FULL INTERVIEW: Former Secretary Of State Antony Blinken Weighs In On U.S.-Iran War, Negotiations

[0:01] In the whole history of the Revolutionary Republic, 47 years, they've only made a fundamental [0:07] compromise and come to a fundamental conclusion on something twice, ending the eight years of [0:14] the war with Iraq and then the nuclear agreement with the Obama administration, which took us [0:19] two and a half years to get to. And so I think what we've seen is, you know, President Trump [0:23] has taken an off-ramp. Maybe he was tired of all that winning. The question is, is this off-ramp [0:29] to a rest stop, which seems the most likely thing? Is it to some kind of destination or [0:34] is it some kind of dead end? And the challenge he has is he's really put himself into a corner [0:40] over the last few weeks that's going to be very hard to get out of. [0:42] And you don't think he can restart the war? Because that is an option, right? [0:46] It is an option. But my sense of this has been that the president has had two guardrails on [0:51] what he's done, markets and munitions. Very sensitive to markets, understandably. Price [0:57] of oil, gasoline, natural gas, fertilizer, the bond market, the stock market, etc. That's [1:04] one guardrail. The other guardrail has been munitions, our supply of both offensive and [1:09] defensive munitions. And these in some cases are significantly depleted, such that our deterrence [1:15] is diminished, including with regard to China. But the other problem is this, Fareed, you can [1:20] have a tactical success, which on one level clearly we've had. The military as always does [1:25] a brilliant job prosecuting its target lists, doing remarkable things. But you have tactical [1:30] success and strategic failure, or at least strategic setback, because what are we left [1:34] with at the end of this? We're left with a regime that's still in place with a younger, [1:38] albeit maybe injured, Ayatollah. We're left with Iran still holding on to the highly enriched [1:43] uranium that it had before, as well as centrifuges that it can spin up. We're left with an Iran [1:48] that is battered, still has missiles, fewer, but it can rebuild the production capacity. [1:54] And of course, critically, a new huge advantage, the Strait of Hormuz, something that didn't exist [1:59] before. Both Iran and the United States and others always came up to the line about the [2:05] Strait of Hormuz many times in the past. There was always this question mark, and we always factored [2:09] in what might Iran do in the strait to make life really difficult. It never got to that. The [2:14] Iranians never pulled the trigger on the strait because they thought that would invite an existential [2:18] crisis and threat from the United States and others, Israel. And we always were very careful [2:24] to make sure that we pushed things, but not so far that the strait would be endangered. Now, [2:30] break glass moment. That's happened. The net result is Iran emerges with tremendous leverage. [2:36] And so I think the issue is this. The president has to decide whether he wants to, if there's no [2:42] durable agreement reached in two weeks, either, as you said, go back to war. And that means, [2:47] what does that mean? An escalation of air power, ground troops, highly risky, highly costly. Or [2:53] is there some kind of negotiation and a negotiation that probably has to give something to the Iranians, [3:00] including the possibility of continuing to collect tolls in the Strait of Hormuz and enriching [3:04] themselves in the process, maybe sanctions relief. And that's why I say this looks right now [3:09] like tactical success, but strategic failure. So let's talk about those negotiations because you've [3:15] spent a long time. You were part of the JCPOA, the Obama nuclear deal. You tried to negotiate with them [3:23] afterwards when enduring Biden. You tried to get them back into the deal. The Trump administration's [3:31] position is no enrichment. Now, this has for a long time been the sticking point. The Iranians say we have a right [3:38] to enrichment. We are signatories to the NPT. Is there a compromise based on what you saw in the [3:45] past, which they were, they may be willing to forego that right or to assert it in theory, but not in [3:52] practice? Absolutely. And my understanding is at various points of the last year and a half in the [3:57] discussions that the administration was having with the Iranians, the Iranians put something like [4:01] that forward. It's not clear whether the folks we had at the table fully grasped what they were getting [4:06] from the Iranians. We never conceded their right to enrich. But as a practical matter, under the JCPOA, [4:12] we moved out 97 percent of their highly enriched uranium, but they retained some capacity at a very [4:19] low level. And the net was this. They could claim that they continued to be able to enrich. We could say [4:26] that they didn't have a right to enrich, but as a practical matter, they were doing it. And the main thing [4:31] was the uranium they were enriching was kept at such a low level in such a low quantity that had they decided [4:39] to break out of the agreement, it would have taken them more than a year to produce enough of the fissile material [4:44] that they needed for a nuclear weapon, a weapon, by the way, that they didn't have and still don't have. But the point is [4:50] this. And you're right. Yes, you could come to an agreement that gave the Iranians, in a sense, as a practical matter, the [4:58] ability to continue enriching at very low levels with a very small stockpile doesn't concede the right, but gives them a face saver.