This ‘series of flights’ could signal ground ops in Iran, ex-intel officer says

[0:00] As we continue to follow the latest in the conflict with Iran, I want to bring in Malcolm [0:03] Nance, a retired U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer and a national security expert. Malcolm, thank [0:09] you for being with us. You write in your sub stack that an invasion of Iran by ground forces [0:15] is imminent. Before we get into what that would look like or maybe the objectives of any mission [0:21] like that would be, I'd first like you to lay out for us what's leading you to your assessment that [0:26] U.S. troops on the ground will happen. Even though the war looks like it's happening in a [0:33] massive aerial campaign, we've noticed just over the last two weeks, about two weeks ago, [0:38] a series of flights started to move from the United States, which started to spell out that [0:44] there was a much bigger picture going on. We started seeing flights that were at the main [0:50] bases of the 1st and 2nd Ranger regiments, large numbers of aircraft, enough to move the entire [0:57] battalion. [0:58] Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida's Special Operations Headquarters, SEAL Team 6's [1:06] headquarters, and then an associated U.S. Air Force unit that is only used to take contingency [1:13] flights to repair damaged runways. This massive armada moved quietly to an air base in Israel, [1:21] over to an air base in Israel, and an air base in Jordan. The numbers that they are having there [1:26] are far bigger than anything else. [1:28] They're taking a lot more than anything you would need for Karg Island. I was in the Navy. I [1:32] served off Karg Island, had naval battles with the Iranians in the 1980s, hit mines. Let me tell you, [1:39] Karg and the southern Strait of Hormuz Islands are a task in themselves. The Marines could handle [1:44] that. But that combined with the 82nd Airborne, we are looking at something much, much bigger than [1:51] taking those islands. [1:52] Okay, you say that they quietly move those troops, but apparently not quietly enough for those with, [1:58] say, a keen eye like yours. Let's lean into that significant military experience of yours a little [2:03] bit more. What would be the objectives in Iran, and where, and how could these missions be carried [2:10] out? Because some of what you describe in your substack sounds like something out of a Jack Ryan [2:15] or John Clark novel. Yeah, it's really Tom Clancy-ish in its conceptualization. My problem [2:23] with this is, as someone who has fought in that region, lived in that region almost 40 years, [2:28] speak the languages. [2:29] That this appears to be haphazard. This appears to be something that was just stacked on at the last [2:35] minute. For example, bringing the Ready Alert Brigade of the 82nd Airborne, which is a thousand [2:41] troops, bringing their headquarters element of the division, and then suggesting that 2,000 more [2:48] Airborne are coming, leads me to believe that they are probably planning a combat jump into Iran [2:54] itself, whether to take one of, you know, three targets, the Isfahan nuclear research, the [3:00] Natanz nuclear research center, or the Yazid ballistic missile complex. That's this underground [3:08] city of ballistic missiles that's in a mountain that is still, to this day, firing missiles, [3:14] even though the Americans and the Israelis have pummeled it day and night. This is a massive [3:20] operation. I mean, one where they will have to seize a runway or make a runway, or use a highway [3:27] as a runway, and after power dropping, troops then get there. And then, you know, there's a lot of [3:30] logistic supply down, and then hopefully airlift them out. The New York Times has indicated in other [3:37] papers that it might be related to getting Iranian nuclear materials. Well, that material is buried [3:43] under thousands of tons of stone, which means you're going to have to bring in excavators, [3:47] backhoes, trucks. You're going to have to hijack them or bring them in. This is massive. And the [3:52] numbers that are being shown only indicate that it's going to happen. It's a question of whether [3:58] it happens right now or whether the problem is going to be solved. [4:00] President takes an absolute off-ramp from this war, but there's no in-between. [4:04] What is your read on what's really happening here? Is it that he's trying for diplomacy, [4:09] or is he trying to kind of create a condition where he can just clobber Iran militarily? [4:16] Why not both, right? I think that's what the administration is thinking. So you've heard the [4:21] old adage from Teddy Roosevelt, speak softly, carry a big stick. You can't really speak softly [4:26] in an era of social media, but that's kind of what you're seeing. The big stick [4:30] is the military buildup and these elite units that are going out. And they are capable of [4:33] everything from snatching enriched uranium in tubes from underground bunkers, taking any number [4:38] of Iranian islands, hunting down the regime remnants who are sleeping in their cars and [4:42] sleeping in tents in the forest. What you want to do is cause these regime remnants to question [4:47] what operation is Trump going to pursue with this military buildup? It forces them to defend across [4:53] a number of fronts, which spreads them thin. You're also, by messaging that, hey, we might be talking to somebody, it might be going, [5:00] well, if you are a person in the regime, your leadership has been eliminated. You have standing [5:05] orders that were established before the Ayatollah was killed, but you don't know who's on what side. [5:11] And you're thinking, what's my family worth? Am I going to be the last one standing? Has that guy [5:16] already sold me out? Who's having these talks? And should I, for the betterment of my own family, [5:21] my own interests, maybe I kind of agree with some of these protests, maybe I don't. [5:24] Where should I be deciding? Because whoever we can flip, that's what you want to do. You want to [5:30] have factions within an already factionalized leadership really drive those wedges. [5:34] So, in a sense, these comments from the administration are weapons themselves, [5:39] trying to foster dissent among the leadership that's still intact. Colonel Layton, I wonder, [5:44] of the scenarios and operations that Kirsten just laid out, either taking Karg Island or a similar [5:50] outpost in the Strait of Hormuz or in the Persian Gulf, or potentially going inland and going after [5:57] some of that enriched uranium that's underground, which do you think is going to be the most effective? [6:00] What do you see as perhaps the most likely or most effective move the U.S. can make? Or would you [6:05] suggest that avoiding that kind of operation altogether is best? Well, certainly, I think [6:11] avoiding everything altogether would be really good for everybody at this particular point in [6:15] time. But, Boris, let's look at the likelihood of what could happen here. I think the most likely [6:20] scenario would be, if they go ahead with any type of military operation, is to first do this right [6:26] here, basically try to secure the Strait of Hormuz. Now, you can do this in several different [6:31] ways. It doesn't necessarily mean that you take control of everything that you see on this map, [6:35] but controlling Abu Musa Island and Larak Island, those could be the kinds of things that would let [6:42] you control this waterway. And that's really what you're looking at. Second, I would say Karg Island [6:47] would probably be the area right here that that would be a very common thing for them to do, [6:54] because 90 percent of Iran's oil is made ready for export at Karg. The problem with this is, [7:01] this is so far, it's about 400 miles from here to there, up in the northern part of the Persian [7:06] Gulf. The last thing that I think they would do is go and secure the nuclear materials, the 60 percent [7:14] enriched uranium. That would become a very hard thing to do. They could do it. It would be a very [7:19] audacious move, but it would also take a lot of manpower to do that. General Schwartz, welcome [7:24] back to the program. So as we've been spending the first 10 minutes of this show discussing the [7:29] president's latest comments, [7:31] Thank you very much. [7:32] The NPR is growing about perhaps even leaving the war and calling an end to the war [7:35] without the straight-of-war moves open for navigation and directing his ire once again at NATO [7:43] allies saying, get your own oil. That aside, what we're seeing on the ground is at odds with what he [7:52] is saying and publishing. We're seeing troop amassment there in the region on the internally [7:59] lider and so on. [8:01] In fact, a force posture that it only keeps increasing and not the opposite. [8:06] So what should we be reading? [8:08] The president's posts on Truth Social or what we're seeing build up in the region in terms of what happens next? [8:17] I would pay most attention to the troop buildup that's occurring in the region. [8:22] So obviously the first Marine Expeditionary Unit, week two, the decision was made, [8:27] or maybe even the end of week one, to start moving that U from Japan into the CENTCOM area of operations. [8:35] But the subsequent deployments of the second Marine Expeditionary Unit, the troops from the 82nd Airborne, [8:42] the command and control element from the 82nd Airborne, are all indications that, as the secretary mentioned this morning, [8:50] the president wants to continue to keep his options open for areas that he believes will be necessary [8:56] to put troops. [8:57] To put troops on the ground to support, you know, achieving the objectives that he's laid out in the campaign. [9:05] Obviously, troops on the ground would carry huge potential risks just in terms of escalating this conflict even further. [9:14] In terms of what options the president has, I mean, his options are severely limited, [9:19] mostly because, I mean, obviously, aside from the Strait of Hormuz, [9:22] the president of the United States is supposed to be on the side of the Iranian people. [9:28] And therefore, [9:28] when he makes threats like taking out desalination plants, for example, [9:32] I mean, those options really either are not or at least should not be at all on the table, [9:37] because that would have severe humanitarian consequences in a country like Iran, [9:43] which is obviously extremely dry, and they rely heavily on these desalination plants to have access to clean water. [9:49] What do you make of that particular threat that the president is making? [9:54] Yeah, I would agree that, you know, the pain and suffering that going after the electric, [10:00] infrastructure, going after desalination plants, going after even the energy infrastructure is only going to have an impact on the population that's underneath the thumb of the regime. [10:13] What I think is guaranteed is that the IRGC and the other state security forces, the religious Lima, they're not going to go without water, right? [10:24] You're going to make sure that whatever is available, they're going to receive. [10:29] So, [10:30] I would agree, I'm concerned that we have that listed as part of the targeting deck going forward. [10:38] You know, one thing that really struck me today when I heard the chairman briefing, General Cain, was that, you know, the increase in what they call dynamic targeting, [10:47] meaning that they have the ability to retask aircraft after they've launched based on actionable intelligence. [10:54] So what that informed me with is the fact that I think a lot of the [11:01] principle target and going after the, you know, the weapon development industrial base, whether that's drones or ballistic missiles and even the nuclear research and development centers and certainly all the command and control the major ones across the country have been effectively either destroyed or degraded. [11:22] So, [11:23] it sounds like based on what we heard today, [11:25] what I read what was inferred is that [11:27] absent of going after this, [11:30] this national infrastructure, [11:31] that you just mentioned the water the electricity and the oil infrastructure a [11:36] lot of this significant targeting minus what's very very deep underground has [11:41] been eliminated