Trump ‘didn’t have good options’ but to take the ceasefire deal: Analysis

[0:00] Joining us from Washington, D.C., is Trita Parsi. [0:02] He is the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft [0:06] and also our senior correspondent, Osama bin Javid, is here with me in studio. [0:10] Osama, let's start with you. [0:12] Do we have any sense at this stage as to how the Pakistanis were able to make this happen? [0:19] Well, I think we need to all take a moment to let this sink in, [0:23] that from the brink of and from the precipice of an all-out war of annihilation, [0:29] the world has stepped back, as Donald Trump has announced it in his Truth Social post. [0:35] You're hearing from the National Supreme Committee of the Iranians [0:39] that on April 10th, a two-week dialogue is beginning in Islamabad. [0:45] I think that is the most significant outcome of all of this. [0:48] This essentially underlines that they've agreed to this ceasefire. [0:52] They've agreed to the terms that were presented to them. [0:54] Now, the Americans are at a 15-point plan. [0:58] The Iranians... [0:59] The Iranians are at a 10-point plan. [1:01] What the Pakistanis had been insisting all through this [1:03] was that find common ground that you agree upon. [1:07] Forget the parts that you disagree with. [1:10] Find a strand that you agree upon. [1:12] Come to the table. [1:13] Talk the other things out. [1:15] The alternative is that you are going to go to war, [1:19] spend billions of dollars, kill millions of people, [1:22] put this region into a war that it might not be able to come out of for years, [1:27] if not decades, [1:29] and then you will, in the end, come to the table. [1:31] And it seems that at the last moment, that sense seemed to have prevailed. [1:36] And this is why you're seeing the Pakistanis being thanked by Donald Trump, [1:39] they're acknowledged by the Iranians. [1:41] And I think Islamabad being on that, playing that crucial role, [1:45] not just in the talks, but as a venue for negotiations, it is significant. [1:50] So you have a 15-point plan, a 10-point plan that we're trying to kind of reconcile here. [1:55] Do we know at all where the points of disagreement may still... [1:59] Do we know where the points of disagreement may still lie? [2:01] Well, I think there's 25 points of disagreement between these two plans. [2:05] Because, you see, the maximalist positions that both sides have taken, they've dug their heels. [2:10] The U.S. president knows that this is an election year. [2:13] He is going to be able to have to sell to the American public [2:17] that he went for a war that was, in his words, necessary and to prevent harm to Americans. [2:23] Whereas the Iranians are saying, this was a complete war of choice. [2:27] I was in Geneva when these were happening. [2:29] These talks were happening. [2:30] The Iranians were quite confident that they've agreed to most parts of what was being put on the table. [2:36] Going into this, they know now that for the last six weeks, [2:39] they've been able to hold off and resist one of the largest armies in the world. [2:43] They've been able to resist the Israeli attacks. [2:46] They've went through a regime change operation, if the Americans want to call it that. [2:51] Whereas it took the Americans 20 years to replace the Taliban with the Taliban. [2:55] But in the last six weeks, they've essentially replaced Khamenei with Khamenei. [2:59] Trita, you're there in D.C. [3:01] I wonder, in your estimation, why do you think the president agreed to extend this ceasefire? [3:06] Or I should say, I guess, agreed to a ceasefire at all? [3:12] Because Donald Trump does not have any good options. [3:14] He was talking a big game about escalatory steps. [3:17] But everyone in the region knew that if he went after Iran's energy resources, power plants, etc., [3:23] the Iranians would retaliate against GCC states and we would have a much, much worse energy crisis [3:30] than we have now. [3:31] Oil prices would reach $200 in a prolonged way because oil infrastructure would be taken out. [3:37] And this would destroy Trump's presidency. [3:40] He needed to get out of this. [3:41] He made these threats earlier today to give the appearance that the agreement that he would come to by this evening [3:49] was done on his terms. [3:51] But when you actually look at it, it does appear that it wasn't. [3:54] Because he, even in his own tweet, says that the negotiations are going to be based [3:59] on the 10-point plan of the Iranians, which is a much more reasonable plan. [4:04] It has a couple of very aggressive proposals, whereas the American plan was really maximalist [4:11] from the beginning to end and really not a serious proposal. [4:15] Now, that doesn't mean that these negotiations in any way, shape or form are going to work. [4:19] The Iranians are going to be tremendously suspicious that this is going to be the same thing [4:23] the U.S. and Israel has done in Gaza several times. [4:26] Use a ceasefire just to catch up. [4:29] Regroup, rearm, and then relaunch the war. [4:31] So this is going to be very tough. [4:33] And Pakistan has its work cut out for it. [4:35] But we should all be thankful that there are still countries around that are willing to stick out their neck [4:40] and use their diplomatic offices to help bring about some form of a reduction of tensions. [4:45] Who do you think is in a better bargaining position? [4:47] Well, I think at this point, the Iranians have managed to take away the potency [4:53] of American military threats from this equation. [4:56] Because even if the U.S. continues to issue threats [4:59] going forward in these talks, [5:01] how serious would anyone take them after it's become so clear [5:05] that the United States, with all of its firepower, [5:08] still cannot bring the Iranians to their knees? [5:11] The U.S. Navy was 3,000 kilometers away from Iran's shorelines [5:16] out of fear that Iranian missiles would sink a couple of American ships. [5:19] So I think what has happened here is that the military option has been tested [5:24] and it has failed. [5:26] And this is going to change the dynamics in the negotiations [5:28] in a profound way. [5:31] Osama, look, Iran has been insisting on basically reparations [5:36] for the damage that's been done thus far in the war [5:39] and essentially saying, look, we should be able to turn the Strait of Hormuz [5:43] into a toll road in order to pay for those reparations. [5:47] Do you think that that is one point where they're likely to be flexible? [5:51] I think they will have to be flexible. [5:53] And they have been showing flexibility on that [5:55] because they're working on a joint mechanism with the Omanis. [5:58] You'll have to see the region come into play in all of this. [6:02] You see, when I was saying that Pakistan is significant, [6:04] it is not just because of its geography, [6:07] but it is because of its ties. [6:09] It's got a defense pact with the Saudis. [6:11] Today, you heard the Pakistanis say that if there is an escalation, [6:15] they will not abandon them. [6:17] It has a line of communication with the Chinese, [6:19] who essentially want free and safe passage [6:22] because China is dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. [6:25] It is not going to be willing to pay a premium [6:27] to let its ships go past. [6:29] So Iran will definitely be able to maintain some sort of control [6:34] of the Strait of Hormuz, [6:35] but I don't think that it's going to be millions of dollars each ship. [6:38] But what is significant here is that this region has been changed forever. [6:43] It is not just the United States that is leaving with a bloody nose. [6:46] What has happened to Iran is extraordinary. [6:49] The blood force that has been hitting Iran, [6:54] you're talking about the Supreme Leader being taken away, [6:57] taken out, [6:58] you're talking about the chain of command being fragmented, [7:00] the new Supreme Leader, [7:02] rumors about his health. [7:04] So Iran will have to recalibrate and reassess [7:07] because it was on the brink of seeing its regional powers, [7:12] people who have so far refrained from conflict and shown, [7:15] and you have to give the GCC a lot of credit here [7:18] that it did not get dragged into this war, [7:20] as was being mentioned earlier. [7:23] But now will be the time to reassess. [7:26] This whole region will have to reassess its security [7:29] and economic priorities. [7:31] You're already seeing murmurs of avoiding the Strait of Hormuz [7:34] and building pipelines and structures for the future. [7:37] The damage that has been done is tremendous [7:39] and the region would not want to go back to it. [7:42] Just in Qatar, [7:43] the Ras Laffan trains that have been damaged, [7:45] the liquefied natural gas trains, [7:47] $26 billion worth of damage. [7:49] In terms of revenues, [7:51] about $20 billion a year for the next three to five years. [7:54] There is tremendous tool [7:55] and that is just one of the oil and gas infrastructures [7:59] that have been hit. [8:00] So there is a lot at stake. [8:02] I think all sides have now realized [8:04] what this conflict costs, [8:06] including the Americans and the Iranians. [8:08] And these 15 days are going to be the litmus test [8:11] whether they believe that the lessons learned [8:13] will be applied to the future. [8:15] Trita, I want to ask you about a pretty remarkable answer [8:18] that the president gave in his press conference yesterday in DC. [8:22] He was asked why the Iranians would go along [8:25] with regime change [8:27] when the Americans have been bombing their countries [8:29] and were threatening to bomb, you know, [8:31] bridges, power plants, things like that. [8:34] And President Trump said, [8:36] quote, they'd be willing to suffer that [8:38] in order to have freedom. [8:39] And he insisted that there were actually Iranians [8:41] who wanted the bombing to continue. [8:44] Do you think that this deal is an acceptance [8:46] that maybe that was hyperbole? [8:49] Is the idea of regime change effectively dead here? [8:53] I think it is completely dead. [8:58] And I think it was actually dead on arrival. [9:00] And you can see it in the New York Times reporting today [9:02] that that was part of the proposal [9:04] that the Israelis sold Trump [9:06] that generated the most skepticism, [9:09] outright skepticism. [9:11] The CIA director called it farcical [9:13] from Trump's advisors. [9:16] Trump, it's not clear whether he fully was bought in on or not, [9:19] but he clearly was bought in on the idea of war. [9:21] He thought the regime was going to collapse. [9:23] At this point, I think the Islamic Republic, [9:26] the theocracy, [9:27] internally is stronger than it was before. [9:30] And we may very well end up seeing a more hawkish [9:33] and more radical Islamic Republic version [9:36] of the Islamic Republic going forward. [9:38] That I think would be very devastating [9:40] for the region as a whole, [9:41] because as the previous guest mentioned, [9:43] there is a dire need right now [9:45] to make sure that the region comes together, [9:47] builds its own security architecture, [9:49] not dependent on outside forces [9:51] in order to make sure that they can safeguard [9:54] the security in the region [9:55] and never end up in a scenario like this. [9:57] And that's going to require flexibility [9:59] from all sides, [10:00] including the Iranians. [10:01] Sorry to interrupt you there. [10:02] You heard our colleague Mohamed Val [10:04] talking about the Iranian demands, [10:06] one of them being that the war in Lebanon also ends. [10:10] How likely do you think it is that that will ultimately be [10:13] a sticking point? [10:14] Because after all, [10:15] this was never America's war. [10:17] Americans have not been dropping bombs on Lebanon. [10:20] Only the Israelis have. [10:21] That is true. [10:24] I think there are several reasons [10:25] why the Iranians include this. [10:27] One is to show their sympathy. [10:28] And solidarity with the people of Lebanon. [10:31] But it's also important because [10:33] if the Israelis continue to bomb Gaza, [10:36] bomb Lebanon, bomb Syria, [10:38] that is going to be a source of instability in the region [10:41] that will in and of itself [10:43] risk expanding the war onto Iran once again. [10:46] And if you truly want to find an end to the war, [10:49] not just a ceasefire, [10:50] then it's necessary to recognize these connections [10:53] between the theater in Lebanon [10:55] and the theater in Iran. [10:56] And as a result, [10:57] I'm not surprised that they're making that demand. [10:59] Now, whether the United States can deliver on that demand [11:02] is a different story [11:03] if it wants to deliver on that demand. [11:05] But there is a clear connection that we saw already [11:08] from October 7th, [11:09] that as long as those conflicts were continuing, [11:12] the Israelis were bombarding these countries, [11:14] the risk of regional spillover was massive. [11:17] We have now seen it happen twice. [11:19] If you want to avoid it in the future, [11:21] you have to address that issue as well. [11:23] Osama, part of the irony of this conflict [11:25] is that you had Israel bombing, [11:27] bombing energy facilities inside of Iran, [11:31] critical infrastructure inside of Iran [11:33] just in the last 24 hours. [11:35] And yet you had Saudi Arabia, [11:37] which is no friend of the Israelis, [11:39] that were ultimately taking the blowback [11:41] from the Iranians for that. [11:43] What do we know about the Gulf's role [11:46] in pushing for a resolution to this? [11:48] How involved have they been? [11:50] What leverage have they had [11:52] and have they been able to effectively use it? [11:54] Well, in the last few days, [11:55] I was in Islamabad [11:56] talking to various sources [11:57] about that particular point. [11:59] And according to the Pakistanis, [12:01] the role that they've been playing [12:03] is not just of the mediator, [12:04] but essentially going to Gulf states [12:06] and convincing them [12:07] that it is not in their interest [12:09] to get involved and dragged into a war. [12:12] One official told me that they reminded people [12:15] of what happened in the 1980s [12:17] where Saddam Hussein was egged on [12:19] to go to war with Iran, [12:20] and then the ladder was pulled from beneath his feet. [12:23] And that is why there's been [12:25] there's been wisdom, [12:27] there's been determination [12:30] to stay on the sidelines [12:32] even despite coming under attack. [12:35] And you saw how angry [12:37] the Saudi foreign minister was [12:38] when there was a meeting in Tehran [12:40] of foreign ministers of the region [12:42] and the Iraqis and the Turks [12:44] and the Pakistanis [12:45] and the Iranian bombs [12:47] were falling on Riyadh during that day. [12:52] So the region has shown a lot of restraint, [12:54] but that does not mean [12:55] that it is going to be unlimited. [12:57] That is why you're seeing from the GCC [12:59] calls that they are going to be behind [13:02] any sort of off-ramp [13:04] that can be provided to Iranians and the Americans. [13:07] But in the aftermath, [13:09] the day after, [13:10] they want to be part of a negotiated solution [13:13] because they are ultimately paying the price. [13:15] What they had built as shields around them, [13:18] as the United States had told them, [13:21] were essentially targets painted on their backs. [13:23] That the Iranians kept on hitting over and over again. [13:26] And the United States was not able to give them [13:28] the kind of cover that they expected [13:30] that it was giving to Israel. [13:32] Although the Americans said that, [13:34] look, the 90% of interceptions you're making [13:36] is because we are providing you with military hardware. [13:39] And that relationship is not going to go anywhere. [13:41] But I think what you're going to see in the region [13:43] is more diversity, [13:45] not just in economic ties, [13:46] but in security ties as well. [13:48] You're already seeing it with Turkey. [13:49] You're seeing it with Europe. [13:50] And now perhaps you'll see China [13:52] become a player. [13:54] Trita, there's still a lot of question marks [13:57] about the Israeli answer to all of this. [14:00] But I just wonder, [14:01] how likely do you think it is [14:03] that we may find ourselves in a scenario [14:05] where the Israelis ostensibly agree [14:08] to a ceasefire deal, [14:09] but then a few weeks later, [14:10] when Washington's not paying attention anymore, [14:13] they sort of go back to a bombing campaign in Iran, [14:16] like we have seen, for instance, in Gaza [14:18] and previous to that, [14:19] like we saw in Lebanon as well. [14:21] How likely do you think [14:22] that that scenario is? [14:24] And do the Americans really have the ability [14:27] or the leverage over Israel to say no? [14:32] So on the first scenario, [14:33] I don't think it is as easy for the Israelis [14:35] to restart the war with Iran [14:36] as it is for them to just bomb in Gaza and Lebanon. [14:39] Because every time the Israelis have attacked Iran, [14:42] they have had to coordinate with the United States [14:44] because they need the US's help [14:45] in order to protect them [14:47] against the incoming retaliatory missiles from Iran. [14:51] So I don't think that the Israelis [14:52] actually can sustain themselves [14:54] in a war with Iran [14:55] without active American support. [14:57] And if they are doing it against American wishes, [15:00] then obviously they would take a huge risk [15:02] of seeing potentially the United States [15:04] stay out of that war. [15:05] And then the Israelis facing Iran alone [15:07] is not a scenario that they want to be in. [15:09] Now, can the United States rein in Israel? [15:12] Absolutely it can. [15:13] There's absolutely no doubt in my mind [15:14] that if the United States really wanted to, [15:16] it would do so. [15:17] The question is, [15:18] what is the political price [15:20] the president and his party would pay [15:22] if they were to do so? [15:23] And obviously, [15:24] are they willing to pay that price? [15:26] We have seen that Trump on occasion [15:28] actually has reined in the Israelis [15:30] in a rather humiliating fashion, [15:32] such as when he forced them to read an apology [15:34] to the Emir of Qatar [15:36] after the Israelis had attacked Doha [15:38] and then released the pictures of it [15:40] to make sure that there was no doubt [15:41] that this was actually happening. [15:43] But we haven't seen Trump being able [15:45] to sustain that pressure on the Israelis. [15:47] And in this scenario, [15:48] in order to make sure that this deal is sustainable, [15:51] that pressure has to be sustained. [15:53] Yeah, how could you forget those photos [15:55] of the president holding the base of the phone [15:58] in the White House [15:59] while the Israeli prime minister [16:01] read his apology to the Qataris? [16:03] All right, Trita Parsi there in Washington, [16:05] Osama bin Javid here in Doha. [16:06] Thank you both for that. [16:07] We'll keep an eye.