Robert Pape On US-Iran Conflict: 'Escalation More Likely To Continue, Potentially Leading To...'

[0:00] Well, I'm being joined right now by Professor Robert Pape. [0:04] He's a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, [0:07] specializing in international security affairs. [0:09] Many thanks once again, sir, for speaking to Times Now. [0:12] I must begin by asking you about whether or not you do see the possibility [0:18] of talks materializing between Iran as well as the United States in Islamabad, [0:24] because there's a lot of uncertainty that prevails over whether or not these talks will proceed. [0:28] President Trump appears to be confident that there might be the possibility of these talks taking place [0:34] and perhaps even an agreement reached. What's your assessment? [0:39] My assessment is not optimistic, even if somehow we're able to have the two sides briefly come together. [0:50] There is real reasons why the ceasefire has broken down and fighting has already broken out. [0:57] This is not just a misunderstanding where you can resolve clarity at the bargaining table. [1:06] We're seeing a collision of interests that neither side wants to give up. [1:14] The two main issues, the nuclear enrichment and also the Strait of Hormuz, are zero sum in nature. [1:23] Iran cannot both control the Strait and not control the Strait. [1:30] Iran cannot both have the enriched material and not have the enriched material. [1:37] There are two zero sum issues here, not just one. [1:43] And that's why what you are observing is a not just fragile ceasefire, [1:50] but they can't really get together and divide up a pie, sort of 60-40, 40-60. [1:58] Somebody has to surrender. [2:02] And that is the fundamental problem here. [2:05] This can go on not just for days, not just for weeks, but for months. [2:11] So, that's very interesting indeed, because it appears that the actions of both the United States as well as Iran, [2:19] at least at this juncture, appear to be running around two parallel lines, which are never likely to meet. [2:26] So, let's unpack what you've actually said about these two sticking points or these two zero sum games [2:31] that we're currently witnessing. [2:33] Let's start with the Straits of Hormuz. [2:35] Now, Donald Trump has already begun implementing what he calls the naval blockade of Iranian ports. [2:44] So, vessels that are bound towards Iran or heading from Iran to other ports [2:49] are being blockaded by American naval vessels near the Straits of Hormuz as well as elsewhere. [2:59] Iran already sees this as an escalation on the part of the United States. [3:04] Is there any resolution to this question at all? [3:07] And what will it take for both sides to return to status quo ante, [3:12] or as the situation prevailed, on the 27th of February before the hostilities began? [3:18] So, the nature, the zero sum nature of the issue of the Strait of Hormuz [3:24] is already being revealed in the military actions of each side. [3:29] What you're seeing is not just clumsy behavior where they don't know where each other's ships are. [3:38] What you're seeing is not just minor nuisance fighting. [3:42] They're ratcheting up the ladder of escalation. [3:47] They're going to, right now, they're at the stage I would call demonstration. [3:51] They're demonstrating to each other they will shoot each other's ships. [3:58] And then, I'm sorry to say, that's not likely to cause surrender of either side [4:04] because of the nature of the extreme demands here. [4:08] You can't cut the Strait in two. [4:10] So, what that means is you're likely to see more escalation to actual damage. [4:17] I can't tell you for sure that will come tomorrow night or a week from tomorrow. [4:22] The timing here is not possible to predict with, like, great precision. [4:27] But you can see where we're heading, and it's all because of the zero sum nature. [4:33] So, once it's clear, one person, one party has to control those Straits. [4:39] It's either going to be the U.S. or it's going to be Iran. [4:43] Then you can see that we're likely to get into a much more costly, damaging war. [4:50] And that's not just costly, of course, on the U.S. [4:53] And it's costly on India. [4:55] It's costly on Americans. [4:57] Ordinary people are paying the price because of the zero-sum nature of the government's, [5:05] the rival government's demands. [5:07] If each of those countries or either of those countries ends up exercising control over the [5:13] Straits of Hormuz, isn't that in itself a violation of international law and specifically [5:18] the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas? [5:21] Because freedom of navigation is intrinsic to that part of the world where vessels are [5:29] allowed to pass through for the furtherance of international trade. [5:33] So, therefore, even if America is seeking any kind of control over and above what Iran is [5:39] managing to do right now, either way, you see a violation of international law. [5:44] Will that bring some element of pressure on each of those countries? [5:47] It's because the Gulf nations and the GCC states might start asking those questions of [5:52] Trump as well as Iran, which they're already doing. [5:55] Countries like India and China might also insist that both Iran as well as the United States, [6:00] by virtue of wanting to control the Straits of Hormuz, are seeking to violate international [6:05] law. [6:07] So, international law can be expressed. [6:10] I do think it's important for India to express international law. [6:15] But it's important to understand that both the United States and Iran have plenty of lawyers [6:22] to spin their way around these distinctions that are in the legal code. [6:29] And so, it is the case, we need to understand, that the United States will say it doesn't control [6:36] the strait, it's just opening the strait. [6:39] Well, that is predicated on military control, however, and I won't be surprised if Iran comes [6:47] up with a group of lawyers to find a way out to explain that even though they're charging [6:52] tolls, they somehow are not violating international law. [6:57] I'm sorry to say that it's not that international law doesn't matter at all. [7:01] It's weak in a situation like this, where we've come to the point of military engagement, where [7:10] both sides have now shot at ships, at each other's people. [7:15] We had the air war before that. [7:17] So, we are not in the realm of peacetime, where international law is strongest, to hold [7:23] things together. [7:24] We're now at a point where international law is, at least for the period of war, it's [7:31] at its weakest. [7:32] Let's also now talk about the other zero-sum game, and that's the nuclear question. [7:37] Now, Iran has always insisted that its nuclear program has been for the pursuit of civilian [7:44] use, that they have no ambitions of acquiring a nuclear weapon. [7:47] They even tried to remind the rest of the world that Ayatollah Khamenei, when he was alive, [7:51] had declared a fatwa against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. [7:56] But obviously, there are no takers for that point of view, as far as the United States [8:00] is concerned, certainly President Donald Trump. [8:02] Now, he's been talking about the handing over of nuclear dust, arriving at a better deal [8:09] than what Obama and his Iranian counterparts had negotiated almost a decade ago. [8:14] Where does that question lie now? [8:17] And can we really expect any concessions on the part of Iran on that front? [8:21] Well, what we know is that Iran has 1,000 pounds of 60% enriched uranium. [8:31] There's no purpose in the civilian world for 60% enriched uranium. [8:39] There's purposes for 5%, which is electric power, even 20%, which is medical research. [8:46] But the 60% is a clear signal that something is desired beyond those other purposes of medical [8:55] and electric power. [8:57] Now, that said, it's not at 90%. [9:00] So it's moving in that direction. [9:03] The big problem, sir, that we have is that we don't know where that material is. [9:10] Yes, the U.S. and undoubtedly Israel have intelligence assessments of maybe most of it is at Estefan or [9:18] most of it is still at Fordow. [9:21] But there's already leaks coming out that we don't know, even with those assessments, where [9:27] about 20% of that material is. [9:30] So there's already leaks coming out that our intelligence is pretty unclear about where that [9:37] is, sir. [9:38] And what that means is that even if you get some deal here, this isn't going to be satisfactory [9:45] for America for very long. [9:47] You'll recall with Saddam Hussein, it took a ground war to prove to America they did not, [9:55] Saddam did not have weapons of mass destruction. [9:58] And we're seeing a very similar process unfold here. [10:03] The intelligence is just not as accurate as those on-site inspections by the IAEA. [10:10] Those have been gone now for a long time. [10:13] And what you are getting is you're back to the Iraq situation where we have some idea, [10:20] we don't have enough. [10:21] That is where the pressure for more escalation and ultimately ground forces comes from. [10:29] Well, that's a very interesting point you made. [10:31] So let me ask you about the Iraq parallel as well and the ground invasion that was witnessed [10:35] in 2003. [10:38] Do you see a similar situation now unfolding in Iran? [10:42] Because President Trump has been very candid in admitting one thing, which is that the pause [10:48] in the conflict that we witnessed over the last few days has allowed each side to stockpile [10:56] or replenish its existing weaponry. [11:00] The Americans have done that. [11:01] The Iranians have done that. [11:02] The Americans already have close to about 60,000 troops in the region. [11:07] Do you foresee the possibility of ground intervention, even if a limited kind, on the part of the United [11:12] States? [11:13] I think it is still quite a possibility, sir. [11:18] And it doesn't mean I'm expecting it in the next days or two, because I think what you're seeing is [11:25] President Trump has decided that the next step of pressure, once we get beyond demonstration, [11:32] is going to be truly damaging, economic damaging attacks. [11:36] And that then will likely lead to Iran retaliating. [11:41] So there will be a round of this, which will be incredibly damaging, not just to Iran and the [11:49] Gulf states, but to shortages, cause even more damaging and permanent, longer-lasting shortages [11:55] for the rest of the world. [11:57] So this is what you could expect in the near term. [12:00] But if you go beyond that, sir, then in, say, July, you know, as the months unfold, you're [12:06] going to see a fork in the road. [12:08] There are going to be—there's going to come a point when we either have to accept Iran has [12:15] that material, and we can't really be confident it does not, or we have to go get it and find [12:22] it. [12:22] There is not really a—this is truly a zero-sum problem, sir. [12:27] There is—we can pretend or something, but the fact of the matter is, just as you saw [12:33] with Saddam Hussein, you—only ground inspections are going to satisfy. [12:40] And at this point, I don't think the U.S. would trust the IAEA on this. [12:46] I just think they would not trust them, because everybody knows the world wants this war to [12:52] end. [12:52] We all want the war to end, but this is—but not Iran and the United States. [12:57] They're the two that are still locked in what I call the escalation trap. [13:02] They're locked in an escalation trap, and they're locked in a zero-sum game here, at least on [13:08] two fronts. [13:09] So, therefore, in that context, my question is specific. [13:12] What new dimensions or theaters do you now see potentially coming into play if the current [13:17] situation continues to intensify? [13:20] Well, I do believe that the Red Sea has been an outlet for a portion of the oil that normally [13:29] would go through the Persian Gulf. [13:33] It's three to four million barrels a day. [13:36] That sounds like a drop in the bucket, but at this stage, any drops in the bucket are very [13:41] welcome. [13:42] That, unfortunately, is likely to become a next theater, because the Houthis have already—they're [13:50] already a proxy that is an ally of Iran. [13:55] They're perfectly located, Yemen, right near the Red Sea choke point. [14:02] It is—they have demonstrated over the last several years an ability to use missiles to [14:08] attack those ships. [14:09] So, this is not a hypothetical, theoretical possibility. [14:15] It's something with true, demonstrated practice just in the recent past. [14:20] So, I am quite concerned that we're going to see more—I call this horizontal escalation, [14:27] where it spreads beyond the narrow battlefield of Iran and even the narrow battlefield of the [14:35] Persian Gulf. [14:35] It will spread horizontally, and even though it doesn't sound like much, because the world [14:42] consumes about 100 million barrels of oil a day, now that they're down about 15 million [14:48] barrels a day, you take another three or four million barrels a day off line, and what you're [14:56] going to end up with is even bigger price hikes, bigger supply shortages, and what's coming, sir, [15:03] is true economic contraction. [15:06] We've had price rise, we've had oil supply decline. [15:11] But now, in the next 30 days or so, you're going to start to see actual economic contraction, where [15:19] commodities will—production will decline. [15:22] Air traffic is already starting to decline. [15:25] That is the precursor, that's always the leading indicator of this economic decline. [15:33] And what you are going to see, unfortunately, is this could actually get worse, although we're [15:38] all hoping this will magically end. [15:41] I think the odds of this ending, I don't think—we're not—we may be near the end of the beginning, [15:48] but this is not the beginning of the end. [15:50] Well, that's nicely put. [15:52] And the last time we experienced economic contraction was during the COVID-19 pandemic, [15:57] and we saw the kind of devastating impact that had on the global economy. [16:01] I have a final couple of questions to you, Professor Pape. [16:05] In the zero-sum game on two fronts that Iran as well as the United States have been locked [16:10] in, where does Israel fit in? [16:14] Israel has been a spoiler, sir. [16:16] So what you see is that for about a year now, the United States has been trying to get [16:24] a deal with Iran. [16:26] Last May, we should remember, just before the bombing, there was a meeting that was supposed [16:32] to be had to move toward a deal, the art of the deal. [16:36] Well, what happened is Israel's bombers killed the actual diplomats that were going to the meeting. [16:45] I mean, literally the diplomats, Israel killed them. [16:48] So you couldn't have a meeting because they were dead. [16:51] So that is what started the 12-day war. [16:54] Now, if we come back to February 28, yes, America has had the big air campaign, but it's [17:00] important to remember that that air campaign—that all started on the morning of February 28 with [17:06] Israel using air power to decapitate, that is, to assassinate the supreme leader and about [17:14] 20 of the more dovish leaders that the supreme leader was meeting with. [17:19] Yes. [17:19] Well, that was also right at the cusp of negotiations. [17:23] So this was literally on the cusp when there was supposed to be another round of negotiations [17:30] in the coming day or so. [17:31] So what you had was two prime examples of Israel spoiling a negotiated outcome. [17:39] And now it's harder still because we've added the second issue of Hormuz. [17:45] So before, we were only worrying about one zero-sum problem, and that was tough enough. [17:51] Now we have a second zero-sum problem. [17:53] And so in this case, you don't even see Israel needing to act as a spoiler anymore. [17:59] Israel may not want a negotiated outcome, but it is so difficult to solve two zero-sum [18:05] issues, we're stuck. [18:08] Absolutely. [18:09] Our final question, and this is more about the internal dynamics within the three principal [18:15] protagonists that we're witnessing in this particular conflict. [18:18] America heads for midterm elections in the month of November. [18:21] Israel heads for parliamentary elections towards the end of the year. [18:26] And as far as Inan is concerned, is there still uncertainty over who actually is in power, [18:32] whether Mostaba Khomeini ends up exercising a significant amount of influence and leverage? [18:38] Is it the IRGC that's calling the shots? [18:41] Or can we trust the likes of Araqchi as well as Pazeshkian to be taking key important decisions [18:46] in Iraq? [18:48] Do you believe the inter... [18:49] Well, I think we need... [18:50] Yes, yes, please go ahead. [18:51] Oh, go ahead, sir. [18:51] I'll just complete my question. [18:52] Do you believe that the internal dynamics in these three countries will have a decisive [18:57] say on how the conflict evolves in the next few days? [19:01] I believe that President Trump is losing political influence in the United States. [19:10] And that is one of the big reasons why he cannot accept a defeat. [19:15] Because he's trying to rescue and reverse the problems he has within his mega base, which is not collapsing, but it is also shrinking. [19:27] And that, of course, is bad for their outcome in the midterms. [19:31] So this is why it's even more difficult for President Trump to simply accept surrender to what Iran says. [19:39] What I would say on the part of Iran is that there's always disagreements among governments. [19:44] There's disagreement inside the Trump administration here. [19:47] So the real issue here, though, is the IRCG, that's the Revolutionary Guards, have clearly gained power because the new supreme leader is essentially their supporter and fought with them on the front lines, sir, during the Iran-Iraq war. [20:05] So literally, this guy was fighting with them side by side. [20:10] But on top of all that, you can really see that they control the guns. [20:16] The Revolutionary Guard is controlling the guns, and there's no obvious limit whatsoever constraint on their use of those guns. [20:26] That's just not been evident at all here, sir. [20:28] So I think that these ideas that there is this big fracture and the doves are about to smush the hawks, there might be disagreements, sir, but I think that's over-reading the disagreement. [20:40] All right. [20:41] We'll wait and see as to how the situation evolves. [20:43] The picture that you've painted, Professor Pape, is a worrying one and, unfortunately, also a fairly realistic one, at least at this juncture in the conflict. [20:52] Many thanks for joining us and sharing your insights. [20:54] Thank you. [20:55] Yes, and I really wish India all the best. [20:57] So good luck, and let's hope for better days. [21:01] Let's hope. [21:01] Thank you.