What's stopping the US and Iran from making a deal? — Global News Podcast

[0:00] Hello, I'm Ankur Desai. Welcome to the Global News Podcast on YouTube. On this episode, [0:04] I'm joined by our Chief International Correspondent, Lise Doucette, who's in Tehran for us. [0:09] Lise, let's begin with recent events. What have you made of everything that's unfolded, [0:15] especially from your viewpoint there in Tehran? What seems to be clear, as far as anything is [0:21] clear, is that that first round of high-level face-to-fakes, and it has to be said, historic [0:28] talks in Islamabad, did make what both sides are describing as significant progress. But from [0:36] there, the account is dramatically different between the two sides. President Trump continues [0:42] to give these upbeat assessments that they're on the brink of a deal, that there are only [0:47] insignificant differences remaining, in his words, we can straighten them out. But for Iran, [0:55] those insignificant differences are actually major concessions. And while we're not exactly [1:03] clear all of the details of the discussion, what we do know from the last round of very [1:09] protracted negotiations, which did reach a nuclear deal in 2015, is that these files are highly [1:17] technical. We're talking about nuclear power, after all. They're deeply sensitive, because [1:22] they are asking Iran to make significant concessions, but so too the United States has to. That is [1:30] in the nature of negotiations, a give and take, so that both sides can say, well, we didn't [1:34] get everything, but it is still a win-win. And Iran has said there's many gaps to close and [1:41] some fundamental points. So this is not a deal that can be done in a day. It could not be expected [1:48] that 47 years of enmity between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America [1:54] could be done, could be removed in so short a time. But what we do here is that they are working on [2:03] something far less than a grand bargain, but what would still be a significant step. And that is some [2:08] kind of a framework, is the word, being used by some of the Iranians that we've heard from, [2:13] a memorandum of understanding about some broad points. And then the two sides would agree to [2:19] embark on a more intensive, more detailed discussions, perhaps over a period of 60 days. [2:24] Even 60 days may not be enough to close the gaps, but it may be enough to keep a fragile ceasefire [2:31] in force. So what you have here is two very different political systems, two very different [2:36] political ideologies, two very different negotiating styles. And to try to mesh them in such a short [2:43] time would really be considered almost miraculous. [2:48] I find it fascinating the strategies that are being used on both sides. You've mentioned this [2:52] yourself. You've got Iran on one side who are taking a longer view when it comes to their strategy. [2:58] Then you've got Donald Trump on the other side in Washington who want immediacy, who want the big [3:02] deal. And they want it down now. They want it done quickly and they want it done fast. [3:10] Yes. And if you wanted to do a quick deal, you'd also have to have a lot of trust between the two [3:16] sides. You'd also have to have a lot of understanding. You would have also had to have what was achieved, [3:22] what was a process of stretching over 18 months of breakdowns and breakthroughs when the last [3:31] nuclear negotiations, which involved not just the United States and Iran, but other world powers, [3:36] the permanent members of the UN Security Council and a strong EU delegation. But by the end of it, [3:43] not only did they have a deal, but they had a better sense of each other. They had earned each [3:47] other's political respect. Yes, they had stormed out of meetings. They had argued over each other, [3:52] but they understand each other's sides. And they both ended up making compromises to do the deal. [3:57] They are just beginning this on this now, this new round of high stakes, high level negotiations. [4:05] But on the positive side, a taboo has been broken that Iranian officials have now agreed to meet [4:11] face to face at this high level with the United States. And that helps them in this decision making [4:18] process that more senior officials can make quicker decisions on the spot. Although it was said that during [4:25] those talks in Islamabad, that J.D. Vance and his team had been on the phone half a dozen, maybe a dozen times [4:31] to President Trump. The Iranians, of course, because of security concerns, because, and of course, [4:36] this is a big question, how do they reach the Supreme Leader, Mushta Bar Khamenei? Is he in touch? [4:42] How seriously injured he is? But they didn't want to. They had to wait till they came back to Tehran. [4:47] So there's lots of factors in the mix. But let's take them at their word. Both sides want to do a deal. [4:55] And both sides say that if they don't do a deal, they're ready to return to war. And that's where the situation [5:00] is now hanging in the balance. [5:03] And when it comes to a breakthrough, what could that look like? Because it seems very complicated in terms of how [5:08] you've outlined it there. We've talked about the enrichment of uranium. We've talked about the importance of the [5:13] Strait of Hormuz as well, and the control of that in particular. So a breakthrough is very difficult [5:19] to picture at the moment. Well, what could it look like, though, if they are able to somehow meet in [5:24] the middle and create something which they both agree on? The last nuclear negotiations, and indeed [5:30] the last rounds of talks before this war between the United States and Iran, only focused on the narrow [5:36] nuclear deal. They didn't talk about ballistic missiles. They didn't talk about Iran's prognosis and [5:41] partners in the region. And they didn't have to deal with this new challenge, which has been a gift [5:46] to Iran in this war. And that is what Iran insists now is its control of that strategic [5:51] strait, the Strait of Hormuz. So when you're looking at the wide range of issues that have to be [5:58] resolved, it is going to take a long time. But let's look at it by one of the issues. For example, [6:03] what President Trump says is the core issue, Iran's nuclear program. He's repeatedly said, [6:08] Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. And not just that, it cannot have the means to acquire [6:13] a nuclear weapon. So Iran, before this war, the concession it had made to the American [6:21] negotiators was, we are willing to put a moratorium on nuclear enrichment for five years. Now bear in [6:27] mind that Iran is now enriching uranium now, as far as we can see, because of the damage to its nuclear [6:32] sites in the June war last year, when the United States struck three main nuclear centers of Iran's [6:40] program. What we understand what the Americans are demanding is a 20 year moratorium. Well, [6:46] it's in the nature of negotiations that they can, would they settle around 10 years? Would that be [6:51] enough for the Americans? Would President Trump accept that? Would the Iranians, given they have [6:56] political pressures within their ranks as well, the hardliners who aren't happy about this deal [7:00] making? Could they do that? But that's in the nature of these negotiations, both sides trying to [7:06] narrow the gap. And to the issue of the stockpile of highly enriched uranium, 440 kilograms, enriched [7:13] to 60%. That's dangerously close to weapons grade. President Trump, in the manner he likes to do deals, [7:19] is demanding hand over what he calls that nuclear dust. I was speaking with an official this morning, [7:25] they said, we're not going to hand over this nuclear, this nuclear stockpile. They had offered [7:30] again before the war to dilute it down to 20%. That's not enough to do a deal. So that's, those little [7:38] details give you a sense of how a deal, what are the elements, what is the, what is the nature of the [7:44] negotiations that can, you can inch toward a deal. And in that time, you're going to have people [7:51] walking away from the table, one side or another saying, that's not, that's not acceptable. One [7:56] side or another saying, I have to go back to the Capitol to discuss. And that is why, again, I keep [8:01] referring back because they give us a lesson. The last round of negotiations in Vienna in 2015, [8:08] the Iranian negotiators here had told me some time ago, they went to Vienna for what they thought was [8:13] six days. They stayed for 22 days. I remember the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, clearing his diary [8:20] for three weeks. I thought, wow, can he really do that? And he did. On top of it, he fell off his bicycle [8:26] when he was, when he was cycling through the streets of, you know, so he couldn't go, he couldn't go [8:30] anywhere. And other foreign ministers did the same. If you really want to do a deal, you have to get down [8:36] into the nitty gritty of the deal. And they're not there yet. And the question is whether the [8:41] President Trump's team, having hollowed out the State Department, are dealing diplomacy really [8:46] without diplomats. And President Trump says, I know how to do a deal. A deal will be done with [8:51] my invoice. Let's see. But that's, that's what you need. Those are the ingredients, if you like, [8:57] if you want to bake a cake of a deal. Just a word on the Iranian regime. Do you feel as though [9:04] maybe the United States have fundamentally not really looked at how Iran is run? Have they [9:12] misread how Iran works? It seems that Iran are willing to wait this out as long as it takes [9:17] because they have a strategy and they have a very long term view of this. We don't really know what [9:21] what position papers have been given to President Trump, how he's been briefed on the nature of [9:28] decision making, the structure of power, in this theocracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran. If we [9:34] go by his statements, and of course we know sometimes his statements are made for one reason [9:39] or another to influence the markets, to give a positive impression. But what he keeps saying [9:44] is that, well, we've achieved regime change in Iran because we've changed the individuals. That is [9:48] patently incorrect. The regime, they wouldn't call it regime here, they see it as an opposition [9:54] statement. But the Islamic order is still in place. Yes, the top echelons of the political [10:00] and the security establishment have been killed in those assassinations through Israeli airstrikes. [10:06] But the Iranian system is not dependent on one individual, one decision making. It is a [10:13] multi-layered security, religious and political system which has been honed and hardened over 47 [10:20] years since the Islamic revolution. And it is built for survival. It's built to survive these [10:27] kinds of shocks. And the way that President Trump seems to be seeing this, because he uses the words, [10:33] is that he talks about Venezuela as being the perfect scenario. In other words, you took out [10:38] Nicolas Maduro, not a single life was lost among the American forces. And then you work with Delcey [10:43] Rodriguez, who moves up from being vice president to president. And basically, they find a way to work [10:49] together largely at the behest of President Donald Trump. That's not going to be the situation here. [10:55] The system now is much more militarized. It is increasingly dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard [11:01] Corps, even before all of this happened. Last year's war, this year's war, the assassinations. [11:08] The assessment of Iran had been that once the supreme leader, in that case the discussion was passed away, [11:14] not assassinated, that it would be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, they would be [11:19] the ones who would have a dividing say. There'd be even discussions that the order would become less [11:26] clerical and much more of commanders literally calling the shots. So this gives you some indication [11:34] decision-making here. And yes, it takes a long time. It takes a long time to negotiate here. It takes a [11:42] long time to decide how far they're able and willing to go. And they have their red lines. And some of the [11:47] red lines, they're not going to cross. And some of them, the lines can become pink or they can move the [11:52] red lines. But right now, they're only at the start of what, by any realistic assessment, is going to [12:00] still be a distance to travel. [12:02] Lisa, as always, thank you so much for your time. At least you said there are chief international [12:05] correspondent reporting from Tehran. All of Lisa's material that's being used, it's being used on the [12:12] condition that none of it is being broadcast on the BBC's Persian service. That restriction also applies [12:17] to all international media organizations reporting from Iran. As always, thank you so much for your [12:23] company. Do give us a like and subscribe below. And we'll see you on the next one.