Trump threatens Iran energy strikes as expert warns of escalation risks.

[0:00] a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He's joining us from Philadelphia. [0:03] Thank you very much indeed for being with us. I want to talk to you about Donald Trump's threats [0:09] with regard to Iran's energy facilities in the event that the Strait of Hormuz is not opened. [0:15] What are your thoughts on that? Well, you know, I think that Trump does not have a lot of arrows [0:22] in his quiver except to escalate, to escalate, to de-escalate in his mind. In other words, [0:29] to impose more costs on Iran, to raise the pain, to try to get Iran to make a deal to open the [0:38] Strait of Hormuz. And that's because if you don't get a deal, it's very difficult to open that [0:44] strait. It's narrow. It's shallow. The Iranians can mine it. They can send out speedboats from [0:50] the coast. They can launch missiles from the high ground along the coast. And so I think at least [0:55] for now, the U.S. is continuing to believe that it can [0:59] get a deal. And what's left in terms of targets, going away from the military targets that Israel [1:07] and the United States have been hitting toward bridges, which we saw a couple of days ago, [1:13] toward energy facilities, toward perhaps water facilities, in a way of trying effectively to [1:20] cause such domestic pain and dislocation that the Iranian government says it's time to cut a deal [1:28] and end the fight. [1:29] Does the nature of this particular threat that he's issued tell us anything about any sense of [1:35] urgency he might be feeling in terms of trying to bring this war to an end? [1:39] I think Donald Trump feels considerable urgency. And that's because this is not a popular war in [1:48] the United States. I would say that at the beginning of the war, a majority of Americans [1:54] were not on board. And that has shifted even more decisively against the war, [2:01] since it began about five weeks ago. Most American allies are not on board with the war. [2:07] And very importantly, and perhaps crucially, this is a war that even though is not affecting the [2:15] flow of oil to the United States per se, we live in a world in which the market for oil is globalized. [2:22] And as a consequence, we Americans are now paying four plus dollars a gallon when we fill up the car. [2:30] We're seeing [2:31] energy prices go up, electricity prices go up, fertilizer, food. And as a consequence, [2:38] this is taking a toll on not just Donald Trump's popularity, but the Republican Party's popularity [2:44] with the midterms looming not that far away. And so I do think that Donald Trump feels some [2:51] time pressure to try to up the ante militarily in the hope that that will then end the war [2:58] diplomatically within the next two, three years. [3:01] Now, I was reading an article that you wrote on the Council on Foreign Relations website, [3:06] and you were saying that there were three possible options, outcomes for the end of the war. One, [3:12] of course, was on the battlefield. The second one was diplomacy. There was one that I wanted [3:16] to ask you about. And I may be paraphrasing slightly what you were marking as point three. [3:23] How possible is it, do you think, that Donald Trump, given the timelines that we've just been [3:27] discussing and the pressure that he might be feeling, could simply decide that the U.S. and [3:31] the U.S. has been victorious, however he chooses to define that? And he might just walk away, [3:37] leaving a fragmented but vengeful Iran in charge of the Strait of Hormuz and possibly still with [3:44] some missiles. [3:47] You know, that's a real possibility. Then we have something that would look more like a frozen [3:53] conflict, perhaps not unlike what we see with Ukraine and Russia, where the battlefield is [4:03] what it used to be. The frontline doesn't move much, but there, at least as of yet, is no peace [4:09] deal. And Donald Trump could say, you know, we've hit the missiles. We've hit the drones. We've hit [4:16] command and control. We've taken out the leadership. Mission accomplished. I'm now handing [4:23] this problem over to the Europeans and the Japanese and the Koreans and the Gulf neighbors [4:28] that are more dependent upon Gulf oil than we Americans are. [4:33] But, and this is an important but, I'm not sure that he can do that. Because if you don't get [4:40] some kind of understanding with Iran, then the Strait remains closed. And if the Strait remains [4:46] closed, or at least at the will of Iran's decision-making on whether to shoot at tankers, to [4:53] shoot at cargo ships, then the impact of this war on the global economy doesn't abate. And that is [5:02] something that I think Trump has to do. [5:03] He has to keep front and center. So I do think that at least for now, the goal here is not just [5:09] to do more damage to Iran, but to do more damage to Iran with the goal of convincing the Iranians [5:17] to sit down at the negotiating table and end this war with some kind of peace settlement that [5:23] represents common ground and an opening of the Strait. [5:26] Donald Trump, as we've just been discussing, is threatening to hit civilian energy sites. We [5:33] know that both Israel and the U.S. have hit civilian sites, such as the bridge, for example, [5:38] in Iran as well. That's regarded as a war crime under the Geneva Convention. Now, for its part, [5:44] of course, Iran has been firing cluster munitions into Israel, particularly that, too. They, too, [5:50] are banned under the Geneva Convention. Is there any circumstance now where the so-called rules of [5:56] war can be said to apply anymore? You know, the rules of war are still out there. [6:06] I mean, we are in a moment in history in which geopolitical competition is heating up, in which [6:18] great power rivalry, which was in abeyance two, three decades ago, seems to be coming back with [6:26] a vengeance. And under those circumstances, I think you're going to see countries perhaps try [6:33] to abide by international law, at least rhetorically. [6:36] But feel that they need to cross the line when it comes to fulfilling national interest and [6:44] fulfilling strategic missions. So, listen, the laws of war are quite clear. You cannot target [6:51] noncombatants. You can't go after civilians. If the United States does begin to target civilian [6:59] infrastructure, does begin to impose costs upon the average people who can't get food, [7:06] can't get water, can't get electricity, then obviously we're in a very ambiguous place when [7:13] it comes to whether this is a war that is abiding by the international law and norms that are out [7:19] there. I really appreciate you taking the time and giving us the benefit of your expertise in [7:24] this. Charles Copson, thank you very much indeed, sir. My pleasure. Bye-bye.