What would it take for the Iran-US talks to succeed? — The Bottom Line

[0:00] Hi, I'm Steve Clements and I have a question. With a shaky truce between Iran and the United States [0:05] and even shakier truce between Lebanon and Israel, is there any way to get from unstable [0:11] to stable in the Middle East? Let's get to the bottom line. Despite the claim of some American [0:23] leaders that the United States has prevailed and won in its little excursion against Iran, [0:28] the closer truth is that Iran and the U.S. are locked in a stalemate. The White House is looking [0:33] for a win, especially regarding limits on Iran's nuclear program. One of Iran's demands was an end [0:40] to the Israeli war on Lebanon, which killed almost a thousand people over the last five weeks. [0:45] That demand was met by Trump, clearing the way for more Iran-U.S. negotiations. So is the appetite for [0:51] more wars in the Middle East fading? Can temporary ceasefires turn into something more lasting? And [0:57] at the end of this conflict, who are going to be the real winners and who are going to be the real [1:02] losers? Today, we're talking with Elisa Ewers, former director for the Middle East and North Africa [1:07] on the White House National Security Council and currently a senior fellow at the Council on [1:12] Foreign Relations. And political scientist Mohsen Milani, executive director of the Center for [1:17] Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of South Florida. And he's author of Iran's Rise and [1:23] Rivalry with the U.S. in the Middle East. Thank you both for joining us. Look, at the time of this [1:29] recording, folks, I just want to tell you, at the time of this recording, who knows what's going to [1:33] happen moment by moment. The Iranian foreign minister is saying the Strait of Hormuz is completely [1:39] open and President Donald Trump is saying a full blockade is in place. Is this, Mohsen, what a truce [1:47] looks like? First of all, thank you for having me on. And I have to tell you, I am a fan of yours. [1:55] I've been following you for many years. And it is truly a great honor to be with you. I think what is [2:02] taking place today is one of the unintended consequences of the war launched against Iran by [2:09] the United States and Israel. And that surprise, that unintended consequences is Iran's control of the [2:17] Strait of Hormuz. And what we're seeing today is the declaration by Iran that as long as the ceasefire holds [2:25] on Lebanon, Iran is going to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, which means that Iran has now a new [2:33] leverage, which in my judgment is even more powerful than the leverage it had, the deterrence it had [2:41] before in terms of missiles or potential nuclear weapons. And it shows that Iran is entering into these [2:49] latest phase of negotiating, not so much from a position of a strength, but perhaps from a position, not from a position [2:59] of weakness, but from a position of a strength. Let me ask you a question, Elise. We know that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu [3:07] convinced President Trump to go along this because there was sort of an expectation that the Iranian people would rise up and [3:14] overthrow the regime. Can you give us a quick snapshot of what assumptions proved to be pretty correct about Iran and what we [3:21] got wrong? Well, thank you for having me. And I'm really glad that we're having this discussion. I think that one of the [3:30] assumptions specifically about the regime that's always animated U.S. planning around these kinds of scenarios is that the regime itself [3:41] would likely be able to withstand an enormous amount of pressure, whether that pressure be economic or military in nature. And so the [3:51] expectation that you could force regime change, see the regime topple, even with an aggressive decapitation campaign that we've seen over the [4:01] last six weeks, was always a kind of low probability scenario in the planning that's taken place over decades because of the [4:10] institutional nature of the Iranian regime, the layers upon layers of how it was designed. And so it wasn't really about even 10 or 12 [4:21] specific individuals. It was about whether or not that power center could fold. I think there are questions about how decisions are going to be [4:30] made moving forward amongst the regime power centers. But at the end of the day, the IRGC specifically and the political power [4:39] centers more broadly in the regime have been able to withstand this fight despite the degradation of [4:47] capabilities. Now, I will say that we have yet to see this play out completely. Right. You cannot expect the Iranian people to be out on the [4:57] streets under tens of thousands of strikes taking place throughout the country. So so we do not know exactly how the new perhaps [5:07] weakened regime and the Iranian people are going to react and mobilize in the aftermath of this war. But this weakened regime is going to [5:18] seek to consolidate its power. It's going to look for leverage and it's going to seek an economic lifeline. And that's what these [5:26] negotiations are about. Most I would love to kind of get your chance. What cards does Iran continue to have in this conflict? Well, let me first [5:36] disagree about the point made about Iran being in a weaker position internationally, maybe. But domestically, what we are [5:45] witnessing is consolidation under authoritarian rule. Today, Iran, the Islamic Republic, in my judgment, is stronger than it was before the [5:56] beginning of this war. But I want to add a few points about why the Islamic Republic did not fall and why I didn't expect that to fall. [6:06] Number one, I think we often confuse Iranian system with a one man show. We had a one man show under the Shah. And when the Shah showed [6:17] paralysis of decision making, the entire system collapsed. That is not the case with the Islamic Republic. Power is dispersed. It is not a [6:28] system of a system of men only, but a system of men as well as institution. The second point that we often misunderstood [6:37] about Iran is that decisions are not made by one individual. There has to be consensus among different centers of power. And finally, when you get [6:47] red of the red of the top, that doesn't mean the entire system is going to collapse. Right after the beginning of the [6:54] revolution in 1981 AD, before the Islamic Republic was consolidated, 72 of its top leadership were killed in a terrorist attack. Yet the system [7:06] survived. And finally, that is the key element that I think made some people think that the system is going to collapse. They thought that the [7:15] people are going to take to the streets. There are two problems with that. One problem is that not too many countries in the [7:23] world, when they are attacked, they try to overthrow their own government. Usually, when a country is attacked, people are [7:31] unified. They try to defend their country. But secondly, and more importantly, oftentimes in the United States, the confused dissent, [7:42] dissatisfaction of dissatisfaction of the people with the ability to overthrow a government. It is one thing to be [7:50] unhappy with the Islamic Republic. It is an entirely different matter to be able to overthrow that. In order to do [7:56] that, you need organization. You need financial support. You need leadership. You need to form a cross-cutting [8:05] national alliance, something that Ayatollah Khomeini did in 1979. And none of those conditions existed. In other words, the point I'm [8:14] trying to make, even if, even if the people would have taken to the streets, the repressive capability of the Islamic Republic was intact. They could have [8:24] suppressed it. And with all the leadership that can bring unity among middle class, the Bazaris or the merchants, students, [8:36] intellectual. There was no way we could have overthrown this regime. And finally, air power. There is substantial historical [8:47] evidence. With air power alone, you cannot overthrow any regime, especially a regime that is as fortified and as [8:55] institutionalized as the Islamic Republic. I am interested in how the regime looks at its future. What is either giving it [9:03] opportunities or what is deterring it? I'm interested in how the nuclear issue plays out. Alyssa? [9:08] So I think that a couple of things can be true at the same time here, right? The regime had serious, serious economic [9:17] problems on February 27th. Those have not gone away. They could not provide electricity. They mismanaged the ability for access to [9:25] water. They can't stabilize their currency. And they certainly have lost legitimacy with a great number of their [9:33] population. And if they didn't have that before January of this year, they certainly had it after they killed tens of thousands, [9:41] reportedly, of Iranians in the street. So that problem set doesn't go away the day after there is potentially some kind of [9:50] arrangement with the United States. I think that there is an incentive by this regime to seek that arrangement, an [9:57] arrangement that does release some of this economic pressure. That's why we're seeing demands for not only [10:04] sanctions relief, but access to frozen assets, as well as reparations, looking to benefit economically from the outcome of [10:13] this war. What it did in the Strait of Hormuz also gives it enormous economic leverage. It didn't close the strait. It [10:20] threatened to close the strait. And that was enough to set the kind of economic global environment into [10:27] into a very serious crisis. So it's going to look to maximize the benefit of these tools that it has. I think the [10:36] enrichment issue, the nuclear program more generally, is such a significant pillar of the ideology of the regime. It would be [10:44] difficult to imagine that they would agree to the zero enrichment indefinitely demands of the United States. But we're already [10:52] seeing that there is an accommodation that's emerging there, maybe 20 years, maybe less. So there is a negotiation on what [11:01] exactly that right to enrichment looks like at the end of this. So it seems to me that even with the leverage that it's accrued, the [11:09] regime has an interest in seeing whether it can get a pretty good deal out of the situation of the last six weeks. Mosin, how do you think they [11:17] process and deal with the nuclear issue to resolve it? And again, how important is that to their future? And do you think they would [11:26] negotiate that away to get a different equilibrium in this conflict? First of all, I completely agree with the assessment of the [11:36] problems the Islamic Republic faces, including economic problems, corruption, pervasive corruption. And perhaps most importantly, with a lack of [11:46] legitimacy, what happened in Iran in December of last year in January, in which several 1000 people were killed is absolutely [11:55] despicable. It is something that has not taken place in Iran for a long time. So if the Islamic Republic wants to stay in power for a long [12:03] time, they have to come out with a solution with a new social contract with the people of Iran. The old Islamic Republic cannot sustain its [12:13] issue even in the midterm. They have to make some changes now regarding the nuclear issue. I think the two countries can reach an [12:23] agreement provided there is a change of attitude in Washington. If the idea is that they can make Iran surrender, this is not going to [12:33] happen. It's not going to happen because anyone who signs an agreement that is interpreted in Iran as a surrender, that person, that [12:44] faction is not going to be able to survive in Iran for more than a few months. And therefore, there has to be a compromise. I have [12:53] said all along, I have written about it for over 30 years. Iran cannot have economic prosperity. Iran cannot become a normal state unless and [13:04] until it normalizes its relationship with the United States and should make some changes in its policies toward the state of Israel. In other words, [13:13] Iran is accepting the state of Israel as a legitimate player in the Middle East. But the key point for the Islamic Republic is [13:20] that without an agreement with the United States, Iran cannot cannot be brought back into international economic system. And without that, there is [13:31] no way Iran can realize its potential. But the key for Iran, the key for Iran is that if they continue focusing on one issue, that is the issue of [13:42] nuclear up Iranian nuclear program. We're going to see perhaps even an agreement. But two or three years from now, you might see the [13:51] outbreak of another war. Instead of focusing on Iranian nuclear program, the Islamic Republic is well advised to focus on movement or [14:01] normalizing relationship with the United States. And in this context, Iran's nuclear issue, Iran's position in the Middle East could be [14:11] addressed. In my judgment, the war with Iran is more than Iranian nuclear program or Iranian missile program. I honestly believe this is [14:23] about the future of the Middle East and the role Iran, regardless of what kind of system he's had, whether it's Islamic Republic or a [14:32] monarchy or whatever. It is about the role of Iran in a new emerging Middle East order. And if you look at it that way, there are a lot of the [14:40] ways that it is much better for Iran and for the United States to go a little bit beyond the very narrow focus of nuclear issue and talk about [14:50] restoration of relationship, normal relationship. It doesn't mean good relationship. It doesn't mean friendly relationship. The United States and the Soviet Union were in the cold war for many decades, but still they had relationship. This business of not, we do not want to negotiate with the [15:09] Americans face to face. Right. I'm sorry. It's counterproductive and it's Chinese. Well, let me ask you about a third party in this, Alisa, and love to get most in for you, too, is, you know, another major player. And this was Israel. [15:21] Israel has elections in six months. Just the overlap of interests in between the United States and Israel. Is it tight or is it diverging as we see the Trump team trying to get to a different place in the region? [15:36] Is Israel a spoiler in that, Alisa? So I think there is there is some overlap and there is some daylight. I mean, you do see clearly a commitment from both Israel and the United States to address the issue of the nuclear program of the ballistic missile program. [15:54] This was the 12-day war last year. It has continued in the targeting in the last in the last six weeks. Obviously, there is a difference between how Israel deals with Hezbollah, which is a terrorist organization on its border, and the way the United States looks at the issues of proxies throughout the region. [16:14] But there is, I think, a shared interest in that support for terrorism that the regime has promulgated for decades and addressing that issue. I think the difference here is twofold. [16:26] One, a very real change in the way Israeli doctrine operates since the massacres of October 7th and the commitment to use whatever tools are necessary to preemptively eliminate threats rather than wait for those threats to come home to roost. [16:45] And so I think that fundamentally helps to explain the changes in some of the Israeli posture on this. I think for Washington, it's very different. I mean, we have the luxury of distance. [16:58] We do not need to be thinking about the direct existential threats to the United States in the same way. And there is a political pressure here, an economic pressure here at home that's real. [17:10] There are Israeli elections in the fall. There are also midterm elections in the United States. And this war is deeply unpopular in the U.S. already. [17:19] It is correlated to deeply unpopular views of the economy, which is only getting worse when Americans see gas and diesel prices go up, food prices go up, [17:32] the threat of potential global recession and inflation. So there is a difference here, I think, in the political pressures. [17:40] That the Trump administration needs to manage and the the imperatives and objectives of the Israeli government. [17:47] Mohsin, what are your thoughts? Are Israel and the United States converging or diverging at this moment? [17:53] I happen to agree with what she said, but I want to point out one major difference. [17:58] In my judgment, the U.S. as the only global power has an interest of seeing Iran opening up its huge market, 92 million, extremely educated, more than 96 percent of people can read and write. [18:16] And if you look at how Iran has managed this war against the greatest superpower in the world, as well as the greatest regional power, [18:27] you have to give them some credit. And the credit goes to the educated people who run the Islamic Republic. [18:35] Oftentimes, we look at the clerics and what they say publicly, and we forget about the people who are actually managing the system. [18:45] Therefore, the United States and Iran have an interest of normalizing relations and hopefully one day having decent relationship. [18:54] Well, in the case of the state of Israel, I think there is a little bit of disagreement there. [19:00] I think the Israelis have made it very clear that they want to see a regime change in Iran. [19:07] They have said it publicly. Now, whether they are willing to spend the kind of capital they need to spend to bring about the regime change, I don't know. [19:16] But one thing I do know, based on everything they have said, that the Israeli plan is to see a weakened Iran. [19:24] They want to see an Iran that cannot challenge Israeli role in the Middle East. [19:30] And that's where the United States and Iran, the United States and Israel differ. [19:36] But the key point for the Islamic Republic to understand, and again, I've said that all along for many, many years, [19:43] Iran cannot have normal relationship with the United States until it changes its policies toward the state of Israel [19:52] and come to accept, explicitly accept, the existence of the state of Israel as a legitimate member of the United Nations. [20:00] Let me ask you about just real short form. [20:03] One of the other dimensions of this is the Gulf, the GCC, the country's right or in the periphery. [20:08] Again, I read Elisa's paper. A lot of them didn't expect to be in the conflict. [20:12] Almost all of them were attacked in one way or another. [20:15] Does this create a sort of caution on their part about how closely aligned they are with the United States in the future? [20:24] Are they going to hedge their bets more? [20:26] Or does this conflict create very clear lines between which side various countries are on? Elisa? [20:37] So the Gulf is not monolithic, so the answer doesn't necessarily apply equally to every state. [20:42] But I think their options are not great coming out of this. [20:47] Detente with Iran over the last five or six years did not get them a reprieve from being the first line of defense [20:54] against Iranian missiles and drones over the last six weeks. [20:58] They could, of course, hedge their bets with Russia and China, but both have supported Iran, [21:04] either implicitly or explicitly in the last six weeks. [21:10] And, you know, the options to replace what the Gulf wants from its relationship with the United States are limited. [21:17] There really are not a lot of great alternatives to the kinds of relationships, whether it's on defense, [21:24] whether it's on advanced technology, whether it's broadly speaking on economic transformation. [21:29] And so what you're seeing from Washington is a willingness to negotiate and not necessarily address all of the interests of the Gulf. [21:38] So when we come out of this, I think there are going to be some hard decisions in these capitals. [21:42] But I think those hard decisions include, do they have a better alternative to their relationship with the United States? [21:47] And I think the answer to that is likely to be no. [21:50] Mohsen, let me get a snapshot from you on the same question. [21:52] I think for a long time, the Arabs of the Persian Gulf believe that if you kill the head of the snake, [22:01] the snake is going to die and the system is going to collapse. [22:04] I think it's high time for them to re-evaluate this. [22:07] And they must also understand that when they say finish the job, what do they mean by this? [22:12] Do they mean more destruction of Iranian infrastructure? [22:16] They have seen how the new leadership in Iran operates. [22:19] The new leadership is much more aggressive than the old leadership. [22:24] We killed the top echelon of the Iranian decision makers. [22:28] Guess who is coming to make important decisions? [22:32] Younger, more radical members of the IRGC. [22:37] And even if, even if for the sake of argument, we assume that we can go ahead and change the regime in Iran, [22:44] have they thought about the day after when the Islamic Republic is going to collapse? [22:49] Do they really think this a million and a half or two million people who are armed in Iran are going to disappear? [22:57] Right. [22:58] Don't they think that Iran has supporters in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Yemen? [23:02] And this is going to create more problems for the region. [23:06] I think the best way to proceed is to come out with a peace agreement between Iran and the United States [23:12] and hopefully one day between Iran and Israel. [23:15] So real quick, yes, no, we have this pause, true, something going on, defined differently. [23:22] Does it hold, Mohsen? [23:24] Or let's say, are we going to have a, how long do you think it will last? [23:28] Just very quickly. [23:29] You think it will hold? [23:31] Very quickly. [23:32] I don't have an answer. [23:33] I hope that it does. [23:35] Alisa? [23:36] I think it will extend beyond the April 21st deadline, yes. [23:41] Fascinating. [23:42] We rarely have optimists on this show, but there you have it, folks. [23:45] Alisa Ewers, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and University of South Florida professor Mohsen Milani, [23:52] thank you both for being with us today. [23:55] Thank you. [23:57] So what's the bottom line? [23:59] If you're looking for an exclamation point that marks the end of this war, you're just wasting your time. [24:04] The underlying tectonics of the issues at play are really old, full of intangible factors like ego and national pride and national ambitions. [24:14] Israel has wanted an all-out conflict with Iran for decades, and most U.S. presidents did that math, and they resisted until Donald Trump came along. [24:22] Iran has also been consistently expanding its power throughout Asia, whether Israel liked it or not. [24:29] These issues don't end with one therapy session. [24:32] Whatever pauses come in this long-term conflict, they will be fragile. [24:36] In the best-case scenario, there will be no more full-blown system crashes like the one President Trump is trying to get out of now. [24:45] And that's the bottom line.