The real consequences of Trump’s Iran war flip-flops

[0:00] Here's my take. [0:02] In the years after Barack Obama's presidency, it became an article of faith that one of [0:06] his central errors in foreign policy was the Syria red line. [0:12] He said that he would attack Syria if it used chemical weapons. [0:16] But when evidence emerged that it had used those weapons, he pushed the question of intervention [0:21] to Congress, which declined to act. [0:24] A disaster, Donald Trump called it at the time, a cause of generational and reputational [0:29] damage, said then-Senator Marco Rubio. [0:32] Part of an incoherent maze of foreign policy, Pete Hex had argued a few years later. [0:38] In ignoring a red line that he had drawn, Lindsey Graham explained, Obama had risked [0:43] squandering American credibility around the world. [0:48] Obama's red line flip-flop looks like the model of careful policymaking compared to [0:54] what we have witnessed since the Iran war began. [0:57] Last week, President Trump posted on social media that [1:00] If Iran doesn't fully open without threat the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours from [1:08] this exact point in time, the United States of America will hit and obliterate their various [1:14] power plants, starting with the biggest one first. [1:19] The rest of the story is well-known. [1:21] Iran refused to be cowed by this threat and continued its attacks and its closure of the [1:25] Strait. [1:27] Trump's response? [1:28] To quickly climb down. [1:30] And announce that he had postponed any action [1:32] on energy infrastructure for five days, claiming that [1:36] Suddenly, overnight, Iran and the U.S. had been engaged in productive conversations to [1:43] wed a complete and total resolution of our hostilities in the Middle East. [1:50] The Iranians denied any such talks were taking place. [1:54] Now Trump says he's extending the pause by another week and a half. [1:59] It is by now clear that Donald Trump is being graded on a curve. [2:04] And he says he will raise tariffs to 130 percent. [2:08] Or that he will blow up Iran's biggest gas field. [2:11] Or that, quote, the war is very complete, pretty much, unquote. [2:16] None of these statements mean much. [2:18] They could be actual American policies or not. [2:22] Or they could stand as policy for a day or a week, after which they will change. [2:28] After saying that the war was pretty much complete, that same day, Trump asserted, we haven't won [2:35] enough and we will not relent until the enemy is totally and decisively defeated. [2:41] He said that he agreed to negotiate with Iran's leaders, but then couldn't because they keep [2:47] getting killed, though it is, of course, his own military and Israel's which is doing the [2:52] killing. [2:54] All clear? [2:56] Trump supporters claim this incoherence is strategic genius. [3:00] That he's keeping people off guard. [3:02] Except that the policy seems to change for a variety of reasons. [3:06] Maybe the stock market falls. [3:08] Or maybe the target country lavishes praise on Trump and gives him a gold bar. [3:15] Trump's superpower is that he is flexible enough to turn on a dime and has a base that [3:20] will accept anything he proposes. [3:23] Once unalterably opposed to Middle East wars, many of his MAGA supporters now believe in [3:30] this Middle East war with the zeal of converts. [3:34] And while Trump has made clear that he would like to end the hostilities. [3:38] The problem this time, unlike with tariffs, is that he cannot unilaterally stop what he [3:45] started. [3:47] Iran gets a vote and it is currently voting to keep fighting, calculating that though [3:52] weakened it has enough military power to do damage to the world economy, thereby inflicting [3:58] pain on the US. [4:01] For the world, there is no longer any such thing as American credibility. [4:06] Just a strange reality television show in which the main [4:10] actor swerves, bobs and weaves his way through crises, hoping that what he says today will [4:17] solve the crisis caused by what he said yesterday. [4:21] The day before he threatened to obliterate Iran's power plants, Trump claimed that the [4:26] U.S. was considering winding down its military operations against Iran and implied that protecting [4:31] the Strait of Hormuz was not his problem and could be dealt with by other nations whose [4:36] imports pass through the strait. [4:39] At another point, he said he didn't need any other country's help. [4:43] Businessmen used to rail against previous administrations because of policy uncertainty. [4:50] Now they line up to praise Trump as his carnival of chaos roils markets almost every week. [4:59] Donald Trump has gotten used to playing with the United States' massive power, punishing [5:04] those who don't bend the knee and rewarding those who do. [5:08] In doing this, he's squandering credibility. [5:10] Built up over it. [5:11] Over decades. [5:13] To extract short-term goodies, sometimes to the benefit of his own family's business interests. [5:19] But in Iran, he seems to have come up against an adversary that won't play by his rules. [5:25] The Trump administration sent Iran a 15-point peace plan to end the war this week. [5:32] But Tehran did not accept it. [5:34] At the center of the proposed deal is Iran's nuclear program. [5:38] The Trump administration is pushing for Iran to dismantle its main nuclear system. [5:42] It's main nuclear sites, halt its uranium enrichment, and hand over its current uranium [5:47] stockpile, among other commitments. [5:50] A key player in any potential deal will be the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International [5:57] Atomic Energy Agency. [5:59] Rafael Grossi, the director general of that organization, has been involved in the mediation [6:05] efforts. [6:06] He joins me now. [6:07] Let me ask you, Director General, about the nuclear issue. [6:11] So on the nuclear issue. [6:11] The nuclear part of the demands and counter demands. [6:18] What is the nub of the disagreement? [6:21] The Iranians say that they have the right to enrichment. [6:24] The Americans say they don't want them to have any enrichment. [6:28] Is there a compromise there? [6:30] Because that seems to me the heart of the matter. [6:32] Of course. [6:33] There can be many forms of compromise, and this is, of course, something that the negotiating [6:39] parties have to come to. [6:42] And it wouldn't be new. [6:45] I was part of this frustrated, truncated negotiating process that was taking place last February, [6:54] you may remember. [6:55] And then last year, as well, there was another attempt, both mediated by the foreign minister [7:01] of Oman, you may remember. [7:03] And there, of course, the issue of enrichment is at the center. [7:07] This idea of a right to enrichment per se does not exist. [7:11] Countries have the right to enrichment. [7:12] Countries can enrich. [7:13] Of course, they can do that. [7:15] But they have to submit all their facilities, all their facilities to inspections by the [7:20] IEA. [7:21] The United States has said repeatedly, we do not want to see enrichment there. [7:27] And in the past processes, we were considering some alternatives that would result in a very [7:34] limited activity related to uranium enrichment, which, of course, as is evident, didn't work. [7:39] So, we have to do something. [7:40] We have to do something. [7:41] We have to lead [7:46] And now the question mark here is whether we would go or they would try in the conversation [7:52] to go to a zero enrichment or some activity and also probably some form of moratorium, [8:00] maybe, for a number of years whereby Iran would not renounce to this activity but would [8:06] put it on the side. [8:08] So, to speak, for some anticipated mediocre. [8:09] But these steps change. [8:10] Right now,ところ kids. [8:11] time in a wider process of confidence building. [8:14] But here I am already speculating and I'm not very comfortable in that area. [8:19] Do you believe that given the level of bombardment that has taken place, Iran could still rebuild [8:26] its program? [8:28] You do hear people say, look, they have the knowledge. [8:32] You can't bomb away the knowledge. [8:34] Or do you think that the facilities are now in such bad shape that, you know, it would [8:39] be many, many, many years before they could do something? [8:45] You know, Farid, there is no contradiction in both assertions of what you said, what [8:50] you just said. [8:53] So there was enormous damage, in particular during the 12 day war last year at Isfahan, [9:01] Natanz and Fordow. [9:04] You remember that that campaign was mainly focused on the nuclear facilities. [9:10] What we are seeing now is this war. [9:12] A war that has more than a month, has had, you know, a number of targets and objectives [9:20] that go far beyond the red of the nuclear. [9:25] So last year there was enormous damage done. [9:28] But not everything was destroyed, of course. [9:32] And we are not here doing a military assessment of what survived and what not, but it is obvious [9:39] that not everything was destroyed. [9:40] And we are not here doing a military assessment of what survived and what not. [9:41] And we are not here doing a military assessment of what survived and what not. [9:42] And we are not here doing a military assessment of what survived and what not. [9:42] And we are not here doing a military assessment of what survived and what not. [9:43] And also your second phrase is absolutely true. [9:49] One cannot unlearn what one has learned and has been doing. [9:53] Don't forget that this activity of uranium enrichment, which is rather complex, is not [10:01] something that is impossible to to do. [10:05] It's mythology, quite sophisticated mythology. [10:10] So the説 [10:10] So the説 [10:11] centrifuges that spin at high velocity to separate the isotope of uranium, which is [10:17] interesting from the one which is not. [10:20] All of these things Iran has mastered throughout the years. [10:25] And this is not per se a nuclear activity. [10:29] So you may have in Iran dozens or perhaps more workshops or small factories where they [10:35] could reproduce these capacities.