Try Free
Home › Transcripts › Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing On Special Operations Command And Cyber Command

Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing On Special Operations Command And Cyber Command

Forbes Breaking News April 29, 2026 1h 40m 15,335 words
▶ Watch original video

About this transcript: This is a full AI-generated transcript of Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing On Special Operations Command And Cyber Command from Forbes Breaking News, published April 29, 2026. The transcript contains 15,335 words with timestamps and was generated using Whisper AI.

"11-15, I didn't know that a vote was going on on the Senate floor. So we appreciate our witnesses visiting with us down in the classified skiff. And now we meet today to receive testimony in open session on the posture of United States Special Operations Command, United States Cyber Command. We're..."

[0:00] 11-15, I didn't know that a vote was going on on the Senate floor. [0:07] So we appreciate our witnesses visiting with us down in the classified skiff. [0:16] And now we meet today to receive testimony in open session on the posture of United States Special Operations Command, [0:26] United States Cyber Command. [0:27] We're joined by Admiral Mitch Bradley, commander of the United States Special Operations Command, [0:34] General Joshua Rudd, commander of the United States Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency, [0:42] Mr. Derek Anderson, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, [0:50] and Ms. Katie Sutton, assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy. [0:58] And all members are reminded to silence their devices, including the chair. [1:07] Recent operations, including Absolute Resolve, Midnight Hammer, and Epic Fury, [1:15] represent a watershed moment for American military power. [1:18] Each operation wove cyber effects into the fabric of joint force operations at the beginning of planning. [1:27] Consequently, our cyber operators were able to illustrate the potential of these capabilities [1:32] as a force multiplier unlike any other. [1:37] We must ensure that the lessons learned from recent operations are fully digested and integrated [1:43] into our doctrine and planning. [1:45] However, we cannot allow these successes to lull us into complacency. [1:50] Cyber threats are immediate, persistent, and they are escalating. [1:56] Every day, our adversaries target America's critical infrastructure and government networks. [2:00] They're advancing their capabilities to outpace and outcompete our forces in cyberspace, [2:07] and we must not allow that. [2:09] To keep up with these threats, we must redouble our efforts to modernize [2:13] and strengthen American cyber forces. [2:18] Doing so requires us to make fundamental updates to the way military services generate, [2:24] organize, and sustain cyber forces. [2:26] This effort is as ambitious as it is necessary. [2:31] The Pentagon has launched a department-wide initiative, Cybercom 2.0, [2:37] to increase skill and readiness of our cyber forces. [2:41] This initiative is simple. [2:42] Just like any other military service, we will need a well-trained pipeline of cyber operators [2:51] supported by a whole range of acquisition professionals. [2:54] And we do not have that today, perhaps have testimony about how far along we are. [3:00] Our cyber operators are working overtime, and we're not ready to generate new forces to replace them. [3:07] I'm troubled that this effort is not moving fast enough. [3:09] Current operations will always be priority number one, but we must ensure this pace is sustainable. [3:18] Our cyber operators are not the only highly specialized forces in demand. [3:23] America's special operations forces are more important now than ever before. [3:28] No longer confined to their traditional role as a force of last resort, [3:34] special operations forces often serve as a first choice across the full spectrum of military action. [3:46] Special operations forces conduct direct action against high-value targets, [3:50] as we witnessed during the raid to apprehend Nicolas Maduro from his heavily fortified compound outside Caracas. [3:58] They train and advise partner forces, building capacity and strengthening alliances across Latin America, [4:06] Europe, and the first island chains. [4:09] They gather intelligence against our adversaries in hostile environments. [4:13] They respond to crises worldwide at a moment's notice, and they operate in the gray zone between peace and war, [4:23] the context in which much of today's strategic competition unfolds. [4:27] However, the funding provided to Special Operations Command has not kept pace with the seemingly insatiable demand for its capabilities. [4:36] The command faces a troubling gap between its mission requirements and available resources, [4:42] and I do think there's consensus on both sides of the dais and both sides of the aisle to correct that as soon as we can. [4:50] Last year, General Brian Fenton, then commander of Special Operations Command, [4:55] stated before this committee, and I'm going to quote General Fenton, [4:59] We continue to grapple with years of flat budgets, a 14% decrease in buying power, [5:08] significant personnel reductions, and the requirement to evolve our technology and authorities. [5:16] All this forces trade-offs, tough choices that challenge current missions, and put modernization at risk. [5:23] End of quote from General Fenton. [5:26] Ladies and gentlemen, unfortunately, the $1.6 billion increase in last year's reconciliation funding was not fully applied [5:34] to the purpose for which Congress intended it. [5:40] Perhaps we could discuss that today. [5:42] This morning, I looked to Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson to tell us, to tell this committee what they need. [5:49] I hope they will tell us how to equip their force to combat the advanced militaries of China and Russia, [5:56] to remain fully engaged in the fight against violent Islamic terrorism, [6:01] and to respond at a moment's notice as our nation's premier crisis response force. [6:09] And with that, I recognize my friend and colleague, the ranking member, Reed, for his opening remarks. [6:14] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome. [6:16] Admiral Bradley and General Rudd, Mr. Anderson and Ms. Sutton, thank you very much. [6:23] And please convey our thanks, our deep thanks to the men and women under your commands. [6:28] Tomorrow marks two months since President Trump launched the war with Iran. [6:34] Both Special Operations Command and Cyber Command are deeply engaged in this conflict. [6:39] Our Special Operators and Cyber Forces have played a major role in enabling combat operations, [6:45] conducting information warfare, and providing intelligence support, [6:50] including the remarkable mission to rescue the crew of the F-15 aircraft shot down in Iran early this month. [6:57] This hearing is a reminder that modern warfare requires the full integration of every element of American military power. [7:04] Today, I would like our witnesses to provide updates on how their personnel are engaged in the war with Iran [7:12] and what lessons should be drawn for future conflicts. [7:16] Admiral Bradley, our Special Operations Forces are unparalleled, but they are not without limits. [7:22] I am concerned the administration has been deploying your forces at an unsustainable pace [7:28] and for missions that could be questioned. [7:33] Over the past year, SOCOM has led and executed the attack on Venezuela to capture Nicolas Maduro, [7:40] the bolt strike campaign in the Caribbean and Pacific, [7:43] and various operations throughout the Middle East and Africa. [7:46] I have serious concerns about Operation Southern Sphere in particular. [7:51] Our service members have been ordered to strike and kill hundreds of suspected criminals [7:55] in the open ocean over the past eight months, [7:59] placing them in legally and ethically perilous circumstances. [8:03] I would ask for an update on SOCOM's role in Southern Sphere [8:06] and its missions in the region moving forward. [8:10] Additional, Admiral Bradley, in your prepared statement, [8:13] you will rightly discuss how warfare is increasingly defined by, in your words, [8:18] competition below the threshold of armed conflict, in essence, a gray zone environment. [8:23] That is precisely where our Special Operations Forces should be most affected, [8:27] and I would ask for your plans to prepare our Special Forces for such environments [8:33] and what impact today's high operations tempo could have on future readiness. [8:38] Similarly, Mr. Anderson, I would appreciate an update on the role of our Special Operations [8:43] in advising U.S. partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, [8:47] and what steps you are taking to help equip and modernize our forces. [8:51] I would also ask for an update on your efforts to strengthen the abilities of your office [8:57] to fulfill its service secretary-like responsibilities for the oversight of the organization [9:03] and readiness of our Special Operations Forces. [9:06] General Rudd, Ms. Sutton, I understand you are conducting a Cyber 2.0 Force Structure Review. [9:13] I welcome such a review. [9:15] The current Cyber Mission Force design is more than a decade old, [9:18] and chronic readiness problems persist. [9:22] Our most skilled cyber operators are highly sought after in the private sector, [9:27] and the military cannot easily match the financial incentives that they're presented with. [9:34] As such, a professional attrition in cyber calm remains high. [9:40] I would appreciate an update on the force design changes you are considering [9:44] and how such changes could affect the joint cyber warfare fighting architecture. [9:50] Additionally, this committee has been briefed in closed session about the cyber activities used [9:56] during recent operations like Midnight Hammer and Absolute Resolve. [10:00] I would like to understand in open session how you are integrating cyber effects [10:04] into combat missions and operational planning, [10:07] and where shortfalls remain that can be addressed through legislation. [10:11] Finally, Ms. Sutton, your office is new, [10:15] and its mandate is very consequential, [10:18] providing civilian oversight and advocacy for cyber calm. [10:22] I would like to hear how you are structuring your office, [10:26] whether you are adequately resourced, [10:28] and how you are working across the department [10:30] to improve acquisition functions and civilian hiring authorities for the command. [10:35] Thank you again, all of you, [10:38] that the missions of SOCOM and cyber calm are indispensable [10:41] to our national security, [10:42] and I look forward to your testimony. [10:44] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [10:45] All right, Secretary Anderson, [10:46] I think we'll start with you on opening statements, [10:49] if you don't mind. [10:50] And I know you gave full statement in the classified section, [11:00] but feel free to go ahead and tell us what you have in mind. [11:06] Thank you, Senator, and appreciate that. [11:09] Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, [11:10] and other distinguished members of the committee, [11:12] thank you for the opportunity to testify [11:14] on the global posture of our nation's special operations forces. [11:17] I'm honored to testify alongside Assistant Secretary Catherine Sutton, [11:20] Admiral Mitch Bradley, and General Joshua Rudd. [11:24] The SOLIC team, together with their U.S. SOCOM counterparts, [11:26] bring invaluable expertise, leadership, and insight [11:29] as we advocate on behalf of the SOF enterprise, [11:32] our service members, and their families. [11:34] People are the foundation of SOF and of the joint force. [11:37] They are our competitive advantage against our adversaries. [11:41] We are thankful for those who have volunteered to serve, [11:43] those currently in harm's way, [11:45] and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, [11:47] including the 13 U.S. service members [11:49] we've lost during ongoing operations. [11:51] We honor their lives and legacy, [11:53] and we'll never forget the sacrifices in defense of our country. [11:57] Today's security environment is defined [11:58] by simultaneity, convergence, and speed. [12:01] State adversaries, terrorist organizations, [12:03] and transnational criminal networks [12:04] are increasingly aligned, technologically enabled, [12:07] and active across domains and regions. [12:10] To answer these challenges, [12:11] the national defense strategy marks a fundamental shift, [12:13] directing the Department of War [12:14] to implement a flexible, realistic approach [12:17] to protect America's interests. [12:19] Purpose built for this era, [12:20] SOF provides capability and optionality. [12:23] Comprising only 3% of the joint force [12:25] and less than 2% of the department's budget, [12:28] roughly equivalent to the procurement cost [12:30] of a single aircraft carrier, [12:32] SOF delivers outsized strategic value. [12:33] SOF provides senior leaders [12:35] with scalable, tailorable, and asymmetric options [12:38] across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. [12:41] Leveraging persistent global presence, [12:43] generational relationships, and unique authorities, [12:46] the quiet professionals within SOF [12:47] shape the operating environment, [12:49] strengthen partners, [12:50] and impose costs on our adversaries. [12:52] While you may not read about it in the headlines, [12:54] every major operation has a SOF component to it. [12:58] Operations like Southern Spear, Rough Rider, [13:00] Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, [13:02] and Epic Fury have demonstrated [13:03] our nation's prowess and commitment [13:05] to confront our adversaries wherever they may be. [13:08] From the Western Hemisphere across the Indo-Pacific [13:10] to the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and beyond, [13:13] SOF has been decisive in defending the homeland, [13:15] deterring China, [13:16] and enabling our partners and allies. [13:18] Should deterrence fail, [13:20] SOF's posture with the joint force [13:21] to prevail in high-end conflict. [13:23] In accordance with the law [13:24] and congressional guidance, [13:25] of which we are immensely grateful, [13:27] the department has taken decisive [13:28] and concrete steps [13:29] to institutionalize SOLEC's oversight and advocacy role [13:32] and strengthen the governments [13:33] of the SOF enterprise. [13:35] Over the last year and a half, [13:36] we have transformed the Secretariat [13:37] for Special Operations [13:38] to provide direct civilian oversight [13:40] across organized, train, [13:42] and equip responsibilities. [13:44] Not to duplicate or disrupt [13:45] the operational execution role of USOCOM, [13:48] but to support, sustain, and strengthen it. [13:51] This transformation moves us [13:52] beyond the old advisory construct [13:54] to a true exercise of authority, [13:56] direction, and control [13:58] through an analytical, disciplined, [14:00] data-driven, and strategically sound approach. [14:03] While the maturation of these initiatives [14:05] is ongoing, [14:06] these foundational changes [14:07] fulfill congressional intent [14:08] and provide the oversight mechanisms [14:10] needed to shape force structure, [14:12] guide budgetary and planning processes, [14:14] and forge the future of SOF. [14:16] The optionality that SOF delivers [14:17] requires resourcing and investments. [14:19] To maintain our competitive edge, [14:21] SOF needs sustained partnership, [14:22] predictable resourcing, [14:24] and continued modernization. [14:26] We greatly appreciate the support [14:27] from this committee, [14:28] and I commit to continued collaboration [14:29] with Congress [14:30] and to make full use of my position [14:32] in the department [14:32] and alongside the services [14:34] to ensure SOF remains resourced, [14:36] ready, relevant, and accountable, [14:38] and to ensure that they can meet [14:39] today's missions while transforming [14:40] for tomorrow's challenges. [14:42] I'm honored to lead the SOF enterprise. [14:45] I invite you to visit our special operators [14:46] and their families across the globe [14:48] to see firsthand in the great work they do [14:50] and the challenges they face. [14:52] Our service members and their families [14:53] represent the finest that America has to offer [14:55] and are something we, as a nation, [14:58] should be proud of. [14:59] Thank you for the opportunity to testify, [15:00] and I look forward to your questions. [15:02] Okay, let's go Admiral Bradley, [15:04] and then we'll do Secretary Sutton [15:06] and General Rudd. [15:08] Admiral, you're recognized. [15:09] Chairman, thank you. [15:10] Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, [15:11] and distinguished members of this committee, [15:14] thank you for the opportunity [15:15] to represent the men and women [15:17] of the United States Special Operations Command. [15:19] I am honored to testify alongside [15:21] Honorable Derek Anderson, our ASW SOLIC. [15:24] In SOCOM, we rely upon the empowered [15:26] SOCOM SOLIC team for oversight, support, [15:30] and advocacy to succeed in all of our global missions. [15:33] Furthermore, privileged to testify [15:35] alongside our partners from Cybercom, [15:37] General Josh Rudd and ASW Honorable Katie Sutton. [15:40] The deep integration between our commands ensures, [15:44] as you have said, Chairman, [15:45] that we can project power and protect the homeland [15:47] across all domains. [15:49] Distinguished members of this committee, [15:51] the Honorable Anderson has laid out [15:53] the strategic challenge, [15:54] and I'd like to emphasize what this means [15:56] for your warfighters inside SOCOM. [15:58] The bottom line is, [16:00] we do not have the luxury of focusing [16:02] on only a single goal or mission. [16:05] While we defend the homeland as our top priority, [16:08] we must also orient our force [16:09] on the long-term pacing challenge of China. [16:12] We simultaneously deter the acute threat [16:15] of conventional aggression from Russia and Iran [16:18] and remain postured to dismantle [16:20] the networks of their proxies [16:21] while we guard against the reckless provocations [16:24] of isolated rogue states. [16:26] And through it all, [16:27] the persistent threat of ideologically driven [16:29] and narco-terrorism continues to demand [16:32] our and our integrated interagency's [16:35] constant vigilance. [16:36] This is the reality of simultaneity. [16:39] To meet this reality, [16:40] we carry on the legacy of the Chendits, [16:42] the Marine Raiders, [16:43] the underwater demolition teams, [16:45] and the jetbergs of World War II. [16:47] Small teams who flew and parachuted [16:50] behind enemy lines [16:51] or swam through murky waters, [16:53] not to win the war by themselves, [16:55] but to empower our partners to win it [16:57] as part of a greater alliance. [16:59] That is the essence of how we, [17:01] as just 3% of the joint force [17:03] and less 2% of the department's budget, [17:06] provide an indispensable asymmetric advantage. [17:08] We are a force ready to multiply the effects [17:11] of our allies, partners, [17:13] and our joint force teammates. [17:14] Our joint force teammates recognize this. [17:16] They recognize that our SOF [17:18] are more in demand today [17:19] than we ever have been. [17:21] Your $2 billion, [17:22] near $2 billion uplift [17:23] to our budget last year in 26 [17:25] was an important down payment. [17:27] But after five years of flat budgets, [17:30] only with increased investment [17:32] can we continue to meet the demands [17:33] of the competition crisis [17:35] and modernization for future conflict. [17:37] You see, our purpose is our mission. [17:40] This means that we are laser-focused [17:42] on maintaining the readiness required [17:44] to defend the homeland, [17:45] to deter aggression from our pacing challenge, [17:48] and to enable true burden sharing [17:49] by empowering the growing capacity [17:51] of our allies and partners. [17:53] But that mission is not accomplished [17:55] by technology alone. [17:56] It is executed by the most decisive advantage [17:58] we have, our people, [18:00] empowered by a culture of meritocracy [18:02] and supported by critical programs [18:04] that you have helped to manifest, [18:05] like the preservation of the force and family. [18:08] The health of your SOF formation [18:10] is not just strong, [18:11] it's getting stronger every day. [18:14] And to ensure these exceptional men and women [18:15] can succeed in the complex environments of tomorrow, [18:19] increasingly encroaching upon today, [18:21] we are making transformation our imperative. [18:24] We must adapt faster than our adversaries. [18:27] We must sustain and improve [18:28] our ability to project force [18:30] through the most contested environments. [18:32] We must evolve to leverage [18:34] the ubiquitous information environment, [18:36] and we must make advantageous use [18:38] of abundant, attritable autonomy [18:40] as we support the joint force. [18:43] We are evolving our force design, [18:45] accelerating capability development, [18:47] and strengthening our partnerships [18:48] with the services and allies [18:49] to stay ahead of emerging threats. [18:52] Our partnership with Cybercom [18:54] is a hallmark of this evolution, [18:56] synchronizing virtual and physical domain maneuver [18:58] across the spectrum for mission success. [19:01] As the department's lead [19:02] for experimentation in autonomy, [19:05] we are not just adapting, [19:06] we are driving change. [19:08] We are working with the services [19:09] to incorporate next-generation capabilities, [19:12] systems that are precise, autonomous, affordable, [19:15] and always consistent with the law of war. [19:17] Our goal? [19:18] To deliver these tools [19:19] with the element of surprise [19:20] from unwarned access and placement at scale, [19:23] ensuring our forces maintain [19:25] the decisive advantage against any adversary. [19:28] However, our ability to accomplish this [19:30] is not guaranteed. [19:32] It requires accelerated modernization [19:33] in your continued partnership. [19:36] Predictable resourcing [19:37] for our program's modernization [19:38] is a strategic necessity. [19:40] SOF was purpose-built [19:41] for this era of competition, [19:43] and with your continued support, [19:45] we will meet today's missions [19:46] while transforming to ensure [19:48] we are ready for the challenges tomorrow. [19:50] Thank you, [19:51] and I look forward to your questions. [19:54] Thank you, Admiral. [19:55] Secretary Sutton, you are recognized. [19:57] Chairman Wicker, [19:59] Ranking Member Reed, [20:00] and distinguished members of the committee, [20:02] thank you for the opportunity [20:03] to testify here today. [20:05] I am honored to be here [20:06] with General Rudd, [20:07] whose immense experience, [20:08] especially in the Indo-Pacific region, [20:10] will prove invaluable [20:12] as we posture to implement [20:13] the priorities [20:14] of the National Defense Strategy. [20:16] I congratulate [20:17] Lieutenant General Hartman [20:18] and his wife, Catherine, [20:20] on his retirement, [20:21] and thank him for his service [20:22] and visionary leadership [20:24] that has built [20:25] the cyber enterprise [20:26] over the years, [20:27] setting the stage [20:28] for our future success. [20:30] It is a privilege [20:31] to also testify [20:32] alongside our special operations partners, [20:35] Assistant Secretary of War, [20:36] Derek Anderson, [20:37] and Admiral Mitch Bradley. [20:39] This joint appearance [20:41] underscores a critical reality. [20:43] The synergy between our communities [20:45] creates an asymmetric advantage, [20:48] presenting our adversaries [20:49] with compounding dilemmas [20:51] in both physical and virtual worlds. [20:54] In my role, [20:55] I'm responsible for overseeing [20:56] the department's [20:57] cyber operations policies, [21:00] integrating cyber activities, [21:02] and exercising authority, [21:04] direction, and control [21:05] over U.S. cyber command. [21:07] I'd like to start [21:09] by describing two key dynamics [21:10] of the strategic cyber environment. [21:13] The character of cyber warfare [21:14] is changing rapidly, [21:16] shaped by the growing threat [21:17] posed by our adversaries, [21:19] and accelerated [21:20] by the ever-growing power [21:21] of technology. [21:22] The first major change [21:25] we are seeing [21:25] is that our adversaries [21:26] have moved [21:27] beyond conducting espionage [21:29] and theft [21:30] and are preparing for conflict [21:32] by pre-positioning [21:33] disruptive capabilities [21:35] inside our nation's [21:36] critical infrastructure. [21:38] This strategic shift [21:39] from exploitation [21:40] to effects [21:41] aims to disrupt [21:43] military deployments [21:44] and sow chaos [21:45] in crisis or conflict. [21:48] Cyber threats [21:48] like Volt Typhoon [21:49] are not just a nuisance, [21:51] they represent [21:52] a significant [21:52] and persistent threat [21:53] to our national security. [21:55] Second, [21:56] artificial intelligence [21:57] is a powerful force multiplier, [21:59] increasing the speed, [22:00] scale, [22:01] and sophistication [22:02] of these threats. [22:03] AI accelerates [22:04] the entire attack lifecycle, [22:06] creating a new dynamic [22:07] where the pace of attacks [22:09] challenges our ability [22:10] to react, [22:11] and the scale overwhelms [22:14] our ability to defend. [22:16] Rapid innovation [22:17] has lowered the barrier [22:18] for entry [22:19] for advanced cyber actors [22:21] blurring the line [22:22] between nation states [22:23] and other malicious actors. [22:25] Our adversaries [22:26] are operationalizing AI [22:27] to out-compete us, [22:28] and we must move urgently [22:30] to put these same tools [22:31] in the hands [22:32] of our warfighters. [22:34] Given these realities, [22:35] a purely defensive posture [22:37] is no longer sufficient. [22:39] To implement [22:39] the 2026 National Defense Strategies [22:42] Vision of Achieving [22:43] Peace Through Strength, [22:44] we must act decisively [22:46] to transform the cyber enterprise [22:48] guided by three core priorities. [22:51] First, [22:51] we must integrate cyber [22:52] across all domains. [22:54] Cyber is the connective tissue [22:56] of modern warfare [22:57] playing a critical role [22:58] in joint operations [23:00] alongside our special operations partners. [23:03] We will continue [23:04] to integrate cyber capabilities [23:06] across every warfighting domain [23:08] to develop a full range of options [23:10] to deter conflict [23:11] and ensure the joint force [23:13] has every advantage. [23:15] Second, [23:16] we must gain strategic advantage [23:18] below the level of armed conflict. [23:21] A resilient defense [23:22] must be paired [23:23] with proactive, [23:25] relentless disruption. [23:27] By empowering [23:28] our world-class cyber operators [23:31] to execute full-spectrum cyber operations, [23:34] we will systematically erode [23:36] our adversaries' cyber capabilities, [23:39] dismantle their infrastructure, [23:40] and impose consequences. [23:42] Third, [23:43] our force must organize to dominate. [23:47] Our strategies are only as effective [23:49] as the force that executes them. [23:52] Through the Cyber Command 2.0 initiative, [23:54] we are undertaking [23:55] the most comprehensive transformation [23:58] of our cyber force [23:59] since its inception [24:01] to elevate our operational readiness, [24:04] scale technological advantage, [24:06] and propel our force [24:07] to meet the modern demands of conflict. [24:09] To achieve these priorities, [24:12] we are leveraging the engine [24:13] of American industry, [24:16] harnessing the speed [24:17] and innovation [24:17] of the private sector [24:18] to protect the cyber domain [24:20] that powers our national security, [24:23] our economic prosperity, [24:24] and the American way of life. [24:26] My office is leading [24:27] the development [24:28] of a Department of War cyber strategy [24:30] to implement this pivot, [24:31] which I look forward to sharing [24:33] with the committee when complete. [24:34] Let there be no doubt, [24:36] the Department of War's commitment [24:38] to the defense of this nation [24:39] is absolute. [24:40] We have a solemn duty [24:41] to ensure our joint force [24:43] is equipped to dominate [24:44] within the highly contested cyber domain. [24:46] The support of this committee [24:47] is fundamental [24:48] to this mission's success. [24:50] Thank you for your support, [24:51] and I look forward to your questions. [24:53] Thank you very much. [24:55] General Rudd. [24:57] Chairman Wicker, [24:58] Ranking Member Reed, [24:59] and distinguished members [25:00] of the committee, [25:01] thank you for the opportunity [25:02] to testify before you today [25:04] alongside my distinguished colleagues [25:06] from the Department [25:07] and U.S. Special Operations Command. [25:10] With me today [25:11] is Command Chief Master Sergeant [25:12] Kenneth Bruce, [25:13] the U.S. Cyber Command [25:15] and National Security Agency [25:16] Senior Enlisted Leader. [25:19] We are honored to represent [25:20] the soldiers, sailors, airmen, [25:22] Marines, guardians, [25:24] and Coast Guardsmen, [25:25] as well as the civilians [25:26] who defend our networks [25:28] and deliver effects [25:29] that matter every day. [25:32] I want to thank this committee [25:33] for your continued support [25:34] for our critical mission [25:36] at U.S. Cyber Command. [25:38] I also want to recognize [25:39] and thank Lieutenant General [25:41] Joe Hartman [25:41] and his wife Catherine [25:42] for their many years of service [25:44] to this nation [25:44] and their incredible contribution [25:46] to Cyber Command [25:47] and the National Security Agency. [25:50] The people of U.S. Cyber Command [25:51] are paramount to our success. [25:54] Their professionalism [25:55] and dedication [25:56] enable everything we accomplish. [25:59] Our workforce represents [26:00] the finest talent [26:01] in cyber operations, [26:03] a broad team [26:03] of military service members [26:05] and civilian professionals [26:06] delivering unparalleled expertise [26:08] to one of the nation's [26:09] most critical missions. [26:11] Cybercom's mission is threefold. [26:13] Defend the homeland, [26:15] defend the Department of War's [26:16] information networks, [26:17] and support the joint force. [26:20] In executing these missions, [26:21] we maintain a formidable partnership [26:23] with the National Security Agency. [26:25] NSA's roles, responsibilities, [26:27] and capabilities complement Cybercom's, [26:30] creating a unity of effort [26:31] that strengthens our common defense. [26:33] Since taking command, [26:37] I've emphasized [26:37] four operating principles, [26:40] speed, scale, innovation, [26:43] and integration. [26:45] I'm proud to report [26:45] that Cybercom has been executing [26:47] under these principles [26:48] since before my arrival, [26:50] which has made for a smooth transition [26:51] and allowed me [26:52] to hit the ground running. [26:54] Throughout 2025 and into 2026, [26:56] we've quickly adapted [26:57] to the dynamic [26:58] and complex cyber domain, [27:00] demonstrating our value at scale. [27:03] In 2025, [27:04] we executed more than 8,000 cyber missions, [27:06] an increase of 25% [27:08] compared to 2024. [27:12] This year, [27:13] we expect even more activity, [27:15] and with your support, [27:16] I'm certain our talented force [27:17] is up to the task. [27:19] Cybercom gains experience [27:20] and insights [27:21] from real-world operations every day, [27:23] and that experience guides [27:24] our operational support [27:25] to the warfighter. [27:27] Our innovative activity [27:28] contributes to mission outcomes, [27:30] to force-building initiatives [27:31] like Cybercom 2.0, [27:33] and to the employment [27:34] of emerging technologies. [27:37] Cyberdomain cuts across [27:38] all warfighting domains, [27:39] and integrating cyber [27:41] into the joint force operations [27:42] enhances combatant command [27:44] effectiveness across the board. [27:47] When called upon, [27:48] Cybercom employs [27:49] full-spectrum cyber operations [27:51] with and on behalf [27:52] of the other combatant commands [27:54] to deter and, if necessary, [27:56] defeat our adversaries. [27:58] Our participation [27:59] in Operation Absolute Resolve [28:01] and Operation Epic Fury [28:02] are prime examples [28:04] of this integration in action, [28:06] cyber and kinetic operations [28:08] working seamlessly [28:09] to achieve joint objectives. [28:11] We're also executing [28:14] the service-like authorities [28:15] granted to us by Congress. [28:17] Cybercom 2.0 is moving at pace [28:19] and achieving new milestones [28:20] each month. [28:23] Through Cybercom 2.0, [28:24] we will deliver the capability [28:26] and capacity [28:26] to identify and hire [28:28] a talented workforce, [28:29] provide them with optimal training, [28:31] and incentivize them [28:32] to stay in the cyber force. [28:34] Additionally, [28:35] it will enhance our ability [28:36] to work more closely [28:37] with industry and academia [28:39] to develop, acquire, [28:41] and operationalize [28:42] cutting-edge capabilities. [28:44] Cybercommand will continue [28:45] to work with the cyber policy team [28:48] and the services [28:49] to ensure Cybercom 2.0 [28:50] is implemented effectively. [28:53] Thank you for the privilege [28:54] of appearing before you today. [28:56] I look forward to working with you, [28:57] and I look forward to your questions. [29:01] Thank you very much. [29:02] Secretary Sutton and General Rudd, [29:04] let me begin with the two of you. [29:08] I read a pretty disturbing quote [29:13] from General Brian Fenton last year [29:19] about years of flat budgets, [29:25] 14% decrease in buying power [29:28] and significant personnel reductions. [29:32] How is Cybercom 2.0 [29:37] going to address these? [29:39] And is the work, [29:44] is our pace at this point [29:46] happening fast enough? [29:49] Secretary Sutton. [29:51] Senator, thanks for the opportunity [29:53] to talk about this really [29:54] critical initiative. [29:56] One of the concepts [29:57] of Cybercommand 2.0 [29:59] is really looking at how we build [30:01] mastering of our force [30:02] before we continue [30:03] to just grow the force. [30:05] We have built out [30:07] our cyber mission force [30:09] and have largely been able [30:10] to get them to a basic [30:12] trained and qualified level. [30:13] What we really need to look at [30:15] and what the aim of Cybercommand 2.0 [30:17] is how do we take that basic [30:19] and trained force [30:20] and build in domain mastery [30:22] and specialized skills [30:24] to be able to get after [30:25] some of these problems [30:26] that we face [30:27] and to have them be a more effective [30:29] and more lethal force. [30:31] To do that, [30:32] the Cybercommand 2.0 implementation plan [30:35] looks across the entire talent management pipeline [30:38] to really address this [30:39] not as an incremental one-by-one step, [30:42] but to re-look at the entire way [30:44] that we talent manage this force [30:46] to really build that unique technical skill set in, [30:49] the way that we've done other models [30:51] in the department, [30:52] like the medical community, [30:53] the soft community, [30:54] the nuclear community. [30:55] And so we are undertaking [30:58] that implementation plan very rapidly, [31:01] looking at how we can do quick wins [31:04] and pilots off the bat [31:05] and then take lessons learned from those [31:08] and implement more of the long-term policies. [31:11] We can always move faster [31:12] and we continue to move faster [31:14] and look forward to continuing to brief you [31:16] on our progress as we move forward. [31:18] Well, General Redd, [31:20] I'll let you follow up there, [31:21] but could you identify your most, [31:25] in connection with Cybercomm 2.0, [31:30] your most important milestone [31:32] to achieve at the earliest possible moment? [31:40] Yeah. [31:41] Thanks, Chairman. [31:42] I appreciate the opportunity [31:43] to follow up on this. [31:45] The Cybercomm 2.0 approach [31:47] is built on seven attributes. [31:50] First and foremost, it's the people. [31:53] We've got to identify, recruit, [31:55] and assess and bring in the right people [31:57] and get them at that baseline level [32:00] of certification that enables them [32:03] to do the mission [32:03] as soon as they get to the force. [32:06] The next attribute that's really guiding [32:08] and driving us is incentivization. [32:11] So both monetarily for the skill set, [32:15] great competition with the private sector, [32:18] as you would imagine, [32:19] for this type of skill set, [32:20] and making sure that we harness every authority [32:23] and every cent that we have [32:24] to incentivize the workforce. [32:28] Next critical piece of this is training. [32:30] We've got to have the right training pipeline [32:33] and the right resources centered around training [32:35] to go, again, [32:36] from what the services provide, [32:39] which is that baseline operational capability, [32:42] and then bringing it to what we desire [32:44] for every member is the mastery. [32:47] We've then got to make sure [32:48] that we can retain this force. [32:50] This is where we look at models [32:51] like Special Operations Command, [32:53] where across the service components, [32:55] there's a career path [32:56] where we can retain the best [32:58] and the highly trained ones [33:00] that have, again, [33:01] ideally gained mastery [33:02] or working towards mastery. [33:04] We can repeatedly keep them in a rotation [33:06] and an assignment here at Cyber Command. [33:10] And also, much like Special Operations, [33:13] we're developing [33:13] and executing specialized mission sets [33:16] that require specialized training [33:17] and, again, [33:18] the ability to incentivize [33:20] and retain that talent. [33:22] And then, finally, [33:23] we're looking at, [33:24] it's not just the cyber operator, [33:26] but it's also the enablers. [33:27] It's the headquarters element [33:29] and the support pieces [33:30] that come with that. [33:31] That's part of the force presentation model [33:33] from the services, [33:34] and that's what we're getting after. [33:35] Chairman, [33:36] the most, [33:37] I think one of the biggest challenges [33:38] is really just figuring out [33:40] how do we attract the right people [33:42] and incentivize them [33:44] to want to have a career in cyber force. [33:47] And just briefly, [33:48] you can't do this on the cheap, [33:50] can you, General? [33:51] Chairman, we certainly can't. [33:53] Thank you very much. [33:54] Senator Reed. [33:57] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [34:00] Admiral Bradley and Mr. Anderson, [34:02] you have some of the same issues [34:06] and you've been working on it before [34:08] as Secretary Sutton and General Rudd [34:11] of creating a service secretary-like position. [34:15] And since you've been both confirmed, [34:19] what have you done [34:20] to sort of accomplish that mission [34:23] of getting you into the service secretary-like mode [34:25] and maybe what advice you have [34:27] for our cyber conference? [34:31] Senator, first and foremost, [34:33] you know, Honorable Sutton [34:34] and I speak regularly about this topic. [34:38] I can assure you of that. [34:39] But I want to thank the committee [34:40] specifically on the 907 authorities [34:42] that you gave us in the NDA [34:43] that allowed us to be a service-like entity. [34:46] Since taking the seat, [34:47] we've had a few initiatives, [34:49] but just to highlight a few, Senator, [34:51] you know, [34:51] we've been investing more in our personnel, [34:54] having that advocacy for the budget, [34:56] specifically being in the room [34:57] with our service secretaries [34:59] to make sure we're doing things [35:00] in an efficient manner [35:01] and it's the best dollar going for the taxpayer. [35:06] Administratively, [35:06] Admiral Bradley and I have done a sprint, [35:09] as you might call it, [35:10] where we have taken our staffs [35:12] to look at where there might be efficiencies made [35:14] so we don't have duplicate efforts, [35:16] both from the SOLIC enterprise [35:18] as well as from the SOCOM enterprise. [35:20] Ideally, [35:21] we come out with a general order one, [35:23] similar to what the Army [35:24] and other services do, [35:26] where it lays out the roles [35:27] and the responsibilities for us [35:29] as a service like in SOLIC [35:31] and then obviously SOCOM and Admiral Bradley. [35:33] So it's been a great, great initiative [35:35] that we've been pushing forward [35:36] and it's quite honestly [35:38] made our staffs talk [35:39] and be more open in dialogue [35:42] in how we do things. [35:43] So I'd be remiss not to mention [35:44] I have, I think, [35:45] one of how we've organized ourselves [35:47] specifically in SOLIC [35:49] to mirror something [35:50] like what the services have, [35:51] where we have a capabilities [35:52] and development, [35:53] we have an MNRA [35:54] and we have a special operations [35:56] analytical arm as well. [35:57] So it's a lot of work, [35:59] but we're moving headstrong [36:00] forward with it. [36:02] Admiral? [36:03] Yes, Ranking Member. [36:04] First, I'd start foundationally. [36:06] We inside the uniform aspects of SOCOM [36:09] recognize the constitutional foundation [36:11] of civilian control [36:13] of the uniform service. [36:14] It's a critical facet [36:16] of our constitutional democracy [36:17] and we are fully supportive [36:20] of manifesting it [36:21] inside our formations as well. [36:23] Very pragmatically, [36:24] as well, [36:25] as SOCOM recognizes [36:27] that the next challenges [36:28] we face [36:29] will be solved [36:30] through a tighter integration [36:32] with our service teammates. [36:33] We have to also have [36:35] that service connection [36:36] at the secretariat level. [36:38] And so inside the Pentagon, [36:39] it's very important [36:39] for a robust, empowered SOLIC [36:42] to be able to be [36:43] in the same meetings [36:44] and to have the same interactions [36:45] to complement [36:46] what we are doing [36:47] on the uniform side. [36:49] And the sprint [36:50] and the interactions [36:51] that our staff are having [36:52] to both find places [36:54] where horizontal integration [36:56] is appropriate, [36:56] that is, [36:57] teaming to divide labor [36:58] and be better, [36:59] but also appropriately [37:00] where vertically [37:01] oversight functions [37:02] need to exist. [37:03] Both of those [37:04] are critical aspects [37:05] that are coming out [37:06] of this sprint. [37:07] Thank you very much. [37:08] General Rudd, [37:10] we've talked a lot [37:11] about CyberConf. [37:12] Can you tell us [37:14] what you believe [37:15] your three tough challenges [37:16] are at NSA? [37:20] Sorry, [37:21] ranking member at NSA? [37:23] Yes. [37:23] I'm sorry. [37:24] That's my own accent. [37:26] Forgive me. [37:26] All right. [37:27] No, thanks, ranking member. [37:29] The, you know, [37:30] it kind of goes back [37:31] to the operating principles [37:33] against which I conveyed [37:35] both to the committee [37:36] in my opening statement, [37:37] but also to the forces. [37:38] We have to move [37:40] at the pace [37:41] of the strategic environment [37:42] and which driven [37:45] really in large part [37:46] by the pace of technology. [37:48] So the ability [37:49] to be able [37:49] to harness technology [37:51] ahead of an adversary [37:52] to be at the foremost front [37:54] and retain and maintain [37:55] that advantage [37:57] is really what's critical. [37:59] The next piece [38:00] is the ability to scale. [38:02] We've got to take [38:03] our efforts, again, [38:07] to move fast, [38:08] figure out [38:09] where does it apply [38:09] not only across [38:10] other parts of NSA [38:12] but across CyberCon [38:13] but then, of course, [38:14] across the entirety [38:15] of the Joint Force. [38:17] And then, [38:18] driven by innovation, [38:20] moving creatively [38:21] to solve the hardest problems. [38:23] We may not always have [38:24] the scale and mass [38:25] that we would desire, [38:27] but we know [38:27] that we can creatively [38:28] outthink anybody. [38:29] And then, finally, [38:30] it's integration. [38:31] We want to make sure [38:32] that we are nested with, [38:33] again, [38:33] not only across [38:34] the two commands [38:35] to be complementary, [38:37] delivers that speed, [38:38] but then in support [38:39] of the Joint Force [38:39] but also in support [38:41] of interagency [38:42] where required. [38:44] Well, I have 14 seconds left [38:46] so I can just salute [38:47] Secretary Sutton. [38:48] I think you're going [38:49] to do an excellent job. [38:51] And one of the issues, [38:52] the question I was going [38:53] to ask, [38:53] we'll send you [38:55] a written question. [38:56] Time's up. [38:56] Thank you. [38:58] The center of gravity [38:59] for your AI efforts [39:02] in the cybercom realm [39:05] and also I think [39:06] in special ops. [39:08] I think that's the question [39:09] we'll send in writing, [39:10] but it's important. [39:11] Thank you very much, [39:12] Mr. Chairman. [39:13] Thank you, sir. [39:14] Senator Fisher. [39:15] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [39:17] Admiral Bradley, [39:18] how are you working [39:19] and assessing SOCOM [39:23] if it's appropriately postured [39:26] for the Indo-Pacific? [39:31] Senator, thank you. [39:32] First, we look at it [39:34] across the spectrum [39:35] of conflict. [39:36] Competition, crisis, [39:38] and should crisis [39:39] cascade into conflict, [39:41] how are we positioned [39:42] to be able to support [39:43] the combatant commander, [39:45] my good friend, [39:46] Admiral Sam Paparo? [39:48] How are we prepared [39:49] to integrate [39:50] with the services [39:51] and the service components [39:52] there in the Indo-Pacific [39:53] AOR? [39:54] And at a competition level, [39:56] how are we able [39:57] to provide value [39:59] to our allies [39:59] and partners [40:00] to strengthen [40:01] the resilience [40:02] of our alliances there? [40:04] And we believe [40:05] that that is foremost [40:06] and most important [40:08] in any strategy [40:09] of deterrence [40:10] is to have [40:10] that stronger alliance. [40:12] Do you have direct input [40:15] when you're talking [40:16] about being able [40:17] to integrate [40:19] with services? [40:20] Do you have input [40:21] on the training [40:21] and equipping them [40:24] for the Indo-Pacific? [40:25] Certainly on our soft forces, [40:27] I do. [40:28] I have direct responsibility, [40:30] statutory responsibility, [40:31] to ensure that our soft members [40:33] are trained and adequate [40:34] to the missions [40:35] that they'll be presented with. [40:37] To integrate with the services? [40:38] Well, to do our missions, [40:40] and part of our mission [40:41] is to integrate [40:41] with the service, [40:42] so yes. [40:43] Okay, thank you. [40:45] We've seen our adversaries [40:47] increasingly coordinate, [40:49] coordinate, especially on malign activity. [40:54] So how is SOCOM working [40:56] to strengthen relationships [40:58] with our allies [40:59] and our partners, [41:00] which you talked about earlier, [41:02] but both in terms of building up, [41:05] first of all, [41:06] our capabilities with them, [41:07] but also their own capabilities, [41:09] and when you work on those [41:12] combined training exercises. [41:14] Senator, of course, [41:17] the first level [41:17] in a relationship is trust, [41:19] the first, [41:20] the most basic essence, [41:21] and that trust [41:22] comes from credibility. [41:23] Our relationships [41:25] over generations [41:26] help us to give [41:27] that credibility, [41:28] bring that credibility [41:29] and that trust. [41:31] I might pick just one [41:32] as an example, [41:33] the country of the Philippines, [41:34] where for 100 years, [41:36] over 100 years now, [41:37] we've had an institutional [41:39] relationship as a nation, [41:41] but just since 2016 [41:43] and our partnership on island [41:44] to help the Philippine Armed Forces [41:47] clear Merawi, [41:49] one of their principal cities [41:50] of the threat from ISIS, [41:52] has given us great ability [41:54] to stretch across turbulent [41:56] political and diplomatic times [41:57] to today, [41:59] where we are able [41:59] to use that credibility, [42:01] help them see [42:02] and share information with them [42:03] through some new relationship dynamics [42:07] to understand the threats [42:08] to their sovereign territory. [42:10] And so that sharing of information [42:12] is a critical aspect [42:13] to allow them [42:14] to take action [42:15] for their own problems [42:16] in the information [42:17] in the competition space. [42:19] I'm sure you've had [42:21] a number of opportunities [42:23] there in the Indo-Pacific [42:24] to work on having [42:26] that greater collaboration [42:28] with our partner forces. [42:30] I was interested [42:32] in your view [42:34] on the exercises [42:35] that took place [42:37] with Cold Response 26. [42:40] looking at Norway and Finland, [42:43] an entirely different environment, [42:46] I'd say. [42:47] Yes, ma'am. [42:47] I'll speak more generally, [42:50] and I don't want to get ahead [42:51] of my good friend, [42:53] General Grinkovich, [42:53] there, [42:54] who, of course, [42:55] oversees those. [42:56] But from a soft perspective, [42:58] our partnership [42:59] with our Scandinavian [43:00] and European [43:00] and NATO allies [43:02] has always been critical. [43:03] of course, [43:04] for the last 25 years, [43:06] a lot of focus for us [43:07] in the Middle East, [43:08] not as many [43:09] snow-capped mountains [43:10] to work in [43:11] as in the high north. [43:13] And so as we re-enter [43:15] into that area, [43:16] working with our [43:17] Scandinavian partners [43:18] has brought [43:19] an awful lot of [43:20] reprisal [43:22] of old skills back. [43:23] And so we are deepening those, [43:25] and I think that partnership, [43:26] not just on the land, [43:29] but in the maritime domain, [43:30] is a critical component [43:31] to what we will offer [43:33] to NATO [43:34] for future deterrence. [43:35] Good to hear. [43:36] Ms. Sutton, [43:38] how will Cybercom 2.0 [43:40] enable the department [43:42] to better adapt [43:43] to the evolving [43:44] technological landscape [43:46] when we look at AI? [43:49] That's kind of what [43:50] the question is [43:51] that Senator Reid, [43:53] I think, [43:53] was going to send you. [43:55] So as technology [43:56] continues to move [43:57] at a tremendous speed, [43:59] one of the gaps [44:00] we're seeing in the force [44:01] is the ability [44:01] to get our force [44:03] after they've made it [44:04] through the service [44:04] basic training [44:05] to have training available [44:07] at the speed of need [44:09] to address some [44:10] of these technologies. [44:11] So for example, [44:13] someone might have made it [44:14] through their basic training. [44:15] How do we provide [44:16] training for them [44:17] on cloud, AI, [44:19] on SCADA systems, [44:21] other specialized things [44:22] we're going to need? [44:23] One of the enablers [44:25] of Cyber Command 2.0 [44:26] is creation [44:26] of an advanced cyber [44:28] training and education center, [44:30] which is not going to be [44:31] a brick and mortar institution [44:32] that builds courses [44:33] in sort of the traditional way, [44:35] but is looking at [44:36] how we leverage industry [44:37] and academia [44:38] to have training available [44:40] for our active force [44:42] to be able to get it [44:42] closing those skill gaps [44:44] as technology [44:45] continues to move [44:46] quickly. [44:47] Let's leverage [44:47] the training [44:48] that's available [44:48] in industry [44:49] that's moving [44:50] at that speed as well. [44:52] Thank you. [44:52] I will have a question [44:54] for General Redd [44:55] for the record [44:56] when we look at [44:57] CyberCon 2.0 [45:00] and specifically [45:01] for the Indo-Pacific. [45:02] Thank you. [45:03] Thank you. [45:04] Senator Fisher, [45:05] Senator Blumenthal. [45:06] Thank you, [45:10] Senator Wicker. [45:11] Thank you all [45:11] for being here. [45:12] And again, [45:13] as I expressed this morning, [45:14] thank you all [45:14] for your service. [45:16] In our closed session, [45:18] we discussed [45:19] a number of the questions [45:21] I'd like to raise. [45:22] Now, first, [45:23] I think our cooperation [45:25] with Ukraine [45:26] is tremendously important. [45:28] I'm regretful [45:28] that we are, [45:33] in my view, [45:34] failing to provide [45:35] all of the support [45:36] that we should militarily. [45:38] I am working hard [45:41] on a Russia sanctions bill [45:43] that I hope will help [45:45] economically stop [45:48] the flow of revenue [45:50] to Putin's war machine [45:51] from purchasers [45:52] of Russian oil and gas. [45:55] And intelligence sharing [45:57] has been tremendously important [45:59] to Ukraine [46:00] in pushing back. [46:03] And I think impressively [46:06] on Russia's assault, [46:09] the false narrative [46:10] that Russia is winning, [46:11] I've tried to counter [46:13] based on my trips [46:17] to Ukraine 10 and all, [46:19] most recently in February, [46:20] where I saw really [46:22] the progress [46:23] that Ukraine is making [46:24] contrary to some [46:26] of the propaganda [46:27] that Russia is spreading [46:29] about how they are winning. [46:32] But I'd like to ask [46:33] this panel, [46:35] maybe beginning [46:36] with General Rudd, [46:38] whether our intelligence sharing [46:41] is continuing [46:42] in a robust way [46:44] as it has been [46:45] in the past, [46:46] which I think [46:48] has been tremendously important [46:49] to the extent [46:50] you can comment [46:51] in this setting. [46:54] Thanks, Senator Blumenthal. [46:56] As we discussed previously, [46:58] the focus and attention [47:00] on a variety of priorities [47:05] and efforts [47:06] remains steady. [47:07] we move in an agile manner [47:11] to various crisis [47:14] and or efforts, [47:15] but we maintain focus [47:17] and pressure on that. [47:18] And so our support [47:20] through European command [47:21] from an intelligence perspective [47:23] in support of that effort [47:24] remains intact. [47:26] We're looking consistently [47:28] and making sure [47:28] that we have the right resources [47:29] and folks focused on that, [47:31] working very closely [47:32] with General Grinkovic on that. [47:34] I hope that our military command [47:38] will let us know [47:41] if there's any change [47:42] in that approach [47:44] and policy [47:45] because I think [47:46] that the American people [47:47] deserve to know [47:47] if there is a reduction [47:50] or a diminution [47:51] in our intelligence commitment. [47:54] General Bradley, [47:57] I'm sorry, [47:58] Admiral Bradley, [47:58] if you could tell us [48:01] a bit about the lessons [48:03] learned from Ukraine. [48:06] Senator, absolutely. [48:08] First, [48:09] to answer the original question [48:10] and maybe bridge to that, [48:12] one of the things [48:13] that I think we provide [48:14] through those relationships [48:15] longstanding [48:16] is the venue for others [48:18] to partner [48:19] and to bring capacity [48:20] and capability. [48:21] And so one of our [48:22] SOF headquarters there, [48:24] Asijasodiv, [48:25] offers the opportunity [48:26] for 19 different nations [48:27] to partner [48:28] to come to support [48:29] the effort across the area. [48:31] And I think that's critical [48:32] because it is not just [48:34] about what we bring, [48:35] but it's about enabling [48:36] those partners [48:37] to really share more [48:38] of the burden [48:38] to be able to provide [48:39] assistance to the Ukrainians [48:41] as well. [48:42] Ultimately, though, [48:42] I think to your point [48:43] about lessons learned, [48:44] if I look back [48:45] over the last 25 years [48:46] of counterterrorism targeting, [48:48] where our integrated [48:50] interagency, [48:51] law enforcement, [48:52] intel community, [48:53] and military, [48:54] were able to bring [48:54] great precision [48:55] to our understanding [48:56] of both the adversary [48:57] but also the context [48:59] around the adversary, [49:00] those civilians [49:01] that were not adversaries. [49:02] That has been very important. [49:04] Those lessons [49:04] have translated [49:05] very importantly [49:07] into the high-end conflict [49:09] of the Ukraine battlefield. [49:10] And so we continue [49:12] to apply those lessons, [49:13] refine them [49:14] with new information, [49:15] and frankly, [49:16] we learn from them [49:17] as well as we do [49:18] in part to our teammates there. [49:20] When I've visited Ukraine, [49:22] often I've gone [49:24] to the drone manufacturing [49:26] facilities, [49:27] which have grown [49:28] in sophistication [49:29] and number. [49:30] They're producing, [49:32] I think, [49:32] a thousand drones a day now. [49:34] And what has so impressed me [49:36] is they change, [49:37] they work on the evolution [49:39] of their drones [49:40] on the assembly line. [49:41] And they'll get real-time information [49:43] from the battlefield [49:44] and they'll make adjustments [49:45] literally as they are manufacturing. [49:48] And I don't know anything [49:51] in our industrial base [49:54] that is as nimble [49:55] and agile and quick. [49:58] I hope this panel agrees [50:02] that we need to move more [50:03] in that direction. [50:04] Would you agree, Admiral? [50:06] Senator, I do, [50:07] although I will say [50:08] that many of our business, [50:09] our defense industrial base partners [50:11] are watching this as well. [50:12] And, of course, [50:13] the Ukrainians are driven [50:14] by the existential need [50:16] for that cycle of adaptation. [50:18] As we watch that, [50:19] I have great confidence [50:20] that our industrial base here [50:22] can do the same. [50:23] Thank you. [50:24] Thanks, Mr. Chairman. [50:25] Thank you very much, [50:26] Senator Blumenthal. [50:27] Senator Budd. [50:28] Thank you, Chairman. [50:29] Good to see each of you. [50:30] Thank you all for being here. [50:32] Admiral Bradley, [50:32] I want to talk about [50:33] SOCOM's operation [50:34] and maintenance budget, [50:36] if you will. [50:37] So I noticed that O&M [50:38] has only increased [50:39] from $9.4 billion [50:41] to $10.9 billion [50:43] between 2019 and 27. [50:46] So it's failing [50:48] to keep pace [50:48] with inflation [50:49] and, more importantly, [50:50] the increase [50:51] in the operational tempo. [50:53] So can you talk about [50:54] what you'd be able to do [50:55] with a higher top line [50:57] and some of the tradeoffs [50:58] that you're currently making [50:59] between O&M as it is [51:02] and modernization [51:04] and also MilCon? [51:07] Senator, I will, [51:08] specifically to O&M, [51:10] in unique ways, [51:13] Special Operations Command [51:15] uses our ops [51:16] and maintenance budget [51:17] for our key [51:18] modernization efforts. [51:20] In most cases, [51:21] to be able to, [51:22] we modernize just, [51:23] not just through [51:24] the development [51:25] of new means, [51:26] articles and devices, [51:28] but also the ways [51:30] in which those means [51:31] are used. [51:32] That requires [51:33] more exquisite ranges [51:34] that have the ability [51:36] for us to be able [51:37] to practice, [51:38] train, and rehearse [51:39] in increasingly contested [51:41] electromagnetic spectrum [51:42] environments. [51:43] Those are difficult [51:43] to be able to produce [51:44] inside the United States, [51:46] but not undoable. [51:47] It just takes more money. [51:49] We also need threat [51:50] representative systems [51:51] to be able to operate [51:52] against, again, [51:53] and operators [51:54] to mimic our adversaries [51:56] as they operate them. [51:57] All of that takes [51:58] new ranges and money. [52:00] And for the employment [52:01] of autonomy, [52:02] as Senator Blumenthal [52:04] was discussing, [52:05] we have to be able [52:06] to bring together [52:07] our standard exquisite [52:09] weapons systems, [52:10] now with teamed [52:11] and collaborative autonomy. [52:12] And there are very few [52:13] places inside the United States [52:15] where that is an easy thing [52:16] to do, [52:17] in many places [52:18] where it needs to be done, [52:19] and we are working [52:19] to do that. [52:21] Thank you for that. [52:22] A question for you, [52:23] Admiral Bradley, [52:24] and also Secretary Anderson. [52:26] I'd like your thoughts [52:27] on how we retain [52:28] mid-career operators, [52:29] if you will. [52:30] I know each service [52:31] drives their own bonus programs, [52:33] and I acknowledge [52:34] that money is not [52:35] the only reason [52:35] why folks stay or go. [52:38] So tell us what you're doing [52:39] to help retain [52:40] our most seasoned operators, [52:42] whether it's through [52:42] non-monetary or monetary. [52:44] Secretary Anderson, [52:45] we'll start with you [52:46] and then Admiral Bradley, please. [52:48] Yes, Senator. [52:49] One of the things I noticed [52:50] when I was over in the Army [52:51] was you just can't throw money [52:53] at the problem all the time, [52:54] whether it be retention bonuses, [52:56] that certainly is helpful, [52:57] but we've seen things [52:57] in the Army where [52:58] change of duty location, [53:01] those small things [53:02] are what keep our individuals in. [53:03] But what I would argue [53:04] within the SOCOM community [53:05] that we do incredibly well [53:07] is our preservation [53:07] of the force and family, [53:09] which Congress has been [53:12] so gracious to give us [53:13] that $11 million. [53:14] Now, granted, [53:15] we're going to see an increase [53:16] in the workforce on that, [53:18] but what I would tell you [53:19] is when we look at [53:20] the service member [53:21] and when they're making [53:23] those decisions [53:23] to stay in the military, [53:25] it's typically not done [53:26] in the team room. [53:27] It's not done at the pool. [53:28] It's not done wherever. [53:29] It's usually done [53:29] at the kitchen table. [53:31] So the preservation [53:31] of the force [53:32] and family [53:32] has been an absolutely [53:33] amazing program [53:35] where we're not only [53:36] taking care of our operators [53:37] from a physical standpoint, [53:39] but from a mental standpoint. [53:40] You'll hear Admiral Bradley [53:41] talk about the mind gym [53:43] that we have our service members [53:46] where if you see [53:47] a professional athlete [53:48] when they go out [53:49] to the top tiers, [53:52] yes, their physical body [53:53] is absolutely in great shape, [53:55] but their minds [53:56] also have to be pristine. [53:57] And so whether it be [53:59] family outings [54:01] where we can take individuals [54:03] and have them speak [54:03] with folks [54:05] to help their family out. [54:06] But that POTIF program, [54:08] the preservation [54:08] of the force and family [54:09] is absolutely critical [54:10] when we look at retention, [54:11] Senator. [54:12] Thank you, sir. [54:13] Senator, the only thing [54:14] I would add is that, [54:15] as you highlighted, [54:16] pay incentives [54:17] are a part of it, [54:18] but those are controlled [54:19] by the services. [54:20] And another place [54:21] where a robust [54:22] and empowered SOLIC [54:23] helps us to be able [54:24] to stitch those together [54:25] to ensure we have [54:26] a common approach [54:28] across all the services [54:29] for all of our operators [54:30] and enablers. [54:32] Very helpful. [54:33] Thank you both. [54:34] Secretary Anderson, [54:35] I'm a strong supporter [54:35] of the U.S.-Israel [54:36] counter-UXS program. [54:39] I think that's in your office. [54:40] So can you talk about [54:41] what your team's doing [54:42] to assist Israel [54:43] in countering Iranian [54:45] unmanned systems [54:46] and how these programs [54:47] actually help [54:48] our own military in return? [54:51] Yes, Senator. [54:52] So we have a unique ability [54:54] to be able to work [54:54] with countries like Israel, [54:56] and there's a few other [54:56] countries out there [54:57] where we do essentially [54:58] a 50-50 burden-sharing investment. [55:01] What we have found [55:02] incredibly helpful [55:04] is to see some [55:05] of the counter-UXS [55:06] that us and Israel [55:08] have developed together [55:10] that have 100% been applicable [55:12] to operations like Epic Fury. [55:16] Now, granted, [55:17] we don't always have [55:18] the capability [55:19] that has the same function, [55:20] if that makes sense. [55:21] So there's certainly things [55:23] that we want to use [55:23] the capability for [55:24] that the Israelis [55:25] want to use [55:25] the capability for, [55:26] but it's been 100% [55:28] an absolute great partnership [55:31] with the Israelis [55:32] to be able to, [55:33] not only on the counter-UXS front, [55:35] but a few other different areas [55:36] that we've been able [55:37] to work with the Israelis. [55:38] Very helpful. [55:39] Thank you all. [55:41] Thank you very much, [55:42] Senator Budd. [55:43] Senator Hirono. [55:44] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [55:46] General Rudd, [55:47] you know, [55:47] in previous elections [55:48] as part of the election [55:51] Security Group, ESG, [55:55] both Cybercom and NSA [55:57] played a vital role [55:58] in protecting our democratic processes [56:01] from foreign interference. [56:02] And I assume you share my concern [56:05] that there is a potential [56:07] for foreign interference [56:08] in our upcoming elections. [56:10] So I'd like to ask [56:13] if you have already set up [56:16] or you're planning to set up the ESG [56:19] to ensure that there is no foreign interference [56:22] in our upcoming elections. [56:26] Senator, we certainly share your concern [56:29] and we're always looking, [56:30] as you would expect us to, [56:32] for any type of foreign activity [56:34] that would undermine our democratic process. [56:37] And as we discussed, [56:39] we are postured and ready [56:40] to support as required or tasked [56:43] in making sure [56:44] that we safeguard our elections. [56:46] Well, do you have an ESG set up [56:48] for this purpose? [56:52] Senator, I don't know [56:53] that an ESG has been established yet, [56:55] but we are prepared to as required. [56:59] Well, we used to have an ESG. [57:01] And I think you can understand [57:03] why I'm concerned [57:04] because there's no reason [57:05] not to anticipate [57:07] foreign interference in our elections. [57:09] i.e. Russia, China, possibly Iran, [57:12] although there being, [57:13] maybe they have other things to deal with. [57:16] But do you anticipate [57:19] foreign interference [57:21] with our upcoming elections? [57:26] Senator, I think it's reasonable to expect [57:29] based on what we've seen in the past. [57:31] And so I think it is really important [57:33] to set up an ESG [57:35] and I will follow up with you [57:37] on whether that is happening. [57:38] And will you commit to zealously [57:40] guarding our elections this year? [57:42] And report to Congress any attempts [57:46] by by this administration [57:50] to polarize the process? [57:55] Senator, we will certainly execute [57:59] what we're tasked to in regards to that. [58:02] Yeah, I realize that that you have a responsibility [58:05] regarding foreign interference with our elections, [58:08] but there is definitely efforts [58:11] to domestically interfere [58:15] with our elections by, for example, [58:17] having the former attorney general [58:18] sue 29 states for voter rolls. [58:21] These are millions of people's information. [58:23] What does the Department of Justice need [58:26] with these with this information? [58:28] What do they intend to do? [58:29] And not to mention the desire to to push [58:33] for the passage of the so-called SAVE Act, [58:36] which will result in millions of people [58:38] who are currently registered to vote, [58:40] unable to register to vote [58:41] because they don't have either a birth certificate [58:43] or passport. [58:47] So there are things happening on the domestic front, [58:49] and that's why, you know, [58:51] I have some serious concerns. [58:53] For Admiral Bradley, one of SOCOM's [58:57] enduring competitive advantage, [58:59] and you mentioned how important our allies are [59:02] in great power competition is its network of allies [59:05] and partners in the Indo-Pacific built over decades [59:09] through sustained engagement, training, [59:11] and interoperability. [59:14] Given the increased demands for homeland defense [59:17] and allied burden sharing in the new NDS, [59:21] how are you increasing SAVE's posture and presence [59:25] in the first and second island chains [59:27] to deter Chinese aggression [59:30] and support Admiral Paparo's denial defense? [59:36] Senator, thank you. [59:37] As you know, General Fenton was very strong on leading [59:41] to adjust our posture over the last four years [59:44] to be able to have to empower [59:46] those generational relationships. [59:48] And thanks to both chambers, frankly, [59:50] but your strong work, we are well resourced [59:53] with people in the right structure to be able [59:56] to sustain that presence and that commitment [59:59] while we manage the ongoing threats to the homeland [1:00:03] and the other commitments that we have. [1:00:06] Okay. [1:00:07] I'm glad that some of you already talked about the importance [1:00:11] of having the kind of workforce that is trained to deal [1:00:15] with the needs of the cyber domain. [1:00:20] And General Rudd, you mentioned that it is really critical [1:00:25] to get the right kind of people. [1:00:27] What are the right kind of people that you're hoping [1:00:29] to recruit to be trained in the cyber domain? [1:00:35] Yeah. Thanks, Senator. [1:00:36] Senator, as you would expect, someone who's highly technical minded, [1:00:41] smart, innovative, motivated, and is committed [1:00:46] to doing something extraordinary. [1:00:49] Do you have a number of goal? [1:00:52] I mean, how many thousands of people are we going to need [1:00:54] to have this kind of training to counter the Milan activities [1:00:58] of our near peer competitors? [1:01:01] Yes. Senator, I think we have objectives [1:01:04] that are outlined within CyberComm 2.0, but I think what I owe [1:01:09] this committee and, frankly, the nation is a continuous assessment [1:01:12] to make sure that we have the right numbers. [1:01:15] And to your opening point, that they're the best, [1:01:18] most highly qualified talent and that we can make sure [1:01:21] that we can up-game them through training [1:01:24] and through the mechanisms that will make this enduring. [1:01:28] General, if you could quantify that on the record [1:01:31] by supplementing your answer with it. [1:01:33] Chairman, I'll-I-I certainly will. [1:01:35] Thank you. [1:01:35] Thank you, Senator Hirono. [1:01:37] Senator Scott. [1:01:38] Thank you, Chairman. [1:01:39] I want to thank each of you for joining us here today. [1:01:41] It is critical that the U.S. [1:01:43] is always ready to deter any threats. [1:01:45] One big way is by working with our allies and partner nations [1:01:49] to solidify our coordinated efforts to ensure our security [1:01:52] around the world, even in places where we don't have [1:01:54] our own troops readily stationed. [1:01:57] Admiral Bradley, how do foreign military sales programs [1:02:00] enhance U.S. military-to-military relationships [1:02:02] in the Indo-Pacific and globally? [1:02:06] Senator, foreign military sales, direct commercial sales [1:02:10] and the like are all critical to us being able [1:02:13] to have expectation of interoperability [1:02:17] and expectation of what our allies and partners will be able [1:02:20] to perform when they act on their own behalf. [1:02:24] That, in turn, gives us a much better ability to understand [1:02:27] what their weaknesses might be or what gaps that might need [1:02:30] to be filled by U.S. contributions. [1:02:32] And so, as you highlight, even in places where we are not present [1:02:36] in all times or all ways, knowing what they are using, [1:02:40] how they're using it, gives us that extra advantage. [1:02:43] So you know their capability and you also, [1:02:45] if you're ever going to work with them, you know how you operate with them. [1:02:48] Yes, sir. [1:02:50] What risk do we face to access and influence if we fail to work well [1:02:55] with our allies and remain a reliable and timely defense partner [1:02:58] compared to competitors like Communist China? [1:03:01] Well, Senator, in all cases, placement and access is a corollary to understanding. [1:03:08] And so being on the ground with those out on the edge of the territory [1:03:13] to be able to appreciate the context of what's happening [1:03:16] helps to inform our decision-making in the rear [1:03:19] and throughout the chain of command. [1:03:20] So I believe that it is fundamental to our ability to know not only [1:03:24] when we should act, but how we should act, and that is a partnership [1:03:29] that we see play out across the world, not just in the Indo-Pacific. [1:03:33] For instance, in Ecuador recently, some really good operational results [1:03:38] informed by our Ecuadorian partners to help us choose [1:03:41] which and how to target adversaries there. [1:03:44] But that, of course, is just an instance that has been played out [1:03:47] over the last 25 years across the Middle East, Africa, [1:03:51] across Europe as well, and I believe the same analog applies globally. [1:03:58] Emma Bradley and Assistant Secretary Anderson. [1:04:00] How does the forward presence of U.S. Special Operations Forces [1:04:03] contribute to countering Communist China's influence campaigns, [1:04:06] particularly in the Indo-Pacific and other key regions? [1:04:09] And what advantages do Special Operations Forces bring [1:04:12] in building partner capacity, strengthen resilience, [1:04:14] and shaping the competitive environment below the level of armed conflict? [1:04:19] Senator, I might start, but just quickly, [1:04:20] that same placement and access and that understanding [1:04:23] allows us to use what is the equivalent of the high ground [1:04:27] in the influence sphere of competition, the truth. [1:04:31] In almost every case, all we have to do is illuminate the truth [1:04:35] of our adversaries' nefarious activity [1:04:37] to allow our partners to then counter it [1:04:40] and to be able to use it to their advantage. [1:04:43] Senator, I might add, just back to Admiral Bradley's point [1:04:46] of placement and access, without going into some detail, [1:04:48] but just being present in some of these areas [1:04:51] with our partners is an absolute deterrent. [1:04:54] Not only that, but some of our forces and what they've been able, [1:04:58] the capabilities they've been able to create, [1:05:00] if you might call it, within some of these areas of responsibility. [1:05:04] One example is, you know, some of our Special Operations Forces [1:05:07] had a critical need for medical, [1:05:10] and so a medical roll to facility, and what they were able to do [1:05:13] is work with the local hospital to embed themselves [1:05:15] within that hospital, not only providing care for that local area, [1:05:19] but also providing training for themselves. [1:05:22] That in itself is one, a capabilities development, [1:05:24] a readiness development, but also, you know, [1:05:27] we talk about by, with, and through your partners. [1:05:29] There's no better way than through the local population. [1:05:32] Thank you. [1:05:32] Admiral Bradley, how are U.S. Special Operations Forces [1:05:35] integrating unmanned and autonomous technologies [1:05:38] into their operations? [1:05:40] Senator, at every level, as we say, [1:05:43] from the battlefield to the back office, [1:05:45] finding ways to be able to bring autonomy, [1:05:47] attributable mass autonomy to bear, [1:05:51] is a very important part of how we, on the edge, [1:05:54] can leverage our placement and access [1:05:56] to not only serve our own interests, [1:05:58] but to be able to help our partners [1:06:00] who generally don't have the same budgets we do, [1:06:02] to be able to buy that kind of capacity [1:06:05] to give them asymmetric advantages. [1:06:07] So autonomous capability is critical to our understanding, [1:06:12] from a sensing perspective, [1:06:14] as well as it is from a, from a surveillance, [1:06:16] to be able to sustain containment [1:06:19] of an objective that you would want to watch. [1:06:21] And then finally, clearly for, [1:06:22] for the ability to project violence, [1:06:25] should that be required. [1:06:26] So looking at the success [1:06:27] the Ukrainian Armed Forces have had with drones [1:06:31] and other autonomous opportunities, [1:06:34] do you think we're moving fast enough? [1:06:36] Senator, I would never suggest [1:06:39] that the pace at which we are moving today [1:06:41] is fast enough. [1:06:42] We need to continue to accelerate it. [1:06:44] Clearly the Ukrainians are driven [1:06:46] by an existential need that we do not feel. [1:06:49] And so we need to make up that difference [1:06:51] in existential motivation [1:06:54] with a real appreciation of the advantage [1:06:56] that it will provide us. [1:06:58] And importantly, to deal with the challenges [1:07:00] of simultaneity, to be able to help our partners [1:07:03] to do the same. [1:07:04] Our role inside the department there [1:07:06] is to identify opportunities to test, [1:07:09] to validate and to illuminate those down-selected. [1:07:14] And frankly, to work with our industry partners [1:07:16] to help them improve their capabilities [1:07:18] so that they might be more readily integrated [1:07:21] into our services warfighting constructs, [1:07:23] as well as our allies and partners. [1:07:25] Thank you, thank you, Chairman. [1:07:26] Thank you, Senator Scott. [1:07:28] Senator Cain. [1:07:30] Thank you, Mr. Chair, [1:07:31] and thanks to the witnesses. [1:07:32] I have questions for Admiral Bradley [1:07:34] and Secretary Anderson really about two topics, [1:07:36] Operation Southern Spear [1:07:38] and then the Preservation of Force and Family initiative [1:07:42] that you've discussed. [1:07:43] On Southern Spear, I'm correct, am I not, [1:07:46] that the lead on Southern Spear operations is SouthCom, [1:07:51] but special operators often play a role [1:07:53] in particular operations within that, am I correct? [1:07:57] Yes, Senator. [1:07:59] There is an article that was published on April 21 [1:08:02] in The Guardian that I'd like to introduce for the record. [1:08:05] The title of it is, [1:08:06] We Were Terrified They Were Going to Kill Us, [1:08:08] Fishers Who Survived U.S. Boat Strike Speak Out. [1:08:11] If I might introduce that into the record, Mr. Chair. [1:08:15] You guys will be surprised to know [1:08:16] that I don't just believe everything I read in news accounts, [1:08:20] but this is one that is public that I want to ask about. [1:08:22] It's a story about a U.S. strike purportedly [1:08:26] on an Ecuadorian fishing vessel near the Galapagos [1:08:30] that took place on March 26. [1:08:33] And the indication in the story, say it's a week old, [1:08:36] is that this was a fishing vessel, [1:08:39] that after the boat was struck, [1:08:41] a U.S. patrol boat rescued those on the vessel, [1:08:46] handcuffed them, [1:08:47] transferred them to a Salvadoran patrol boat. [1:08:50] They were eventually taken to Salvador, [1:08:53] where they were released to a U.N. shelter, [1:08:56] and then eventually taken back home to Ecuador, [1:08:58] where they were released without charge. [1:09:01] Are you aware of the allegation of this U.S. strike [1:09:04] on this Ecuadoran fishing vessel, Admiral or Secretary? [1:09:08] Senator, I am aware of the article. [1:09:11] I'm also aware that later in the article, [1:09:13] it quotes the department's response to it as, [1:09:17] they're not having been any U.S. military involvement. [1:09:21] I'm also aware that there were no recorded [1:09:25] or no U.S. strikes within three weeks around that incident. [1:09:30] As well, I believe the Ecuadorian government [1:09:33] has rendered judgment that there were no U.S. involvement in that. [1:09:36] So I can't speak to any greater detail. [1:09:39] Obviously, South Com and the department would own that, [1:09:42] but those are from superficial observations. [1:09:46] Yeah, let me read the portion from the article [1:09:48] that I think you're referring to. [1:09:50] The Pentagon and the White House [1:09:51] did not respond to requests for comment. [1:09:54] U.S. Southern Command said it had, quote, [1:09:56] no information to provide regarding any U.S. government [1:10:01] personnel involvement in any of the incidents, [1:10:04] close quote, laid out. [1:10:06] Are you aware of any investigation into this? [1:10:10] This is a pretty, you know, tough claim, [1:10:13] the tough claim that the U.S. would have attacked [1:10:16] a fishing boat that had nothing to do [1:10:18] with any group on the classified DTO list. [1:10:22] Are you aware of any investigation that's being done [1:10:25] into this public reporting to see if it's accurate or not? [1:10:28] Senator, I'm not. [1:10:30] I believe, though, the methodology we go through [1:10:34] is first to assess a claim like this, whether or not it is credible. [1:10:39] And I believe from what you've cited there [1:10:41] and what I understand from the rendering, [1:10:45] that it was deemed not to be credible, [1:10:46] therefore, further investigation not required. [1:10:48] And, Secretary Anderson, is that your understanding as well? [1:10:50] Yes, Senator Cain. [1:10:52] Exactly what Admiral Bradley say. [1:10:54] Unaware as well from what I've been told. [1:10:57] So your testimony, based on your understanding, [1:11:00] and this is Southcom equities, obviously, [1:11:02] but Special Operations participates, [1:11:05] is that this public reporting, at least Southcom, has gone back [1:11:10] and they cannot find evidence that the U.S. carried out strike operations [1:11:16] of that kind on that day. [1:11:18] That's your understanding? [1:11:19] Yes, Senator, it is. [1:11:20] Well, I think it's important to put that on the record [1:11:23] because, obviously, if there is information about the veracity of this, [1:11:26] it should come out. [1:11:28] One of the things that I think can be a little confusing in this instance [1:11:32] that could have led to confusion in this circumstance is, [1:11:35] as far as I know, Southern Spear is a military operation carried out [1:11:40] against targets connected to organizations, the list of whom are still classified. [1:11:46] Is that correct? [1:11:51] I believe so, Senator. [1:11:53] I think that the operations authorized by the President [1:11:57] can be carried out against organizations on a list of DTOs, [1:12:01] designated terrorist organizations, that is classified. [1:12:05] It's only been shared with Congress in a classified setting. [1:12:07] It's not been made public. [1:12:09] And that also means the enemy hasn't been told you're an enemy. [1:12:13] If you declare war against Iraq, for example, or Al-Qaeda, [1:12:18] that public declaration alerts the enemy to know that, hey, [1:12:21] you're the enemy if you associate with the group subject to the designation. [1:12:26] If the DTO list in Southern Spear is purely classified, [1:12:30] that means we haven't alerted those who the U.S. has determined are combatants [1:12:36] that we are, in fact, engaging in war against them, [1:12:38] and that can lead to confusion. [1:12:40] My time is up, but I just want to just say this. [1:12:43] I do commend what you guys have done on this Preservation of Force and Family [1:12:49] initiative, and I think it's particularly needed among special operators, [1:12:53] but I also think it offers a template more generally for the way we ought to [1:12:57] approach the issue of the long-term well-being of our service members. [1:13:01] So keep it up and spread the best practices from what you're doing. [1:13:05] Thank you, Senator Sullivan. [1:13:07] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses. [1:13:10] I just want to add Senator Kane's point. [1:13:13] We had a classified briefing a couple months ago on the ways in which both SOCOM, [1:13:20] Southern Command, NSA go through the targeting in this regard. [1:13:26] And, Admiral, isn't it true? [1:13:27] It's the JAG officers are there in every step of the way. [1:13:30] The NSA is. [1:13:31] I mean, it is an exquisite, detailed, and very robust targeting op [1:13:37] before anyone is given the authority to go strike, correct? [1:13:41] Senator, that is correct. [1:13:43] It is based off of the lessons learned and the processes perfected [1:13:47] over the last 25 years of persona targeting. [1:13:50] Yeah, I think that briefing, from my perspective, was very impressive. [1:13:55] General Rudd, I want to go back to where you and I had a good conversation [1:13:59] during your confirmation process. [1:14:01] And it's about how our adversaries often all over the place take aggressive, [1:14:06] offensive, state-sponsored, kind of cyber-related actions against us [1:14:11] across so many spheres, elections, infrastructure. [1:14:17] NSA and our other services do a great job on defending that. [1:14:22] But I think, you know, the best defense is also a good offense, right? [1:14:26] And I know you probably can't answer the questions here. [1:14:29] But are we also looking at offensive operations from a cyber perspective [1:14:35] to keep our adversaries at bay? [1:14:37] The one I always think would be good is letting the people of China [1:14:40] and Russia know just how corrupt their leaders are, how rich they are. [1:14:44] Putin, I think, is one of the richest guys in the world. [1:14:46] Xi Jinping's sister is a billionaire. [1:14:49] I wonder how that happened. [1:14:51] I mean, isn't it also good to go on offense, right? [1:14:55] We get attacked a lot, but to let people know that we can go on offense [1:15:00] with the exquisite capabilities that you have? [1:15:05] Senator, we absolutely have to be capable of providing offensive options [1:15:11] and certainly working in concert with Honorable Sutton. [1:15:14] As she crafts out the strategy for the department in support of the NDS, [1:15:19] you could expect that we'll be in a position and we have to have the capabilities. [1:15:22] I mean, when these dictators are using cyber ops to come after the most important thing [1:15:27] to all of us, which are the, you know, American elections, [1:15:31] when none of them would ever stand for election because they fear their own people, [1:15:35] I think we should flex a little offensive cyber capability. [1:15:39] Do you agree with that, Madam Secretary? [1:15:42] Absolutely. [1:15:43] As was articulated in the president's cyber strategy for America, [1:15:47] we need to be very clear that malicious cyber actors in this space have [1:15:52] and will feel the consequences of their action. [1:15:55] We need to look at how we leverage all tools of national power, [1:15:59] whether it be military offensive capabilities or other interagency efforts. [1:16:03] And that is something we are going to be posturing with the new department [1:16:06] of war cyber strategy to make sure we have those capabilities. [1:16:09] Good. I think it's really important. [1:16:11] We don't have to say it, but I mean, they want to come play with our elections. [1:16:15] We can make sure their people know how corrupt they are. [1:16:18] They're leaders because a lot of them are corrupt and their people should know that. [1:16:22] General Rudd, we're really excited in Alaska. [1:16:26] NSA Alaska's expansion is almost complete. [1:16:30] You know, it's great to see that. [1:16:32] My understanding is the new addition is going to be able to house 50 additional billets there. [1:16:40] You know that the group in Alaska, they do fantastic work. [1:16:43] It's not on the front pages. [1:16:45] It doesn't need to be, but would you be willing to visit NSA Alaska with me soon [1:16:50] and meet these great Americans who are conducting these missions under your command from my state [1:16:56] and work with me on ensuring any additional requirements we need to fully man that expansion [1:17:02] in NSA Alaska, 50 additional billets, we can make sure we get done. [1:17:07] Senator, I look forward to that opportunity. [1:17:10] I think we may have a chance here in the near future to see that site, that it's ribbon cutting. [1:17:17] Yeah. [1:17:17] But I also have a confession to make. [1:17:19] I think I pledged in confirmation hearing that I would go there first if confirmed. [1:17:25] I hope you'll appreciate and understand. [1:17:28] Everybody commits to come into Alaska. [1:17:30] Well, it'll be my second location in the role, only because Hawaii, as I think you know, [1:17:37] experienced some pretty horrific storms and it caused some physical damage [1:17:42] and wanted to check on our folks there. [1:17:44] General, your excuse is accepted. [1:17:46] General, all of our witnesses are absolved from that promise. [1:17:50] It's made by everyone under duress and we understand. [1:17:54] It's not duress. [1:17:56] They're just going to see, Mr. Chairman, the most strategic place in the world and Admiral, [1:18:01] I want to and maybe I submit this for the record, but the University of Alaska Fairbanks [1:18:08] is doing fantastic work on the UAS counter UAS strategy testing. [1:18:14] DIU is going to make an announcement here on a commitment to work with the University of Alaska [1:18:21] Fairbanks on all the counter UAS stuff that they're doing, which is really needed. [1:18:26] And we're at the cutting edge up in Alaska. [1:18:28] So I'd like to get Secretary Anderson, you and the Admiral, maybe in a answer for a question [1:18:35] for the record because I'm over my time here to work with me and the committee on those [1:18:40] really good opportunities on a critical area for our national security. [1:18:43] And that's the counter drone mission. [1:18:47] Thank you. [1:18:47] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:18:48] Thank you, Senator Sullivan. [1:18:49] And thank you for your question about the leaders of our adversaries. [1:18:55] Vladimir Putin is not our friend. [1:19:02] Not only is he one of the most notorious war criminals of our time, but one of the greediest [1:19:10] thieves breathing on the earth. [1:19:14] Well, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warren and I have worked on this very issue together. [1:19:18] It's a bipartisan issue that, hey, these guys are coming after our elections. [1:19:22] We need to make them feel the pain. [1:19:24] Why don't we recognize her at this moment? [1:19:27] Thank you. [1:19:32] Thank you. [1:19:33] I want to talk about what's going on with our troops when they're injured. [1:19:36] We have 400 troops at least so far who've been injured in President Trump's war with Iran. [1:19:43] And now traumatic brain injuries have become the, quote, signature injury of the war against [1:19:51] Iran. [1:19:52] The research has shown that special operators are at a higher risk of blast exposure and [1:19:58] TBI, which, as you know, increases the risk of suicide, of seizures, and of memory loss. [1:20:06] Several hundred special operators are now deployed in the Middle East. [1:20:09] And I'm very concerned about whether or not our troops are getting the care that they need [1:20:17] for these injuries. [1:20:18] For instance, we know about a soldier who was injured in the Iranian drone strike in Kuwait, [1:20:23] and he was promised TBI care once they made it out of the war zone. [1:20:28] But even after being shipped to Germany and then to Texas, the soldier didn't receive care [1:20:34] for weeks. [1:20:35] So, Admiral Bradley, do you think that wounded soldiers should have to wait nearly a month [1:20:41] to see a doctor? [1:20:45] Senator, no, in the hypothetical, I absolutely don't believe that. [1:20:50] I don't know the details of the situation, though. [1:20:53] Yeah, but that's the real point. [1:20:55] We can agree they need help and they need to be evaluated right away. [1:21:00] And this committee has worked on a bipartisan basis to help service members with brain injuries. [1:21:07] But without records of these injuries, it becomes harder and harder to get care. [1:21:14] That's particularly critical for high-speed boat teams and special operators, given the [1:21:20] exposure to these pounding waves and high-caliber weapons. [1:21:25] Boat team leaders have described how, quote, the damage piles up almost unnoticed for years and then cascades. [1:21:36] But DOD requires cognitive assessments only every five years and SOCOM every three. [1:21:44] I have a bipartisan bill with Senators Ernst and King and others on this committee to make sure that these injuries don't fall through the cracks, [1:21:53] including by requiring more regular screening and logs to be able to track exposure. [1:22:00] Admiral Bradley, the effects of TBIs can compound over time, as we know. [1:22:06] Do you agree that it is better if we catch these brain injuries earlier rather than later? [1:22:11] Senator, I absolutely do. [1:22:13] Good. [1:22:14] And do you support keeping better records so that we're able to do that and more frequent evaluations? [1:22:20] Senator, I do. [1:22:21] It is critical to be able to understand the mechanisms of harm that come from these various sources that we don't understand very well. [1:22:30] And that data, those logs, that data will help to inform not only treatment, but also means to be able to prevent it in its outset. [1:22:37] Good. [1:22:38] I appreciate that. [1:22:39] You know, the fact that troops have faced long wait lists to get specialty care for brain health within DOD's military system. [1:22:50] And one of the ways that DOD has tried to address these wait lists is by partnering with outside experts like Home Base back in Massachusetts. [1:23:01] Home Base's comprehensive brain health and trauma program has helped get 95% of special operators that it's treated back into the field. [1:23:13] Admiral Bradley, in your experience, have special operators benefited from programs like Home Base? [1:23:19] Senator, absolutely combat that comprehensive program for brain health is a critical part. [1:23:28] We also have partnerships with UNC University of North Carolina and Southern Florida and several others to be able to do the same thing. [1:23:35] They are all very capable and progressing programs. [1:23:40] I think, as you highlight, institutionalizing those beyond the pilot that they are into something that is a part of our mainstream system that can then be treated with Tricare and with our VA systems is a critical next step. [1:23:52] And I very much appreciate your point about institutionalizing it. [1:23:56] We can't just treat this as a one off. [1:23:58] We know the problem exists. [1:24:00] We've got to record. [1:24:01] We've got to document. [1:24:02] And we've got to have people who can treat it. [1:24:05] We need to have dedicated resources to support our troops who are suffering from brain injuries. [1:24:12] The Trump administration has plunged us into a war and is asking Congress for a record $1.5 trillion for the Pentagon. [1:24:22] It is outrageous that we would be cutting corners on treating wounded warriors. [1:24:28] Thank you, Admiral. [1:24:29] I look forward to working with you on this. [1:24:31] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:24:32] Thank you. [1:24:33] Senator Rosen. [1:24:34] Well, thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed. [1:24:37] And thank you for, well, I saw you a little bit earlier today. [1:24:41] So thank you again for your service and for being here. [1:24:44] I want to talk a little bit about operational tempo and readiness reporting. [1:24:49] Because cyber operation forces will, of course, have, well, they're always in high demand, but they've been in extra high demand since CyberCom was established, [1:24:56] which has been exacerbated by the challenges of getting the unit readiness numbers up at the same time. [1:25:03] Now that we're fighting wars in multiple theaters, I have to imagine that the operational tempo of those forces is also increasing dramatically. [1:25:10] So, General Rudd, could you give us a sense of what the trend is for the op tempo of Cyber National Mission Force, please? [1:25:18] Thanks, Senator Rosen. [1:25:20] Thanks, Senator Rosen. [1:25:21] I appreciate the attention on this topic. [1:25:25] As you described, and as we would expect, very high demand and a very high operational tempo for our cyber warriors in support in real time, 24-7 of the joint force across a number of problem sets. [1:25:40] And so this really speaks to the heart of one of the attributes of CyberCom 2.0 that we refer to as optimized unit phasing. [1:25:48] So think of a cycle upon which you rotate. [1:25:50] Again, this is where we have a lot to gain from understanding SOCOM's model for years. [1:25:57] Both Admiral Bradley and I were part of a system that had a rotational force effort. [1:26:03] Now, granted, there are surges and we account for those, but part of the way we accounted for that is size of the force and bringing in sufficient capacity to be able to operationally employ the force continuously across a number of problem sets. [1:26:19] Well, that's good because you didn't know what my next question would be, but it's to Secretary Sutton, the status of implementing the 97 recommendations from CyberCom 2.0. [1:26:28] What is that? [1:26:29] And the resources, speaking to your point, General, the resources needed to implement them, especially when setting up three enabling organizations. [1:26:38] Senator, thank you for that question and for your continued focus on the cyber topic over the years. [1:26:45] From an implementation perspective, as you mentioned, there's a lot of tasks. [1:26:49] So the approach that we're taking is that within my office, I've built a core team that is dedicated to the implementation process. [1:26:58] And one of the things that's really exciting to me about that is it features contributions from all of our service cyber components. [1:27:05] And we've actually brought in people who have been in our force for a long time that are now have the opportunity to build the system, the talent management system that they wish they would have had. [1:27:15] So it's the unicorns that we're trying to build at scope and scale are now coming in and helping to write the details, build out the assessments we need, and come up with the models of how we keep careers going to build mastery. [1:27:29] From a resource perspective, we have included funding for the Cyber Command 2.0 initiatives in the President's 27 budget, including funding to start incentive pay to get mastery incentives implemented, as well as for some of the enabling organizations and some of the other service requirements to be able to get this to speed and look forward to being able to execute that upon passage of the budget for FY27. [1:27:54] Thank you. I'm going to stick on cyber operations for a minute because I want to talk about intelligence capabilities. [1:28:02] So General Rudd, your responses to our advanced policy questions during your nomination process. [1:28:08] You mentioned the critical criticality of foundational intelligence to support cyberspace operations and the need for that capability to keep pace with operational needs. [1:28:18] So as we all know, the FY25 NDAA has set a requirement for DOD to establish a cyber intelligence capability to provide just that sort of foundational intelligence support. [1:28:29] So General Rudd, you have the ability to shape this foundational intelligence capability from the start. [1:28:35] So could you elaborate a little bit more based on your experiences at INDOPACOM and SOCOM, what you would like to see incorporated in this foundation intelligence capability, please? [1:28:48] Well, Senator, the reference to my past experience, I would tell you intelligence drives ops and ops drives intelligence. [1:28:57] And so it's a continuous cycle. And what we learned over decades of fighting alongside each other in a variety of places is the intelligence apparatus has to be closely linked to and understand the operational side of this. [1:29:10] And I haven't had the chance to specifically dive into this yet. [1:29:14] It's going to be part of my initial assessment and happy to come back to you for the record as I look more closely at that. [1:29:21] Thank you. I look forward to that. We have a lot of work to do. Thank you, Mr. Chair. [1:29:25] Senator Slotkin, we're doing everything we can to keep you from asking your question. [1:29:31] Senator Banks, you're recognized. [1:29:33] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Rudd, can you talk about how the PLA is using artificial intelligence to enhance its military operations? [1:29:40] Senator, as you would hope and expect, that's certainly something that we are paying particular attention to, [1:29:51] the details of which I'd probably rather go into in a close session. [1:29:55] You can vaguely talk about how artificial intelligence is used in warfare and gains that they're making. [1:30:03] I mean, I don't think there's anything classified about that. [1:30:05] Senator, I appreciate that. [1:30:06] Or agree that they are using artificial intelligence? [1:30:08] I'm sorry? [1:30:09] You would agree that they are using artificial intelligence? [1:30:12] Senator, I think that's quite clear that they are. Yes, sir. [1:30:15] Thank you. [1:30:16] Thank you. [1:30:17] So, that being the case, would you agree that AI is a, quote, dual-use technology? [1:30:27] Senator, dual-use in what sense? Both for non-military and military? [1:30:33] Senator, I think that's a fair way to characterize it. [1:30:36] And how important is it for the U.S. to have more and better high-end chips than what China does? [1:30:43] Senator, I would take that category more broadly and say I think it's critical that the U.S. has the technological advantage in every aspect of war fighting. [1:30:56] And certainly, as we see the increase in the advent of the application of artificial intelligence, we're going to have to make sure that we retain and maintain our advantage in that and move as fast as we can. [1:31:10] You agree? I mean, I believe we have, today we have the advantage. [1:31:15] I think you would have, you just said that to maintain our advantage. [1:31:18] So, you agree that we have the advantage. [1:31:19] What would happen if we lost that advantage? [1:31:21] Well, Senator, I think this team right here is going to do everything we can to make sure that we don't do that. [1:31:27] Certainly, we're working furiously to do that. [1:31:29] And we're not going to be complacent. [1:31:32] We won't be satisfied. [1:31:33] In my opening statement, I emphasized four operating principles. [1:31:39] Speed, scale, innovation, and integration. [1:31:41] I think if we press as hard as we can to apply those principles to everything that we're doing, but in particular, an effort to maintain our advantage in the highest tech areas, we'll be okay. [1:31:54] And yet, we'll never be satisfied. [1:31:55] But it would be completely unacceptable, wouldn't it, General Rudd, if we lost that advantage? [1:32:00] Chairman, it would be unacceptable, and we'll make sure that we do everything to retain that. [1:32:05] Yeah, I think that's, I understand there are a lot of things that you can't say in this setting, but I think it's important for the American people to know that the critical nature of us keeping that advantage and the role that high-end chips play in all of it. [1:32:20] I mean, you've already agreed that it's important that we maintain high-end chips for America and for our own use and develop our own technologies and how dangerous it would be if our adversary gained an advantage on us on that front. [1:32:39] Or even that we would give away our high-end chips to our adversary. [1:32:42] Does that make sense? [1:32:43] Senator Arp, it does make sense. [1:32:48] And again, that's a critical piece of how we're going to maintain our advantage. [1:32:54] And we also have to understand and expect that capability will be distributed and available to others, which is why this continuous cycle of maintaining our edge is really important. [1:33:06] I'll move on. [1:33:08] Last week, President Trump said that, quote, America's aging and constrained electric grid infrastructure poses an increasing threat to national defenses, end quote. [1:33:21] What risks do cyber attacks pose to our critical infrastructure? [1:33:25] Well, Senator, it's certainly a vulnerability. [1:33:33] And I think that's the awareness and understanding of that is the first line of defense. [1:33:38] And then making sure that experts in this field know how to get ahead of it, know how to apply the best cyber defenses. [1:33:46] And certainly to the extent we're able and we have the capacity, we want to make sure that we're working with the right folks to protect our critical infrastructure. [1:33:56] And I assume what President Trump is saying about the infrastructure, that would extend to transportation nodes like seaports, airports, and railroads. [1:34:07] Would you agree with that? [1:34:08] Senator, I won't speculate on what the president meant specifically. [1:34:15] I haven't had that conversation with him. [1:34:17] But I think it's fair. [1:34:19] Actually, I think it's important that we figure out what the definition of critical infrastructure is. [1:34:25] Prioritize where we need to put our efforts and resources to safeguard it. [1:34:30] Thank you. My time has expired. [1:34:32] Thank you very much. Senator Slotkin. [1:34:34] Thank you. [1:34:36] I want to support everything that Senator Banks just said and just return to the topic on the classified AI race. [1:34:44] I know we can't talk about it here, but I don't think the American public understands how important it is to win that race, [1:34:51] that it's the equivalent of winning the nuclear race, like whoever gets there first. [1:34:55] And I think, you know, if we were healthy as a country, then elected officials from both sides of the aisle would be focusing on this constantly to make sure we win this race. [1:35:08] In that spirit, General Rudd, you know, I think the thing that has been, congratulations on being in the seat. [1:35:14] I think the thing that has caught, I think the attention of a lot of us is the announcement in the last three or four weeks by Anthropic and then OpenAI of new products. [1:35:26] Mythos being the Anthropic product and the OpenAI product having a longer name. [1:35:31] And they are testing this new product very differently than a commercial product. [1:35:38] They are testing it like a weapon. [1:35:40] They have provided, at least in Anthropic's case, they've provided Mythos to like 50 big companies for them to test and stress test and figure out the vulnerabilities. [1:35:50] Microsoft is one of those companies that are turning around and announcing like 270 new patches just last week, which we assume Mythos picked up. [1:36:00] And I was so concerned about this new step we're taking and how it supercharges cyber attacks that I did a big Zoom yesterday with 350 Michiganders, IT professionals for our hospitals, our schools on how to prepare for this threat. [1:36:15] Is the NSA or Cybercom testing Mythos right now and using this moment to test out our own vulnerabilities? [1:36:25] Senator, this is a critically important topic. [1:36:30] I think the way you described it was appropriate. [1:36:36] And, you know, what I don't want to do is speak to one specific model. [1:36:43] I think what we need to think about is the application and the access to early all future models that we see in terms of the capability that the most current models and the new models potentially imply for both defensive. [1:37:03] I understand. [1:37:04] But. [1:37:05] Our nation, our networks. [1:37:08] We have two companies, right? [1:37:10] Who have, I mean, this is public information, right? [1:37:12] They've come out with these products in the past month. [1:37:15] It's sent the cybersecurity world in the commercial sector kind of spinning that we now have this supercharged AI technology that finds these vulnerabilities. [1:37:25] I'm just asking if the Pentagon or NSA is testing out either of these two companies' models. [1:37:31] Senator, again, we're looking at all models that we think have the power that is being associated with this. [1:37:38] Yes. [1:37:39] You're using, I want you to be using them. [1:37:40] I want you to be experimenting with them. [1:37:42] And, but the Pentagon has had a very public fight with Anthropic. [1:37:46] Again, this is public information. [1:37:48] So I'm just making sure that the newest, hottest AI empowered cybersecurity models are being used by the Pentagon on cybersecurity. [1:37:58] So I'm taking your answer as yes. [1:38:01] And correct me if I'm wrong. [1:38:03] Let me turn to another topic. [1:38:05] And, you know, we're heading towards a summit between the president and Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, on May 14th. [1:38:12] Huge deal, right, in the world of negotiation and security. [1:38:19] And I am just concerned that there's a topic on the table of allowing Chinese vehicles into the United States. [1:38:27] And I think the Chinese have shown themselves to be bad actors when it comes to collecting data on American citizens. [1:38:35] They hacked the president and vice president's phones during the campaign, salt typhoon, volt typhoon, getting into our infrastructure. [1:38:44] They stole a bunch of our records, probably yours, definitely mine in 2016 from OPM. [1:38:50] I mean, they are not positive actors. [1:38:53] And this body banned Huawei and TikTok because of the data they were taking on Americans. [1:39:00] So can you just say aloud, I asked others in uniform this last week. [1:39:05] Do you believe that allowing in Chinese cars with LiDAR and full motion video, geolocation, the ability to be hacked via Bluetooth, do you believe that that is a threat to our military bases, our critical infrastructure, and generally to collecting on American citizens? [1:39:25] Senator, I think we need to take into account any potential technological application that poses a threat against our bases, our service members, [1:39:37] and make sure we do everything to protect against that. [1:39:39] Yeah, I would love the chairman's help. [1:39:40] I've tried for two years in a row to ban Chinese vehicles from our military bases. [1:39:45] As I understand it, abroad, our military bases, with all these Chinese cars, they can already get on. [1:39:50] They've got 15% market share in Mexico. [1:39:53] So would hope that this committee could at least do the banning of them collecting on our military bases. [1:39:59] And I yield back. [1:40:00] Thank you very much, Senator Schlock. [1:40:03] And this concludes today's hearing. [1:40:07] I'd like to thank our witnesses for their testimony. [1:40:10] For the information of members, questions for the record will be due to the committee within two business days of the conclusion of this hearing. [1:40:18] Thank you very, very much for your information and your testimony today. [1:40:22] And we are adjourned. [1:40:23] We are adjourned. [1:40:24] We are adjourned. [1:40:25] We are adjourned. [1:40:26] We are adjourned. [1:40:27] We are adjourned. [1:40:28] We are adjourned. [1:40:29] We are adjourned. [1:40:30] We are adjourned. [1:40:31] We are adjourned. [1:40:32] We are adjourned. [1:40:33] We are adjourned. [1:40:34] We are adjourned. [1:40:35] We are adjourned. [1:40:36] We are adjourned. [1:40:37] We are adjourned. [1:40:38] We are adjourned. [1:40:39] We are adjourned. [1:40:40] We are adjourned. [1:40:41] We are adjourned. [1:40:42] We are adjourned. [1:40:43] We are adjourned. [1:40:44] We are adjourned. [1:40:45] We are adjourned. [1:40:46] We are adjourned. [1:40:47] We are adjourned. [1:40:48] We are adjourned. [1:40:49] We are adjourned. [1:40:50] We are adjourned.

Transcribe Any Video or Podcast — Free

Paste a URL and get a full AI-powered transcript in minutes. Try ScribeHawk →

Powered by ScribeHawk — Transcribe Anything. Instantly.