FULL HEARING: Marco Rubio's Senate Confirmation Hearing

[0:00] Senator Rubio, the floor is going to be yours, and I hope you'll introduce your beautiful [0:04] family to start with, and we'll take it from there. [0:07] Well, thank you, Chairman Risch, and I want to thank the ranking member as well, Senator [0:12] Shaheen, and thank you, Senator Scott, for your introduction. [0:16] And let me just say, it's a bit surreal to be on this side of the room, but you all look [0:22] very distinguished, and I just wanted you to know that. [0:25] Yeah, yeah, yeah, we know that. [0:29] In the 249-year history of our republic, there's only been 71 other Americans who have served [0:36] in the role and the position that President Trump has now nominated me to occupy, and I [0:41] want to thank him for his confidence, and it's an incredible honor. [0:45] It is also, as many of you have already pointed out, an extraordinary responsibility. [0:51] Three of my children, Amanda, Anthony, and Dominic, could not be here with us today or join us [0:57] here in person. [0:58] But I am happy that my wife, Jeanette, is here, and that my daughter, Daniela, is here [1:02] with me as well, because I think, as each of you know well, it really isn't possible [1:06] to do our job in the Senate, not to mention the job I've been nominated for without the [1:11] love and the support of our families. [1:14] I'm also very pleased that my sisters, Barbara and Veronica, and my nephew, Orlando, are joining [1:19] me here today. [1:20] And to me, it's a reminder that the path that brings me to this moment was paved by those [1:29] who are not here with us today. [1:32] By two parents who arrived here on May 27th of 1956 from Cuba, and they had nothing but [1:39] the dreams of a better life. [1:43] And because of them, I had the privilege to be born a citizen of the greatest nation in [1:47] the history of mankind, and to be raised in a safe and stable home by parents who made [1:54] their children's future the very purpose of their lives. [1:58] I also want to acknowledge all the blessings that God has bestowed upon me in my life. [2:03] My faith is critical and it's something I will lean and rely on heavily in the months that [2:09] are ahead. [2:10] In a tumultuous world where, in my faith, we are called to promote the cause of peace [2:15] and the common good. [2:17] And that task has gotten harder than it's ever been. [2:21] And I will rely heavily on my faith and pray for God's blessings, that he'll provide me [2:26] the strength, the wisdom, and the courage to do what is right in these tenuous moments. [2:33] At the end of the Second World War, the United States was, in the words of the then-secretary [2:38] state, tasked with creating an order, a world order, a free half, as he quote, in his quote, [2:45] out of chaos, without blowing to pieces, without blowing the whole of the world into pieces [2:51] in the process. [2:53] And in the decades that followed, that global order served us quite well. [2:57] Americans' incomes rose and communities flourished. [3:00] Alliances emerged in the Indo-Pacific and Europe that led to the emergence of stability and democracy [3:05] and prosperity in these regions. [3:06] But it also prevented a cataclysmic world war, and ultimately a wall in Berlin came down, [3:42] and with it an evil empire. [3:45] Out of the triumphalism of the end of the long Cold War emerged a bipartisan consensus. [3:50] And this consensus was that we had reached the end of history, that all of the nations [3:54] of the world would now become members of the democratic Western-led community, that a foreign [3:58] policy that served the national interest could now be replaced by one that served the liberal [4:03] world order, and that all mankind was now destined to abandon national sovereignty and national [4:08] identity, and would instead become one human family and citizens of the world. [4:15] This wasn't just a fantasy. [4:18] We now know it was a dangerous delusion. [4:21] Here in America, and in many of the advanced economies across the world, an almost religious [4:25] commitment to free and unfettered trade at the expense of our national economy, shrunk the [4:30] middle class, left the working class in crisis, collapsed our industrial capacity, and has pushed [4:37] critical supply chains into the hands of adversaries and of rivals. [4:41] An irrational zeal for maximum freedom of movement of people has resulted in a historic mass migration [4:48] crisis. [4:49] Here in America, but also around the world, it's one that threatens the stability of societies [4:55] and of governments. [4:57] Across the West, governments now censor and even prosecute domestic political opponents. [5:02] Meanwhile, radical jihadists openly march in the streets and sadly drive vehicles into [5:07] our people. [5:09] While America far too often continued to prioritize the global order above our core national interests, [5:16] other nations continue to act the way countries always have. [5:19] Pause. [5:22] Back to order. [5:32] Back to order. [5:34] I get bilingual protests, which is, I think, isn't too cool. [5:37] As you know, that's a first year for us, at least in recent times. [5:42] All right. [5:43] All right. [5:46] Back to order. [5:52] All right. [5:54] So while America too often prioritize the global order above our core national interests, other [6:00] nations continue to act the way nations have always acted and always will in what they [6:05] perceive to be their best interest. [6:07] And instead of folding into the post-Cold War global order, they have manipulated it [6:13] to serve their interests at the expense of ours. [6:17] We welcome the Chinese Communist Party into the global order and they took advantage of [6:21] all of its benefits and they ignored all of its obligations and responsibilities. [6:26] Instead, they have repressed and lied and cheated and hacked and stolen their way into [6:33] global superpower status. [6:36] And they have done so at our expense and at the expense of the people of their own country. [6:41] In our very own hemisphere, narco-terrorists and dictators and despots take advantage of [6:48] open borders to drive mass migration, to traffic in women and children, and to flood our communities [6:54] with deadly fentanyl and violent criminals. [6:56] In Moscow, in Tehran, in Pyongyang, dictators, rogue states now sow chaos and instability and align with and they fund radical terror groups. [7:07] And then they hide behind their veto power at the United Nations Security Council or the threats of nuclear war. [7:15] The post-war global order is not just obsolete, it is now a weapon being used against us. [7:24] And all this has led to a moment in which we must now confront the single greatest risk of geopolitical instability [7:31] and of generational global crisis in the lifetime of anyone alive and in this room today. [7:38] Eight decades later, we are once again called to create a free world out of the chaos, and this will not be easy. [7:47] And it will be impossible without a strong and a confident America that engages in the world, putting our core national interests once again above all else. [7:57] Just four years ago, I believe we began to see the outlines and the beginnings of what that would look like during President Trump's first term. [8:05] American strength was a deterrent to our adversaries, and it gave us leverage in diplomacy. [8:10] There were no new wars. ISIS was eviscerated. Soleimani was dead. [8:16] The historic Abraham Accords were born, and Americans were safer as a result. [8:21] Now, President Trump returns to office with an unmistakable mandate from the voters. [8:28] They want a strong America. A strong America engaged in the world, but guided by a clear objective [8:34] to promote peace abroad and security and prosperity here at home. [8:40] That is the promise that President Trump was elected to keep. [8:43] And if I am confirmed, keeping that promise will be the core mission of the United States Department of State. [8:50] Now, tragically, horrifying atrocities and unimaginable human suffering can be found on virtually every continent. [9:00] And I am certain that today I will be asked about the array of programs and the activities [9:04] the Department of State carries out to address them. [9:07] We are a nation who was founded on the revolutionary truth that all men are created equal, [9:11] and that our rights come not from man or from government, but from God. [9:15] And so we will never be indifferent to the suffering of our fellow man. [9:20] But ultimately, under President Trump, the top priority of the United States Department of State [9:27] will be the United States. The direction he has given for the conduct of our foreign policy is clear. [9:35] Every dollar we spend, every program we fund, every policy we pursue must be justified by the answer [9:42] to one of three questions. Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? [9:48] Or does it make America more prosperous? Under President Trump, the dollars of hardworking [9:54] American taxpayers will always be spent wisely, and our power will always be yielded prudently [10:01] and towards what is best for America and Americans before anything and everything else. [10:07] Prudence in the conduct of foreign policy is not an abandonment of our values. It is the common sense [10:14] understanding that while we remain the wealthiest and the most powerful nation on the earth, [10:20] our wealth has never been unlimited, and our power has never been infinite. And placing our core [10:27] national interest above all else is not isolationism. It is the common sense realization that a foreign [10:37] policy centered in our national interest is not some outdated relic. Since the emergence of the [10:43] modern nation-state over two centuries ago, countries acting based on what they perceive to be their core [10:49] national interest, that has been the norm, not the exception. And for our country, placing the [10:55] interest of America and Americans above all else has never been more relevant or more necessary than [11:02] it is right now. For in the end, how can America promote the cause of peace on earth if it is not [11:10] first safe at home? What good is America to our allies if it is not strong? And how can America help end the [11:18] suffering of God's children across the world if it is not first prosperous here at home? I thank you and I [11:26] hope I can earn your support, whether it's because you believe I will do a good job or because you want to get rid of me. Thank you. [11:32] Either way, the results are the same. Thank you, Senator Rubio. I've always been impressed with your view, particularly on a [11:43] 50,000-foot level of the kind of problems that we face in our lane and national security lane, [11:50] foreign relations and intelligence. So appreciate those remarks. We're now going to start around, [11:56] I'm going to allow 10-minute questions since this is a cabinet-level position. That doesn't mean you [12:01] have to use all 10 minutes, but the 10 minutes are there. And what I'm going to do in this hearing, [12:07] and what I'm going to do in future hearings is I will call on people based on seniority on the committee [12:13] at the time the gavel goes down. And if you come after that, you'll be put in line after that and [12:19] we'll go down the list like that. In any event, with that, Senator Rubio, could you talk for a minute [12:28] about the Russian energy reliance? I think all of us were impressed when the war started that [12:36] the Europeans knew the necessity of cutting a cord with Russia on their reliance on Russian energy, [12:45] which had developed since the Iron Curtain came down, all of us believing that Russia would behave [12:51] itself, which turned out to be a very misplaced view. And now, with the war carrying on, it's going to [13:03] end, obviously, at some point in time. There are voices in Europe saying, well, we can go back to [13:09] using Russian energy. My view is that that's not reasonable and it's not appropriate. And indeed, [13:16] I think that the fallout from this war is going to go on for generations. Your thoughts on the [13:21] the energy relationship between Europe and Russia in the future? [13:26] Well, I'm reminded, I believe back in 2018, then President Trump, on two occasions, once at the [13:32] United Nations and I think another time at a NATO conference, pointed, for example, to Germany's [13:37] reliance on Russian energy as a real vulnerability. And he was snickered at. I remember he was snickered [13:44] at by the representatives of Germany at the United Nations. He turned out to be 100 percent correct. [13:49] In fact, that that reliance on Russian energy was a major loss of deterrence. Vladimir Putin, [13:55] among his many calculations, one of the calculations he took in going in in Ukraine was that the [14:00] Europeans would complain. Maybe they'd hit him with a couple sanctions. They'd write some strongly [14:05] worded nasty letters about him, but ultimately would not be able to do anything effectively [14:09] because of how much they depended on Russia. And in some cases continue to depend. I believe [14:14] France is the third leading payer into Russian energy in the world. And I think a couple other [14:20] countries in Europe follow right behind. So there's still a significant amount of dependence in that [14:24] regard. And that dependence on Russian energy is a tremendous amount of leverage that Vladimir Putin [14:29] holds on his neighbors in Europe. Now, there is some good news. I think, for example, I watched a [14:35] great interest, the German engineering marvel, where they've been able to, I think by the end of this, [14:40] at the end of this year after, they waived permitting requirements and within nine months were able to [14:46] open what is literally a floating LNG terminal to allow and receive exports, including from the United [14:55] States and other places. So I do think you're seeing movement in Europe now to try to detangle itself [15:00] from that level of dependence. But it remains a real vulnerability and a tremendous piece of leverage [15:07] for Putin against his neighbors in the broader world. It's also a reminder, by the way, and I used to [15:13] be guilty of saying this quite a bit, that the Russian GDP was the size of Italy's, you know, [15:17] not very large. I think one of the things we learned from this endeavor is that it's not just the size of [15:23] the GDP, but what it's composed of. And the Russian GDP, while smaller than some other countries, is largely [15:29] reliant on the production of raw materials, on the energy, on food production, fertilizer and the like. [15:37] And these are critical components of national strength and a reminder of how important they are for [15:42] us here domestically as well. Thank you. I appreciate that. I do think, [15:47] too, we ought to acknowledge that the Europeans did a job that was well beyond their expectations [15:55] the first winter as they struggled through. They did really well as far as cutting the cord with Russia, [16:02] being as how hard they were tied to that. Let's talk about AUKUS for a minute. There hasn't been much [16:07] discussion about AUKUS – well, there hasn't been much discussion about AUKUS, really, since the thing started. [16:12] A lot of us have been pressing the administration to gear that up. It has not been forthcoming. [16:19] I'd like to hear your thoughts on AUKUS, the importance thereof and getting this thing moving [16:28] as it was intended. Well, one of the things we'll have to endeavor to see, obviously, [16:31] is a tremendous amount of this that relies on the Department of Defense and other entities in [16:35] government. To the extent the Secretary of State and the Department of State is engaged, [16:39] it's something that I think you're going to find very strong support for in this administration. [16:47] I think it's almost a blueprint in many ways of how we can create consortium-like partnership [16:51] with nation states that are allied to us to confront some of these global challenges, [16:55] be it in the defense realm, in the technology realm, in the critical minerals realm, [16:59] in the sensitive technologies and critical technologies on, for example, artificial intelligence [17:05] and advances in even quantum computing. This, obviously, is more defense-related. But it's [17:10] one example of how we can leverage the power of these partnerships with allies – two, three countries, [17:15] in some cases, broader than others – to reach outcomes and objectives, such as creating a geopolitical [17:22] and strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. So we'll have to look at that and to see [17:28] what components of whatever impediments exist can be removed by the action of the Department of State. [17:34] But it also reminds us that in many of these, very few of these global issues are entirely reliant on [17:39] the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense. We have a host of other [17:44] government agencies, commerce in many cases, who also play a critical role in expediting and going [17:51] through, for example, some of the lists of technologies that perhaps are not being transferred [17:56] because they've been deemed as sensitive. But in the case of our strong and close allies, [18:01] that's the point, right, is that you want to be able to find yourself in a situation where you [18:06] can accelerate partnership by making available to key allies these sensitive technologies that we [18:11] wouldn't want to see in the hands or develop by an adversary or unaligned country. [18:16] Thank you. I appreciate that. Our view is aligned, particularly on the excluded technology list. [18:21] These are our closest and most trusted allies. And unfortunately, the current administration has [18:27] really been difficult to work with as far as getting through that excluded technology list. And I hope [18:35] you'll help expedite that. Let me talk for a minute about the International Criminal Court. [18:40] Look, I, as you know, we've got real problems there. The court originally was intended, at least from [18:49] our point of view, to be a court that focused on international crimes that were committed by people [18:57] from countries who did not have a robust democracy nor a robust judicial system that held its own people [19:04] accountable for crimes. The court's gone beyond that, obviously. They are not only focusing [19:10] on people who aren't accountable elsewhere, but they're also focusing on people who come from [19:17] countries that solve their own problems, like the United States of America and like Israel. [19:22] The most recent obvious thing that flowed from that was the indictment on the same day of Netanyahu, [19:34] plus a Hamas character. Any court that is a court of law has to be able to recognize good from bad. And when you [19:45] try to indict two people and show some type of moral equivalency in that regard, they're just barking up [19:53] the wrong tree. And I think, unfortunately, we're going to have to rein them up. Your thoughts on that? [19:58] Well, I think it's done tremendous – the ICC has done tremendous damage to its global credibility. First [20:02] of all, it is going after a non-member state on the claims that I believe – in fact, I think just in [20:07] the last 24 hours, the Israeli High Court filed an appeal before the ICC, even though it's not a [20:12] member state. And I saw some of the filings from the prosecutor, Mr. Khan, who's involved in that [20:17] process. And he argues that they have the right to go after non-members for their activities within [20:22] the confines of member states in this case. And I think, first of all, the whole premise of his [20:28] prosecution is, well, beyond the process of it and the precedent that it sets, which is a very dangerous [20:32] precedent for the United States of America, by the way, because this is a test run. This is a trial run [20:36] to see, can we go after a head of state from a nation that's not a member? If we can go after [20:41] them and we can get it done with regards to Israel, they will apply that to the United States at some [20:46] point. And in fact, there have been threats to do so in the past. But the premise of the prosecution [20:50] itself is completely and utterly flawed. As you said, they went ahead – I think they also went after [20:55] Senwar. Well, number one Senwar didn't travel around the world. He's not with us any longer. But he [21:00] doesn't – didn't travel around the world, was at no risk of being apprehended. Second of all, the moral [21:04] equivalency piece of it was offensive. Let me explain. And I think I don't need to explain to [21:08] this committee. Hamas carried out an atrocious operation. They sent a bunch of savages into [21:15] Israel with the express and explicit purpose of targeting civilians. They went into concerts. [21:21] They went into these music festivals. They knew that there were no soldiers at the music festival. [21:25] They knew that these were teenagers and young families that they went into this – into different [21:29] communities and the kibbutzes and the like. And they deliberately targeted civilians. Deliberately. [21:34] It was their – in fact, they kidnapped the ones they didn't murder, the families who they didn't [21:38] eviscerate, the people whose skulls they didn't crack open. They – they kidnapped and to this day [21:43] continue to hold people that they – innocents that they took a deliberate operation. In the case of [21:49] Israel, responding to that attack has had to go after Hamas. How can you coexist? How can any nation [21:55] state on the planet coexist side by side with a group of savages and – like Hamas? It's – they have to [22:02] defend their national security and their national interest, as I pointed out in my opening statement. [22:06] And so there is no more – and they didn't target civilians. Now sadly and unfortunately, [22:10] and I'm sure we'll discuss it further, some of the other questions that will come up here today. [22:14] One of the horrible things about war – it's a terrible thing about war, and it's why we should [22:17] try to prevent it at almost any cost – is that innocent people are caught up in it. And that's true [22:23] of every conflict on the planet. But there is a difference between those who, in the conduct of armed [22:27] action, deliberately targets civilians – and those who do as much as they can to avoid civilians [22:33] being caught up – against an enemy that doesn't wear a uniform, against an enemy that hides in [22:38] tunnels, against an enemy that hides behind women and children and puts them at the forefront and uses [22:43] them as human shields. That's who Hamas is. There is no moral equivalency. And I think the ICC, [22:48] if they don't drop this, will find its credibility globally badly damaged. And I think the United States [22:53] should be very concerned because I believe this is a test run for applying it to American service [22:58] member and American leaders in the future. Well said. I couldn't agree with you more. And [23:03] certainly the court has badly damaged its reputation, and it's going to have a long ways to go [23:10] to recover from that. So with that, Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [23:15] Senator Rubio, as I said in my opening statement, I hope that this committee can better collaborate to [23:19] swiftly confirm career foreign service officers. These are patriotic Americans who have served under [23:25] both Democratic and Republican administrations, and they work to advance U.S. national security [23:30] interests. Delays and vacant posts hurt America's interest. I know you agree with that because we've [23:37] had that conversation. But will you commit to working with Chairman Rish and me to prioritize the [23:42] advancement and confirmation of career State Department officials? [23:45] Well, the answer to that is yes. But I would also point to this fact that I think we're going to [23:52] begin by prioritizing. We're going to look at what are the key issues in the world. They're obviously [23:55] every post in the world is important or it shouldn't exist. And then the question is, which are the ones [24:00] we bring to you first? And those are the ones that I think are most critical. So obviously, I think you'll [24:04] see our nominees for the deputy posts, which are critically important, all the undersecretaries as well. And what [24:09] I've endeavored to do is we interview and identify people. And I believe I've met with and interviewed most of the [24:15] candidates for those top posts is I want to bring you people that are three things. Number one, are [24:19] aligned to the mission. I think that's critically important, whether they be foreign service officers. [24:23] I'm not talking about political alignment. I'm talking about alignment with the mission that we've [24:27] outlined for American foreign policy, which is one of the things that I think has hurt the State [24:32] Department. Under numerous administrations is sometimes the mission or what it is the core mission [24:37] of the department has not been well defined. That's on us and it's our obligation to define that. So number one, [24:43] align to the mission. Number two, the capability to do the job. And I can tell you now that my entire [24:49] service on this committee, which spans 14 years, we always had fellows from the Department of State, [24:55] I believe all of whom are still in the service of our country. And I intend, because I know them and [25:00] I've worked with them, to utilize their skill sets in the department. And in fact, a couple who we hope [25:08] will be returning home soon from foreign postings to work with us at the State Department closer to my [25:13] office. But the point is that we want to have people that are highly capable, both those who [25:17] we bring from what they call political appointees, but also those that are promoted from within the [25:22] foreign service. And then the third are people that we can get through the committee because time is [25:27] of the essence. Now, you may not agree with all their views, whether they be foreign service officers [25:32] or whether they be political, but I think it's important for and we're not going to exclude someone [25:36] just because we think that maybe they're going to have a rougher confirmation process than someone else. [25:41] But I do think it's important that we have people in these positions as quickly as possible. [25:45] And having served for 14 years on that side of this room, I understand that one of the things we [25:50] can do to help expedite that is to bring you people that will do a good job, who are qualified for the [25:55] job or mission aligned, but also that can move through this process quickly enough so that they [26:00] can be at post and begin to fulfill their duties. If I have to wait a year to get them in place, [26:05] well, I'm not sure on some of these issues we face today, we have a year to wait. [26:09] I certainly agree with that and I appreciate your focus on mission and qualifications because I [26:16] think the committee will be looking closely at that. I want to go now to NATO because in 2023, [26:23] Congress overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan Cain-Rubio provision prohibiting any president [26:30] from withdrawing the United States from NATO without Senate approval or an act of Congress. [26:34] Will you commit to adhering to Senate approval or an act of Congress as required under that [26:39] law that you authored if President Trump attempts to withdraw the U.S. from NATO? [26:44] Well, first let me say that President Trump has appointed an ambassador nominee for NATO, [26:49] which clearly indicates his role to engage in that. Second is the law is what it is. I obviously, [26:56] as you've mentioned, I was a co-sponsor of the law and so it's tough to say I'm not in support of a law [27:00] that I hope to pass and that I think it's an important role for Congress to play because frankly [27:03] it's not just about the withdrawal piece of it, it's the contributions you make towards the power [27:08] of the purse still resides with the Congress. Now maybe as if confirmed moving towards the executive [27:14] branch I'll become, I'll forget that lesson a little bit, I hope not, but ultimately I still recognize [27:20] and understand that the power of the purse is with Congress and it's an incredibly important power. [27:25] Let me point on NATO one thing. I think there's a misunderstanding about it. The NATO alliance is [27:29] a very important alliance. I believe that. I believe alliances can be, and it's been very useful. [27:33] Without the NATO alliance there is no end to the Cold War. In fact, without the NATO alliance it's quite [27:38] possible that much of what today, at the time, today we know as Europe would have fallen victim to [27:46] aggression. But what's important for the United States is not just to have defense allies, it's to [27:50] have capable defense allies, allies who are capable of defending their region. And I think there is a [27:56] question to be asked. I'm not stating a public policy position. I'm stating a question to be [28:00] asked, and that is should the role of the United States and NATO in the 21st century be the primary [28:05] defense role or as a backstop to aggression with countries in the region assuming more of that [28:11] responsibility by contributing more? Now look, in fairness, and I think the further east you move in [28:15] Europe, the more money you see spent on the military as a percentage of GDP. But I think there's been broad [28:20] acknowledgement across Europe and across multiple administrations, both Republican and Democrat, [28:26] that our NATO partners, these are rich advanced economies, need to contribute more to their own [28:31] defense and ultimately to the NATO partnership as well. And that's a demand that's been made by [28:36] multiple presidents across the years. And the fact that that is true has been revealed by what's [28:43] happened with Ukraine. Look at the ramp up in defense spending and the industrial capacity of [28:47] multiple countries in Europe as a result of an armed conflict. Imagine if that capacity had been [28:52] there before, it quite possibly might have had a deterrent effect as well. So I think it's important [28:57] that we have alliances. But we have to have alliances with strong and capable partners and not those who [29:03] sort of have viewed the U.S. and the NATO defense agreement as an excuse to spend less on defense and [29:09] more on some domestic needs. We have domestic needs too. These advanced rich countries in Western Europe [29:14] have enormous safety nets programs that they fund. We have domestic needs as well. But they've been [29:20] able to divert or grow those programs because they don't have to spend as much on defense as we do as [29:25] a percentage of our overall economy. And that dynamic needs to change. And I expect that President Trump [29:29] will continue to forcefully make that point. And as you know, this committee and the Senate NATO [29:36] Observer Group, which I co-chair, has made that point repeatedly. And we are now up to 23 of the 32 NATO [29:42] nations who are meeting their 2 percent of GDP. And we have a number of them who are going beyond that. [29:48] And it's appropriate. And I think the sentiment on this committee would be to agree with what you're [29:54] saying. But to ensure that we continue to have a strong NATO, I think will be important not only to [30:00] European security, but most important to our own security. I appreciate – we talked about Ukraine. [30:08] I appreciate your past leadership in supporting Ukraine's fight for sovereignty. More recently, [30:14] you voted against supplemental funding for Ukraine and against forgiving loans for Ukraine in November, [30:20] loans that would be critical to Ukraine's economic stability. So can you talk about how your views on [30:27] Ukraine have developed and where you are now and what you think is important for us to do in order to [30:32] ensure that there is the strongest possible negotiating position if Ukraine and Russia do get to the [30:39] negotiating table? Sure. First, let me point out – and although I'll still speak to my view of the [30:45] process – that I voted against that bill because I said I would not vote for a bill unless it addressed [30:49] the crisis at our southern border as part of the overall arrangement. That was not done, [30:53] and so I voted against it. That said, here's my view of a situation. Once this war became what we now know [31:00] it is, and that is a war of attrition, a stalemate, a protracted conflict. The dynamic on that situation [31:06] has changed. It has. And I believe, and I think that this echoes with the President – let me first [31:10] echo the President's words and what he said in an interview about a year ago. He was asked about the [31:14] war in Ukraine. He says, I want the dying to stop. I want people to stop dying. I want the killing to stop. [31:20] And frankly, I don't know how anyone could say they don't. The destruction that Ukraine is undergoing [31:26] is extraordinary. It's going to take a generation to rebuild it. Millions of Ukrainians no longer live in [31:31] Ukraine. And the disruption – that means how many of them are going to come back, and what are they [31:34] going to come back to? Even as I speak to you now, the Ukrainian infrastructure and their energy [31:39] infrastructure is being decimated in ways that are going to cost hundreds of billions of dollars to [31:44] rebuild over the next decades. So this is an important conflict, and I think it should be the [31:49] official position of the United States that this war should be brought to an end. And the question [31:54] becomes, you know, what role can we play? And I think the first is by making that abundantly clear. [31:58] And my differences with the Biden administration throughout this process is that they never [32:04] clearly delineated what the end goal of the conflict was. What exactly were we funding? What [32:09] exactly were we putting money towards? And on many occasions, it sounded like, however much it takes, [32:14] for however long it takes. That is not a realistic or prudent position. The truth of the matter is that [32:18] in this conflict, there is no way Russia takes all of Ukraine. The Ukrainians are too brave and fight [32:23] too hard and the country is too big. That's not going to happen. It's also unrealistic to believe that [32:28] somehow a nation the size of Ukraine, no matter how incompetent and no matter how much damage the Russian [32:35] Federation has suffered as a result of this invasion, there is no way Ukraine is also going to push these [32:40] people all the way back to where they were on the eve of the invasion, just given the size dynamic. [32:45] I saw a quote recently, and I wish I could attribute it to who it was, but the quote was, and I think it [32:50] was very wise, where they said the problem that Ukraine is facing is not that they're running out [32:54] of money, it's that they're running out of Ukrainians. There's a size differential here that's important. [32:58] Now, what Vladimir Putin has done is unacceptable. There's no doubt about it, but this war has to end, [33:03] and I think it should be the official policy of the United States that we want to see it end. [33:06] Now, what that master plan looks like is going to be hard work. This is not going to be an easy endeavor, [33:12] by this, but it's going to require bold diplomacy, and my hope is that it could begin with some ceasefire, [33:17] and we're going to have, there are going to, in order to achieve objectives like the one that needs [33:21] to occur in Ukraine, it is important for everyone to be realistic. There will have to be concessions [33:26] made by the Russian Federation, but also by the Ukrainians, and the United States has lent itself [33:31] there. It's also important that there be some balance on both sides. In essence, it will be difficult [33:36] to achieve this objective of a ceasefire and ultimately a peace settlement unless both sides [33:41] have leverage. Putin's goal now is to have maximum leverage so that he can basically impose neutrality [33:47] on Ukraine, retrofit, and come back and do this again in four or five years, and that's not an outcome [33:52] I think any of us would favor. By the same token, I think it's important that the Ukrainians have [33:57] leverage, but they also will have to make concessions to reach this agreement. It's going to be very [34:01] difficult. This will not be easy. Conflicts of this nature that have historical underpinnings to it [34:06] are going to require a lot of hard diplomacy and tough work, but that's something that needs to [34:11] happen. This conflict needs to end. Well, I'm out of time, but I appreciate your last comment about the [34:18] importance of leverage, and it's important for the United States to do what we can to help provide [34:24] that leverage to Ukraine so that they can be in the best negotiating position possible with Russia. [34:29] Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ricketts. [34:32] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, Senator Rubio, congratulations on your nomination to this very, [34:38] very difficult job. I want to thank you for your previous service in the U.S. Senate and your [34:43] willingness to take on this job should you be confirmed, and I also want to thank your family [34:50] as well for their support for you to be able to be a U.S. Senator and to apply for this job as Secretary [34:55] State. And I want also to express my gratitude to all the members of the State Department. [35:03] We have a lot of people who choose to serve our country overseas, spend time away from their [35:08] friends and family, and I can't think of a more noble calling. You're taking over a department that's [35:13] very, very important to us. On Sunday, Jake Sullivan, President Biden's National Security Advisor, [35:20] said, quote, the American people are safer and the country is better off than we were four years ago. [35:27] Let me repeat, the American people are safer and the country is better off than four years ago. [35:32] I don't know who believes that. I don't believe that. I think the election results demonstrate the [35:41] vast majority of Americans don't believe that. We don't believe it at home. Inflation has hurt [35:49] average American's pocketbooks. Open board policies have put Americans at risk, and I don't believe we [35:59] see it overseas. In fact, Senator Rubio, should you be confirmed, you're being handed a job at a time [36:09] when this country is in the most danger we've been in since World War II. It's a very dangerous time [36:17] in the world, and your opening remarks demonstrate that you know that. We're not better off and we're [36:24] not safer. President Biden started this with a disaster withdrawal from Afghanistan, that projected [36:33] weakness and an incomprehension of what it means to have a policy of deterrence. Vladimir Putin invaded [36:43] Ukraine and started the largest war in Europe since World War II after that withdrawal. I believe it's [36:50] because he saw weakness in this Biden administration. It's been the president's fear of helping Ukraine [36:57] that has contributed to putting him in the untenable position they are today by slow rolling the weapons [37:05] that Ukraine needs to be able to defend themselves. His incomprehensible and incoherent policy has [37:12] caused him to handcuff American liquid natural gas exports while delaying tough sanctions on the [37:19] Russian oil and gas industry, which, as you know, is the lifeblood of the Russian war machine. [37:24] The Middle East is equally disastrous. Instead of enforcing sanctions on Iran, Biden naively tried to [37:32] resurrect the Iran nuclear deal, enabling the regime to generate $100 billion in oil revenue. And I want [37:39] to point out that during the Trump administration, because of sanctions, Iran's foreign reserves fell [37:45] from $122 billion to less than $14 billion. That hampered their ability to be able to fund terrorist [37:53] groups like Hamas and Hezbollah and the Houthis. What the Biden administration has done is allowed the [38:00] Iranian regime to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium to be a week or two away from having a nuclear [38:07] weapon. And since October 7th, President Biden has not supported Israel in the way he's needed. And [38:16] because of the previous mentioned money that he's allowed the Iranians to have that has funded the [38:22] terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, our allies like Israel have been attacked. And we've been [38:28] attacked directly. Thankfully, Israel's had the courage to stand up to these terrorists and take matters [38:34] into its own hand. And it's led to the decimation of Hamas and Hezbollah. But no amount of revisionist [38:41] history can change the fact that this was despite the lack of support from the Biden administration, [38:46] not because of the support from the Biden administration. And of course, let's not forget [38:51] North Korea and how dangerous they have become. And the fact that we are now seeing North Korean troops [38:57] in Europe. I thought four years ago that was unthought by anybody. And of course, one of the most [39:07] concerning things is Biden's weakness has emboldened the greatest adversary we have on the face of [39:12] the earth right now, which is the People's Republic of China. The People's Republic of China is the head [39:17] of the stake of this axis of dictators that are challenging the United States today. They're [39:25] challenging our freedom, our security and the very way of life we have. Beijing has had a direct hand in [39:32] each of the problems I just mentioned. That's why addressing any one of them cannot be done without [39:39] making sure that we are thinking about how we are deterring the People's Republic of China. [39:46] When everything is a priority, nothing's a priority. And Senator Rubio, your top priority must be [39:53] the People's Republic of China. Since the election in November, so this is all within the last two [39:58] months, the PRC has hacked our Treasury Department, including CFIUS. Continue what has been described as [40:04] the worst telecom hack in U.S. history. Sabotage important undersea communication cables [40:11] in Asia and Europe. Deployed ships to the South China Sea to harass our allies like the Philippines [40:16] in their own territorial waters. Simulated a naval-backed blockade of the Japanese [40:21] islands for the first time. Conducted the largest naval drills in decades, targeting Taiwan and the [40:27] broader Western Pacific. Revealed new mobile piers suitable for a Taiwan invasion. Unveiled advanced [40:33] aircraft and launched the world's largest amphibious warship. And they've allowed Iran to draw down and [40:38] ship nearly three billion barrels of oil from a storage site in China. It's obvious that Xi Jinping [40:45] is positioning his chess pieces in preparation for war. He's directed his military to be prepared to [40:50] take Taiwan by 2027, and folks, that's only two years away. Now, it's true that that does not mean [40:56] that he will invade in 2027. And it's also true that it's not predetermined. But it should be very [41:01] concerning to all of us that he's given his military that direction. Because time and time again, [41:06] dictators tell people what they're going to do, and then they go out and try and do it. [41:11] The only thing that dictators respond to is force. Strength. Peace through strength. This was [41:18] something Ronald Reagan understood a long time ago. And it's what we have to get back to in the United [41:23] States. Xi Jinping is bound to be the world-dominating power by 2049. We should take him at his word. [41:30] That's what he believes he is going to try and do. It's time for us to go on the offensive and abandon [41:36] illusions about what kind of adversary we're faced. This is not a managed competition. This is [41:41] a competition we must win. It will take more than an all-of-government approach. It'll take an [41:48] all-of-society approach to be able to win this. As our lead diplomat, Senator Rubio, [41:56] you are in a position to set the tone. And that's why I can't think of a better pick to be the Secretary [42:02] of State than you. So, first of all, do you agree that the PRC is the biggest threat that we face as [42:12] the United States? The Communist Party of China is, leads the PRC, is the most potent and dangerous [42:23] near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted. They have elements that the Soviet Union never [42:27] possessed. They are a technological adversary and competitor, an industrial competitor, an economic [42:32] competitor, a geopolitical competitor, a scientific competitor now, in every realm. It's an extraordinary [42:39] challenge. It's one that I believe will define the 21st century. When they write the book about the 21st [42:44] century, there's going to be some chapters in there about Putin. There's going to be some chapters [42:47] in there about some of these other places. But the bulk of that book about the 21st century will be [42:52] not just about China, but about the relationship between China and the United States and what [42:56] direction it went. And I think you're alluding to it in your statement. I know you may have another [43:00] question. I don't want to eat up all your time. But I do want to say this. The Chinese believe that the [43:04] United States are a great power and inevitable decline and that they are an inevitable rise. Now, [43:09] they're going to be – they already are. They're going to be a rich and powerful country, [43:12] and we're going to have to deal with them. The danger is that because of our own actions, [43:18] in many cases, a dangerous imbalance is built up in that relationship. We allowed them for years to [43:23] pretend that they were some developing countries, so we should allow them to continue to cheat on trade [43:27] and commerce. We should allow them to continue to expand. They lied about not militarizing and [43:32] populating island chains in the South China Sea and the like. We allowed them for years before we got [43:37] serious about it to conduct grotesque human rights violations against Uighur Muslims, as an example. [43:43] One of the most horrifying things happening on the planet. And for years, no one talked about it, [43:47] which, by the way, not just has a human rights component to it. It allows them to use slave labor [43:52] to produce goods at the expense of the rest of the world. Talk about not just a horrific humanitarian [43:58] crisis, but an unfair trade practice as well. We've allowed them to get away with things. And frankly, [44:03] the Chinese did what any country in the world would do, given these opportunities. They took advantage [44:07] of it. And so I think now we're dealing with the ramifications of it. I agree 100 percent what you [44:12] said, but I remind you, and I remind everyone, I guess I want to make this point, that much of what [44:17] we need to do to confront China is here at home. It's not just abroad. It's also here at home. We have to [44:22] rebuild our domestic industrial capacity, and we have to make sure that the United States is not reliant on [44:27] any single other nation for any of our critical supply chains. And with four seconds left, [44:33] how are you going to explain that to your average American, that we need this all-size society [44:37] approach? And to your point exactly, that it needs to begin here at home, so that people from my state [44:43] in Nebraska will understand and get on board? If we stay on the road we're on right now, in less [44:49] than 10 years, virtually everything that matters to us in life will depend on whether China will allow [44:53] us to have it or not. Everything from the blood pressure medicine we take to what movies we get to [44:59] watch, and everything in between, we will depend on China for it. They have come to dominate the [45:04] critical mineral industry supplies throughout the world. Everywhere in the world they've now [45:09] established critical mineral rights. Even those who want to see more electric cars, no matter where [45:13] you make them, those batteries are almost entirely dependent on the ability of the Chinese and the [45:18] willingness of the Chinese Communist Party to produce it and export it to you. So if we don't change [45:22] course, we are going to live in a world where much of what matters to us on a daily basis, from our [45:27] security to our health, will be dependent on whether the Chinese allow us to have it or not. That's an [45:33] unacceptable outcome. Thank you, Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, [45:44] Senator Rubio. And I've enjoyed working with you on the Congressional Executive Commission on China, [45:49] which engages in many issues related to their treatment of folks from the Tibetans to the Uyghurs, [45:56] to their position regarding Hong Kong and Taiwan. But let's talk about Taiwan. I had the chance to go to [46:03] Taiwan in 20 – well, the year 2000. It was the second presidential election there, [46:08] and it was the first one where people were becoming convinced that they actually might [46:11] be able to hold a democracy. I believe they've earned the right to have a voice in international [46:17] affairs. And I also believe that they are at great risk right now with mainland China Xi's plan to be [46:24] aggressive militarily towards them, as my colleague Senator Ricketts just noted. [46:31] Will you support your role as Secretary of State? Taiwan's right to have a voice in international [46:37] affairs, participate in international forums. And will you support the porcupine strategy [46:43] provided – providing that we will supply them with defense articles and defense services [46:51] in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability? [46:57] By the way, that phrase is from the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. It's in our current law. [47:02] Yeah. Let me just point out that on the Taiwan Relations Act, and I believe of the year 2016, [47:07] I was the lead Republican sponsor in reauthorizing and reinvigorating it. I think that the [47:13] multiple or consecutive presidential administrations of both parties are made clear that the policy of [47:20] the United States towards Taiwan is encapsulated not just in the Taiwan Relations Act, but in the six [47:24] assurances that multiple administrations, including the Trump administration and now the Biden [47:28] administration, have made clear our policies. With regards to your second point about international [47:33] forums, ASEAN is a great example of one in which that's being tested. That last year at their conference, [47:41] the Chinese were able to prevent participation by the Taiwan – any mention of Taiwan in the memorandum, [47:51] and then this year they're working very hard to make sure that no one associated with Taiwan is anywhere [47:55] near it. So this is just one more example of how they're being excluded. I would also point to the [47:59] Western Hemisphere. I know that sounds like half a world away, but you understand this issue. The majority [48:03] of nations on Earth that continue to recognize and have relations with Taiwan, the vast bulk of them, [48:08] the plurality, are within the Western Hemisphere. They've undertaken a very aggressive action in [48:12] just the last seven, eight years to get these countries to flip. They got Panama to flip, then [48:17] they got Panama to convince the Dominican Republic to flip. They've targeted multiple other nations, [48:22] and Nicaragua most recently to flip. So I think that's an important thing for us to keep in mind and [48:27] make a priority. And I also think it's important to recognize allies in the region like Paraguay that [48:33] have not flipped, and others who have stayed strong in that regard. On the Porcupine strategy, [48:37] because I know it may sound weird to people or if anyone's watching this. I know what the ratings [48:42] are, but hopefully not high. But let me just say that on the Porcupine strategy, what it really means [48:48] is you want to make the cost of invading Taiwan higher than the benefit. We want to discourage that [48:55] by the Chinese believing that, yes, could they ultimately win an invasion of Taiwan, but the price [49:01] would be too high to pay. It's basically deterrence. And I think that's critical, not just to defending [49:06] Taiwan, to preventing a cataclysmic military intervention in the Indo-Pacific. And that's [49:13] what it would be. And I would make one more point, and again, I don't mean to want to be alarmist about [49:18] it. But if you listen to Xi Jinping, and it's important when you listen to him, and I say listen, [49:23] read, don't read the English translation that they put out, because the English translation is never [49:28] right. You have to read the real translation on what they actually said in their native tongue. What they're [49:35] basically saying is that this is a foundational and definitional issue for Xi Jinping personally. [49:40] And as a result, I think we need to wrap our head around the fact that unless something dramatic [49:45] changes, like an equilibrium where they conclude that the costs of intervening in Taiwan are too high, [49:53] we're going to have to deal with this before the end of this decade. [49:55] And so strongly support for the Porcupine strategy. Thank you. And I know people in Taiwan – [50:01] I just don't like saying Porcupine, but yes. [50:03] You know, when I went to Taiwan in November and met with the president and other leaders, [50:11] they are extremely nervous right now. And part of the reason they're nervous is they're concerned [50:16] about how things play out in Ukraine as possibly creating an incentive for China. And I take your [50:25] point about the current stalemate and the fact that there is a range of objectives that are out of reach for [50:30] for other side. But I do feel like our partnership with NATO and our continued supply of war material that [50:39] enable Ukrainians to keep fighting until that resolution is done is extremely important. Because if Ukraine [50:47] collapses, it will say a lot to China about whether we will stay the course in assisting Taiwan. Not to [50:56] mention it will be a catastrophe for democracy and a catastrophe for the Ukrainians. I don't know if [51:02] you share that view. [51:04] Well, I think, first of all, our goal, as President Trump has stated, is he wants the dying to stop. [51:09] He wants the killing to stop. So it's very difficult to reach an accord or an agreement that begins with [51:14] a ceasefire and ends with a peace agreement unless both sides have some leverage. Now, there's some leverage [51:19] that exists beyond military capabilities as well. We have a significant number of sanctions on the [51:25] Russian Federation, and they continue to grow and expand, and other nations do as well. And that will [51:30] have to be part of this conversation in terms of bringing about a peaceful resolution. And then there's [51:35] the question of the long-term security and stability of Ukraine beyond the – even if the conflict were to [51:42] end, there needs to be the capability of Ukraine to defend itself. And it's a point that I made back as far [51:47] as 2014 when the United States, under the Obama administration, chose not to provide [51:53] weapon capabilities. And I think we lost the turn during that period. [51:57] Thank you. I want to keep – I'm going to keep rolling here for a few other questions. [52:01] One of the things China is doing is deeply engaged in transnational repression, which means [52:06] threatening people here in the United States that they will disappear or kill or harm their family [52:12] members back in China if they exercise their free rights here in our country. And also they're seeking [52:17] to repatriate Uyghurs who have escaped China. And right now there are 48 Uyghurs that are in [52:25] Thailand, and Thailand is on the verge of repatriating them back to China. Will you lobby for [52:34] Thailand to not send these Uyghurs back to the horror they will face if they're returned? [52:42] Yes. And the good news is that Thailand is actually a very strong U.S. partner, [52:46] strong historical ally as well. And so we – that is an area where I think diplomacy could really [52:51] achieve results because of how important that relationship and how close it is. I think it's [52:55] also one more opportunity for us to remind the world of what exactly we're talking about here. This [52:59] is not some obscure issue. These are people who are basically being rounded up because of their [53:03] ethnicity and religion. And they are being put into camps. They're being put into what they call [53:08] re-education centers. They're being stripped of their identity. Their children's names are being [53:13] changed. It's one of the most horrifying things that's ever happened. And they're being put into [53:18] forced labor – literally slave labor. And I will say our work together on the Forced [53:23] Labor Prevention Act, Uyghur forced labor, was tremendous. Thank you for championing that. [53:29] I'm encouraging other nations, including Canada, Mexico, and Europe, to follow the [53:34] rebuttable presumption strategy we put into that bill. Because right now, if our slave labor products [53:41] or China's slave labor products are rejected here, they're shipped to Canada. And we need to expand on [53:46] that. I want to turn to another point. Our companies face in China often the requirement for partnerships [53:54] or location or what products they can produce or the theft of their intellectual property. Meanwhile, [53:59] we're helping their economy by being a major supplier of fossil gas, LNG, to China. Should [54:06] we be strengthening the Chinese economy by sending them LNG? Well, I think that is a good point to [54:15] raise in that regard because I will tell you that it's one of the things that's going to have to be [54:19] discussed in the broader relationship with China. And that is, it is one of the things we actually [54:23] export to China. They import a lot this way. One of the few things that we export in great capacity is [54:30] these long-term contracts that are tied up either directly to China or through third countries. [54:35] Because some of this obviously is exported to a third country who in turn uses, sends it to China [54:39] either as a direct sale or as a byproduct. So I think that has to be on the table as a number of [54:45] other measures that we have in leverage as we engage the Chinese in this geopolitical perspective. [54:49] I would go further and point out that the Chinese also have, I believe, the world's largest surplus [54:54] refining capacity. They've invested very heavily in that as well. And that's one more area where I [54:59] think our energy policy will be critical and bringing some geopolitical stability to our [55:03] relationship with them. I know you sponsored a bill to cut off the exports. [55:07] I've focused on China, but I want to turn to humanitarian issues. I, by the way, [55:13] fully support Israel's ability to respond to Hamas. But I am very concerned about how it has played out [55:22] in terms of the massive humanitarian conditions in Gaza. Will you help lead the world [55:28] in responding to those humanitarian conditions? And there is a proposal for a broad regional [55:37] agreement that would provide security to Israel, peace with all their Arab neighbors, building on [55:42] the Abraham Accords that in return would create a framework to have a palace or concrete steps towards [55:50] a Palestinian state. I believe that's our best bet to break the cycle of hate and war that we've [55:57] been trapped in my entire lifetime. How will you pursue breaking this cycle of hate? And will you [56:03] support humanitarian support to the – to Gaza? [56:05] Yeah. So my first point is I am hopeful – and again, I've been here so I don't know of any news [56:10] has emerged in our time during this hearing – but I am hopeful that there is an agreement in place that [56:15] will bring hostages back immediately in an exchange and in a three-phase plan that Secretary Blinken sort [56:21] of has outlined over the last 24 hours. And that credit to both the Biden administration and the [56:26] Trump transition work side by side on helping this become about. And I hope that comes about. [56:31] And part of that phrase, part of that deal as I understand it, is it has this very tenuous but [56:36] important six-week transitional period where it's going to require international cooperation to bring [56:42] some level of stability and administration. And that could serve as – assuming it works – that could [56:47] serve as a foundation to build upon. I would also point to one more thing, and that is we don't know [56:53] yet for sure, but there are opportunities available now in the Middle East that did not exist 90 days ago, [56:59] whether it's what's happened in Lebanon, whether it's what's happened in Syria, whether it's what [57:04] hopefully will happen with the ceasefire and the release of hostages after horrifying detention and [57:10] unjustifiable actions by – by Hamas. Whether it's any of these three things are all in combination. [57:16] There are now factors at play in the Middle East that I think we can build upon and may open the door [57:21] to extraordinary and historic opportunities, not just to provide for Israel's security, [57:25] but ultimately begin to confront some of these other factors. But these things, again, [57:29] are going to be hard work, and they'll require us to take advantage of those opportunities if they exist. [57:33] Thank you. Senator McClark. [57:37] Great. Senator Rubio, good to see you again. I'm looking forward to working with you closely on [57:42] many of the issues we're going to discuss today. As a senator, you've been a strong voice for [57:47] American leadership, and I'm really confident you'll be a strong Secretary of State on behalf [57:52] of President Trump and the American people for advancing America's interest. I believe you're [57:55] the right man for the job. When we met privately, we talked about a range of topics, from China to [58:01] Israel to the fate of the hostages in Gaza to energy policy. We also talked about something that hits home [58:08] here in Pennsylvania for my constituents, which is the fate of Mark Fogel. As you and I discussed, [58:13] Mark has been imprisoned by the Russians since 2021. I've had a chance to meet with his mom, [58:20] 95-year-old Mafa. She was at the Butler rally with myself and President Trump in the front row when [58:25] he was shot. We need to bring him home. It took far too long for the State Department to designate Mark [58:31] as wrongfully detained by the Russian government, and it was really a gut punch to many of us in [58:37] Pennsylvania that Mark wasn't included in the swap last year. So, Senator, will you commit to working [58:44] with me and others in our delegation to make Mark's return home a high priority? [58:49] Absolutely. And in fact, I've been involved already. I've met with those families as well. We've had [58:54] conversations about this, and there are two things I'd point to. Number one, this is a ridiculous case. [58:59] I mean, this is an American that clearly there was an order given at some level that if you see an [59:04] American and you have anything you can charge them with, let's charge them and let's collect these [59:07] because we can trade them in the future for something. There's a global market for this now, [59:11] and it's one of the challenges of the 21st century. There is now an active global market for detaining [59:15] Americans wrongfully in Venezuela, in Russia, in China, or somewhere else, Iran, and then using [59:21] them to trade for something they want in the future. And so I think there needs to be greater [59:26] awareness put out about that reality. Although people are still going to travel, Americans are still [59:31] free people that have the ability to travel. This is a real risk. In this particular case, [59:35] this has nothing to do with politics. No one can claim, nor do they, that he's a spy or that he's [59:39] involved in a national security threat. And so this is a case that has to be elevated and hopefully one [59:46] that can be done through strong private diplomacy, at a minimum, as a goodwill gesture. Because if [59:52] they're not willing to do this, not to mention the broader challenges posed to us by what Putin is [59:58] doing in Ukraine, then I think the chances of improvement in U.S.-Russian relations are impossible. [1:00:03] But this is – not that this would solve that problem, but it is at a minimum the kind of thing [1:00:08] you would hope to see if anyone is serious about improving relations, especially if we can get the [1:00:13] situation in Ukraine to a peaceful standing. And I hope that this case will be one that we can reach [1:00:22] a good result on. MR. Good. Thank you. On the sad topic of hostages, as you know, [1:00:28] Dina and I and my wife live in Squirrel Hill in Pittsburgh. We've been part of a meeting with [1:00:33] hostages in Israel and in the United States as recently as last week. Noah Aragami and Ronan and [1:00:40] Orin and Nutra, who lost their son sadly, Omar, recently came to visit. And, you know, President Trump [1:00:47] said recently that all hell will be to pay if the hostages aren't released. If confirmed, what [1:00:55] what emphasis would you put on releasing those hostages in Gaza? Do you agree that a permanent [1:00:59] ceasefire in Gaza must include – absolutely must include the release of those hostages? [1:01:04] MR. Well, it must – it must include it because if it doesn't, there won't be a ceasefire for long. [1:01:10] I mean, the Israeli commitment to bringing back – they're civilians. That's what these are. These are [1:01:13] civilians. These are not – these are people – these are innocent people who were targeted and have [1:01:17] been held in horrifying conditions, the health and well-being of which many of them were not – we [1:01:22] still don't know. But we believe the substantial number that – that are going to be released as [1:01:27] part of this first tranche. And that's an important point as well, you know, in regards to this [1:01:32] agreement that has now been publicly reported on. It's not everyone. I think there's a first tranche [1:01:36] of women, children, and people over a certain age, and then a second tranche of releases [1:01:40] of males that are of military age, who they claim are all combatants even though they are not. [1:01:46] They just happen to be of a certain age. But without the hostage situation resolved, [1:01:53] this situation will not be resolved. It is the linchpin of what's happened now. Hamas has been [1:01:57] severely degraded. But these people, that include a number of American citizens, need to be home as [1:02:01] soon as possible. And that will remain a priority in any engagement that we're involved in with regards to [1:02:07] not just to cease fire, but some permanent peace process moving forward. [1:02:10] Very good. Thank you. You know, since October 7th, there's been a disturbing rise in anti-Semitism, [1:02:17] pro-terrorist violence in our cities, on college campuses. You and I had the opportunity to write [1:02:22] an op-ed together. And in that op-ed, we called on foreign nationals who support Hamas or other [1:02:29] terrorist organizations to lose their visas and to be sent back to their home countries. As Secretary of [1:02:35] State, of course, you'll be responsible for overseeing the issuance of visas. How will you [1:02:41] enforce our laws to ensure that we remove supporters of terrorist groups from our country? [1:02:47] Listen, my view of this is one of common sense, okay? If you apply for a visa to come into the [1:02:52] United States, and in the process of being looked at, it comes to light that you're a supporter of Hamas. [1:02:58] We wouldn't let you in. If we knew you were a supporter of Hamas, we would not give you a visa. [1:03:03] So now that you got the visa and you're inside the U.S., and now we realize you're a supporter of Hamas, [1:03:07] we should remove your visa. If you could not come in because you're a supporter of Hamas, [1:03:12] you should not be able to stay on a visa if you're a supporter of Hamas. That's how I view it. And I think [1:03:17] that's just an issue of common sense. And we intend to be very forceful about that. [1:03:22] Good. Thank you. You know, fentanyl is killing 4,000 Pennsylvanians each year, over 200 Americans a day. [1:03:29] President Trump campaigned on this throughout the country in Pennsylvania, as did I, on we have to [1:03:34] stop that flow of fentanyl. And of course, violent criminal groups in Mexico, including the Jalisco [1:03:40] and Cianola cartels, terrors our communities here at home with this deadly fentanyl and the Mexican [1:03:48] people with endless violence. As Secretary, will you initiate the process to designate these groups, [1:03:55] these cartels, as foreign terrorist organizations? And if so, can you describe for the American people [1:04:02] the national security tools that that unlocks, that designation unlocks, to degrade the cartels? [1:04:09] Well, first of all, the designation of a designated terrorist, a foreign terrorist organization brings [1:04:13] with it a host of things. It makes it illegal to cooperate or work with them in any way or to be [1:04:18] supportive of their endeavors. It cuts off access to all sorts of banking opportunities and the like [1:04:24] around the world where it's important to move money around. Now that said, it's probably an imperfect [1:04:28] tool when it comes to these groups that you're discussing, because these are sophisticated [1:04:33] criminal enterprises. They are terrorizing the United States, but they are sophisticated criminal [1:04:37] enterprises, and they operate in the trafficking of people, drugs, and migrants, to a horrifying effect. [1:04:44] Sadly, they also have basically operational control over huge swaths of the border regions between [1:04:50] Mexico and the United States. That's just an unfortunate fact, and it's one we're going to have to [1:04:54] confront with our partners in Mexico, is that these sophisticated, transnational, [1:04:59] terroristic organizations have operational and functional control over huge swaths of areas that [1:05:06] border the United States of America. And so whether that is the tool that we use, which may be the [1:05:12] appropriate one, or some new one that we come up with, it is important for us not just to go after [1:05:16] these groups, but to identify them and call them for what they are, and that is terroristic in their [1:05:20] nature, because they are terrorizing America with mass migration and with the flow of drugs. [1:05:25] What about military force? [1:05:26] Well, that's an option the president has at his disposal. Obviously, it's not one that is in [1:05:31] the purview of the Department of State. I think President Trump is someone that never publicly [1:05:36] discusses his options and leaves himself the flexibility to act. I think there's a lot we can and [1:05:41] will continue to do in close partnership with our allies in Mexico. I think there's more they can do as [1:05:47] well to confront this challenge. And my preference would be, from the Department of State's perspective, [1:05:52] my preference would be that we can work with the Mexicans on this issue cooperatively, because it [1:05:57] is impacting their nation as much as ours. These sophisticated groups, these criminal organizations, [1:06:04] don't simply threaten America. They threaten the Mexican political process. In the last election, [1:06:08] you had multiple presidential candidates and other candidates to other offices assassinated. You've had [1:06:13] journalists targeted and assassinated for speaking out against these groups. So these groups don't [1:06:18] simply terrorize the United States. They're terrorizing and in some ways undermining the Mexican [1:06:24] government and Mexican sovereignty and the health and well-being of the Mexican people. And so my hope, [1:06:28] in a perfect world, is that we could work in close collaboration with Mexican authorities to take [1:06:34] these groups out. Very good. Thank you. Final question. The Chinese Communist Party, as you said in your [1:06:40] testimony, has waged a deliberate campaign of economic warfare against the United States and our [1:06:44] allies. We need to restore, as President Trump has said, reciprocity in that economic relationship and [1:06:51] impose cost on Beijing for hurting American workers. How can the United States counter that campaign? How do [1:06:58] you think about the economic tools that the administration can apply to cut off the flow of American capital and [1:07:05] technology that supports China's geopolitical ambitions? Well, and again, much of what it [1:07:12] comes to trade and so forth in this administration will be handled through the Department of Commerce, [1:07:15] but we'll certainly have an economic undersecretary and a whole entire bureaus that will be dedicated to [1:07:21] what we can contribute to that endeavor. So I'll just share my views broadly on it. Number one, [1:07:25] I think it would make common sense to everybody that if, by and large, a relationship in which their [1:07:30] companies can do whatever they want here, but we can't do it there, it's a pretty unfair [1:07:34] relationship. And it's something we've allowed in the past for allied countries who are small, [1:07:38] poor, and developing. That cannot continue, in my view, and I think that's the President's view. [1:07:43] The second is, there's much that we need to be, that needs to be done with regards here domestically. [1:07:47] I think we once again, as a nation, this is not a Department of State issue, but once again, [1:07:51] as a nation, need to prioritize the importance of our industrial capacity and our access to supply [1:07:57] chains domestically, especially in key and critical industries. Maybe not every industry, but some key [1:08:01] industries, we should either have a domestic capacity or an allied capacity that's reliable [1:08:06] and can't be used against us in a moment of conflict as leverage. The third point I would make is, [1:08:11] we need to be actively engaged in the world. As an example, the Chinese own significant mineral [1:08:16] rights and mining rights in Argentina, in Chile, throughout Africa. It's one of the reasons why the [1:08:22] polar region and the Arctic region has become so critical as well in that regard, is because [1:08:27] they are scooping up all over the world, these mineral rights, port rights, et cetera, [1:08:33] that place us at an enormous disadvantage in the long term. And it's what I said in the short answer, [1:08:37] is we're going to, if this trend continues, we are going to wind up living in a world where much of [1:08:42] what we depend on for our security, our health, our safety, and our economic prosperity, will largely [1:08:47] depend on whether the Chinese allow us to have it or not. And that cannot be a world that we leave for [1:08:51] our children. Thank you, Senator. Senator Coons. Thank you. Senator Rubio, I look forward to this [1:08:59] hearing and to our service together. Welcome to the other side of the dais. And welcome to your wife, [1:09:04] Jeanette, your children, your family. Thank you for your service. I have three questions broadly of [1:09:10] nominees. Do they have the qualifications to appropriately serve? Do they have a policy alignment [1:09:15] with our core national interests? And do they have the integrity and character to serve? We may [1:09:20] have policy disagreements, but we've had multiple areas of convergence. Over the time we've served [1:09:25] here in the Senate together, I had my folks go back and look. We've co-sponsored nearly 60 bills [1:09:30] together. So I hope we can continue to find constructive ways to partner. I have a number of [1:09:36] questions to get through, so I'll try to move briskly. With regards to special envoys, President-elect [1:09:42] Trump has appointed a series of special envoys focused on a wide range of areas. And some of these, [1:09:48] I think, can genuinely complement, not undermine or distract from State Department's core efforts. [1:09:54] The special envoy for hostage affairs, for example, Adam Bowler, I look forward to working with. [1:09:59] As Senator McCormick asked about, there's a number of key issues around [1:10:03] hostage-taking of Americans. There's a bipartisan bill Senator Risch and I have on this that we hope [1:10:08] to work with you on. Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, [1:10:13] Russia, I think will be central to achieving an outcome in Ukraine that is a lasting and secure [1:10:20] piece and prevents further Russian aggression. But others, like Rick Grinnell for special missions [1:10:25] and Mossad Boulos for the Arab world, concern me in terms of the potential for mission conflict [1:10:31] or conflict of interest. How will you work to ensure that State maintains its authority and encourage the [1:10:37] administration to conduct a full vetting of any potential conflicts of interest and to ensure there's [1:10:42] clarity of alignment with special envoys? Sure. And thank you for the question because [1:10:46] I think it's a valid one. With the exception of Mr. Boulos, who I don't know, may have met once but [1:10:51] don't know, every one of the envoys that have been named so far is someone that I've worked with in the [1:10:54] past and expect to work well with in the future. To me, the expression of a special envoy is critically [1:11:00] important. Where it's most successful, it sits on a complex issue with a defined goal and an expression of [1:11:07] presidential priorities. So Sudan is an example of a special envoy and Mr. Perriello and the job he's [1:11:13] done there. And this is in addition to the fact that we have an ambassador and we have other [1:11:16] presence, diplomatic presence there, that can be very complementary. So the way this will work and how [1:11:21] I anticipate it will work is these envoys work for the president in coordination with us. These are all [1:11:28] people, with the exception of one of whom I'm not disparaging, I just don't, I'm not, don't know him, but I've [1:11:32] worked with everyone else that you've mentioned, are people that are going to be focused on this full, [1:11:37] like a laser. And they will need to do so not simply in coordination with the Department of State [1:11:42] because of subject matter expertise. Let's say you reach an agreement or you reach an outcome, [1:11:46] you're still going to need the technical support necessary to pull this off, and we have a right of [1:11:51] array of experts in the Department of State that will help achieve that. And, and it also, it'll involve [1:11:55] other elements of the U.S. government. So as an example, if you're going to reach an agreement on [1:12:00] migration, say in the Western Hemisphere, that also could entail the necessity to have a conversation [1:12:06] about trade policy and tariffs that will involve commerce and others. That's the only way this will [1:12:11] work. And that's how I anticipate it working. I've agreed to co-chair with Senator Hagerty, [1:12:17] a commission on reform and modernization of the State Department that Senator Cardin created with him. [1:12:22] We cannot, in my view, do more with less given the challenges of the global moment. I think we need [1:12:29] more investment in U.S. diplomacy and development as instruments of national power, but we also need [1:12:35] to address efficiencies and make sure that we are streamlining and focusing the department and [1:12:40] supporting its workforce, the foreign service. How will you work to make sure that the Trump [1:12:46] administration's efficiency mandate will strengthen and not deplete core state functions? [1:12:51] Well, first of all, I think the work of this new committee that's being set up as a result of [1:12:56] the legislation that passed will be critical. My understanding is the impediment was that not all [1:12:59] the appointments have been made. Maybe that's now changed. And we eagerly await that because I do [1:13:03] think that there are two things that are very important. The first is, when we talk about [1:13:08] efficiency, the efficiency isn't simply just saving money. The efficiency is improving performance. [1:13:13] A key part of the State Department is customer service. We provide consular affairs, passports, [1:13:18] visas, all kinds of work around the world for Americans who are stranded or in trouble or need to get [1:13:22] somewhere. Improving that experience for the consumer is one of the top priorities we need to [1:13:27] have. How can we leverage, and I think Secretary Blinken has begun this work, we need to build on this, [1:13:33] how can we infuse technology, AI and the like, not simply to improve the customer service aspects of the [1:13:40] State Department, but improve the productivity. If somehow through leveraging technology appropriately, [1:13:46] we can get people at the State Department to achieve three times the amount of work than they do now, [1:13:51] because it takes less time to do these tasks, or frees them up to do other tasks. That would be an [1:13:56] enormous win, and I hope that the Commission will look at those aspects of this as well. [1:14:01] I think I understand, Senator, if I might move to another question, that multilateral organizations [1:14:07] concern and frustrate many of us. Some of their actions have been counter to American interest, [1:14:13] but when we've withdrawn from multilateral organizations, and in particular some UN entities, [1:14:18] it's also given an opening to our adversaries. The previous Trump administration withdrew from UNESCO, [1:14:25] the Human Rights Council, the World Health Organization, and I'm concerned that if we do so [1:14:30] without thinking through the consequences, we may abandon our chance to implement our agenda around [1:14:38] human rights, around 5G standards, around technical standards that matter for the 21st century. [1:14:44] Do you support sustained U.S. participation in multilateral organizations, and how will you work [1:14:49] to strengthen our leadership in those institutions in ways that prevent our adversaries from advancing [1:14:55] their competing agendas? [1:14:56] Well, I want to point back to what I said at the opening, and that is our engagement in any [1:15:01] international agreement or any international arrangement or any international organization has to be driven by [1:15:06] the answer to one of three questions. Will our involvement in this organization make us safer, [1:15:12] make us more prosperous, make us more secure? It has to be justified by an American interest. [1:15:17] It just does. I mean, we're in an era where we need to really, it should have always been that way, [1:15:21] but now more than ever. And so each of these will have different components to it. I think there's a [1:15:25] second component of funding, and that is should the United States be funding organizations who in many [1:15:30] cases are pursuing and or achieving outcomes that are contrary to the national interest of the United [1:15:35] States. Each of these will require a serious examination as we work through them and a justification to [1:15:39] Congress about why we're no longer funding it or we're no longer participating. I think you do point to [1:15:44] one that I can tell you right now is one that will be critical for us to be engaged in, and that is the [1:15:48] setting of standards. But the setting of standards for people to understand is it's not simply from these [1:15:54] organizations. It also becomes practical. So throughout Africa, we are now seeing the [1:15:58] deployment of these safe city programs by Huawei. Now, this is just a commercial deal for Huawei. This is the ability to [1:16:04] ingrain itself in telecommunication of these countries and establish itself as the leader in 5G. [1:16:09] And now all of the other technologies that depend on 5G, additive manufacturing, you know, the 3D printing [1:16:15] and so forth, autonomous vehicles, they will all have to be drawn to the standard set by Huawei. That's not [1:16:21] because an international organization set it up. It's because they've established market dominance, [1:16:25] and it's a concern we have in multiple parts of the global south and the developing world. We need to be engaged [1:16:30] that way as well. I very much look forward to working with you on deploying the full tool set [1:16:35] that allows us to compete in the global south, including the Development Finance Corporation, [1:16:40] something Senator Corker and I led on this committee, in which I know you see the potential for it. As I [1:16:46] come to the end of my time, I've worked hard with Senator Graham to get signed into law two different [1:16:52] bills I wanted to mention. The Global Fragility Act, which presses the Department of Defense, Department of [1:16:58] State, AID, to have a common strategy in fragile states. And we've really struggled to effectively [1:17:05] implement that. And much more recently, the U.S. Foundation for International Conservation Act, [1:17:10] something that Chairman McCaul and Senator Graham and Congressman Meeks and I worked on, [1:17:16] it would create a public-private foundation to address security and conservation in ungoverned and [1:17:22] insecure spaces in the global south, in South America, in Africa, in Southeast Asia. Both of these bills [1:17:28] address the root causes of instability and facilitate cost-effective uses of American dollars [1:17:33] by encouraging engagement of the private sector and philanthropy. Can I count on your support to work, [1:17:39] as the Secretary have confirmed, in the State Department to implement these two laws more [1:17:43] effectively in the coming years? Well, and the conservation one, I believe, just passed, right? [1:17:47] Most recently. Just signed into law. We're getting there just in time to help you with it, [1:17:51] and it's had strong bipartisan support. On the global fragility, this has been ongoing for quite a [1:17:57] bit of time, and we'll have to go back and check on the progress. I don't know entirely. I know [1:18:00] there's a 10-year plan, and there's the five countries that we've identified. And by the way, [1:18:04] no country likes to be identified as fragile, so we have to be sensitive about how we do it. [1:18:08] But I think that's a component. We've got to go back and see where we are on that 10-year planning, [1:18:12] because that's an important way of leveraging both economic security and development efforts in the [1:18:18] whole of government. And I think key to this is going to be not simply the Department of State, [1:18:22] but it's that steering committee that's supposed to meet every three months at the National Security [1:18:26] Council that coordinates all this work that's happening. Look, laws are great, programs are [1:18:30] great, but if someone's not in charge of it, someone's not running it, and someone's not [1:18:34] measuring at the end of those periods of time, whether it's reaching its intended outcome, [1:18:38] we're going to have a huge problem. But the goal of that legislation, as I recall, [1:18:43] and believe still, is we want to get ahead of this. This is about preventing crisis, [1:18:49] which is, frankly, is a lot cheaper and a lot better than actually dealing with crisis after [1:18:55] the fact. And so identifying places around the world that are in danger of becoming chaotic, [1:19:02] uncertain, insecure, and getting ahead of it, and helping them through a variety of means to prevent [1:19:07] that from happening. And preventing those crises from happening is going to save us a lot of headaches, [1:19:12] a lot of danger, and a lot of money. In closing, I'll just repeat something I've heard from several of my [1:19:16] colleagues. I think that our global network of alliances and partners rooted in our shared values, [1:19:22] a commitment to democracy and human rights, is essential to our national security, and how the [1:19:28] war in Ukraine ends, and whether a peace agreement there lasts and secures Ukraine from ongoing Russian [1:19:35] aggression is critical to our credibility and security and to sustaining that network of allies [1:19:40] and partners. I hope that's something you strongly agree with. I look forward to working with you towards [1:19:44] that end. Thank you, Senator Coons. Next up is going to be Senator Daines, and after that will be [1:19:49] Senator Murphy. At about that time, it's going to be noon. We're going to take a short five-minute [1:19:55] break at noon. Not a Senate five minutes, but a for real five-minute break at noon. And those of you [1:20:02] who have a seat here, I'd suggest you don't leave because it's going to be difficult to claim your seat [1:20:07] back if you're here as an observer. So with that, Senator Daines, welcome to the committee. [1:20:12] Mr. Chairman, thank you. Marco, it's good to have you here. I've got a great view here from the [1:20:16] dais, seeing your family behind you, seeing Jeanette, Daniela, the rest of the Rubio family. [1:20:23] What a moment of great honor celebration for the Rubios culminating on Monday, when your family will [1:20:28] celebrate the one-month anniversary of Anthony Rubio's touchdown as a Florida Gator. So congratulations [1:20:34] on every front, proud dad. Look, you are charged with one of the most important tasks I think the [1:20:42] administration will have, and that is advancing President Trump's agenda and representing the [1:20:46] interests of the United States around the world. I can't think of a better nominee for Secretary of [1:20:52] State to serve under President Trump than Marco Rubio. You'll have a lot of active convuls we're [1:20:59] working together on as we think what's going on in Ukraine, Israel, Sudan, ongoing nuclear weapons [1:21:06] program in Iran, the tyranny in Venezuela. The New START Treaty has been completely disregarded [1:21:15] by Russia, and not to mention what we actually think about strategies relates to China. I could [1:21:21] continue to list the results that we saw from the Trump administration with the Abraham Accords and [1:21:27] really moving forward here with significant substantive advancements of American interests abroad. [1:21:33] But look, this next administration and the leadership of President Trump and your service will be [1:21:37] extremely consequential. This posting could not be more important. Marco, as you know, Iran's the [1:21:44] world's leading sponsor of terror. In 2024, Iran exported roughly 587 million barrels of oil, an increase [1:21:54] of over 10% over the prior year. These illegal oil sales fund Hamas, the Hezbollah terrorism, the Houthis, [1:22:02] the nuclear arms programs, drone technology that's being used right now by the Russians against Ukraine. [1:22:09] These oil sales are directly resulting in global unrest, and they're costing innocent lives. [1:22:16] Senator, if confirmed, what would be your goals and strategies to think about addressing Iran as an adversary? [1:22:23] You asked that question at a very interesting moment. So Iran today, let me, two points I want to make [1:22:28] about Iran, and it's really important. When we talk about Iran, I'm talking about the radical Shia clerics, [1:22:33] and not the people. The people of Iran are people of an ancient civilization, an ancient culture, [1:22:37] with tremendous pride and advances. And I don't know who take great pride in their Persian heritage [1:22:43] and identity. And I don't know of any nation on earth in which there is a bigger difference between [1:22:47] the people and those who govern them than what exists in Iran. And that's a fact that needs to [1:22:52] be made repeatedly. In no way is the clerics who run that country representative of the people of that [1:22:57] country and of its history and of contributions it's made to humanity. And it's a point I wish [1:23:03] we would continue to make. Iran and that regime is at its weakest point in recent memory, maybe ever. [1:23:10] Their air defenses have been badly damaged. Their Shia crescent that they were trying to create has been [1:23:17] badly damaged in Lebanon and Syria, where they've been basically forced and driven out. [1:23:22] Their economy is in shambles. They now are on some days having six, eight, twelve, nine hour blackouts. [1:23:30] They are on the verge of potentially, if not having done so already, having to pull back on the energy [1:23:34] subsidies that they provide people in that country that are incredibly popular and it would be unpopular [1:23:40] to reverse. So they're in a lot of trouble. And now what we need to be wise about is the following. [1:23:45] I imagine that within that regime, and I'm just saying this because of common sense, there are two [1:23:50] schools of thought. There's one group that's saying, now is the time that we need to find ourselves an [1:23:54] off-ramp. Not just, not going to turn into really nice guys, but we're really in trouble here. We need [1:23:59] to find an off-ramp and buy ourselves some time. And then there's another group that's probably saying, [1:24:03] now the time, now is the time to prove that we are a nuclear power or a nuclear capable power, [1:24:08] enriched from 60 to 90 and press go. And that's how we're going to buy ourselves immunity from foreign action. [1:24:15] And this is a tenuous moment in that regard, but it's one we need to acknowledge. My view of it is [1:24:20] that we should be open to any arrangement that allows us to have safety and stability in the [1:24:24] region, but one in which we're clear-eyed. Any concessions we make to the Iranian regime, [1:24:29] we should anticipate that they will use, as they have used in the past, to build their weapon systems [1:24:34] and to try to restart their sponsorship of Hezbollah and other related entities around the region, [1:24:40] because they seek to become the dominant regional power. That's their stated goal, and it's been clear [1:24:44] by the actions that they've taken. I think it is interesting that in the year in which by, [1:24:48] I think by October of this year, the Europeans and the E3 countries of the UK, France and Germany, [1:24:58] have to confront whether they're going to do the snapback provisions or not, because Iran is clearly [1:25:02] in violation of the agreement that we're no longer a part of. In fact, IAEA inspectors have not even been [1:25:08] in the country since 2021, if I'm correct. So I think early this week on Monday, they engaged the [1:25:15] Europeans in talking about nuclear arrangements. So whether that's indicative of the direction [1:25:21] they're going or not, we're going to find out. What cannot be allowed under any circumstances is a [1:25:25] nuclear-armed Iran. What cannot be allowed under any circumstances is an Iran and an Iranian regime [1:25:30] that has the resources and the capability to restart and continue their sponsorship of terrorism. [1:25:36] And what cannot be allowed under any circumstances is an Iran with the military capability of [1:25:41] threatening and destabilizing its neighbors and potentially reaching the homeland as well, [1:25:45] both kinetically and directly, and also through their surrogate groups who have long planned [1:25:49] contingencies for attacks. And let us not forget that this is a group, these are individuals that [1:25:55] have spent the last five years actively and openly plotting the assassination of the president-elect [1:26:01] and of multiple members of previous administrations. Think about this for a moment. When is the last [1:26:07] time you heard that a foreign government is actively, openly, and admittedly seeking to [1:26:12] assassinate the former secretary of state, the former and soon to be once again president of the United [1:26:16] States, and others? And that people have been arrested for plotting that. This is who we're dealing [1:26:21] with. And anything that we do with Iran needs to be clear-eyed about who that regime is, [1:26:25] but also who those people of Iran really are, and – because they're not their leaders. [1:26:32] Marco, thank you. Shortly after the election and prior to Thanksgiving, I took a quick trip over to [1:26:39] Central Asia, as I discussed that with you a bit, to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. In fact, [1:26:42] in the last 12 months, I visited all five of the Central Asian countries. In fact, I was bedded down, [1:26:47] speaking of Iran, 20 miles from the Iranian border in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. They have the fourth [1:26:52] largest reserves of natural gas in the world. But this is a part of the world that is often neglected. [1:26:57] But of such strategic importance, you've got Iran, you've got Afghanistan, Russia, and certainly [1:27:03] China, as they talk about living in a submarine, as they're looking at multi-vector diplomacy, [1:27:08] wanting to engage with the United States as the Russians and Chinese are competing for their favor. [1:27:14] One of the first trips that I made after the election, the reason for Central Asia, [1:27:19] they've not been a U.S. senator there in 13 years. 13 years to Turkmenistan or Tajikistan, [1:27:24] very important strategically. One of the first goals of the caucus that [1:27:27] Senator Gary Peters and I created of Central Asia is to repeal the Jackson Vanek label on the region [1:27:33] and extend permanent normal trade relations with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. I realize you have [1:27:38] a lot of priorities on your plate when you will be confirmed as our secretary, [1:27:43] but I would say rescinding it would be a good faith indication of the Jackson Vanek requirements [1:27:48] that Central Asia needs right now to grow. My question is, would you work with me [1:27:52] and Senator Peters to have your team work with us to remove this designation? [1:27:58] Yeah, and I believe that the permanent removal will require legislative action. I don't think [1:28:02] Senator Murphy has a bill on that as well. Yours is three countries. Look, I think this is a relic of [1:28:07] an era that's passed. There are some that argue that we should use it as leverage for human rights [1:28:11] concessions or leverage to get them to go stronger in our way as opposed to Russia and the like, [1:28:16] but I think in some cases it's an absurd relic of the past. I think it's Kazakhstan who the Department [1:28:23] of Commerce has already said is a market economy. In fact, I think they hosted the WTO ministerial just [1:28:30] a couple years ago. So they've met the conditions. So we will work with you on this because I think [1:28:35] it's important, Mark. I think it's a neglected part of the world. I look forward to working with Senator [1:28:39] Murphy on this. You know, that C5 plus one, which is Central Asian countries plus the United States. [1:28:44] I hope we can work with President Trump, actually, to think about maybe hosting some kind of a summit [1:28:48] there. Very strategic after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. We need more friends in Central Asia [1:28:54] and I look forward to working with you on that. In the time I have left, when I open up my comments, [1:28:58] talk about all these conflicts around the world, sometimes we forget some of the most important [1:29:02] relationships are right in our backyard thinking about Mexico. With the nearshoring going on at the [1:29:06] moment, a lot of production coming now into more of our time zone and hemisphere coming from China and so [1:29:12] forth. Laredo, Texas, is now the largest port in the United States. I think it's one of the [1:29:17] underreported facts in our country. You talked about the cartels. They have command and control [1:29:24] certainly on the border at the moment. My question is, you think about Mexico and you've been so active [1:29:29] on Latin America and, you know, looking south of the United States with President Scheinbaum now just [1:29:34] coming into office. What are your thoughts around how do we become better engaged with Mexico to help [1:29:39] them with their issues as it relates to the cartels basically which are running the country it seems [1:29:44] at times? Well, and I wish we had more than 30 seconds to do it because it's one of those issues [1:29:49] that I think don't get enough attention beyond the problems. Look, Mexico's economy in many ways is a [1:29:54] very vibrant one and has made tremendous advances and continues to be a very strong regional power. [1:29:59] They can become frustrating at times for us because they have a, enshrined even in their constitution, [1:30:04] sort of non-aligned, non-interventionist foreign policy with regards to some of the abuses. And so [1:30:09] it's been disappointing, for example, to see the position they've taken with regards to Venezuela [1:30:13] and others. By the same token, our economic interests are so deeply intertwined. I think there are three [1:30:19] areas of friction. The first is on trade and violations of trade agreements and so forth that have [1:30:26] been laid out and some of the things that I've seen even as a senator from Florida in the agricultural [1:30:31] sector that are going to continue to be an irritant in our relationship that we hope we can resolve. [1:30:35] The second is the security situation at the border. And I think there's great interest and should be on [1:30:40] the part of the Mexicans to bring this migratory problem at the border under control. People forget [1:30:44] an increasing number of cases. The people crossing the border are not Mexican nationals. They are people [1:30:49] that are transiting through Mexico. And in fact, in southern Mexico, you have seen a significant uptick [1:30:54] in resentment against migration by Mexicans who are bearing the brunt of the costs of becoming a key [1:31:02] element of the migratory path. And the third is the violence. And this violence at our border has to [1:31:06] be addressed. I think they pose a threat to the United States most certainly. The flooding us with [1:31:11] fentanyl, the criminal activities occurring within the United States facilitated by these groups who have [1:31:16] become vertically integrated. These are not the Colombian cartels. These transnational groups are now [1:31:20] vertically integrated. They are the suppliers all the way down to the street level and all the way up to [1:31:24] the production level. They are vertically integrated criminal enterprises. But they are also [1:31:29] threatening the sovereignty and security of the Mexican state. And as I pointed, there are journalists [1:31:34] and there are politicians who have been assassinated for standing up to these cartels. And it tells you [1:31:39] the amount of leverage they have over the government as a result of it. So it is in their interest as well [1:31:44] as ours that we work cooperatively to take these groups apart and not allow them to continue the reign of [1:31:49] terror, not just in the border region of Mexico, but spilling over into the United States. [1:31:54] Thanks, Marco. Thank you very much for the identification of the committee. I've just [1:31:58] been advised that there's been a ceasefire announced in Gaza before we all celebrate though. Obviously, [1:32:04] we're all going to want to see how that executes. With that, Senator Murphy, you're up and then we're [1:32:09] going to take that short break. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That is indeed good news. [1:32:17] Senator Rubio, I want to talk to you about a topic that I think is going to be real trouble for you and for [1:32:23] U.S. national security interests, at least for the first few minutes of my time. And that's the [1:32:27] growing personal financial entanglement of President Trump, his family, and Middle East [1:32:34] governments. I'll give you an example of what I'm talking about. For nearly eight years, the Trump [1:32:41] organization has been pursuing a real estate deal to build a hotel complex in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. [1:32:47] During President Trump's first term, the Trump organization actually voluntarily committed to [1:32:52] refrain from pursuing real estate deals with foreign companies, especially those that are backed by [1:32:59] foreign governments. And so the deal didn't go through. And then it remained stalled for the [1:33:03] entirety of the Biden administration. And then magically, 30 days after the November election, [1:33:10] Saudi Arabia's biggest construction company that's affiliated with the government announced [1:33:16] that the deal was going forward alongside an additional $200 million deal for a Trump property [1:33:23] in Oman. Now, it used to be that somebody with these big financial business interests would come [1:33:29] into government and take actions like setting up a blind trust or divestment in order to make sure [1:33:35] there was no connection between their personal financial interests and the business they were [1:33:40] conducting in government. But President Trump has just done the opposite, right? Over the last eight years, [1:33:45] while he was in office, and since he's been out of office, he and his family have become more [1:33:51] deeply dependent on revenue from governments in the Middle East. During his last presidency, [1:33:58] Middle East interests sent about $10 million to Trump properties. After he left office, Trump's son-in-law, [1:34:05] Jared Kushner, who was his primary Middle East envoy, was handed $2 billion in investment by the Saudis, [1:34:12] even though a Saudi investment board said the investment was a bad business decision. That [1:34:18] investment actually comes up for renewal in 2026, giving the Saudis massive leverage over the Trump [1:34:24] family. And then to make matters worse, right after the election, the Trump organization said that in [1:34:29] this term, the president-elect second term, it would drop its previous prohibition on doing new deals in [1:34:37] the Middle East with private foreign companies aligned with foreign governments. So the Trump [1:34:44] organization is going to be signing new business deals in the Middle East with private companies [1:34:49] that have connections to foreign governments at the very moment that you are going to be conducting [1:34:54] sensitive diplomacy in these countries. That's just extraordinary. Never before in the history of [1:35:01] this country has a president been, I mean, literally receiving cash from foreign governments and from [1:35:07] foreign companies that are backed by foreign governments in the middle of their term. If you [1:35:12] or I had done this as senators, we would be in violent violation of Senate ethics rules. That's not permitted [1:35:19] on the Foreign Relations Committee. And so I guess my question to you is a pretty simple one. [1:35:26] Do you see how this fundamentally compromises your diplomatic efforts? Do you have an issue or will [1:35:38] you raise an issue with the president about his growing financial connection with the governments [1:35:44] that you're going to be negotiating with? Well, first of all, I am neither authorized nor in any position [1:35:49] to give you sort of any insights into any of these arrangements you've pointed out. You mentioned Jared [1:35:54] Kushner as an example. He's a private citizen, happens to be a Floridian. I don't know what of any [1:35:59] engagement he has in the work that's going on now. I can tell you what I know, obviously I'm not in the [1:36:04] State Department yet, but I can tell you as an example, the president's envoy to that region, who is [1:36:11] charged, Steve Woodcoff, who is charged with being an envoy towards reaching an accommodation between [1:36:15] the Israelis and the Saudis, has been working cooperatively and together with the Biden administration. [1:36:21] And in fact, I dare to say that all involved deserve credit for the ceasefire that the chairman's just [1:36:26] announced. But Steve Woodcoff has been a critical component of it and he has been involved in it [1:36:30] from day one. I think the broader consideration about whether we want to see a Saudi-Israeli mutual [1:36:38] recognition and relationship would be one of the most historic developments in the history of the [1:36:42] region for all the factors we've discussed here today. It would be, and one of the impediments to it [1:36:48] has been this conflict and the ongoing conflict and the lack of a ceasefire. I also think it's going [1:36:52] to be important for the Saudis and others to be participants in post-conflict stabilization efforts [1:36:58] in Gaza and beyond. So all I can tell you is that what I've said from the very beginning from the [1:37:04] opening statement, and that is our foreign policy is going to be driven, as the president's made abundantly [1:37:09] clear, by whether some action makes a metric as in the interest of the United States and our national [1:37:14] security. And that's what it's going to be driven by, and that's how all these policies should be judged [1:37:18] by, and that's certainly the job that I believe I've been tasked with executing on. Well let me then [1:37:23] simply ask you this question. Do you believe that the president should refrain from doing new business [1:37:30] deals with Middle East governments during his term in office? Well my understanding, again I'm speaking [1:37:38] out of term, but the president doesn't manage that company. His family members do, and they have a right to [1:37:43] be in the business. I mean that's the business that they're in. They're in the real estate business [1:37:46] they've been for a very long time, both domestically and abroad. They have properties in multiple [1:37:50] countries. So at the end of the day, I don't know, his family is entitled to continue to operate their [1:37:55] business. The fundamental question is not whether his family is involved in business. The fundamental [1:37:59] question is whether that is in any way impacting the conduct of our foreign policy in a way that's [1:38:04] countered to our national interest. And the president's made abundantly clear that every decision he makes [1:38:10] and every decision we are to make at the State Department should be driven by whether or not [1:38:14] it serves the core national interests of the United States. And that's how I hope our policies will be [1:38:20] judged by, not what business his family is conducting while the president is here in Washington working [1:38:25] not on his business but from the Oval Office. You are correct. That is the fundamental question, [1:38:30] whether or not a policy is being pursued in U.S. national security interests or due to the president's [1:38:36] personal financial interests. That is the reason why, as United States senators, we are not allowed [1:38:41] to have complicated existing financial arrangements with foreign governments because you do not want [1:38:47] to create the impression that there is a conflict of motivation. And I just wish that this president [1:38:55] applied to this incoming administration the same rules that we hold ourselves to as United States senators. [1:39:00] Senator Rubio, at the time I have remaining, I just want to tackle two other topics. One that I know is [1:39:07] of mutual concern to you and I, and that's the need to confront China in non-military ways as they try to [1:39:16] exert influence around the world. Last time President Trump was in office, he was calling for pretty massive [1:39:23] cuts to the State Department's budget. But as you know, China uses all sorts of non-kinetic tools like [1:39:29] misinformation, economic diplomacy around the world to exert influence. I'm hopeful that you're going [1:39:39] to be an active voice to try to make sure that you have the tools, including when it comes to combating [1:39:44] Russian and Chinese misinformation, to be able to confront all of the ways, many of them asymmetric, [1:39:51] that China in particular, but Russia as well presents challenges to U.S. interests. Just wanted to get your [1:39:57] commitment to make sure to build that full comprehensive foreign policy toolkit. [1:40:03] Yeah, not only have I been someone concerned about foreign disinformation, I've been the target of it [1:40:07] from multiple nation states. And I've learned over time that the best way to confront disinformation [1:40:15] is through a flood of free speech that allows the counterpoints of view to be heard and understood. [1:40:22] I think where we get ourselves into trouble, and we've learned this now, and I think multiple U.S. [1:40:25] companies are now admitting is when we get ourselves into a position of determining what's true and [1:40:29] what's not, and then using the tools of government to go after that, particularly when it implicates [1:40:34] domestic entities. But yes, it is one of the tools that they have in their toolbox. By the way, [1:40:38] it's not just disinformation. It's flat-out influencing nation states' views of the United States [1:40:46] writ large by promoting conspiracy theories internally in other countries that undermine us, [1:40:52] and that undermine our standing, whether it's in Africa, and increasingly you see it in the western [1:40:57] hemisphere as well. And one of the best ways to combat that is to be present, to be there, [1:41:02] to show what we do, and to brag about what we do. One of the things that frustrates me the most [1:41:06] is there are literally programs within the USAID where they do not allow us to label it as made in [1:41:11] America or a gift of the American people because it might offend someone locally. I think it's important [1:41:15] for the world to know that what the United States is doing to help their societies. We do not do a [1:41:21] good enough job of promoting what we have done historically and continue to do to help our fellow [1:41:26] man around the world. Yeah, China is spending 10 billion dollars per year on that propaganda and [1:41:33] misinformation operation. They celebrate when budgets get sent up to the hill that propose big increases [1:41:41] in military spending and giant decreases in the kind of tools that are available to you. So I do look [1:41:47] forward to working with you to make sure that we've given you that full suite of tools necessary to [1:41:54] confront our adversaries. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murphy. We will take this break now. [1:41:59] We appreciate everyone getting back here in five minutes because we've still got a long ways to go. [1:42:05] And so with that, we'll be at ease for five minutes. It has incredible assets and opportunities. [1:42:14] The lack of focus on Africa can endanger the whole planet. We know in the days of infectious diseases, [1:42:20] for example, an outbreak of an infectious disease anywhere is a threat to public health everywhere. [1:42:26] More than that, we see the climate challenges, migration patterns there threatened to destabilize [1:42:32] the Middle East and other areas. Egypt, for example, literally is hosting millions, millions of refugees [1:42:39] in Egypt right now. Now, my frustrations in my 12 years here is that we as a nation have not really [1:42:47] prioritized it. We do not have ambassadors in some countries where China and Russia, who understand the [1:42:54] African opportunities, are investing heavily. I've gone around the world and in my times in African [1:43:01] countries, I often encounter people that say, hey, the Chinese are here. Where are you? And it's not [1:43:08] just ambassadorial placements. Other critical positions in embassies just aren't being filled. [1:43:14] And therefore, we're being outplayed by the Chinese and the Russians. African countries and leaders have [1:43:21] told me time and time again, we prefer you. We'd rather deal with you. We'd rather work with you. [1:43:26] And we can see by legal immigration patterns that their people would rather our way of life than the [1:43:32] Chinese or the Russians. But we are simply being outplayed in ways that we can counter if we had a [1:43:38] real focus and a real strategy for engaging Africa. And the impact of U.S. engagement is real. And the [1:43:45] backbone of our diplomacy is that diplomat abroad. Is that Secretary of State on down people saying, [1:43:52] this is a priority? I said this to you in our office, and I want to make it plain now, that [1:43:58] we are at a point in this country that what we do in the Senate and in the White House and in the [1:44:03] State Department are planting seeds for the future. We could reap a tremendous harvest in 10, 20 years, [1:44:09] prioritizing and emphasizing our work in Africa. And not to do so undermines the three points that you [1:44:15] said at the beginning that I agree. Our foreign policy should be guided by what makes us safe, [1:44:20] strong and prosperous. And the future in so many ways is Africa. Could you just talk to me a little [1:44:27] bit about how you are prioritizing it, how you understand the critical opportunities and the [1:44:31] dangers of not engaging at a higher level than either the Biden administration, Trump administration, [1:44:36] Clinton administration, Bush administration have done? Yeah. And I'll preface it by saying that [1:44:40] obviously I'm not been confirmed yet. The president's not in office yet. There will be a national [1:44:44] security strategy that will be that will frame much of what we do in foreign policy. So what I'm going to share [1:44:48] with you basically here today is as someone who will be at that table, some of the impressions that [1:44:54] I would share with regards to our historic involvement in Africa and also some of our challenges moving [1:44:58] forward. So the first and you've already highlighted all the things about the growth that's going to [1:45:03] happen. They'll double in population between now and 20, 20, 35 or what have you. So it's extraordinary. [1:45:09] That isn't just an interesting number. That's also markets. Those are also consumers. Those are also places [1:45:15] that I think provide an extraordinary opportunity properly positioned for America to become more [1:45:20] prosperous. Literally more people that can afford to buy the things Americans provide both in services [1:45:25] and goods and vice versa. So I think there's an extraordinary opportunity. Where I think some of [1:45:29] our situation in Africa has fallen off has been, it's been and rightfully so heavily focused on [1:45:36] counterterrorism and solely on counterterrorism in some places. And that's valuable and important. It is [1:45:41] very difficult for a country to progress or move forward if they are in fact a haven, you know, [1:45:46] for, that's open. And so, you know, the freaks come out at night and you've got terrorist groups [1:45:51] that are operating and undermining that country. So it's not that it's unimportant. I think we're also [1:45:55] learning from the Sahel how quickly the situation changes. Despite significant counterterrorism contributions, [1:46:01] each of those countries have pivoted to their great mistake, grave error, towards the Africa core led [1:46:06] by Russia. These are not, these people are not any good at fighting counterterrorism and, and again, [1:46:11] unreliable. And I think the moment will come when they'll realize that and maybe there will be a [1:46:15] new opportunity to engage. On the flip side of it, if you look at littoral West Africa, [1:46:19] there are real opportunities there for, and in fact, ongoing engagements, not just on counterterrorism, [1:46:24] but on economic progress. I look in the north to Morocco, another place where we have already seen [1:46:28] substantial improvements because of the accords, but also because phase two of that relationship that [1:46:35] continues to build. You also talk about one thing that I don't think has been talked about enough, [1:46:39] and I, and I think we hear the term as a 19th century term. The impact that malaria has is not [1:46:46] simply a health crisis or humanitarian crisis. It has deep economic crisis, deep economic implications. [1:46:53] It pulls kids out of school for long periods of time and not in their lives. It literally sets people [1:46:58] and communities back in the human, with humans and people are the greatest resource of any country. And the [1:47:03] cost benefit of an investment leveraging private partnerships to deal with things like malaria [1:47:10] pays extraordinary dividends if appropriately done and channeled. And that is something that I think [1:47:15] could, as part of an overall approach to Africa, include, uh, be included in things that you could [1:47:20] argue are improving our prosperity, our security. Thank you, Senator Rubin. You've affirmed a lot of this to me in, [1:47:26] uh, in our private talks. I just want to make an emphasis publicly here [1:47:31] that, uh, the disinformation in Africa, and I've mentioned disinformation writ large, [1:47:35] but, you know, for example, the Washington Post published, uh, an article in October [1:47:40] detailing how Russian propagandists targeted U.S. anti-malaria programs in Burkino Faso. [1:47:44] The Africa Center for Strategic Studies reported, published in March 2024, highlighted how Russia and [1:47:50] China are leading sponsors of disinformation campaigns in Africa that are showing incredible success [1:47:55] because we aren't doing a coordinated plan campaign to counter their misinformation. And so I'm [1:48:01] looking forward to working with you. I hope that you'll prioritize this for the sake of America's [1:48:05] future, um, that you could be the Secretary of State that says we have a vision for Africa and [1:48:10] we're backing it up, not just from the, uh, Secretary of State's office, but all the way down to making sure, [1:48:16] uh, key resources are invested in, uh, dis- and countering disinformation, as well as making sure [1:48:22] that we have personnel in, uh, in there. It's not a popular post, as you know, for many State [1:48:27] Department people. We've got to make it that way and let people know that they're helping to define [1:48:32] the future of, uh, of not just the United States, but humanity by, by focusing on Africa. I cannot, uh, [1:48:37] let my time expire without talking about the biggest humanitarian crisis going on, uh, on the planet [1:48:43] Earth right now, what is happening in Sudan. Uh, uh, it, it's been, uh, called by our country a genocide. [1:48:50] There's a famine being declared in areas where you're seeing unbelievable levels of systemic, [1:48:56] uh, sexual violence going on. Uh, I traveled to the Sudan border with Chad and saw humanitarian [1:49:02] crises like I'd never seen before and I've been around, uh, the world looking at humanitarian crises. [1:49:08] Um, we have a, a great special envoy who you've already positively name-checked in this, uh, in this, [1:49:15] uh, confirmation hearing. Um, it is so important and vital that that work continue, uh, [1:49:20] and that we work for diplomatic solutions. Uh, there are a lot of our allies who've been implicated [1:49:25] in fueling this crisis. This is an opportunity to end this crisis by diplomacy, uh, to bring about [1:49:32] one of the most important, uh, uh, peace processes there are. And I'm hoping that you and, and, uh, [1:49:37] incoming President Trump will prioritize that. Yeah. For, in a, in an era in which the term genocide [1:49:43] has been misappropriated, um, to almost a global slander, international slander, this is a real [1:49:49] genocide. By its very definition, this is a real genocide. This is the ethnic targeting of specific [1:49:54] groups for extermination, for elimination. By groups, by the way, that are being funded by nations that [1:49:59] we have alliances and partnerships with in other parts of the world. And we've, and we should express [1:50:04] that clearly. I, I think in our, in part of our engagement with the UAE and it'll have to be a pragmatic [1:50:09] engagement. I mean, they're important players in what we hope to resolve in the Middle East. And I [1:50:13] think as part of that engagement, we also need to raise the fact that they are openly supporting, [1:50:18] uh, an entity that is carrying out a genocide. And, and, and I think for those who are interested [1:50:23] in going out and actually protesting a real genocide, this to be the one, and I just don't see it. I don't [1:50:28] see people mentioning it. Well, it is morally reprehensible that, that this crisis has, has, it gets [1:50:34] virtually no attention in our country, especially because of the role we should be playing. Um, [1:50:41] and I, I, I, my time is over, but I, I want to say this, you don't need to respond. But the other [1:50:46] place on the planet that gets no attention that we are responsible for in our hemisphere is the crisis [1:50:54] in Haiti as well. I know that, you know, this, uh, intimately. And again, I just want to keep calling [1:50:59] out these, these moral omissions of our country, uh, often, at least in the press, of an inability [1:51:06] to focus our, our compassion, empathy, and understanding of our, uh, uh, our, our interwoven [1:51:13] destinies with places like Africa and places like Haiti. Thank you, uh, Senator. Thank you, [1:51:20] Senator Booker for that. Those are, uh, things that needed to be said. Having said that, you, you have [1:51:25] underlined, uh, probably the most difficult, uh, crises we have on the planet. And I, I think [1:51:32] everybody's ready to sign up on a path forward. So far, nobody's laid out that path forward. And [1:51:38] you're, you're right. We have an obligation to at least try to design a path forward. And when that [1:51:43] happens, I have no doubt that we'll pull together Republicans and Democrats and, as Americans, uh, to [1:51:48] do something about this. But I, I'll tell you, the, uh, identifying who are the people there, [1:51:55] that are the good guys that you can partner with is very, very difficult, as you know. [1:52:01] Thank you. Thank you, Senator Rubio, for your comments in, in that regard. We will move now [1:52:05] to Senator Paul. Senator Rubio, congratulations on your nomination. [1:52:12] One of the questions that I've asked over time to secretaries of state, as well as ambassadors and [1:52:17] others from the State Department, is can you name for me instances where sanctions have, uh, changed [1:52:24] behavior for the better? I'm not going to ask you that question now. I'll wait till you come back to [1:52:29] ask you. There's a preview of what I'll ask you the next time. But the reason I bring that up is, [1:52:34] is that I think hopefully people think of sanctions as a way of trying to modulate behavior. You want [1:52:40] better behavior out of a country. A country's doing something you don't like. You'd like them to change [1:52:44] their behavior for better through sanctions. And I think it rarely works. And I think we pile more on. [1:52:50] Now, some would say, well, sanctions are just to punish them. And we just want to, you know, [1:52:54] Russia invaded Ukraine. We're just punishing them. And so as punishment, they kind of work. I don't, [1:52:58] I don't think they're deterring a Russia's behavior or changing it. [1:53:02] But really sanctions can have effect in a couple of ways. I think the threat of a sanction, [1:53:07] the same way the threat of a tariff can have an effect on behavior. [1:53:11] But once placed, I think a sanction or tariff only has effect on someone's behavior if you remove it. [1:53:16] Now you mentioned earlier a little bit about discussing ways to unwind some of the sanctions [1:53:21] ultimately on Russia. People mentioned, well, we never want to let them sell energy again. [1:53:26] No, you have to let people enter back into the world. That's how you're going to get behavioral [1:53:29] changes. And it really will have to be part of the peace. If there is going to be a negotiated peace, [1:53:33] the one aspect that makes us part of that war are all the sanctions. And so it really should be offered [1:53:39] up of removing that and going back to normalcy when we can find a resolution to the war. [1:53:44] I'll give you an example of where I think often the State Department loses its sight of its mission. [1:53:52] Instead of being the Department of Diplomacy, which I think it's supposed to be, [1:53:56] it becomes just an extension of the Department of War and muscle and we show how strong we are [1:54:00] through the State Department. But really, when bellicose statements come from other parts of [1:54:05] the government, I see the State Department as the one that shows up and tries to still have a conversation. [1:54:11] In the past, I think because of remarks, you had been banned from travel to China. [1:54:17] The ambassador that's been nominated also has had statements that make us question whether or not [1:54:23] he'll be received in China if he becomes the ambassador to China. When Blinken and Yellen went [1:54:29] to China recently, they decided – and I'm not arguing with the goal – the goal was to get China not to sell [1:54:38] dual-use parts to Russia to use in the war against Ukraine. A noble goal. I share the goal. [1:54:45] But they got to China and they shamed them in public and called them names and told them they're [1:54:50] terrible people and they should quit doing it. I would argue that there's another way to try to [1:54:54] get behavioral changes. I would argue that the opposite of sanctions is trade. And so we have a [1:55:00] lot of sanctions on China. If I had been the one going to China with a mission, I would have said to [1:55:05] China very quietly, we may not be able to undo everything, but perhaps we could undo one bit of [1:55:11] sanctions that will enhance your economy by X amount if you will agree to quit selling dual-use parts [1:55:17] to Russia. And I think that's just a – it's a different look on things and I don't think we're [1:55:23] getting it very often. I guess my hope is that you will think about a different way of doing business [1:55:28] other than just saying let's sanction everybody and let's call people names we don't like because I [1:55:33] don't think it helps. I think it actually makes the situation worse. That doesn't mean we curl up in a [1:55:37] ball and just say do whatever you want, but there has to be some give and take. There has to be [1:55:41] something we take back. And so I guess my general question to you would be we know a lot about the [1:55:48] stick. We know about sanctions and this and that. Do you see any possibility of any carrot with China [1:55:54] to make relations better with China? Well, let me first say indeed I've been strongly worded in my views [1:55:59] of China. Let me just point out they've said mean things about me too. And I'm not sure they're fans of [1:56:04] mine in that regard here. My role now as the Secretary of State is to lead the diplomatic [1:56:09] wing of the country and that will involve engaging them. The fact of the matter is in a mature and [1:56:15] prudent conversation and I would expect that they at the end of the day are also mature and prudent [1:56:20] practitioners of foreign policy. They've got a billion people and nuclear weapons and a large economy. [1:56:25] We have 400 million people, the largest economy in the world, and nuclear weapons. And it is in their [1:56:29] interest, our interest, and the interest of the world for two great powers to be able to communicate. [1:56:33] In fact, despite everything I have said, I have consistently throughout my career said [1:56:38] that it is that geopolitical balance between our countries that, or imbalance, developing imbalance, [1:56:43] that is the greatest risk to global security and prosperity because that could quickly trigger [1:56:48] not just the trade and economic conflict, but an armed one, which could be catastrophic. Never [1:56:53] in the history of mankind have two powers like the United States and China ever faced off in a global [1:56:58] conflict and the outcome would be catastrophic and we should want to avoid it and so should they. [1:57:02] So the bottom line is this. Yes, we are going to have to deal with China. They're too big and too [1:57:06] important in the world and they're going to have to deal with us. And my goal is that it is dealt with [1:57:10] in a way that furthers our national interest. What cannot continue to happen is that China continues [1:57:15] to assume all of the benefits of the international system and none of its obligations, all the benefits [1:57:19] of global trade and commerce and none of its obligations. Your point on sanctions are important. [1:57:26] I think that one of the things that's happened over time is we have adopted this view that we're going to be [1:57:30] involved in less armed conflicts, which I think is a positive, generally speaking, right? Most people [1:57:34] would agree. The only other alternative left in the toolbox, then, is economic sanctions. And while [1:57:39] I do think that there are you can question whether it has an impact over the changing the behavior of a [1:57:44] country, it can achieve two things. The first is it can deny a nation state the resources they could use [1:57:50] to fund more of that activity. Let there be no doubt if the Iranian regime had more money because of no sanctions, [1:57:56] they would have spent more money on Hezbollah and Hamas and their missile program and the Houthis [1:58:02] and others. So I do think there is value in that regard. And the second is, to be frank, leverage. [1:58:07] When you sit down at a table, let's say we talk about Ukraine and the need to end that conflict, [1:58:11] when you get and sit at the table and the United States is involved in those conversations, hopefully, [1:58:17] to reach a peaceful settlement of that conflict, you're going to have to give, not just get. And sanctions [1:58:22] and the release of sanctions could be a part of that, assuming that the conditions are appropriate. [1:58:27] So I do think sanctions also have a role to play in that regard. But I would not diminish the part [1:58:32] about denying resources for governments and countries to carry out nefarious, denying them the ability to [1:58:38] have the resources to carry out these nefarious activities. I think you're right and the point [1:58:43] is probably valid with regard to Iran, probably not so much with China. I don't think we've denied China [1:58:49] resources and I think their resources extend beyond what we can do. I think our sanctions are more, [1:58:56] you know, prodding them but not really damaging their economic prospects. With regard to the concept [1:59:04] of diplomacy and how we make things better, attempt to make things better, I think if we have absolutes, [1:59:11] we tend to not understand really the way diplomacy has to work because it is about engagement, [1:59:16] it's about hearing the other side. It's not about accepting their position, but it's about at least [1:59:20] knowing what the position of the other side is. With regard to NATO and Ukraine, to a person, [1:59:28] the State Department under the previous administration is adamant, and so are many Republicans, [1:59:33] that there is absolutely no way we will ever say that Ukraine could be a neutral country, [1:59:39] that absolutely they will be and it is our absolute prerogative to invite anybody we want to into NATO. [1:59:45] Well, we can say that and we have the ability to do that, but there are consequences to that and one [1:59:50] of the consequences is, is that at least from the Russian perspective, they see that as one of the [1:59:54] reasons why the war has developed there. And so I think that if you are looking at peace, you have to [2:00:00] look at in the – first you have to get to a ceasefire before you even get to real discussions, but if you [2:00:05] had a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, I think our sanctions need to be on the table as far as [2:00:10] negotiating the removal of them. But I think also the idea of Ukraine being a neutral country as far [2:00:15] as a military alliance, if it's not on the table, Ukraine doesn't have that much to offer. I mean, [2:00:20] Russia now occupies a good 15, 20 percent of the country. It's been a big bloody war and they've done [2:00:26] it in a sort of World War I fashion, but I don't think they're going anywhere. It is at a stalemate. [2:00:31] But the one thing Ukraine has to offer is they won't become part of a military alliance allied against [2:00:37] Russia. Just not taking it off the table enhances our ability to negotiate, enhances Ukraine's ability. [2:00:44] I think Zelenskyy's public words have been a little less firm than they had been in the past. [2:00:50] But instead, I think we've done the opposite with our diplomacy. Every day it's blinking, [2:00:54] you know, beating the drums, beating the drums, they absolutely be in Ukraine. Do you think that [2:00:59] the concept of a neutral Ukraine, not in NATO, can be part of the negotiations to end the war? [2:01:06] Well, obviously, that's something that will ultimately be part of any negotiation. I do agree [2:01:10] with your point that we want to be real here for a second. I think we've lost the art of [2:01:14] reality in some of the foreign policy. These are not outcomes that are almost [2:01:18] rarely are they ideal. Sadly, in many cases, our choices in foreign policy are a choice between a bad [2:01:24] outcome and an even worse outcome. And that's been true not in the modern era, but throughout the history [2:01:30] of diplomacy and nation-state relations. In the case of conflicts such as these, they invariably [2:01:36] require concessions. I don't think it would be wise nor appropriate before even an office or even [2:01:42] at any public forum such as this to discuss the parameters of what those potential concessions [2:01:47] can be for either side. Suffice it to say, I do think, to be honest with the committee and the full [2:01:52] Senate, if you want to reach agreements to end armed conflict where people are dying on a daily basis, [2:01:57] an enormous destruction is occurring, and a great potential for escalation exists on a daily basis. [2:02:06] If we want to be honest about bringing that to an end, true diplomacy will require concessions from [2:02:11] every party engaged in those conversations. That's the nature of diplomacy, and it's best conducted [2:02:17] directly and in an appropriate forum and not in public. And that can be done, by the way, without [2:02:24] abandoning our core principles as a nation or our feelings as a people about what's happened and [2:02:29] transpired in that conflict to date. Senator Van Holm. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shaheen. [2:02:38] Senator Rubio, good to see you. It was great to sit down with you and talk about some of these [2:02:42] important issues yesterday. Let me just say at the outset that I appreciate your response to [2:02:48] Senator Booker's question about what's happening in Sudan, specifically as the Biden administration just [2:02:55] found that the RSF under Hamedi is engaged in a genocide, and we need to do everything we can [2:03:02] to stop what's happening there. You referred obliquely to some of our sort of Gulf partners who have not [2:03:12] done what they should be doing. One of them is the UAE, and I've been very clear that the United States [2:03:18] should not be providing military assistance to the UAE when the UAE is in turn providing military [2:03:25] assistance to a group like the RSF that is committing a genocide in Sudan. And I'm expecting a briefing from [2:03:33] the Biden administration by the end of this week as to whether or not their commitments to President [2:03:38] Biden to stop doing that have been fulfilled. I want to pick up on a couple of the issues we discussed [2:03:45] yesterday. One, as you know, Senator Sullivan and I are the co-chairs of the Bipartisan Foreign [2:03:51] Service Caucus. We've passed a number of pieces of legislation through the United States Congress, [2:03:58] most recently the Foreign Service Families Act. As you know, and we discussed yesterday, [2:04:04] you know the importance of supporting the men and women at the State Department, including [2:04:09] the Foreign Service. And I appreciate your willingness to work with us in the caucus [2:04:14] to continue to make sure that they have what they need to do their jobs effectively. We also discussed [2:04:22] the ongoing war in Ukraine and the importance of supporting the Ukrainian people against Putin's [2:04:27] aggression. And I just want to say for the record, I support and endorse everything that Senator [2:04:31] Shaheen said on that score, so I don't have to go into great detail. [2:04:35] I will say that we know that what happens in Ukraine does not stay in Ukraine. And it's not just me [2:04:44] saying that. That is what we've heard repeatedly from leaders in Japan, leaders in South Korea, [2:04:50] and other partners of ours in the Indo-Pacific region. So I hope that we will continue to focus on that, [2:04:59] because what we do know is that President Xi has one eye on what's happening in Ukraine and another eye [2:05:07] on what's happening in Taiwan and measuring everybody's response. Like you, and we've worked [2:05:16] on a bipartisan basis to try to make sure that we meet the challenge of China. Lots of important pieces [2:05:23] of legislation that have passed, but none yet to really rise to meeting those challenges. I do support [2:05:30] the Biden administration's ongoing efforts to restrict the flow of very high-end technologies, [2:05:37] the highest-end chips, to China that can be used in their military. We're going to have to work [2:05:42] successfully with our allies to do that, just like the Trump administration back in the day [2:05:47] worked on the Huawei issue. So my view is that we need to expand that effort. We also discussed the [2:05:56] volatile situation in the Middle East. You know we often talk about the importance of shifting our [2:06:04] focus to China and the Indo-Pacific, but we always seem to get dragged back into conflicts in the Middle [2:06:10] East. I want to start with Syria. Good riddance to the murderous Assad regime. Obviously, we have a [2:06:20] stake in what comes next in Syria, given the fact it's a very volatile part of the world. I support the very [2:06:28] cautious engagement of the Biden administration with HTS, but we should acknowledge their very poisonous [2:06:37] genealogy, beginning with al Qaeda morphing into al-Nusra. The other issue, of course, in Syria is that [2:06:45] when you've got a situation like we see today, there are opportunities for ISIS to get further back on [2:06:55] its feet, to provide it more oxygen. And as you know, the tip of the spear in our fight against ISIS [2:07:02] ISIS has been our Syrian Kurdish partners, the SDF. But at this moment, President Erdogan of [2:07:11] Turkey has been backing attacks of the so-called Syrian National Army, which Turkey largely controls, [2:07:21] against our partners, the Syrian Kurds, which opens the door to a revival of ISIS. Because of the [2:07:29] actions of the United States government, Turkey has so far paused that effort. Senator Graham and I have [2:07:36] introduced legislation to impose sanctions on Turkey, should they renew those attacks in an aggressive [2:07:44] way. We talked about this. I know that you recognize the importance of that partnership with [2:07:51] the Syrian Kurds. But just a very straightforward question. Do you agree that we should continue to [2:07:57] support our partners, the SDF, in the fight against ISIS? [2:08:02] Yeah, well, absolutely. Not only that, but I think we also need to recognize that [2:08:06] there are implications to abandoning partners who have a great sacrifice and threat actually jailed [2:08:12] the ISIS fighters. One of the reasons why we were able to dismantle ISIS is because they were willing [2:08:17] to host them in jails. A great personal threat to them. And obviously, that situation is very tenuous. [2:08:22] I don't want to take up a lot of your time, but I do think it's important to respond to this [2:08:26] opportunity in Syria. Because it could be an opportunity. Look, the new people that are in [2:08:29] charge there are not going to pass an FBI background check, okay? We recognize that. [2:08:33] These are not people we know it all about, and their history, as you said, is not one that gives us [2:08:37] comfort. That said, it is in the national interest of the United States, if possible, [2:08:41] to have a Syria that's no longer a playground for ISIS, that respects religious minorities, [2:08:47] ranging from allies all the way to Christians, that protects the Kurds, [2:08:51] and at the same time is not a vehicle through which Iran can spread its terrorism to Hezbollah [2:08:58] and destabilize Lebanon, not to mention what's happened in other parts. Not only is it in the [2:09:02] national interest of the United States, it's in the national interest of virtually every nation [2:09:06] state in the Middle East to see that come about. That is worth exploring. There is an interesting [2:09:12] dynamic at play, and Senator Post a moment ago about the impact of sanctions. I would argue that the [2:09:17] Caesar sanctions directly contributed to the downfall of the Assad regime in many ways. [2:09:24] We find ourselves in this interesting situation now, where because it, I think, [2:09:27] was reauthorized as part of NDAA, we now have these sanctions in place against a government that [2:09:32] no longer exists. But nonetheless, it's an opportunity for us to explore how we could use that tool, [2:09:39] the removal of it, and others, if in fact the territory is fertile for these outcomes. There are [2:09:45] impediments to this that go beyond simply the new people in charge, and one of them, as you pointed [2:09:49] out, is Erdogan and what his intentions are. Right now, there's a very tenuous ceasefire with regards [2:09:54] to the Kurds. It's important for that to be maintained. I think it's important to signal to Erdogan early, [2:09:59] including through this hearing, that there should not be, they should not view a transition in power [2:10:04] in the U.S. as a window in which they could take advantage of to sort of violate whatever agreements [2:10:09] were in place. Right now, what we want in Syria is stability, so that we can explore what [2:10:14] opportunities exist to bring a different dynamic, because it would have an impact on Lebanon, [2:10:20] on Israel, on the situation in Gaza, and on the broader Middle East, and to walk away from an [2:10:25] opportunity that may not come back. By the way, the Russians have been run out of there, the Iranians [2:10:29] have been run out of there, but they are pragmatic foreign policy operators. If we don't explore these [2:10:34] opportunities, they will work their way back in there at some point. [2:10:36] And I agree with everything you just said, and look forward to working with you on that. [2:10:40] Let me turn to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which we also discussed yesterday, and we all [2:10:49] witnessed the horrific October 7th Hamas terror attacks on Israel. We've also witnessed the devastation [2:10:55] and human rights catastrophe in Gaza. Like you, I've met Israeli families who lost loved ones on October [2:11:02] 7th. I've met with hostage families. I've also met with Palestinian families who lost kids and [2:11:07] other innocents in this war. So I'm very pleased to see the announcement today of the ceasefire and [2:11:17] the return of hostages. Let us pray that it holds and that it is implemented. But of course, as we [2:11:23] discussed yesterday, the question is what happens next. And we all agree that Hamas can have no role [2:11:30] in the governance of Gaza or any other place. We also know that for all its flaws and faults, [2:11:38] the Palestinian Authority has recognized Israel's right to exist for the last 30 years since the [2:11:42] Oslo Accords. Their security forces are trained by U.S. forces. They today are fighting Palestinian [2:11:49] militants in certain parts of the West Bank. But at the same time, their funds have been restricted by [2:11:56] the Netanyahu government today. These are the funds that belong to the PA. We've seen a record increase [2:12:03] in the number of settlements in the West Bank. And so the PA is not able to deliver on what had been the [2:12:11] hope of Oslo, which is self-determination, security, and dignity for both Israelis and Palestinians. So [2:12:20] you have said that the ideal way forward, recognizing that we've been at this for a long time, [2:12:26] is a two-state solution. There are members of the Netanyahu government that today want to annex [2:12:31] all over the West Bank. So my question is, do you agree that annexation would be contrary to peace [2:12:38] and security in the Middle East? And what is your vision going forward? [2:12:41] First, let me say that, yeah, the idea would be that there not be conflict and the people could live [2:12:45] side by side with one another without being in conflict and the ability to pursue prosperity. [2:12:50] Sadly and unfortunately, the conditions for that to exist have not been in place for some [2:12:55] substantial period of time. I point to you as an example, back in 2020, the Trump administration [2:13:00] offered 58 billion, or about 50 billion or 58 billion, 50 billion, 58 to 50 billion dollars in [2:13:06] investment to the Palestinians. And that included, I believe, 28 or 29 billion specifically for Gaza, [2:13:11] and it was rejected. That offer was made back in January of 2020, and then it pivoted over as a [2:13:17] result of that rejection to what we now know as the Abraham Accords. Second, I would say that Israel [2:13:21] is a small nation who at its narrowest point is nine miles wide. It has been historically surrounded [2:13:27] by enemies that seek their destruction. Hezbollah to the north, Hamas to the west, Iran further north [2:13:33] with nuclear weapons constantly. In fact, I would argue that if Israel had not been firm and strong [2:13:38] in its response in this endeavor most recently, they may very well have faced an existential threat, [2:13:43] as they continue to in many ways. Now, here's the good news, and it's not just about the ceasefire [2:13:47] today, although that's very important. The good news is that, potentially, we have had a dynamic [2:13:52] shift in the region that has an historic opportunity, if appropriately structured and pursued, [2:13:57] that changes the dynamics of what might be possible. And that, we've discussed Syria, [2:14:01] we've discussed events in Lebanon quite a bit as well, the degrading of the Iranian capability, [2:14:06] which I hope will continue, and hopefully the ability to reach some agreement between Israel and Saudi, [2:14:11] and Saudi Arabia on normalization, and being able to engage both for their mutual security and also [2:14:17] economic prosperity. The real open question for the Palestinians is, who will govern? Who will govern [2:14:23] in Gaza in the short term, and who will ultimately govern? Will it be the Palestinian Authority, [2:14:27] or some other entity? Because it has to be someone. That was the initial goal for Gaza, [2:14:32] when the Israelis withdrew from there, and they turned it over, and they turned it over with greenhouses, [2:14:36] and they turned it over with all kinds of economic development. Hamas won an election, [2:14:40] they took over, and they destroyed the place and built tunnels for terrorists to operate from. [2:14:45] So the key is not simply governance, it's who will govern? You can't turn it over to people who seek [2:14:50] your destruction. And so I do think this is a very complex issue, and I think that's understating it. [2:14:57] We all recognize it. But I also believe that we should not underestimate the potential opportunities [2:15:02] that now exist, and it'll take some time to fully understand what those are, that perhaps open the [2:15:07] door to things that were not open in the future. But from the Israeli perspective, which I fully [2:15:11] understand, it begins with their existence. Because you cannot coexist with armed elements at your [2:15:17] border who seek your destruction and evisceration as a state. You just can't. No nation on it. We [2:15:22] wouldn't tolerate it, and they can't either. And it begins with having that level of security, and if they do, [2:15:28] then I think there are opportunities that come about as a result of it. Those opportunities [2:15:32] historically have not existed in recent times. Perhaps we're living in an era where that will be, [2:15:37] the likelihood of it is higher because of recent events, unexpected events in Syria, [2:15:43] and Lebanon, and other places. [2:15:44] Sir Scott. [2:15:45] Thank you, Chairman. So I was in Miami, or Haile on Monday, and when there was a video [2:15:57] where you were recognizing Alina Garcia, and Dario Fernandez, and Tomas Regalado, everybody applauded. [2:16:04] They're so excited about your being the Secretary of State. Your homegrown son, and so they're just [2:16:15] all excited. The other thing they're excited about is that they have somebody that is going to care [2:16:19] about Venezuela, and Cuba, and Haiti, and Nicaragua, all the problems, because you've been so vocal. [2:16:25] So I guess, can you just go through sort of one by one and say, just, I mean, look, we know what's, [2:16:31] so what's, what, what are our options? Not that you know exactly what you're going to do, and a lot of [2:16:35] these decisions will be made by somebody else anyway, but what are, like right now, look at what's going [2:16:40] on in Venezuela. We, the Biden administration has allowed oil to flow. The, he stole the election, [2:16:48] completely violated what, what Biden told him, uh, he would do. Um, reincorporating the Machado, [2:16:54] uh, probably was only alive because of your hard work making sure that Donald Trump put a tweet out. [2:17:00] You look at, um, you look at Cuba now, we just, they just dropped the state-sponsored terrorism, [2:17:06] which makes no sense. Um, we've got people like Jose Daniel Ferre in prison. People, kids, he's shown [2:17:12] as 14 in prison for peaceful protests. So, give me some of your ideas of what, what is possible. [2:17:17] Let's take one, let's start with Haiti, because in many ways it's globally complex, [2:17:24] and I think the chairman sort of alluded to this a moment ago. There's a fundamental [2:17:28] problem in Haiti in that there is no legitimacy of authority. And I say this in recognition of the [2:17:34] fact that some of the national police forces in Haiti have been extraordinarily brave. Despite [2:17:38] being outgunned and outmanned, these guys and gals have stuck at their post and fought back against [2:17:43] armed gangs. You know, when you're, when the most powerful person in any nation state is nicknamed [2:17:47] barbecue, that is not a good thing. And this guy obviously is not named that for good reasons. [2:17:51] He's not a cook. These are bad, these are bad gang elements that are operating within Haiti [2:17:57] and, and have destabilized, not just Haiti, but threaten to destabilize the Dominican Republic, [2:18:02] not to mention the migratory pressure that it places on the United States, on the Bahamas, [2:18:06] and on other places in the region. There is no easy answer. The Kenyans are there, and I tell you, [2:18:11] I think they deserve a lot of credit for being willing to take on that mission. In recent days, [2:18:15] missions from various other countries have arrived, El Salvador being among them, [2:18:20] to sort of contribute to that effort. I don't think anyone can tell you they have a master plan [2:18:25] for how you fix that overnight. I do think it does begin with stability and security. You've got to [2:18:29] establish some baseline security, and it's not going to come from a U.S. military intervention. [2:18:34] So to the extent that we can encourage foreign partners, and I would include foreign partners in [2:18:38] the Western Hemisphere who should be contributing to this effort, to provide some level of stability and [2:18:43] security in Haiti, so that you can explore the opportunities to have a transitional government [2:18:49] that has legitimacy, that can ultimately lead to the conduct of elections, and then have governing [2:18:53] bodies in that country that can bring about a nation state, that can begin to build some of the [2:18:58] things you need in order for permanency. But it's going to take a long time, and I say this with sadness [2:19:04] in my heart. There have been good times, and there have been bad times, and worse times in Haiti, but sadly, [2:19:09] there's not really been a golden era in Haiti's history, and your heart breaks for these people, [2:19:13] and for what they've gone through. But you also, as a policymaker in the United States, recognize [2:19:18] the implications it's had on our country. It's not just in the migratory pressures that's placed on us, [2:19:22] but as I pointed out earlier, the threat it poses on a daily basis to destabilizing the Dominican [2:19:28] Republic. You mentioned Nicaragua. It's a very weird situation, for lack of a better term. [2:19:36] The Sandinistas earlier, one of the first things they did in the New Year is they kicked out every nun, [2:19:40] in the country. They've gone to war with the Catholic Church, which was the last institution [2:19:45] in the country capable of standing up to them. But now they've begun this process of amending their [2:19:50] fake constitution to basically create a family dynasty, so that Ortega and his wife will now [2:19:58] be co-presidents. There's no democracy that has been completely wiped out. They have literally put [2:20:03] plane loads of opposition figures and exported them here to the United States and around the world. [2:20:10] They literally arrested anyone who signed up to run for president. They arrested every single [2:20:14] you signed up to run for president, they put you in jail. So it's a big challenge, but our national [2:20:19] interest is most challenged. Number one, because of migratory pressure. Number two, because the [2:20:24] Nicaraguan regime is allowing people to fly into Nicaragua visa-free from anywhere in the world and then [2:20:30] transit to the United States. They have become the point of entry for people from all over the world, [2:20:34] because you come in without any visa. They charge you $1,000 or whatever their going rate is today. [2:20:39] And from there, you get on the migratory route and into the United States. They have been direct [2:20:43] contributors to the migratory crisis we face at our southern border. And the third is the Nicaraguans [2:20:48] have basically invited the Russians to establish a military naval presence in Nicaragua in our hemisphere. [2:20:55] That poses a threat to our national security. That needs to be addressed. Venezuela, sadly, is not governed [2:21:01] by government. It's governed by a narco trafficking organization that has empowered itself of a [2:21:07] nation state. And we have seen, I believe, upwards of seven, eight, nine million Venezuelans have just [2:21:13] left the country, more expected to leave. I was in strong disagreement with the Biden administration [2:21:18] because they got played the way that I knew they would get played. They entered into negotiations with [2:21:23] Maduro. He agreed to have elections. The elections were completely fake. They leveraged migration against [2:21:29] us to get those concessions. And now they have these general licenses where companies like Chevron [2:21:33] are actually providing billions of dollars of money into the regime's coffers. And the regime kept [2:21:39] none of the promises that they made. So all that needs to be re-explored. Because in Venezuela, you have [2:21:44] the Russian presence. You have a very strong Iranian presence. The Iranians, in fact, are exploring, [2:21:49] or in fact, are beginning to build drone factories for the manufacture of Iranian drones in our own [2:21:55] hemisphere. Not to mention the long practice of the Venezuelan regime of providing real but illegitimate [2:22:02] passports to operatives for Hezbollah in our own hemisphere. And lastly, and I leave it lastly to [2:22:08] Cuba because it's one that's been more enduring. The problem in Cuba, basically, is that despite being a [2:22:13] communist regime and Marxism not working, is that they've decided and they thought what they would do [2:22:17] is that they would create this holding company. It's called Gaesa. It is a company that they own by the [2:22:22] Cuban military, and that holding company owns everything that makes money in Cuba. If it makes [2:22:27] money in Cuba, they own it, and it generates revenue for them. The Miami Herald just did an [2:22:31] expose on Gaesa. And while you have electrical blackouts and you have all these other problems [2:22:36] economically in Cuba, Gaesa's sitting on billions of dollars that they've generated for their permanency. [2:22:41] We, in 2017, the Trump administration sanctioned Gaesa. Unfortunately, the Biden administration lifted [2:22:49] some of those sanctions and restrictions a couple of years ago, which increased the [2:22:53] amount of money they were able to generate through things like manipulating remittances and the like. [2:22:57] And then yesterday, the Biden administration announced they were rescinding all of the sanctions [2:23:03] on Gaesa, which basically the sanctions were this. You can do business with an independent, [2:23:08] individual Cuban, but you cannot, it's the regime that doesn't allow it. You cannot do business with [2:23:13] anything owned by that government-run entity. And yesterday, they lifted the sanctions on them. [2:23:17] Now, the new administration is not bound by that decision, but nonetheless, that's what's in place. [2:23:21] Ultimately, the reality, the moment of truth is arriving. Cuba is literally collapsing, [2:23:26] both generationally in terms of all the young people leaving, but it's also collapsing economically. [2:23:30] They are now living on 20 and 21 hour rolling blackouts and some days longer because Marxism doesn't [2:23:36] work because they're corrupt and because they're inept. And they're going to have a choice to make [2:23:41] those that are in charge there. Do they open up to the world? Do they allow the individual Cuban to have [2:23:48] control over their economic and political destiny, even though it threatens the security and stability of the [2:23:53] regime? Or do they triple down and just say, we'd rather be the owners and controllers of a [2:23:59] fourth world country that's falling apart and is losing, has lost 10 percent of its population in the [2:24:04] last two years? And that's, that's a dynamic that they're facing right now. I hope that they will choose [2:24:12] the path of empowering the individual Cuban so that the individual Cuban has the ability to do with [2:24:16] virtually every, the peoples of virtually every other country in the hemisphere have been able to do [2:24:21] at least once in the last 60 years, and some more than once, and that is elect their leaders, [2:24:26] vote for their leaders. You think about what happened here today, the Cuban people have no idea what it's [2:24:32] like to have an authority figure or someone in charge of power like I am as a U.S. Senator sitting [2:24:37] here having to answer questions from his colleagues and also having to have people on the back screaming and [2:24:42] protesting against you. You can't do that to a Cuban official. You can't question their decisions. The [2:24:47] Cuban people have never been able to participate in an economic, in a political process for over, [2:24:51] almost 70 years now. And they, they're entitled to that as much as the people of Colombia and Argentina [2:24:57] and Paraguay and Peru and virtually every other country in the region has enjoyed. So let's assume you [2:25:03] have this job, you're confirmed, you have the job for four years. What would your definition of success be? [2:25:08] With regards to generally, the alignment of our foreign policy to our national interest [2:25:15] has been defined the security, prosperity of the American people. And, and that's, and by the way, [2:25:22] I would define that as success for the country. What I would define as success for the State Department [2:25:26] is not just that alignment, but making the State Department highly relevant again. Sadly, and I think [2:25:31] I've shared this with you in some of our meetings with many of my colleagues, what has happened over the [2:25:35] last 20 years under multiple administrations is the influence of the State Department has declined [2:25:40] at the expense of other agencies and also at the expense of national security councils because it [2:25:45] takes so long for the State Department to take action. And so increasingly you stop getting invited [2:25:50] to the meetings and you start getting, they stop putting you in charge of things because it takes too [2:25:53] long to get a result. So we want the State Department to be relevant again and it should be because the State [2:25:59] Department has a plethora of talented people who are subject matter experts and who have skills in [2:26:06] diplomacy and it's not being fully utilized because increasingly on, on issue after issue we've seen [2:26:11] the State Department marginalized because of internal inertia, because of the, the way the structure works. [2:26:17] So we have to be able to get, we have to be at that table when decisions are being made and the State [2:26:22] Department has to be a source of creative ideas and effective implementation. So I would define making the State [2:26:27] Department relevant again in the setting of our foreign policy is critical. And I think that's [2:26:31] something that maybe is not as perceived by the general public as it is by those of us who watch [2:26:35] it on a daily basis. Thank you. Thanks. Senator Rosen. Well, thank you Chairman Risch, [2:26:41] Ranking Member Shaheen for holding this hearing and for welcoming me to the committee. You know, [2:26:47] I'm joining this committee at a challenging time for the global community from conflicts with Iranian [2:26:52] proxies in the Middle East to Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine, growing tensions with China, [2:26:57] a genocide in Sudan and so much more. And I look forward to working with my colleagues on both [2:27:02] sides of the aisle to find bipartisan solutions to these problems. And I also want to thank you, [2:27:07] Senator Rubio, your family that's here and those who couldn't be here for working with me over the [2:27:13] last six years and your service to our nation. And I'd like to congratulate you again on your nomination. [2:27:19] And I'm going to move on. I just want to make a quick statement because ensuring the United States [2:27:26] remains a steadfast supporter of Israel I know is one of your top priorities and one of mine. And [2:27:31] throughout your time in the Senate, you've been one of Israel's most unwavering supporters. I want to [2:27:37] thank you for supporting Israel. I look forward to working with you to ensure that the U.S.-Israel [2:27:42] Security Partnership remains ironclad and that our friendship remains unconditional. And I want to [2:27:49] thank you for your response to Senator McCormick's hostage question. Now, we all hope since we've been in this [2:27:54] hearing that there's news maybe of an imminent agreement being reached to free, I hope, all the [2:27:59] hostages. We hope to hear that confirmation soon. But nevertheless, these issues must remain a top [2:28:06] priority for the committee going forward. So I'm going to just move over to talking about Abraham Accords, [2:28:11] speaking of going forward. Because despite the immense challenges that you've addressed posed by October [2:28:17] 7th, the Abraham Accords have ushered in new forms of cooperation between Israel and countries in the [2:28:23] Middle East and North Africa. As one of the founders and co-chairs of the bipartisan Senate Abraham [2:28:29] Accords Caucus, I firmly believe the U.S. should continue building on the Accords by deepening [2:28:35] people-to-people ties, soft diplomacy if you will, and widening the circle of partnerships with Israel [2:28:40] to new countries. So, Senator Rubio, I know you've touched on this briefly, but if confirmed, how will you [2:28:47] support the growth of the Abraham Accords to new countries generally? And specifically, [2:28:53] maybe try to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia? [2:28:56] Senator Rubio, Thank you. I think those are important points. A couple of things that have [2:29:00] come up here as a result of this. The first is, and I point this again because we just don't know, [2:29:03] it's a new development. But I think we are, we should not underestimate or understate the potential [2:29:10] historic opportunities that exist right now with what's happened very unexpectedly for most in Syria, [2:29:16] what's happened in Lebanon, the weakening of Iran and of its Shia crescent of destabilization in the [2:29:24] region. These are extraordinary opportunities that I think lend themselves to an era of diminishing [2:29:32] insecurity, not total elimination of it, but enough security that it opens the door for agreement on [2:29:38] other topics. Critical to that is the Saudi normalization, the potential of a Saudi normalization [2:29:43] with Israel. And I think that, as a broader context of the Abraham Accords, I think would [2:29:49] be historic in nature and I think provide extraordinary benefits to the world and help [2:29:54] bring a level of stability and peace to an area that frankly has not had it, one could say for [2:29:59] thousands of years, but certainly in my lifetime. You talk about what we could do to build on it. [2:30:03] I think the most important part of any arrangement of countries that enter into these agreements that [2:30:07] historically have been difficult is there has to be a benefit to it. They have to perceive that there's a [2:30:12] benefit to it, particularly among themselves. Like what is the benefit to a country? What benefits will Saudi [2:30:18] Arabia derive from being in recognition of Israel and vice versa? And I could think of a variety of [2:30:23] things, whether it's advances in their investments in high-tech and how Saudi Arabia wants to diversify its [2:30:31] own economy, the ability of cross-investments, and also frankly of security. Because for the foreseeable [2:30:38] future, I think most anticipate that there will be a mutual threat from Tehran. It may not be openly [2:30:43] stated as a military alliance, but it's certainly a security, certainly one that I think they both [2:30:47] have a mutual interest in and which I think the U.S. could be a very strong partner in providing those [2:30:52] assurances as well. So I do think there's a real opportunity to expand it and it won't be without [2:30:56] irritants. There's no doubt about it. There won't be without irritants that we're still going to have some [2:31:00] issues with UAE or Saudi Arabia, but we also have to be pragmatic enough to understand what an enormous [2:31:08] achievement it would be if, in fact, not just you get a ceasefire, but you actually – that leads to [2:31:13] the opening – the opportunity of a Saudi-Israeli partnership and joint recognition. What that would [2:31:20] mean to the region is historic. MS. And you've talked about potential opportunities going forward, [2:31:25] and we talk about maybe not just with other countries, but how does the private sector get [2:31:29] involved in creating – building and sustaining the normalization in areas of water insecurity, [2:31:36] power insecurity, healthcare, technology? We know that there are ways that we can do this. [2:31:42] They have been doing it. How does the private sector feed into this? [2:31:47] MR. I think from an economic and development perspective, they're the linchpin of it. [2:31:50] I think one of the things that could come about as a result of an agreement between the Saudis and [2:31:55] the Israelis is that companies and institutions in both countries would now be open in [2:31:59] able to invest in and or partner in the economies of each other. So the Israelis, as an example, [2:32:04] have made extraordinary advances in agricultural production. Because of geographic constraints, [2:32:10] they've had to be incredibly creative, and nonetheless have been able to – and I think the Saudis would [2:32:14] benefit from that greatly. Likewise, I think that we know, as a start-up nation, the technological [2:32:21] capabilities and advances that the private sector has made in Israel. And that, I think, would be a great [2:32:25] interest to the Saudis and partnership. In reverse, is I think some of the energy resources that Saudi [2:32:31] Arabia could provide, some of the financing for projects that they work together on. The linchpin [2:32:35] of all of these is private sector engagement. But without the governmental imprimatur, or without the [2:32:41] government creating the pathways for that to be possible, because of recognition, because of [2:32:45] diplomatic relations, that's what opens – because those don't exist, that hasn't been able to happen. [2:32:50] This would open the door for that, and I think be transformative. [2:32:53] Thank you. I want to continue a little bit on this theme, because, of course, a lot of this [2:32:59] also has a nexus with combating anti-Semitism. And, of course, anti-Semitism domestically and abroad. [2:33:05] I probably founded the Senate – the first ever Senate Bipartisan Task Force to Combating [2:33:09] Anti-Semitism. You and I have done a lot of work there. You're a member of the task force. And we work [2:33:15] closely with the Special Envoy's Office at the State Department. We know that global rates of [2:33:20] anti-Semitism, they are skyrocketing – skyrocketing, excuse me – it's critical. The White House [2:33:26] ensures the Special Envoy in their office is sufficiently staffed, supported, and resourced. [2:33:31] So I know we've talked about this in our meeting, and, of course, like I said, we worked on this [2:33:36] before. Can I have your commitment that you'll work with the White House to do two things – quickly [2:33:42] nominate a qualified candidate to be Special Envoy. Quickly and qualified. We really need to get [2:33:48] somebody on board. Yes. And I think it needs to be someone that, as we've discussed, also enjoys [2:33:56] broad support across different sectors. But the key, ultimately – I don't know if it was a study or [2:34:02] survey or something that came out yesterday, but it showed something that's really disturbing. I think [2:34:06] it said 60 percent of people on Earth hold anti-Semitic views, according to this poll, are in 60 percent of [2:34:11] the countries. But I think it's a 60 percent. Look, unfortunately, bigotry and hatred has been a [2:34:17] part of human nature from the very beginning. But anti-Semitism is a unique danger. The suffering [2:34:25] that it inflicted on the world historically, but in the last century, is unimaginable and can never [2:34:31] be allowed to be repeated. And it's something that we should make sure we're constantly speaking out [2:34:35] against and identifying for what it is. I think the U.S.'s role as a leader in speaking out in that regard [2:34:41] is indispensable. And we need to be forceful about it. One of the things that's most troubling [2:34:47] is what seemed to me that many – one of the things that's undermining the legitimacy of many [2:34:51] of our international organisms is they've become havens for anti-Semitic activity. That oftentimes is [2:34:58] disguised as anti-Israel, but I believe is frankly anti-Semitic. And of course, we've seen incidents of [2:35:03] that in the United States as well. We cannot ignore what anti-Semitism has cost humanity in the past, [2:35:10] because if that lesson is forgotten, it will very quickly repeat itself in every – and potentially [2:35:15] in every region on the planet. Thank you. I want to just quickly – a yes or no. We know – you've [2:35:20] talked a lot about how important deputies are in mission sets of different things. We know that if [2:35:25] we don't have a deputy envoy in place, they keep the – they keep the wheels turning. They keep the [2:35:31] organization going for the – waiting for the special envoy to be confirmed. Do I have your commitment [2:35:37] that we'll quickly put in a deputy envoy to make sure that the work can continue until – Yeah, [2:35:42] we'll work to do that as soon as possible. Thank you. I wanted to – oh, I only have 56 minutes – 56 [2:35:48] minutes. I do not have 56 minutes. I have 56 seconds. That would be a little crazy. I know that the first [2:35:55] Trump administration created the Women's Global Development Prosperity Initiative. It was the first [2:36:00] whole-of-government initiative to promote women's economic empowerment, dedicated global resourcing [2:36:07] for this – for these activities. As Secretary, will you commit to continuing to expand on the WGDP [2:36:13] initiative, and if so, in what ways? Yeah, and – and that was a high priority of Ivanka Trump, [2:36:18] who's no longer going to be in government, but was at the time, and she worked on that very much, [2:36:21] and I'm – I was a supporter of it then, and look forward to being a supporter and – and of it now, [2:36:27] uh, if confirmed. Thank you. And we got that 56 minutes went awfully fast. There you go. I yield [2:36:32] back, Mr. Chairman. Time flies. You yield back all eight seconds? Yes. Senator Cornyn. Thank you, [2:36:39] Mr. Chairman. I can barely see you down there. I know. It's – I – I was there one time. They had to [2:36:44] extend the dais so, uh, Senator Curtis and I could actually sit with the big – at the big boys at the [2:36:49] girls' table. So, uh, Senator Rubio, it's great to see you. I have complete confidence in your ability to lead [2:36:58] the State Department. Uh, I think it's an inspired choice, and, uh, you couldn't be better prepared [2:37:04] for that job. I do want to ask you a few questions, uh, some of which – I know Senator Cruz is here as [2:37:10] well. He and I share a concern about Mexico. You've heard some concerns, particularly about the cartel [2:37:16] activity, but I want to talk to you about water. 1944, uh, there was a water treaty between the United [2:37:23] States and Mexico, and we have had chronic problems getting Mexico to, uh, cooperate and release the [2:37:33] water that's been absolutely critical to the life and the – the livelihood of our, uh, agriculture [2:37:39] community in the Rio Grande Valley and elsewhere. We've had the, uh – I've talked to Secretary Blinken [2:37:45] about this. We've written letters. We've done everything we know how to do. But I would just like to get [2:37:51] your commitment to work with us to try to just simply get Mexico to live up to its requirements [2:37:57] under the treaty, and if they won't do it voluntarily, to look for leverage and ways we can, uh, persuade [2:38:05] them to do what they already have a legal obligation to do, which is to release water on a timely basis. [2:38:11] Absolutely. And I think one of the reasons why we need to do that is twofold. The first is because [2:38:15] it has real implications, uh, not just for the state of Texas, but broadly for the United States. But, uh, [2:38:21] the second is because I think this has become part of a pattern, and I would argue part of a pattern in [2:38:25] a number of international arrangements, but in particular international arrangements with Mexico, [2:38:30] in which you can strike any deal you want or sign any document you want, but if you're not willing [2:38:34] to prioritize its enforcement, you are encouraging others to get away with the same thing. And at the [2:38:39] same time, you're undermining the willingness of people to commit to enter into agreements in the future. [2:38:43] And this has become a – we've seen it with USMCA, frankly. We've seen it with a variety of other [2:38:49] commitments that have been made by partners in other parts of the world, and we're seeing it with [2:38:52] this treaty. Where there is a treaty, they have obligations under it, and they don't seek to [2:38:56] meet it. And it's part of the broader challenge that I alluded to in my opening statement, which is [2:39:00] we've entered this era where we've entered into all these international arrangements, but oftentimes [2:39:05] have been weaponized either through non-compliance or through a creative reinterpretation. And that [2:39:11] extends to trade all the way down to treaties such as this. Speaking of Mexico, I know that in different [2:39:19] quarters we've had people suggest that the cartels be identified as a foreign terrorist organization. [2:39:28] And as I've looked into that, it feels like the right thing to do because, of course, the cartels are [2:39:35] wreaking havoc and misery and death and destruction, not only here in the United States, but also in [2:39:40] Mexico. But I worry a little bit about some of the unintended consequences. For example, does that create [2:39:49] some new category of asylum, perhaps, for people who claim that they are victims of cartel activity [2:39:56] that otherwise wouldn't exist? What's your view about the designation? [2:40:02] Well, and I think this question was asked earlier, so I'll tell you what I said. [2:40:06] The first is that they most certainly are terroristic in their nature. They terrorize Mexicans, [2:40:11] they terrorize on the U.S. side, they are involved in the trafficking of women and children, [2:40:15] labor, both labor and sex trafficking, deadly fentanyl, and drugs writ large, as you can imagine, [2:40:23] and I think, you know, pose a grave danger in the process of trafficking people, trafficking terrorists [2:40:28] into the United States. So they are terroristic in nature. What I said was that whether it's that [2:40:33] designation or some new designation that we create, it is important that they be identified for what [2:40:38] they are. I also pointed to something you just alluded to in your question, and that is they pose a grave risk [2:40:44] to Mexican sovereignty as well. We have seen multiple journalists and politicians and candidates [2:40:50] assassinated, murdered in Mexico by cartels, because either they're not the cartel's chosen candidate, [2:40:56] or they're a journalist that's spoken out against the cartels, and you find yourself murdered. [2:41:00] And I don't think we should underestimate, and I hope the Mexicans do not, the amount of leverage that [2:41:04] they have created over the Mexican government. And in some parts of Mexico, they are, in fact, have [2:41:09] operational control of territories, particularly near the US-Mexican border. So this is something [2:41:15] that I hope we can work with jointly and cooperatively with the Mexicans to address, [2:41:20] because it's in their interest as well as ours. Ultimately, I do not think I speak out of turn when [2:41:25] I say that you can expect President Trump will do whatever it takes to secure the United States of [2:41:31] America and the American people from the threat that they pose. But it is my sincerest hope, and frankly, [2:41:36] I think the most productive outcome would be if we could do so in partnership and cooperation [2:41:42] with the government of Mexico, who I know shares many of our concerns. [2:41:45] Well, that certainly should be our first choice, but I have the same confidence you have that President [2:41:51] Trump will send a very clear message and follow that up with decisive action to persuade Mexico to do [2:41:58] what it is in its best interest, because it's an intolerable situation right on our southern border. [2:42:07] We can't get a divorce. We've got to make the marriage work somehow. But it's a troubled marriage, [2:42:15] to continue the analogy. Let me talk to you briefly about the Foreign Agent Registration Act, [2:42:22] which is within the jurisdiction of this committee. This is something I've been concerned about for some time, [2:42:29] because we have lobbyists that work here in Washington, D.C., that actually represent [2:42:35] foreign nations that, unbeknownst to members of Congress, they're actually advocating not on behalf of [2:42:43] the American people and American interests, but on behalf of the interests of foreign nations. [2:42:48] Now, there is a loophole called the Lobbyist Disclosure Act, which is frankly weak sauce when it comes to [2:42:59] providing the kind of transparency that we need. Anytime somebody shows up in your office [2:43:04] and is advocating for something purporting to represent American interests, but in fact is there [2:43:10] motivated by being paid by a foreign interest to advocate their interest, is that something that you [2:43:19] would be willing to work with us to further reform and refine? [2:43:23] Yes, and as you know from our time serving together on the Intelligence Committee as well, [2:43:27] it's something we spend a lot of time talking and thinking about as well. And I would raise two points. [2:43:32] The first, look, the straight up, some foreign government hires a lobbyist, you know that because [2:43:37] they're registered and we're aware of it. The second is more nefarious, and that is that you hire someone [2:43:42] through a cutout, a third party, without aware of the fact that they are in fact being paid by a foreign entity. [2:43:48] And sometimes dressed up as an American interest, when in fact it's furthering the interest of a foreign [2:43:54] entity. And then the third, and it's one that I don't think gets talked about enough and it isn't [2:43:59] covered by this law, but needs to be said, is some of the most effective and vociferous lobbyists on [2:44:04] behalf of Chinese interests in the United States for a long time was U.S. corporations, who had a pretty good [2:44:10] deal going in China with regards to manufacturing and the like, and would come here and argue in [2:44:15] favor of outcomes and policies that favored China. And by the way, China would weaponize this openly. [2:44:22] They would in fact bring in CEOs of corporate America and encourage them to go back and talk [2:44:26] to a member of Congress and tell them they better not do that, because if they do, companies like [2:44:30] yours are not going to do very well in China. And that was weaponized against us too. That's not illegal, [2:44:36] but it's most certainly troubling and something we need to have our eyes open to as well as we move [2:44:40] forward. [2:44:41] Well, that's a perfect segue into my last question, and this has to do with outbound [2:44:48] investment transparency. As you know, the Senate has passed legislation providing for a reporting [2:44:55] requirement for American companies who are investing in China. It's not a prohibition. It's merely a [2:45:02] disclosure requirement, because the unique circumstances that you're well aware of that China provides, [2:45:08] there is no division between civilians or the private sector and government. Under Chinese law, [2:45:17] the private sector, so-called private sector, is required to share any and all information that [2:45:22] might be of use to the People's Liberation Army or to the Chinese intelligence agencies. And it is [2:45:31] not a stretch to say that due to the tactics of people like, or strategies really, of people like [2:45:39] Deng Xiaoping who said, hide your motives and bide your time. We've seen massive U.S. investment [2:45:45] in China, which has not only helped them rebuild their economy, which is fine, but more ominously, [2:45:53] rearm their military, and modernize their military so that they become a threat not only to their [2:45:59] neighbors in the region, but to world peace. We can all imagine a nightmare in which China decides to [2:46:08] to take Taiwan, which President Xi said he's committed to do. So I think it just makes sense for [2:46:15] us to have more transparency so that as policymakers, we can then figure out what is the right policy. I [2:46:22] could care less whether American companies want to build more Burger Kings or Starbucks in China, [2:46:28] but I do care if American companies are investing in dual-purpose technology or in ways that would [2:46:36] undermine the national security of the United States. Do you share that concern? [2:46:40] Absolutely. And in fact, I shared it beyond just simply what you've discussed. This was a few years [2:46:44] ago when the Thrift Savings Plan, the retirement, 401 basically for federal workers, was investing in funds [2:46:51] that are going directly to Chinese military use. So you think about it, there were people serving in the [2:46:55] Armed Forces of the United States whose retirement funds were being invested in companies that were [2:46:59] building the weapons designed to one day blow the ship that they served on in the Indo-Pacific. [2:47:05] And in the case of other private sectors, you're right, every sector is not created equal in terms [2:47:09] of the threat they pose to our country. But at a minimum, we should have insight into whether [2:47:13] American investment dollars, be the institutional or individual, are going through the funding of [2:47:18] activities designed to undermine the United States of America. That's a core national security interest. [2:47:24] Thank you, and Godspeed. Senator Keene. [2:47:28] Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ranking Member Shaheen, welcome the opportunity to work with you in this [2:47:33] Congress. Senator Rubio, congratulations on your nomination. If you're watching the hearing, [2:47:40] you probably notice senators coming in and out, and most people understand why that is. But for those who [2:47:45] don't, we have a lot of other hearings, a lot of other responsibilities. We get in a queue and kind of [2:47:50] know when our questioning time is coming up. I decided that I would show up, albeit 11 minutes late, [2:47:55] and stay because this is so important to the country and to me. But I think for those of you who have [2:48:03] watched this hearing that was gaveled in at 10, what you've seen is a nominee who is extremely well [2:48:09] prepared. We're used to seeing nominees who know a lot about a couple of things and sometimes who know [2:48:15] very little about virtually everything. But I think you've seen a hearing with a nominee who agree or [2:48:21] disagree with the points he's made. He's not talking out of a briefing book. He's not having [2:48:25] a thumb through a binder to decide how to answer a particular question. I've always been struck in [2:48:31] working with Senator Rubio on this committee since I came to the Senate in January of 2013 that he has [2:48:36] a very well developed sense of the world and a passion and interest in all corners of it. I was [2:48:43] particularly happy that he was nominated for two reasons. One, we have worked together significantly on [2:48:50] legislation touching many different areas over the years, and one was referred to by Senator Shaheen, [2:48:57] legislation to send a clear message that NATO and the U.S. participation in NATO is not just simply [2:49:05] an executive priority that could come and go depending upon the Article II Commander-in-Chief, [2:49:11] but it was also something so important that Congress would say that the membership of the United States [2:49:16] in NATO is something that Congress would want to weigh in on should there ever be a decision by an [2:49:23] executive that we should back out of NATO. And I think sending that message from Congress has been [2:49:28] a very important thing that has led to a NATO that is expanding. Finland and Sweden, where the polling would [2:49:35] have been de minimis 10 years ago for joining NATO, are now in. And I think a strong message from Congress is [2:49:42] part of that. Obviously, the fear of Russia is a huge part of it, but a strong message of Congressional [2:49:47] support is part of it. I'm particularly proud that the Virginia National Guard has now struck a deal [2:49:53] under the state partnership program, where we are partners with the military in Finland, a very capable [2:49:59] military. And the first exercises of the Virginia Guard with the Finnish military will start next month. [2:50:05] I'm very excited about that. The second reason I was particularly gratified to see Senator Rubio nominated for [2:50:11] this position is he cares about the Americas. I cast my first vote in a presidential election in 1976. [2:50:18] I have not seen a single administration, Democratic or Republican, that has devoted enough attention [2:50:24] to the Americas. We devote attention to it in a time of crisis and then move our attention elsewhere. [2:50:32] It seems like secretaries of state have often thought that the world only has an east-west axis and [2:50:37] not a north-south axis. And Senator Booker addressed that with his questions around the attention that [2:50:44] should be paid by the United States to Africa. I feel that very strongly about the Americas. [2:50:49] I don't have to ask Senator Rubio questions to gauge his interest and attention level. Everyone who comes [2:50:57] before the committee tells us they're really interested in the Americas, only to find that they end up spending [2:51:02] all their time somewhere else. I don't have to ask that question of this nominee to know that he has [2:51:07] a passion about the nations that are our nearest neighbors, a passion about the nations who are so [2:51:13] connected to us in our cultural roots and in our family ties. And it is so important, not just because [2:51:20] China and other nations are now getting into the area. I don't want to, I don't want to have a new Monroe [2:51:26] doctrine that we only care about it to keep Europe out of it. We only care about it to keep China out of it. [2:51:31] We ought to be paying attention because we're connected to these nations and things will go [2:51:35] better for us if things go better for them. So to you, Senator Rubio, I'm very, very happy that you're [2:51:41] nominated for this position. Two comments, then a couple of, then one particular question. [2:51:48] One, the status of career ambassadors. I think it is a norm for every administration to ask ambassadors [2:51:56] to tender their resignations. And it is certainly the norm for the political ambassadors to be [2:52:03] politely let go the day that the new administration comes into place. And I think that's an expectation [2:52:08] that everybody has. We get that. For the career ambassadors that are in place, they have been asked [2:52:14] to tender their resignations to the incoming administration. And that's normal. But I would [2:52:19] hope that the administration would consider, if their career, keeping them in place until their successors [2:52:25] are ready. Because to swap out a career ambassador for a career charge does not advance our ability [2:52:33] in any way to operate in nations. There is a cache that comes with being a confirmed ambassador [2:52:41] that really helps you with continuity and diplomacy in these nations. So I know that that's a decision that [2:52:48] the president makes. But I hope as you have a conversation with the national security and [2:52:53] diplomacy team, you might encourage the administration, yes, you're going to replace the [2:52:58] politicals with career charges. But don't replace the career ambassadors unless you're until you're [2:53:04] ready to put somebody in place, which we know can often take quite a while for the administration to [2:53:08] even forward nominees, much less the time to get through the committee process. [2:53:13] That would be a comment. And then second is more for colleagues, really, rather than for Senator [2:53:18] Rubio. One thing I've tried to be consistent on in my service on this committee is fight against [2:53:24] unilateral executive application of military power, unless it's in pure instances of imminent [2:53:33] self-defense, active self-defense or self-defense against imminent hostilities. And I have been able to get [2:53:39] this committee to pass significant war powers resolutions under three different presidents now, [2:53:46] President Obama, a Democrat, President Biden, a Democrat, and President Trump, a Republican. [2:53:53] And I just wanted to assure everybody that I'm going to continue to be a stickler that the nation [2:53:58] shouldn't be at war without a vote of Congress, except in the instances of imminent self-defense. [2:54:05] And I will do that because I have done that under presidents of both parties, and I'll continue. [2:54:10] Senator Rubio, now to the question. And you alluded to this very briefly in one of the comments that you [2:54:17] made about the nation of Paraguay. Not only do we not devote enough attention to the Americas, [2:54:24] but when we do, we devote attention to the headaches, and the headaches abound in the Americas and elsewhere. [2:54:30] And so we've talked about Haiti a problem. We've talked about Venezuela a problem. But so often we [2:54:38] don't pay attention to lift up, elevate, provide resources to celebrate the nations in the Americas [2:54:44] that are doing things right. And so when I travel through the region, and I'm sure you've heard the [2:54:48] same thing, I hear these nations that are doing things right. Why won't you pay attention to us, [2:54:52] Ecuador, threw out a pro-China government, put a pro-US government. All they wanted, [2:54:57] all they wanted was a trade deal. We want to be closer to the United States. We're the only nation [2:55:02] on the Pacific coast of the Americas that doesn't have a trade deal with the United States. [2:55:06] This administration, I've been critical about the Biden administration, didn't do anything to advance [2:55:10] that cause. Talk to us about some of the nations in the Americas that you think are doing things right, [2:55:16] and what we ought to do to help those nations. Because we'll be much more likely to spread the right [2:55:22] if there are other nations in the region that are doing better and better and better than if we're just [2:55:26] trying to lecture people about how to improve. Well, just as a general matter, one of the things [2:55:29] that's always struck me is that the region, and maybe this is true in other parts of the world as [2:55:33] well, but particularly in the region, it's almost better to be America's adversary or enemy than [2:55:38] friend because there's the impact of friendship or the benefits of friendship are not tangibly clear [2:55:44] to a lot of them. And, you know, I've seen that expressed time and again over multiple years. [2:55:49] And it's easy to pay attention to a headache. You're going to sanction, you know, some country that's not [2:55:54] acting in anti-American ways, but the people that are sort of doing it the right way or want to be [2:55:58] cooperative, they're ignored. And the countries that are doing it the right way are ignored. [2:56:01] So I think there are a number of countries that right now as we speak, and I always say this with [2:56:05] caution because I may not mention one country and they say, well, they left us out. But I just want to [2:56:09] point to a few that I think are present and clear for us. You mentioned well with Ecuador. Ecuador was [2:56:14] actually left out of CAFTA because at the time, the people in charge didn't want to be a part of anything with us. [2:56:19] They're facing some real security threats that are unique to Ecuador's history. And they're facing these threats [2:56:25] because you've got violence and gangs coming over from the Colombian border and then pushing up through [2:56:29] Ecuador as a transit country. But they bring with it the turf fights and the gangs and to the point where [2:56:34] last year there was a real threat to the stability of the government where they took over television [2:56:38] stations and things that these armed elements did. And there's a lot we can do and have done but can do. [2:56:44] We're not talking about a lot of money. We're not even talking about money in many cases. It's just [2:56:48] equipment to help them at least restore some sense of stability. The other thing that Ecuador, these [2:56:54] are just off topics but I think they're all relevant, Ecuador faces a very significant challenge with [2:56:59] illegal fishing off their coasts by Chinese fishing fleets who violate their territorial waters [2:57:05] on an almost daily basis and massive quantities and it's an ecological crisis as well on top of it. [2:57:10] That's a country that can use our help tremendously. I think about the Dominican Republic. People don't [2:57:14] talk about the Dominican Republic enough and they face a real challenge because of Haiti and the [2:57:18] instability next door. They were also one of the countries that emerged from COVID the fastest [2:57:23] and not just because of the tourism return quicker there and they've really been able to do some [2:57:28] positive things. I think Argentina, I know people, some have not met the president of our, the new [2:57:34] president of Argentina. This is a serious well-trained economist. I would not, if you sit down and talk to him for a few [2:57:41] minutes, he has real clear ideas about economic development and is doing some really necessary [2:57:45] things in terms of restructuring the direction of Argentine economics in a way that I think is very [2:57:50] positive. Can I just say to every other nation out there that thinks you're a good guy, he was about [2:57:54] to mention you but my time has expired. But please focus on the good guys and let's help them do better [2:58:00] and better and better and be good examples in the region. Thank you. Thank you. Excellent point, [2:58:04] Senator Keane. Excellent point. Senator Curtis, welcome to the committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, [2:58:10] Ranking Member. It's great to be with you today. Great to be on this committee. [2:58:14] Senator Rubio, for the last seven years from a distance of about 600 feet, that's what separates [2:58:19] the House chamber and the Senate chamber, I've watched and admired your work from a distance. [2:58:25] And on a few but very fortunate times, I've had the chance to actually be wind at your back [2:58:30] on some of your work supporting Taiwan and protecting Hong Kong dissidents [2:58:35] events as we work together on some legislation. Now in a twist of events, I sit not far from where [2:58:42] you once sat. And there's another symbolic feet, 600 feet between us, between the State Department [2:58:47] and the Senate. And I'm excited to work with you in your new role. And I would like to continue to be [2:58:53] wind at your back on a lot of issues and none more important to me than China. And if you remember [2:59:00] really nothing else about our short interchange today, please know that that's very important to [2:59:05] me. And I hope to work with you on what I do with the aggression of China. And in many ways, [2:59:11] their global push for military and economic supremacy, I think is a threat in many ways. [2:59:19] China is imposing, it's what they call China one principle on the world, which is very different [2:59:26] than you know from our China policy. Can you kind of describe how we can push back on that and how [2:59:33] we need to make sure we're shaping that conversation? Yeah. And well, the first is to understand that the [2:59:38] one China policy is and the U.S. policy towards the issue of Taiwan has been consistent and reaffirmed by [2:59:46] every administration since 1979. And it is the combination of the Taiwan Relations Act with the six [2:59:52] assurances that make clear that the United States, we're not going to pressure Taiwan in any [2:59:56] arrangement. We're not going to tell you when we're going to stop or if ever. We make no commitment to [3:00:00] not helping them in their national defense. We're not going to force any outcomes. And frankly, we are [3:00:06] going to do everything and we reject any effort to coerce, intimidate, and or forcibly drive Taiwan [3:00:13] to do whatever China wants them to do. And that's been our position and that will continue. That was the [3:00:17] position under President Trump's first administration. I anticipate it will continue to be in the second [3:00:22] administration. I think within that context, it's important for us to find every opportunity possible [3:00:28] to allow Taiwan to engage in international forums where important issues are discussed. And they're [3:00:33] not represented. Irrespective of what China claims about one China principle, they're not represented. [3:00:38] And so the views there need to be, they need to have an opportunity in these forums to be made clear. [3:00:45] But I think stability is critically important. Here's the one thing I would point to here with regards to [3:00:50] stability. If the Chinese are in fact serious about stabilizing U.S.-China relations and finding avenues [3:00:57] of which we can cooperate and avoid conflict, then they will not do anything rash or irrational when [3:01:03] it comes to Taiwan or the Philippines for that matter. The actions they are taking now are deeply [3:01:08] destabilizing. They are forcing us to take counteractions because we have commitments to the Philippines [3:01:13] and we have commitments to Taiwan that we intend to keep. And so if they want to destabilize the [3:01:19] relationship or they want to at least create some pathway for stabilization of our relationship with [3:01:24] them, even as we remain engaged in global competition and in some cases more adversarial than others, [3:01:31] they really need to stop messing around with Taiwan and with the Philippines because it's forcing us to [3:01:37] focus our attention in ways we prefer not to have to. As a matter of interest, I actually lived in Taiwan in [3:01:43] August of 1979, three months after that act that you referred to and I think you're very accurate. [3:01:49] I think for a minute about Europe and there's some countries it feels like in Europe because of their presence, [3:01:54] Poland, Czech Republic and Baltics that are more in tune with this issue, but as a whole it feels like some European [3:02:02] nations are in denial of some of the things you've just said. You talk a little bit about how we work with our NATO friends over [3:02:07] there and how we get them to appreciate this and actually play a part in this. [3:02:12] Well, I think in the case of NATO, I think I would expand it to really talk about the European Union [3:02:17] and the EU, which I think is increasingly every single day climbing to the realization of the threat [3:02:22] that China's mercantilist policies and unfair trade policies are posing to them. They are flooding [3:02:28] the European market with their cheaper electric cars or attempting to do so. There's a dispute now about [3:02:33] the importation of aluminum on sector after sector. You're seeing the EU confronting the reality. [3:02:39] By the same token, like many countries around the world, including ours to some extent, there's a [3:02:44] quandary involved. There is an intermeshing economic relations that you can't just walk away from, [3:02:50] but you also recognize the long-term threat that Chinese practices are having on your economic lives. [3:02:57] And so I think that's an area in which the Europeans, some more than others, are increasingly aware and [3:03:03] willing to be more forceful. Italy has been willing to lean into it more than perhaps some other [3:03:07] countries in the region. Hopefully that will continue to change. On the security front, look, [3:03:12] an event in the Indo-Pacific, say, let's leave Taiwan out of it for a moment and say it's the [3:03:18] Philippines. Okay, in the last 48 hours, there's this massive, I don't even know how to describe it, [3:03:22] but this massive ship that the Chinese have built that's like headed towards the Philippines, [3:03:26] and the Philippines feels threatened by it, rightfully so. We've seen this on a daily basis with [3:03:31] the harassment and so forth, but on a daily basis. If, God forbid, there is some miscommunication [3:03:36] or some inadvertent conflict emerges there, and we have obligations to them, the impact that will [3:03:42] have on the entire globe, the impact that it will have on the entire globe is enormous, and that includes [3:03:47] Europe. So they have a selfish vested interest in seeking for the Chinese to curb their behaviors. [3:03:53] I would also point to the Europeans that what the Russians have done with Ukraine would not have been [3:03:58] possible without the assistance of China, whether it's the sharing of technology, or aid in evading [3:04:04] sanctions, or selling their oil in secondary markets. The Chinese have been hidden, but clear to everyone [3:04:12] watching, partners in the Russian endeavor. Yeah. And the Europeans know this, and they need to be [3:04:18] continually reminded of it, because it reveals the nature of who we're dealing with. That was actually [3:04:23] my next question, so I'm going to skip that one, but thank you for addressing that. I want to turn to Hong Kong. [3:04:27] I mentioned I lived over in that area, and I actually remember as a young man in the 1980s, [3:04:33] shopping for a camera in Hong Kong. As a businessman in the 2000s, I tried to sell my product over there [3:04:39] in Hong Kong. I've been over there a number of times as a tourist, and just enjoyed that beautiful city, [3:04:44] and unfortunately today, none of that is possible. As a matter of fact, I actually have a warrant for my [3:04:49] arrest over there because of the work in the house that I've done over there. Can you talk a little bit [3:04:53] about the role there, and what's even worse is Hong Kong's now playing a role in facilitating sanctions, [3:05:00] evasion, and money laundering, and can you address that issue? Well, I think it's important to take [3:05:06] 30 seconds down memory lane. Hong Kong was turned over by the UK with a strong set of assurances that [3:05:12] it would remain autonomous and independent. It would be governed by the Chinese, but independent. They would [3:05:16] have a democracy. They would be free enterprise. They would be left alone. In essence, that's the [3:05:21] promises they made. Over time, they violated every promise. They basically broke the deal, [3:05:29] just like they lied about all the island chains that they said they weren't going to populate and [3:05:32] militarize, and they have done so as well. Today, we cannot consider Hong Kong to truly be autonomous [3:05:38] anymore. It is not. It is now under the full control, especially on national security matters, [3:05:44] of Chinese authorities, and it should not be surprising to us that these deeply rooted banking [3:05:50] institutions that are in Hong Kong, who long has served as financial capital on the global scale, [3:05:55] are now being used to the benefit of the Communist Party and to evade global sanctions, and I think [3:06:00] there has to be a growing recognition of that. I also think it's important to remind those sectors [3:06:05] and finance that are still involved there that the Chinese national security now that's now been [3:06:09] implemented in Hong Kong allows them, if they don't like what you're doing, to basically trump up any [3:06:14] charges they want, go into your offices, raid the boxes, see all of your files, threaten to jail you, [3:06:19] and they've done so in some cases. So it's no longer a hospitable place for people to conduct [3:06:24] financial activity. So I think we'd have to call it for what it is. The notion that Hong Kong is now [3:06:28] some autonomous entity that operates within China's system, but independent of it and the decisions they [3:06:34] make is a complete work of fiction. Yeah, and I hate to ... I want one more quick question, [3:06:40] but I also want to point out before we go on how good it could have been for Hong Kong and China, [3:06:44] had they kept that agreement. I think that'd been a whole lot better for China. Last question, [3:06:49] as we run out of time, obviously there's a lot of conversation about Panama in the news. Can you [3:06:53] talk about the Chinese influence in the Panama Canal, what Americans should know? [3:06:57] Well, let me tell you, I actually didn't print a lot of ... I mean, things to read like verbatim here, [3:07:02] but there's one that I thought was interesting that I wanted to share, and I'm not going to put it out [3:07:06] there for everybody but the whole thing, but maybe I'll submit it for the record. But I just went [3:07:10] through ... this thing with Panama on the canal is not new. I visited there, I think it was 2016. [3:07:17] I think I've consistently seen people express concern about it, and it's encapsulized here in [3:07:22] quote after quote. Let me tell you, the former U.S. ambassador who served under President Obama said, [3:07:28] the Chinese see in Panama, what we saw in Panama throughout the 20th century, a maritime and aviation [3:07:33] logistics hub. Just immediate past head of U.S. Southern Command, General Laura Richardson said, [3:07:42] I was just in Panama about a month ago and flying along the Panama Canal and looking at the state-owned [3:07:47] enterprises from the People's Republic of China on each side of the Panama Canal. They look like [3:07:52] civilian companies or state-owned enterprises that could be used for dual use and could be quickly [3:07:58] changed over to a military capability. We see questions that were asked by the ranking member [3:08:06] in the House China Select Committee where he asked a witness and they agreed that in a time of conflict, [3:08:13] China could use its presence on both ends of the canal as a choke point against the United States [3:08:18] in a conflict situation. So the concerns about Panama have been expressed by people on both sides of the [3:08:25] aisle for at least the entire time that I've been in the United States Senate and they've only [3:08:29] accelerated further. And this is a very legitimate issue that we face there. And I think there's a, [3:08:33] I'm not prepared to answer this question because I haven't looked at the legal research behind it yet, [3:08:38] but I'm compelled to suspect that an argument could be made that the terms under which that canal [3:08:44] were turned over have been violated because while technically sovereignty over the canal has not been [3:08:49] turned over to a foreign power. In reality, a foreign power today possesses through their companies, [3:08:56] which we know are not independent, the ability to turn the canal into a choke point in a moment of [3:09:02] conflict. And that is a direct threat to the national interest and security of the United States. [3:09:06] And it's particularly galling given the fact that we paid for it and that 5,000 Americans died making it. [3:09:13] That said, Panama is a great partner on a lot of other issues. And I hope we can resolve this issue of the [3:09:18] canal and of its security, and also continue to work with them cooperatively on a host of issues [3:09:23] we share in common, including what to do with migration. Thank you, Senator. I'm out of time. [3:09:28] Thank you so much. Thank you. And Senator Rubia, I think that you're right about doing an analysis [3:09:34] of the turnover documents. But I think even before that, we ought to do an analysis of the original [3:09:40] documents that went into place because they were very strong documents, giving us control over [3:09:48] a five-mile-wide on each side of the canal path and was very specific. So I think a legal analysis [3:09:55] beginning to end is critical. Senator Schatz. [3:09:59] Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Ranking Member. Senator Rubio, nice to see you again. Thanks for [3:10:04] taking the time with me. And thank you for being willing to serve. I want to start with the Pacific [3:10:08] Islands. As you know, it's an area of focus of mine. And the Indo-Pacific is – look, we've been through [3:10:14] several administrations and they all say the same thing. They all talk about the future being in [3:10:19] the Indo-Pacific and that it's the most important region in the world. That continues to be true. [3:10:25] My concern is that specifically when people talk about the Indo-Pacific, they're mostly talking [3:10:30] about China. They may be talking about other East Asian countries, but there's very little conversation [3:10:35] about Pacific Island nations. And we've got some auspicious things happening, but we've also got some [3:10:43] challenges in front of us. The embassy in Kiribati is stalled. The Solomon Islands, as you know, [3:10:50] are sort of contemplating making themselves available for PRC military forces. So we passed the Compact of [3:10:57] Free Association. It's a bit of a mixed bag. And I'd like to just hear your theory of the case here [3:11:03] about how to have some continuity. Obviously, it's a new administration. It's going to be a new [3:11:09] state department. But I think some of the things that have happened over the last four and even [3:11:13] eight years in terms of Pacific Island relationships have been good for the United States of America. [3:11:19] So give me your theory of the case, not generally Indo-Asia Pacific, but specifically these small [3:11:25] island nations with whom we want stronger ties. Sure. So I think the first, obviously, [3:11:29] is the ability to engage bilaterally with each of these individual nation states, you know, [3:11:34] and that opportunity is already there. I think we should continue to build on it. And it's important [3:11:40] and bears great fruit. I think the second, and it's an open question, which I certainly want the [3:11:44] State Department to look at, and I think policymakers on the Hill need to consider as well, is, you know, [3:11:49] we are dialogue partners in the Pacific Island Forum. And the question is whether we are fully utilizing [3:11:55] that ability to be at the table in that forum. Now, you know, that forum includes Australia and New Zealand, [3:12:01] which are bigger than some of these, but nonetheless important elements of it. And look, I think our [3:12:05] expectations of the forum is, and they've had some internal friction with some of the member states, [3:12:10] you know, about how, who's going to lead it and how the succession, so we hope they can work that out. [3:12:15] But it's an existing forum, which I think could potentially, as a dialogue partner, provide us the [3:12:20] ability to not just engage bilaterally with the individual nation states, but also collectively. [3:12:26] And we may not agree on a hundred million things, but there might be some things we can do through that [3:12:30] forum, at a minimum have a presence at it, at a higher left level that, that, that, that shows our [3:12:36] level of commitment and interest has been elevated even further. And then ultimately some real deliverables. [3:12:41] I do think that given, again, we keep saying they're small, but they, you know, they're important, [3:12:45] both because of geographic location, their presence in international forums. And I do think that [3:12:52] whether it's the Millennium Challenge grant, whether it's through the successor to OPIC, [3:12:59] there are opportunities as well to leverage some private sector engagement from the American side [3:13:04] and the U.S. side or the broader North American side on some of the, whether it's energy needs or [3:13:11] resiliency needs or other development projects that they may have. So I think we have to explore that [3:13:15] both bilaterally with individuals, by ensuring that we have people there, but also explore whether [3:13:21] we are fully utilizing the Pacific Island Forum as a dialogue partner to its full effect. [3:13:27] And you, and you know that China engages in debt trap diplomacy, which, which can be effective for [3:13:33] their, their, their needs, but it's usually, you know, people get figured out eventually. And I think [3:13:38] one of the areas where we can provide something that there, there's no other country that can provide [3:13:42] is in the resilient space. And in, in, in a severe weather context, we're really the only folks that [3:13:48] really know how to prepare for, respond to, and rebuild from disaster. So, you know, the United States Navy has [3:13:54] always been helpful, uh, in this context, but that's something we should continue to focus on. So [3:13:59] staying in the Pacific, and I'm glad you mentioned the Philippines, you know, my theory of the case [3:14:04] here is that not that China has decided that its risk appetite is higher, but rather that the things [3:14:12] that they are doing are not so risky at all. And that's because we have not been in a position to [3:14:17] impose consequences. I think one of the places where we have a good and growing partnership and [3:14:22] obviously a bilateral, um, economic and treaty obligations is the Philippines. And, um, in, in [3:14:29] addition to the, uh, enhanced defense cooperation agreement, in, in, in, in addition to the Luzon [3:14:36] corridor economic partnerships, I'm just wondering how you see that, um, growing democracy, one of our best [3:14:43] allies on the planet, um, how you see that as strategically important for the United States? [3:14:48] Well, I think it's important, first of all, it's always been strategically important for the United [3:14:52] States. Obviously our military presence there diminished greatly as a result of, uh, some of [3:14:57] the decisions that were made within the Philippines, but now you see a willingness to see us return. [3:15:01] Look, we're not looking to militarize the Philippines, and this is not, we should, I think it would be a [3:15:04] mistake to solely view it as a security arrangement. There are long, uh, ties between the United States and [3:15:11] Philippines that date back to 1899 and the Spanish American War. And, uh, you know, and, and so I [3:15:18] think it's important to build on that as well. I think there are real, uh, economic opportunities [3:15:22] that we should be exploring. And so it's one that we need to show us, uh, commitment. If I'll be frank, [3:15:27] I think where this kind of fell off was, and I don't, I'm not getting involved in internal Filipino [3:15:33] politics, but I'm telling you during Duterte it was a little tougher to work with them. And obviously there's [3:15:38] some issue going on there internally as well. I'll leave that to their electorate and their [3:15:42] politics to solve. So I think to the extent that over the last few years you have seen a reinvigoration [3:15:47] of American interests, it's not simply driven by the fact that the Chinese are harassing them. [3:15:51] It's also driven by the fact that there's been a more welcoming attitude towards our posture and [3:15:56] our position there. And that's one that when that opportunity presents itself we should embrace, [3:16:01] but then we need it to show results so that it becomes enduring. In essence, when your engagement [3:16:05] with a country leads to economic development, whether it's outbound in U.S. investment in, uh, [3:16:10] the Philippines or, or what have you, then that becomes enduring. Then it makes it difficult, [3:16:14] no matter who's in charge, to walk away from the alliance because the alliance is more than just [3:16:18] military and a military presence. It also involves jobs and businesses and investment and economic [3:16:23] opportunity. And we need look, we need to look for ways to emphasize that. I think it would be a [3:16:27] mistake to simply view it as a military or defense alliance. Absolutely. And coming from Hawaii, [3:16:33] it's the people-to-people ties that is the foundation of the, of the relationship for sure. [3:16:38] I want to talk to you a little bit about our, our approach on the, on the Korean peninsula. Uh, [3:16:44] and I'm going to say something rather provocative. Um, I think our North Korea policy is broken. Um, [3:16:50] I think it's broken on a bipartisan basis. I think, um, see if it is a fantasy. I think that, um, [3:16:58] the non-proliferation community wants to hold onto it for reasons related to other countries and non-pro [3:17:06] priorities. But it's clear to me that it's not working. Ten years ago, you've been laughed out of [3:17:11] the room for suggesting that North Korea was able to develop maneuverable hypersonic warheads, solid [3:17:17] fuel ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles. But all of that has happened. 40 launches in 2024, [3:17:26] and more launches yesterday. So I just like you, I know you're a hawk. I know you've been a strong [3:17:33] supporter of sanctions. I never have opposed a sanction, um, uh, against North Korea in my life. [3:17:39] But I just think that we need to look at this thing realistically and say, whatever it is that we have [3:17:44] been doing, it's not working. The, these guys keep getting more and more capable and whatever sacrifices [3:17:51] they are making internally in terms of the suffering of their people, um, they got the [3:17:56] technical capacity. Like, I remember 10 years ago being told, well, they can do this, but they can't [3:18:02] do a nuclear tip. Oh, they can range Guam, but they can't range Hawaii. Oh, they can range Hawaii, but they [3:18:08] can't range the continent. They keep meeting and exceeding every technical mark that we think they [3:18:15] can't make. And we are attached to a policy that is basically, it doesn't appear to be slowing them down [3:18:21] in the least. So is there an appetite for rethinking of this, in my view, totally failed policy? [3:18:28] Well, I think there has to be an appetite for a very serious look at broader North Korean policies. [3:18:33] And so I think it would be difficult for me today to come here and tell you this is going to be the [3:18:38] official United States position on it moving forward. Because I do think, because of the factors [3:18:41] you just pointed to, there's some things we have to look at in a broader perspective. Now, to his credit, [3:18:47] President Trump, and look, I'll be frank, I was one of the people that was very skeptical about it, [3:18:52] but he sort of reached out to Kim Jong-un, walked away from negotiations twice, ultimately didn't [3:18:56] reach something enduring. But here's what he did able to achieve in that engagement, [3:18:59] is he stopped testing the missiles. That didn't stop the development of the program, [3:19:04] but at least it calmed the situation quite a bit. I think what you're alluding to, and I'm not saying [3:19:09] this is going to be the policy of the United States, because that policy is set by the President, [3:19:13] and ideally set through a process that involves a bunch of stakeholders rethinking and being creative [3:19:18] about it. But I do think what you're pointing to is the following. You have a 40-something-year-old [3:19:23] dictator who has to figure out how to hold down to power for the rest of his life. He views nuclear [3:19:28] weapons as his insurance policy to stay in power, despite it means so much to him that no amount of [3:19:35] sanctions has deterred him from developing that capability and, in fact, has not even kept him [3:19:41] from having the resources to develop it. Unfortunately, recent events now also have them engaged in [3:19:49] conflicts beyond the Korean Peninsula, in fact, providing troops and weaponry to the Russians [3:19:53] and their effort in Ukraine. And so all of this needs to be taken in conjunction and looking at [3:20:01] the policy and seeing what can we now do that destabilizes that situation, that lowers the risk [3:20:08] of an inadvertent war, be it between South Korea and North Korea, maybe including Japan at this point, [3:20:13] and ultimately the United States. What can we do to prevent a crisis without encouraging other nation [3:20:22] states to pursue their own nuclear weapons program? That's the solution we'd like to get to, [3:20:28] and I just didn't bring it in my folder today because we're not ready to deal, but it's important. [3:20:31] And you've got to involve the committee, and this is certainly multi-agency, multi-lateral, [3:20:36] the president has to drive some of this. But I think none of this is possible without an acknowledgement [3:20:42] of more than a decade of bipartisan failure in this space. And so if we can at least start with the [3:20:48] premise that whatever we're doing right now is not working, we can start to work on something else. [3:20:54] Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I got to say, [3:21:03] boy, that sounds good, Mr. Chairman. That isn't as good as it sounds to me. Thank you. Well, [3:21:08] congratulations, and I'm looking forward to the next two years working together. Thank you. And to [3:21:12] Senator Rubio, let me say congratulations to you as well. We're going to miss you on this committee. [3:21:16] We're going to miss you in the Senate, but you're going to do an extraordinary job at Foggy Bottom. [3:21:22] And I will say if they capture you and tie you up in the basement, we will send a team to pull you out. [3:21:31] You know, as I look back over the last four years of the Biden-Harris administration, [3:21:35] there are a lot of policies that have done a lot of damage, domestic policies, economic policies, [3:21:41] but I think all of those pale compared to the damage that has been done to national security [3:21:46] and foreign policy over the last four years. Over the last four years, this administration [3:21:52] has systematically undermined and abandoned our allies. And it has systematically shown weakness [3:21:58] and appeasement to our enemies. And the consequence has been disastrous. We've gone from four years ago, [3:22:05] peace and prosperity to today, a situation with wars across the globe and every enemy of America [3:22:14] stronger than they were when this administration came into office. I am confident the incoming [3:22:21] administration is going to change that direction. I am confident that President Trump in the White [3:22:25] House and you as Secretary of State are going to shift us back to where we should be, which is [3:22:31] standing by our friends and allies and standing up to our enemies. Do you agree with that assessment? [3:22:38] Is that what you intend to do as Secretary of State? Well, let me say first, the foreign policy [3:22:42] of the United States will be set by the President and my job is to advise on it and ultimately to [3:22:46] execute. I think the President has been abundantly clear and that is his policy is going to be driven [3:22:50] about making America safer, stronger and more prosperous. As I said in my opening statement, [3:22:55] everything the State Department does, every policy, every program, every dollar it spends, [3:23:01] every initiative it takes has to answer three questions. Does it make us safer? Does it make us stronger? [3:23:06] Or does it make us more prosperous? And if it doesn't, if the answer is not yes to one of those three, [3:23:11] you're going to have a hard time moving that forward because that's the priority that the [3:23:15] President, and that's the priority, by the way, voters gave this President when they elected him. [3:23:19] You point to a number of things that I think are critically important and that, and let me, [3:23:23] I'll phrase it a different way, but I think we're saying the same thing. We have lost deterrence in [3:23:28] multiple theaters around the world. So as an example, and I use this as a small scale example, [3:23:32] it's really an important one. I think the year was 2020, 2019, the Wagner group tried to get cute [3:23:39] and came after some of Americans operating in Syria, and fire from the sky rained down on them, [3:23:46] and that group was pushed back pretty hard. That's deterrence. They threatened us and they knew what [3:23:51] the response would be. I recall the consternation here and in other places when Soleimani met his demise, [3:23:59] but I can tell you it impacted Iranian behavior for a substantial period of time. No matter how [3:24:05] tough they talked, it impacted their behavior. I think it's important to reestablish deterrence, [3:24:10] and to the extent that that's been lost for a variety of reasons, the lack of deterrence is an [3:24:15] invitation to war. The lack of deterrence is an invitation to hostility. It prevents the very thing [3:24:21] that we hope to achieve, which is peace and stability in the world, and I do think we've lost [3:24:27] deterrence, and I think in some ways it contributed to what happened in Ukraine. An item I know is very [3:24:33] close to you and you've worked very on and we talked earlier today about is energy dependence. I [3:24:37] recall President Trump at both a NATO summit and at the United Nations, and I recall the United Nations [3:24:43] one in particular, President Trump said Germany is dependent, entirely going to be left dependent on [3:24:49] China, on Russia for its energy, and they laughed at him. There were diplomats in the hall that were [3:24:54] snickering. That's exactly what happened. It is one of the reasons why Putin believed he could invade [3:24:59] Europe is because Europe would not push back because they depended on him so much for energy. [3:25:04] Now Europe is to be congratulated. They have moved very swiftly, particularly the Germans, [3:25:08] to diversify their energy resources. But one could argue that we may never have had that invasion [3:25:14] had that dependence not existed because maybe who would have thought the European response would have [3:25:18] been more forceful than he anticipated. So I do think reestablishing deterrence and strength is [3:25:24] important because it prevents war and it gives us leverage in diplomacy, which where we hope to [3:25:29] solve 99.9% of the global disagreements we hope to solve through diplomacy, not through armed conflict. [3:25:36] I think that's very well said, and I want to give several specific examples. Number one, [3:25:42] you and I are the only two Cuban-American senators. You're about to leave me as a lonely [3:25:46] sole member of the Cuban-American caucus. Thank you for that, Marco. [3:25:49] No, there are three Cubans. They always call it a conspiracy. [3:25:54] Now I have no one to play dominoes with. But look, issues of Cuba, both you and I share family stories [3:26:05] of parents who fled oppression and came here seeking freedom. As you know, as you talked about [3:26:11] earlier today, this week the administration delisted Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. I think it was an [3:26:18] absolutely shameful and reckless decision. I think it was a political decision on the way out. I think [3:26:23] it was designed to hamstring the incoming administration. I am unequivocal that I think the [3:26:30] Cuban government are evil communist bastards. Given your new job, I suspect you might be slightly less [3:26:37] forceful in saying so and slightly more diplomatic, but I know you're hard on the question. [3:26:43] But let me ask you this. Do you believe Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism? [3:26:52] Without a question. And I'll tell you why. Number one, the FARC, which is, you know, [3:26:58] elements of the FARC and the ILN for that matter in Colombia, these are narco-terrorist organizations [3:27:04] and have been. They started out as ideological organizations and now figured out they're Marxists, [3:27:08] but they want to make money selling cocaine. So they've done that. They have had the full support [3:27:14] of the Cuban regime throughout their entire existence. We know that Cuba has been friendly [3:27:19] towards Hamas and Hezbollah, openly friendly towards Hamas and Hezbollah. We know as well [3:27:24] that the Cuban regime, for example, hosts not one but two countries' espionage stations within their [3:27:29] national territory, 90 miles from the shores of the United States, and they provide valuable insights [3:27:35] and cooperate with these elements. We know that they have strong ties to Iran as well, [3:27:39] and the terrorist elements associated with them. And we know for a fact that there are fugitives [3:27:46] of American justice, fugitives of American justice, including cop killers and others who are actively [3:27:54] hosted in Cuba and protected from the long arm of American justice by the Cuban regime. So there is [3:27:59] zero doubt in my mind that they meet all the qualifications for being a state sponsor of terrorism. [3:28:05] Well, it is clear you're going to be confirmed to this position. You're going to be confirmed with [3:28:11] an overwhelming bipartisan vote. I think it is likely you'll be confirmed on January 20th, [3:28:16] on the first day the president is sworn in. When you are confirmed, I think it is also likely, [3:28:23] I hope on that very first day, you will reverse that determination. You may not feel prepared to [3:28:27] make that commitment now. But is there anything you want to say on that? [3:28:30] Well, I would just say, again, I don't want to speak ahead of the administration's. These decisions, [3:28:36] as I said, the president sets our foreign policy, and my job is to execute it. That's how our system of [3:28:41] government works. I would just remind anyone on this recent deal with Cuba that just happened [3:28:46] over the last 12 hours. Nothing that was agreed to is irreversible or binding on the new administration. [3:28:53] And I think people know my feelings, and I think they know what the president's feelings have been [3:28:57] about these issues when he was president previously. And nothing that the Biden administration has agreed [3:29:03] to in the last 12 or 18 hours binds the next administration, which starts on Monday. [3:29:08] Good. Let's turn to Israel. In the last four years, this administration has been the most [3:29:15] anti-Israel administration we have ever seen. They have systematically undermined the government of [3:29:19] Israel, particularly at a time of war. The Biden State Department secretly asked other parts of [3:29:25] the administration to suspend anti-terrorism sanctions so they could pour unaccountable hundreds [3:29:31] of millions of dollars into the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. They refused to implement mandatory [3:29:36] congressional sanctions against Hamas terrorists for using human shields. They made incredible [3:29:41] efforts to secretly circumvent mandatory congressional prohibitions on money going to the Palestinian [3:29:49] authority because of the PA's support for pay to slay. Even after October 7th, they secretly poured [3:29:55] millions and even cash for American taxpayers into Hamas-controlled areas. Meanwhile, they secretly [3:30:01] implemented boycotts of Jews living in Judea and Samaria through the Development Finance Corporation, [3:30:06] and binational science and technology foundations. They secretly manufactured files used to impose [3:30:12] crippling financial sanctions on Israeli Jews and refused to provide those files to members of Congress. [3:30:19] Those sanctions were renewed just yesterday. I have every confidence that President Trump and you will [3:30:24] reverse these policies broadly and specifically, but I'd like to ask you about some of them quickly. [3:30:30] Can you commit to ending anti-terrorism sanctions waivers related to Palestinian terrorism and [3:30:35] implementing sanctions against those terrorists? Yes. [3:30:39] Can you commit to ending discriminatory policies, including Biden administration's secret boycott policies [3:30:46] against Jews in Judea and Samaria? Yes. [3:30:49] And can you commit to reversing the discriminatory sanctions against Jews living in Judea and Samaria? [3:30:54] Again, yes. I think that the policy of – again, without speaking out of turn, [3:30:59] I'm confident in saying that President Trump's administration will continue to be perhaps the [3:31:04] most pro-Israel administration in American history. [3:31:07] And the final question. You and I talked at great length about the 1944 water treaty with Mexico. [3:31:13] Mexico is in violation of that treaty. It is doing enormous damage to South Texas. Farmers and ranchers [3:31:18] there are experiencing drought. As the Secretary of State, tell me what the State Department can do [3:31:23] to encourage and incentivize Mexico to comply with the treaty and provide the water that they are [3:31:30] obligated to provide to the people of South Texas? I think raise it in every engagement. We will be [3:31:33] engaged with Mexican partners. We have to engage with the Mexican government. And it's important to [3:31:37] elevate it and raise it at every one of those engagements. And I don't just mean like sending a [3:31:41] letter or somebody sending an email or just mentioning it. I'm saying making it a priority. And it's a priority [3:31:46] not just because it matters to Texas. It's a priority because these international agreements and [3:31:51] arrangements only work if they're complied with. And if they're not complied with, and it becomes [3:31:56] habitual, other nations believe they can begin to violate them as well. It undermines this entire [3:32:01] commitment to multilateral agreements and so forth. And I think it's in the crevices of those agreements, [3:32:07] whether they've been in place for a long time and no one's paying attention anymore, or it just doesn't [3:32:11] matter enough and you ignore it because you don't want to destabilize the rest of your relationship, [3:32:15] but it encourages it to happen more and more. It is not the only irritant we have in our bilateral [3:32:20] relationship with them. And in our agreements, I imagine they have some with us as well. But it's [3:32:24] one that needs to be prioritized and raised consistently as a priority, not just as an [3:32:29] asterisk or a footnote. Thank you and you're going to do great. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Cruz. [3:32:34] Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say, Senator Rubio, I want to start off by [3:32:41] noting for the record that when I first got to the Senate and I was in my first year and you just run for [3:32:49] president and I didn't think you would know who I was. I was pregnant with my daughter and trying [3:32:56] to change Senate rules so that I could bring her onto the floor so I could do my job and vote because [3:33:00] I can't come through the normal back door to vote because there's stairs there and it's not accessible [3:33:05] for wheelchairs. And I remember in the middle of that battle rolling through the Senate floor to vote [3:33:11] and I heard Tammy Duckworth from across the Senate chambers and you came running down from the top back [3:33:17] of the Senate chambers to tell me I'm with you, I will support you, you have the right to vote and I [3:33:22] will support you being able to bring your daughter or your child onto the floor when she's born and I [3:33:26] want to thank you for that kindness because you did speak to your leadership about it and it was a [3:33:30] moment of true bipartisanship but also as parents and as someone who was new to the Senate I was [3:33:35] extremely grateful to you for that kindness. I think what I exactly said is what's the big deal this [3:33:40] place is already full of babies. Exactly, exactly. So I want to touch on a topic we discussed last [3:33:50] month. Thank you for sitting down with me. I always appreciate the opportunity to sit down with nominees. [3:33:58] I appreciate also your earlier response to Senator McCormick about Americans detained abroad [3:34:04] and your commitment to tackling this head-on. As you and I also discussed last month I appreciate your [3:34:09] attention and commitment to addressing the case of Illinoisans in particular that we discussed as [3:34:13] well. Thank you for that. Another topic, you already touched on some of the issues in the Indo-Pacific [3:34:19] particularly around the PRC and the DPRK but I'd like to dive back into the issue of ASEAN and ASEAN [3:34:27] nations. Since coming to the Senate I make a point of visiting Southeast Asia annually to reinforce our [3:34:32] friends and partners there and those that we want to become our friends and partners there that the United [3:34:38] States and particularly those of us in the Senate care deeply about these long-standing historic [3:34:43] relationships and making sure that those relationships live up to their potential. And as you know respect [3:34:49] for ASEAN centrality has been a core part of a foreign policy in that region. In fact the first Trump [3:34:55] administration's Indo-Pacific strategy correctly emphasized ASEAN centrality as an important principle. [3:35:02] Unfortunately not all of President Trump's nominees this time seems to grasp the importance [3:35:06] we're going to in fact know what ASEAN is. Yesterday I was distinctly unimpressed when questioning Secretary [3:35:12] of Defense nominee Hegseth that he could not mention a single nation in ASEAN. Particularly shameful when [3:35:19] we have at least two major non-NATO allies in the bloc one of which Thailand is the longest treaty alliance [3:35:28] that the United States has at over 190 years long. What can you share with us today about how you would [3:35:33] approach ASEAN as a whole and with individual member states through capitalize on some of the [3:35:38] key opportunities and challenges facing the region? I know you've spoken about the Philippines but can [3:35:43] you build on that? Sure ASEAN first thing is the the group's utility begins by the fact that through [3:35:50] its 10 members they've also I believe have five or maybe it's six free trade agreements now with [3:35:54] neighboring countries as well. Look though we have to be very pragmatic in our approach and how we [3:35:59] prioritize it. I think the group will always struggle to coordinate unanimity on the issue of [3:36:06] their relationship with China. Okay if you look at the continental Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia because of [3:36:15] their geographic presence because of history they lean a little bit more in the Chinese direction [3:36:19] and other countries do not. I think it would be a mistake for us to sort of make it as a condition of [3:36:24] our engagement with ASEAN to say you must pick a side and you must pick a side now are you with them [3:36:28] are you with us? I think what I can safely say is that the overwhelming and vast majority of the [3:36:33] nation states and ASEAN if not maybe all do not want to live in a region in which China is the [3:36:40] predominant power and they are viewed as tributary states to Beijing and welcome US engagement in the [3:36:46] region as both an economic and defense counterweight. And so I think we need to view this as it would be a [3:36:52] mistake to go in with sort of a cold war mentality of pick a side and pick a side now. I think the broader [3:36:57] approach is to say they have a vested interest in us being involved. We have a vested interest as an [3:37:02] Indo-Pacific nation in involving ourselves through this forum and finding opportunities both holistically [3:37:08] through the ten nations and individually through whatever bilateral opportunities present itself. [3:37:13] Earlier you may not have been here but I was asked a question about Thailand and there is a group of [3:37:18] Uighurs that are in Thailand that they're saying may be deported and I said this is one of our strongest, [3:37:24] longest relationships in the region and maybe one of the longest and strongest in the world and that's [3:37:30] where these relationships really come to bear not to browbeat them in a public forum but through strong [3:37:35] diplomacy and using the benefit of that relationship to go to a Thailand and see if we can't get them to [3:37:40] not deport these people into the hands of the Chinese authorities knowing the atrocities that have been [3:37:46] committed. So that's a value added to this relationship. That is a bilateral relationship we have [3:37:50] with Thailand. It's not the one we're going to have with every country in the region but I do think [3:37:55] the forum serves as a useful platform for us to be able to engage the region and individually these [3:38:02] countries. So you would agree with what the first Trump administration emphasized which is that ASEAN [3:38:07] centrality and I think this is something that the new ASEAN chair Malaysia under Prime Minister Anwar [3:38:13] Ibrahim is saying with the Mandani concept which is growing that cohesion within ASEAN itself and in [3:38:20] dealing with the organization while we continue to pursue those bilateral relationships with the [3:38:24] stronger ASEAN can be cohesively as a unit allows them to better deal with countries like Myanmar for [3:38:30] example and allows us to better have those relations with them and also for them cohesively to try to stand [3:38:37] up to outside forces. One of the things that I think and I think you saw this in the first Trump term [3:38:41] we'll probably see again is to the extent you see production sort of moving from China to other [3:38:46] countries some of these countries stand to benefit from that assuming they themselves are not the [3:38:50] target of some tariff or what have you but I think there are benefits there in that regard. I would [3:38:56] imagine that there are also some concerns they would share with us about maybe some of our other policies [3:39:01] economic or otherwise but I do think it's an opportunity that provides some real economic development [3:39:09] benefit opportunities for a number of the countries in ASEAN we would hope all of them but certainly [3:39:14] some more than others because of alignment of interests. What I do think is we have to be realistic [3:39:19] and I just want to reiterate this because I think sometimes we go into these things viewing them with the [3:39:23] lens of NATO or something else this this the key component to understand is we are probably never [3:39:29] going to have sort of a overwhelming majority consensus on the role China is going to play but I do think you [3:39:35] could argue that the vast majority of countries in this form if not all do not want to live in a [3:39:40] region in which China is the predominant overwhelming power and they all are viewed as sort of tributary [3:39:46] states they are not interested in that and they view the United States as a very logical and welcome [3:39:52] economic and defense counterweight to that. And I do think that even the the mainland ASEAN nations [3:39:58] uh that uh as you uh in your words are lean more towards China um have suffered uh uh if you look [3:40:04] at what happens with water we talked a lot about Mexico and water into Texas but also with the Mekong [3:40:10] River uh in ASEAN uh with with the 10 dams that China has built up river is now affecting uh water [3:40:16] and also uh arable lands uh further down the river and initiatives like the two rivers initiative which [3:40:22] marries the Mississippi River which is two-thirds of the border of my home state along with the Mekong River is [3:40:28] a way for us to build some of these relationships and bring in American expertise uh a different [3:40:33] place uh where we can also provide expertise is international disability rights uh we have been [3:40:38] working with ASEAN on on developing disability rights and and a cohesive approach to it um in ASEAN [3:40:44] but I think on an international scale whether it's ASEAN or Ukraine as they rebuild I do think that [3:40:49] disability awareness uh rebuilding Ukraine to become more accessible uh promoting disability rights around [3:40:55] the world is something that is uh a way that we can engage with the rest of the world as well [3:41:00] love to hear from you um and I say this disability rights around the world and I say this uh you know [3:41:06] sadly it's going to be of critical importance to nations that are emerging from conflict where we [3:41:11] know modern conflict uh uh people are injured in ways that are now survivable but leave them for the rest [3:41:16] of their lives with permanent disabilities and and so I think it's going to be in the case from a very [3:41:21] practical perspective in the case of Ukraine it's going to be valuable because there are people that have been [3:41:25] injured in that conflict that for the rest of their lives they're going to have to deal with that [3:41:29] and it's conducive the other thing we've we've discussed is our diplomatic uh facilities around [3:41:35] the world and whether they are and understand that the number one job the reason why we have embassies [3:41:39] and consulates yes we represent u.s interests in that country but its number one obligation is to [3:41:45] support Americans for if you lose your passport if you go to jail whatever it may be that we have a [3:41:51] presence there that can support Americans abroad and it was stunning for me in our conversation to learn [3:41:56] that there are a number of these uh locations around the world that are not accessible to Americans [3:42:02] with disabilities that needed to access them so it's something that we would have to look [3:42:06] we'd be interested in looking at as well to make sure that just from our core obligation we're able [3:42:10] to fulfill it and also it keeps many of your own uh staff members who may have disabilities from [3:42:15] serving in some of these overseas missions uh as you said highly trained high well qualified regional [3:42:20] experts subject management experts may not be able to serve in some of these embassies where uh [3:42:24] they can't accept it's not accessible for them so i thank you for bringing that up and i will yield [3:42:29] back my nine seconds mr chairman oh thank you so much you're welcome thank you um thank you very [3:42:35] much senator duckworth those are important points last but not least welcome back senator lee to the [3:42:41] committee and uh appreciate you've had your work cut out for you today and your new role as uh chairman of [3:42:47] your committee but uh the floor is yours thank you thank you mr chairman and uh thank you senator rubio [3:42:53] for your willingness to serve in this position i'm going to make a bold prediction and say that you [3:42:58] were you are likely to be confirmed that's my prediction i i i can't speak for others but i i believe [3:43:04] that nonetheless and it's it's a bittersweet moment uh i'm back on the committee after 12 years of being [3:43:09] away from it you and i came to this committee and to the senate at the same time both in our late 30s the [3:43:13] the youngest members of the senate at the time although you had me by exactly seven days uh seven [3:43:19] days older notwithstanding the fact that you were uh the older between us you've got all of your hair [3:43:23] and it's uh not a single gray hair in there um but i i've deeply enjoyed working with you as a as a [3:43:29] colleague and getting to know you as a friend uh we have kids that are about the same age and i've [3:43:35] watched yours uh grow and it's just been a delight getting to know you jeannette and your kids and i hope [3:43:39] that'll continue but i'll miss having you here not only is my spanish teacher not only is my source [3:43:44] of uh bible insights and my source of comedic material but also for your great insights on foreign [3:43:51] policy domestic policy and everything else we do here uh you've just been great to work with and [3:43:55] you will be missed in the very likely event that you are confirmed let's talk first about uh the [3:44:01] western hemisphere an issue that i know is near and dear to your heart and mine um and we'll start [3:44:06] with the panama canal president trump has recently talked a little bit about the fact that um there [3:44:11] are some questions arising about the status of the panama canal when we look to the to the treaty at [3:44:17] issue the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the panama canal [3:44:22] we're reminded that some things maybe aren't quite as they should be there right now given that the [3:44:28] chinese now control major ports at the entry and the exit to the canal it seems um appropriate to [3:44:36] say that there's at least an open question there's some doubt as to whether the canal remains neutral [3:44:43] would you agree with that assessment yeah and yes here's the challenge number one is look i want [3:44:50] to be clear about some of the panamanian government particularly its current office holders are very [3:44:54] friendly to the united states and very cooperative and we want that to continue and i want to bifurcate [3:44:59] that from the broader issue of the canal now i am not president trump is not inventing this this is [3:45:08] something that's existed now for the at least a decade in my service here i took a trip to panama [3:45:13] in 2017 when on that trip to panama in 2017 it was the central issue we discussed about the canal [3:45:19] and that is that chinese companies control port facilities at both ends of the canal the east and [3:45:27] the west and the concerns among military officials and security officials including in panama at that [3:45:33] point that that could one day be used as a choke point to impede commerce in a moment of conflict [3:45:40] that's going back to that but i earlier to before you got here and i don't want to have to dig through [3:45:44] this folder to find it again but basically cited that the how the immediate past head of southern [3:45:51] command just retired general richardson said she flew over the canal looked down and saw those chinese [3:45:57] port facilities and said those look like dual use facilities that in a moment of conflict could be [3:46:03] weaponized against us the bipartisan china commission over in the house last year had testimony and and [3:46:10] hearings on this issue and members of both parties expressed concern the former ambassador to panama [3:46:15] that's under president obama has expressed those concerns this is a legitimate issue that needs to [3:46:20] be confronted this the second point is the one you touched upon and that is look could an argument be [3:46:26] made and i'm not prepared to answer it yet because it's something we're going to have to study very [3:46:31] carefully but i think i have an inkling of i know where this is going to head can an argument be made [3:46:35] that they basically have the chinese basically have effective control of the canal anytime they want [3:46:41] because if they order a chinese company that controls the ports to shut it down or impede our transit [3:46:48] they will have to do so there is no independent chinese companies they all exist because they've been [3:46:52] identified as national champions they're supported by the chinese government and if you don't do what they [3:46:57] want they find a new ceo and you end up being replaced and removed so they're on the complete [3:47:02] control of their government this is a legitimate question and one that senator riche had some [3:47:06] insight as well he mentioned that in in passing that needs to be looked at this is not a joke [3:47:11] the panama canal issue is a very serious one and so the the mere potentiality of that the the ability [3:47:16] to exercise that control even uh until such time as as they do do it as they do shut it down [3:47:23] is a concern is it not well i i listened 48 hours ago to fbi director ray and one of his exit interviews [3:47:30] he gave to the press and he said the chinese are embedded in our tel and our utilities and critical [3:47:36] infrastructure now he didn't say every single day they're shutting off the power in the united states [3:47:41] he said that if there's a conflict they're embedded and they could shut off the power in key places [3:47:45] we've all identified that as a threat the fact that you can do it you don't have to do it every day [3:47:50] i'm not no one's claiming that the chinese are shutting down the canal every day [3:47:54] what the claim is the very legitimate concern is that if these companies control both ends of that [3:47:59] canal in a time of conflict and the chinese tell them shut it down and don't let the u.s go through [3:48:04] there we got a big big problem a big economic problem and a big national security and defense [3:48:08] problem the ability to do it alone is a threat we shouldn't ignore it it isn't a joke it's a [3:48:12] legitimate issue and it needs to be solved excellent that feeds right into the next thing i wanted to [3:48:18] ask you about which um it just involves areas of dual use capabilities throughout uh the western [3:48:24] hemisphere um you know ports infrastructure critical minerals and so forth we we've had um policies [3:48:31] from the biden administration involving the supercilious use of uh untargeted foreign aid [3:48:39] and sort of uh cultural coercion in order to persuade them to or in an effort to coerce uh some of these [3:48:48] countries to adopt policies that are contrary to their established cultural norms um you know abortion [3:48:55] rights lgbt policies and curriculum and so forth that probably hasn't helped uh in in this uh conflict [3:49:04] in this still somewhat soft conflict in which uh many of these countries are opening their doors to [3:49:10] china i i can't imagine that will have helped how will your approach uh to chinese incursion in the western [3:49:17] hemisphere be different from those of the current administration well there are a couple points [3:49:22] the first is the chinese incursion in the hemisphere involves number one investment of dollars like [3:49:28] as an example they go into some country they say here's five million dollars or ten million dollars to [3:49:33] build the stadium um but in exchange you have to let us build out your three you know your your 5g [3:49:39] network using huawei safe cities and the like and by the way here's a couple million dollars for you [3:49:44] and your friends as a bribe okay that's their first level of engagement they go in and they and in [3:49:48] some ways they create deals that are that you can not possibly pay back so now you've got a debt that [3:49:53] you can't pay back and they have you trapped and now they've got your vote at the un and your cooperation [3:49:57] on x y and z and that's how that happened in panama by the way in 2016 2017 that was well understood [3:50:04] that part of the investments they made in panama were conditioned upon panama's ability to convince the [3:50:09] dominican republic and other countries to flip their recognition away from taiwan that happened [3:50:15] so that's number one the second element of their involvement is they go into a country and a chinese [3:50:19] company will buy up the lithium mines or access to the rare earth minerals in these long-term contracts [3:50:26] and that exists in allied countries argentines times will tell you there are a number of business [3:50:31] deals that the chinese and chinese companies have gotten a hold of in argentina that even if they [3:50:35] wanted to back away they can't get out of the deals because the way they were structured so that's number [3:50:39] two and then number three is their presence the chinese are actively involved in a military [3:50:45] military installations in the western hemisphere on the island of cuba 90 miles from our shores only a [3:50:51] few hundred miles from where space force operates and nasa and cape canaveral only a few miles from [3:50:56] mcdill where we have central command and special operations command only a few miles from southern [3:51:00] command only a few miles from eglin air force base and the the test range we have out in the gulf of [3:51:07] mexico all of these things this is real and it's operating right off the coast of the united states [3:51:11] they have a presence in our region so we have to acknowledge that this is happening and then we [3:51:16] have to be present and have counters to each of these and or there has to be consequences for each [3:51:20] of these fortunately the united states has strong relationships in multiple key countries in the [3:51:27] region and i think we have the opportunity to build upon that and won't and and in ways that can [3:51:32] attract the sort of investment that they would rather have than the chinese investment but right now it's not a [3:51:37] it's not available it's not happening there is no american alternative to what the chinese are [3:51:41] offering so hopefully we can provide the openings for that indeed and i appreciate your enthusiasm [3:51:46] and thoughtfulness uh in providing that answer um now you touch on another issue when you reference [3:51:52] the significance of agreements made by prior administrations obviously the javier malay [3:51:57] administration in argentina wouldn't have been as likely to enter into those arrangements [3:52:01] uh as his predecessor was the united states we have to keep this in mind the constitution of course [3:52:06] allocates uh the treaty making and binding power and spreads it out between two branches the president [3:52:13] can enter into a treaty can sign a treaty but that treaty uh isn't ratified unless two-thirds of the [3:52:19] senate does it so it it flips the usual legislative process because it's a different type of legislation [3:52:24] would you agree with me that that type of arrangement uh which is the submission of a treaty after the [3:52:31] president has entered into it after the president has signed it the submission of that treaty to the [3:52:35] senate for ratification and the ultimate ratification by the senate is a necessary precondition for an [3:52:42] international agreement to be binding on the united states of america to be binding beyond the [3:52:46] administration that entered into it this was the case of the jcpoa which was being sold to people as [3:52:51] a treaty but it wasn't and the reason why it was a political agreement it's basically a political [3:52:55] arrangement between the current administration and the regime in iran and that's why president trump [3:53:01] had the authority to pull us out of it when he did i think what's important to understand about treaties [3:53:05] in general and we talked about treaties here today with mexico we've there's a number of other [3:53:09] treaties that are people may not be aware of every treaty by definition okay is a surrender of [3:53:15] sovereignty at some level as a nation but you do it and you enter into it why why do you enter into a [3:53:21] treaty even though you're surrendering some sovereignty because you've concluded that that [3:53:26] surrender and the benefit of it to the national interest or the national security far outweighs [3:53:32] the surrender of sovereignty and the consequences of it and that is why it's so critical that the [3:53:36] senate be involved in that deliberation because an individual administration may get that calculus [3:53:41] wrong but when you have this overwhelming majority that concludes that it it too agrees that that [3:53:47] surrender of sovereignty matches is exceeded by the benefit of the treaty now you know you have [3:53:53] some you've increased your chances of having something that's good and makes sense and so um you [3:53:58] know i agree with your with your view of it and um and i think uh you know that's the way we i would [3:54:04] hope we would pursue arrangements in the future if we enter into any that's why it takes two-thirds [3:54:08] thank you so much uh senator rubio thank you mr chairman senator rubio we know you have an appointment at the [3:54:13] white house at three o'clock uh senator shaheen has one brief question for you i have a couple of brief [3:54:18] remarks and then we'll get you on your way thank you senator rubio i think that was a very impressive [3:54:23] display of your knowledge of the global situation but the one area that you mentioned but we haven't [3:54:30] really talked about is the arctic and given what's happening in the arctic and china's designs on the arctic [3:54:37] can you just speak to um what you think our posture ought to be with respect to the arctic well we're [3:54:45] in arctic power the russians legitimate arctic power the chinese are not they they're whether they're [3:54:51] near arctic power or i don't know what the term they came up with to give an excuse for them to be [3:54:56] up there crazy i think frankly i know you didn't ask me this question but it's one i welcome the ability [3:55:01] to talk about in some of this discussion with greenland putting aside all the things that are going on in [3:55:07] the media i think we need to understand that green has been strategically important to the united [3:55:10] states and to the west for a very long time in fact in 1941 at the outbreak of world war ii the united [3:55:17] states was signed up as a protectorate even though the the denmark was had been occupied you think back [3:55:23] into the night i think harry truman tried to buy denmark harry truman had made an effort to try to buy [3:55:28] for like a hundred million dollars he was rebuffed and then uh the u.s has maintained through a mutual [3:55:34] defense agreement there the opportunity to base itself to have military bases and i had them for [3:55:39] a while why the reason why is because of where it's located geographically yes the the access to [3:55:46] the minerals on greenland are critically important but as more navigable space is opening up in the arctic [3:55:53] particularly this northern passage that goes from russia to china russia to asia and could cut [3:55:59] transit times by as much as 40 percent the arctic is going to become incredibly critical and so we [3:56:05] have to have a presence there we have to have a presence there not just saying okay we have a base [3:56:09] we have 200 people or we have a flag flying we have to have the ability for example to have the ships [3:56:14] that can navigate on the naval level and keep those shipping lanes open if in fact they're being [3:56:19] threatened we have to have partners along the arctic region that will join us in ensuring that the [3:56:24] arctic region is open for free and flow of navigation as these as these passages open up because global [3:56:31] trade is in many ways going to be infused by it we have positions within the state department that i [3:56:36] think in the past have been diminished or people just haven't paid a lot of attention to i just had [3:56:41] this conversation the other day with senator murkowski that all of a sudden i think people are interested [3:56:45] in serving in arctic affairs and and in arctic posts because this issue of greenland has opened our [3:56:51] eyes to the broader geographic importance of the arctic region which long has been a curiosity or [3:56:57] something people have not talked about but i think now we have the opportunity to see it for what it is [3:57:02] and that is one if not the most important one of the most critical parts of the world over the next 50 [3:57:08] to 100 years will be whether there's going to be freedom of navigation in the arctic and um and what [3:57:15] that will mean for global trade and commerce thank you uh i'm going to order that uh senator rubio's [3:57:21] responses uh written responses to the questions regarding uh his relationship with this committee be [3:57:27] filed for the record i'm also going to order that the written that the letters uh in support of senator [3:57:32] rubio's confirmation be entered in the record and finally i want to say thank you senator rubio for [3:57:38] providing us with the benefit of your testimony your responses and your knowledge it was outstanding [3:57:44] this committee takes oversight of u.s foreign assistance extremely seriously uh you know [3:57:51] well the transparency and accountability are paramount to that end i want to flag for you [3:57:58] my work with the office of the inspector general on the state department's bureau for global health [3:58:03] security and diplomacy pepfar and the biden administration's failure to uphold long-standing [3:58:09] united states laws protecting life in global health assistance in addition to my request for an [3:58:15] investigation i've been holding over a billion dollars in u.s foreign assistance since uh september of last [3:58:20] year and will continue to do so until i can be sure that not one single american tax dollar will be [3:58:25] used to perform or promote over abortions overseas as that is required uh by u.s law i look forward to [3:58:35] working with you on this in addition to the many issues that we discussed here today uh finally i will [3:58:43] note for the information of members of the committee that the record will remain open until tomorrow [3:58:48] thursday january 16th at 1 p.m uh for members to submit questions for the record thank you god bless you we [3:58:57] wish you well committee is adjourned