Trump 'can't imagine' Iran peace plan 'would be acceptable'

[0:00] The war with Iran has entered its third month, and while a shaky ceasefire holds, [0:05] diplomatic efforts between the U.S. and Iran look like they're at an impasse. [0:09] Last night, President Trump posted on True Social that he would soon be reviewing the [0:14] new peace proposal sent by Iran, but that he could not, quote, imagine that it would be acceptable [0:19] in that they have not yet paid a big enough price for what they have done to humanity [0:24] in the world over the last 47 years, unquote. The Strait of Hormuz remains a central flashpoint [0:31] in the conflict, with both sides blockading the crucial trade route, choking the global economy [0:36] as the price of oil has skyrocketed. Joining me now is Anne-Marie Slaughter, who will soon step down [0:43] from her role as CEO of the think tank New America and become dean of the School of Public Policy at [0:49] the London School of Economics in early 2027. And of course, retired Admiral James Stavridis, [0:55] the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander. Anne-Marie, it feels like both sides are dug in. [1:03] And when these things happen, usually the question is, who can bear the pain longer? What's your sense? [1:11] Yeah, this really is a game of chicken, right? Who's going to blink first? I think the U.S. [1:17] is in a really risky position because it's actually, and ironically, like Russia and Ukraine. [1:24] Ukraine, Russia needs to win. The U.S. needs to win. Ukraine just needs not to lose. And Iran just [1:32] needs not to lose. And Iran has tremendous capacity to take pain. It's got an authoritarian government. [1:41] It's got a people who are now much more allied in favor of that government than they were back in [1:47] January with all the protests. And it is the little guy against the big guy. This is, you know, the U.S. [1:54] has been here before, like Vietnam or Afghanistan. I really think the U.S. is more likely to blink first [2:02] than Iran. And to add to that, like Russia, Ukraine, for the little guy, it's existential. [2:09] Exactly. For the superpower, it's one of many things going on. Exactly. [2:14] Jim, when you look at the naval blockade, you know, how easy is it for the United States to keep [2:23] this going indefinitely? How is there a path for Iran to get some of its oil out? You know, [2:31] they've been talking about hugging the coastline and getting the oil out that way. What is your sense? [2:39] I've sailed the Strait of Hormuz close to 100 times as a sea captain, and I have participated in [2:47] several blockades around the world. My conclusion is blockades are inherently very difficult to maintain. [2:54] This is a thousand miles plus of coastline that we're blockading. It's an act of war, by the way. [3:01] And there's always going to be leakage. Think the movie Gone with the Wind, Rhett Butler showing up with [3:08] beautiful cigars and silk scarves from Paris through the Lincoln blockade of the American South. Having said [3:16] all that, I agree with my good friend Anne Marie. Congratulations on the LSC, by the way. And I would [3:23] I would simply add, I think in the White House, they are now starting to look at additional military [3:30] options, because this tale of two blockades is going to be difficult to sustain. So to conclude, [3:36] Fareed, I think the president's looking at probably a package of three different military options. One, [3:42] go after more leadership, try and take out some of the intransigent members, the Revolutionary Guard. [3:49] Number two, perhaps go after the oil infrastructure, quite risky, could lead to retaliation. And third, [3:57] let's call it strategic preparation of the Strait of Hormuz in case you have to open it militarily, [4:04] which may be the next move on the chessboard. And if this negotiation gets going, it feels like the [4:13] key issues are, you know, straight and foremost has to be opened, what to do about the enriched fuel, [4:20] and then the length of the suspension where Iran agrees not to. And it feels to me like all Trump is [4:26] looking for is a deal that he can say is better than Obama's nuclear deal. I think that's right, [4:33] but I think that's going to be incredibly hard to do. Because honestly, had he kept Obama's deal, [4:39] we would not be in this situation. And it's very easy also for Iran to just slow walk things [4:47] and divide the issues so that the Strait of Hormuz issue is one, then they want to do nuclear talks [4:54] later. It's going to be hard for Trump to get to a place where he can say, I achieve my objectives. [5:01] And that's in part also because his objectives keep shifting. He says it's about the nuclear energy, [5:07] but he also just said it's about originally about getting the Iranians to overthrow their government. [5:12] And now he says it's about 47 years, which of course Iran's nuclear program is not 47 years old. [5:19] On Friday, the Pentagon announced that it would withdraw roughly 5,000 US troops from Germany. [5:24] The decision comes after President Trump's recent public clashes with the German Chancellor Friedrich [5:30] Merz over the German leader's criticism of the US war with Iran. Trump has warned that this could be [5:36] just the start of troop withdrawals from the longstanding American ally. The announcement [5:40] has drawn criticism from both sides of the political aisle. Anne-Marie, talk about this, [5:47] the state of US-European relations. Just when you think it can't get any worse, it does. [5:54] How significant is this? Is it just symbolic that the US is withdrawing these troops? [5:59] Well, it's retribution for personal diplomacy. And honestly, I think Chancellor Merz's perception of [6:08] the president being humiliated in the Iranian war is accurate globally. This is cutting off our nose [6:16] to spite our face yet again. Our troops in Germany are hugely important for US power projection. And you [6:25] hear that whenever wounded Americans are flown back. They're flown to Ramstein in Germany. That's a very [6:32] important base. But also we not only run our European operations and everything in Ukraine from Germany, [6:40] we also run our African operations. AFRICOM is headquartered in Germany. So this is, it's 5,000 troops [6:47] is symbolic. But to the extent this is going to be the administration's reaction to Europeans not liking [6:54] what he's doing. We're hurting ourselves more than anything else. And it's unusual. I mean, [6:58] the Europeans criticized the Vietnam War. The French criticized the Iraq War. This is, I mean, [7:04] we've usually viewed this as among democracies, you're, you know, you're allowed to criticize each [7:10] other every now and then. Yeah. In 1982, the US approval rating in Germany was 4% because of the fight [7:17] over the intermediate nuclear forces deployment. But what's different this time is you're seeing [7:25] Britain and France mobilize 40 to 50 countries on a plan to open the Straits of Hormuz and guarantee [7:34] shipping after forces, after there is a lasting ceasefire. Now they don't have the power to force [7:40] that ceasefire. But you're actually seeing the 50 countries, and again, Europe in the lead, [7:47] acting as neutrals in a war between the US, Israel on one side and Iran on the other. That's not, [7:55] that's not the indispensable nation anymore. Jim, as a former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, [8:02] what is your reaction to this announcement to withdraw troops? [8:06] I'm tracking Ann Marie. I'm going to broaden the argument and say there are other critical bases [8:16] in Spain, for example. We have many guided missile destroyers based in Italy. Our rapid [8:23] reaction infantry is there in Poland. We shouldn't rattle this one because, yeah, we have a lot of troops [8:31] there, total 100,000. So you're right, Marie's right, it's symbolic, but it could easily broaden [8:39] and it could also generate kind of a whiplash from other European countries. And finally, [8:47] in one sense, this may cause Europe to pull together, but they may start pulling in a different [8:53] direction from the United States, working more with China, working more with India and other countries. [9:00] So we're going to potentially pay not only a military price here, but an economic and diplomatic one [9:05] as well. Yeah, the idea of encouraging Germany to become the strongest military power on the continent [9:12] of Europe strikes me as something that lacks a certain historical memory. Jim, you have this terrific [9:20] new book out. You've been putting out these series of books on, you know, the future of war. Now you're [9:26] up to the end of the 21st century. So tell us, when you look at what's going on in the Middle East with [9:31] Iran, what part of this is early premonitions of what the future of war is going to look like? [9:41] Let's add Ukraine to it. So if you look at the military operations in both Ukraine [9:47] and the Middle East, one word pops into your mind, drones. So unmanned, huge part of this. But what's [9:54] coming, which has not arrived as yet, are lasers, which could change the balance of power between [10:01] missiles and defenses. It is higher-end cyber, perhaps the result of quantum computing coming very [10:09] soon. It's potentially biotech. Think human performance enhancement. And finally, it's new forms of [10:20] energy, perhaps fusion energy to the battlefield, all overseen by artificial intelligence. Just to [10:28] conclude, the novel also looks at two immutable things in war. One is human character, and the [10:35] other is geography. Those are still with us, but the technologies are shifting rapidly. That's what 2084 [10:43] ultimately is about the fusion of those three things.