Strait of Hormuz crisis: Trump Uutimatums, Iran response & rising war fears explained

[0:00] Now, US President Donald Trump has given Iran shifting deadlines to reopen the Strait of [0:05] Hormuz. That's as Iran insists the key waterway isn't actually closed and that only ships that [0:12] belong to its enemies are barred from passage. Trump issued his first ultimatum about the [0:17] Strait back on March the 21st. He threatened that the US would bomb Iran's power plants [0:23] if the Strait wasn't reopened within 48 hours. He later extended that deadline by five days, [0:29] claiming that negotiations with Iran were underway. Trump then issued a new deadline [0:35] on March the 26th. This time he gave Iran 10 days or until the evening of April the 6th to reopen [0:42] the Strait. Trump has issued his latest Hormuz threat on Sunday after vowing to bomb power [0:49] plants and bridges if Tehran doesn't comply. He posted what appears to be a Tuesday 8pm [0:56] deadline for a deal. Okay, let's unpack this with our guests. [1:02] We've got... [1:02] We've got Ross Harrison, a senior fellow, the Middle East Institute author of Decoding [1:06] Iran's Foreign Policy. He joins us from Washington, D.C. And we have Adam Weinstein, [1:11] who is the Middle East Deputy Director at the Quincy Institute. He is in New York for us. [1:17] Thank you to both of you. Adam, if I could start with you. So, [1:20] US President Donald Trump setting a new deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. So, [1:26] he's now saying Tuesday 8pm Eastern time, according to his latest post on Truth Social. [1:32] Given his track record of shifting ultimatums, how seriously should we take this latest one? [1:41] You know, look, it's always a what if with him. I just don't know how seriously to take it because [1:46] the way he crafts foreign policy is in a impulsive manner. But for the Iranians, [1:52] I don't think the calculus has changed all that much because their goal here is survival. And [1:58] they view a concession in the Strait of Hormuz without some kind of reciprocal guarantee. [2:04] As a threat to their survival, even if it ends the war. [2:08] Ross, to you, on the one hand, Trump is publicly taunting and threatening Iran. But in interviews, [2:15] we saw one he did on Fox News recently, he suggested a deal could be reached [2:20] within days. He said that before. From Tehran's perspective, how difficult does that make it [2:26] to interpret US intentions? [2:30] Well, I think they're accustomed to Donald Trump's style at this point. I think they, [2:36] I assume that what they're seeing in terms of Donald Trump's, frankly, escalatory language [2:44] and profane language is a sign of frustration and a sign that there may be fewer options available [2:54] to the United States to achieve the goal of opening the Strait of Hormuz. So I think they're [2:59] interpreting this as, to some degree, success of their policy of sort of boxing Donald Trump in. [3:06] And the fact that I think that they, they assume that this kind of escalatory language is going to [3:11] be followed by some kind of escalation on the ground in the coming days. So that would probably [3:17] be their assumption, whether in fact that plays out, well, remains to be seen. [3:22] Adam, is there a coherent US strategy here? Or is policy being made in real time? [3:30] No, I think policy is being made in real time. I don't think there's a [3:33] well thought out interagency process in terms of crafting policy. I think, [3:37] the policy that comes out of the White House, like I said before, is extremely impulsive. [3:42] And I think we have to keep in mind the context of all of this, that now the stated end goal of [3:47] this war is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which was, was open the day before the war began. I mean, [3:53] this is a circular foreign policy. It's a war that was launched without real congressional approval, [3:59] without, without a clear achievable end state. [4:02] Adam, you're a former US Marine. How concerned are you about mission creep here? [4:10] I'm very concerned about mission creep. I mean, I think the idea that we're going to launch a full [4:15] scale invasion of Iran, I think that's probably hyperbole at this point, because there's simply [4:19] not enough troops in the region or on the way to the region to make that happen. But if the Trump [4:27] administration were to decide to decide to seize an island or to enter coastal Iran for a brief [4:32] period, I think things can get out of control very quickly. As we saw over the last 48 hours, [4:37] war is unpredictable. [4:38] Ross, how do the Iranian [4:41] leadership feel about the prospect of American boots on the ground? [4:43] Well, I'm sure they're not, they don't anticipate it any kind of a positive way, [4:49] though I think they're probably spent the last number of weeks preparing for it. I think that [4:54] they are recognizing that, that this boots on the ground approach may not have a clear political [5:01] objective, Malene. That, that if in fact the boots on the ground will be used to try to open [5:08] the Strait of Hormuz, it's likely to do the opposite. I think they understand that. [5:12] Which is the way they're interpreting Donald Trump's tantrum this morning, they're interpreting [5:17] that, I think to some degree as a recognition of the fact that Donald Trump understands that a [5:22] boots on the ground approach is not going to achieve the objective that it's purported to have, [5:28] which is to open the strait because the minute the strait becomes a combat zone, [5:33] ships aren't going to go through. So I think it's a recognition on the part of the Iranians [5:36] that the United States might not have a clear political objective, and that there's really [5:40] no way to achieve [5:42] the goal of opening the strait with military means alone. [5:46] Adam, how does the U.S. public factor into all this? [5:50] Is this war beginning to hit Americans directly, [5:53] whether that be fuel prices or the unstable markets? [5:56] To what extent is any U.S. decision-making [5:59] versus this war being driven by political pressure at home? [6:05] Well, anyone who's filled their car with gasoline [6:08] knows that it's hitting Americans. [6:10] You know, there's a long-held attitude in Washington, [6:13] I think, that Americans don't vote based on foreign policy. [6:18] It's a factor, but at the end of the day, [6:20] they'll vote based on domestic policy, [6:23] and they don't always make the connection [6:24] between things that are happening domestically [6:26] and their connection to foreign policy. [6:29] So I think it's a factor. [6:30] I don't think it's an overwhelming factor, [6:31] even though it's undeniable that this war [6:34] is deeply unpopular among the American public. [6:37] But we also have to remember [6:39] that the Iranians also have their own politics. [6:43] And again, I have to... [6:44] I have to reiterate that I think [6:45] what the Trump administration has miscalculated [6:48] about the Iranian regime [6:49] is that its goal here is survival, [6:53] and it's willing to take incredible losses [6:56] to achieve that [6:58] and not appear as if it's backing down to the United States. [7:01] I mean, we forget, historically, [7:03] Iran was willing to take 200,000 losses [7:05] in the Iran-Iraq war [7:07] before they finally agreed to bring an end to the war. [7:12] Of course, that was a war that was... [7:14] that was inflicted upon them. [7:15] But the Iranian regime is not going to negotiate [7:18] at gunpoint in a way that looks like [7:22] it's conceding to Trump's demands. [7:25] Ross, to you on that point, [7:29] I mean, if Iran refuses to negotiate [7:31] under threat of attack, [7:33] what options does it have to de-escalate [7:36] without effectively surrendering key parts of its economy, [7:40] especially its energy sector? [7:41] And, you know, as... [7:44] we heard there, you know, [7:45] there's also the people of Iran to consider. [7:49] You know, Malin, I think what Iran has done thus far [7:52] in terms of its war strategy over the last five weeks [7:54] is it's expanded horizontally. [7:58] And it has done that by extending the war [8:01] out to the Gulf Arab states, including Qatar. [8:05] But I think if, in fact, [8:06] there is an attempt to escalate on the part of the US, [8:09] I think you'll see even a further escalation vertically. [8:12] I think what the Iranians are calculating, Malin, [8:16] is that if they see facts on the ground, [8:19] they see escalation on the ground, [8:20] and they see inflammatory language by Donald Trump, [8:23] that indicates to them that they have few options [8:25] but to keep escalating or keep fighting. [8:28] I think what the signals they're going to be looking for [8:30] in terms to de-escalate [8:31] are going to be a dialing back of the rhetoric, [8:34] possibly an opening up of a real diplomatic channel, [8:37] not just with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, [8:39] and some kind of actual de-escalation on the ground. [8:43] At that point, the Iranians are going to be faced with a decision, [8:46] do they de-escalate or do they keep going? [8:48] I think both parties are going to want to find an off-ramp, [8:51] but I think it's a matter of timing [8:53] and which one leaves the battle the highest on the escalation ladder. [8:58] And on the off-ramp, Ross, [9:00] we've been hearing about these discussions involving Oman [9:03] and the Strait of Hormuz, [9:04] including ideas like transit fees tied to reparations. [9:09] Is this Tehran testing a diplomatic off-ramp? [9:15] I don't think so. [9:16] I mean, they may... [9:17] I think they're testing a possible regime for after the war [9:21] on how they manage transit and revenues after the war. [9:26] But I think in terms of signaling an off-ramp, [9:29] I think they're going to be very careful about signaling an off-ramp [9:33] until they see some kind of de-escalation on the part of the United States. [9:37] And the reason for that, Malin, is very simple. [9:39] They want to leave this war. [9:40] They're determined to leave this war, [9:43] having made the point that any kind of future attack [9:46] will... [9:48] that they will be able to exact a price on the United States [9:51] or on Israel or anybody that attacks them. [9:53] And the way to do that is to leave the war [9:55] having re-established deterrence. [9:56] If they're seen as de-escalating prematurely, [10:00] they will not have achieved their war objective. [10:02] So it's a very tricky tightrope [10:04] over the next couple of days and weeks, I would say. [10:07] And, Adam, to you finally, [10:08] where do Gulf countries come into this? [10:11] Because Iran has threatened to attack more civilian infrastructure. [10:14] That's already happening. [10:15] We saw in Kuwait Iranian drone attacks, [10:18] have damaged two power and water desalination plants. [10:21] The worry is if the U.S. attacks Iran's energy sector further, [10:25] the Gulf will continue to pay the price. [10:29] Well, first of all, I agree with everything that was just said [10:31] by the other guest in terms of Iran's calculation. [10:35] You know, unfortunately, the Trump administration [10:37] has shown that it doesn't care about U.S. partners. [10:40] It doesn't care about the cost to U.S. partners. [10:43] I think the strategy of Iran was to create chaos in the Gulf [10:47] and their hope was to... [10:49] It was that they would create enough pain for the Gulf countries [10:52] that those countries would go to Donald Trump and say, [10:55] hey, you know, you need to find a resolution for this. [10:58] We're your close friends and we're really hurting. [11:01] I don't know that the Trump administration really responds to that, [11:04] which is unfortunate. [11:05] And the real tragedy of all of this is, you know, [11:08] this shouldn't be taken out of context. [11:09] We had a nuclear deal. [11:11] The Trump administration left that nuclear deal. [11:14] We have to ask ourselves, why were hardliners inside Iran always [11:19] so hostile towards diplomacy, but they have—they don't seem to have a problem with this kind [11:24] of confrontation. [11:26] It's because a war of choice by the United States against Iran doesn't actually threaten [11:32] regime survival. [11:34] They're willing to take a lot of pain, and they're going—they're very motivated to [11:39] restore deterrence, as the other guest said. [11:43] The only time that we've seen real flexibility from the—on the part of the Iranians is [11:47] when a U.S. government was willing to work with the more pragmatic actors inside the [11:53] Iranian government towards a diplomatic solution, which is what the Trump administration should [11:58] do. [11:59] But I don't know if they've realized that yet. [12:01] Okay. [12:02] Thank you to both our guests, Ross Harrison and Adam Weinstein.