Will US President Donald Trump’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz work? — The Global Story

[0:00] We can't let a country blackmail or extort the world. [0:06] Does Iran have a much stronger hand than you might think? [0:10] And what could a U.S. blockade do to the Strait of Hormuz? [0:14] On Monday at 10 a.m. Eastern Time, the United States says it began implementing a blockade [0:19] of all ships entering and exiting Iranian ports. [0:23] This new blockade and the escalating threats follows weeks in which it was [0:26] seemingly Iran that was in control of this vital waterway, [0:30] which is barely more than 20 miles wide at its narrowest point. [0:35] We've been called by the other side. They'd like to make a deal very badly. [0:39] Very badly. [0:40] Now this all comes after talks between the Americans and the Iranians over the weekend [0:44] failed to reach a deal. [0:45] The Trump administration has repeatedly insisted that it's winning the war. [0:56] But Iran doesn't look totally defeated. [1:00] Today we're joined by one of our colleagues from the BBC Persian service, [1:03] Parham Gobadi. He's a regular here on our show. [1:06] From the BBC, I'm Asma Khalid. [1:09] And I'm Tristan Redman. And this is The Global Story on YouTube. [1:19] At the moment, Donald Trump is saying that the United States is going to blockade [1:23] Iranian ports. Tell us, what are these ports exactly? And what's going in and out of them? [1:30] So it's quite interesting that he's blocking something that has already been blocked by Iranians. [1:35] But Iran has several ports. And one of them, for example, is in the southern province of [1:41] Hormuzgan, Bandar Abbas province. Another one further to the west, Boucher. [1:46] Another one further to the east. And that is Chabahar. [1:49] So not all the ports are along the Strait of Hormuz. [1:52] And so, no, not all of them are. Bandar Abbas is at the Strait of Hormuz, but Boucher is in the [1:58] Persian Gulf and Chabahar is in Oman Sea. So they're scattered all over the coastline. [2:05] However, there are also some other very important islands as well. [2:10] People have probably heard about Khark Island, that is a strategic island. [2:13] Over 90, 95 percent of Iranian oil export takes place from that island. [2:19] A lot of gas, oil, petrochemical sites and facilities are located in the southern part of Iran. [2:27] You said a moment ago, Parham, that they are blocking something that has already been blocked. [2:33] So I just want to be clear on what we're saying here. I mean, it seems like the Trump administration's [2:38] desire has been to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. We have repeatedly heard that from President Trump. [2:44] You're talking now about a situation in which Iranian ports will be blocked. [2:48] How do you square those two things? [2:49] So, Iranians, when they block the Strait of Hormuz, they said that any ship that passes through that, [2:54] if they are not, we haven't checked them. If they belong to the enemy, we're going to target them. [2:59] And you know, the insurance cost, you know, went through the roof. [3:02] So technically, the ships could not pass the Strait of Hormuz. [3:06] Now, what Americans are doing to counter Iranian move is saying that we allow all the other ships [3:12] to cross. However, those ships that belong to Iran, tankers that belong to Iran, if they, [3:18] you know, they go to Iranian ports, those ones are not allowed to cross the Strait of Hormuz. [3:24] But presumably also oil going to other countries, right? [3:26] Probably at the end of the day, no tanker or ship is going to be able to cross the Strait of Hormuz, [3:30] because it's either going to be targeted by Iranians or Americans. [3:33] The theory is that we're flipping the current situation. Until now, we've had a situation where [3:38] the Iranian ships could get through, but others could not. But the idea is now to flip it, [3:44] so it's the others that can get through and not the Iranians. [3:46] Exactly. So Americans want to apparently cripple the Iranian economy because Iran's one of the main [3:52] revenues in Iran is through gas and oil. So if they can stop Iran's gas and oil export, which is [3:59] mainly to China and Asia, then they can put huge pressure on Iranian economy. [4:04] And the status quo traditionally has been freedom of navigation across that Strait. [4:09] Yeah. So this is a very interesting point that you mentioned, because the objective, [4:14] the aim of the war at the beginning was regime change mentioned by both Donald Trump and Benjamin [4:19] Netanyahu, Israeli prime minister. However, after the war began, Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz. [4:25] And now the main concern at the moment, Europeans, Americans, the entire Arab countries, [4:30] they're all talking about opening up the Strait of Hormuz. [4:33] For the world, it came as a shock, but not for Iranians, because hardline Iranians [4:37] have been promoting that idea, have been talking about that idea for decades. [4:43] The most hardline part of the Iranian political system, they were saying that we have to, [4:48] in order to counter Americans, we have to block the Strait of Hormuz. [4:51] And it has worked tremendously in their favor. Actually, many analysts believe that [4:56] blocking Strait of Hormuz has paid off, and it has become a way more significant leverage for [5:02] Iranians than the nuclear program and that project entirely. Because first of all, they can start [5:09] making money out of this. Second of all, they have choked off, you know, the world economy. [5:14] Many Iranian analysts inside Iran, they're saying that give up the nuclear [5:18] issue. We have a Trump card to play right now, from now on, and that is the Strait of Hormuz. [5:23] So many analysts believe that the war was for United States and for Israelis. [5:30] They had tactical success, but strategically they failed. [5:35] How does what's happening right now fit into Donald Trump's stated aim, which is to reopen the [5:43] strait to actually increase the passage of petroleum products above all? We did an episode last week, [5:50] actually, Parham, on the impact, the economic impacts of what's going on right now. But in your best [5:58] assessment, are these threats of a blockade likely to increase uncertainty and decrease passage through [6:05] the strait, rather than the other way around? [6:07] It's a really important, actually, point, because it can get worse. Iranian parliament speaker, [6:13] Mohamed Bagheir Ghalibov, who also headed the Iran's negotiation team in Islamabad, tweeted something [6:20] today, and he said that kind of mockingly, saying that the Americans should enjoy the four or five [6:27] dollar gas, gasoline, because this is going to be a dream in a few months. [6:32] Which, by the way, by the American standard is already high. [6:35] It's already high. Five dollar a gallon gas is not a good deal by most American standards. [6:38] Exactly. So, and why is he saying that? Because they are saying that if Donald Trump [6:44] blocks the strait of Hormuz, we still have another card to play, and that is Babel Mandab [6:50] strait, that through Houthis they can block in the Red Sea. Many people remember that Houthis managed to, [6:57] you know, target ships that were going through the strait of Babel Mandab. So, if they can block [7:02] that strait as well, that is going to be extra pressure on the freedom of navigation in the world. [7:09] So, Parham, the context in which this is all happening is against the backdrop of talks of a [7:15] ceasefire. This was just last week after, you know, more than a month of strikes by the United [7:21] States and Israel and retaliatory strikes from Iran across the Gulf. We heard news of this 10-point peace [7:28] plan. Where did this plan come from? What was in it? And I think it's important for us to understand [7:35] this context because prior to this escalation, there was a suggestion that, hey, maybe there's [7:40] actually an off-ramp here. You're right. What happened was that after Iran blocked the strait of [7:45] Hormuz and it puts extra pressure on the world economy, Donald Trump wanted to appease Iran by giving [7:51] this ceasefire. He wanted Iranians to remove the blockade of the strait of Hormuz. Apparently, [7:57] this was something that were through backdoor negotiations. It was maybe agreed on or not, [8:03] but it did not materialize. So, the blockade still remained in place. The peace plan is like the [8:08] number of the things that Iranians have demanded and they keep saying and talking about it on a [8:13] daily basis. And one of the most important things in that, for example, is that they want compensation [8:18] for the damage that has been inflicted on Iran as a result of war. Well, how likely is it that [8:24] Donald Trump is going to pay or Israelis are going to pay compensations to Iranians? I don't know, [8:29] but it's extremely unlikely. The other thing is that they want a guarantee that Iran is not going [8:35] to be attacked again because there is a huge mistrust between the two parties, especially Iranians, [8:40] because they say that, listen, we were in the midst of negotiations with you twice and you attacked us, [8:47] you attacked us in the middle of the talks, both times, back in June 2025, in the 12-day war and [8:54] this time round, the same scenario happened, took place. Okay, so 10-point plan originates from Iran, [9:02] the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions on Iran, continued Iranian control over the strait of [9:08] Hormuz, US military withdrawal from the Middle East, an end to attacks on Iran and its allies, [9:14] the release of frozen Iranian assets, a UN Security Council resolution making any deal binding. Okay, [9:20] so this comes from Iran. It's not the basis of a lasting peace plan, but it gives birth to a two-week [9:30] ceasefire. How was that ceasefire actually reported inside Iran and how was it received by people? [9:36] Well, just like Americans, they claimed victory. They said that, listen, we are in control of the [9:41] strait of Hormuz. Through the strait of Hormuz, we managed to make them stop their aggression. So, [9:47] the narrative is totally different inside Iran from the American side. But it's some analysts, [9:54] they say that it's a good thing, actually, that both sides are claiming victory because [9:59] that's how you can stop wars. I was going to say the same. I mean, there's something to be said [10:03] for the idea that a deal can only be reached when both sides think they've actually gotten something [10:07] out of it. But nonetheless, we see these talks then come to some fruition where the Iranians [10:13] and Americans meet in Pakistan over the weekend. The American vice president attended and that was [10:19] frankly a sign, I would say, of how seriously the United States, it seems, was taking these talks. [10:24] What do we know about the Iranian delegation? It was actually fascinating. It was really fascinating [10:29] from several points of view. One was the person who headed this delegation, Mohamed Bagheri Qalibov. [10:34] Because before that, as you remember, it was Arochi, Iranian foreign minister, who headed the [10:39] delegation. Before that, during the JCPOA, Iranian nuclear talks back in 2015. So, it was always the [10:45] Iranian foreign minister heading the delegation. This was the first time that an Iranian parliament [10:52] speaker was heading the delegation and not the Iranian president. Why? Because Mohamed Bagheri Qalibov [10:57] is actually one of the most important politicians in Iran right now. He's coming from the Revolutionary [11:04] Guard. So, he has a background like that. He was Tehran's police chief. But apart from that, [11:09] the most important thing is that when Iranian commanders, all Iranian commanders were killed [11:14] during the 12-day war, according to himself, he was the one who headed the war against the fight [11:21] against the Americans and the Israelis. Last summer. Last summer. So, imagine a member of, you know, [11:28] if I want to put it in a context for Western audience, usually people who work in the government, [11:33] they say it's a revolving door between the private sector and the government, right? In Iran, [11:38] it's the other way around. It's like the Revolutionary Guard and the government. So, yes, [11:42] he looks like a civilian. He wears a suit. However, when it's needed, they're becoming Revolutionary [11:49] Guard commanders. And there were some reports that Pakistanis kind of contacted Americans [11:58] to remove him from the target list because Larijani was killed. He was also Iran's security chief. [12:05] He also had a Revolutionary Guard background, but he was at the moment a politician. He was targeted and [12:10] he was assassinated in an Israeli-American strike. So, it is reported that Qalibov was also on the list, [12:17] but they told Donald Trump that if you kill him, who else is there to negotiate with? And he met, [12:22] this is a high-ranking Iranian politician who met JD Vance, you know, deputy vice president of [12:32] United States. This is the highest, you know, meeting between the two countries after almost [12:37] five decades. But apart from that, the size of the delegation was also really significant. It was [12:41] 70-80 people were, you know, going to Islamabad. From hardliners to less hardline to conservative. [12:51] The delegation was huge and they said that they have the mandate to strike a deal. At least that's [12:57] what they said. Can you help us understand, though, just the size of the delegation. Does that mean that [13:05] there is a very firm idea about who's in charge and what they have to do? Or could it, in fact, [13:11] be the opposite? That there are lots of different factions who are all trying to get in on the action [13:16] during the talks? So, I think the latter is correct. Because, so, when the negotiations took place, [13:25] some Iranian hardliners, they took to the streets and they went in front of Iranian foreign ministry [13:30] and they started chanting his slogans against Mr. Arochi, saying that, you know, he's a traitor, [13:36] that he's negotiating with Americans because just 40 days ago they killed our supreme leader. And now [13:42] you're sitting at the table, also Qalibov, that you're sitting at the table and you're shaking [13:46] their hands, actually, technically. Because there was some news that Qalibov and J.D. Vance shook hands. [13:52] So, they didn't like it. They didn't like it. However, after the Iranian delegation came back [13:56] to Iran and no deal was struck, they were quite happy. And he was received as a welcome, [14:02] he was received as a hero, and I mean, he received praise from Iranian hardliners as well. [14:08] But Iranian hardliners, they don't want any deal with the Americans, but it shows that at least part of [14:14] the Revolutionary Guard is willing to end this fight and strike a deal with the Americans. [14:19] Okay, I want to spend a little bit of time talking about what actually transpired over the weekend, [14:24] when the Americans and the Iranians met in Islamabad, at least what we know from the American side. [14:30] I would say nobody expected them to all come away with a conclusive deal in a day. But after some [14:36] 21 hours of talks, we saw the American Vice President J.D. Vance come out and say there was no deal. [14:43] And frankly, you know, I will say this entire episode was a pretty big deal for Vance. He's someone, [14:48] in fact, we talked about this in an episode we did back on April 1st, how this was a crucial [14:52] foreign policy test for him in some ways. He has not really been the one leading negotiation [14:57] efforts on a diplomatic stage of this sort. And, you know, we saw him come out and say, [15:03] you know, despite him talking to Trump a number of times on the phone as this all went down, [15:07] they were not able to reach a deal. [15:09] And we've spoken, Parham, about the 10 point plan that the Iranians presented [15:14] prior to the ceasefire. The Americans have their own demands, and I'm going to run through a few of [15:20] them. The ending of all uranium enrichment, the dismantling of all major nuclear enrichment [15:27] facilities, the retrieving of highly enriched uranium, what Donald Trump calls the nuclear dust, [15:35] accepting a broader peace security and de-escalation framework that includes [15:40] regional allies. That's a lot of words. How would you how would you describe that more simply? [15:44] I think about the nuclear issue, there is a possibility to reach a deal. However, both sides [15:50] have got the sticking point here is that if Donald Trump agrees to some sort of Iranian enrichment, [15:57] no matter how low it is, then the question is, why did you withdraw from JCPOA? [16:02] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is, or widely known as Iranian nuclear deal, [16:09] is a deal that reached back in 2015 between Iran's government with Obama's administration. [16:17] So if Donald Trump, he allows any percentage of Iranian enrichment, then the big question is, [16:24] why did you withdraw 10 years of Iranian enrichment? He has to answer that question. [16:29] So that's why I think he's pushing for a zero enrichment, at least for a limited period of [16:35] time, 10, 20 years or something. And we also understand that the Trump administration wants [16:40] to see the Strait of Hormuz fully open and presumably with no toll passage either. [16:45] And the ending of funding for proxy armed groups, Iranian allies like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. [16:52] Nonetheless, after this entire day of talks, many hours of talks, we saw the vice president come [16:58] out and say that they gave the Iranians their final and best offer. That is the American version of [17:04] events. What did the Iranians say about these talks? Especially if you've sent 80 people, 70 or 80 [17:10] people all the way to Pakistan, and they come back empty handed. How do you spin that? [17:15] They're all, you know, following the same line that, yes, we were about to strike a deal. The [17:20] Americans suddenly started putting extra pressure after they've made six phone calls and had a [17:27] conversation with Donald Trump. Some of them are saying that after talking to Benjamin Netanyahu, [17:33] interrupted the negotiations after the calls. So we don't know which version is correct. These are [17:38] just reports from different, you know. So the Iranian version of events is that they were close to [17:42] making a deal. They were close to making a deal. However, they say that Americans wanted it all. [17:48] And Donald Trump said that as well. He said that I don't want 90% of my demands. I don't want 95% [17:54] of my demands. I want all my demands. And that infuriated Iranians. They're saying that we're going [17:59] to teach you a lesson that this is not how the negotiations work. We have patience, we are open to [18:04] diplomacy, but you cannot dictate your terms to us. Well, I wonder if now is maybe the moment for us to [18:10] talk about this nuclear issue. I mean, what are the points that the Iranian side refused to accept [18:20] from the American proposal? And I'm really interested by the point that you raised earlier on, which is [18:25] that the nuclear issue is suddenly less important to the Iranian side after they realize how much power [18:30] and leverage they have because of their control of the Strait of Hormuz. Exactly. So for Iranians, [18:35] it's really important not to make the mistake of the JCPOA because JCPOA, yes, they reached the deal. [18:42] However, when Donald Trump got into power, he could withdraw from the JCPOA from the Iranian nuclear deal. [18:49] So they wanted to be ratified by the Congress. And if you know the American, you know, domestic [18:53] politics, this is not something easy to be done. So Iranians are saying, okay, let's say that we reached [18:59] the deal with Donald Trump. How do we know the next president is not going to have, you know, [19:03] a different agenda and say that this deal was also a bad deal? I want to have another deal with Iranians. [19:09] I mean, I know Donald Trump likes to make allusions to who is carrying the cards. And I don't know if [19:14] you're a poker player or not. And there is an expression in poker, which is to get a great card [19:19] in the final card that's dealt, you get a great card on the river. And I just wonder to what extent [19:25] the Iranian situation is a bit like that. They suddenly discover that they have this ace that [19:29] they didn't realize they had. But did they suddenly discover? I mean, [19:32] I've been wondering this too. We talked about the Americans war gaming. That's what I'm saying. [19:35] They knew they had this potential, but I think they refused to play that card because it was a risky [19:41] card. Now it's different for them. Now it's an existential crisis. So they're playing any card [19:46] available to them. But there is a point about this blocking Strait of Hormuz. Yes, Iranians now have the [19:53] upper hand. However, they need to be really careful with this card strategically and in the long run [19:59] because Iranians now have the upper hand. And many Iranians are saying that this is the right moment [20:04] to strike a deal with Americans. However, if they don't do that, we see that Europeans are getting [20:09] together. UK and France are getting together, inviting many other countries to say, quote unquote, [20:15] defending the freedom of navigation. This is a sign that there is a coalition forming against Iran. [20:22] So in the long run, Iran can be not a threat to the region, according to Western governments, [20:27] but a threat to the world. [20:29] Farhan, does the United States simply not know how to negotiate very well with Iran? Is what we're [20:36] seeing here the consequence of decades and decades of not having any contact with each other? [20:41] That's a very good question. I think the problem is Donald Trump's style of negotiation is, [20:48] you know, stick, carrot and stick. So to hit really hard, and then suddenly he was talking about [20:54] erasing the entire Iranian civilization, then they are sitting at a table negotiating with Iranians. [21:02] So that's a slide. But that shows incohesion and lack of trust, lack of trust. So Iranians, [21:09] they are their movement is called their ideology is based on resistance. And that's what they call it. [21:15] That's what they call their proxies, axis of resistance. So their entire ideology, [21:20] their entire existence is based on resistance. So Trump and Netanyahu thought that if they bomb Iran, [21:26] if they kill Khamenei, they're going to give up. They haven't. Not only haven't they given up the power, [21:32] but they've also managed to choke up one of the most important waterways in the world. [21:37] It seems like both the United States and Iran left these negotiations over the weekend, [21:42] to some degree refusing to budge on certain things. And that makes me wonder, okay, well, fine, [21:47] maybe if you both think you win, you can get to the negotiating table. But if you both are refusing [21:52] to budge on anything, then you're really actually not going to solve anything. And that makes me wonder, [21:56] where does this go from here? So the one of the biggest risks is that Americans and Israelis are [22:03] going to continue bombing Iran. But the question is, all those bombings, yes, they have weakened [22:09] Iranian ballistic capabilities, but they have not eradicated and obliterated Iranian ballistic. Iran [22:16] is still capable of shooting missiles both at Israel and the regional countries like countries in the [22:22] region. And there's a huge problem with that. One of the most important issues is that Iran's [22:27] ballistic missiles are really low cost made weapons. However, American made interceptors are very [22:35] expensive, millions of dollars compared to just, you know, tens of dollars, tens of thousands of dollars. [22:43] So this is, and they are going, according to American officials, this is depleting American stockpile of [22:50] weapons and interceptors. And that's not only dangerous for Americans, that can because Chinese [22:55] and Russians are also watching, and they're probably enjoying that to see American stockpile [23:00] depleting day by day, because they need not only to use it for themselves, Americans, but they also have [23:06] to provide it to Israelis and Ukrainians as well. So this is a really, for Iran, becoming a war of [23:13] attrition is in their favor, if this becomes a war of attrition. However, this is not playing in favor [23:19] of the Americans and Israelis. And we know there's certainly not an appetite amongst the American [23:25] public for a resumption of a full out war, right? I mean, to be clear, we've still continued to see a [23:30] war over the last several days, but I'm talking about the full scale escalation you're describing. [23:36] And the Iranians know that. There's not that appetite amongst the American public. [23:40] Iranians know that. Is there an appetite for the resumption of this all amongst the Iranian public? [23:44] No, but that's the thing. You know, Iranians, because, you know, they're suffering. Iran is [23:48] getting bombed really hard on a daily basis. I mean, before the ceasefire. [23:53] So neither public wants this. But they know that Iranians, because it's in their home turf, [24:00] they can endure it better. They've been in a war with Iraq for eight years, let's not forget that. [24:06] In the eighties, you're saying. And they survived that without giving up an inch of territory. [24:10] So they're used to it. And this, these are the same generations like Muhammad Baagir Ghaliw [24:15] both fought in that war. Many of the Iranian authorities are coming for, are the commanders [24:20] of that war. So they know resistance. Rouhani, Iranian ex-president, and Muhammad Jabod Zarif, [24:26] they think that diplomacy is better. Diplomacy should, you should be able to solve all your problems, [24:32] especially with the West, through diplomacy. But they do not have the upper hand nowadays, [24:37] especially after this war. Because Khamenei is dead, more radical and revolutionary guards seem [24:43] to be more in power and have the upper hand. And to them, diplomacy is just an extension to the [24:50] battlefield. The things that determine the future of the country, it should be determined in the [24:55] battlefield, not at the negotiating table. And it has proven right for them from their own [25:00] perspective. If you look at it, blocking the Strait of Hormuz has worked far, far better than sitting [25:05] with the Americans at the negotiation table. So Iran is not feeling the pressure to come [25:10] to an agreement at this point, you're saying? At least they're not showing that. But there is [25:14] a tremendous amount of pressure on them because of the economy. Plus, the other thing about Donald [25:19] Trump is that he's unpredictable. And he has already targeted some of the Iranian bridges and [25:24] infrastructure. So if he chooses, and the other thing is that he hates to lose. So if he thinks that [25:31] he's looking weak, and he's losing the fight, he might choose to target Iranian infrastructure. [25:38] And that is a really dangerous game. That will not only hurt the Islamic Republic, it will hurt Iranians [25:45] for generations probably. That's it for The Global Story. Thanks as always for watching. And if you [25:50] liked what you saw today, I should recommend our show, The Global Story. It's also available as an audio [25:56] podcast. You can find us every weekday on bbc.com or wherever you listen.