Church Committee Hearings: James Jesus Angleton (CIA) Testimony

[0:02] Good morning again from the Senate caucus room, a former CIA super spy, James Angleton. [0:10] Good morning again from the Senate caucus room, a former CIA super spy, James Angleton, [0:15] as to be the whole show before the committee this morning. [0:18] I'm Jim Lara with MPAC Correspondent. [0:20] She's shown a rather interesting propensity to begin on time. [0:25] That's what we are beginning practically on time. [0:27] Yesterday, the committee commenced its inquiry into the Houston plan, our witness being Mr. Houston, [0:52] and it developed in the testimony that several illegal proposals had been made to the president, [1:07] in this case Mr. Nixon, that he had approved those proposals, later had revoked his approval, [1:21] but that the very activities for which his authority was sought had in fact been going on for a long period of time [1:36] prior to the submission of the proposals to the president. [1:44] The evidence also showed that once the president had revoked the proposals, [1:56] about five days after he had first approved them, [2:01] the activities nevertheless continued and in some cases were expanded. [2:05] Mr. Houston testified that Mr. Nixon was not aware of these activities either before or after his approval and revocation. [2:34] One of the illegal activities was the opening of the mail by the CIA, [2:40] and this committee will look into that mail-opening program. [2:51] The evidence also showed that once the president had revoked the proposals, [3:00] about five days after he had first approved them, [3:04] the activities nevertheless continued and in some cases were expanded. [3:09] Mr. Houston testified that Mr. Nixon was not aware of these activities either before or after his approval and revocation. [3:38] One of the illegal activities was the opening of the mail by the CIA, [3:44] and this committee will look into that mail-opening program extensively. [3:54] It's a very serious matter. [3:56] We have hearings scheduled a few weeks from now and into which we will inquire in detail about the mail-opening program. [4:11] To know, for example, why the mail of such individuals and organizations in this country, [4:28] as the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, the Rockefeller Foundation was regularly opened by the CIA, [4:43] or the mail coming to or from such individuals as Arthur Burns, Bella Abzug, Jay Rockefeller, [5:02] Martin Luther King, Mrs. Martin Luther King, Richard Nixon himself, [5:14] as well as such senators as Hubert Humphrey, Edward Kennedy, [5:23] even the chairman of this committee, whose letter to my mother is in the file, [5:30] should have been regularly opened and scrutinized by the CIA against the laws of the country. [5:42] And so today, our objective is not to look at this mail program in great detail, for we will do that later, [5:52] but it is rather to examine the lack of accountability within the agency [6:07] and the failure to keep the president of the United States properly advised of such activities. [6:19] A core issue, if we are going to reform the intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies of the federal government [6:34] and make them properly responsible to and accountable for their actions to the elected representatives of the people, [6:48] chief among whom, of course, is the president himself. [6:56] Now, of course, is the president himself. [7:01] Now, with that brief introduction to the general topic for the day, [7:11] I would like to ask our witness, Mr. Angleton, who I understand is represented by counsel, [7:18] to take the oath before I ask you to take the oath, Mr. Angleton. [7:24] I wonder if your attorney would identify himself with the record. [7:29] Yes, Mr. Chairman, my name is John T. Brown, counsel for Mr. Angleton in these proceedings. [7:34] Thank you, Mr. Brown. [7:35] Mr. Angleton, will you please stand and take the oath? [7:38] Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, [7:46] the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? [7:49] I do. [7:50] Mr. Schwartz, will you please... [7:58] Mr. Schwartz, will you please begin the questioning? [8:03] Mr. Angleton, were you employed by the CIA in 1970? [8:07] Yes, I was. [8:08] Can you keep your voice up? It's hard to hear you. [8:11] Yes, I was. [8:12] What was your job at that time? [8:14] I was the chief of the counterintelligence staff. [8:17] And when did you start working for the CIA? [8:20] I began in 1947, having come from OSS. [8:25] Yes, you knew, Mr. Angleton, did you not, that the CIA was opening mail in New York City in 1970 [8:34] and had been doing so for approximately 15 or 20 years. [8:38] I do. [8:38] Pardon me, if I may interrupt for just a moment. [8:40] As I indicated to counsel for the committee, Mr. Angleton had a very brief opening statement, [8:45] which he wished to make. [8:47] And I would like at this time to ask for the opportunity to have him make that statement, [8:50] if I may. [8:51] Yes, I'm sorry. [8:51] You didn't say that to me, and I'm very sorry. [8:54] Go ahead, Mr. Angleton. [8:58] Mr. Chairman, my name is James Angleton. [9:07] I'm appearing before the committee today freely and without subpoena. [9:13] I'm mindful of the serious issues facing the committee. [9:18] I know of your concern that they be resolved prudently and expeditiously. [9:23] I served in the intelligence community of the United States for 31 years, [9:28] beginning with the OSS, during World War II. [9:30] In 1954, I became chief of the counterintelligence activities of CIA, [9:37] a position which I held until 1974. [9:40] I am now retired. [9:45] My years of service have convinced me that the strength of the United States [9:51] lies in its capacity to sustain perpetual yet peaceful revolution. [9:58] It is the ultimate function of the intelligence community as part of our government [10:03] to maintain and enhance the opportunity for peaceful change. [10:08] I believe most strongly that the efforts and motivations of the intelligence community [10:15] have contributed to the sustaining of a nation of diversity and strength. [10:22] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [10:24] Thank you, Mr. Angleton. [10:26] Strangleton. [10:26] Thank you, Mr. Angleton. [10:29] Strangleton, if we could just get back to where we were. [10:32] You just said, did you not, that you knew in 1970 [10:35] and had known for a substantial period of time [10:38] that the CIA was opening mail in New York City. [10:41] That is correct. [10:41] And Director Helms knew that, did he not? [10:45] That is correct. [10:46] And J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, knew that, did he not? [10:50] I would assume so, sir. [10:52] Well, I'll read to you what Mr. Helms said in his deposition of last week. [10:57] Quotes, Mr. Hoover knew all about the mail operations. [11:00] Close quotes. [11:00] Now, you've no reason to doubt that, do you? [11:03] I do not. [11:04] And Mr. Sullivan of the FBI knew all about the CIA's mail opening program, did he not? [11:09] That is correct. [11:10] Now, Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover and Mr. Sullivan and yourself were all involved in the process [11:20] which has come to be known as the Houston plan, is that correct? [11:24] That is correct. [11:25] And Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover signed the plan, did they not? [11:28] They did. [11:29] And Mr. Sullivan was the primary drafter, [11:32] but you and other working persons contributed to the drafting of the report, did you not? [11:38] Correct. [11:38] Right. [11:39] Would you turn, Mr. Angleton, to page 29 of the Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence [11:49] Ad Hoc, June 1970? [12:01] That's talking about mail coverage, isn't it? [12:04] And it distinguishes between routine coverage and covert coverage, [12:08] saying routine coverage is legal and covert coverage is illegal. [12:13] Is that correct? [12:13] That is correct. [12:15] And by covert coverage, they meant opening the mail, did they not? [12:18] Would you read into the record the first sentence under the heading Nature of Restrictions, please? [12:26] Covert coverage has been discontinued, while routine coverage has been reduced primarily [12:36] as an outgrowth of publicity arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage, [12:42] legal proceedings, and publicity afforded this matter, [12:46] and congressional hearings involving accusations of governmental invasion of privacy. [12:50] Now, the first five words say covert coverage has been discontinued. [13:01] And as you just agreed a moment ago, that states that the opening of mail has been discontinued. [13:07] Isn't that right? [13:08] May I seek a little clarification, please? [13:11] I believe that if you read the contribution under preliminary discussion, [13:22] that it's dealing that we're faced with two problems. [13:25] We're faced with the problem of domestic mail that goes from one point in the United States [13:30] to another point in the United States. [13:33] The CIA activity, CIA activity, was devoted from mail from the United States to communist countries, [13:42] and from communist countries to the United States. [13:45] So there's two degrees of opening. [13:48] In other words, the entire intent and motivation of the programs conducted by CIA [13:56] involved the question of foreign entanglements, counterintelligence objectives. [14:05] The domestic mail program was a program that had been conducted at some time or another by the FBI. [14:14] Mr. Angleton, would you answer my question? [14:16] The words covert coverage has been discontinued. [14:19] Covert there means opening mail. [14:21] Isn't that right? [14:21] That is correct. [14:22] Okay, and I will read to you from the prior paragraph a reference which makes perfectly clear [14:29] that the committee was talking about both foreign and domestic mail. [14:39] Covert mail coverage, also known as sophisticated mail coverage or flaps and seals, entails surreptitious screening and may include opening and examination of information. [14:44] That is correct. [14:45] That is correct. [14:47] That is correct. [14:48] That is correct. [14:49] Okay, and I will read to you from the prior paragraph a reference which makes perfectly [14:52] clear that the committee was talking about both foreign and domestic mail. [14:57] Covert mail coverage, also known as sophisticated mail coverage or flaps and seals, entails surreptitious screening and may include opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail. [15:13] Now, the sentence which says covert coverage has been discontinued, that's a lie, that's false, as far as your knowledge, Mr. Hoover's knowledge, Mr. Helms' knowledge, and Mr. Sullivan's knowledge, isn't that correct? [15:31] Still, my impression is referred to as having been discontinued, refers to the Bureau's activities in this field. [15:52] Well, the words don't say that, number one. Number two, how would a reader of these words have any idea that that distinction was being drawn, Mr. Anglison? [16:01] Well, certainly my impression was the gap the Bureau was seeking to cure. [16:11] All right, but let's make perfectly clear what we're talking about. You knew, Mr. Helms knew, Mr. Hoover knew, and Mr. Sullivan knew that the CIA was in fact opening the mail. [16:22] I agree. [16:23] And the sentence says covert coverage, which means mail opening, has been discontinued. [16:27] But I still say that the FBI, in my view, are the ones who made the contribution of that statement, covering the problems that they have had in discontinuing their mail coverage. [16:39] Mr. Helms signed the report, didn't he? [16:42] That is correct. [16:44] All right, I just want to have you read into the record from two more documents, which relate to the Attorney General of the United States being informed about mail opening, [17:06] but being informed in June 1971, or in other words, a year after the Houston plan. [17:15] Would you first read into the record from the Brown Book, tab J, paragraph four of that document? [17:28] And while you're looking for it, I will identify for the record that that is a CIA memorandum for the record dated May 19, 1971, [17:38] subject DCI's meeting concerning H.T. Lingual, which was the code name for the mail opening program. [17:45] And it refers, Mr. Angleton, to a meeting in Mr. Helms' office, which involved a number of CIA officials, including yourself. [17:54] Would you read into the record, paragraph four, please? [17:57] It's the first page, Senator, of tab J in the Brown Book. [18:05] May I read it to myself first, please? [18:07] Yes. [18:13] Paragraph four. [18:15] The DCI director of Central Intelligence then asks, [18:23] Who in the post office department knows the full extent of the operation beyond cover surveillance? [18:30] That's you. [18:33] The chief counterintelligence, meaning myself, replied that only Mr. Carter knows, [18:37] for he has been witting while with the CIA and the Office of Security. [18:44] The previous chief postal inspector, Mr. Montague, had never wanted to know the extent of examination actually done, [18:51] and thus was able to deny on oath before a congressional committee that there was any tampering. [18:58] Mr. Carter would be unable to make such a denial under oath. [19:06] In exchange between the director of Central Intelligence and the director of plans, [19:14] deputy director for plans, it was observed that while Mr. Carter's loyalty to CIA could be assumed, [19:20] his dilemma is that he owes loyalty now to the postmaster general. [19:26] Right. Now, because of that dilemma, in other words, for the first time, [19:30] someone was in the post office department that for sure knew that the mail was being opened. [19:35] Being opened. [19:36] Because of that dilemma, Mr. Helms went to see the attorney general, did he not? [19:39] Yes, correct. [19:41] All right, would you now read into the record, [19:47] from the memorandum for the record, 3 June 1971, which sentences at tab K, [19:53] the subject meeting at DCI's office concerning H.T. Lingual, dated, as I said, June 3, 1971. [20:03] Would you read into the record the second paragraph which refers to Mr. Helms' statement [20:11] that he had briefed the attorney general concerning the mail opening program? [20:15] Mr. Helms stated that on Monday he had briefed the attorney general Mitchell on the operation. [20:26] For emphasis note, Mr. Helms may have meant Tuesday, one June Monday, having been a holiday. [20:33] Mr. Helms indicated that Mr. Mitchell fully concurred in the value of the operation and had no, quote, [20:41] hangups concerning it. [20:43] When discussing the advisability of also briefing postmaster general Blunt, [20:49] Mr. Mitchell encouraged Mr. Helms to undertake such a briefing. [20:54] Right. Now that document was dated June 3, 1971, [20:57] and the mail opening program lasted until January or February 1973, [21:03] when at the instance of Mr. Colby, who said it was illegal, it was dropped. Is that correct? [21:08] That is correct. It was actually, the director was Mr. Schlesinger. [21:16] And was it not Mr. Colby who was the moving force saying it was illegal? [21:20] Yes, sir. [21:21] Okay, no further questions. [21:22] Mr. Angleton, Mr. Angleton, you heard Mr. Houston's testimony yesterday. [21:31] I heard most of it, sir. [21:34] But you will remember then that he represented to the committee that in response to the president's desire [21:42] to extend intelligence coverage within this country that asked the various departments of the government involved, [22:04] the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, to come together with a plan to give the president some options. [22:13] And that the purpose of the recommendations that were made to the president in the so-called Houston plan, [22:26] based upon the recommendations that had come from these departments, [22:36] was to secure the president's authorization to eliminate restrictions that he felt were obstructing this gathering of intelligence. [22:54] Now, Mr. Houston told us that he was never informed by the CIA, the FBI, or any agency that the mail was being opened. [23:18] He made a recommendation to the president that the president authorized mail openings. [23:24] And he testified that, to his knowledge, the president didn't know that the mail was being opened either. [23:28] Now, when we asked Mr. Helms, the director of the CIA, if, to his knowledge, the president had been told of the mail openings, [23:40] he said, I do not know whether he knew it or not. [23:42] So the state of the record is that, to the best of our knowledge, the president had not been told that the mail was being opened. [23:55] He gets a recommendation in which it is represented that covert coverage, which is mail openings, has been discontinued. [24:09] And he's asked to authorize the reopening of this program. [24:15] Now, you have referred to the president as the commander-in-chief. [24:22] What possible justification was there to misrepresent a matter of such importance to the commander-in-chief? [24:36] I would say that your question is very well put, Chairman. [24:42] I do not have any record of the discussions between ourselves and the FBI during the drafting stages. [24:57] But I know we had several where matters tabled within the drafting committee. [25:05] Matters that we never explained to the other members. [25:12] And one of them, of course, was the mail intercept. [25:15] Again, only by way of speculation. [25:19] I believe if the president had approved, or even if there had been some access to the president, [25:28] because I think this is probably the most difficult task of all, was to have the audience in which these things could be explained. [25:35] I have no satisfactory answer to your question. [25:44] Except that I do believe that a great deal of the mail problem centered on the Bureau's lack of coverage, not the agency's. [25:54] But the CIA was the agency principally involved in the mail opening. [26:08] That is correct for all foreign mail, not for domestic. [26:12] Yes. [26:13] And we will explore the whole breadth of that program in due course. [26:16] Didn't the CIA have an affirmative duty to inform the president about such a program? [26:23] I believe so, without any question. [26:27] But it apparently was not done. [26:31] You did not inform the president. [26:33] Director Helms did not inform the president. [26:40] So... [26:42] I would say, sir, not by way of any excuse, but those are very turbulent periods for the intelligence community. [26:50] Particularly for the FBI. [26:55] And I think that all of us had enormous respect for Mr. Hoover, understood the problems which he had in sustaining the reputation of the FBI. [27:06] But the fact that the times were turbulent, the fact that illegal operations were being conducted by the very agencies we entrust to uphold and enforce the law, [27:18] makes it all the more incumbent that the president be informed of what's going on, doesn't it? [27:24] It's really not an excuse. [27:27] I don't think there was ever a form in which these matters could be raised at that level. [27:32] I think it's been one of the troubles on domestic counterintelligence and foreign counterintelligence. [27:38] That the issues never do get beyond the parochial circle of those engaged in that activity. [27:45] But you have said that there was an affirmative duty on the CIA. [27:49] But you have said that there was an affirmative duty on the CIA to inform the president. [27:55] I don't dispute that. [27:56] And he was not informed. [27:58] But I... [27:59] So that was a failure... [28:00] That was a failure of duty to the commander in chief. [28:02] Is that correct? [28:03] Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone would have hesitated to inform the president if he at any moment asked for a review of intelligence operations. [28:14] Well, that's what he did do. [28:17] That's the very thing he asked Houston to do. [28:20] That's the very reason that these agencies got together to make recommendations to him. [28:24] And when they made their recommendations, they misrepresented the facts. [28:27] I was referring, sir, to... [28:29] But I'm referring... [28:30] ...a much more restricted form. [28:33] I'm referring to the mail. [28:35] And what I have said is solidly based upon the evidence. [28:40] The president wanted to be informed. [28:42] He wanted recommendations. [28:43] He wanted to decide what should be done. [28:46] And he was misinformed. [28:47] Not only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered authorizing the opening of the mail five days later and revoked it, [28:58] the CIA didn't pay the slightest bit of attention to him, did it? [29:02] The commander in chief, as you say. [29:04] I said I have no satisfactory answer to... [29:12] You have no satisfactory answer? [29:14] No, I do not. [29:15] Well, I don't think there is a satisfactory answer because having revoked the authority, [29:24] the CIA went right ahead with the program. [29:26] So the commander in chief isn't the commander in chief at all. [29:30] He's just a problem. [29:33] You don't want to inform him in the first place because he might say no. [29:38] That's the truth of it. [29:39] And when he did say no, you disregard it. [29:43] And then you call him the commander in chief. [29:46] I have no further questions. [29:52] In the tower? [29:56] In the tower? [30:08] Mr. Angleton, the role of certain leaders within the intelligence community, such as Mr. Helms, have been of concern to this committee. [30:21] Referring back to your transcript of September the 12th at page 17, you were asked about the role of the director of your agency, [30:32] the role of Mr. Helms, and you began by discussing the first meeting of the interagency committee. [30:42] Now, you were asked who attended it, and your response was, and I read from the transcript... [30:48] Mr. Helms, but he attended only for a few moments. [31:04] Houston made the opening remarks, as I recall. [31:08] And since it was being held in our building, Helms made a brief appearance, so to speak, the host. [31:16] He took off. [31:17] And I don't think from that moment he attended any other meetings. [31:22] Now, Mr. Angleton, the question is this. [31:25] Is this still an accurate characterization of Mr. Helms' participation in the decisions and recommendations leading up to the so-called Houston Plan? [31:36] Well, I didn't mean my statement to indicate that there was any neglected duty. [31:42] It was simply that the working group were qualified to adhere to certain guidelines. [31:54] Mr. Helms' appearance, the first appearance, was to lend weight to the president's request and to support Mr. Houston. [32:07] Are you saying, then, that Mr. Helms made no substantial contribution to the substance of the report? [32:17] No, I'm speaking about that his original talk was only to outline what the president required from the working group. [32:31] And, naturally, I saw him from time to time in terms of, I would telephone him to indicate where we stood on the report. [32:42] Mr. Angleton, in these working group sessions, who represented the FBI? [32:50] Mr. Sullivan, sir, who was also chairman of the working group. [32:55] In your opinion, did Mr. Sullivan's views accurately represent those of Mr. Hoover? [33:01] No, I do not think so. [33:03] Could you elaborate on that? [33:07] Mr. Sullivan, as chief of the internal security, assistant director for internal security, himself handicapped by lack of personnel and funding. [33:26] In addition, many of the aggressive operations conducted by the Bureau in the past had been systematically cut out by Mr. Hoover. [33:42] What does that mean? What's the significance of that? [33:44] Well, the significance being that the production of the internal security fell down considerably. [33:54] Mr. Angleton, did you come to gain some insight into the relationship between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Tom Charles Houston? [34:03] Well, it was my understanding, sir, that they had known one another for over a year prior to the meetings. [34:12] I would suggest that Mr. Houston was much better educated when he embarked on these matters than his testimony suggests. [34:28] Well... [34:30] I found him extremely knowledgeable. He was certainly aware of the gaps. [34:35] Would you say that Mr. Houston reflected the views of Mr. Sullivan? [34:39] Pardon? [34:40] Would you say that Mr. Houston reflected the views of Mr. Sullivan? [34:44] Very much so, sir. [34:45] I have no further questions, Mr. Mondale. [34:54] Thank you, Senator Tower. [34:57] Questions, Mr. Mondale. [35:00] Thank you, Senator Tower. [35:02] Mr. Angleton, you were in charge of the covert mail cover program from the beginning, am I correct? [35:11] Not from the beginning, sir. From 1955. [35:14] All right. [35:15] I took it on as an ongoing operation, which had been lodged elsewhere in the agency. [35:22] And what is your understanding as to who authorized the program? [35:30] I would say that the operation that was first initiated in 1952, at some stage, the authorization was from the chief of operations of the clandestine services. [35:48] As you conducted this program, under whose authority was it your understanding that you were operating under? [35:59] Within the agency? [36:01] Yes. [36:02] Under the chief of clandestine operations. [36:06] The deputy director for plans, would that be? [36:09] Correct. [36:10] And for your purposes, was that considered adequate authority, or was this such that you felt authority had to flow from either the president or the National Security Council? [36:24] It regarded that, thus, who was knowledgeable of the program as internal authority. [36:42] And at your level of operations, that would be the only authority you would concern yourself with? [36:48] That is correct, sir. [36:49] What was your understanding of the legality of the covert mail operation? [36:59] That it was illegal. [37:00] What? [37:01] That it was illegal. [37:04] Now, you're an attorney. [37:05] No, I'm not, sir. [37:06] Well, maybe. [37:07] That might be an asset. [37:08] It's my covering. [37:10] Being one myself, I shouldn't say that. [37:12] It's my covering. [37:13] What? [37:14] How do you rationalize conducting a program which you believe to be illegal? [37:22] To begin with, I was taking it over as an ongoing operation. [37:23] The probability that the program, through lack of personnel and funding, would have been scrubbed at some stage. [37:49] From a counterintelligence point of view, we believe that it was extremely important to know everything possible regarding contacts of American citizens with Communist countries. [38:06] Second, that we believe that the security of the operation was such that the Soviets were unaware of such a program. [38:20] And therefore, that many of the interests that the Soviets would have in the United States, subversive and otherwise, would be through the open mails, when their own adjudication was that the mails could not be violated. [38:41] So that a judgment was made with which you concurred that although covert mail openings were illegal, the good that flowed from it in terms of anticipating threats to this country through the use of this counterintelligence technique made it worthwhile nevertheless. [39:00] That is correct. [39:01] Excuse me, sir. [39:04] Do you have something more? [39:11] No, I'm sorry. [39:12] Do you have something more? [39:17] No, I'm sorry. [39:18] How do you recommend that this committee deal with this profound crisis between political and legal responsibility in government, a nation that believes in the laws, and what you regard to be the counterintelligence imperative of illegal activity? [39:41] What do we do about it? [39:42] What do we do about it? [39:49] The authority, whether it be on the Hill, the Congress, or in the executive, needs to examine very closely intelligence content available to this government regarding its adversaries and regarding the Soviet and the Soviet bloc. [40:14] To my knowledge, there has never been such an examination. [40:19] I believe very much in a statement made by the director of the FBI, Mr. Kelly, that it is his firm view, which he expressed in Canada at a Bar Association convention, that certain individual rights have to be sacrificed for the national security. [40:47] Do you believe that national security cannot be protected and accepted through the sacrifice of these rights? [40:55] I believe that all matters dealing with counterespionage require very sophisticated handling and require considerable latitude. [41:07] And who do you think should be empowered to determine which rights should be set aside? [41:19] I think it's so, and I've been an expert in these matters, that it should be a combination of the executive and the Congress. [41:26] And how would the Congress express itself? Traditionally, it's through the adoption of laws. [41:32] Pardon? [41:34] How would Congress make its views known through the adoption of laws? [41:39] I'm afraid I don't. [41:40] Well, as I understand the progression of this discussion, it's your opinion that this nation cannot protect itself without setting aside certain personal laws. [41:54] And then I ask you, well, who would determine what liberties were to be set aside? [42:03] And you said it should be a combination of the executive and the Congress. [42:07] And, of course, the Congress acts through laws. [42:10] Are you saying that we should take another look at our laws to see whether they fully meet the needs of national security? [42:17] That is correct. [42:18] Well, wouldn't it have been better then, when these laws were violated in the past, to do just that? [42:25] Come to the Congress and say, in our opinion, we can't defend you under this present set of laws, and therefore we make these recommendations for change. [42:35] But that wasn't what was done, surreptitiously and privately and covertly. [42:41] Legal rights of the American people were violated, in this case opening the mail, without any such approval in the law. [42:49] Is that correct? [42:50] That's correct. [42:52] Do you think that was the correct way to proceed? [42:54] Well, I think in an ideal world in intelligence, and I've never seen one yet, that these matters should have been brought up vigorously all through the lifespan of the Central Intelligence Agency. [43:08] I don't think there was a proper forum here for the airing securely of these matters. [43:16] I disagree with you on the question of national security. [43:28] I think our Constitution provides plenty of power to protect this country. [43:33] But in any event, I see no authority in anyone in the executive, or in the Congress, or anywhere else, for determining on their own that the law isn't good enough, and therefore taking it into their own hands. [43:47] I see no way of conducting a civilized democratic society with those kinds of rules. [43:57] Now, in your system for covert openings, there was prepared a watch list, which set forth certain names of organizations and purposes. [44:14] And those names were the trigger for opening mail to or from them, which were sent internationally. [44:29] On the watch list... [44:31] To the Soviet Union. [44:32] To the Soviet Union. [44:33] What? [44:34] To the Soviet Union. [44:35] On the list included Linus Pauling, John Steinbeck, the author, and Victor Ruther of the Autoworkers. [44:51] What counterintelligence objective was it thought you were achieving in opening the mail of what most of us would assume to be very patriotic, thoughtful, decent Americans? [45:05] It's possible to respond to that question in executive session. [45:15] Well, I'd like the answer. [45:18] The chairman isn't here, so I think we ought to pass that request up until the chairman is back. [45:24] I have several other questions. [45:26] The chairman is back. [45:28] I have several other questions along the lines of the permission of the President. [45:31] The chairman is back.