The Arrest That Exposed the CIA's Most Secret Mission (Full Episode) — Inside the CIA — Nat Geo

[0:09] The CIA's business is all about understanding threats and taking risk. [0:15] Our mission is a secret one. [0:17] Of course, there are ramifications for exposing people that are undercover. [0:24] The press said, we're going to publish your name. [0:26] And the fact that you were allegedly poisoned, it certainly was. [0:31] It's the most tightly compartmented operation in the history of the United States. [0:36] The first thing the Pakistanis did was scramble their jets to shoot down our helicopters. [0:40] The experience told me that some things would not go according to plan [0:43] because there is always some aspect of it that goes wrong. [0:52] American citizen has been handed to police one day after he shot dead two people in Lahore. [0:57] Facing a possible death sentence, [1:00] this was jeopardizing the most important CIA operation that had been planned in years. [1:06] When he returned, he didn't look like someone who was going to survive. [1:10] There are no coincidences in espionage. [1:27] I had a one-year assignment in Pakistan, so I arrived in January 2011. [1:35] But by the second week of June, I was pretty sick. [1:39] Went back to Washington, went to a doctor. [1:43] They couldn't figure out what was going on. [1:46] Went back to Pakistan, and ultimately, very quickly, within a couple of days, [1:52] I couldn't function anymore. [1:54] His health had dramatically declined. [1:56] He had lost an extraordinary amount of weight in a very short amount of time. [1:59] You have to react to situations, and there are always situations that come up. [2:06] I never saw an operation in my career that went wholly as planned. [2:11] Never. [2:19] My name is Mark Kelton, and I was chief of station Islamabad, Pakistan. [2:24] The opportunity to come to Islamabad came out of the blue. [2:29] The job is the U.S. Islamabad. [2:30] It's a massive job. [2:31] When he was first selected to be our senior officer in Pakistan, a few different things [2:37] going through my mind, and maybe some people could be surprised. [2:41] I was happy. [2:42] Happy for him. [2:43] Happy for the organization. [2:45] Because I knew what he would bring to that mission. [2:50] I'm Jennifer Eubeng. [2:51] I was deputy director of the CIA for digital innovation. [2:55] Most of my career has been in Asia, Europe, and Eastern Europe. [2:59] Mark Kelton also happens to be my husband, two foreign partners. [3:05] Mark can be your best, strongest partner and supporter when our interests align, and probably [3:11] your most formidable adversary if your interests are not aligned. [3:16] He is a man of extraordinarily deep integrity. [3:20] He's got kind of a limitless reserve of strength and determination, and now that can look like [3:28] stubbornness at times to some people, but it's also resilience. [3:32] I had no idea that Mark would be part of one of the most secretive missions that CIA have [3:39] ever pursued. [3:41] So I went to our counterterrorism center, got a briefing. [3:44] The mission there, as described by the director, was A, attacking al-Qaeda, degrading al-Qaeda. [3:50] B, was to work with the local intelligence service counterparts, the ISI, on that mission. [3:57] And the last thing, which became the main mission, was this compound in Abbottabad. [4:03] It was clear to me that the compound itself indicated that it had been built and was being [4:09] used to hide something or someone. [4:14] Well, there was an urgency to get out there because people in the field needed leadership. [4:20] The highest ranking American spy in Pakistan was rushed back to the U.S. today after his [4:25] cover was blown. [4:26] The identity of the CIA station chief was revealed in a lawsuit accusing him of orchestrating [4:32] drone missile strikes that killed Pakistani civilians. [4:36] There was a concern of an increased threat against the previous COS. [4:41] Being publicly known as the chief of station and the media is not a way to operate. [4:46] My name is Pat Wenninger. [4:48] From the 2010 to 2011 time frame, I served as a chief of base in the CIA in South Asia. [4:53] No matter where you work as a chief of station, normally the host nation knows who you are. [5:00] But it's not something we talk about publicly, ever. [5:03] That led to Mark's early arrival in January of 2011. [5:08] Director Panetta, in fact, his words were, get your butt out there, but he didn't use butt. [5:16] It was a very difficult operating environment from a counter-terrorist perspective. [5:23] I hadn't served in Pakistan before. [5:25] I didn't speak the language, which is always uncomfortable. [5:29] Pakistan is a dangerous place to operate in. [5:33] Americans identified as Americans are at risk. [5:35] You've seen kidnappings, you've seen killings, dating back to Daniel Pearl. [5:40] There were bombings there. [5:41] Marriott Hotel bombing, 2008. [5:44] Newsweek magazine, on the cover of it in 2007, said Pakistan was the most dangerous nation in the world. [5:53] The security detail accompanied me everywhere I went around town. [5:56] I did not leave the embassy as frequently as I normally would have. [6:00] Really, the job is just all about risk, managing risk. [6:05] And so that's a natural part of your everyday life. [6:08] I was always conscious of the fact that if I was going to go out, it had to be for a good reason. [6:12] Because it is a risky environment, and I was responsible for the people that were protecting me as well. [6:19] And that became more important as time went on. [6:21] At the time, of course, the United States was involved in Afghanistan, and the Taliban and the extremists would use bases and staging areas in Pakistan to attack into Afghanistan. [6:38] Many times, along the border of Pakistan, loyalty wasn't to the United States, and it wasn't to the Pakistani government. [6:48] It was to the Taliban. [6:50] Mike Rogers, former chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Pakistan was helpful in the war on terror. [6:57] They understood that that lion could bite them as well as it could be biting your neighbor. [7:01] We knew that a large number of al-Qaeda operatives were located there. [7:07] So they understood that they, the Pakistanis, wanted to help us in the fight in terrorism. [7:14] Yes, they were with us, but yes, that had some constraints. [7:19] It's the first time I heard the term frenemy. [7:22] Complicated is another way I'd put it. [7:24] At the same time, they're also trying to monitor and identify who the CIA officers are and what they're doing unilaterally in their country. [7:30] You combine that with the political instability in that region, it makes for a very challenging and high-threat environment to operate. [7:42] Capturing or killing bin Laden remains a high priority of this administration. [7:47] Part of what's happened is, is bin Laden has gone deep underground. [7:51] But we have the best minds, the best intelligence officers, the best special forces who are thinking about this day and night. [8:01] Prior to my arrival, the compound had been under surveillance for about nine or ten months. [8:11] It was 2010 when it was identified. [8:15] Abbottabad was effectively the home of the West Point of Pakistan. [8:20] We had to be very, very careful about getting near the compound because the last thing we wanted to do was spook the people that were in the compound. [8:26] There were a number of things that were apparent. [8:32] A, that the compound itself was a significant operational challenge. [8:35] 12-foot walls, balconies that you couldn't see into laterally. [8:40] If you looked down the driveway, you couldn't see left or right into the courtyards. [8:45] The compound itself was massively large compared to the areas around it. [8:50] And we had to be very careful as to who was exposed to it. [8:55] Within CIA, there is what we call compartmentation, where we take particularly sensitive activities [9:00] and allow people insight into them based on their need to know. [9:04] In this case, the knowledge, the compound was highly restricted. [9:09] Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, was not included. [9:13] That was a decision taken by the president himself and keeping it within the tightest possible circle. [9:18] The great concern was that it would leak somehow. [9:21] I've been involved in a lot of tightly compartmented operations, [9:24] but it certainly was, given the stakes, the most important of those operations. [9:31] Operational planning is something that we do a lot of [9:34] and try to take account of every possible problem that's out there. [9:38] But invariably, things happen. [9:54] Mark Hilton arrived in country at the end of January, two days later, [9:59] while he happened to be in meetings with senior Pakistani government officials. [10:03] According to published reports, two men on a motorcycle tried to rob a U.S. government security contractor at gunpoint. [10:18] The U.S. says it was self-defense, but local police called it cold-blooded murder. [10:23] Imagine that you show up in country your second day to present your credentials to your host nation counterparts [10:30] in an event like this happens, and the U.S. security contractor defended himself. [10:36] I can't say it was a surprise because Pakistan is a dangerous place, [10:57] and I don't see that he could have taken any other action. [11:00] American citizen Raymond Davis has been handed to police on six-day physical remand [11:05] one day after he shot dead two people in Lahore. [11:07] He was arrested and charged with two counts of murder and illegal possession of a weapon. [11:14] Facing a possible death sentence, Raymond Davis has been catapulted [11:17] from an obscure job at the American embassy in Pakistan to the center of a diplomatic meltdown [11:23] with a critical ally. [11:25] There was a perception that the U.S. security contractor was a former special forces Rambo type [11:32] operating and abated within Pakistan. [11:35] There was anger within the Pakistani government, [11:39] and there was a tremendous amount of anger with the Pakistani populace. [11:43] It's going to be, as one of my Pakistani sources said, like an atomic bomb, [11:55] not just for the Americans, but for the Pakistanis. [11:58] So the threat was even more significant for not only the security contractor [12:02] that was illegally being held, but those U.S. government officials operating in that region. [12:06] Whether he was a diplomat or not, a murderer is a murderer, and a murderer is a murderer. [12:12] So you had an already high threat environment where U.S. government officials were operating, [12:18] and you just poured gasoline and lit a match. [12:27] I would argue it takes a special kind of officer to operate within Pakistan, [12:30] one who understands what they're walking into first. [12:33] Second, somebody who understands tradecraft, has good judgment, [12:37] and more importantly, has courage. [12:38] I remember in 2010, I met with one of my superiors in Washington. [12:43] He said, bad things are going to happen. [12:46] You better be prepared. [12:48] You're in command. [12:49] You don't get to be in command for the good things only. [12:52] You're also in command for the bad things, [12:54] and particularly when the bad things happen. [12:56] That's when leadership is needed. [13:00] Mark was the right person for that role at the right time. [13:03] He is, in my opinion, the finest officer of his generation [13:06] because of the breadth of his experience. [13:08] I grew up in New Hampshire. [13:10] My parents never went to college, working-class family. [13:14] My dad was an airborne Black Hat paratrooper, [13:17] so service of country was in my family. [13:20] He has a deep sense of duty and responsibility [13:23] to a country that he cherishes. [13:27] Even as a young boy, he asked to go off to military academy [13:30] because he wanted to serve. [13:31] After I came out of grad school, [13:33] I was hired by CIA as a Soviet military analyst. [13:36] I had never been outside the United States, never. [13:38] I was a Reagan baby going in to fight the Soviet Union. [13:42] We're talking 1981, 82 here. [13:45] At that time, Soviet operations was the holiest of holies. [13:48] It was the center of operations against the evil empire. [13:52] When you're a young officer, of course, [13:54] you're out there trying to cut your teeth [13:56] to make an impression early on. [13:57] It was also scary. [13:59] It's not physical fear so much. [14:01] It's fear of making a mistake [14:03] that's going to jeopardize someone else. [14:05] It's nerve-wracking. [14:06] So managing that fear was something that I had to learn. [14:10] Once it happened, I had confidence in myself [14:13] to deal with any of the challenges that would confront me. [14:20] By the time I got to Pakistan, I was a very experienced officer. [14:25] Pakistani police say an American diplomat [14:31] carried out an intentional and cold-blooded murder. [14:35] A judge ordered that Raymond Davis remained in custody [14:37] for at least another two weeks. [14:39] Normally, when a person with diplomatic status [14:42] is arrested by a local government, [14:45] the embassy is called, the ambassador will come [14:47] and get them out back in the charge of the United States. [14:51] That did not happen here. [14:52] And that this seems to be shaping up [14:53] as a battle between the CIA and the ISI, [14:57] the Pakistani Secret Service. [14:58] This is a proxy war. [14:59] He was, in fact, charged with murder. [15:02] Raymond Davis is interrogated by the Lahore police. [15:05] He's got a story, and he's sticking to it. [15:07] My name is Mark Mazzetti. [15:09] I'm a correspondent for The New York Times [15:11] focused on national security, foreign affairs, intelligence. [15:15] The Pakistani government isn't quite buying it. [15:17] I need to tell the embassy where I'm at. [15:19] I'm not the audience. [15:20] I tell you, you're from America? [15:22] Yes. [15:23] And you're from to American embassy? [15:24] Yes. [15:25] I just work as a consultant there. [15:27] And the US government's position is pretty clear. [15:31] If our diplomats are in another country, [15:34] then they are not subject to that country's local prosecution. [15:40] The Pakistanis said, well, you know, [15:43] we don't think he's actually a diplomat. [15:45] We think he's a spy. [15:47] The court has arrived to the conclusion [15:48] in our past order that he does not enjoy immunity. [15:51] He has to face trial before this court. [15:53] That in itself is a major diplomatic meltdown [15:57] in a country that was still essential for the United States. [16:00] Beyond the demonstrations that were happening outside [16:04] and the danger that they created [16:05] for people working in the consulate or in the embassy, [16:09] the fact that he was detained in an area [16:11] that was beyond the reach of the United States, [16:14] there was always worry that what might happen to him in jail. [16:17] There was great concern for his safety. [16:21] At the same time, we were trying to find HVT1, [16:24] high-value target one, which, of course, was Bin Laden. [16:28] The pressure grew to get greater specificity [16:30] as to who was inside the compound. [16:34] We reviewed a piece of surveillance [16:36] that showed a person we called the PACER [16:39] walking in that compound [16:40] in the area behind the main building. [16:45] And that person was the focus. [16:46] Who is that person? [16:48] Another senior terrorist leader, [16:51] an important Gulf Arab hiding for other reasons. [16:54] Director Panetta met me, said, [16:55] we've got to find other ways to get a look into this compound. [16:57] So we undertook activities that allowed us, ultimately, [17:04] to identify the sexes, ethnicities, nationalities [17:08] of everybody in that compound, except one. [17:13] I'm not going to tell you how we did that, but we did that. [17:16] And when you looked at those sexes, ages, ethnicities, [17:19] it matched exactly Bin Laden's family [17:22] and the families of the couriers, [17:24] which gave me a good degree of confidence. [17:27] I'm 95% sure it's Bin Laden. [17:29] The concern was just that circle of knowledge would expand [17:34] and that knowledge could leak, [17:38] hence the need to reach a decision as quickly as possible [17:41] on what we were going to do. [17:45] The problem was, of course, [17:47] the embassy security contractor is sitting in a jail. [17:52] We got to get him released [17:53] because we couldn't go forward with the operation [17:56] out of fear of his security. [17:58] Depending on how the raid came out, [18:00] the extremists could take action against him, [18:03] bring him in direct physical threat. [18:05] That was a great worry. [18:08] This was possibly jeopardizing [18:10] the most important CIA operation [18:12] that had been planned in years. [18:14] So it was an imperative to get him out. [18:23] Al-Qaeda is not a forgiving organization, [18:26] so we were concerned that even the security contractor [18:29] was in Pakistani detention. [18:32] We'd seen incidents before where Pakistani police [18:35] or others had worked in conjunction with the extremist groups [18:38] and that could have put him at direct risk. [18:42] The U.S. negotiates for him to be basically in a wing [18:46] effectively by himself [18:48] where the guards were not heavily armed [18:51] because there was a suspicion an accident might happen [18:54] and a guard might shoot him trying to escape or something like that. [18:58] And then another provision that was built in [19:01] was because they were worried about actually him being poisoned, [19:04] they negotiated for dogs to taste his food. [19:07] So it was a very tenuous and difficult time [19:12] and probably an all-time low in the relationship [19:16] between the United States government and Pakistan. [19:23] While this is happening, in the backdrop, [19:26] you have the planning of the bin Laden raid, [19:29] and Mark is leading both those efforts. [19:33] During my time working against Russia, [19:34] the risks were very high. [19:36] If you failed, the person that suffered was not only you, [19:39] but the person you were responsible for. [19:40] What you learn is, of course, [19:43] a tremendous number of hours [19:44] went into each operational activity. [19:49] Like Eisenhower said, plans are useless, [19:51] planning is everything, [19:52] constant planning for all possible contingencies, [19:55] things that could happen. [19:58] This is a highly risky and uncertain business. [20:01] Things do tend to go wrong. [20:03] You rely on your training, you rely on your experience, [20:05] you judge the situation and assess it in the moment [20:07] and then execute. [20:12] In planning for the raid, [20:13] remember that you're conducting an operation [20:15] inside a foreign country [20:17] without that country's knowledge. [20:19] There could be resistance on the site [20:21] and there could be casualties. [20:23] So those were all the factors that weighed heavily [20:25] on decision-makers in Washington. [20:28] Ultimately, the SEALs were selected [20:29] because they had access to aircraft [20:31] and the ability to bring to bear [20:33] all of the capabilities of the United States military. [20:36] One of those unforgettable days, [20:39] I was standing in my kitchen talking to my wife. [20:42] The phone rang. [20:43] The voice on the other end of the line said, [20:45] hey, Dave, you and the boss got to get to CIA headquarters. [20:48] Something is up. [20:49] My name's Dave Cooper. [20:50] At the time, I was the command master chief [20:52] of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group. [20:55] Our relationship with the CIA depends on the day. [20:58] When the CIA called, [20:59] it was usually a political hostage, [21:01] a nuclear threat, [21:02] some kind of counterterrorism operation. [21:04] The training for this particular operation [21:07] was done on a mock-up of the compound [21:10] that was built by CIA based on our intelligence gathering. [21:13] We built them a model that they could practice on. [21:16] I'm John Pereira. [21:17] I served in CIA for 31 years. [21:20] I was the deputy director of CIA for support [21:23] and I was in that role prior to and during the bin Laden raid. [21:27] We were responsible for making sure the people are ready, [21:29] they're in place, they have what they need. [21:32] But the facility itself had to be protected from any visibility. [21:38] Meaning that we didn't want adversary countries to know [21:42] that we were planning for an operation against a compound [21:45] that looked like the bin Laden compound. [21:48] So we did it in a remote location. [21:49] We had to have this as protected as we could possibly get it. [21:53] The folks that do cybersecurity, [21:56] they know a great deal about the satellites [21:58] that our adversaries have. [22:00] They could track those satellites through the sky. [22:02] So when those satellites came overhead, [22:04] we simply took a break. [22:05] You know, we went inside. [22:11] There were things that we couldn't confirm. [22:14] And going into that day, of course, [22:15] those are all the ones that you're worried about. [22:17] We don't know what the inside looks like. [22:19] We know what the outside looks like. [22:20] What we were able to build [22:21] is something that had some modularity to it. [22:24] We could reconfigure it [22:25] so they could train on different scenarios [22:27] once they got inside. [22:28] Staircase here, windows there. [22:30] And that's typical of, you know, [22:32] what we call shoot houses, right? [22:33] They are modular, [22:34] so you can just mix it up for the guys. [22:37] At some point, [22:37] there are going to be stairs right in front of them. [22:39] The next time they come in, [22:40] that's going to be a hallway, [22:42] and the stairs will be over to the left. [22:43] On at least one occasion, [22:45] they're going to go up a stairway [22:45] that doesn't go anywhere. [22:47] They would take out a door, go through. [22:49] We would rebuild that door. [22:50] So we don't want it to be routine, right? [22:52] Keep the guys sharp, keep them thinking. [22:54] Keep them on their toes, so to speak. [22:56] Then we come together to talk about [23:00] how we're actually going to do [23:01] the full mission profiles [23:02] and working out contingencies. [23:05] And the mindset is [23:06] we don't prepare against surprise. [23:07] We prepare to be surprised. [23:09] What will cause us to fail? [23:11] I had known that something was brewing, [23:14] not from work, [23:16] but I just knew that for a period of weeks [23:18] he was unavailable. [23:19] Sleep was at a premium. [23:21] Most nights, three, four hours of sleep, maybe. [23:26] It was an exhausting period. [23:32] In public, you know, [23:33] it's looking like Reamus Davis [23:34] is going to stand trial [23:36] while the U.S. and Pakistan [23:39] are secretly negotiating what to do. [23:41] The embassy was able to work [23:42] with Pakistani authorities. [23:44] Led by an effort by the Consul General [23:46] in Lahore, Carmela Conroy. [23:48] She used to meet with him every day [23:50] to ensure his safety. [23:52] She really had a critical role [23:56] in leading the U.S. government charge [23:58] both locally and with the embassy [24:01] to help resolve this. [24:05] Raymond Davis was released [24:07] after Pakistan paid $2.3 million [24:09] in so-called blood money [24:11] to the families of the two men [24:12] he shot and killed. [24:14] Under Sharia law, [24:16] the families of the victims [24:17] have to forgive the perpetrator of the crime [24:21] and they're paid money for it. [24:24] Davis has no idea what's going on. [24:25] He doesn't speak Urdu. [24:27] And he's basically spirited out of the court, [24:31] thrown into a car, [24:32] driven to the airport [24:33] where a plane was waiting [24:35] to basically get him out of Pakistan. [24:37] And only then does he realize [24:38] that, you know, he's now a free man. [24:41] This was a very difficult time [24:42] and I think Mark's leadership was critical [24:44] in getting us through that. [24:48] People ask me what a day in the life is like [24:50] as an intelligence officer. [24:52] Each day is different. [24:53] Different challenges, different threats, [24:55] lots of early mornings, [24:56] lots of late nights, [24:56] lots of weekends, [24:58] lots of time away from home. [24:59] We don't have places anywhere in the world [25:01] where two senior officers could work together. [25:03] So we've done six years of separated deployments [25:06] and that presents its own challenges [25:08] to a couple, to a family. [25:10] So his middle of the night, [25:13] I just knew that he was away. [25:15] And so I had started piecing together [25:17] what I thought could be going on [25:19] without any real knowledge. [25:21] There were several options considered for the date, [25:30] but it was settled ultimately on May 1st, U.S. time. [25:34] May 2nd, it's 12.30 a.m. [25:36] was Pakistan time. [25:39] They run up to the rate, of course. [25:40] There was nerves, nervous anticipation. [25:44] What if the U.S. government [25:45] launched an operation into Pakistan [25:47] and come up dry? [25:48] What if there was a leak [25:50] and bin Laden or whoever was there escaped? [25:53] What if, what if, what if? [25:55] We flew out to Afghanistan, [25:58] got set up and ready to go [26:00] with communications and everybody in place, [26:03] helicopters in place. [26:05] I was in my office [26:07] with the officer from SEALs, [26:09] as well as the ambassador [26:10] and several other officers from my station. [26:13] We were watching on live video feed the target. [26:17] The audio was provided by Admiral McRaven, [26:20] who was listening to the tactical radio net [26:22] of the SEALs. [26:23] We see the first helicopter come over the target [26:28] and then slowly slide off the target. [26:32] When the helicopter went down, [26:33] there was sort of a gasp. [26:34] You know, there were some people [26:35] in the operations center that jumped up, [26:39] said, hey, they've trained for this, [26:40] let them deal with it. [26:42] We did a controlled crash [26:43] and the SEALs all got out [26:45] and they did what they were trained to do [26:47] and they did it perfectly. [26:50] The other thing we were worried about, of course, [26:51] was the reaction of people around. [26:53] This was in the middle of a town. [26:55] Very shortly after the helicopter crashes, [26:58] you have the curious onlookers [26:59] starting to come out of their houses. [27:01] What were the civilians going to do [27:03] in this middle-class town [27:04] when they started hearing helicopters [27:06] and gunfire in the middle of the night? [27:08] What were the police going to do? [27:09] What was the military response going to be? [27:11] We really didn't have an answer [27:13] to any of those questions. [27:15] There are so many ways [27:17] for this mission to go wrong. [27:18] We are invading a sovereign nation, [27:22] generally frowned upon. [27:24] Our relationship with Pakistan [27:25] was already on the rocks. [27:27] But now imagine if we start [27:28] killing innocent men, women, [27:30] and even possibly children, [27:31] how that will look. [27:34] We had a sense that [27:35] there was a stir happening [27:37] when the helicopters came in. [27:39] We didn't want any innocents [27:40] to get hurt in this. [27:42] And so on the night the SEALs went in, [27:44] they had their interpreter dressed up [27:46] as a Pakistani ISI agent. [27:48] Everybody in Pakistan knows what ISI is, [27:50] their version of the FBI and the CIA, [27:55] who when those people started pouring [27:56] out of their houses [27:57] to see what the ruckus was, [27:58] he was there with a bullhorn [28:00] essentially saying, [28:01] ISI, go back inside your houses. [28:04] And they all went back inside their houses [28:06] and they didn't call the police. [28:08] So that very creative bit of problem solving [28:11] took two huge problems right off the table. [28:14] We did not encounter any civilians whatsoever [28:19] and no police showed up. [28:20] We had video feed [28:26] until they went into the main building. [28:28] So all we're hearing at that point [28:30] is the relay of the tactical communications. [28:33] McRaven was walking us through [28:35] as they went on. [28:39] And there was a period of quiet. [28:41] It felt to me like five or six hours. [28:45] I think it was 10 minutes. [28:46] It was less than 10 minutes. [28:48] It might have been less than five. [28:50] Several minutes later, [28:51] we heard Geronimo. [28:53] Geronimo. [28:54] Geronimo came pretty quickly. [28:55] Which, of course, was the designator for bin Laden. [29:00] I can't tell you what that felt like. [29:07] I mean, I liken it to the world just changed. [29:14] We celebrated. [29:15] I cheered that. [29:16] I mean, normally one wouldn't cheer [29:19] the death of another man, [29:20] but this guy richly deserved it. [29:21] I can tell you that the dozen or so people [29:24] inside of that joint operations center erupted. [29:27] Closure, joy, elation, this chapter is over. [29:37] You know, if you go back [29:37] and you remember how you felt on September 12th, [29:42] for me, personally speaking, [29:49] there was no greater moment, [29:51] I think, in my career [29:52] and the career of many officers [29:54] who contributed to it [29:55] when he was removed from the battlefield. [29:57] But that's quick. [30:07] That elation doesn't last very long [30:08] because now we've got to get folks out. [30:15] Let's get everybody out safely [30:16] and then let's deal with the consequences. [30:18] The breachers went out [30:20] and began to essentially rig that helicopter to blow. [30:23] We watched all of that. [30:25] But, you know, the concerns then, [30:26] of course, didn't stop then. [30:28] The first thing the Pakistanis did [30:29] was scramble their jets [30:30] to shoot down our helicopters. [30:32] That was the only time [30:35] that I was remotely nervous. [30:37] You have to do a time-distance problem, right? [30:39] The boys leave Abad Abad [30:40] doing 150 miles an hour in their helicopter. [30:42] Forty minutes later, [30:43] the two Pakistanis leave [30:45] going 1,000 miles an hour in their jets. [30:47] How long until they shoot the boys out of the sky? [30:50] We never answered that question. [30:52] Thankfully, the jets went the wrong way. [30:54] Literally went the wrong way. [30:56] And guys flew back to the base in Afghanistan. [31:01] A puzzle had been worked on for a long time [31:02] by a lot of extraordinary people [31:04] and extraordinary resources [31:05] had been thrown at this objective for years. [31:10] And, you know, I'm biased [31:12] because I share a life [31:13] with this officer, this person. [31:15] But I felt like he brought [31:16] that extra piece to the puzzle. [31:18] And so I was very proud. [31:23] This was Pakistan's fight back. [31:25] A senior military and intelligence team [31:27] took over the compound [31:28] and sealed all roads leading to it. [31:31] They're closing down, [31:32] putting up the defenses, [31:33] and going on the offensive. [31:36] Of course, we had worried [31:37] about Pakistani reaction. [31:39] And there was already a plan in place [31:41] to call senior officials in Pakistan [31:44] and talk to them. [31:45] I've been doing this work for a long time, [31:47] and I know that the elimination [31:48] of the leader of al-Qaeda [31:49] does not eliminate the terrorist threat [31:51] to the United States. [31:53] It was maybe one chapter of a book. [31:56] Some of the contingencies [31:57] that we had to work through [31:59] is the level of security [32:01] for Americans in that area. [32:04] Are we prepared to handle [32:06] what might be a backlash? [32:07] And naturally, one would be concerned [32:10] about senior officers involved [32:12] in that effort being publicly identified. [32:15] We knew that there would be risks there. [32:17] Do we have the right security levels there? [32:19] Do we have the right tripwires there? [32:20] Can we tell if there's an action [32:23] about to be taken? [32:23] Do we have any intelligence [32:24] on specific retribution [32:27] that they might be planning? [32:29] There was great concern. [32:31] It's a prideful country. [32:32] They're proud, [32:33] and they're protecting [32:33] their own sovereignty. [32:34] We demand of America [32:35] to treat us as a sovereign nation, [32:39] not to treat us [32:40] as a colony of theirs. [32:42] And we tried to the degree [32:43] that we could to mitigate that [32:44] by talking about the fact [32:46] that bin Laden was a common enemy, [32:48] enemy of both our countries. [32:50] You know, according to published reports, [32:52] the host nation was humiliated, [32:55] and they were furious with Mark. [32:59] I don't think that I personalised it [33:01] or thought about me. [33:03] I would argue post-raid, [33:05] if the senior officer on site [33:07] was known to our adversaries, [33:11] that officer would have had a target [33:13] on their back. [33:24] After the raid, [33:24] I thought every American [33:26] potentially had a target on his back. [33:28] Al-Qaeda reacted, certainly. [33:31] There was a lot of animosity [33:33] toward the United States [33:34] in the wake of the raid. [33:36] But it became pretty clear [33:39] pretty early on [33:40] that the reaction [33:41] was more personal, [33:42] directed at me. [33:43] I wasn't the most popular man [33:45] in the world [33:45] after the operation. [33:47] Mark was the senior CIA officer [33:50] on the ground. [33:51] The environment, [33:52] as you might imagine, [33:53] would have been very tense. [33:55] They were upset [33:55] that we had violated [33:57] their sovereignty. [33:59] But I was there to do a job, [34:00] and I hope, you know, [34:01] that they recognised that. [34:03] But if a personal relationship [34:05] with the people [34:05] you're working with [34:06] is a problem, [34:07] they feel trust [34:08] has been violated, [34:09] then sometimes it's easier [34:11] to remove the cause [34:12] of the problem. [34:16] By first week, [34:19] second week of June, [34:20] I was pretty sick. [34:23] The symptoms weren't normal. [34:25] I spoke with Mark [34:26] on the phone a few times [34:27] about it. [34:28] It was clear [34:28] that something was off. [34:31] Very quickly, [34:31] within a couple of days, [34:33] I couldn't function anymore. [34:34] By that time, [34:34] pain was a real issue. [34:37] His health had dramatically [34:38] declined precipitously, [34:40] I would say. [34:45] He had lost [34:46] an extraordinary amount [34:46] of weight [34:47] in a very short amount [34:48] of time [34:48] in a way that seems [34:49] medically impossible. [34:50] I'm not going to get [34:53] too much into the nature [34:54] of the symptoms, [34:55] but just to say [34:55] it was extremely painful. [34:57] And as they developed, [34:59] they got worse. [35:00] His condition was unusual [35:02] in its rapid development [35:04] and unusual [35:06] in its symptomology. [35:08] In my opinion, [35:09] I'm not a doctor. [35:10] It happened in the middle [35:11] of the night. [35:11] I just reached the point [35:13] where I was close to collapse. [35:14] I wasn't doing any good [35:15] for myself, [35:16] but more importantly, [35:17] I wasn't doing any good [35:18] for the people [35:18] that were there. [35:23] Definitely stressful, [35:24] right, [35:24] trying to figure out [35:25] what's going on. [35:26] When you get to the point [35:27] you're not able to function, [35:29] then there was only one choice. [35:31] And as you might imagine, [35:33] if you were the senior CIA [35:35] officer in Pakistan [35:36] and had a role [35:37] in the hunt [35:38] for Osama bin Laden [35:39] in a country [35:40] where people were not [35:41] happy about that, [35:42] you wouldn't seek [35:42] medical care there. [35:44] So really coming home [35:45] was the only option. [35:47] And in his weakened state, [35:49] it was definitely [35:50] the best option. [35:53] If I recall correctly, [35:54] he wasn't all that eager [35:55] about leaving post, [35:57] but it was time. [35:58] It's almost unfathomable [36:02] the sense of commitment [36:04] and duty that he feels. [36:06] It's terrible. [36:08] It felt like abandoning my post. [36:10] I wanted to be part [36:11] of trying to fix the problem [36:12] to get things better [36:13] with Pakistan, [36:14] and that was just not possible. [36:16] It was some tough love [36:19] and strong encouragement [36:20] on the part of a security team [36:22] that basically said, [36:23] sir, we're getting you out of here. [36:24] And at that point, [36:26] he was candidly [36:27] in such bad shape [36:28] that he just said, fine. [36:30] An indicator of Mark's leadership, [36:32] he was leading [36:33] and making decisions [36:34] and giving guidance [36:35] right up to the last moment [36:37] before he departed. [36:38] It just tells you something [36:39] about what a promise [36:41] and a commitment [36:41] means to him. [36:42] It's somehow woven [36:44] into the very fiber [36:45] of his being. [36:46] I mean, you cannot separate [36:47] that from him. [36:49] When I came back, [36:51] my wife was obviously [36:51] very worried [36:52] about my condition. [36:53] I had lost 40 pounds, [36:55] you know, [36:55] and was in great pain. [36:56] So we did a lot [36:57] of doctor's appointments, [36:59] but she was always there [37:00] to help me, you know, [37:01] and there was concern [37:02] about what was going on. [37:04] He had really lost [37:06] kind of all color [37:07] when I did see him [37:08] when he returned. [37:09] Candidly, [37:10] he didn't look like someone [37:11] who was going to survive. [37:14] I worried more [37:15] at that stage [37:15] about the impact [37:16] on my family [37:17] and others. [37:18] There was a period [37:18] of uncertainty coming back [37:19] as to whether I'd be able [37:21] to continue a career [37:21] and all of that. [37:22] It was pretty sick. [37:23] But, you know, [37:24] I had good doctors [37:25] and, you know, [37:26] we've been able [37:26] to manage it. [37:35] I retired in 2015. [37:37] A Russian intelligence officer [37:39] once told me, [37:40] there's no such thing [37:41] as a former intelligence officer. [37:44] And that's absolutely true. [37:46] I will always be [37:47] a CIA officer, always. [37:49] I still wake up [37:50] in the night [37:51] thinking about operational decisions [37:52] I made or didn't make. [37:55] Nobody ever leaves [37:57] with everything [37:58] they wanted to accomplish done. [38:02] You know, [38:02] it's the nature [38:02] of the business. [38:03] It carries on. [38:04] I got a phone call [38:08] from a journalist [38:09] who said, [38:10] we're going to publish [38:10] your name [38:11] and the fact [38:12] that you were allegedly [38:13] poisoned in Pakistan. [38:15] You know, [38:15] there were all sorts of theories [38:16] about why that happened. [38:17] We don't know [38:18] why I got sick. [38:20] I don't know [38:21] till this day. [38:22] Was there [38:22] a real explanation? [38:24] No, never. [38:27] It could be [38:27] I'll never get an answer [38:28] to it. [38:29] That's, [38:30] that's something [38:34] I live with. [38:35] Anything's within [38:35] the realm of possibility, [38:36] but, you know, [38:37] I wouldn't, [38:39] I would be uncomfortable [38:42] levying any accusations. [38:45] Foreign intelligence services, [38:46] of course, [38:47] have used poison [38:48] and other things, [38:49] you know, [38:49] and we have demonstrated [38:50] instances of it. [38:51] I've written about it publicly, [38:53] of Russia using it [38:54] against dissidents [38:56] and people [38:57] it considers traitors, [38:58] but never, [38:59] to my knowledge, [39:00] against a foreign [39:00] intelligence officer. [39:03] It's a totally [39:04] different thing. [39:06] Of course, [39:08] I was not, [39:08] I was not happy [39:10] to get the phone call. [39:11] The story was going [39:12] to associate me [39:13] with the bin Laden [39:13] operation by name. [39:18] I was not so much [39:19] worried about me, [39:20] I'm worried about my family. [39:25] I mean, [39:25] there are people out there [39:27] who definitely [39:28] wouldn't like that. [39:34] My name being out there, [39:35] there's a potential [39:35] that somebody [39:36] doesn't like CIA [39:37] or like what I was [39:39] allegedly involved with [39:40] and comes to my door [39:41] and harms me [39:44] or my family, right? [39:45] That's the concern. [39:46] There are, [39:46] there are enough [39:47] crazy people out there. [39:50] So we appealed [39:51] to them, [39:52] not to publish my name. [39:54] The agency appealed [39:55] to them as well. [39:59] The press decided, [40:00] no, we're going [40:00] to publish it, [40:01] which had safety [40:03] and security ramifications [40:05] for me and my family [40:06] that continue till this day. [40:08] It's not pleasant. [40:10] My name is pretty much [40:11] all over the place. [40:12] We're an open society. [40:13] Once somebody prints [40:14] a story like that, [40:15] it goes everywhere. [40:16] It doesn't stop [40:17] at the borders [40:17] of the United States. [40:19] I thought the story [40:22] was poorly researched, [40:24] poorly written, [40:25] should never have been published [40:26] and his inclusion of the name [40:27] was both irresponsible [40:28] and gratuitous. [40:29] It seemed designed, [40:30] in my opinion, [40:31] just to yield clicks online. [40:33] The salacious, scandalous, [40:34] or, you know, [40:35] kind of dramatic aspects [40:36] of the story [40:37] were never anything [40:37] that we conveyed to people. [40:45] But the article did, [40:46] let's say, [40:48] ratchet up our focus [40:50] on safety, [40:51] safety for our family members, [40:53] safety for our environment. [40:55] That's a reality [40:56] that I live with. [40:57] That being said, [40:59] you know, [40:59] once it happened, [41:00] and make the best of it [41:01] and try to, [41:02] A, document some of the history, [41:04] and B, [41:05] try to ensure [41:06] that the American people [41:07] understand what CIA [41:08] does in its name. [41:09] And they can be proud of them. [41:11] They can be proud of the officers [41:12] who served there. [41:16] Otherwise, [41:16] you wouldn't even, [41:17] you would never have met me. [41:19] The job demands [41:22] great sacrifice of you. [41:24] So you have to give up [41:25] some things personally, [41:26] particularly if you're [41:27] in an operations field. [41:28] You're out there alone [41:29] without your family. [41:29] You're working long hours. [41:32] You might be in places [41:33] that are dangerous. [41:35] The professional satisfaction [41:36] might be quite high, [41:38] but the cost for your family [41:39] can also be high. [41:41] It's been pros and cons. [41:43] I would say in the pro column, [41:45] there's something special [41:45] about being able to share [41:47] what is a unique life [41:48] with someone [41:49] who really understands it. [41:50] My wife was a very positive thinker. [41:54] You know, [41:55] she comes from my world too. [41:56] You know, [41:57] doesn't pay to dwell [41:58] on the negative. [42:00] Focus on success. [42:02] She's the greatest thing [42:02] that ever happened to me. [42:05] Support in that time [42:06] was unbelievable. [42:09] And ultimately, [42:10] she helped me through it, [42:11] which I'll be forever grateful for. [42:13] Mark was an exemplary leader. [42:18] I mean, [42:18] he had the unique ability [42:19] to have a strategic vision [42:22] and execute that vision [42:24] during an extremely complex [42:28] and challenging set [42:29] of circumstances. [42:32] He had been, you know, [42:33] kind of forged in the fire [42:35] of some pretty challenging work [42:37] across decades. [42:40] I never saw [42:41] an operational success [42:42] at CIA [42:43] that was a result [42:44] of one person's action. [42:46] CIA works and fights [42:47] as a team. [42:49] People with all different skills [42:50] being brought together. [42:51] And that's true [42:52] of the bin Laden operation. [42:54] Well, the lesson [42:55] to our enemies [42:56] is that if you attack [42:57] the United States, [42:58] we will not quit. [42:59] You can do everything [43:00] you want to hide, [43:02] but we will not quit. [43:03] We will find you. [43:04] And you will pay a price [43:06] for that. [43:08] It's not just a job, [43:09] it's a way of life. [43:10] Right? [43:11] You choose that life, [43:12] then you get the good [43:13] and the bad [43:13] that goes with it. [43:14] And from my perspective, [43:15] it was overwhelmingly good. [43:17] Even when it was bad, [43:18] it was good. [43:21] Looking back on it, [43:22] it was worth it. [43:22] It was worth it. [43:23] We delivered a great victory [43:24] in the United States. [43:27] You know, [43:27] joining CIA, [43:28] it isn't like the movies, [43:30] no, [43:31] but there are thrills [43:32] that are comparable.