. And the economic reforms pushed a lot of people into poverty [8:49] and made a lot of people disillusioned with the idea of democracy. And yet there was still hope. [8:55] There was hope for that decade, the 1990s, that Russia and the West, you know, were going to link [9:00] cans and be friends and be partners. And that the Cold War was behind us. But you had the drama of [9:08] 1993 and Yeltsin sending tanks against the parliament. You have the two Chechen wars. So it was an often [9:14] chaotic period. And it's a period that Vladimir Putin often refers back to, to warn people, you know, [9:19] what life could be like. Then you had Putin's Russia. Vladimir Putin came along and stabilised things. [9:26] And I think for the first few years, he was incredibly popular. Oil prices went up, [9:31] which was good timing. And yeah, people's prosperity went up. But gradually he became [9:37] increasingly frustrated with the West, I think, and fuelled by resentment of the West. He believed [9:45] that the West wasn't serious about a long-term relationship with him and with Russia. And then [9:52] you come to this current Russia we're in now, which I often call Zed Russia, because Zed is one of the [9:59] symbols of Putin's special military operation. So the Russia we see from February the 24th, 2022, [10:07] feels like a very different kind of Russia. Much more repression, more repressive legislation. [10:14] Russia's taken a darker path. And Russia presents itself as a besieged fortress, even though Russia [10:22] launched an invasion of Ukraine. Russia presents itself to the world and to its people as a besieged [10:27] fortress. It says there are threats to it everywhere, NATO, America, Europe. And it wants [10:35] the Russian public to believe that they need to kind of unite around the government. That's the message [10:41] from the authorities. So yeah, over the last sort of 35 years, I've seen kind of different kinds of [10:48] Russias. But one conclusion from that is that things can change here quite quickly, actually. [10:56] Just when you think that Russia has taken one particular path, it changes. [11:00] Just on the theme of change. So I met Yeltsin quite a few times and working with Tony Blair, [11:06] and then I met Putin quite a lot during the early period of his rule. And when Rory and I interviewed [11:11] the widows of Alexander Litvinenko and Alexei Navalny, they both said that they thought we were naive. [11:18] Ever to have believed that Putin might be trying to build better relations with the West. [11:23] We, if you remember, we were quite a big part of trying to get the G7 to become the G8. [11:28] And, you know, for some years there he was alongside, he was even standing alongside Tony Blair when [11:33] Tony Blair announced that he was returning to London to deal with the 7-7 bombing. [11:38] So were we naive? Or was, when we talk of change, is the Vladimir Putin of today a completely [11:46] changed Vladimir Putin to the one that we knew back at the turn of the century? [11:49] I think he has changed. People change, particularly over a quarter of a century. [11:53] And when I think back to the Putin of 2000, the Putin that sat with Tony Blair at the ballet, [12:00] right, in St. Petersburg, someone who reached out to the West, who believed in building a [12:07] relationship with the West, the United States, with Europe, with the UK, he changed. And I think [12:12] that we saw that particularly with his big speech in Munich at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, [12:19] when a lot of the resentments that had been bubbling away inside him came out. And that was a shock for Europe. [12:26] Remind us a little bit of that speech. Tell us a little bit about what happened, why it was dramatic, [12:30] why it was a change, what he said, and why he changed. [12:33] He was in Munich. We kind of heard for the first time his resentment about a world dominated [12:40] by one power, this call for a multipolar world that you hear a lot now from the Russian authorities. [12:47] And he was laying down a challenge, I think, to the West, basically saying that, no, you know, [12:53] Russia isn't going to take things lying down. Russia is going to protect its interests as it sees them. [13:00] And I think it was a warning to the West. It wasn't the moment that Western leaders concluded [13:08] it was impossible to build a relationship with Russia. And of course, not long after that, [13:15] Vladimir Putin, on paper, at least, stepped aside. And Russia had a new president, Dmitry Medvedev. [13:20] Although, you know, the power behind the throne very much, I think, was Vladimir Putin. [13:27] But the sense was that Russia was kind of keeping on a democratic path. However, certainly from 2012, [13:35] when Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin, you know, we'd seen street protests, big street protests [13:41] in Russia. I think Putin believed that the West was out to get him. The West was out to foment [13:46] revolution. He convinced himself of that. And you remember when Barack Obama described Russia as a [13:53] regional power? I think that hurt. That hurt Putin. And I think he kind of concluded that he wanted to [13:59] show the world that Russia was a global power and a superpower. So all of these things were bubbling [14:05] inside him. He wanted to assert his authority, and particularly in relation to Ukraine. The annexation [14:11] of Crimea was obviously a key moment. What about the corruption? Do you think he was always [14:17] minded to be corrupt, or at least to kind of organise this oligarchic economy? And secondly, [14:25] when did he sort of decide that you didn't really necessarily have to worry too much about telling the [14:31] truth when you're in power? You can actually create your own fictional narratives and force them [14:37] through public opinion. I don't know if there was one particular moment. I mean, you know, he came [14:42] back, he gained power. He was given power, basically, in 2000. And very quickly, we saw changes, [14:49] right? Him bringing back the Soviet national anthem was a sign that he was going to take Russia in a [14:55] different direction. But I think the thing we have to keep in mind about Vladimir Putin and the Putin [15:00] system, we need to think of it as a house. You know, this is the house that Vlad built, right? It was built [15:06] by Putin. It was built for Putin. It was built around Putin. If you go around in every room of [15:12] the house, every room is in the image of Vladimir Putin, which raises the question, can the house [15:17] survive post Putin? But that's another question, I think, for another day. But it was built with very [15:22] strong foundations, this system, this house. And those foundations have been rocked, certainly in the [15:29] last four years by the war, and by the economic consequences of the war. And there's definitely [15:36] structural damage which has been done to it. And we saw that in 2023, during the Wagner mutiny, [15:43] you know, when Yevgeny Prigozhin, remember, started marching on Moscow with his mercenaries. [15:49] And for 24 hours, the system was in paralysis. So damage has been done. And what we don't know is [15:57] what are the shocks around the corner, I think, to this house. There's no sign of it falling at the [16:02] moment. But, you know, we don't know what shocks are ahead of us. [16:06] You went back to this moment where Obama called Russia regional power. And I grew up in a British [16:12] politics, which from 2010 onwards, loved to say, you know, the Russian economy is the third smaller [16:18] than the British economy, doesn't really matter anymore. And then we had this strange moment, [16:24] I think, probably 2014, where we suddenly discovered this country that we thought was, [16:29] you know, less wealthy than the United Kingdom, and therefore, we imagine maybe was the third [16:32] less powerful globally than the United Kingdom, was able to completely tip the balance of power [16:37] in Syria, annex Crimea. So what is it that people missed about Russia when they went around saying, [16:44] this is a country of an economy a third smaller than Britain, and it's just a regional power? [16:49] What is it that makes Russia, in a sense, much more powerful than countries like Britain or France? [16:57] Well, Russia, obviously, is the biggest country in the world geographically. It's a nuclear [17:01] superpower. So that's for starters. But I think what we saw in Vladimir Putin, he was someone who was [17:07] prepared to push the envelope and to play the hand that he had in quite a clever way to project Russian [17:16] power. And he got used to winning regularly. You know, whether we're talking about the war in Georgia, [17:23] whether we're talking about Syria, the Russian army in Syria, whether we're talking about Russia's [17:29] annexation of Crimea, he got used to playing poker and winning. There is an argument to say that perhaps [17:36] the West was too slow in reacting to that or finding a way to react to that. And that leads up to the [17:43] full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. I think he believed, he was confident in 2022, that the [17:50] special military operation that he launched would be successful. And it, of course, it hasn't gone [17:56] at all according to plan. But just listening to him now, he still believes, I think, or he has [18:01] convinced himself that actually Russia is in the driving seat, you know, despite everything we see. [18:08] What you just said, does that not underline the nonsense, really, of him thinking that everybody's [18:13] out to get him? If anything, I do agree with you that maybe the West was too accepting, [18:18] too forgiving, too slow, too actually confident in thinking that he wouldn't keep pushing the [18:25] envelope. And I think Syria probably was the turning point in that. That's where he thought [18:28] these guys aren't going to do anything. Absolutely. Absolutely. And to add to that, Alistair, [18:33] I think there's no doubt that European leaders and European businessmen wanted a decent relationship [18:40] with Russia. They thought it was beneficial to their countries and to their businesses to have a good [18:45] relationship with Russia, not to go to war with Russia, not to have conflict with Russia and [18:50] certainly not to have a war in Europe. But the view from the Kremlin, I think, you know, as we got [18:56] these current revolutions going on in parts of the former Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin got convinced [19:02] and perhaps people around him were telling him as well, that no, attempts are being made by the West, [19:07] by the United States, by NATO, to undermine Russia, to move into parts of the former Soviet Empire that [19:15] Russia still considered, you know, its backyard. And, you know, this continued as street protests built inside [19:23] Russia that many people in the Kremlin thought were being orchestrated by forces in the West, because, you [19:30] know, as people, officials here believed it, well, it couldn't be that people would want to come onto the [19:35] streets themselves. They had to be organized by external forces. And all of this, I think, built up [19:41] over the years, this resentment and this sort of suspicion of the West into, you know, the decision [19:48] to launch this full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And, you know, whenever he makes a big speech, Putin, [19:55] this resentment, the suspicion of the West, you know, comes pouring out. [20:00] If you were a country, and Russia maybe is like this, Britain's probably like this, [20:05] that feels that we're declining. We used to be a great empire, and I don't know, US and China are [20:11] dominating the world, and are much bigger than us, and more powerful than us. One thing that you might [20:16] do is think the problem is your economy. The problem is your technology. You know, this is what famously [20:22] Japan did in the 19th century. They had this Meiji restoration, and they went full out, all society [20:28] effort for reinventing their technology in society. So, you know, I don't know, Britain or Russia could be [20:34] saying the only thing that matters is renewable energy, or AI, or we're going to build data centers [20:40] everywhere. We're going to have the finest, you know, frontier AI models in the world. [20:45] But that doesn't seem to be, probably you might say, not the way Britain's responding, but it's [20:48] certainly not the way that Russia's responding. Why is the natural response to decline from Putin [20:53] not, we're going to make ourselves the tech superpower of the future, despite the fact that Russia is [20:58] stuffed full, presumably, of brilliant mathematicians, brilliant engineers, and the rest? [21:03] Yeah, absolutely. But Russia, you know, Britain has got used to the fact a long time ago, right, [21:07] that it's not an empire, it doesn't have an empire, it's given away most of the empire. [21:12] Russia, I think, you know, this massive country hasn't come to terms with the fact, [21:18] still, you know, more than three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, that perhaps things [21:23] have changed. It wants to maintain some influence over the countries that used to be part of the [21:28] Soviet Union. But what have we seen over the last four years or so? We've seen Russia lose influence [21:34] because of its decision primarily to launch this full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We've seen Russian [21:40] influence wane in Azerbaijan, Armenia, the recent elections there showed that, Moldova, to an extent [21:47] in Central Asia, too. We see more NATO now on Russia's borders. You know, Finland and Sweden [21:53] subsequently became members of NATO. This is the result, I think, of this decision taken by Vladimir [22:00] Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But he thinks in terms of, not of technological [22:05] development, he thinks in terms of Russia's power and influence. And certainly, I think he cannot imagine [22:13] a sort of a great Russia without Ukraine being part of that and Belarus being part of that. I think it's [22:20] very difficult for him to think about that. There was an article he wrote, I think it was the year [22:25] before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, about Russians and Ukrainians. And, you know, he sees them [22:31] as one people. But the result of the last four years, it appears, has been to push, you know, Ukrainians [22:39] further apart, further away from Russians. Yeah, it doesn't appear that he's achieved his aims. [22:47] One of the things that we've sort of grown used to, and it's almost been normalized, is the [22:51] killing of his opponents, you know, including, you know, on our soil, they got the wrong people. [22:57] There was a Brit who got killed, but including in Salisbury. But I mentioned Navalny, I mentioned [23:02] Litvinenko, and you keep reading little paragraphs here and there of people falling out of windows and [23:06] what have you. I just wondered, as a journalist, what it's like for a Russian journalist in Russia. [23:15] Do you feel that as a BBC guy, even though there is this anti-British feeling occasionally, but you [23:22] don't confront it very often, but what's it like for the Russian who's trying to speak truth to the power [23:27] of Putin? Or do they just give up? I think independent Russian journalists who are critical [23:32] of the authorities are very much on the front line, putting themselves in a lot of danger. And, you [23:39] know, we've seen cases over the last four years of journalists across the country being arrested [23:43] and put on trial for a number of offences. It's a very difficult situation. I talked about the [23:51] repressive legislation that's been introduced over the last few years, and that is used to silence [23:57] critics of the authorities. What would happen if you did report a drone attack on the apartment block [24:02] next to where you live? Who knows? You know, it's a bit of a grey area. As a foreign journalist, [24:09] if I reported that, you know, my report is going not to a Russian audience, but it's going out of the [24:14] country. So maybe that would, you know, be seen differently. I don't know. You know, [24:21] it's like walking this minefield. You don't exactly know where the mines are, and you're kind of trying [24:25] to navigate yourself around this kind of all these problems, all these issues. You know, [24:31] it's quite difficult. I'll give an example, actually. I was in St. Petersburg recently for [24:37] the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and trying to chase kind of movers and shakers and [24:42] officials and businessmen there. But at the same time, we were being harassed by the Russian media [24:47] and sort of slagged off by certain Russian officials and tried to sort of defend ourselves. [24:54] So it was a bit like being in the trenches. So you've got all these different things going on and [24:59] try to choose. When you're doorstepped by Russian state television or, you know, pro-Kremlin bloggers, [25:04] you have to think very carefully, think very quickly on your feet about what you're going to say. [25:08] And it's quite tiring in that sense. It's quite tiring coping with all that, trying to gather and tell [25:14] the story, but also, you know, trying to be aware and be ready for these kind of moments. [25:19] It's very weird, isn't it, Steve? Because it's more like being a politician. I mean, [25:24] this idea of being doorstepped and suddenly ask questions. Journalists normally ask the questions. [25:28] You must have to develop a whole different skill set to work out what you do if Russian state [25:34] television stuffs the camera in your face and asks you something. What sort of questions do they ask? [25:38] I mean, what are they doing when they're harassing you? [25:40] It depends. If a particular event has happened just before, you know, your doorstep, they may [25:46] ask about that. So, you know, every time you go to an event where you think state television might [25:51] be at and might doorstep you, you have to think what they might ask you, what you're going to say. [25:57] Give an example of a moment where you felt particularly surrounded by people and they [26:00] were particularly excited by a particular issue. [26:02] Oh, I mean, there are so many. I mean, one of the most common questions I get asked by Russian [26:08] state television is at the Putin press conferences. You know, why is it that you're allowed to come [26:13] to these press conferences and ask questions to our president and Russian journalists are not [26:18] allowed to ask questions to Keir Starmer? That's a common one. I get asked. [26:24] And is that true, Steve, that Russian journalists are not allowed to ask questions to Keir Starmer? [26:27] Well, I don't know what the situation is in the UK, whether Russian state television is allowed to [26:33] go to these Dowling Street briefings. I mean, I'm glad that I have the chance to go to the Kremlin [26:39] ones. And there's no guarantee that I get a question. But I've been lucky in the past to get [26:44] questions. And I'm grateful for that because it's, you know, a chance to ask something that perhaps [26:50] President Putin doesn't get asked normally. [26:52] I mean, it's superficially sounds like a pretty fair point, doesn't it, for the Russians? How come [26:56] you're allowed to turn up? They're not allowed to turn up. So what's the answer to that as somebody who [26:59] used to do this stuff? [27:00] The answer right now is you're not going to have many situations where Russian media are [27:04] attending a Keir Starmer press conference because he's not going to be standing alongside [27:08] Vladimir Putin. We did have, we had several press conferences with Putin. And we used to go, [27:15] you know, Britain, Russia, Britain, Russia, occasionally American, whatever. So there was [27:19] never, the only person, I'm ashamed of this, the only person I ever stopped asking a question [27:24] at a press conference was John Sweeney, because I knew he was going to give Putin a really, really [27:28] hard time. And we didn't want that at that particular time with the relationship we were [27:33] developing. But no, I don't. And we've done interviews. Tony did interviews in Russian [27:37] television. We even appeared on a Russian radio soap opera. Get this, Steve. I said, we're only [27:43] doing it if he can say the line. My three priorities are obrozovania, obrozovania, obrozovania. [27:49] How about that? [27:50] Oh, my goodness. Alistair, excellent pronunciation there. [27:53] Thank you. [27:53] Education, education, education. There you go. Very good. [27:57] That's a really good hook to take us back into the deep past of Steve. So you are somebody [28:02] who developed a fascination with Russia, right? But you're not, you know, you're a Brit [28:08] from Chingford and Essex. [28:09] North London. North London, Rory. I have to say it used to be Essex. [28:13] Yeah, it became North London. [28:17] All right. Give us a glimpse of your childhood in Chingford, the young Steve Rosenberg, what [28:23] this world was before you became an almost full-time Moscow resident. [28:26] I used to watch a lot of television, you know, a lot of television. I sat there glued to the [28:32] screen and I used to watch everything, you know, whether it was news or children's programs [28:36] or music or whatever. So I kind of fell in love with TV. [28:41] And your parents, Steve, didn't try to stop you? I mean, they didn't say, Steve, stop watching [28:45] so much television. Get on, read a book. [28:47] No, they were quite happy for me to watch television. Absolutely. Yeah. And in the end, I think it [28:52] worked out okay. [28:53] What did your parents do, Steve? Who were they? [28:55] So my dad, who's sadly no longer alive, he was a dentist. My mum, a housewife. Yeah, it [29:02] was a sort of typical Chingford upbringing for me. But I remember watching, you know, in 1980, [29:09] it was just before the Moscow Olympics, and just after Soviet troops had invaded Afghanistan. [29:14] And the BBC, what timing, the BBC broadcast their first Russian language course on television, [29:20] I think it was on Sundays. And I sat there transfixed watching this Russian language course. [29:25] It was amazing, all these strange letters and pronunciations. And they had little films about [29:30] life in the Soviet Union, you know, this mysterious country that I, you know, knew nothing about. [29:36] I thought it was really interesting. And then our French teacher at school, it turned out, [29:41] spoke a little bit of Russian and taught a few of us a little bit of Russian in the lunch [29:45] hour. So when I was thinking about going to university, I thought, well, I'll do French [29:50] and I'll do Russian kind of from scratch. And the Russian was so interesting, the Russian [29:56] department up in Leeds, that I dropped the French and just did Russian. And I was just [30:01] fascinated by the place. And every lunch hour, they used to wheel this television, this [30:06] satellite TV into the department foyer. And you could sit down and watch an hour of Soviet [30:12] television, kind of Gorbachev TV. And it was amazing. All these programs about Perestroika [30:18] and Graznost and the Soviet TV news bulletins, which were like nothing like, you know, the [30:24] nine o'clock news as it was, or the news at 10. And I just thought, wow, this is a place [30:29] I'd like to kind of spend a bit of time in, just find out more about. It's 40 years ago this [30:34] year that I started learning Russian. And then I went to the Soviet Union on a tourist [30:38] trip and just thought, really interesting place. [30:42] Russian is in your background, in your family background. Do you think, is it as romantic [30:47] as that, that there was something kind of deep in you that was calling you almost? [30:51] Yeah, my great grandparents came from the Russian empire, like from Belarus and one day [30:57] Belarus and Ukraine. They left at the end of the 19th century. But interesting, I didn't [31:02] know that, actually, when I sort of started, you know, took the first steps learning Russian. [31:09] My grandma then found a box with old documents in it, including her father's, my great grandfather's [31:17] passport that he used to exit the Russian empire in 1894. And it was in pristine condition. [31:23] And I really wanted to kind of work out what was written. And so that kind of pushed me a [31:29] little bit to get on with the Russian lessons. [31:32] Why didn't you know this, Steve? What did you think your family were when you thought [31:36] about your grandparents and great grandparents? What was it you imagined? [31:39] It wasn't talked about very much, you know, what the background was. My grandma didn't [31:44] talk much about it. But when she found the documents, then we started talking about it more. [31:47] And I got really interested. Interestingly, one of the little towns, the shtetls that one [31:55] of my great grandfathers came from is called Shklov, which is where Alexander Lukashenko, [32:01] the leader of Belarus, kind of grew up. It's the cucumber capital of Belarus. There's a big [32:06] cucumber statue there. Bizarrely, I've been to Shklov since, yeah. [32:11] You've interviewed him as well, haven't you? You've interviewed Lukashenko. I've always imagined [32:14] he's, I mean, he strikes me as, well, you tell me, you've met him. I've never met him. [32:19] Tell me what you make of him. [32:21] Yeah, I've done two big interviews with Alexander Lukashenko, one of the most memorable interviews [32:26] I've ever done. Quite a difficult interview because, you know, he spent half of it being [32:32] the bully, trying to put me in my place, threatening to end the interview several times. But the other [32:39] half, he was being, trying to be charming. And so he kept switching between the two. And I just [32:44] had to sit there, you know, be like a brick wall, as calm as possible. But the interesting [32:50] thing about Alexander Lukashenko, he was prepared to sit there for as long as he wanted and answer [32:55] any question. You know, if he didn't agree, didn't agree the questions beforehand, he'd [33:01] answer anything. And that's, I think, different with Vladimir Putin. I still hadn't managed to [33:06] organise a sit-down interview with Vladimir Putin. You know, I've managed to ask him questions, [33:11] single questions at press conferences. But I'd love the opportunity to have a, you know, [33:16] a detailed, deep conversation with him about everything. [33:20] I think he's coming on the rest of his politics before he does the BBC. I really do. [33:24] Hang on. [33:24] Next time you talk to Lukashenko, we'd definitely have him on as well. [33:28] Get in the queue, Alistair. [33:31] Steve, let me take that as an opportunity for you to tell us a little bit about, and you [33:36] also have interviewed Gorbachev. So give us a snapshot of the difference in personalities [33:41] between Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Lukashenko and Putin, and what it tells us about Russia. [33:46] Gorbachev, a very different kind of person. Yes, I've interviewed Gorbachev, I think, five [33:50] or six times. I found him to be a very warm-hearted man, someone who was a family man, someone who [33:59] loved deeply his wife, who died before him, and he couldn't get over that. And he was always [34:07] talking about Raisa, his late wife, and his children, and a very warm-hearted person. And [34:15] after one of the interviews, quite bizarrely, there was a piano in the corner of his office, [34:22] and he said, you know, do any of you play the piano? And I said, yeah, I play the piano. And he [34:26] said, sit down and play the piano. So I sat down and started playing the piano, and he started [34:30] singing. I was playing Russian folk songs, and he sang. And that, to me, showed he was [34:36] a very emotional, nice guy. Yes, he made mistakes. Politicians make mistakes. And I think probably [34:45] he made a whole string of mistakes. But I think his heart was in the right place. He wanted [34:50] to change the country for the best. I think he lost control of his reforms, and the Soviet [34:56] Union kind of fell apart. [34:57] I think Vladimir Putin is a very different kind of character. Vladimir Putin obviously [35:02] comes as his KGB background. That was different from Gorbachev. Obviously, the background, I [35:08] think, influences what someone is like. Lukashenko, yeah, doesn't have the KGB background. He [35:15] was a collective farm boss. Maybe that explains why he's, you know, he's quite familiar, quite [35:24] friendly at times, sometimes bullish. They're all different in their own way. I never interviewed [35:30] Yeltsin. But the thing about Yeltsin that I think makes him very different from Putin, [35:36] Yeltsin was quite thick-skinned. You can criticize Boris Yeltsin for many things. But he could take [35:43] criticism himself. And in the 1990s, there was a TV channel that was very critical of Boris Yeltsin. He [35:50] didn't close it down. There was a Russian version of spitting image, Kukli, which made fun of him. He [35:56] didn't close it down. He could take that, I think. Vladimir Putin's a different kind of character, [36:02] you know, perhaps not as thick-skinned. [36:04] Although I think Yeltsin was, I mean, Yeltsin always struck me, no jokes about tired and emotional, [36:08] because he did clearly drink too much, but very, very emotional. I mean, I saw him several times [36:12] where he, you know, would almost move himself to tears by the way he talked about his own life or [36:18] the country. Now, okay, sometimes under the influence, but very, very emotional. [36:22] Yeah. We don't see that with Vladimir Putin so much. [36:25] No, no, he certainly don't. [36:27] Keeps himself to himself, keeps his emotions locked inside. And of course, Vladimir Putin saw what [36:33] happened with Gorbachev. He saw that Gorbachev tried to reform, tried to open up the country, [36:39] and the country collapsed. And the last thing that Putin wants to do is to go down as a second [36:44] Gorbachev. That's why it's hard to imagine Vladimir Putin opening up the country again. [36:49] And he saw what happened with Boris Yeltsin and the chaotic 1990s. So I get the feeling that Putin [36:55] has decided, no, the way to rule Russia is to maintain control, to have complete control in the Kremlin. [37:05] This episode is brought to you by Vauxhall. Electric cars have become part of life on the [37:10] road and Vauxhall is supporting the UK's transition to electrification. [37:15] Well, how are they doing that? Well, to start, their Electric Streets of Britain initiative aims [37:18] to support local authorities in accelerating the UK's on-street charging infrastructure. And [37:23] it's exactly what you want to see from Vauxhall, which is of course a British brand, [37:27] a proud partner of Team GB. Vauxhall's also supporting the next generation of athletes on [37:31] their journey to the 2028 Olympics. And there's more. Their new Vauxhall Grandland [37:37] Griffin, a large family SUV, features a premium specification at an affordable price, whether [37:43] you choose an electric or mild hybrid version. Even better, going electric can get you an [37:48] additional £1,500 discount thanks to the Electric Car Grant. Any questions you have about electric [37:55] cars are probably answered by the Vauxhall Grandland. Search Vauxhall Grandland or visit your local [38:01] Vauxhall retailer today. Electric Grant, T's and C's apply. Visit Vauxhall.co.uk for more info. [38:10] You also interviewed Roman Abramovich at one point and Abramovich famously does not do many [38:14] interviews. And I just wonder what your reaction is looking back, the extent to which we in the UK [38:19] allowed these, you know, really dubious Russian characters so much entry into our economy and into [38:27] our society and into our national life. [38:29] That was also a, yeah, that was a rare interview. That was the first interview, I think, that [38:33] first TV interview that Roman Abramovich had given just after he bought Chelsea. [38:38] Yeah. [38:38] And it took a lot of persuading to persuade him to sit down. We flew to the end of Russia, [38:44] to Chukotka in the Far East, where he was the local governor, and spent a week running around [38:49] after him trying to persuade him to speak to us. But yes, you could say that there was a lot of [38:55] naivety going back a quarter of a century on the part of politicians, on the part of journalists. [39:01] You know, we still believed in that there could be a good, beneficial relationship with Russia. [39:08] I couldn't have imagined 25 years ago what would be happening now, to be honest. I couldn't. [39:13] You know, the fact that the relationship has broken down to such an extent that we have [39:17] this huge war in Europe. I could never have imagined that, you know, sitting down chatting to [39:24] Roman Abramovich about football, that 25 years later, you know, Russia would be accusing Britain, [39:32] NATO, Europe of waging war against Russia, that we'd have this terrible, you know, war in Ukraine. [39:40] How on earth did we sort of normalize figures like Roman Abramovich? I mean, remember, this was a guy [39:47] who, although he absolutely denied it, was sued by Boris Berezovsky, another big oligarch. [39:56] In the High Court in London, in which there were extraordinary allegations made. And the story [40:04] of the way in which these people made their money, which has been documented so often, is, to put it [40:10] mildly, pretty eye-raising. Now, I have to say, for legal reasons, and I'm sure you'd say that, you [40:15] know, these people deny all allegations, but it's pretty fruity, the context from which these people [40:20] come. How did we possibly think it was suitable for them to take over a British football club? [40:25] I suppose the answer to that is it's easier to be wise after the event, isn't it? I suppose going [40:31] back to the nineties, which was as a fair chaotic period, and so many Russians fell into poverty, [40:38] and this small group of, you know, of tycoons struck rich, the oligarchs made huge fortunes. [40:46] I remember people saying at the time, well, it's like, you know, America in the twenties or the thirties, [40:52] you know, there were people who maybe, you know, made money through illegal means then and became [40:59] accepted members of society. And yeah, people turned their eyes away from that because I think [41:06] people in the West still wanted to have a good relationship with Russia and still believed it [41:11] was possible. The command economy had collapsed. You now had this sort of crazy market economy that [41:18] was sort of developing in Russia, something that people in the West could associate with more [41:23] than what came before it. And so I think there was hope that actually this would lay the foundations [41:30] for a decent relationship between businesses and between governments. [41:36] Steve, sorry, maybe I'm being naive, but looking at these business people, they're not business [41:41] people. They're not equivalent to American business people in the 1920s. I mean, you know, [41:45] you can see when Berezovsky and Abramovich start suing each other in the Supreme Court, [41:50] they're talking openly about kind of mafia codes, godfather oaths of loyalty. Some of these people end up [41:58] getting murdered. You know, it becomes clear that they've built their empires partly around [42:04] huge armed groups defending their factories and attacking each other's things. I mean, [42:10] was it that we weren't aware of that at the time? Or we sort of shut our eyes to it? [42:14] Were Russians aware at the time how these people made their money? [42:17] I think we turned a blind eye. [42:18] I think some people did turn a blind eye to it, probably. As I say, thinking that it will work [42:25] out okay in the end, and that there was a lot of money to be made by doing business with Russia. And [42:30] there's no doubt that I think that there was a degree of that. Some people did raise alarms at [42:35] the time. But going back to the late 90s, the early 2000s, there was still hope that this relationship [42:44] would work out for the best, you know, and with hindsight, you know, it didn't work out like that. [42:52] But there was no kind of instruction booklet for people in Russia or people in the West what to do [43:00] when a Soviet superpower, a communist superpower collapses. You know, if Gorbachev could have gone [43:06] to the library or Yeltsin could have gone to the library and taken a book out, what to do, how to [43:10] kind of switch to a normal economy and a normal country, then that would have been absolutely [43:15] wonderful. But there wasn't. And so Russia kind of stumbled its way through the 1990s. The leaders, [43:23] you know, made lots of mistakes, you know, trying to keep the country afloat, trying to, you know, [43:29] there were many people who didn't get their wages or pensions for months and months and months. It was [43:34] a very difficult decade. But Russia stumbled its way through this kind of decade, got to the end of [43:40] the 90s, and Putin came in. And I think many Russians, certainly, in the early 2000s, were [43:49] grateful for the stability, the early stability that Putin brought. And he was genuinely popular [43:56] in those early years in the early 2000s. And he kind of did this deal with people, you know, [44:04] you don't get involved in politics, and we'll make sure you have a decent sort of level of prosperity. [44:10] And that suited a lot of people after the chaotic 1990s. [44:13] If he did welcome you into the inner circle, or when he's sitting down with his inner circle today, [44:19] and they say, come on, Vlad, what do you really think of Donald Trump? What do you think he would [44:23] say? [44:23] I think he'd be disappointed. I think he'd express disappointment. I think last year, [44:30] the Russians had high hopes for Donald Trump. I thought that they thought that he was the man [44:36] to deliver the kind of peace deal that the Kremlin wants on Russia's terms, that he would be the US [44:44] president to put pressure on Volodymyr Zelenskyy to give up, to make the territorial concessions that [44:49] Russia wants. You know, Putin had many meetings with Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and we had the [44:56] Alaska summit. And it seemed as if, you know, the Russians started talking about the spirit of [45:01] Anchorage, the spirit of Anchorage, as if some kind of deal was done or some understanding was [45:06] reached with Donald Trump there, that America would help to end the war in Ukraine on Moscow's [45:11] terms. And it hasn't happened. And so I think Vladimir Putin will be quite disappointed that [45:17] things have worked out like that, and that we're now in the fifth year of the war, and it hasn't [45:22] ended on Russia's terms. [45:23] That's interesting, because Roy and I both think that he's effectively Trump's on Putin's side, [45:28] but Putin doesn't think that at all. [45:29] Or maybe he's on Putin's side, but he's not as powerful as Putin hopes. I mean, [45:33] one of the interesting things is given that Trump hasn't exactly been very helpful to Ukraine. I mean, [45:38] he cut $50 billion worth of funding. He's firing Patriot missiles as though he's on a drunken spree in [45:46] a Dublin bar in the Middle East, which could be used to defend Ukraine. He's threatened to turn off [45:51] satellites, he's played footsie with Putin, he's sent Wyckoff out, he's tried to put forward. Why is [45:57] it that Trump has been unable to deliver the sort of peace that he was consistently talking about from [46:03] before the election? What is it about Ukraine which makes it difficult for Trump to deliver [46:07] that kind of peace? [46:07] Well, it seems that despite Donald Trump saying that President Zelenskyy doesn't have any of the cards, [46:13] he seems to have some cards. And he seems unable to put pressure on the Ukrainian president [46:21] to do a deal that would suit Moscow. And that has surprised people here in Russia. [46:30] I remember last year, lots of articles in the Russian papers, almost crowing about Donald Trump, [46:36] that our Donald has come into power in the White House, that NATO was about to collapse, [46:44] that everything was looking good, basically, in the US-Russian relationship. And if everything was [46:49] good in the US-Russia relationship, that would almost certainly deliver a peace deal in Ukraine [46:54] on Russia's terms. And it just hasn't happened. And so now you're getting disappointments being [47:01] expressed here openly. [47:02] Part of this, I think, is that the US administration, or some of them at least, [47:07] and JD Vance sometimes spoke like this, convinced themselves that the only reason why Ukraine was [47:13] surviving was because of American support. And therefore, it was logical to them. We take away our $50 [47:17] billion worth of support. Ukraine will collapse like a pack of cards. Ukraine's only fighting [47:23] Russia because of American support. Europe will never be able to fill the gap. Ukraine will never [47:27] fill the gap. But presumably, what we've learned is that actually, it wasn't true that the only [47:31] thing keeping Ukraine standing was American financial support. [47:35] Yeah, I think the Russians are particularly furious with Europe. When you listen to Russian [47:40] officials, you read the Russian papers here, they are spitting blood about Europe and European [47:45] support for Ukraine. As far as the Kremlin is concerned, it's Europe which is prolonging [47:50] the war in Ukraine. If Europe, if pesky Europe wasn't there supporting Ukraine, then the war would [47:58] end much more quickly. And so I think the Russians are surprised that even though America has reduced [48:05] its support for Ukraine, the war hasn't ended. And Ukraine has been able to carry on. [48:11] Now, we don't know what lies ahead. Certainly, the last few weeks have been difficult, I think, [48:17] for the Russian army. And Ukraine seems to have stabilized, at the very least, the front line. [48:24] But judging by what is being said, even in the state media here, there is, I think, [48:30] a disappointment that this war continues. And Russia hasn't secured victory yet. [48:36] What do you think, if you were in Xi Jinping's inner circle, when he kicks his shoes off, [48:42] what do you think he thinks of Putin? [48:43] I suspect, as a junior partner, there's no doubt that even though, you know, Russia and China talk [48:51] about their partnership and their friendship, and they were talking about a no-limits partnership, [48:55] weren't they, not so long ago, there are limits to it. And Russia has become increasingly dependent [49:01] on China, because it sort of burned its bridges with Europe. That makes Russia, I think, to a large [49:08] extent, the sort of junior partner of China. And last year, there was this quite an amazing image [49:15] when Vladimir Putin went to Beijing. Do you remember, Xi was walking in the middle. On one side, you had [49:21] Vladimir Putin. On the other side, you had Kim from North Korea. And clearly, the Chinese leader was [49:28] there. He was calling the shots. He was in the middle. And I think that causes a little bit of [49:36] unease in some quarters here. The fact that Russia has become quite dependent on China, on China buying [49:44] Russian goods. And as I say, most of the people that I talk to and meet on the streets feel European, [49:51] and still see Russia's place in Europe, and not in the East, despite officially the country sort of [49:57] pivoting to the East. When we think about great power competition, we tend to assume that in the [50:03] long run, it's the economy stupid. And we look back in time, we tend to assume that the reason why, [50:09] you know, Germany and Japan did what they did, and Britain did what it did, is their economies take [50:14] off. And the Russian economy remains tiny, right? The Chinese economy is 10 times the size of the [50:20] Russian economy. The European economy is 10 times the size of the Russian economy. The American economy is [50:24] 15 times the size of the Russian economy. So if Russia really wants to be a global superpower, [50:30] it's got to sort its economy out. How's it going to do that? How's it going to become competitive? [50:34] How's it going to become productive? How's it going to develop technology? How's it actually going to [50:39] have its moment that Japan or Germany found at the end of the 19th century, or Britain found in the 19th [50:45] century, which is really going to allow it to be the kind of superpower it wants to be? [50:50] It's a really great question. And it's a question that if Vladimir Putin was sitting here, you should [50:55] ask him. Because it's the key question, isn't it? You know, Russia is spending so much money on this [51:02] war, so much money to try to ensure that Ukraine remain, you know, comes back into Russia's sphere [51:09] of influence. And at the same time, and again, the state media confirms this in newspaper articles [51:15] regularly, Russia is falling back technologically. And so logically, the question is, how can a country [51:23] build a stable future as a great technological superpower, if it's falling back? And the distance [51:30] between Russia and countries in the West is growing larger. Vladimir Putin's argument, I suspect, [51:37] because he said that to me in a press conference is, well, at least we've become sovereign. And he talks [51:44] about Russia becoming a sovereign nation. This he believes is Russia's greatest achievement over the [51:49] last four years, that Russia had become too dependent on the West, it had been deceived by [51:54] the West. And what Russia has shown over the last four years is that it has broken free of the shackles [52:01] and is now sovereign in so many words. Now, I'm not sure I don't know what exactly that means. Because [52:07] Russia was an independent sovereign country before that. But he believes Russia become too dependent on the [52:14] West. Well, those bonds, those links have certainly been broken now. And as I say, Russia's become more [52:21] dependent on the on the East. But it's falling back technologically. And yes, there are big questions [52:27] about Russia's future. And when I asked people, I often asked people on the street, how do you see [52:33] Russia's future? How do you see your future and the country's future? And most people don't answer that [52:40] or can't answer that. They think maybe a week ahead or a month ahead, but they don't know what's going [52:46] to happen here, further down the road, because things are so unpredictable. And if people can't [52:52] think long term about their future and where Russia's place in the world will be a year from now, [52:59] five years from now, 10 years from now, that's, that's a problem, I think, for the country. [53:05] Finally, finally, finally, Steve, one thing you and I have in common, we both saw the advent of ABBA at [53:11] the Eurovision Song Contest in Brighton as one of the seminal moments in European history. We don't [53:16] need to talk about our ABBA obsession now. But one thing that people do know you for is this [53:21] extraordinary ability you have on the piano. And every year you weave the songs that are in the [53:27] Eurovision Song Contest into one kind of mellifluous piece of music, which is absolutely brilliant. [53:34] But the one I want to talk to you about is this extraordinary song you wrote for the woman in the [53:39] newspaper kiosk, Valentina. Just tell us that story, because it's the most, without, with all due [53:44] respect, it's not Paul McCartney, the lyrics, it's not John Lennon. They're very mundane lyrics, okay, [53:50] but it's a beautiful piece of music, and the BBC singers did it so well. [53:54] Thank you. So I used to buy the newspapers from, you know, the kiosks down the road, [53:58] and Valentina, this great babushka, sold me the papers. And we struck up a really nice friendship. [54:05] And she used to talk about her life, which was very dramatic. And I used to recall our [54:12] conversations, she'd film on my phone with her permission, and make little videos on a [54:17] Valentina's kiosk. And I loved it, because it was a constant reminder to me why I'd fallen in love with [54:23] Russia in the first place. You know, she kind of symbolized for me, your mother Russia, all the [54:28] good things, all the positive things about this country. She left Moscow in 2022, went back to [54:35] live in Kursk, on the border with Ukraine, she got sick, she got cancer. And I wrote her a song, [54:42] yeah, I wrote her a song to cheer her up, Valentina's song. And the wonderful BBC singers, [54:49] who apparently were following these Valentina kiosk videos online, they wrote to me and said, [54:55] we'd like to do a little collaboration with you. Have you got any ideas? I said, well, I've got this [55:00] song for Valentina. And they said, oh, we watch Valentina's kiosk. We'll sing it. So I went over [55:05] to London and on my next trip, and we recorded it with the BBC singers. [55:10] Well, it's brilliant. [55:11] And I sent it to her on WhatsApp. And I was waiting. And five minutes later, [55:18] the message came back and she said she was very moved by it. And she kept watching it. [55:23] But the interesting thing after that was, it got picked up by media inside Russia. [55:30] So a lot of the kind of channels that are normally full of anti-Western bile, [55:35] and criticizing the BBC, for one wonderful moment, they were just reporting that a British journalist [55:42] had written a song about a Russian newspaper kiosk vendor who wasn't very well. And they were reporting [55:50] it kind of positively. And I thought, well, I'm always looking for the hope. I'm always looking [55:55] for the optimism. And to me, that was an optimistic sign that actually, despite everything, you know, [56:01] we can rebuild a relationship with Russia, despite all the things that have happened in the last four [56:07] and a half years. And I still keep in touch with Valentina. And touch wood, she's feeling better. [56:13] She's learned English. I mean, how many Russian babushkas start learning English, you know, [56:18] in their late 60s? And she, she's an amazing person. [56:21] I'll tell her that she's going to be discussed on the UK, on the UK's number one podcast. [56:25] Thank you very much indeed. [56:26] Thank you. It's lovely chatting to you both. [56:28] Thank you, Steve, very much.