What's driving attacks against govt and Russian forces in Mali? — Inside Story

[0:00] Former enemies in Mali, including an al-Qaeda linked group, joined forces to target military [0:06] sites. The defense minister has been killed. Russian mercies backing the government have [0:11] come under attack. What are the implications of this unrest? This is Inside Story. [0:16] Hello and welcome to the program. I'm Imran Khan. A wave of attacks in Mali has taken government [0:37] forces by surprise. They were carried out by two groups, one linked to al-Qaeda. Until recently, [0:42] they had been fighting each other. The defense minister has been killed. The African Union [0:47] has condemned the violence and warns civilians are at risk. Russian mercenaries backing the [0:53] government have also been targeted. And there have been a series of coups in the Sahel region [0:58] in recent years, including two in Mali. And Russian mercenary groups have been involved. Meanwhile, [1:04] the influence of the U.S. and former colonial power France has weakened. So what's driving the latest [1:10] unrest in Mali? And could it have wider regional implications? We'll talk to our guests shortly. [1:16] But first, this report from Narges Momolehi. Armed groups launching a coordinated attack across Mali [1:25] and killing the country's defense minister. They are from two groups, the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation [1:34] Front, known as the FLA, and the al-Qaeda-linked JNIM. They once fought each other, but they are now [1:43] fighting together against Mali's military junta. They targeted areas across the landlocked West [1:50] African country, including the capital Bamako, Kati on its outskirts, the towns of Savarey, [1:58] Gao, and Kidal, near Algeria. Fighters seen here in Kidal, where the FLA say the town is now under its [2:07] control. [2:09] We are here in the city of Kidal, and we have returned once again. We informed the Malayan army [2:14] that we have formations in Gao, Bamako, and everywhere the enemy is present. This vehicle was seized from [2:20] a house where the governor of the Kidal region had been staying, following clashes with army elements [2:25] there. We will take control of all cities and pursue the oppressors. [2:30] After several hours, the army said the situation was under control, even as fighting continued. [2:38] Several terrorists were neutralized and equipment was destroyed. The operation continues. The situation [2:43] is under control. The general staff of the armed forces calls on the population to remain calm [2:49] and show discernment. [2:50] The scale and coordination of the attacks appear to be unprecedented, putting further strain on the [2:57] military junta. They took power after a coup in 2020 and installed General Assami Goita as president [3:05] after a second coup in 2021. Despite pledging to hand over power to civilian leadership, the junta has [3:12] remained in office. Under General Goita, Mali has ended its security agreement with its former colonial [3:19] occupier France and ordered its troops to leave. It's also thrown out a 13,000 strong UN peacekeeping [3:27] mission and terminated a peace deal with the FLA. Mali left the West African regional bloc known as [3:34] ECOWAS. Instead, it's formed an alliance of Sahel states with Niger and Burkina Faso. The junta has just [3:42] 40,000 soldiers to secure the country. They're fighting Tuareg rebels, al-Qaeda linked groups and ISIL [3:50] affiliates. And it has turned to Russian mercenaries to help. That has not been enough. JNIM fighters now [3:59] control large parts of Mali and are closing in on Banako. The city has been under siege since last [4:06] September, when the JNIM imposed a fuel ban and blocked supplies. And by seemingly working with [4:14] other factions, the group is leaving the government with an increasingly difficult fight on its hands. [4:20] Nagus Mabaleri, Al Jazeera, for Inside Story. Now let's bring in our guests. In Dhaka, Alouwole [4:31] Ojewale, who is the regional coordinator for West and Central Africa, the Institute for Security Studies, [4:37] in the French city of Normandy. Nicolas Normand, a former French ambassador to Mali and vice president [4:43] of the Friends of Mali Association. And Nabuja, Vigwe Agweigu, a policy analyst at Development Reimagined, [4:51] an independent African think tank and a specialist in West Africa and Sahel geopolitics. A warm welcome [4:57] to you all. I'd like to start in Dhaka with Alouwole. Now this is, the headlines here are the [5:05] former enemies are now working together to try and topple the government. Did that come as a [5:12] surprise to you? Well, to a large extent, it wouldn't come as a surprise because I think they [5:21] have a central political objective. The separatist movement that started in the 2012 have a political [5:28] objective, even though I think they do not have a nationwide objective in terms of, because they [5:35] want to carve out a nation out of the northern Mali, close to Algeria, and perhaps to make [5:42] Kida their capital. Because in the last two to three years, we've been seeing the falling of Kida [5:48] and the regaining on the part of the military. Whereas the GNRM seems to have a much more broader [5:55] objective, which I think it's a strategy that they have copied from their other franchises of [6:02] a terrorist group, particularly those ones in the Middle East. And I think they find a common ground, [6:10] as they have seen the military government as their common enemy. And that is what possibly provided the [6:16] recent complementary attack that they've carried out. And going to the fact that there are also other [6:23] forms of convergence in terms of logistics support, in terms of recruitment, because they are also drawn [6:30] from the same pool. So I think a lot of things actually bind them together to be able to [6:35] actually carry out this particular attack that they carried out yesterday. [6:41] Now, I want to go to Abuja now and Avigwe. Avigwe is almost the same question to you. Did this come [6:46] as a surprise, the coordination from the groups? Or is this something that you think people and [6:52] yourself have been predicting? Not necessarily predicting, but certainly it wasn't out of the [7:01] equation. Because just like the previous speaker said, they do have a shared objective, which is [7:07] the shared enemy being the Malian state. The secessionists want to actually cover the state [7:15] in the north, which requires, and then you have the terrorists who have their own [7:20] extremist agenda to topple the states. So because of that is the old logic of, you know, my enemy's [7:30] enemy is my friend. So they are bound to get up based on that. However, it needs to be said that [7:37] when you have a secessionist movement partnering with a terrorist organization, then it raises question [7:44] about the, not necessarily credibility, but the ethical grounding of the secessionist movement. [7:52] And I think that's something that will be interrogated going forward. And this is not [7:57] what the Malian state and even regional countries will just sit back and ignore. [8:02] I want to go to Nicolas Normand now. We are in France. The Mali is twice the size of France. It's a [8:11] huge country. So the Malian army seems to be, I mean, they say they're in control, but they seem to [8:17] be being overrun in particular cities. Did that come as a surprise to you? No, it's not really a [8:25] surprise. We must remember that the Malian army was beaten in 2012 and they were defeated at that time. [8:37] It was very small army at that time of 16,000 soldiers. Now they are much bigger, better armed, [8:45] and they are also assisted by the Russian mercenaries, Africa Corps, former Wagner. But [8:54] the country, as you said, is huge and very difficult to control. And anyway, they cannot control [9:00] the territory overall. There are large tracts of the territory which are under the control of the [9:11] rebels, either the rebels, separatist rebels, or the jihadists. But the current attacks that took place [9:22] from yesterday on, it's still ongoing this morning and this afternoon, at least in Kati and in Kidal, [9:32] in two specific locations, it's not really a surprise. For Kidal, you must remember that the town was the [9:43] headquarter of the former separatist who became autonomous after signing an agreement with Bamako. [9:52] But this agreement, which is called the Algiers Agreement, was denounced by Bamako three years ago, [10:02] and Kidal was recaptured by the Mayan army. So the Tuaregs, the separatist Tuaregs, wanted to take [10:10] revenge. And yesterday, they have succeeded in recapturing, in recovering Kidal. Apparently, [10:19] there are still some infighting in a military camp, just close to Kidal. But Kidal itself, [10:29] the town has been lost to the government of Bamako. Now, Nicholas, the question I'm about to ask our [10:37] other guests, is going to be a question you're going to want to answer as well. But I will give [10:43] you the right of reply. So if you just be a little patient with us, I want to go to Alawale. A lot of [10:48] what the problems that Mali has faced is simply because when the French were involved, they came [10:55] looking like an occupying army rather than a partner for peace. Is that something that you agree with? [11:05] Well, I think the question you've posed to me, my response is probably not going to be a popular one, [11:11] particularly among the Francophone countries, because it has a very serious political undertone, [11:18] and people are very passionate about it. But here's my position. When you look at the [11:24] the minimum results in terms of security provisioning that was achieved within the time of the G5 Sahel, [11:32] and other form of intervention that took place, and what has been the scale and the threat [11:39] of terrorist attack in the past five years now, I think the result speaks for itself. [11:45] And it goes to say that, yes, I know that they've demonized France in particular, [11:52] and it's essentially to achieve a particular political objective. But the lessons that they [11:59] are learning in the past five years now is that while you have the liberty to choose who is [12:04] you're going to be your security partner among the myriad of options that are available to them, [12:12] they also score and won't go by pulling out of ECOWAS and not really binding to any form of [12:20] security partnership that could benefit them in that regard. So I think the result of the past four years [12:28] will probably prove otherwise in terms of that international supply that they've caught off, [12:33] because the event that is also transpiring in Ukraine has clearly shown to them that there's [12:39] so little that Russia can actually offer them now. So it goes back to the point that they need security [12:46] cooperation, particularly starting with their name. I'm going to disturb you there because you've [12:50] raised a number of points. We are going to get into those points in just a moment, but I'm going to go to [12:54] Avigwe. It's the same actual question to you. Do you think this is a result of French arrogance and [13:01] not dealing with their security partners, Malian security partners, and rather acting like an [13:08] arrogant colonial power? I think I'm going to, you know, go in a different direction and say [13:17] the situation in the Sahel, the security problem and complexity of governance in the Sahel, [13:22] is first and foremost the responsibility of countries of the region. Any other security [13:29] assistance or partnership is secondary, you can even say tertiary. This is because as states, [13:35] they have a primary responsibility and function to competently provide security across the entire [13:43] territory for everybody within that territory. So when we look at the situation in 2012, for instance, [13:53] the Malian state failed in that responsibility and they invited the French, I think it was Saval, [14:02] and they initially made a lot of success with Saval. Saval was technically a very successful operation. We [14:08] were able to push back and prevented the capture or state fracture of the Malian state, right? But very [14:15] quickly, it became, you know, we moved into Bakken with about 5000 and then they had MINUSMA, G5C, all of [14:26] the myriad of mechanisms trying to provide security. But in the 10 years that followed, nothing in the ground [14:34] really changed significantly, right? So when we look, the criticism of those security mechanisms must be [14:43] separated from criticism of the partner, of the partner itself, because that's a different [14:49] question. Today, what we see is these countries trying to reassert themselves as the primary provider [14:57] of security and working with partners. However, that doesn't mean that those partnerships and the [15:03] modalities on that with the partnership is established are necessarily providing the result [15:10] as of yet, the way people expect. They see a lot of ground to cover. And I think going forward, [15:17] all of the countries, whether those in the AES and those in the ECOWAS, they have to take this [15:23] security problem more seriously and work more in a coordinated manner to provide security for their [15:28] citizens. Nicolas, so I'm going to bring you in here. So that accusation leveled against the French [15:33] that they were an arrogant colonial power that acted like one, looked like an occupation, [15:39] an occupying army. Is that something that you have any sympathy with? Or do you want to [15:45] give your answer as the French might do it? Well, the French have now nothing to do with the three [15:54] countries of the central Sahel. As you know, we have been kicked out. So now the Russians have taken over, [16:01] more or less, at least not the official Russian army. Nicolas, I'm going to stop you there. I did [16:07] ask about the French. I want to, particularly, when they were there, this was when they were fighting [16:12] Al-Qaeda and they were fighting ISIL. Yes, they were unable to gain control on the situation. The French [16:22] army, which was called Barkan at the time, which left now three years ago, was unable to have a victory [16:32] against the Jihadists because they were only 5,000. The territory is extremely large. The Jihadists are [16:40] probably more than 5,000. And it was an asymmetric war. And it was not a success. It was a failure for the [16:50] French army. And so the Malians finally kicked out the French army. It's understandable because there was [17:01] no success. And also because it was recent, it was regarded, more or less, as an occupying army, because [17:10] it was a foreign army coming from the former colonial power. And it was not very respectful of the local [17:20] sovereignty as well, because the French army fought on its own without really associating itself with the [17:29] Mayan army. So there were many mistakes, in my opinion, made by the French army, which are acknowledged now [17:38] in France. And so our defeat or our figure was not really a surprise. But we have stayed about, we used [17:49] to stay about eight years, but eight years without really success at the end. Now, I want to bring in [17:59] Alouale here. Let's talk about the modern state of affairs, because after the French and that [18:04] failure that took place, you invited in the Wagner group, which was a Russian mercenary group, and then [18:11] came in was the Africa Corps, as they're called now. Now, this was supposed to be a peacekeeping effort. [18:19] Clearly, in your opinion, has this failed? Yes, I think there's multiple failure. And like I mentioned [18:30] earlier, yes, the starting point is with the state. And I think the military government generally is [18:36] distracted. They are distracted by focusing on local polities, how they are going to banish the [18:43] politicians, ban political parties, and at the same time trying to gain legitimacy. And they also, in the [18:49] midst of that, have to prioritize regime protection. And that is the reason why it appears that the last [18:55] place that the terrorists who are interested in is Bamako, because that is about the, maybe the solid [19:02] ground that the army is actually holding onto. Right. And if you look at the replacement, in terms [19:08] of the Africa Corps, the Wagner group that has come in, there is very little that Russia could provide for [19:14] these regimes across the three countries of Central Sahel. Yeah. So even Russia is looking for [19:20] harms in Iran and North Korea and all these places. So I think Putin is just keeping them as a satellite [19:27] orbit in the Sahel, not really that he can really offer them so much. And that is the reason why the [19:35] military, the army in those countries have become extremely overwhelming in the recent time. And if you [19:41] look at harm conflict event location database or shared media on a daily basis, I think the result is [19:48] cheering everybody in the face that the current security framework by Malian government and its [19:53] affiliates in the other two countries of Niger and Burkina Faso, with their sole security partner, [19:59] is not delivering a result for the citizens. Well, let's go to Avigwe. Avigwe, you've already said [20:06] that, you know, the Sahel states themselves, Mali themselves, need to get their house in order and look [20:12] after their own security. You tried it with the French, it didn't work. You tried it with the Russians, [20:17] the Russians have been effectively ineffective. So, but you do need an international partnership, [20:24] a security partnership. Do you think, or do you think it's time for this to be dealt in-house by [20:30] the Malians? I mean, that is exactly what I said, that the security issue and questions of governance [20:38] is the responsibility of the states of the AES and also in West Africa as a region. We cannot [20:49] make analysis or frame this as a question of which foreign partner is better or whatever. No. [20:57] If you look at the trend within these countries, they are increasing their armies, they are getting [21:03] more weapons across different platforms that they didn't have before. Just at the same time, [21:10] we're seeing the jihadists increasing their capabilities as well too. For example, FPV drones [21:16] have been reported to be have been used in this recent attack. Where are they getting those things [21:20] from? They didn't have that during 2012 during Bakan or several, right? So, we have a situation where [21:28] countries in the AES are increasing their capability every single day. Even countries like Burkina [21:33] Paso, for instance, now controls more territory than it did just about five, six years ago. So, [21:40] fatalities may be recorded, but I think one of the most important things we have to look at is [21:45] territorial control. And that is why you would see that Mali would risk very quickly to regain Kidal [21:51] because when you are a military government, your primary responsibility is security as a state. [21:57] Then if you are a military government, you cannot fail in that regard. And Kidal has been a symbol [22:04] or as a way of success that they have been recorded. So… [22:08] Abigwe, sorry, we are tight on time and I want to come back to you as well, but I want to go to our [22:14] other guests as well. I'm going to go to Nicholas now. Nicholas, one of the things that history has [22:18] taught us, recent history has taught us, that negotiating a diplomatic solution, negotiating a [22:24] political solution with groups like Al-Qaeda, with groups like ISIL, is almost impossible, if not very [22:30] difficult. There is only one successful example and that was in Syria and that took a civil war [22:36] and a change of heart to be able to get there. So, if there is no… Do you think, firstly, is there [22:42] a political solution here or is it, like our guest Nabu just said, you have got to take town by town by [22:48] town and the Mali authorities need to, you know, assert authority? [22:53] Yes. I am convinced that there is no military solution to the current conflict in Mali and in the [23:00] side. You have to tackle the roots of the problem. The roots of the problem is the large population of [23:09] youth which are jobless, we have no future, who have no education, so they are in a desperate situation [23:19] and they rebel against the government, they rebel against everybody, they become rebels and they are [23:27] indoctrinated by the jihadist groups or also by the separatist groups in the north. So, you have to [23:35] tackle this situation both socially, economically and also politically by trying to negotiate with those [23:44] groups. There used to be a negotiation with the separatists that achieved the Algiers Agreement, [23:52] which was signed in 2015. There were many defects in this agreement, but it could have been improved, [24:00] it could have been implemented. Instead, it was denounced by Bamako, so the war resumed with those [24:09] separatists and this is what we see just now. With the jihadists themselves, it's also possible to [24:17] negotiate. I think Yad Aghali, who is the head of the JNIM, the local subsidiary of Al-Qaeda, [24:26] would be ready to negotiate. Bamako, the JANTA, is not ready for the time being, but many people, [24:34] many political personalities, political people, ask for a negotiation and I think it's necessary at a [24:42] certain stage to negotiate, at least to ask what they want and to look for a possible compromise. [24:49] Sorry, Nick, I want to put that point, Nicholas, I want to put that point to our guest in Dachau, [24:54] because it's very, very important. A generational change is what Nicholas is saying, that you need, [25:01] you know, employment, you need education. That's a generational change. Short term, [25:07] can you negotiate with the FLA? Can you negotiate with the JANIM, do you think? [25:14] It's a very tough call now, and the reason is simple. So what is that negotiation going to look [25:21] like? I would be extremely surprised if any military government out of the three Sahelian states is going [25:30] to go that route. You know, it bruised the military ego. If that is going to happen at all, I think it's [25:37] going to happen within a democratic dispensation. A soldier would rather lead on the life than [25:43] probably go through that route. And they've demonstrated that in the last five years. [25:48] Yes, the option is there on the table. A lot of political actors are also talking to the terrorist [25:55] groups, but it is very, very unlikely that the military is going to negotiate with those [25:59] terrorist groups. Now, I want to go to Avigwe. Avigwe, you know, are negotiations even something [26:07] that the current Malian military government is thinking about? Or is this simply, let's try and [26:12] just get control of the territory we've lost? Well, if you are convinced that you have military [26:20] capabilities or that you are building the capabilities to win militarily, then you're not [26:25] going to negotiate. Because why negotiate? Because negotiation means you are going to make concessions. [26:29] And if you believe you can preserve your position militarily and even impose it on the other, [26:39] then you're going to go the military route, which I think should be the posture against terrorist [26:45] organizations. But when it comes to a succession is because the Malian state in question is being [26:51] contested, right, by separatists. And they've shown that they are willing to negotiate. They did that [26:59] under the last precedent. So it's not a question of whether they can or they can negotiate. They have [27:05] shown willingness to negotiate. As of now, there's probably a reason why they pulled out of that [27:10] orders agreement. Maybe they believe they can get more militarily. Over time, we will see if they can get [27:17] more. If they cannot, then we'll see them also go back to see what they can negotiate politically. [27:23] I want to thank all our guests, Aluwale Ojiwale, Nicholas Normand, and Avigwe Agwegu. Thank you so [27:33] much. And I want to thank you for watching as well. Now, you can see the program again anytime [27:38] by visiting our website, audicero.com. And for further discussion, go to our Facebook page. [27:43] That's facebook.com forward slash AJ Inside Story. And you could also join the conversation on X. [27:49] Our handle is at AJ Inside Story. For now, that's it from me, Imran Khan, [27:55] and the team here. Aljazeera's coverage continues in a moment. Stay tuned.