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Adam Tooze on America's Renewable Energy Build-out (Plus: Yalta) — Ones and Tooze Ep. 269

Foreign Policy November 22, 2026 54m 8,885 words 1 views
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About this transcript: This is a full AI-generated transcript of Adam Tooze on America's Renewable Energy Build-out (Plus: Yalta) — Ones and Tooze Ep. 269 from Foreign Policy, published November 22, 2026. The transcript contains 8,885 words with timestamps and was generated using Whisper AI.

"Hi, and welcome to Ones and Twos, F.P.'s economics podcast. Every week we take a couple of data points, use them to try to explain the world. I'm Cameron Abadi, F.P.'s deputy editor with you in Berlin, Germany. Joining us as always is F.P.'s economics columnist and Columbia University professor..."

[00:00:00] Speaker 1: Hi, and welcome to Ones and Twos, F.P.'s economics podcast. Every week we take a couple of data points, use them to try to explain the world. I'm Cameron Abadi, F.P.'s deputy editor with you in Berlin, Germany. Joining us as always is F.P.'s economics columnist and Columbia University professor Adam Tuos in New York. Hi, Adam. Hi, Kevin. So two data points for you all today in the second half of the show. We're going to be talking about the economics of the Yalta Conference. Yalta's been in the news in reference to the summit happening today, actually, as we record between Donald Trump, Chairman Xi Jinping of China and President Putin of Russia. We're going to dig into that comparison and the Yalta Conference in history. But as I mentioned, that's the second half of the show. In the first half of the show, we have another data point. That is 0.6. That is the extent by which America's high voltage transmission capacity grew between 2017 and 2024. That is about half the pace of kind of the decade preceding that. And that is the backdrop for a bill that the U.S. Senate is now considering. It is called the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, more commonly referenced to with an acronym, B-A-A-J-A or BAHA. It was released on September 30th. And it's basically aiming to shorten review timelines, narrow the remedies that courts can order when it comes to infrastructure projects, would protect issued permits from later revocation. And maybe most importantly, it would extend federal siting authority for regional transmission lines when states block them. And this is a very live political topic in the United States and with some unusual coalitions around oil and gas interests, manufacturers, labor unions have lined up in support of it, also some clean energy interests. But against it are environmental groups like the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, also progressive groups like the NAACP. So we thought we would try to dig in and unpack this permitting law and why it is such a big deal. So Adam, to start off with, what exactly would this do? And yeah, moreover, why is this such a big issue right now in the United States? [00:02:29] Speaker 2: Well, I think you summarized it very well. I mean, it's basically an effort to streamline environmental review, restrict certain legal challenges, make permits once they are issued more secure. So enabling investors to proceed robustly. And it's aiming basically to enable a more rapid build out of the electricity transmission system. It's such a big deal because this is a really big problem. Electricity interconnection is a fiendishly difficult technical and legal issue. The Berkeley Lab found that there's about 2600 gigawatts of generation and storage projects that are seeking grid connection at the end of 2023. And there's more will have come online since. That's about twice the existing capacity of the United States system. And they spend about five years at least applying for interconnection and entering commercial operation, compared to two years only as recently as a few decades ago. You've got projects like a giant wind project in New Mexico, which is supposed to be a transmission line that connects New Mexico to Arizona. It took roughly 17 years from initial development to construction and the vast majority of that was in the permitting. Pipelines notorious for exactly the same reasons. So Mountain Valley Pipeline, which is a gas pipeline, 303 miles originally billed at $3.5 billion and now finally opened in 2024 at a cost of about $8 billion. So there is a fundamental, there are a fundamental set of issues about, no, not in a sense how American procedures decide whether for and against, but how long it takes them and how expensive they are. If we had a streamlined process, you could process a bunch of obstructions, do it quickly, make a decision, move on. And instead, we have a decision. And instead, we have a decision. And we have a decision. And we have a decision. And we have a decision. And this is a decision. And this is a mess. And this is a mess also against the backdrop of an effort to break this impasse, which after all was the Biden administration. It's certainly true now that AI is driving the conversation about the build out of power supply in the US. But the conversation started earlier with the push around Bidenomics, which then was instantiated in the form of the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022. And people like Brian Deese, who was a key architect of green industrial policy under the Biden administration have said that, you know, passing the Inflation Reduction Act without permitting reform produced modest results. Passing the Inflation Reduction Act with permitting reform would have made a huge difference. Passing the Inflation reform two years before the Inflation Reduction Act had come into effect, setting the stage for the energy and the money that poured through the Inflation Reduction Act would have been a complete game changer. In other words, the pace of rollout would have been very dramatic. And I think that in a sense is what this conversation currently is about. And it's furthermore crucial because it does expose fault lines within the coalitions that you might think of as being supportive to this. And it's furthermore crucial because it's very important. And I think that in a sense, I think that in a sense that the economics glued a coalition together around the green energy project around the American reindustrialization, but also by through extraordinarily complex coalition deals, the everything bagel liberalism, patching in a whole variety of different environmental justice groups, activists on behalf of rural America, activists on the behalf of minorities in the United States and under underrepresented and discriminated and discriminated against communities, and they were all part of the Biden package. Trump has blown that up. And what we're seeing here is also a debate, I think, which we began talking about in our coverage of the midterm breakthroughs by the Democrats. What what are the terms going to be under which a new, energized democratic majority actually attempts to restart the project of green modernization in the United States? That's why that's why that's why this matters beyond the technicalities. It is, however, it's worth saying mind bending that this is what we are talking about. And this has been one of the humbling elements of the entire green modernization, green energy story is that you go from the very big vision and the future of the planet to truly staggeringly minute, in some senses, absurd levels of obstruction and argument, though the stakes may be quite high in some places. And which get in the way of very large projects or conversely, very large projects which simply ride roughshod over a variety of very legitimate and very important interests and how to arbitrate this problem. You know, it turns out that for want of a nail, you know, the battle might indeed be lost. And that is, of course, that's a sort of generic problem, a very complex, very modern system with lots of checks and balances. And so it's both on the one hand kind of, in some senses, it seems almost bonkers that we should be talking about this. But on the other hand, it actually has a has a nitty gritty reality that everyone actually understands. [00:07:57] Speaker 1: Yeah, I almost find it heartening actually to be talking about permits and something as, you know, technical as transmission lines in the context of politics that seems like it has gone, you know, utterly crazy sometimes and mostly focused on, you know, culture war, symbolic issues. And we'll get into, you know, the kind of symbolic issues in the second half of the show with Yalta and that comparison. But there is something almost reassuring that politics can still focus on questions that are important and, you know, technical, I guess, in nature. But we've been talking about the unusual kind of coalitions that have aligned around this law with trade unions on one side and support plenty of other progressive groups opposing it. And that got me wondering about these kinds of coalitions in general, I mean, and taking a step back, have there always been tensions here between the left and unions? I mean, we tend to think of those as kind of unified coalition naturally, but are there actually tensions there that have always run along along the fault lines of environmentalism? You know, and to the extent that those tensions are acknowledged, yeah, maybe they're attributed to, you know, other issues like race in the United States, but is environmentalism perhaps even an issue that sometimes gets overlooked? [00:09:26] Speaker 2: Well, I mean, in support of what I think is called Baha in policy talk of this package deal, the bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, you do see an unusually broad coalition of organized labor. It isn't just building trade unions, sort of, you know, construction happy pipeline workers or whatever. It is in fact a very broad coalition, including the AFL-CIO. And so from their point of view, this is clearly an industrial productivist kind of strategy. And it makes sense. And they're not wrong. And the estimates are that this would move significant volumes of investment, not stupendous, not dramatic. If you've actually seen the econometrics on this, the numbers are not overwhelming, but they're real and every little bit helps. And the obstruction around these issues has been highly significant in a number of individual cases. So the coalition is real, but you're right. There are also blocking opposition. It's in fact telling that in the Senate vote on the legislation so far, the purple state senators. So senators who are exposed to more competitive races were notably more supportive of this legislation than those in absolutely solid blue democratic constituencies, where the leverage of other interests really came to the fore. And there are at least two that are very well worth taking seriously that have been articulated. One is Bill McKibben from, you know, one of the one of the real war horses of the climate movement in the United States, who said, look, it's all very well to say that we need an energy transition. So we need more electrical generation capacity and transmission facilities. This is clear. It's true. On the other hand, ultimately, what counts here is the level of emissions. And so more construction, more activity in this realm is not an unalloyed and unambiguous benefit. And if it's possible that these changes might, in fact, open the door to large scale fossil build out, then in fact, this is really an ambiguous set of proposals. And it's quite clear that in its bipartisan nature, a little bit like some of the Biden administration legislation as well. They are trying to provide pork and to prime divide by support from energy interests across the board. And then the other constituency that you might think of as left is represented by a spokesperson like Abigail Dillon of Earth Justice, who is representing what in the American conversation is called an environmental justice point of view, first and foremost. And so just for clarification sake, right, environmental politics is a very broad church. Climate politics within that comes in different shades as well. But climate politics has this very macroscopic, ultimately global point of view. And one of the answers given by the establishment with regards to climate politics is simply electrify everything, build as much clean energy infrastructure as possible as quickly as possible. But the consequences of that locally can, of course, be very, very disruptive, not to say incredibly damaging. And this is where the environmental justice movement comes in, in the United States, which has a different genealogy, which really originates in the 1980s and 1990s, centrally concerned with the interests of marginalized communities in the United States, notably black communities in the black belt of the American South, who find themselves systematically in harm's way when it comes to otherwise perhaps interesting and important industrial expansion. And so her argument and the opposition of environmental justice campaigners around this is to say, well, it's all very well that you open the door to this kind of development. But who walks through that door? Which interests are going to take advantage of this and who is going to lose out? And to go back to your big picture historical question, what you're seeing there is a confrontation between, if you like, three generations of American radical and progressive politics. One is the classic New Deal productivist coalition, which is about a bigger government and facilitating public private partnerships in various ways that enable large scale investment and development. And that had very considerable bought buy-in from trade unions. But what we see from the 1960s onwards, not necessarily in hostile hostility to organized labor, but recognizing the impact of the success of this kind of development and its lopsidedness and its in egalitarian tendencies are the other two constituencies of American progressism, which are now speaking their voice. These things didn't emerge at the same time in the 1930s, but you could say in the 1960s, we see the development of the ecological movement in the United States, the broad based opposition to environmental damage, which in many cases has a distinctly upper middle class Sierra Club kind of feel to it. And then from the late 1970s onwards, the environmental justice movement, which is, in a sense, environmental politics crossed, if you like, with the civil rights movement in the United States and focusing on environmental issues. And those three things together come out of the same tradition of American progressivism, you might say, but they are not necessarily on the same page and their targets are not necessarily the same thing either. And the work that Biden economics did was to in some senses square that circle. And as we've said, that's the coalition that needs to be rebuilt. And this is a conversation about how that gets done. [00:14:56] Speaker 1: Yeah, it's interesting that you say the kind of that the environmental groups that emerged in the 60s may not have been opposed to labor unions. And but but but but I wonder whether that's entirely true in the other direction, whether, you know, labor unions came to think of environmentalists as, you know, antagonistic to their own interests. [00:15:18] Speaker 2: Well, in the 90s, in the 90s, that issue does emerge. There's elements of it under Nixon as well. But I think what we've seen in the US over time is a concerted effort to counter those those fault lines. And the Blue Green Alliance was one of those efforts. I mean, it's clear that there are not there is not a straightforward alignment of interests here. But I think it's a matter of whether or not you can build the bridging alliances, the bridging cooperations to arbitrate these conflicts. The global also with regard to the environmental justice movement to provide confidence and reassurance and actual bona fide commitments and safeguards such that liberalization of permitting isn't basically a license for highly aggressive, highly capitalized, very cynical fossil interests to just barge through the door and make the life of some of the most disadvantaged communities in the US even more intolerable. Those are the issues. It is not, as it were, fixed. There are clearly conflicting points of view, but whether or not those tensions are irresolvable. Well, that's that's an open question. And it takes constructive politics, no doubt, to patch them up. [00:16:30] Speaker 1: Yeah, I want to dig into some of the claims made by advocates for renewable energy, at least that I've encountered repeatedly when talking to people from that sector or around that sector and how they line up with this new permitting law. Because what I repeatedly hear is that renewables now out-compete other sources of energy on economic terms, you know, the term affordability, which is so much in vogue right now in politics, you know, is repeatedly applied to renewable energy as the more affordable choice when it comes to energy. And so one would think that sort of in a free market that renewables would out-compete other sources of energy if permitting was not an issue or as much of an issue anymore. But if they're fond of citing those statistics about how that's the more economical choice, why not then prefer a law that would presumably create that freer market? I mean, what is to that claim exactly that they're making and under what circumstances exactly are those claims about renewables, you know, being more affordable? When is that exactly true? [00:17:43] Speaker 2: Well, those kind of claims are based on what are so-called comparisons of unsubsidized levelized costs of new electricity generation. That's the standard. That's the standard measure. And outfits like Lazard's, the bank, have produced numbers that show, for instance, that onshore wind can be had for a cost of between $37 and $99 per megawatt hour. Utility scale solar for between $40 and $98 per megawatt hour. Combined cycle natural gas for $51 to $129 and so on and so forth. So you can make those comparisons. And when you make the comparisons on that basis, it's generally true that solar and onshore wind come out as the optimum strategies. But they're very, very partial measures of cost because what they don't really account for is intermittency fundamentally. Right now, we really shouldn't be making comparisons of just pure solar and wind versus gas because gas can be turned on and off once you've got infrastructure. Whereas, obviously, solar and wind can't. It depends on the availability of sunshine and wind. So they need to be backed up by batteries. Once you do the backup by batteries, they're still competitive. But the argument is not as simple as simply saying that they're the cheapest. But broadly speaking, I, in fact, entirely agree with the general thrust of your message. I'm an optimist on this question. And I think this is also the position, for instance, of the abundance agenda types, Klein and Thompson and so on, which is that it's a totally reasonable argument to make the one that you have. Namely, that in the end, these technologies are superior. They are cheaper. People are investing them. If you look in the pipeline, the pipeline is overwhelmingly renewables. And that's not for reasons of wokeness. There are issues of intermittency. But the harder we push at this, the more we invest, the more the urgency will be to find solutions to them. And markets which are relatively free, like that of Texas, for instance, have turned out to be huge pioneers of rapid adoption of solar and wind. So I think, broadly speaking, that argument is well-merited. The risk is, and this is where somebody like a McKibben will come in, will be to say, well, that's all very well. But at the margin, we can't be certain that this game will play out necessarily in favor of renewables. And the argument here is not coal anymore. Once upon a time, you might have said that coal could come back as a source of electricity generation. I think that argument is done everywhere outside China, probably. Very few places in the world where coal makes any sense. Nuclear, for those who have environmental concerns about nuclear, also prohibitively expensive. A free market option without subsidy probably kills it completely stone dead, given its costs. The real issue is gas. And the lesson here is not abstract, it's historical. Because in the 2010s, what happened is that the entire calculus of the electricity generating investment game in the US was changed by the sudden availability of huge quantities of dirt cheap shale gas. And that had the effect of considerably displacing the adoption of wind and solar, which actually progressed more rapidly in Europe because gas prices, despite all of the talk of cheap gas from Russia, it was always nonsense. The really cheap gas comes from Texas, it comes from Pennsylvania, it comes from shale in the United States. And that considerably slowed down the progress of the adoption of more sustainable, more renewable energy sources. But broadly speaking, of course, it's still a win. And folks from within the Obama administration embraced this under the, you know, under the heading of all of the above, because gas replacing coal is a net win in terms of emissions. You might quibble with this if you think about the methane admitted in the toss of the production of gas, but nevertheless, it's a step in the right direction. So you're the general thrust of your question, I think, should be affirmed, you know, we should not be thinking of renewables as some as a sort of endangered technology that needs protecting against the big beasts of fossil industry. Are there fossil risks and do those? Yes, but they come largely for innovation in the fossil sector. And so the not the old enemies, not not coal, not nuclear oil has never really been in the game here anyway, for electricity generation, not since the 70s. But that, to my mind, is not this. That means that this should be weighed up in terms of, you know, exactly how much build out of which types of energy we expect. It's not a matter of principle that, you know, renewables should favor regulation, fossils should refavor deregulation. It's not as simple as that. It's a conjunctural specific historical gamble that in the current moment, the benefits outweigh the downsides. What we're seeing, unfortunately, under Trump is that the biggest build out and the biggest acceleration of electricity demand in American history in recent times, at least probably ever in American history, actually, in terms of sheer volume is taking place under an administration that seems determined to block renewables and under a permitting system that doesn't permit a rapid build out of efficient capacity. And the disaster there is it's channeling all of that AR demand into gas-fired generation. It's not epic by global standards. This isn't China's coal build out, but it's taking America in the wrong direction. And that's the backdrop also against which this conversation is taking place right now. We see that there is a once in a lifetime opportunity or historic opportunity to have accelerated American electrification along green lines. And it's being obstructed. [00:23:33] Speaker 1: Yeah, it does seem, I mean, the psychological dynamics of work are interesting in the sense of, on one hand, a confidence in the technology and the kind of competitiveness of it when it comes to renewables. And then on the other hand, a kind of sense that one is used to being the underdog here and that there are other sort of like bigger interests opposing oneself. And yeah, how to kind of resolve that I think has been interesting to watch. But more generally, I guess I wanted to end by asking about the politics of affordability. I mean, affordability is right there in the center of the name of the law, the bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act. And yeah, it is no secret that affordability is now at the heart of whatever consensus exists in the Democratic Party that is now taking control of Congress. But does anyone ultimately really know what we mean by affordability? I mean, you know, it does seem like there are differences being uncovered in this debate. You know, on the one hand, this law is pursuing affordability by means of an increase of supply of energy. That seems a coherent way of conceiving of affordability. But then, yeah, you have progressive groups opposing that even as they also claim to be pursuing affordability. I mean, they tend to, you know, be making other recommendations for regulations or price controls in pursuit of affordability. So, yeah, what does affordability ultimately mean at all? Or is it possible to say? [00:25:11] Speaker 2: So it's worth, first of all, putting some numbers on the discussion about the Baha thing. So Rhodium Group in earlier this month estimated that if it were to be passed, it would lower electricity prices for residential consumers by three to four percent by 2035, reducing the average annual household bill by that same date, 2035, by between $41 and $66. And this then brings us back to the question of why all the heat? Because these are tiny numbers, obviously. Rhodium is a serious outfit. The the we shouldn't read too much into this particular debate. Right. The the the broader issue here is whether or not the build out of American infrastructure can really be accelerated on a large scale and whether we can get to much larger numbers than that. And those obviously were the ambition, say, of the Biden administration. And this permitting pipeline turned out to be a major dead weight on that program. So I think of this as the, you know, first steps in the direction of a more expansive agenda. I don't think there are many people I was kind of racking my brains about this. I didn't know think there are many people that deny or reluctant to acknowledge that increasing supply can lower prices. Like it's I think I think that's widely accepted. I think the question is, what are the costs of increasing supply? So who are the what are the unaccounted for costs and who benefits? In other words, the questions are the political economy of increasing supply. And there was a regime, of course, famously Fordism in America, in which a new version of the American dream was fashioned, a truly popular, truly demotic, a truly inclusive vision. At least that's the rhetoric in the 1920s then came the disaster of the 1930s, but then revived at least for privileged groups in American society in the 50s and 60s, which saw unprecedented, historically unprecedented, at least then unprecedented productivity growth in manufacturing as the source of general abundance, which was then distributed in a way to at least the organized working class and those who were part of the Treaty of Detroit system for industrial workers in the US. In a way, which meant that that abundance, that increase in productivity, that increase in production and supply, translated into rapidly rising real living standards for average Americans, for the American working class. People talk about it, the American middle class, what they really mean is working class Americans. And I think the hesitancy of the current moment around this supply agenda is that we've been living through a 50 year regime shift in which that's just no longer the case. One can argue about the details of this. There are varying estimates of the real household income and how it's grown and its relationship to productivity, but I don't think anyone disagrees that the regime shifted in the 1970s. The most extreme version would show that the median American household has barely benefited in real terms from all of the growth achieved since then. More moderate estimates would say that there hasn't been much improvement in their position. And it's quite clear that small elites and people at the very top have been doing spectacularly well out of this. And so then the question obviously is, is an abundance agenda really not a stalking horse for more of the same of the neoliberal and highly inegalitarian bargain in which we get growth, but it benefits only very small people. And that's a small number of people. And that's, I think, where this skepticism comes from. I would say the price control element of the affordability agenda is different again, because that's trying to address the even more egregious aspect of American society in the current moment, which is not that as you expand output and productivity, that the benefits are unequally distributed. It's that in an essentially stagnant productivity pool, there's just been gouging, there's just been accelerated and more and more sophisticated behaviorally optimized strategies for shifting the balance within a given envelope from consumers to producers of bubble. It isn't even so much a worker based argument as an argument about the way in which corporations exploit various types of behavioral mechanism to generate super profits. And they do this cleverly in response to shocks. So they're the affordability of gender articulated by people like Isabella Weber or whatever is to say, look, precisely at those kind of moments, you need to intervene to stop that. So I would differentiate two different types of skepticism there, and both of them have their merits. But in general, I don't think either of them would be resisting the idea that obviously more is more, right, at some level. The only people who I think would have fundamental objections there are the other more comprehensively conscious, more holistically thinking ecological side of the argument who really insist that more growth is a problem because it goes hand in hand with more resource mobilization and more environmental destruction. And we simply cannot afford it. And we simply cannot afford it if we're serious about the carbon budget that cannot be the priority. And so I think of them as a third win, right? There is the abundance or bust view. There is the abundance. Okay. But can we talk about the distribution or bargain? And then there is the position which says, can we really, well, we actually clearly cannot afford the existing technological paradigm that the abundance conflicted and inequality is unequal as it is that we already have. So those are the, I think those are the three different positions. [00:30:55] Speaker 1: Hmm. Yeah. Interesting. And yeah, the first two seemingly could be complimentary, but I suppose we'll see how it shakes out exactly in Congress as the law comes up to a vote. But for now we should take a break. Of course, we'll be back in a second to talk about Yalta. Hi, and welcome back. The next data point is 40. That is the number of times that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have met with one another since she became president of China in 2013. Donald Trump and Putin have met face to face seven times. Trump and Xi have sat down several times. But today, as we record this, that's Thursday, the three of them have met together in one room for the very first time. And that meeting of those three leaders has drawn comparisons with another famous meeting, namely the Yalta conference. That comparison was drawn by, among others, the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky. He warned of a Yalta 2 or 3 or 4. The Kremlin has insisted that's a kind of nonsense comparison. But the fact is that many people have sort of been drawing that comparison and drawing on the legacy of the Yalta conference in terms of having supposedly given Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union after World War II. This was a meeting between Joseph Stalin, later of the Soviet Union at the time, and Winston Churchill of Britain and Franklin Roosevelt of the United States in what's today Crimea. So, yeah, to unpack Yalta and its comparison with what's going on today, I thought we'd start off with Adam by asking, where does this idea of Yalta as a kind of geopolitical pejorative? That's clearly what Zelensky meant in making reference to it. I mean, is it really true that Yalta gave Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union? [00:32:57] Speaker 2: I mean, the short answer is no. That doesn't necessarily satisfy the critics, right? So, Yalta was this meeting in February 1945, shortly before the end of the war in Europe. And the terms that were formally agreed are anodyne. They are that Germany should be split into occupation zones, denazified and demilitarized, that there would be reparations. Contrary to myth, Germany paid heavy reparations, notably to the Soviet Union. There was a declaration on liberated Europe, which said that liberated people should establish democratic institutions and hold pre-elections. There was an agreement between those powers on Poland's boundaries. And if anyone has any reason to take umbrage at the actual explicit terms of Yalta, it would be the Poles. Because what is happening between the three powers is that the Soviet Union is essentially being granted the territory of Poland that it seized in conjunction with Nazi Germany in 1939. And a new Poland is being made, this time with more German components. And the German population, as will then be agreed at Potsdam, will be eliminated from there. There was agreement on the United Nations, on its broad structure. And crucially for the further conduct of the war, there was also an agreement very much of the insistence of the allies that the Soviet Union would actually enter the war against Japan. And it would then aim its dramatic assault against the Japanese positions in Manchuria, with which the war of Japan's aggression against China had really begun in 1931. So that's what was agreed at Yalta. It's the three big three at the end of World War Two agreeing business. And yes, at the expense of Poland in the sense that Poland is restored, is large, but is being shuffled around. And if you wanted to say there was a reason for objection, it would be from the Polish side, because it was obviously the Soviets are imposing their control. They have to say the least uncooperative with the resistance forces in Poland itself. They have watched as the Warsaw Uprising takes place and is suppressed by the Germans. That's the Polish nationalist one, not the Jewish ghetto uprising. And the government in Britain, the original exiled Polish government, which was exiled by the joint attack of the Soviets and the Germans, is increasingly sidelined. But the broader demonisation of Yalta really comes later, and it's in the course of the Cold War. And the accusation, I think, is that it was in bad faith that those agreements were simply never serious, that the Western powers should never have believed Stalin when he took that position. And as Soviet powers imposed more and more emphatically on all of Eastern Europe, this accusation becomes harder and harder to resist. And by the American election of 1952 in the full swing of McCarthyism, where the question is, how did we quote unquote lose China and how did we lose Europe? Yalta becomes a hugely explosive issue such that the Eisenhower administration actually ends up publishing archival documents to try and clarify what the position was. So that's how it became toxic. But the basic fallacy behind this entire argument, whether Yalta was, you know, just malign as far as the Poles were concerned or the Western powers were innocent, naive, Stalin was in bad faith, is that the idea that Yalta, this conference in February 1945, gave anything to the Soviet Union is the fundamental mistake, right? The Soviet Union took Eastern Europe, established its power through blood, through winning the largest single conflict in world history and the struggle with Nazi Germany since June 22nd, 1941. And they were still months from finishing that. And even as the conference was meeting, they were paying an exorbitant price in Soviet casualties for unrecoverable losses in the first quarter of 1945 exceed 500,000. By the end of the war, the total would reach 800,000. Now, those are hard to determine in specific cases, but the point stands that fundamentally what Yalta was doing was trying to order a world that resulted from the outcome of the war, which was a giant military triumph for the Soviet Union paid for at huge cost, unimaginable cost. You know, Soviet losses exceed the populations of many East European countries. And that's the fundamental reality. And that's why the comparison of the current moment is utterly absurd, because, you know, of the three that are there, two are fighting wars which neither of them can win. Russia in Ukraine and the United States with Israel in Iran and China is sitting there between the two of them and arbitrating in some way. The configuration of the seating is really quite striking. Xi in the middle, Putin and Trump arrayed on either side as though he's mediating between them. And they're not, of course, in conflict. So the and certainly not triumphantly disposing of the world that they have the demonstrated capacity to reorganize. So it's bizarre, actually, actually thinking about it, the more I thought about it, the more I realized that this is a complete misnomer, because what I think is really on everyone's minds is not Yalta, but Churchill's meeting with Stalin in Moscow. And I think the real concern, and which was a percentages agreement, this is the notorious deal where Stalin and Churchill sat down on basically on a napkin divided Europe up, you know, Yugoslavia this way, Greece 90% us, Romania 90% you. And the fear is that Trump is going to do a Churchill. That's actually the fear. No one wants to say that out loud, because obviously Churchill, great, Trump, trivial. But but that this is not Yalta, this is the insofar as there is a fear, it's that fear that an exhausted empire Britain in one case, the United States on another would somehow concede to a powerful, you know, future power, presumably Xi, some sort of bargain of that type. And of course, that's not going to happen either. And if Trump did this, you wouldn't take it seriously. In any case, he's not Churchill. So, and the, the whole historical vapors here seem to me intoxicated and slightly bonkers. [00:39:18] Speaker 1: Yeah, I was also trying to consider the players involved in Yalta and how they line up with the players this week in China. And in 1945, you know, if we were to look at that conference through an economic lens, as we like to do on this podcast, I guess I was wondering whether this really amounted to, you know, one superpower, namely the United States, you know, as being the only economy that had grown through the war, sitting down with two exhausted allies. Britain obviously was financially exhausted and the USSR had been devastated in ways that you were just describing. So was this really a kind of uneven meeting in, in that way in 1945? [00:40:06] Speaker 2: You could look at it that way. Um, certainly the disproportion in economic terms is dramatic. It's even more stark. I think if you look at standards of living, Americans were experiencing still in wartime, considerable affluence. The only thing that was really scarce was rubber, new tires for cars. Um, the British had, had rationed for many people, famously nutritional standards actually went up. Whereas the consumer share of Soviet GDP, I just lectured on this yesterday, falls by 80%. So, and that's from a Soviet base in 1941. So if you aren't part of the war effort, you're borderline starving in the Soviet Union. And of course, many people actually do die of starvation, even after the end of the war, because the economy is so damaged. So 35% of GDP roughly on the American side, more than 50% famously of manufacturing. Everyone wants dollars. The Americans have got everything, notably also oil. You could say this. I do think, however, it will be a quite serious misunderstanding what's going on, um, because of the extraordinary military power mobilized by the Red Army. With regard to Britain, I think one would have to agree. So it's there, like, as the Germans would say, misery at a high level, a high level, misery at a form level. But the Soviet Union is just a completely different actor in the world. And I would say that, no, what 45 marks is the emergence of two globally capable superpowers of a new scale. I mean, no one's ever seen a land army like the Red Army before. The scale of its operations, their pace, the drama is so extraordinary after, especially from 44 onwards. It's helped in part by American infrastructural aid, but largely driven by the Soviets' own military industrial complex. And America's all-encompassing scope is very dramatic as well, but it's been done on the military shoestring, right? There was a decision taken by the Roosevelt administration to actually minimize the size of American's army. So America is fighting with air power and with naval power and with huge financial resources and raw materials, but not with a lot of manpower, which is why you get bands of brothers and these kind of stories of American infantry units that have to fight almost continuously for months on end because they've minimized the size of the army. And that means it's kind of gladiatorial, like one's got the spear, the other one's got the net, right? They're two very different types of power, but just the sheer scale, the mobilizing capacity, the ferocity, the political grip of the Soviet regime is just like nothing anyone's ever seen before. And it is Eurasian in scope, right? At the same time as they are driving towards Berlin, they are intruding in the Middle East by way of Iran, which they jointly occupy with the British. And then in August, they just devastate Japan in the Manchurian campaign. And so even the advent of the American atomic bomb in the summer of 45 doesn't fundamentally change the game because those early A-bombs are not world-destroying weapons, right? They blow out city, but the Soviets shrug at that kind of threat. And how many atomic bombs do the Americans have and what is their chance of being able to deliver them to Moscow? Zero, right? So the atomic bomb by itself is not a game changer. Thermonuclear confrontation in the '50s, of course, is. But by that point, again, it's quite equilibrated. So in short, I don't think I would go with that analogy, even though the economics are strongly in America's favor. But it is certainly two plus one, to that extent, rather more similar to the current moment in that, you know, Russia is clearly the old country out in this sitting. But that comes back to the question of what exactly they can trade, what exactly their weapons are in this confrontation. It's very weird and asymmetric. [00:43:42] Speaker 1: And that is interesting that there is this asymmetry and that then Russia in that analogy would be the British player, so to speak, as the kind of smaller marginal player versus a duopoly. In this case, US-China. [00:43:55] Speaker 2: But I think we should avoid talk like marginal, because Russia is just too flipping big. And it's got atomic weapons. It's like it's all of Eurasia, for heaven's sake. It's never going to be marginal. It's like everyone's marginal neighbor. It's like Iran's marginal neighbor, China's marginal neighbor. Like Korea, you know, it's like... [00:44:13] Speaker 1: Well, just as once upon a time, the sun never set on the British Empire, right? [00:44:17] Speaker 2: Exactly. Yeah. So to that extent, it isn't a good like the British Empire, not marginal in that sense either, but sort of weakly omnipresent or something like, you know, a worry everywhere. [00:44:29] Speaker 1: But yeah, you mentioned the kind of levers available to the parties meeting this week. And yeah, I do think that is what informs the image of this kind of meeting of these leaders sitting down. It's what informs the fear of this kind of meeting where these world leaders are sitting down and one imagines them trading their respective priorities against one another in some kind of major deal. But what are then the levers available to today's powers in this kind of, you know, renewed Yalta, so to speak? I mean, I had trouble trying to imagine what those would be. I mean, I guess maybe sanction waivers or, you know, tariffs could be on the table, arms control deals. I mean, what exactly would be the tradable items in these world leaders meeting together? [00:45:17] Speaker 2: I mean, presumably, I mean, part of the problem here is that we're having this conversation on Thursday, US time morning, which means we're in Thursday evening in China. And both you and I have been going back and forth about this, like what actually emerged from this conversation? Not very much by all accounts. I mean, after all, they're in their meeting was only for 90 minutes. Like I do book presentations at Columbia, which are longer than that, like nothing happens. These guys will each have kind of read a script and then they will have been two or three rounds of formulaic exchanges. Nothing happened here, right? So this isn't in that sense like the, you know, rolling dinner party conversation type meetings that those wartime meetings actually were. People got drunk. People said things off the record that weren't going to be said anywhere else. Churchill got famously sentimental about not shooting too many German officers, that kind of thing. FDR and Stalin were all in favor of just executing large parts of the Wehrmacht leadership. In their cups late at night over good, you know, Crimean cognac or whatever. So that's not this kind of meeting. So it's really difficult to know what kind of deals. And presumably, though, this the big issues are some sort of strategic nuclear arms limitation deal or control deal or just the restoration of a regime between Russia and the United States, the United States, because that is where Russia is just a key player in the entire global system. And the problem with that is you can't really sensibly do any longer a bilateral deal, because even though the Chinese arsenal is still very small, comparatively speaking, it's very rapidly growing. And so and there's an implicit understanding that the Russian and the Chinese systems could be coordinated with each other in some kind of confrontation with the US. So the US is not going to do a deal with just Russia if it's worried about China's growth. So it's difficult to see how you would do a deal, but that will be a substantial area where these are the three people that need to be in the room. The other area where obviously there's lots of bilateral scope is trade, and that would be China, US. I don't think US or Russia sanctioning in and of themselves just by themselves as a restanding agreement is going to make much sense because sanctions against Russia have to be more comprehensive and would need to include the Europeans who are excluded from this meeting. And Russia presumably will welcome the fact that they've managed to keep Ukraine, as far as I can see, basically off the agenda, which from Russia's point of view is a win. The idea that they were going to get some sort of carve out percentages deal was always absurd. And apparently another thing they've agreed on is that they all think that international tribunals and things like this should mind their P's and Q's and stay out of everyone's business. That is great powers business. So that's something they can agree on, like common opposition to various types of supranational organization and disciplining regime. But as you say, the difference is total, because in one case, you have a tightly coordinated alliance that is waging a massive war with huge resource flows. And literally, if you fight this battle, we don't have to fight that battle. They're incredible trade offs. And in this case, it's discombobulated and they aren't as powerful as the three of them are. They don't they don't dispose and control the world of the 21st century of the 2020s in the way that the big three did. Big three did at the end of World War Two. It's just not our reality, thankfully. [00:49:03] Speaker 1: Yeah, I guess to finish off, there's one other aspect of the history that I was curious how it lines up with today. And yeah, famously, the Yalta conference was followed up by the Potsdam conference. And this was a kind of phase in which the deal struck in Yalta began to come apart as it was trying to implement it. And I'm curious if that's a kind of like structural phenomenon. Even if there any any time there would be a Yalta style agreement, kind of a broad strokes agreement among various powers that there would inevitably have to be a follow up implementation phase. And that would lead to a kind of fraying of whatever deal was in fact struck. [00:49:54] Speaker 2: Well, my sense is that that's should probably not be best thought of as a kind of deficit of an agreement. But the sensible modern agreements, given the complexity of the modern world, are all about process. So this is something that we get from, say, the climate regime, right? Not that the climate regime is a sign, you know, is an example of spectacular success. But nevertheless, it's quite interesting as a place where people have thought about modern diplomacy. Where if you look at think about the EU, it's basically an agreement to go on talking almost continuously for the foreseeable future about how we're going to organize the world. So the idea that you just agree something and then you have implementation phases, I think, is quite old fashioned as a way of thinking about how we go. The Versailles peace treaty wasn't like that as well in the reparations agreement, for instance, wasn't an agreement. It was a process to fix the sum and then to haggle over how it was going to be implemented. So I think that's if that was going to happen, we would know this was for real, you know, if they had actually agreed to meet again in six months time to get into the weeds on what they were going to do about international justice. You know, they actually all agree on that and they want to dismantle it. So what's the next stage? Instead, I think what they've said is just like we don't like it. They should stay in its lane. That's that's symbolic politics. That's not the real thing. The real thing is a agreement to meet again in six months to get down to business, which is what they did in Potsdam. And heaven help us if we go there, because that's the agreement, for instance, was the moment where they decided to carry out the ethnic purging of the German population of Eastern Europe, which again is not, you know, it was something that was most likely going to happen. And it was a result of power and it was a result of the reconfiguration of the war. It's not something you could point at Potsdam and said, you did this in Potsdam. But that mercifully is not the kind of level of power that these guys currently dispose of. And it is, after all, remarkable that both the resistance of the Iranians and both, which isn't the topic, but after all, should be on the agenda and the resistance of Ukraine means that we're not we're not in that kind of we're not we're not figuring out where to move the Ukrainian population to that doesn't want to live under Russia. That would be that would be the you know, the stark analogy to to Potsdam or a decision by Russia to expel Ukrainians they don't want to live with like none of those are our worlds. And so I, to my mind, we should ask ourselves like why it is people mobilizing this analogy, I guess, you know, the Ukrainians have their have their due. The polls occasionally will talk about Molotov Ribbentrop. You know, these are scarred. This is this is this is painful territory. And Kyiv has, after all, heaven knows reason to feel upset. So maybe that's why we're we're having this conversation. It doesn't. I think it's not really very informative about the realities of the 2020s. [00:52:57] Speaker 1: Yeah, no, it is an epithet in in in in US discourse about foreign policy. It's up there with Munich as a kind of one word slur, so to speak. It's evoked at times. But yeah, obviously, the analogy breaks down pretty quickly. I suppose we'll see. I mean, exactly. The Potsdam conference was obviously attended by Truman. So, you know, I guess in this analogy would be J.D. Vance at whatever next an athlete meeting they have. Exactly. So who's off to Putin? I don't know. If Britain is Russia, then Putin doesn't get to come to Potsdam. Exactly. And just so Stalin remained, right. So, yeah. [00:53:36] Speaker 2: Xi Jinping is, yeah, the Xi Jinping rides on. Yeah. [00:53:40] Speaker 1: Great. So, yeah, to be continued. But otherwise, we'll be back, of course, next week with other data points. [00:54:02] Speaker ?: Thank you.

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