Why was the last US nuclear deal with Iran ripped up? — The Global Story

[0:00] What was the Iran deal that President Trump ripped up? [0:03] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, more commonly known as the JCPOA, [0:08] was the big nuclear deal crafted under President Obama. [0:11] It's an agreement that President Trump has repeatedly slammed. [0:15] Donald Trump now insists he's going to land a far better deal. [0:20] But that could prove to be a daunting task. [0:23] From the BBC in Washington, D.C., I'm Asma Khalid, [0:26] and welcome to The Global Story on YouTube. [0:30] I began my conversation with Wendy Sherman by asking her how these talks with Iran actually started. [0:40] The final deal was worked on and signed by a number of countries, [0:43] including China, Russia, and the European Union. [0:47] And, you know, frankly, it's easy now to forget how extraordinary it was for the U.S. and Iran [0:53] to make a deal like this, because as you all might know, [0:56] the U.S. and Iran have not had a formal diplomatic relationship for decades. [1:02] Wendy Sherman told me that the seeds of this all began when Iran reached out to the Obama administration [1:08] through this secret channel. [1:10] She said that the Iranians wanted to talk because their economy had been under enormous pressure, [1:16] and they were keen to see if they could negotiate some sort of sanctions relief from the U.S. [1:20] President Obama made a very critical decision. [1:24] He knew that we could either negotiate with Iran and try to do this diplomatically, [1:31] or we could face war. [1:34] And we had gamed this out. [1:37] We all knew that Iran could strangle the Strait of Hormuz. [1:42] We all knew that Iran could take on our partners and allies in the region, [1:48] that the world economy could be at stake. [1:52] So the president thought it was critical to see what diplomacy could achieve. [1:57] And he also made another critical decision, which was to say to Iran that he would consider [2:04] a small, very small, civil nuclear enrichment program for civil purposes if there was intrusive [2:15] monitoring and verification. [2:17] The United States had never said that before. [2:20] We don't believe that a country has a right to enrichment. [2:24] So he opened the door. [2:26] We worked on that draft. [2:27] I asked our team to write what they thought would be the ideal agreement. [2:35] They wrote 100 pages, including technical annexes. [2:40] All of the team, no matter what their role, met in a conference room for two days. [2:45] And we went over that line by line, not because we knew we'd get that exact deal, but because [2:50] I needed to know. [2:52] Every member of the team needed to know what we were trying to achieve. [2:56] Was the crux of what you wanted to achieve was that you were trying to prevent Iran from having [3:02] a nuclear weapon? [3:03] Absolutely. [3:03] So you say that Iranians came to you all and you decided that it was worthwhile to [3:09] negotiate because you said this a moment ago that otherwise it would lead to war. [3:13] Yes. [3:13] And can you help me understand that? Because the United States and Iran, as you know, [3:17] have been at odds for years, have had no formal diplomatic relations. [3:21] But what made you think that it would lead and erupt into war at that particular moment? [3:26] We didn't know that it would happen at that moment, but we thought it would indeed happen. [3:31] And Iran was clearly improving their nuclear capacity every single day. [3:38] The Iranians had gone the enrichment of uranium route and they had gotten up to 20 percent [3:45] enriched uranium from 20 percent to 90 percent, which is what you need to have enough material [3:53] for a nuclear weapon was a leap we did not want them to make. [3:56] Were you trying to stop it or were you all trying to pause it, the development of a nuclear weapon? [4:01] To stop it, we were trying to ensure they could never get enough material for a nuclear weapon. [4:07] So we saw them accelerating their program. We didn't like where it was headed. [4:12] We knew the breakout time was getting shorter and shorter to them having enough missile material [4:18] for a nuclear weapon. Of course, they then have to create the weapon. They now have to attach it to [4:22] a launch vehicle. They were a ways away from having a nuclear weapon. But nonetheless, [4:28] they were moving in a direction that was unstable and very bad for us and for the world. [4:35] You mentioned a moment ago that the negotiations took some time. I believe it was about 18 months [4:45] in total, a year and a half. Tell me about when you first met your Iranian counterparts. [4:51] So I had met an Iranian delegation even before 2013, actually starting in 2011, [5:00] when Syed Jalili was head of their delegation. He was a leader in the Iranian government. He was assigned [5:07] to lead this delegation. It was very performative. We traveled all over the world. Iran made us go to [5:18] Almaty, Kazakhstan twice because it took 19 hours for the Americans to get there. We were in Iraq during [5:26] a sandstorm. It was pretty crazy. And all of the discussions happened in Farsi. But we didn't make [5:34] much progress. Then Rouhani became president and things... In 2013, is that right? [5:42] For 2013. Okay. And things changed. Javad Zarif became the foreign minister and he led the delegation. [5:53] He had spent 30 years in the United States. He spoke perfect English. He knew us. The delegation spoke [5:59] English. The negotiations were now in English. And Abbas Arachi... They were in English. [6:04] And Abbas Arachi, who was my counterpart and now the foreign minister. We began much more serious [6:12] negotiations and ultimately brought in this short-term agreement. And ultimately, it led to 28 days [6:21] in a Vienna hotel, the Palais Coburg. Secretary John Kerry came for the last two and a half weeks [6:30] and spent time in these negotiations to get to a final deal. [6:34] You mentioned a name that I want to ask you more about, Abbas Arachi. You say he was your [6:42] counterpart in the Iranian delegation. He's now Iran's foreign minister. We see his name tossed [6:48] around in the current talks. We saw news that, in fact, he was just recently in Pakistan. What's he like? [6:54] How did you build rapport with him, if rapport is the right word to use? [6:57] Rapport is not a bad word. You know, I don't believe these kind of negotiations are about trust. [7:03] I don't trust Iran today. They don't trust me. [7:07] Did they not trust you at the time? So at the time, you did not trust them? [7:10] No, no, no. It was about respect. I respected that they had national interests, [7:16] some of which made no sense to me. But in their culture, in their framework, it did to them. [7:21] Abbas Arachi is very smart, very tough, knows every detail of the deal. Now, I tried to [7:31] understand they were human beings, even though we were quite different culturally. And Abbas and I [7:39] became grandparents at the same time. During the talks, we shared photos of our grandchildren. [7:47] So you do things like that, not because it's going to change what President Obama and Secretary [7:53] Kerry required of our team, but it does make us more human. And having to deal with each other and [8:03] be in the same hotel for 28 days, it helps. [8:06] LESLIE KENDRICK Ambassador, you mentioned that during the final stage of negotiations, [8:12] there was this period of intense talks where you all spent essentially nearly a month in that hotel in Vienna. [8:18] Very pressured, very exhausting. At one point, I remember talking to my husband, [8:25] who was, of course, back in Washington, D.C., and really focusing on our daughter. [8:33] And I said, I don't know. And he said, I said, I'm so sorry to be away for so long. [8:39] And he said, you are part of history. This is important. Having that kind of support was critical. [8:48] One of our team members' kids made sock puppets for everybody in our team and sent them to [9:00] Vienna, which was really sweet and very cute. The Europeans could always go home on the weekend [9:06] because it was a short flight from Vienna if they needed to go home. Not so much for the Americans. So I [9:13] tried to work things out so that team members could go home for a weekend or go home for a few days [9:21] so they wouldn't feel so locked in. That wasn't true for me. [9:24] You were there for, what was it, 28 days, you said, right? [9:28] 28 days. Every day, ate one meal outside of the hotel in those 28 days. [9:34] Did you ever feel that as much as you thought a deal was within sight during that time period, [9:40] that there were moments where it seemed like it all might just fall apart? [9:43] Many times. Many, many times. There was a point, I remember, in the Beau Rivage Hotel in Geneva, [9:51] and we all came to agreement on what we thought was a set of parameters for a final deal. And soon after, [9:58] the Supreme Leader gave a speech and set out a whole bunch of new parameters, new thresholds that had [10:09] to be reached. I'm not even sure Zarif knew that was coming. And we had a very difficult meeting [10:20] suddenly in Geneva with the Iranian delegation where we had to figure out a way to meet some of [10:29] what the Supreme Leader was asking for and keep the deal moving forward. But it was a very tense [10:35] and very difficult time. Secretary Kerry is an extraordinary negotiator. He never runs out of [10:44] energy and he rarely gets angry. But he got so angry at that day-long meeting in Geneva that he banged his [10:52] hand on the table and, hey, pen flew across the table and hit Arachi. He didn't mean to, of course. [11:02] But it was a moment that showed how tense and difficult a moment it was. [11:07] So the final deal was 110 pages long. It is finalized, signed in the summer of 2015. And in the end, [11:17] and I'm going to summarize this here, but in the end, Iran agreed to limit its nuclear activities and [11:25] allow in international inspectors in return for the lifting of some economic sanctions. [11:31] I know that the Obama administration lauded this as a major achievement. I also recall at the time [11:38] there were some prominent Democrats who criticized it. And the crux of their criticism, in summary here, [11:43] was that they had concerns that Iran would not moderate its nuclear program as a result of this [11:49] deal. And then in some ways, this deal might in fact actually help bolster the regime, might help [11:55] it actually acquire a nuclear weapon in the long run. They felt the deal in particular, I will say, [12:01] I think because of the sunset clauses, right, which were these key parts of the agreement that expired in [12:05] 10 to 15 years, they felt that it didn't do enough to limit Iran's nuclear programs. [12:13] What do you make of the criticism that the deal was simply too limited? [12:19] I respect that people had differences of opinion for many different reasons. But our whole notion, [12:27] and I think what President Obama understood, is if we could have these very severe limits for 15 years, [12:34] and quite frankly, many other limits for 20 and 25 years, that that gave us time to see what else we [12:44] could achieve. [12:45] Was dismantling it as a whole, sorry, Ambassador, was that just not on the table? [12:49] It was not, it was, it was not on the table. [12:51] Did you all try to discuss it? [12:54] Of course, of course, of course, of course. [12:55] You did. [12:55] But if, but Iran is a culture of resistance, and part of its national identity is this ostensible [13:05] right of enrichment, which as I said, America still does not agree to, but some of our European [13:11] colleagues do, and Iran's believing that we were trying to take away the country's right to its own [13:24] sovereign sense of itself. [13:26] Today we are seeing this again. Iran is not going to give up the right to enrich at some point. [13:37] So I think we understood what the limits were over time, but of course we wanted, [13:43] we preferred to eliminate everything, but that wasn't going to happen. [13:49] We also developed channels of communication that we thought would be important. [13:54] And soon after the deal, a bunch of American sailors found themselves in Iranian territory [14:02] and got picked up by the Iran military. In other times, that would have been a disaster [14:09] that would have gone on for some time. They would have become hostages. Instead, [14:14] John Kerry could pick up the phone, call Javad Zarif, foreign minister of Iran. And within 24 hours, [14:21] those sailors were free. Did we think it would change everything? No. [14:25] No. But did it open a door? Yes. And could we use that door? The Europeans very much wanted [14:31] the middle class market of Iran. They wanted to get their car manufacturers back in to Iran. [14:38] They saw a real possibility for commercial success. The US not so much because Iran didn't want to see [14:46] Americans on the ground at the time, but it did open channels. And if we were getting close to that 15 years, [14:54] we could go back to the negotiating table and see what more we could get. And now Iran has a new weapon, [15:01] the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before this war began. [15:07] Was that never, by the way, part of that? Was that never perceived to be a threat when you were [15:11] negotiating with them, you said? No, it was not. We knew it could become one. We knew it could become [15:17] one. And certainly if we went to war, we had spent many hours gaming that out. But it was not used as [15:25] a leverage point in the negotiation. Another major criticism of the JCPOA, of the deal that you worked [15:32] on, is that because it lifted sanctions on Iran and granted access to billions of dollars of unfrozen [15:38] assets is that it could use that sanctions relief to arm its proxies in the neighborhood, organizations [15:45] like Hamas or Hezbollah. And in fact, you know, you could make the argument that the funds did [15:53] strengthen the Iranian regime over the years. How do you reconcile that? So there is no question, [16:02] the regime is horrible. It has slaughtered its own people. At the time when we discussed some of those [16:09] frozen assets, a humanitarian channel was set up for those funds to go for food and medications [16:20] and humanitarian purposes to help out the Iranian people. And if those frozen assets helped on the [16:25] humanitarian side, there's no doubt it freed up some funds for Iran to deal with its proxies. But had [16:33] the deal stayed in place before President Trump in his first term withdrew, we would have been able, [16:42] I believe, to go back to the table to discuss some of these other issues. A lot of people have said, [16:48] why didn't we do it at the time? Why didn't we discuss proxies and more on missiles and other things [16:56] of concern? Well, it took us years. The Europeans had been negotiating with Iranians for a decade, [17:04] and then it took us 18 months to get this final deal. If we had tried to do other things, we'd [17:09] probably still be negotiating. And if you do other things, then the Iranians might say, [17:16] okay, we'll give a little less money to Hezbollah, but we want more sophisticated centrifuges [17:22] to be able to enrich more uranium. And there are so many elements just on the nuclear side that are so [17:29] complicated. Because every time you agree on what the stockpile can be, or what the percentage of [17:34] enrichment can be, you affect 100 other things. And you have to manage all of them at the same time [17:41] to ensure you've reached your objective. The deal was ultimately only in place for three years. And [17:49] during that time period, the International Atomic Energy Agency, known as the IAEA, which was responsible [17:56] for inspecting Iran's activities, made several reports detailing Iran's compliance with the deal. [18:02] We also saw the State Department issue a report that said Iran was indeed implementing the agreement. [18:08] But nonetheless, in May of 2018, President Trump, during his first term, pulled the United States [18:14] out of the deal. I want to then bring us up to the present, where we are now in Trump's second term. [18:21] We are now in another moment where the U.S. is trying to reach another deal with Iran. [18:27] How does this moment feel different to you than 2015? [18:31] It feels terrible. I think the president has engaged in a war of choice, not of necessity. [18:44] I don't think there was an imminent threat to the United States. I think diplomacy was what was called for, [18:51] not war. I understand the June bombing by the U.S. and Israel. It did set back Iran's [19:02] program. There's no doubt about it. But you cannot bomb away knowledge. So you ultimately have to sit [19:08] down and talk. The Strait of Hormuz was opened before this war. And now I believe that Iran will [19:16] always feel that it has ownership over the Strait of Hormuz. It will always be a leverage point for Iran. [19:26] Before this war, we were seeing a recovery from COVID in the world's economy. And now the world's [19:37] economy is facing great risk, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, because so much of their oil [19:44] has gotten through the Strait of Hormuz. We are seeing very desperate times for many countries. [19:50] The U.S. is economically hit hard. It will affect the president in the midterms here in the United [19:58] States. But because we have an abundance of oil here, we're probably hit less than the rest of the [20:05] world. So I believe that President Trump has accomplished giving Iran the leverage of the [20:12] Strait of Hormuz. He has alienated our European allies because he never included them in this [20:20] process. He has gotten mixed reviews from our Gulf partners. And of course, 13 American soldiers have [20:29] died. Many more have been wounded. Thousands of civilians in the Middle East, including in Iran, [20:36] have died or been injured. And the Iranian people are not better off. They are worse off because we have [20:44] a more hardline regime than we had before. One of the things we've heard from the Trump [20:52] administration is that they say they were in the midst of talks with Iran, but that they were not [20:59] serious. That is their argument. They say that they felt the talks weren't going anywhere, and therefore, [21:04] ultimately, they launched those strikes in late February on Iran in coordination with Israel. What do you [21:13] make of that argument? I think President Trump likes to get quick wins. And he thought he could lay down [21:22] what was necessary, they could agree on the top lines, and he could have that quick win. I think he has [21:29] never understood Iran, its history, its culture, how deep and profound their civilization, their sense [21:39] of their own civilization, their own identity is. This is not Venezuela, which he is often pointed to [21:45] as such a success. This is not just pulling someone out of a country. This is life and death, war and peace. [21:56] That's not what Venezuela was about. And Iran is, as I said earlier, a culture of resistance. [22:02] They lasted in Iran-Iraq war for eight years. They will not give up easily. They have a pride that [22:12] we do not understand. It is so deep and so profound and goes back so far. It is so much a part of the [22:19] 1979 revolution. And they feel that we in the West keep on tricking them. Back in 1953, the U.S. and [22:29] Great Britain got rid of the Prime Minister because we were afraid he was going to nationalize oil. That [22:35] led to the Shah of Iran, who worked well with the West, but was a terrible dictator and oppressor [22:41] of the Iranian people. We began negotiations under the Trump administration twice. And while those [22:49] negotiations were happening, attacked militarily. So sort of no wonder, Iran wonders whether we are [22:59] serious. Let alone us wondering whether they are serious. These negotiations are hard. They cannot [23:08] be done in a day. They cannot be done in a week. I had sanctions experts and lawyers and nuclear [23:15] physicists. You cannot do this just with us terrific diplomats. You need a team of experts who understand [23:25] all that is necessary here. Our military is exquisite. They have done a remarkable job. But [23:33] Iran has asymmetric capabilities and they've used them quite well. If back in 2013, 2014, 2015, Iran really [23:43] wanted a deal, you say, because of its own internal economy, they reached out via Oman to start conversations [23:51] with the United States. If that was the case back then, is it your sense, I know there are different [23:57] people, I know the terrain is different, that Iran also wants a deal or wants a deal as much as the U.S. [24:03] and this Trump administration wants? I think both parties are in a bit of a stalemate at the moment. [24:12] I think they would do a deal, but we now have an antecedent to all of this. And that is the leverage of [24:20] the Strait of Hormuz and the American blockade. And in my own view, we won't get to the nuclear [24:28] negotiation until somehow we unlock that so that oil, helium, fertilizer, and other goods can flow again [24:41] to the world economy. Now, as we're talking today, ostensibly Foreign Minister Arachi is putting together [24:51] some kind of proposal to open the Strait of Hormuz, leaving Iran still in control of it, [25:01] asking for the blockade to end, unfreezing assets, opening up sanctions. Now, the U.S., I don't believe, [25:10] is going to agree to all of that. But I could see a deal where there is some suspension on both sides [25:19] of the blockade and the closing of the Strait of Hormuz and a ceasefire for negotiations to happen [25:27] around the nuclear program. Iran is asking for a permanent end to the war before beginning [25:35] the nuclear negotiations. And they're asking for opening all the sanctions and opening all the [25:45] frozen assets before getting to the nuclear concerns. I don't think all of that's going to [25:51] be acceptable to the U.S. But there is a basis, I believe, here to negotiate. But I know that Foreign [25:57] Minister Arachi is engaged in diplomacy and building a network for whatever he's proposing. And I wish [26:09] President Trump were doing likewise. I have one final question for you. And that is that, [26:14] as I look what has been happening between the United States and Iran, and also the lack of [26:21] what's been happening, I don't have a real clear sense of how this all ends. There were talks that [26:26] were supposed to happen this past weekend in Pakistan. Those talks did not actually materialize. [26:32] You referred to this as a stalemate. Do you see a way to break the stalemate? [26:37] I think there are lots of ways to break the stalemate. You have to build partners in this effort. So I think [26:44] the President of the United States has a lot of diplomatic work to do. I think there is a way to [26:49] break this stalemate. I think Iran is putting some ideas on the table. And although I don't agree [26:54] with where they are, I think I could probably work with them, and others could, and President Trump's [27:02] teams could, with experts at the table, to figure out a way forward. [27:07] That's it for The Global Story on YouTube. Thanks, as always, for tuning in. And if you [27:12] enjoyed our episode, then I should mention that our show, The Global Story, is also available as [27:17] an audio podcast. You can find us every weekday on bbc.com or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.