US ‘miscalculation’ complicates Iran talks, say experts; mediation continues

[0:00] Let's discuss this more with our guests. [0:02] We have Mohamed Al-Masri, [0:03] professor of the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies [0:05] and a political analyst. [0:06] He joined us in the studio in Doha. [0:09] And we have Niloufar Afridi-Kazi, [0:11] a public policy specialist in Pakistan. [0:14] She joins us live from Islamabad. [0:16] Good to see you both. [0:17] Mohamed, if I could start with you. [0:20] The signals we are getting from Islamabad [0:22] suggest that both sides are poised [0:25] to head towards these talks. [0:27] But the threats and accusations [0:30] being thrown around by both sides [0:32] and, of course, the seizing [0:33] of that Iranian cargo ship yesterday [0:37] highlight how tense things are between both sides. [0:40] What's your sense of where we're at? [0:42] It's very precarious right now. [0:45] I think there was a real opportunity a few days ago [0:48] when Trump asked the Iranians to open the straight up [0:52] and they responded positively. [0:55] They opened the straight up. [0:57] They tweeted that they had basically [1:01] stepped down the escalation ladder. [1:03] They responded favorably to Trump's request. [1:06] It was at that moment that the U.S. [1:08] had an opportunity to also step down [1:11] the escalation ladder. [1:12] And instead, Trump kind of did the opposite. [1:14] He used it as an opportunity to declare victory. [1:18] Why do you think he did that? [1:19] I think he wanted to show the American people [1:22] that he had won and that he had forced an Iranian surrender. [1:25] And that was a really big miscalculation. [1:27] I don't think he read the Iranians correctly at that moment. [1:31] And so here we are. [1:33] It's very precarious. [1:33] We're still not 100 percent certain [1:35] if the Iranians are going to show up in Pakistan. [1:37] I think they probably will. [1:39] But I think the negotiations are going to be more difficult now [1:42] that this has all happened over the last few days. [1:44] If both sides do show up in Pakistan, [1:47] should we take that as a sign [1:48] that neither side actually really wants this war to resume? [1:53] Look, I don't think either side has an appetite for more war. [1:57] I think they will fight if they have to. [1:59] But, you know, both sides would like to take the first off ramp. [2:04] The problem here is that the United States, I think, [2:07] has fundamentally miscalculated and misread [2:10] this entire situation from the beginning, really. [2:12] And we could go back. [2:15] And I think Trump believes that he has more leverage [2:19] than he actually does. [2:21] And so now both sides are going to ultimately [2:24] sort of dig their heels in. [2:26] It's going to be a difficult negotiation. [2:28] But to answer your question, [2:30] I don't think either side wants to go back to war. [2:33] Niloufar, how optimistic are you [2:35] that we will see both sides in Islamabad [2:38] in the next few days? [2:40] And what has the role of Pakistan been in getting us to this point? [2:48] Thank you for having me. [2:50] I think everyone in Pakistan, [2:52] and particularly in Islamabad, [2:54] are waiting for both of them to arrive. [2:58] We completely understand the reservations of the Iranis, [3:03] especially the provocative actions that the Americans [3:08] just on the eve of the second round of talks. [3:12] But the mood in Islamabad is that both will be arriving. [3:17] And we are in lockdown mode [3:20] and the expectation of everyone in Islamabad [3:24] and all those who are analyzing the situation second by second [3:30] are in a state of readiness for a second round of discussions. [3:40] Peace talks, perhaps, is, you know, like a little, [3:46] you know, like that comes later. [3:48] But just to move the dialogue process [3:53] between these two countries, [3:55] and Pakistan is working 24-7, [3:59] if 25-7, [4:01] to try and get this process moving. [4:04] So there is a sense of hope and expectation [4:10] that by tonight and tomorrow, [4:14] we will be moving in a slight direction of positiveness. [4:18] Mohamed, so as we heard there from Niloufar, [4:23] Pakistan putting 25-7 into the efforts [4:27] when it comes to these talks. [4:29] How fundamental is their role here [4:31] in bringing the two sides to this point? [4:34] Super important. [4:35] You know, I think Pakistan in many ways [4:37] is the perfect place, [4:39] the perfect mediator, [4:40] because they have long had good relations [4:42] with the Iranians, [4:43] and they have a good relationship with the United States. [4:45] So there's trust there. [4:46] And a basic problem here between the U.S. and Iran [4:49] is the lack of trust. [4:50] As you all have been, you know, [4:52] covering for weeks, months now, [4:54] there's just a fundamental lack of trust. [4:56] And so you need a mediator [4:57] that has the ear or ears, as it were, [5:02] of both sides. [5:02] And I think Pakistan has that. [5:04] Mohamed, there's been quite a bit of mixed messaging [5:06] coming out of Tehran, [5:08] to the extent that some people are questioning [5:11] whether it is the supreme leader who is in control [5:14] or whether it is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard [5:17] making the key decisions. [5:19] Why does that distinction matter right now? [5:22] It's really important. [5:22] So first of all, [5:23] to answer the first part of the question, [5:24] I think that the IRGC has more control right now [5:30] during wartime. [5:32] And the reason why that is important [5:34] is that it basically lends itself [5:38] to a more kind of hardened position. [5:40] And I think it's very important [5:42] that the United States understand that, [5:43] that the Iranians had those 10 points, [5:46] that list of 10 demands. [5:48] And I think they're going to stick to their guns. [5:51] I think they will be willing to compromise [5:53] on some of them. [5:54] You know, four of those 10 demands [5:56] are economy-related. [5:59] They're money-related. [6:00] And I don't think that the Iranians [6:01] are going to surrender all of them. [6:03] They may be willing to compromise [6:04] on a couple of them. [6:06] But unless the Americans understand [6:07] that the new faces of the Iranian regime [6:12] have hardened their position [6:14] and believe that they are in a position [6:16] of strategic leverage [6:17] and that they are perfectly willing [6:18] to go back to war if they have to, [6:20] I think it'll be a much more difficult negotiation [6:23] if the U.S. doesn't understand those things. [6:26] And Nilouf, I could ask you the final question. [6:28] To what extent does this mixed messaging [6:29] coming from Iran highlight [6:31] how much pressure Iran is under right now? [6:36] I think it's also important [6:37] not to only talk about [6:40] the so-called reference [6:42] to the mixed messaging from Iran. [6:44] I mean, in every country [6:46] you have different centers of power. [6:50] We have over the last six weeks [6:53] seen that the United States themselves [6:56] not necessarily reflecting the public opinion [7:00] or the power centers [7:02] that influence foreign policy in America. [7:06] I mean, the elephant in the room [7:09] which is, you know, very visible to everyone, [7:12] Israel and its influence on decision-making, [7:16] the undermining of the entire process [7:18] of discussion, peace talks, [7:21] eventual sustainable peace, [7:24] which is what Iran also seeks. [7:26] Is it coming from America [7:28] or is it coming from a third party? [7:30] So I think it's very important [7:32] when we talk about power centers in Iran [7:35] that influence decision-making, [7:39] at least in Iran, [7:41] in all of the centers of influence [7:45] towards foreign and domestic policy. [7:47] It is in the interest of Iran and Iranians. [7:51] One can't quite say that with the Americans [7:53] and those that are influencing decisions in America. [7:58] Interesting point. [7:59] Okay, thank you to both our guests, [8:01] Nalifah Afid-Kazi, [8:03] public policy specialist in Pakistan, [8:05] and Mohamed Al-Mastri [8:06] from the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.