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Dan Rather on JFK Assassination: What He Saw That Day (2005 Interview)

American Experience | PBS November 21, 2026 1h 58m 18,325 words 3 views
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About this transcript: This is a full AI-generated transcript of Dan Rather on JFK Assassination: What He Saw That Day (2005 Interview) from American Experience | PBS, published November 21, 2026. The transcript contains 18,325 words with timestamps and was generated using Whisper AI.

"I want to start off talking about JFK, the man, and how we have come to remember him. Am I right that you were at the inauguration? I was at the Kennedy. I was at the JFK inauguration in 1960, cold, snowy day. I think up to that time, at least, a record snowy day. But I was there for the..."

[00:00:00] Speaker 1: I want to start off talking about JFK, the man, and how we have come to remember him. Am I right that you were at the inauguration? [00:00:14] Speaker 2: I was at the Kennedy. I was at the JFK inauguration in 1960, cold, snowy day. I think up to that time, at least, a record snowy day. But I was there for the inauguration of President Kennedy. At that time, I was not with CBS News. I was working with Corinthian Broadcasting, which owned a chain of television stations. And I was the anchor and director of public affairs for the Corinthian Broadcasting Station in Houston. But I had been sent to Washington to cover the inauguration of President Kennedy for this small chain of stations. I was there. [00:00:51] Speaker 1: Did you get a sense of, as Kennedy said, the torch being passed? Did that impact you personally? [00:00:55] Speaker 2: Well, at the Kennedy inauguration, there was this strong sense of the torch being passed. Here was the first U.S. president born in the 20th century. And he was succeeding a justifiable legend and icon, war hero and president, and a getting-to-be elderly Dwight D. Eisenhower. So you couldn't be in Washington, D.C., inauguration day in 1961, without being aware of that. Now, as one who was roughly President Kennedy's age, I was somewhat younger. But particularly if you were of his generation or the generation that was coming behind him, you did have a very strong sense of it. Now, coupled with that and what I believe made it even stronger, the sense of the torch being passed, he looked the part. Vigor is a word that's so associated with President Kennedy, and it was impossible to be in his presence. I think it was virtually impossible to be in his presence via even television, to see him, and not have a sense of an energetic person and a curious mind. He looked, if you had been picking a person to play the part of the first American president born in the 20th century, you couldn't have done better than to cast John F. Kennedy in that role. Now, besides that, he had a strong sense of the moment, and those around him, such as Ted Sorenson, who wrote some of his material, was his, if not his closest confidant, other than his brother Bobby, a very close confidant. But President Kennedy and those around him, they exuded youth, they exuded vigor, they put forth, some of it was calculated, but much of it didn't have to be calculated, they put forth just almost a constant message of, it's a new day. Later, much later, President Reagan won the 1984 election with the slogan, it's dawn in America, it's morning in America. Well, it seemed that way when John F. Kennedy came into the presidency. And it probably should be noted that not everybody, not nearly everybody, was pleased with President Kennedy's election. It's easy to forget that this was an extremely close election. He defeated Richard Nixon by the narrowest of margins, so narrow that President Nixon seriously considered contesting the election and decided not to. So, having said that President Kennedy looked the part on Inauguration Day of the first American president of the 20th century, exuded vigor, a new day in America, and a very youthful image. [00:03:51] Speaker 1: Was he a divisive figure? [00:03:54] Speaker 2: Well, was President Kennedy a divisive figure? Well, he wasn't a divisive figure as he came into the presidency. My view is that he was a big question mark. There are certainly people who are extremely disappointed that he was elected. And I would say that the most partisan political activists who opposed him in the election, and some people who consider themselves devout ideologues hated the fact that he was elected. But he didn't come into the presidency as a divisive figure. He came in as a question mark. Among the question marks were, is he too young? Is he too inexperienced? And it's hard to remember, but it's worth remembering, that there also was the issue of religion, that he was the first Roman Catholic to be elected president. And that was an issue in the campaign. In my view, it was probably the biggest single thing he had to overcome in the campaign was, well, he's a Roman Catholic. What's he going to do to the country? But a divisive figure, no. It was just a question mark. There were always questions. Is he too young? What about having a Catholic in the presidency? I'm sure there are people who are watching and listening to this would say, well, gosh, how could that be? That there would be people who were either not born at the time or not of memory age at the time, because it was a very big question mark. He had put the issue of his Roman Catholicism pretty much to bed during the campaign. He handled it very adroitly by going to Houston and speaking to a large group of Baptists, all of that. But as he came in, as you looked at him, as you looked at John F. Kennedy that day when he was being inaugurated, you would like the way he looked. He looked like an American president, particularly an American president for the latter half. In the latter half of the 20th century, he was at the height of the Cold War. Certainly those who liked President Kennedy, and perhaps some who didn't like President Kennedy, had their hopes that maybe somehow a fresh approach, a new young president, can reduce these very dangerous tensions of the Cold War. On the other side, there were those who said, come on, this guy comes out of the left side of the political spectrum, and he'll be terrible for us in the Cold War. So all that was part of the scene in Washington as President Kennedy was inaugurated. [00:06:23] Speaker 1: Was he, in looking back now, he sort of regarded this as a sort of liberal icon, and that's how the people, I think a lot of people, they choose to remember him. Is that accurate? [00:06:32] Speaker 2: I know that there is a modern, I consider it to be, a revisionist view of President Kennedy. He has become, to some people, a kind of, I'd like to put this quotation marks again, liberal icon, quote unquote. Frankly, I think the record demonstration, certainly in my memory, is that he was far from that, certainly as he came into the presidency, which is a long list of reasons to think that, but among those, his father was among the more conservative or reactionary people in American politics for much of the 1930s and through the 1940s. His brother had worked on cones with McCarthy, was a counsel, McCarthy. His reputation in the Senate, John Kennedy's reputation in the Senate, was certainly not to the right in the American political spectrum, but he was by no means considered to be among the more liberal senators. It didn't fit. It didn't fit at the time. I don't know of anybody at the time who thought of him as a budding or potential liberal icon. As he came into the presidency, he was seen as more a middle-of-the-road candidate to the left by American political standards, but to the left, sort of as President Eisenhower's predecessor had been saying to the right, to the right, but more to the middle. Middle, moderate, progressive. Some Democrats were suspicious of him, that he wasn't, quote, liberal enough, if you will. I would say there were just as many suspicions that he wasn't liberal enough as there were suspicions that he was too liberal. But to point, he didn't come into the presidency seen as a potential liberal icon of the future. [00:08:32] Speaker 1: What was it that he did as president that engendered such really visceral hatred on the part of certain groups in this country? [00:08:42] Speaker 2: It's always been a good question in my mind what there was in President Kennedy and in his presidency that came to engender such deep feelings of suspicion, even hatred for him, as a, quote, far-left or, if you prefer, liberal icon. I really don't know. Part of my difficulty with seeing him as a liberal icon, as someone who represented the worst of the Democratic Party, if you will, is you have to look at the record, including the fact that he was very slow. President Kennedy was very slow to get on to what was not just a moving, beginning to pick up momentum, but in a way, he just barely caught that train as it was leaving. One can argue that he was worried about the political ramifications of being seen as a champion of civil rights, keeping in mind how close was his victory over Richard Nixon in 1960. But for whatever reason, he was not in the forefront of the civil rights movement. Now, as his presidency developed, he got on the train of the civil rights movement. So why is President Kennedy detested by so many long after his death? I think he's seen as someone who became a champion of the civil rights movement, not a champion, certainly a supporter of it. And keeping in mind what an important factor race is in the whole American experience, and particularly the experience of the last half of the 20th century, and particularly during the 1960s, I think that's one reason. I think race comes in to that. Secondarily, he did give a voice, he tried to give a voice to the poor, to the downtrodden, to what you might want to describe as the Dickensian side of America. Now, it's easy to have that out of context. He didn't become a champion of most people, but he did give some voice to it. And it stood out because we hadn't had such a voice for at least the preceding eight years. So I think that's another factor that's being detested. The other is, another, is that he put forward, and some, again, this was thought through. He cared a lot about his image. So when you have the kind of glamour associated with President Kennedy, when you have someone who was as popular as he became, and again, you want to have that in perspective, during his presidency, he was never an overwhelmingly popular president. His popularity grew during the presidency. Nonetheless, when you have a handsome, wealthy, successful person with a, in his case, beautiful, fashionable wife, great family, people are going to take the shots. And it's an unfortunate phrase, given what happened to President Kennedy, but people, not everybody's going to love you. [00:11:59] Speaker 1: I mean, when you were covering civil rights in the South, did you notice that, that feeling towards Kennedy that he was, even if he was going slow? I mean, I remember as a kid, you go into homes of African Americans, and there would be two pictures on the wall. This was probably later, I think, after he was killed. I remember many times seeing Jack Kennedy and Martin Luther King. [00:12:20] Speaker 2: Well, it's interesting how President Kennedy became so associated with the Civil Rights Movement. It's absolutely true that in the '60s, I would argue, mostly, if not entirely, after he was assassinated, he would go into some homes, and particularly the homes of African Americans, you would find a picture of President Kennedy on one wall and a picture of Martin Luther King on the other. Or in the case of coal mining towns in Pennsylvania, steel towns in Pennsylvania or Ohio, you'd find a picture of John F. Kennedy on one wall and a picture of maybe Franklin Roosevelt on the wall. The point is that he became seen, he became, it became the situation for him to be seen as a constant champion of civil rights, which he wasn't during his presidency. If you look at the early stages of the Kennedy presidency, it's very clear that he didn't quite know what to do about Martin Luther King, and he was very cautious about moving in King's direction. Very clear, he didn't quite know what to do about the Civil Rights Movement, and my opinion, clearly labeled, underestimated how quickly the Civil Rights Movement was taking traction. What the effect of seeing the Civil Rights Movement on television was having in the country as a whole, which was tremendous, that people had heard about Klan meetings, they had heard about what was happening to Black people. But when you saw it full screen on television, and television was just beginning to penetrate into deep into the American consciousness and become a very important factor in the culture, that around the country, the Civil Rights Movement was taking traction. But as is often the case, in Washington, it was slow to catch on, and it was slow to catch on in the Kennedy White House. I recognize there are a number of people associated with President Kennedy who may want to argue the other point of view, but I think the record demonstrates this. But, once President Kennedy recognized, one, the importance of the Civil Rights Movement, two, had to make a choice, and I would argue he was forced to make a choice of, "Listen, you've got to go one way or the other," and he chose to go in the direction of the movement. Then, he had a presidency of roughly a thousand days, and I would say for two, three hundred, maybe four hundred days of that presidency, he was on the fence of that Civil Rights Movement. And then, for the following time of his presidency, he tried to play a little catch-up. So, that result, what resulted from that was he so suddenly and dramatically died, that in death he became a bigger champion of civil rights than he was, in fact, when he was president. But that takes nothing away from the fact, and it is a fact, that he did support civil rights through the last two-thirds of his presidency, roughly, and he does deserve credit for that. It's just that it's another case of being larger in death than he was in life. [00:15:32] Speaker 1: Did he have any legitimate fears of being defeated in '74? [00:15:38] Speaker 2: Well, political scientists and those who were around President Kennedy and around then-Vice President Johnson argue about whether President Kennedy had fears of 1964. But here's where I think the record is instructive for us. The reason President Kennedy went to Texas, where he met his death, was out of concern of what might happen in 1964. I think the answer is, yes, that I think President Kennedy was very concerned about the election in 1964. First of all, politicians up for reelection are nearly always concerned about the next election. But he had real reason President Kennedy had to be concerned about the 1964 election. First of all, was this narrowest of margins by which he defeated President Nixon in 1960. Secondly, in 1960, what had been previously for a large part of the early part of the 20th century called the Solid South, that the Southern states, states of the old Confederacy and/or Southern border states, had been solidly democratic. But you could see that the Solid South was beginning to crack, beginning to have questions, basically over race. And particularly with white males, who had been strongly supportive of the Democratic Party, they were beginning not just to drift away, they were beginning to go in the other direction. Not as much as became apparent in the late '60s and in the early '70s, it became apparent. President Kennedy was concerned about the closeness of his election in 1960. He was concerned that Southern states were no longer dependable. And particularly Texas, which had more electoral votes than any other state of the former Confederacy. And he went to Texas because he was that concerned about 1964. He also saw the development of Goldwater Republicanism, which later became known in the latter half of the 20th century among some people as Reagan Republicanism. But it had its roots in the Goldwater candidacy for the Republican nomination in 1960. And for whatever else he may or may not have been, President Kennedy was a very close student of politics. And he could see that the Goldwater movement within the Republican Party was beginning to pick up steam. But he was concerned about it. He was also concerned that the Vietnam War was not even known as the Vietnam War at the time of the Kennedy presidency. And it was President Kennedy who made the important decision to increase the number of American advisers. We did a few advisers in Vietnam to increase those to a level of about 15,000. That happened during his presidency. He wasn't yet overly concerned about the war, but still it was nagging a bit at him. There were any number of reasons he was concerned about the '64 election, but I think the record shows very clearly he was concerned about the '64 election. And as much as he was concerned about whether he would win the '64 election, and I think there was concern about it, he also wanted a mandate, which you couldn't argue he had a mandate with the razor-thin win in 1960. So naturally, he was thinking, if we really press, if we really put it on, start early, work hard, I can come out of 1964 with a significant victory, and that will give me a mandate for a second term. But it's worth remembering he went to Texas because Lyndon Johnson, who was his vice president, John Connolly, who was a very well-known Texas political officeholder, governor, said, "Listen, not only is the grassroots Democratic support sort of on the fence in some ways about you, but the money that you need to run, the money is beginning to go in the other direction. You need to get down to Texas in late 1963 to shore up your grassroots support." And Lyndon Johnson told him, John Connolly, I think, told him, I know Lyndon Johnson told him, "You get down with your aura as president, and you get down with the first lady, Texans are going to love you. And so you shore up your grassroots support, and we'll be able to tie up a good deal of the money. If you wait much longer, you're going to have trouble with both of those things." And President Kennedy looked at it and agreed, and that's the reason he went to Texas. [00:20:20] Speaker 1: Okay. Oh, what was the mood in Dallas? [00:20:23] Speaker 2: Well, it's very hard to generalize about a mood anywhere when you're talking about a lot of people. I think probably too much has been made about the atmosphere, the mood in Dallas in 1963. Dallas was one of those cities that began to boom after World War II, and was a growing city, becoming more cosmopolitan in the best sense of that word, more sophisticated, if you will, in the best sense of that word. It is undeniable that Dallas was seen as, and was in fact, the capital of the more conservative, if you like it, more reactionary, if you don't, elements of not just the Republican Party, which barely existed in Texas at the time, was beginning to grow, but among so-called, quote, "conservative Democrats," those who later became, most of them Republicans. That it was the, if there was a capital of suspicions about President Kennedy, questions about President Kennedy, yeah, you'd have put your finger on Dallas as a place. [00:21:30] Speaker 1: How was this manifested? [00:21:32] Speaker 2: Well, it was the home of General Edwin Walker, who had commanded U.S. troops in Korea, but who had come home and led the resistance to James Meredith being the first black admitted to the University of Mississippi? I was in Oxford, Mississippi when that happened. He made a, by anybody's standards, an incendiary speech about how the land needed to be held, and Edwin Walker, former military man, distinguished military career, was stirring up trouble on the race front. Some of the biggest contributors to the more conservative or reactionary causes in the country lived in Dallas. In so far as money for Richard Nixon and money potentially for a Goldwater, somebody else in the '64 campaign, Dallas would have been the mother load in Texas. Then there was the matter of Adlai Stevenson when he visited Dallas, former two-time Democratic presidential candidate. They'd been at one of the Dallas hotels, someone had hit him with a sign, and there'd been trouble around him. There'd been sort of trouble. Here's the point, that in 1963, as President Kennedy came to Texas and was going to tour Texas with Lyndon Johnson, if you were to look at one place where they were going to have trouble, he would have said, "Well, if there's going to be any trouble, it'll probably be in Dallas." Now, I was in charge of, had been put in charge of CBS News coverage of the Kennedy trip to Texas. Having been born there and spent the first 20, 21 years of my life there, I was chosen to organize our coverage. And I thought the trip would be very successful. I thought that President Kennedy would find that he was much more popular in the state than he might have believed. I didn't expect there to be trouble. I did say to those from my work, "We probably ought to have stronger coverage in Dallas than anywhere else, because if there's going to be any trouble, it will likely be on the Dallas top of the trip." I didn't imagine that there'd be any real violence. I certainly didn't imagine anybody would take a shot or anything of the sort. It was more just keeping in mind that Abby Stevenson had some difficulty when he was there with protesters, reactionary, politically active people such as General Edwin Walker and others lived there, that if there's going to be trouble, it would be in Dallas. But I didn't foresee any violence. I thought maybe some demonstrations. I really didn't think that would happen. But I did say, if there's going to be trouble, it's more likely to be in Dallas, so we probably ought to show up our coverage in Dallas a little. And I think that was generally thought at the time. But I think it may be important to note, I don't think that President Johnson or Governor Connolly, all of whom knew Texas very well, not only do I believe that they thought there wouldn't be trouble. I think they thought, you know, when we get to Dallas, President Kennedy is going to be surprised at what a warm welcome he receives. And that turned out to be true. Overwhelmingly, overwhelmingly, Dallas gave President Kennedy a very warm, enthusiastic welcome. And while Vice President Johnson and Governor Connolly might have thought as others, including myself, well, if there's going to be any demonstration or anybody throw something, it's likely to be in Dallas. I don't, in fact, think they thought anything would happen there. [00:25:10] Speaker 1: Okay. Well, it's 12:30 on November 22, 1963. Where are you? What do you see? What do you do? [00:25:18] Speaker 2: Well, I was in charge of our CBS News coverage in Dallas. And insofar as it was organized, I had organized it. President Kennedy was to tour the state, and he was just speaking Fort Worth, then come the next morning into Dallas, which is what he did. And I had organized our coverage. Our White House correspondent and a very good one, Bob Pierpoint, was traveling with the President from Washington to come to Texas, and he was part of the White House press corps. And we had a Washington cameraman who was to be part of the motorcade. And part of our organization was that we would shoot film. It was film and not videotape at the time. Fairly important because film has to be processed. It takes time to do that. You don't just bring it in and put it right up. And we had put together a plan which the Washington group, traveling with the President, would be in the motorcade, that we would take their film and the film done by our local station, an excellent local station, KROD Television in Dallas, and take their film. And I would be the person who helped put all that together into a report. It was not even -- I wouldn't be the correspondent necessarily on it. The plan was actually to have our White House correspondent, probably his voice on the piece. But at any rate, when the motorcade came, as the motorcade wound its way through, that from time to time, when the camera crews in the back behind the presidential limousine, turned out quite a ways behind the presidential limousine, got film along the motorcade route, that they would throw the film off to people at stations along the way, bring it back to KROD, where we could begin processing the film. And also, we'd be getting film from KROD, our local station, cameramen through. The trip to the preceding night to Fort Worth had gone well. I was at the station laying at our local station, which will be our headquarters, laying plans for, "Okay, here's the time schedule when we need to have our report ready so we can transmit it to New York." And there was one place in the motorcade where I said to myself, "Well, you know, we don't have anybody there. Just pass the underpass." The motorcade plan, which was carried out, was to wind through downtown Dallas, go in front of the school book depository, which has since become infamous, go under a slight overpass, a railroad overpass. And that was to be the end of the motorcade through Dallas. And at that point, the motorcade would pick up speed and go a few miles forward to the trademark where the president was to make an address. And so I thought, "Well, we don't have anybody at that last motorcade place, so I'll just go down there and wait for the motorcade to pass. And if the camera crew has anything, I'll wait to them and they'll throw me the film. If they don't, they just go on." So at the time of the assassination, as it turned out, I was just past the overpass, which is just past the school book depository on the other side of the overpass, waiting for the motorcade to come by and see if anybody had a film drop. And if they did, then I'd take it and go back to the station. And also, frankly, I thought, "Well, you know, I'll get to see the motorcade, get to see the president and the first lady, and that'll be good." So that's where I was. [00:28:59] Speaker 1: Just tell me what you heard, what you saw, what you did. [00:29:02] Speaker 2: Well, it all happened so quickly. I did not hear any shots. I didn't see anything other than the following, that I was waiting for the motorcade to come through. And I thought it was running a little bit late, but suddenly what I thought, I couldn't be sure what I thought was the presidential limousine swept by. And it happened so quickly. So, gosh, was that the presidential limousine? And I looked, and there wasn't-- the rest of the motorcade wasn't coming. Oh, golly. And they were, you know, it seemed to be going very fast. I also thought that they took a wrong turn. I thought, gosh, I'm not sure they went in the right direction here. So I was a little bit confused. But when I didn't-- the main thing was I didn't see the rest of the motorcade come. I didn't know that anything had happened. But I wasn't sure that it was the presidential limousine, but I thought it was. And then when I didn't see the rest of the motorcade coming, it just-- since something's happened here, I better get back to the station in case something has happened. So when I got to this slight road rise there, because where the overpass is built, there's a slight rise. When I got to the top of that rise, in front of the school book depository, there was panic and chaos. People were following their children. People were shouting, pointing. And at that moment, it was clear to me, God, not only has something happened, but I don't know what, but something bad has happened here. And I was thinking to myself, I'm out of position. I hadn't been trained as a reporter. The best story in the world is not worth anything unless you can get it out. I had no idea what had happened. It just-- when I saw the front lawn of the school book depository and saw what was happening in the crowd, people running, I said, well, I got to get back to the station. So I took off and as quick as I could got back to KRLD. Did you talk to anybody? No. I did not talk to a cell. I got to get back to the station. Mind you, we didn't have cell phones. [00:31:16] Speaker 1: You didn't ask anybody what had happened? No. [00:31:18] Speaker 2: I zipped back to the station. We had plenty of people to find out what happened. You know, might have, could have, should have. But I know what happened and what happened with me. The second I saw that something's happened here and I'm not at the station and I have no way to gather information, I'm responsible for coverage here. And I zipped right away as fast as I could get. The station was some blocks away. I don't know, four, four and a half, five blocks away. Zipped in the station as quickly as I could get there. I had no idea that any shots had been fired. I had no idea that the president had been wounded, much less killed. All I had was this limousine spy sense that maybe it took a wrong turn, maybe in the wrong direction while they were doing that. And I come back to the central thing. The motorcade, the rest of the motorcade was not coming. It had been, it turned out, had been stopped before it got to the underpass. Then when I went up just over the no and saw this scene in front, boy, I'm badly out of position. And I need to get back to the station as quickly as I can. Let me add something which may or may not be important that, you know, I'll never know. I can't know. But I don't believe, well, I believe that a lot of people in the crowd itself had no idea what had happened. Like some had heard shots, maybe a lot of them heard shots, but the confusion factor was extremely high in those first moments. I know it's easy to think, well, gosh, why didn't people think this? Why didn't people know this? Why didn't people look this? Why didn't they do that? It all happened so suddenly and so quickly that an awful lot of people had no idea what had happened. As I say, any number of people had no doubt heard shots, and it turns out some had actually seen what happened. But the whole day in Dallas, particularly the early part of the day after the president was shot, was a kind of fog of confusion, was the first thing to lower over the city. [00:33:27] Speaker 1: Once you found out that the president was shot, was there any fear that this could be the beginning of something much bigger? I mean, I remember 9/11, you know, I was downtown and we all thought, oh, my God, you know. [00:33:42] Speaker 2: Well, not just in the first few moments, but in the first few minutes and hours, and I would say continuing for quite a little while after that. You know, first it was confusion. What's happened here? Something happened. Then it was, well, the president, someone has taken a shot at the president. And it was known almost simultaneously, very quickly. Not only has a shot been taken at him, but he's been at least wounded and maybe dead. That became apparent fairly quickly, fairly quickly, that, you know, in rapid succession, something's happened at the modal case. Somebody took a shot, somebody only took a shot, but it, you know, got in the presidential motorcade. Not only that, the president's at least wounded, maybe dead. All of this followed in very quick succession. And not only in the very top echelons of the U.S. government, but with this reporter and I'm sure others, well, if the president's been shot, what is this about? And a natural thought, given the state of the Cold War. Remember, we were in a deep trough of the Cold War, which had really started in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Sort of came to a head with the Berlin Airlines of 1948, the Korean War beginning in 1950. We weren't perhaps yet at the height of the Cold War, but if not there, we were somewhere close to it. So there was a general sense of, well, how did this happen? Who did this? These were almost immediate questions once it became clear that the president not only had been shot, not only wounded, but was dead. And it was, well, this may be part of something much larger. And we know that President Johnson was concerned. And I think that, when I say drifted down, it was a natural thought that day. I don't believe, outside of top of government, it was the first thing on people's mind. Clearly, for those who weren't there and out of memory age, wonder about it, understand. And the first reaction really was an absolutely sledge to the heart. Just, you know, how could this happen in America? And what a terrible thing this is for the country. What a terrible thing it is for the Kennedy family. What a terrible thing it is. That was the first and overriding concern. But there was this second thought pretty quickly, oh, well, maybe it could be. Maybe this is the start of something bigger. Maybe there were more killings planned. Who knows? And against the backdrop of the Cold War and all that that entailed at the time, it was not so wild a thought. [00:36:43] Speaker 1: And what, as a reporter, where is your mind racing now? You're back at the station. You're making phone calls. What's, where's your, has the shock hit you, or are you just focused on getting the story? No. [00:36:57] Speaker 2: I think it was true of most reporters that day, but I can only speak for myself. The realization that President Kennedy was dead, and we knew he was dead before the official announcement was made, was you're fighting your emotions. You have, as a citizen, as one who has a deep and abiding love for this country, the emotions of love of country, sorrow for anybody being killed, but the symbolism of an American president being shot on the streets in America, all that he meant for his family, Mrs. Kennedy and the children. For some little while, but only for a little while, one fought one's emotions as a, as a citizen. But counterbalancing that is what you see as your responsibilities as a reporter. So one or two things are going to happen. Either your emotions overwhelm you, and you're not able to do the job, or you gather yourself. You say, I've got to seal all of that out. I've just, I just can't think about that. You've just sealed it out. And the goal was to become focused, so focused on the story, what I'm told tennis players call being zoned. You just get myopic thinking. I can't think about all the other stuff. I've got to deal with what's in front of me. This is a tremendous story. It's a very important story. This is serious. It's by far the largest story I've ever covered. I thought at the time, probably the biggest story I'd ever cover, that I wanted to be as focused as I could on my work. So you struggle with those things inside you, and either you fall apart emotionally, or you get focused on the story. I think it was generally true of reporters, but it was certainly true of this one, that that's what happened. [00:38:53] Speaker 1: But let's just move on through November 22nd. How did it come about that you were the first to, am I right about this, that you were the first to report on community death? [00:39:04] Speaker 2: CBS News broke the story that the president not only was wounded, but was dead. And I've forgotten how many minutes it was before the official announcement. They were holding off the official announcement. It turns out that they pretty much knew when the president got to the hospital that he was dead. Or they didn't know immediately when he got to the hospital, it was a very short time after that, that the news director at KRLD, Eddie Barker, who was at the trademark awaiting the president's arrival, had reported to New York that he had heard there that the president was dead. And they had mentioned that on the air, that they broke for years, that he was dead. And because I got back to the station pretty quickly, I got through the hospital, and they hung out the first time, but I got them to hold on the phone the second time and talked to people at the hospital. And it wasn't in my mind, if you're talking to people at the hospital, that he was dead. I was told he was dead, that I think the people at the hospital were pretty much in a state of shock like everybody else. And so he just said to me that he was dead. And I had three sources at the hospital. I say sources, these are not people I knew, but doctor, priest, talked to the hospital. So when I got this information, we already had heard at the trademark that he might be dead, was dead. Nobody, I didn't know quite what to make of that, but I knew, you know, Barker's a good reporter, and he didn't, I knew he didn't make it up. But it was not something that was confirmed. But I'm looking at, okay, Barker has somebody at the trademark who says that the president is dead, or they think he's dead. He's dead. I wasn't quite sure what they'd said. I've talked to people at the hospital, and talked to enough people at the hospital that, you know, I once worked the police beat in Houston at number 61 Reasons Street, that if I'm covering the police beat in Houston, what I'm looking at is the president is dead. And I told that to New York. I was, we had old-fashioned telephones in those days, and I told the radio editor, who said, well, you know, I said, you know, I think he's dead. He said, he's dead? I said, yes. He said, well, you know, this is what we had. And I recounted to him what we had. And so he relayed that to radio right away. And the next thing I knew, they were playing the Star Spangled Banner, and the anchor person for that radio broadcast was saying that, you know, the president is dead. And recounted what we had. Now, I didn't make the decision to go on air with it, but I did tell him that he was dead on the basis of what I had. The decision was made not to go with it on television. They didn't doubt it. They'd had to speak for themselves, but I knew them talking to them. They didn't doubt it. But the decision was made for television that they'd hold off for the official announcement. But, you know, it doesn't amount to much. It's just, yes, we, you know, we were the first to report and confirm that the president was in fact dead. [00:42:14] Speaker 1: Did something click for you personally when you heard the Star Spangled Banner? I mean, like this had come from you, had gone to New York, and is now all over the country from you, Dan Rather. [00:42:24] Speaker 2: Well, first, you know, I was heavy hearted from the moment that I realized that he was in fact dead. Whether it was announced or not, he was dead. Well, I guess I'm heavy hearted about that. And again, you fight your emotions about it. But you just, you can't, I kept saying the story. Staying on the story, straight on the story. And when they played the Star Spangled Banner and announced that he was dead based on my reporting out of Dallas, I gulp pretty hard. I said things to myself, you know, just very quickly to myself. Boy, I know we're right about this, but we better be right about this. But in the great scheme of things, it doesn't amount to much. But I think that given the atmosphere at the time, the worries about perhaps, perhaps that there was some tie in with the Cold War, Russians, Cubans, what have you, concerns about that, that the government might have held off the announcement of the president's death for a longer time if CBS had not broken the story that he was, in fact, dead. We'll never know about that. But we do know that there was enough concern that maybe others were involved and maybe there was a conspiracy for President Johnson to move immediately to the airport and get back to Washington as quickly as he could. But it wasn't just that Friday, as you know. It was Friday, which is the day of the assassination. It's become known as the four dark days in Dallas. The president is assassinated on Friday. Sunday morning, the assassin is assassinated incredibly, almost unbelievably. And then the funeral service on Monday, in which the First Lady performed a national service, a great service to her country in the way she handled herself, handled that. Those four dark days in Dallas set a tone for the rest of the 1960s that I think is undeniably true. Those four dark days in Dallas set a tone in many important ways the rest of the 1960s that I think, looking back on it, is fairly clear. And any number of things were set loose in the country, in the society, growing out of the four dark days there, some for better, some for worse, many hard to tell. But it's undeniable that the country changed in the course of those four dark days. In the same way that we now say it, I think, correctly, that after 9/11, everything changed. Or if it wasn't a case of everything changed, certainly a lot changed after 9/11. There's a great similarity with what happened with the Kennedy assassination in 1963, that you couldn't come away from the four dark days in Dallas of 1963, not saying to yourself, everything's changed or if everything hasn't changed, a lot has changed. And much of it, we know not what it will be, but we can't kid ourselves that the country will be different after these four dark days in Dallas. [00:45:56] Speaker 1: He said, "And really it wasn't this when all the craziness started: Dallas, Oswald, Ruby, Watts, Manson, Ray, Saran, Bremer, Vietnam, Wargate, FBI, CIA, Squeaky From, Sarah Moore." This was written in the '70s, obviously. The endless lunatic newsreel. What did you mean by that? [00:46:14] Speaker 2: Well, when I wrote in the camera never blinked that sort of the endless lunatic newsreel that became part of the 1960s and beyond, Oswald, Ruby, Manson, Bremer, Vietnam, the country being torn apart, Martin Luther King's death, Robert F. Kennedy's death. The whole waterfall of, in many ways, cataclysmic events, in many ways you can mark it from the death of President Kennedy in 1963. Would some of these things that flowed in the wake of it happened anyway? We'll never know. Were many of them spawned by the events in Dallas on that fateful day? I think it's obvious, or this much again, that the country changed and the country began changing so dramatically in the wake of the Kennedy assassination. And the acceleration of change increased tremendously after the Kennedy assassination. Well, why? I wish I knew the answer to why it changed so much. But among the reasons I think things changed so much after the death of President Kennedy and that we had this kaleidoscope of so many changes in the society, so many violent things happening in society, is number one, before the assassination of President Kennedy, there was a widespread belief, I was a subscriber to it. But this kind of thing can't happen in America, it doesn't happen here. We're not the kind of people, we don't have the kind of country where presidents are assassinated on our public streets. Yes, this fought our history, if you knew our history in any ways. Lincoln was assassinated, McKinley was assassinated, I feel. We had a list of presidential assassinations before and attempted assassinations. But particularly after World War II, it was the 20th century is the American century. We were emerging, not just as a superpower, but as the dominant superpower. And it was just this, you know, we're the new people. We're on a new frontier, President Kennedy's phrase. We're in the new frontier. We're in the high frontier. We're into outer space. We're headed for the moon. The sky is the limit. And that assassinations of kings and archdukes, those sort of things, they happen in Europe. They don't happen here. Then I want to say, one can argue that there was little historical foundation for that kind of thinking. But it was the prevailing mood. And that with the death of President Kennedy, there were so many questions about the death that they remain to this day, a lot of questions about was Oswald the only shooter, all of that sort of thing. But those questions were real and present, were acutely asked in the immediate aftermath of the death of President Kennedy. And the whole atmosphere of asking questions, asking tough questions, grew out in part. Secondly, there was a, I hesitate to call it pent-up youth, but there was a sense in the country that conformity in the wake of World War II and through the 1950s and even the early part of the 1960s, conformity was considered to be the norm. And after the death of President Kennedy, all kinds of fundamental questions began to be asked. I think you can make too much of it. It's also easy not to make enough of it. Another factor was the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was at one scale during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. And again, to be fair and to be accurate, it was President Kennedy who made the fateful decision to increase American involvement significantly in Vietnam. One can argue whether it was the right decision or the wrong decision, but it was his decision. And when Lyndon Johnson came to the presidency, given the way he came to the presidency, the death of his predecessor, a younger predecessor, and President Johnson feeling, I want to keep the same team, the same Kennedy team around me for at least a while and to carry on the war. Don't read this. No one should read it as excuses for President Johnson. But by any reasonable analysis, that a president who succeeds to the presidency by a sudden assassination of his predecessor and an increasingly popular predecessor at that, and then given the outpouring of the nation, Republicans, Democrats, independents, whatever you were, of outpouring of sympathy for the Kennedy family and the emotional situation the country was in, that when President Johnson came in, not only did he feel that he needed to pursue the war, at least at the level of President Kennedy, but that he felt of anything, that he had to pursue it even harder to demonstrate that he wasn't, quote, "soft on communism," or that he didn't have the stomach from the war. And he had, what President Johnson had around him, his choice, he kept around him. For example, the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, who was a believer in the importance of the war. So the point here is that among the many things that were set loose, many things that flowed in the wake of the Kennedy assassination, was the rise in the dominance of the war, as we went on through the '60s, in the American psyche and the American consciousness. Now, one should note that there remains to this day the argument which no one can really settle. Would President Kennedy have continued to pursue the war as actively after being re-elected in 1964, had he been elected in 1964 or not? I, for one, think you can argue that both ways, but there has been instilled this kind of mythology or something close to that, that, well, President Kennedy certainly would have stopped the war. He certainly would have gotten out of Vietnam. What I'm suggesting, all I'm suggesting, what I'm suggesting is the empirical evidence of that is very thin. What we have is President Kennedy, he increased significantly American involvement in the Vietnam War. He was dedicated to winning the war, whatever. He didn't have any better definition of what win would mean than President Johnson did later, but those things. So we'll never know what a second Kennedy term, if there was to be one, would have been like. But again, it let loose these forces, not just within the Democratic Party, but within American politics as a whole. Many, not all, but many of the Kennedy people, including the President's brother, Robert, never really liked Lyndon Johnson for various reasons, some understandable, some not so. They never really liked him. Then he becomes President, and there was this resentment that he was President. He never got the, many of them, full confidence. And in some cases, he got it for a short time and it went away. It let loose in American politics a spirit of suspicion and a harder edge to politics. Listen, politics has always been a tough trade, but the development of the spirit that it's not just enough to defeat your opponent, that you must destroy your opponent, I think had its seeds in the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination. Maybe it would have developed otherwise, but I don't think so. [00:55:12] Speaker 1: Is that because many people thought that Kennedy had been destroyed by politically? [00:55:19] Speaker 2: I think a lot of reasons for it. I think, you know, one reason that politics turned harder-aged, considerably more sour, however you want to describe it, is that a certain segment, it's hard to quantify it, but a segment believed that he had been destroyed. And that with him went their hopes for what the future of the country could look like. And then there were those who resented the rise of Lyndon Johnson. People who said, like, "President Kennedy looked like a president. He sounded like a president. He had forward-looking. He was youthful." And now we have Lyndon Johnson, who was not what a lot of people thought a president should look like, and who had a Texas twang in his voice. And also, he had come to the presidency not having been elected, but having been elevated in the wake of the assassination. But in fairness, on the other side of that, there were those who saw an opportunity, said, "Well, John Kennedy in 1964 would have been tough to beat, but maybe Lyndon Johnson's beatable." And even after President Johnson roared to a victory by one of the widest margins at the time in our history, there were those who said, "Well, you know, if Kennedy had had a second term, he had a two-term Kennedy presidency, it might be hard to get the Republican elected down the side." But with Lyndon Johnson, he's more vulnerable, he's more weaker, if you will, in political terms. And the key thing to me is that when President Johnson, in 1965, sought to get passed and did get passed the most important legislation having to do with efforts for... ...improvement of race relations, the Open Housing Act, the Open Voting Act, that this was significant in that Lyndon Johnson knew at the time, he knew before others, that this was going to spell trouble for the Democrats in the South. The Republicans realized it was an opportunity for Republicans in the South, that would we have had these breakthrough pieces of legislation dealing with racial inequality in 1965, in 1965, if we had not had the death of President Kennedy in 1963? I, for one, I, for one, have my doubts about that. Certainly, it can be argued, well, President Kennedy in a second term, if he'd had one, might have done that and more. Well, might have, could have, should have, maybe. But what we do know is that President Johnson, as president, head of the Democratic Party, titular head of the Democratic Party, made the decision to get through Congress. And, through Congress, these significant pieces of legislation dealing with efforts to make racial equality, knew that he was running high risk with an important part of the Democratic constituency, which was the so-called solid South. And the Republicans knew it as well. And I think that added to this sense of a harder edge to politics, because understandably, the Republicans began building their base, and understandably, building their base among Southern white males, not just males, but in political terms, that was the key. The key, who resented this legislation, thought that President Johnson was going too fast, or what have you. So, all of this happened in the '60s. We can see what happened going into the '70s and '80s as a result of this. But it all was happening in the '60s. And much of it can be traced directly to the day President Kennedy was assassinated. [00:59:32] Speaker 1: Right. I want to get back into some specifics. What was the general tone of the original reports that you were getting into your station about what exactly had transpired the moment Kennedy was killed? Was there a consistency in terms of the number of shots or where they came from, anything like that? [00:59:50] Speaker 2: No. As is frequently the case with breaking news, whether you're covering a five-car pileup on I-95, or a homicide in a home in a suburban district, or the, I would say, especially the slaying of the president, eyewitnesses. Eyewitnesses and earwitnesses can and usually do differ greatly in their descriptions of what happened. It's reporting 101 that if you ask five people, "Did you see this car wreck? Yes, I saw it. Tell me what you saw." When you compare the notes of the five people who were there, no doubt saw it, there are great differences in the story, certainly some differences, gaps in the story. And so it was with the Kennedy assassination. I think, fair to say, for quite a while, nobody quite knew what was happening. There wasn't an agreement on where the shots came from. There wasn't an agreement on how many shots there were. There wasn't an agreement on where the shots went. There wasn't an agreement on what the succession of events that followed very quickly behind it meant. For example, Officer Tippett was killed shortly after President Kennedy was killed. He was killed by Lee Harvey Oswald. I recognize as a theory that it wasn't Lee Harvey Oswald. But in many ways, the killing of Officer Tippett, Police Officer Tippett, who saw Oswald and sought to stop him for questioning, and was killed as a result of it, is, as it's been called before, is the Rosetta Stone of the Kennedy assassination. But at the time, you know, yes, some of us knew a police officer had been killed, but we didn't know he'd been killed by the assassin of President Kennedy, or if you prefer, the alleged assassin of him. We now know that Oswald was captured in the theater, and was captured in the theater, that he had a gun, and he would have shot another police officer there, except the police officer put his hand on it. And when he put his hand on it, he got this part of his hand between the hammer and the shell and saved his life. But we didn't know all that at the time. It was a confusing, chaotic, tumultuous period. And looking back on it, you could say, yes, there were dots that could be connected. Okay, Officer Tippett was shot. He was shot by the same guy who was arrested in the theater, and this guy was in the textbook depository. But there really wasn't much known for a long time in way of established facts. [01:02:40] Speaker 1: So when the Dallas police chief said, I think it was on Saturday night and Sunday morning this case is cinched, was there an accumulation of evidence that you were aware that was coming out of the Dallas Police Department that led people to think, led you to think that they probably got the right guy, or were you still kind of open about it, or do you remember? [01:03:05] Speaker 2: I don't think I was alone, but I didn't know what to think. So much was happening so quickly, and we were all dealing, again, with the emotional undertow of the assassination of a president that confusion reigned. It reigned inside the Dallas police station, and quite honestly, I think it would have reigned in almost any police station in America. [01:03:32] Speaker 1: Describe that. Describe the scene in the Dallas police station. [01:03:35] Speaker 2: Describe that. In the police station itself, it was like every other place in town. Rumors were flying around. You could hear almost anything you wanted to hear in the Dallas police station. Not unusual. In a big homicide case, not a president would be killed. You often hear all kinds of rumors around. But when Oswald was captured, and the police chief said, "In effect, we've got our man," it was believable. But there was so much unknown, and you said, "Well, we'll see." Now, with reporters, many of whom, including this one, have worked a lot around police work, well, you know that they sometimes get the wrong person. But in many ways, I think Hope was father to the belief that they had the right person. And as more came out, for example, he shot Officer Tippett, and the circumstances under which he was arrested in a theater. By Saturday, not all of the dots, not nearly all of the dots were being connected, but some were being connected. The police case was, "Well, how do you know we got the right guy? Worked in the school book depository. He worked on the floor at the school book depository from where we think the shots came. He ran away. He killed a police officer when the police officer sought to arrest him. He almost killed another police officer in the theater. By luck and the grace of God, he didn't. And you put all those things together, and it made sense. But the overwhelming mood in Dallas, and I think in the country, was one of sorrow and grief. That the police story was, you know, rivetingly interesting, no question, but a lot of interest. But it was mixed with the, "God, how could this be happening to the country? What happens to the country now?" And there were still echoes of the, "Well, is this the last of it?" Or, "Is there some conspiracy, foreign-led or otherwise, that led to all this?" It was a miasma of confusion, chaos, conflicting emotions. But when the police chief said, "In effect, we've got the man," I think it's fair to say there was a great sigh of relief at that time. And rising hope that, "Well, yes, they've got the man." And, "Was he the only one?" remained an open question, a very active open question for quite a while after that. [01:06:19] Speaker 1: Tell me about just the role of the media in this. I mean, I've seen, you know, the famous footage of the scene in the Dallas Police Department, all these big old unwieldy cameras rolling over there. Do you ever seen anything like that? And how did that, how was the Dallas police, how were they influenced at all in relating to this international attention they were getting and live TV coverage coming out of there? [01:06:42] Speaker 2: Well, the Dallas police force, which has been criticized in many ways, and I think quite honestly is an opinion in some ways unfairly, that they were overwhelmed. That's not an excuse, but it's a fair and accurate assessment. They were overwhelmed. They were overwhelmed by the enormity of what had happened. They were overwhelmed by the number of questions that flowed out of what happened. They were overwhelmed by the press, which was, as the American press does, beating on doors saying, "What's going on in there? And what do you know? And why aren't you telling us what you know?" And their job was complicated, but federal authorities, including the FBI, the Secret Service, all kinds of federal law enforcement agents and officials were descending on them and asking questions, causing some rifts and turmoil. Anybody who's ever worked in a police station knows that, for example, the FBI and the local police may cooperate a lot of times, but a lot of times there's tension with them. All this was going on inside the station. The Dallas police were overwhelmed. Now, in retrospect, one can say what they should have done is tell the press, "Keep a distance. We'll have a news conference so-and-so time," to, insofar as they could, tell the federal authorities, "This is, for the moment, a local murder case, and we're going to handle it." And we're going to handle it that way. You can look back on it and say any number of things the Dallas police could have, should have, might have done. But under the circumstances, it's as if a great tidal wave smashed into the house, knocked down the walls, the water's coming over you, and you've got people saying, "Why don't you do this? Why don't you do that?" That was pretty much the mood and the atmosphere in the police station. But there were reporters like Pappas, I remember. There were reporters at the time who said, "You know, they're not handling this as well as they should." In some cases, why don't they, in a reasonably calm atmosphere, let him have his say. Walk him out, let him have his say, and let us question him. That's always the imperative from the press standpoint. In some, the Dallas police, which they deserve some of the criticism they've gotten, some of it they don't, they were trying to do the best they could under the circumstances, but overwhelmed. I keep coming back to it because it's the only word that applies. And by the way, the federal law enforcement agencies were also overwhelmed. They began flying in people, getting people in there as quickly as they could. But no one was prepared for the president's assassination. [01:09:35] Speaker 1: Perhaps too eager to appease the media? I mean, in terms of this whole thing about the reputation of Dallas, and there was the issue that, that when Oswald said, you know, how do you get that bruise and he was like, got hit by a pop. [01:09:53] Speaker 2: Well, that it's reasonable to believe that the Dallas police, because of Dallas's national reputation, don't want to overstate it, Don't want to understate it, national reputation of being a place hostile to politicians of anything close to President Kennedy's ilk. Reputation, by the way, which I think was not fully deserved. But because the pictures of Adlai Stevenson, former Democratic presidential candidate being assaulted, those pictures were distributed so widely that Dallas had a reputation of not being a very friendly environment, which for those of us who were Texans sort of was head scratching because Texans think of themselves as very friendly indeed, and overwhelmingly Dallas people can be friendly. But nonetheless, the police department was operating in an atmosphere of, okay, Dallas is on trial here. There was a very big spirit of Dallas being on trial. And with good reason, because there were unreasonable things being said about Dallas elsewhere in the country. It was very popular to say, well, no wonder this happened in Texas, you know, couldn't happen here. Well, you know, Abraham Lincoln was assassinated in Washington, DC, McKinley was assassinated in upstate New York. But in the emotions of the moment, it was very popular to criticize Texas and say, blame Texas, and particularly to blame Dallas. And the police were operating in this same milieu, if you will. The press was pressing very hard for answers. And it's in its human nature to want to, quote, get them off your back. And you had a national press, some stayed on because the president's visit, but they were journalists were descending from all over the world, pouring into Dallas to cover this story. And again, you had questions from Washington being asked and these federal law enforcement agencies. And the Dallas police were on the defensive from moment one. And there was the case of Oswald. He had a mark on his eye. I hope I have the right eye. I don't remember, but the mark on his eye, he said, a policeman hit me. Well, again, anybody's been around a police station. Sometimes police have to hit people to subdue them. And keep in mind that whether you believe that Oswald killed President Kennedy or not, that is, he killed Officer Tippett. There are people who still--so the police had a person in their hands who, at the very least, had killed a policeman and came very close to killing another. So the fact that he was--if it's a fact that he was treated roughly, under other circumstances, it might have been a shrug of the shoulders. It all added to this. The Dallas police unquestionably got in a situation. They wanted to get everybody off their back. They wanted to please as many people as they could. And they did feel that not only they, but the whole city of Dallas was on trial. And they wanted a good verdict out of that trial, the verdict being, we got the guy, we got the shooter, we got him, and we handled him in a very professional manner, which they were trying to do through Saturday. But if you take a look at this footage of what was happening at the police station trying to get Oswald from one place to another, by today's standards, and I would say by the standards at that time, it was seen as ridiculous. [01:13:27] Speaker 1: Do you think that that led to Oswald's death? Their attempt to appease the media by presenting him so? [01:13:36] Speaker 2: Well, I have a different view, what I perceive to be the majority view on this, and I could be wrong about it. But I don't think that the Dallas police were moving Oswald on Sunday morning to please the press. It may have been a factor. It's reasonable to argue it was a factor. But I don't think that was a--I think the overwhelming thing was they wanted to get him to some other location, almost any other location. And in fact, you know, look, we've been through, what, 36 hours here, 36 plus hours here, of just utter chaos. And it's just overpowering us. We need to get him transferred to a place where we can do our work at the police station and be sure that he's secure. And I think there were very good reasons, legitimate reasons, for moving Oswald from the police station itself over to the other location, besides wanting to please the press. I don't question for a moment that the Dallas police had in mind, well, it will please the press. They can get pictures of him and see him being transferred. And we want to get those pictures out to the world. I don't question for a moment that that was a motivation. But I do think that the main motivation was to get him to a more secure location and to get him out of the police station itself. Again, it's so easy to look back and say, well, they might have done this, they could have done this, they should have done this, that instead of moving him at, what, roughly 9:00 a.m. in the morning, depending on whether you're in East Coast time or Central time, when I'd move him at 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock in the morning, you'd look back and say, well, that would have been better. But at the time, you know, who knows? I think they did the best they could in their circumstances. [01:15:25] Speaker 1: Do you have a sense, like, my God, they're like walking this guy around and somebody's going to... [01:15:28] Speaker 2: Well, on Saturday, the first time we saw him, there was, the first time we saw Oswald at the police station, and it was, you know, the television cameras there. And you say, ah, golly, what's going on here? Why are they doing this this way? And the chaos, and that's the proper word, that reigned around it. Well, you know, I went some, and I think most people went some. But with the wincing was an understanding of it. Well, you know, the police have a real problem, and they'd never dealt with anything like this before. And when the decision was made to move him at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, shrug of his shoulders and say, gosh, why are they moving 9:00 o'clock in the morning? And the argument was made, well, they can get well prepared by that, and they get the press in position for it. And the world can see that things are settling down in Dallas, things are getting into control in Dallas. The assassin is in handcuffs and is being moved, and the criminal justice system is beginning to turn. I don't think you can be argued that that was one reason that they wanted to move him at the time that they chose to move him. [01:16:41] Speaker 1: Tell me about your search for footage of the assassination itself. [01:16:47] Speaker 2: Well, in this sea of confusion, the chaos and the coverage, it was, you know, we're in television. And in television, the pictures matter. Pictures add something to the story. Even if you're in newspapers or magazines, you want the picture because they add to the story. And at some point, my recollection is sometime during the afternoon, late afternoon, no later than early evening, it was maybe even before that. You know, at some point, you say, somebody's got to have pictures. Where, you know, where are the pictures? You know, still photographs or moving pictures. At that time, they were saying in television, we're the business of pictures that wiggle, moving pictures. But note that home movie cameras were not nearly as popular and not nearly as prevalent among Americans as they are now. But home movie cameras were known. Some people had them. So, as reporters, and we weren't the only ones, we said, let's try to find some pictures. Who, still pictures, if we can find them, better still moving pictures. And the newsroom in Dallas, the KRLD newsroom, which had a lot of good pros. We all, we, the CBS contingent, was working with them, and we set out to see, did anybody have any pictures? Anybody heard of anybody have any pictures? And one thing led to another, and eventually somebody said that they saw a man with a movie camera. My recollection is there were several false leads or leads we couldn't develop. Then we got a name, Sapruder, which is not all that common name. And Mr. Sapruder was contacted, and he very calmly said that, yes, he had his movie camera there, and that he had filmed the assassination. Well, as reporters, you say, what? Are you sure? And he was pretty sure, but he hadn't had the film developed. And because it was a weekend, again, keep in mind, this is 1963. Now you might have a lot of places over the weekend open. It could develop film right away, but it wasn't that easy to get the film developed. And so arrangements were made, special arrangements were made to help him get that film developed. He was pretty sure that he had what it turned out he had. He just said, you know, saw the whole thing through the finder. But sometimes people think they've got it, and they don't. And by the next morning, he had an attorney. He was contacted. He said he had it. Special arrangements were made to develop the film. Again, because there weren't that many home movie cameras around, there wasn't any place open on the weekend, a regular retail place, to get it developed. And arrangements had to be made to get it developed. [01:19:47] Speaker 1: And you helped those arrangements? [01:19:49] Speaker 2: And we helped make those arrangements. That he got an attorney. And I got a call, and it was to be at the attorney's office at a certain time, and that Mr. Saputo's attorney will let you see the film. Well, before I put the phone down, I was gone. And when I got to Mr. Saputo's attorney's office, the attorney who was quite a gentlemanly Dallasite, when I came in, the first thing I noticed was that Dick Stolley, whom I knew from the Civil Rights coverage time, who was with Time and then later, by that time, Life Magazine, was seated there. I was under the impression, certainly had the hope, that we'd be seeing this film by ourselves. But when I saw Dick Stolley there, I was thinking, oh, man, how did he get here? And then it was, well, how many more are going to be? But it turned out it was only Dick Stolley and myself. And the attorney said, where's the effect? I have Mr. Saputo's film. Here's what's going to happen. We have a projector in the room here. We're going to put the film up once and one time only so you can see it and know what he has. And then I'll talk to you about some arrangements, which was whether the film was going to be for sale and if so, how much? And we went into this makeshift viewing room and they put it up on a small home movie kind of projector and projected it right up on the white wall. And there it was, the whole assassination in frame and in focus, that it didn't last long. But the impact of it is something I had never experienced before and haven't experienced since, a kind of almost disbelief along with the realization that here is a piece of evidence that can answer a lot of the questions. And I practically levitated out of the seat the second it ended and just almost took the hinges off the door and said, I'll be back because our station was not far away. And the number one thing in my mind was, boy, that when the public finds this out, this is going to be news. And my intention was, and I did, I raced back to the station, told our people in New York, I've just seen this film, an incredible film, the whole assassination is there. And so I laid out film, quality of it is good. And they said, are you sure? They were a little bit concerned about the integrity of the film. That is, you know, is it what it purports to be? And he said, listen, there's no doubt about it. And so they said, well, you know, get in the chair, get in front of the microphone, describe what you have seen. I've seen the film one time, no notes. It was, you should look at this film. And so I described the film on live television, which we were constantly covering live. I described the film from memory, having seen it the one time. And as soon as I did that, then they said they wanted to do it again almost immediately. [01:23:31] Speaker 1: And this wasn't live? [01:23:33] Speaker 2: This was live. [01:23:35] Speaker 1: And they said they wanted you to do it again live? [01:23:37] Speaker 2: Yes, because at that time videotape, it's fair, but we were live coverage. And we did it live. And frankly, I think they were stunned by the whole thing. And they said, well, you know, hold on a minute and do it again. And whoever was anchoring New York, I don't remember by that time whether it was Harry Reasoner or Walter Cronkite, but they said something in between. But Ernie Liser, who was the executive producer of the coverage, said, you know, don't go away. I want you to turn around and, you know, and do it again, which was a little like replay of the film. We had the film. If we'd had the film, we'd replayed the film. You would have shown the film. I would have. It wasn't my decision to make. I would have shown the film. And do I think, do I believe CBS News would have shown the film? Yes, I do. We'd have known because we didn't have the film. What we had is a reporter, this reporter, who had seen the film, seen it one time, going from memory to describe it. But nobody else had that. [01:24:34] Speaker 1: But what you said was not entirely accurate. [01:24:38] Speaker 2: Well, I think what I said was remarkably accurate given the fact I'd seen the film one time. Perhaps someone wants to read it as a self-serving statement. But I think if you put what I said up against the film and you look carefully, that the remarkable thing is how much I got right, not what I, quote, left out or got wrong. Well, a case in point, much has been made of, say, "Well, you see the film," and you say, "It's clearly he was hit from the front." Well, widely believed that may be, but true, it is not. I would say this, that if anybody besides Oswald was firing, and if anybody hit President Kennedy with gunshots, it did not come from the front. And I think overwhelming of the scientific evidence and every other piece of evidence. But here's what happened. Now, this gets fairly detailed. But where I've been criticized in my description of the film, and again, listen, I'm not a victim of anything. But I saw this film once, and I came back and was asked to describe what I had seen. And by that standard, if someone wants to argue, they could have and would have done it better than let them argue it. But they weren't there. Now, what you see in the film, if you look at the film very carefully, what you have at the moment, President Kennedy's head goes slightly forward. That's what I described. And what I've been criticized for saying is saying, "Well, his head moved slightly forward." Right? His head did move slightly forward. Then his head crochets back. Now, this is pretty grim and gruesome. But anybody who's ever hunted deer or any other animal knows that a high-velocity bullet, when it enters, it makes a small hole. And when it exits, it makes a big hole. And the physics of high-velocity bullets, that when a bullet enters, it enters so quickly in such high-velocity. Then it gets unstable as it gets into the, in this case, the head. As it gets unstable, it begins to spread, and it blows out the backside. If you shoot a deer from the front, it'll have a small hole in the front side. We'll have a huge hole on the backside. He said, "It's difficult for me to talk about it because I, you know, a lot of memories come flowing back about how bloody and outbrooding the murder was." But I'm going to talk about it. Talk about my recollection of the film, having seen it one time. I stand by it as I didn't do it perfectly. Who among us could have done it perfectly? Number one, I did it honestly. And number two, if anybody pays attention to the film without a preconceived notion of what they think happened or what they want to believe happened, we'll see the president's head go slightly forward, which is consistent with being shot from the rear. Now, any number of people, Oliver Stone, whose movie-making talents I admire, and others, have wanted to argue, well, any idiot, quote, "any idiot can see that he was hit from the front." Well, forgive me, any idiot can jump to the conclusion that he was not from the front. And I stand by my description of the film. About that, I have nothing to be apologetic about it. [01:28:15] Speaker 1: Well, how do you feel about the fact that you're exactly right? I mean, that is what, that is exactly, partly, and we'll get into this, the whole fact that it was never shown for so many years. But there was this notion that all you have to do is see the Zaprooted film. Like, that's the Brasetta Stone. All you have to do is see the Zaprooted film that obviously would show up in front. That was always the mantra of those people who were promoting a conspiracy. And your report that day kind of thrust you into this maelstrom, right at the very center, because it's that head movement that everybody says is the key thing. I mean, I agree with you, but have you, the repercussions of that report, how has that come back at you over the years? [01:29:00] Speaker 2: Well, if the repercussions, I don't even like the word repercussions, but if one wants to say the repercussions of having been the first person to describe on television what was in the Zaprooted film without the film and having seen it one time, if there have been any serious repercussions from that, I don't know what they would have been or are. And I'm probably in the least reliable position to assess them. That it did thrust me eventually into the whole argument about whether the Warren Commission had reached the right conclusion or not. You know, I'm reminded when someone wants to talk about how I was thrust into the middle of the controversy over the Kennedy assassination. By virtue of the fact, one, I was there. Number two, I was in charge of CBS News coverage on the scene, which I say with a smile, we didn't have that many resources there in the beginning. And by virtue of the fact that it helped in some small way get the Zaprooted film found processed in a very small way. It was a collaborative process all the way around. And because I saw the film and came back and described it on the television before anybody had seen it and before anybody else had described it, you know, I was thrust into the controversy. Well, the following things, I would say gently, that I'm not a scientist. I'm not an expert on guns. Yes, I grew up in a gun culture. And yes, I grew up around guns. And yes, I did it as a child and a young man, these things. And I'm not an expert on any of these things. What I tried to be that day is I tried to be a responsible reporter, doing my best to report honestly and accurately. And, you know, saying my prayers about every hour, not only for the Kennedy family and for the country, but, you know, God gave me the strength to report right. Well, and I did it to the best of my ability. I was surprised, most of the time I could smile in surprise, at how many people chose to make something of saying, well, you know, he must be part of the conspiracy because you look at the film and the film tells you all you need to know about where the shots come from. Well, excuse me, and with all respect, it doesn't tell you all you need to know about it, particularly if you don't look at it very carefully. But, you know, there used to be these signs in old mining towns, and I'm telling West Texas cattle towns that said, "Please don't shoot the piano player. He's doing the best he can." Well, in that spirit, I look back on all of that, that I was there. I did the best I could. What I wanted to do and all I wanted to do was report as honestly, as accurately as I knew how. Did I do it perfectly? No. I did do the best I could. As the years went by, the fact that I was in Dallas when President Kennedy was assassinated, the fact that they became a conspiracy industry, some very well-meaning people, some not so well-meaning people, and other people who just kind of liked to be involved. Between President Kennedy's death in 1963, as the '60s went forward, what I call the conspiracy business, the conspiracy industry, the questions, which is in a broad general way part of the American way. We love to doubt as well as to know. I had been thrust in the middle of that by virtue of the fact that I was in Dallas in 1963, but I went on from that to cover the Vietnam War, which became another very controversial, highly politicized and divisive subject. So I had the Kennedy assassination, then into the Vietnam War, and in some ways these morph together. But how is it that this guy manages to be in Dallas for the assassination of President Kennedy, and then he's in Vietnam? It must be a conspiracy there somewhere. Well, pure, utter, unadulterated balderdash. But it surprised me a little and sometimes brought a smile to my face about how many people began to say, "Well, you know, it is kind of odd," you know. Or to CBS. By the way, he's covered the civil rights movement where CBS frequently was called the colored broadcasting system because we were out front on that story. We were reported on it more than anybody else on television, and yes, I think more effectively. But from civil rights to the Kennedy assassination to the Vietnam War, by the late 1960s, I would say, mid to late 1960s, it all got stirred in with the conspiracy theories about the Kennedy assassination, which only tells you what a really crazy time it became. [01:34:24] Speaker 1: Well, this gets into the whole issue of the news media, which I'm interested in explaining with you. Why was it that the Warren Commission hearings were not tele-lost? Was there any outcry about that? Did CBS want to broadcast it? No, it wasn't. There didn't seem to be an intervention of it as being an issue at the time. [01:34:49] Speaker 2: Yeah. The Warren Commission hearings were not televised. And why they weren't, I don't know. And I don't remember a lot of hue and cry at the time about it, but perhaps there was. I just don't remember much about that. Certainly given today, as we sit and talk in the first part of the 21st century, you say it would be very hard for the government to have such hearings and not have them televised. [01:35:19] Speaker 1: But even then, though? I mean, there was the- [01:35:21] Speaker 2: They had been the Keith Offer hearings, the McCarthy hearings, and all of those things. Yeah. [01:35:26] Speaker ?: It wasn't- [01:35:26] Speaker 2: It's a good question. I don't know the answer to that. But I do not know the answer to why the Warren Commission hearings were not televised, not broadcast at all, regular television. And to the question of why, I don't know. Was there much complaint about it? I don't remember there being much complaint about it. Maybe there was, but I don't remember it. I don't remember it. That's a good point, though, that there had been hearings coming back in the 20s. [01:35:57] Speaker 1: I mean, it just seems strange, but again, you know, we're living in 2005. Yeah. You might be right looking back. But I mean, there was a history. No. On this being such an important- Well, I would say this- It had a huge impact. The fact- Yeah. I'm getting the sense of- Well, the subverted film being suppressed by Time Life. The Warren Commission hearings operating in secret. And the only things that people were seeing and coming to understand about what happened in the assassination being, they're getting it piecemeal from the media. And they're putting together the pieces. Yeah. [01:36:28] Speaker 2: Not a bad point. I'm not sure I agree with where that point goes. But one thing is here about the hearings. It's true that there had been hearings before, televised hearings, the McCarthy hearings, the Key Fall for Crime Commission hearings, and there had been others. All of those had been congressional hearings. They'd been in Congress. The Warren Commission was not a congressional hearing. But I'm not here to defend the decision, not to televise it. Listen, I'm a reporter, and my job is knock on doors and say, "What's going on in there?" And I think it's a good idea to televise and have regular broadcasts of them and to allow reporters in. My only point is, I do not remember there being much discussion of why they were not held in public. I suppose the argument, I don't remember hearing the argument at the time, but I think one of the arguments must have been, "Well, this is an investigation of a crime, and you don't allow television cameras, nor should you, when you're dealing with criminal acts. You don't allow television cameras at every police station. Now, here in the late 20th century, early 21st century, when videotape came in, it's very common that the police want those investigating crimes, want a videotape record of it as evidence. But it's just a fair question, and I think the question of why the Warren Commission hearings were not publicly broadcast is, to my mind at least, less important than that there was not transparency with the process as a whole, that nobody really knew what was going on in there. We were saying, well, okay, they didn't televise them, but there wasn't somebody coming out every day, my recollection, of briefing and saying, "All right, these are the witnesses we've heard today. This is basically what happened." There was secrecy about it. [01:38:33] Speaker 1: But were you guys pushing for that? Were you just accepting that this is the way they want to do it and okay? The media, the national media, national news media has been criticized for kind of being slow, as kind of like Kennedy with civil rights, instead of dragging, being drag-kicking and screaming into really exploring whether there were questions, whether there were issues that needed to be explored. [01:39:00] Speaker 2: Well, there are two points here as to the first. In other words, was the press pushing to have televised Warren Commission hearings? If so, I'm not aware of it. I don't remember that happening, and I think I would remember if it did. I don't think there was any big press to have it. As for asking questions, and that's a different matter. I can't speak for anybody else, but at CBS News, we never stopped investigating the Kennedy assassination. Mind you, when the Warren Commission was conducting his investigations, we were running our own investigation. And on a size and scale that was unprecedented for the network, that I and others spent a good deal of Mr. Paley, Bill Paley, who was chairman of the time, money, that we had almost carte blanche, okay, to run our own independent investigation. The late Les Medgerly, who was executive producer of the program, was in charge of that, for my recollection at the time. And now, a press investigation is far less effective in some ways because the press does not have the power of subpoena to force people to appear. And they do not have the threat of pain of perjury if you don't tell the truth. So the press is limited in what it can do. My point here is that we, on three different occasions at CBS News, including immediately after the Kennedy assassination, set about to do our own independent investigation. Saying, "Whatever the Warren Commission is doing, we're going to run a press investigation." And we did, to the best of our ability. And as I say, with more resources than any such investigation it had not done before. And we did that, I can't remember specifically the year when we broadcast it, but I think in 1964 or 5, when did the Warren Commission win? 64. Okay. Well, either in 64 or early 65, we broadcast the results of our own investigation. [01:41:10] Speaker 1: Well, there was the big documentary that you did in 67. Yeah. [01:41:17] Speaker 2: That was- [01:41:18] Speaker 1: That was- That was the late, you're talking about the earlier one. [01:41:20] Speaker 2: No. The earlier one, the 67 one. Right. My point is we never stopped investigating it. Right. I operated then, and not just myself, but speaking only for myself as long as I do, I operated, but I know the others at CBS News operated under the following. It's our job to follow the trail as close as we can, as much as we can, and do the best job we can do. And that if the Warren Commission has reached the wrong conclusion, it would be the biggest story that you could conceive of breaking. So for those who say, well, the fix was in, which I consider reporters are not insulted, but I think is rubbish. We may have done our investigation poorly. You may point to 15 things we should have done, might have done. But we certainly had the motivation to come to a different conclusion than the Warren Commission did. And within the limitations of our resources, time, and yes, our own fallibility, we did the best we could. But we did come to the same conclusion. But with us, and this is the difference, with me and the others I worked with, we never considered the case closed. It was, okay, this is the spirit we're giving the American people this documentary. We've done the best we can to follow the trail, to ask the right questions, try to, you know, we're not law enforcement people. We're not physicists or scientists, but run whatever experiments we can run, and tell you what we found up to now. But my attitude always was, and I know this was widely shared at CBS News, we operate on the best available information we have at the time. But let's be open-minded about other views. And over the years, if you look at the record between 1963 and certainly as late as 1972, we ran a series of assassination documentaries in 1972. We keep on asking questions, we keep on asking ourselves what the weaknesses are in the argument and never rule out the possibility that the other person is right, but also never be stampeded into changing your opinions just because they happen to fit somebody else's idea of what happened or to fit the mood of any particular moment. And I remain open-minded to this day about the Kennedy assassination, that if someone brings forward certainly empirical evidence, such as to be physical evidence, or for that matter, believable witnesses with a contrary point of view, I always want to hear it. I'll make my own assessments about where it leads, I always want to hear it. But that's been our attitude right the way through. I think the last time we did it, and it might not be called a documentary, was we did something on 48 Hours in, did we do it 2003? Somewhere in there. But same thing. [01:44:33] Speaker 1: There's something about this all occurring in the age of television. That people have, this was a first sort of live experience. Yeah. That people have a memory of experiencing a historical event live. And there's a feeling among a lot of people I've talked to. Okay. That they personally experienced the Kennedy assassination without it being mediated by a journalist. Yeah. You see, whereas in the past, it always went in there being a reporter. Good point. A newspaper article. Yeah. And that kind of immediate connection. You see the same thing with 9-LMs. They may not have been there, but they think they were there. And therefore, it's an experience that they personally had. And it divests you, the mediator, of a certain authority over the story. And people have sort of taken possession of the Kennedy assassination away from you all who were there and your whole generation of reporters who have now been sort of almost pigeonholed as part of the establishment in a sense. Yeah. [01:45:38] Speaker 2: Gosh, there's so much in that. I hardly know where to start. [01:45:40] Speaker 1: Well, I'm just exploring an idea that I think is really central to the film here. Yeah. What is it about, and why I really want to talk to you here, is what is it about the way that the Kennedy assassination has been absorbed into our society? We're so obsessed with this. We have documentaries. Time found again. You're absolutely here. It's the most fascinating thing. Two things. JFK and the assassination of JFK. Two stories that never died. [01:46:06] Speaker 2: Oh, fascinating stuff. [01:46:07] Speaker 1: JFK and the assassination of JFK. Yep. Are two stories that just, analysts are fascinating for people. Is there something about the fact that this was the first live TV event of this kind, and that this all spilled out in a blossoming period of live television, and dramatic things, violent things, being broadcast live that has somehow divested reporters like yourself of being the mediators of saying, well, this is true and this is not true? [01:46:41] Speaker 2: Well, let me say right off the top, that's too heavy a thought for me. But wrestle with it as best you can. Well, let me try to take it in pieces. Okay. And I think that to say, I mean it, you know, this heavy thought that would require some thinking about. I don't feel divested of anything, but part of it's because I never felt invested with anything. Perhaps that's another subject for me. First of all, in 1963, I'm thinking as I talk, had there been anything on television, any cataclysmic, disastrous event on live television before? Well, I can't think of any. I can't think of any. We had the national political conventions. We had things like the McCarthy hearings and the Kifoffer crime hearings. But I think this is the first time on live television that a true disaster, great tragedy, yes, cataclysmic event happened and television was there. Now, reminding ourselves that we didn't see the assassination on live television. We only saw that much later on the Sapruder film, and it was quite a bit later before we saw the film itself. We only had a description of the film. But one of television's strengths, it has many, many weaknesses. One of television's strengths, the strengths of television news is it can take you there, literally transport you there, almost literally a magic carpet like used to be described in children's books, take you there. Now, what happened in Dallas in 1963, the number of people in the country who owned television sets had begun to explode because the price of sets was coming down cheaper. Late '40s, only a few fairly well-to-do people could own television sets, depending where you were in the country. Through the '50s, the number of sets began increasing. But by the time we reached 1963, television as an entertainment medium had already overwhelmed most other entertainment. Movie houses were already having difficulty because there was so much entertainment on time. As an entertainment medium, television was coming to great prominence, had already come to great prominence. The television news had not reached great prominence. There were moments, national political conventions and all the rations and others, when news came to the fore. But by and large, it was entertainment in television that was coming to prominence. It wasn't until the Kennedy assassination that television news got the kind of prominence that we now associate with it. I would say that the Kennedy assassination was the time when television news reached at least parity with newspapers and magazines and was catapulted in its way to becoming the manner in which most Americans get their news. Now, because you are transported there through the miracle, the medium of television, it shouldn't be surprising that so many people almost literally think, "I was there. I was in Dallas." Because that's part of the power of television, to give you the feeling that you are there and in some ways take you there. Now, among television's weaknesses, particularly television news weaknesses, is context, depth, and perspective. It's very hard to get that on television. It's one who spent most of my professional life as a journalist working with television. I love the strength of it, that on an occasion such as the assassination or a 9/11 or an inauguration or a political convention, you can take people there. What you ache to do is have it seen in context and in some perspective and in some depth. And that's where television has its weaknesses. But unquestionably that so many people came away so deeply moved by the events in Dallas in 1963, the four dark days starting with the president's assassination. It became burned in the national psyche in a way that very few things in our history have been, and partly because people did feel I was there. [01:51:21] Speaker 1: Television news became the thing that people turned to in moment of crisis, and that's where they got the news after the Kennedy's assassination. That obviously invests Walter Cronkite and all the other anchors with a certain degree of power and authority that people turned to. [01:51:40] Speaker 2: On the point of whether the Kennedy assassination was the moment that television news people were imbued with new authority and respect, I think there's something to that. But I think it could be overstated. I think it was in the years following that as television became even more prevalent, having said it was beginning to reach up new heights in 1963 in terms of sets and use of people who had sets. But even in 1963 there were quite a few Americans who couldn't afford a television set and for one reason didn't have it. Coming out of the Kennedy assassination, what flowed out of that was if you didn't have a television set, you weren't going to be very well informed. But I don't think, as you can say, that the kind of respect for television reporters and particularly the main anchors of television news programs reached its height at the time of the Kennedy assassination. I think all that flowed later during the 1960s and the ascendancy of anchors, if you will. I was not an anchor at that time. I was a line reporter. But the ascendancy of anchors in the public culture and becoming figures you were respected started in the '50s, took a jump up at the time of the Kennedy assassination. And then after the Kennedy assassination, we had the Vietnam War, we had the war on poverty, we had assassination of Martin Luther King, assassination of Robert Kennedy, and the space program, which brought a lot of attention to central television news figures. All of that went into the mix. One thing to keep in mind about this, and it'll be for the film, that it's one thing to run a network television news operation. It's another thing to be a line reporter, which I was proudly so during that whole period, that everybody had questions about the Warren Commission, particularly about the mythology. I'd say even to including the state, I'd try to remind myself, well, the most important thing, why they chose to run the investigation as they ran it, handle the investigation as they did. These are important questions. But the most important question is, did they come to the right conclusion? How they reached the conclusion is important. And it's important considering whether they get the right conclusion. But the right, the principal place to look is, well, did they reach the right conclusion? Well, I had questions, and I certainly was not the only one. I don't know of any reporter during that period who didn't have some question about how the Warren Commission had conducted the hearings and basically why they didn't leave it as an open question, which I would have preferred. But you can say, well, that's the reporter's way. He always wants to leave it open for future things. I have a question, but it always came back when we were doing our documentaries. And some of them were not documentaries as such, special reports, whatever you want to call them. The central question was, well, was the right conclusion reached? And while I believed then, at the end of each time that we looked into it, saying to myself, be as open-minded as you can about things. And wouldn't it be, I mean, what a sensational story would be if you could prove or even bring really seriously into doubt the conclusion of the Warren Commission report? What a story, what a story to break. Now, for better or for worse, that each and every time came back to, you know, try as we may. The best eyewitness testimony, the best scientific evidence, if you want to include the Saputa film in either category, okay, leads to the following conclusion. As well, Oswald was a shooter. Oswald shot. He probably was the only shooter. If there were any other shooters, if there were any shooters, they were almost certainly looking, if you will, head-on in the Saputa film, to the left, which is to say, not in front of the president, but to the side or behind. Do I know that there are plenty of people who say, well, there he goes again. You know, you look at the film. Are you listening to this person or whatever? More of that is something I've lived with a lifetime. And listen, this is America. People are entitled to their views and entitled opinions. But if you look at the best available physical evidence and the best available eyewitness evidence, which is not all that good, and they put together what happened in the wake of it. I think that the conclusion is pretty self-evident that Oswald was, at the very least, a shooter. Do I personally think he was the only shooter? I do, but I'm open-minded about it. That is, if someone wants to say, well, here's where I think you're wrong. I've listened to them over a lifetime. But anyway, if there's a new perspective on it, I've listened to them now. It seems to be the most important unanswered question is, was Oswald connected in any way with anybody else in terms of planning or carrying out the assassination? Now, I'll make very clear that I still believe that the best available evidence is that he wasn't. But it remains a gray area. It may be unprovable. Hadn't been proved, at least not to me, that he was connected with anybody else. But if you wanted to concentrate on one area of the Warren Commission Report, of the whole discussion of the Kennedy assassination, I think the most fruitful area, if there's any fruitful area, for future historians who will be in the area, was there anybody else connected with him? Was he anything from, was he a Manchurian candidate, which is, you know, sort of hypnosis? Was, were the Cubans involved? He made the trip to Mexico, which remains a lot of unanswered questions about that. Were the Russians in any way involved? Was the mob involved? That whole area is one that I frankly don't think we're ever going to have all the answers. We don't have him about the Lincoln assassination. But that doesn't mean that people shouldn't continue trying to find them.

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