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US-Iran deal still far from reach : Analysis

April 18, 2026 6m 1,016 words
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About this transcript: This is a full AI-generated transcript of US-Iran deal still far from reach : Analysis, published April 18, 2026. The transcript contains 1,016 words with timestamps and was generated using Whisper AI.

"To discuss all this further now, we're joined by Alan Iyer. He's a distinguished diplomatic fellow at the Middle East Institute and a former senior diplomat on the U.S. negotiating team for the 2015 JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal. Thank you so much, Mr. Iyer, for being with us on Al Jazeera. So we..."

[0:00] To discuss all this further now, we're joined by Alan Iyer. [0:03] He's a distinguished diplomatic fellow at the Middle East Institute [0:06] and a former senior diplomat on the U.S. negotiating team [0:09] for the 2015 JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal. [0:13] Thank you so much, Mr. Iyer, for being with us on Al Jazeera. [0:16] So we have Iran saying that there won't be any talks [0:19] until a framework is agreed. [0:21] President Trump says a deal is within reach. [0:23] So two completely different versions of reality [0:26] from Washington and Tehran. [0:27] How, first of all, do you interpret these contradictions? [0:32] I don't interpret them. [0:33] I ignore them because the problem is that policy [0:38] is not what people put on social media. [0:40] What President Trump puts on social media, [0:43] what Erakchi puts on social media, [0:45] should not be the focus of too much attention, okay? [0:49] It's not the case that the strait has reverted back [0:53] after Iran opened it. [0:55] Iran never opened it. [0:56] Iran always said there'll be limited passage, [1:00] coordinated with the IRGC Navy, and they'll be tolling. [1:03] What happened was, as a result of President Trump's tweets [1:06] saying the deal was within reach, [1:08] the IRGC put a different spin on what actually is the case, [1:12] and they shut down traffic. [1:14] But the reality is there has been no appreciable change [1:17] in the ability of ships to transit the strait. [1:20] Iran is still going to maintain a chokehold on that [1:23] until they get what they want. [1:25] And in terms of how close we are to a deal, not close at all. [1:29] There is no low-hanging fruit. [1:30] Still substantial differences between the two sides. [1:33] On the differences, and I want to get your expertise [1:36] on the nuclear issue more specifically, [1:38] because you were, of course, part of the negotiating team [1:40] in the GCPOA deal. [1:43] The U.S. today is demanding zero enrichment. [1:46] Iran refuses that and offers time-bound suspension. [1:50] Trump has also said that they've agreed to hand over [1:53] their enriched uranium. [1:55] The Iranians have denied that as well. [1:57] What concessions, if any, could Tehran make here? [2:00] And can they realistically come up with a different mechanism [2:03] established under the JCPOA regarding, you know, [2:07] uranium stockpile limits and monitoring? [2:10] Can they come up with a better deal? [2:13] Well, unfortunately, as a result of this war, [2:15] whatever deal the U.S. will get will be worse [2:18] than the one they would have gotten had they not attacked. [2:21] Whatever deal the U.S. could get will be essentially the JCPOA, [2:25] which is Iran is willing to temporarily suspend uranium [2:28] and put limits on the uranium it keeps within country [2:32] in exchange for a source of money. [2:35] Sanctions relief, unfreezing of blockaded Iranian funds, [2:39] that's the essential calculus that the two sides have to play with. [2:44] Restrictions on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for money. [2:48] The problem is, is that Iran's demands, excuse me, [2:53] U.S. demands of Iran haven't changed since before the war, [2:56] which is no indigenous enrichment, which Iran will never agree to, [3:01] and no uranium on Iranian soil, which Iran might well agree to. [3:07] They've indicated they would be willing to keep minimal reserves [3:11] of enriched uranium on Iranian soil. [3:13] But the key variable is, what does Iran get in return? [3:18] And what do you think they would want to get in return, [3:21] especially on the question of transferring enriched uranium? [3:24] President Trump talked about joint cooperation on that. [3:28] How would that work practically? [3:31] Well, there's two things Iran wants. [3:33] It wants security. [3:34] So it's not attacked again six months and a year from now by Iran and Israel. [3:38] That's hard to get verbally. [3:41] But luckily for Iran, they've found a way to guarantee that, [3:44] which is the Strait of Hormuz, [3:46] which is the new equation is you pressure us, we close the strait. [3:51] And the ability Iran has to close the strait [3:53] requires so little military power on their part, [3:56] it effectively can't be taken away from them. [3:58] That's one thing they want. [4:00] The second thing they want is money. [4:02] They've got anywhere from $300 billion to a trillion dollars worth of damage. [4:05] Their economy was horrible even before the war. [4:09] So they need money, whether that's reparations, [4:11] which no one wants to pay them, [4:13] unblocked Iranian funds, [4:14] which isn't anywhere near enough to pay for that, [4:17] or relaxing, if not eradication of sanctions, [4:21] which is politically unpalpable for the Trump administration to give [4:25] with elections coming up. [4:26] But that's what Iran is looking for. [4:29] And so what do you see as the main differences today [4:32] between the appetite and willingness to get things done by Iran right now [4:38] compared to what you were dealing with during the JCPOA negotiations? [4:42] And do you think there are lessons from those negotiations [4:44] that are most relevant or that are being overlooked today [4:48] that could be helpful? [4:52] Well, unfortunately, we've blotted the copybook. [4:55] I mean, you don't need a lot of trust between two sides to negotiate, [4:58] but there has to be some. [4:59] The fact that the U.S. twice attacked Iran during negotiations [5:05] weakens the chance. [5:07] Plus, there's a new leadership in Iran. [5:09] We killed the existing Iranian leadership, [5:11] but the ones that have taken their place are more hardline, [5:15] more radical, more militaristic. [5:17] It's the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. [5:20] So this is not the Obama era [5:22] where both sides were willing to negotiate. [5:26] Iran was looking for sanctions relief, [5:27] and the U.S. was looking to put a cap [5:29] and put the Iranian nuclear program in a box. [5:33] Right now, Trump is looking to eradicate the nuclear program, [5:37] which Iran is unwilling to do. [5:39] And Iran is looking for cash guarantees [5:42] or cash of more money that the U.S. is unwilling to give. [5:46] So it's much, much harder now than it was back then. [5:50] To say nothing of the fact that the rate of Hormoz [5:52] is a new ticking time bomb. [5:54] Indeed. [5:54] Alan Ayer, thank you so much for your insight. [5:57] Thank you for sharing your expertise with us. [5:58] Alan Ayer is a former senior diplomat [6:01] and who was part of the negotiating team [6:03] for the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. [6:05] Thank you very much.

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